Centre for Internet and Society

Free Speech and Civil Defamation

gautam — 2014-07-08T08:31:18Z

Does defamation become a tool in powerful hands to suppress criticism? Gautam Bhatia examines the strict and unrealistic demands of defamation law, and concludes that defamation suits are a weapon to silence dissent and bad press.

Previously on this blog, we have discussed one of the under-analysed aspects of Article 19(2) – contempt of court. In the last post, we discussed the checking – or “watchdog” – function of the press. There is yet another under-analysed part of 19(2) that we now turn to – one which directly implicates the press, in its role as public watchdog. This is the issue of defamation.

Unlike contempt of court – which was a last-minute insertion by Ambedkar, before the second reading of the draft Constitution in the Assembly – defamation was present in the restrictions clause since the Fundamental Rights Sub-Committee’s first draft, in 1947. Originally, it accompanied libel and slander, before the other two were dropped for the simpler “reasonable restrictions… in the interests of… defamation.” Unlike the other restrictions, which provoked substantial controversy, defamation did not provoke extended scrutiny by the Constituent Assembly.

In hindsight, that was a lapse. In recent years, defamation lawsuits have emerged as a powerful weapon against the press, used primarily by individuals and corporations in positions of power and authority, and invariably as a means of silencing criticism. For example, Hamish MacDonald’s The Polyester Prince, a book about the Ambanis, was unavailable in Indian bookshops, because of threats of defamation lawsuits. In January, Bloomsbury withdrew The Descent of Air India, which was highly critical of ex-Aviation Minister Praful Patel, after the latter filed a defamation lawsuit. Around the same time, Sahara initiated a 200 crore lawsuit against Tamal Bandyopadhayay, a journalist with The Mint, for his forthcoming book, Sahara: The Untold Story. Sahara even managed to get a stay order from a Calcutta High Court judge, who cited one paragraph from the book, and ruled that “Prima facie, the materials do seem to show the plaintiffs in poor light.” The issue has since been settled out of Court. Yet there is no guarantee that Bandyopadhyay would have won on merits, even with the absurd amount claimed as damages, given that a Pune Court awarded damages of Rs. 100 crores to former Justice P.B. Sawant against the Times Group, for a fifteen-second clip by a TV channel that accidentally showed his photograph next to the name of a judge who was an accused in a scam. What utterly takes the cake, though, is Infosys serving legal notices to three journalistic outlets recently, asking for damages worth Rs. 200 crore for “loss of reputation and goodwill due to circulation of defamatory articles.”

Something is very wrong here. The plaintiffs are invariably politicians or massive corporate houses, and the defendants are invariably journalists or newspapers. The subject is always critical reporting. The damages claimed (and occasionally, awarded) are astronomical – enough to cripple or destroy any business – and the actual harm is speculative. A combination of these factors, combined with a broken judicial system in which trials take an eternity to progress, leading to the prospect of a lawsuit hanging perpetually over one’s head, and financial ruin just around the corner, clearly has the potential to create a highly effective chilling effect upon newspapers, when it come to critical speech on matters of public interest.

One of the reasons that this happens, of course, is that extant defamation law allows it to happen. Under defamation law, as long as a statement is published, is defamatory (that is, tending to lower the reputation of the plaintiff in the minds of reasonable people) and refers to the plaintiff, a prima facie case of defamation is made out. The burden then shifts to the defendant to argue a justification, such as truth, or fair comment, or privileged communication. Notice that defamation, in this form, is a strict liability offence: that is, the publisher cannot save himself even if he has taken due care in researching and writing his story. Even an inadvertent factual error can result in liability. Furthermore, there are many things that straddle a very uncomfortable barrier between “fact” and “opinion” (“opinions” are generally not punishable for defamation): for example, if I call you “corrupt”, have I made a statement of fact, or one of opinion? Much of reporting – especially political reporting – falls within this slipstream.

The legal standard of defamation, therefore, puts almost all the burden upon the publisher, a burden that will often be impossible to discharge – as well as potentially penalising the smallest error. Given the difficulty in fact-checking just about everything, as well as the time pressures under which journalists operate, this is an unrealistic standard. What makes things even worse, however, is that there is no cap on damages, and that the plaintiff need not even demonstrate actual harm in making his claims. Judges have the discretion to award punitive damages, which are meant to serve both as an example and as a deterrent. When Infosys claims 2000 crores, therefore, it need not show that there has been a tangible drop in its sales, or that it has lost an important and lucrative contract – let alone showing that the loss was caused by the defamatory statement. All it needs to do is make abstract claims about loss of goodwill and reputation, which are inherently difficult to verify either way, and it stands a fair chance of winning.

A combination of onerous legal standards and crippling amounts in damages makes the defamation regime a very difficult one for journalists to operate freely in. We have discussed before the crucial role that journalists play in a system of free speech whose underlying foundation is the maintenance of democracy: a free press is essential to maintaining a check upon the actions of government and other powerful players, by subjecting them to scrutiny and critique, and ensuring that the public is aware of important facts that government might be keen to conceal. In chilling journalistic speech, therefore, defamation laws strike at the heart of Article 19(1)(a). When considering what the appropriate standards ought to be, a Court therefore must consider the simple fact that if defamation – as it stands today – is compromising the core of 19(1)(a) itself, then it is certainly not a “reasonable restriction” under 19(2) (some degree of proportionality is an important requirement for 19(2) reasonableness, as the Court has held many times).

This is not, however, a situation unique to India. In Singapore, for instance, “[political] leaders have won hundreds of thousands of dollars in damages in defamation cases against critics and foreign publications, which they have said are necessary to protect their reputations from unfounded attacks” – the defamation lawsuit, indeed, was reportedly a legal strategy used by Lee Kuan Yew against political opponents.

Particularly in the United States, the European Union and South Africa, however, this problem has been recognised, and acted upon. In the next post, we shall examine some of the legal techniques used in those jurisdictions, to counter the chilling effect that strict defamation laws can have on the press.

We discussed the use of civil defamation laws as weapons to stifle a free and critical press. One of the most notorious of such instances also birthed one of the most famous free speech cases in history: New York Times v. Sullivan. This was at the peak of the civil rights movement in the American South, which was accompanied by widespread violence and repression of protesters and civil rights activists. A full-page advertisement was taken out in the New York Times, titled Heed Their Rising Voices, which detailed some particularly reprehensible acts by the police in Montgomery, Alabama. It also contained some factual errors. For example, the advertisement mentioned that Martin Luther King Jr. had been arrested seven times, whereas he had only been arrested four times. It also stated that the Montgomery police had padlocked students into the university dining hall, in order to starve them into submission. That had not actually happened. On this basis, Sullivan, the Montgomery police commissioner, sued for libel. The Alabama courts awarded 500,000 dollars in damages. Because five other people in a situation similar to Sullivan were also suing, the total amount at stake was three million dollars – enough to potentially boycott the New York Times, and certainly enough to stop it from publishing about the civil rights movement.

In his book about the Sullivan case, Make No Law, Anthony Lewis notes that the stakes in the case were frighteningly high. The civil rights movement depended, for its success, upon stirring public opinion in the North. The press was just the vehicle to do it, reporting as it did on excessive police brutality against students and peaceful protesters, practices of racism and apartheid, and so on. Sullivan was a legal strategy to silence the press, and its weapon of choice was defamation law.

In a 9 – 0 decision, the Supreme Court found for the New York Times, and changed the face of free speech law (and, according to Lewis, saved the civil rights movement). Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan made the crucial point that in order to survive, free speech needed “breathing space” – that is, the space to make errors. Under defamation law, as it stood, “the pall of fear and timidity imposed upon those who would give voice to public criticism [is] an atmosphere in which the First Amendment freedoms cannot survive.” And under the burden of proving truth, “would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is, in fact, true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so. They tend to make only statements which "steer far wider of the unlawful zone." For these reasons, Justice Brennan laid down an “actual malice” test for defamation – that is, insofar as the statement in question concerned the conduct of a public official, it was actionable for defamation only if the publisher either knew it was false, or published it with “reckless disregard” for its veracity. After New York Times, this standard has expanded, and the press has never lost a defamation case.

There are some who argue that in its zeal to protect the press against defamation lawsuits by the powerful, the Sullivan court swung the opposite way. In granting the press a near-unqualified immunity to say whatever it wanted, it subordinated the legitimate interests of people to their reputation and their dignity to an intolerable degree, and ushered in a regime of media unaccountability. This is evidently what the South African courts felt. In Khulamo v. Holomisa, Justice O’Regan accepted that the common law of defamation would have to be altered so as to reflect the new South African Constitution’s guarantees of the freedom of speech. Much like Justice Brennan, she noted that “the media are important agents in ensuring that government is open, responsive and accountable to the people as the founding values of our Constitution require”, as well as the chilling effect in requiring journalists to prove the truth of everything they said. Nonetheless, she was not willing to go as far as the American Supreme Court did. Instead, she cited a previous decision by the Supreme Court of Appeals, and incorporated a “resonableness standard” into defamation law. That is, “if a publisher cannot establish the truth, or finds it disproportionately expensive or difficult to do so, the publisher may show that in all the circumstances the publication was reasonable. In determining whether publication was reasonable, a court will have regard to the individual’s interest in protecting his or her reputation in the context of the constitutional commitment to human dignity. It will also have regard to the individual’s interest in privacy. In that regard, there can be no doubt that persons in public office have a diminished right to privacy, though of course their right to dignity persists. It will also have regard to the crucial role played by the press in fostering a transparent and open democracy. The defence of reasonable publication avoids therefore a winner-takes-all result and establishes a proper balance between freedom of expression and the value of human dignity. Moreover, the defence of reasonable publication will encourage editors and journalists to act with due care and respect for the individual interest in human dignity prior to publishing defamatory material, without precluding them from publishing such material when it is reasonable to do so.”

The South African Constitutional Court thus adopts a middle path between the two opposite zero-sum games that are traditional defamation law, and American first amendment law. A similar effort was made in the United Kingdom – the birthplace of the common law of defamation – with the passage of the 2013 Defamation Act. Under English law, the plaintiff must now show that there is likely to be “serious harm” to his reputation, and there is also public interest exception.

While South Africa and the UK try to tackle the problem at the level of standards for defamation, the ECHR has taken another, equally interesting tack: by limiting the quantum of damages. In Tolstoy Milolasky v. United Kingdom, it found a 1.5 million pound damage award “disproportionately large”, and held that there was a violation of the ECHR’s free speech guarantee that could not be justified as necessary in a democratic society.

Thus, constitutional courts the world over have noticed the adverse impact traditional defamation law has on free speech and a free press. They have devised a multiplicity of ways to deal with this, some more speech-protective than others: from America’s absolutist standards, to South Africa’s “reasonableness” and the UK’s “public interest” exceptions, to the ECHR’s limitation of damages. It is about time that the Indian Courts took this issue seriously: there is no dearth of international guidance.

Gautam Bhatia — @gautambhatia88 on Twitter — is a graduate of the National Law School of India University (2011), and has just received an LLM from the Yale Law School. He blogs about the Indian Constitution at http://indconlawphil.wordpress.com. Here at CIS, he blogs on issues of online freedom of speech and expression.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/free-speech-and-civil-defamation

FOEX Live

geetha — 2014-07-07T12:36:49Z

Selections of news on online freedom of expression and digital technology from across India (and some parts of the world)

For feedback, comments and any incidents of online free speech violation you are troubled or intrigued by, please email Geetha at geetha[at]cis-india.org or on Twitter at @covertlight.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/foex-live

Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt

sunil — 2015-04-17T01:44:39Z

Much confusion has resulted from the Section 66A verdict. Some people are convinced that online speech is now without any reasonable restrictions under Article 19 (2) of the Constitution. This is completely false.

There are many other provisions within the IT Act that still regulate speech online, for example the section on obscenity (Sec. 67) and also the data protection provision (Sec. 43A). Additionally there are provisions within the Indian Penal Code and other Acts that regulate speech both online and offline. For example, defamation remains a criminal offence under the IPC (Sec. 499), and disclosing information about children in a manner that lowers their reputation or infringes their privacy is also prohibited under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (Sec. 23).

Others are afraid that the striking down of Section 66A results in a regulatory vacuum where it will be possible for bad actors to wreak havoc online because the following has been left unaddressed by the IT Act.

Criminal Intimidation: The phrase "criminal intimidation" was included in Sec. 66A(b), but the requirement was that intimidation should be carried out using "information which he knows to be false". Sec. 506 of the IPC which punishes criminal intimidation does not have this requirement and is therefore a better legal route for affected individuals, even though the maximum punishment is a year shorter than the three years possible under the IT Act.
Cyber-stalking: A new section for stalking - Sec. 345 D - was added into the IPC in 2013 which also recognised cyber stalking. The definition within Sec.345D is more precise compared to the nebulous phrasing in Sec. 66A, which read - "monitors the use by a woman of the internet, email or any other form of electronic communication, commits the offence of stalking".
Phishing: Sec. 66A (c) dealt with punishment to people who "deceive or mislead the addressee or recipient about the origin of such messages". Sec.66D, which will be the operative section after this verdict, deals with "cheating by impersonation" and forms a more effective safeguard against phishing.

Cyber-bulling of children is arguably left unaddressed. Most importantly, spam, the original intention behind 66A, now cannot be tackled using any existing provision of the law. However, the poorly drafted section made it impossible for law enforcement to crack down on spammers. A 2005 attempt by the ITU to produce model law for spam based on a comparative analysis of national laws resulted in several important best practices that were ignored during the 2008 Amendment of the Act. For example, the definition of spam must cover the following characteristics - mass, unsolicited and commercial. All of which was missing in 66A.

Good quality law must be drafted by an open, participatory process where all relevant stakeholders are consulted and responded to before bills are introduced in parliament.

A scanned copy of the article was published in the Deccan Chronicle on March 26, 2015.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/deccan-chronicle-march-26-2015-sunil-abraham-fear-uncertainty-doubt

Facebook and its Aversion to Anonymous and Pseudonymous Speech

Jessamine Mathew — 2014-07-04T07:53:07Z

Jessamine Mathew explores Facebook's "real name" policy and its implications for the right to free speech.

The power to be unidentifiable on the internet has been a major reason for its sheer number of users. Most of the internet can now be freely used by anybody under a pseudonym without the fear of being recognised by anybody else. These conditions allow for the furtherance of free expression and protection of privacy on the internet, which is particularly important for those who use the internet as a medium to communicate political dissent or engage in any other activity which would be deemed controversial in a society yet not illegal. For example, an internet forum for homosexuals in India, discussing various issues which surround homosexuality may prove far more fruitful if contributors are given the option of being undetectable, considering the stigma that surrounds homosexuality in India, and the recent setting-aside of the Delhi High Court decision reading down Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code. The possibility of being anonymous or pseudonymous exists on many internet fora but on Facebook, the world’s greatest internet space for building connections and free expression, there is no sanction given to pseudonymous accounts as Facebook follows a real name policy. And as the recent decision of a New York judge, disallowing Facebook from contesting warrants on private information of over 300 of its users, shows, there are clear threats to freedom of expression and privacy.

On the subject of using real names, Facebook’s Community Standards states, “Facebook is a community where people use their real identities. We require everyone to provide their real names, so you always know who you're connecting with. This helps keep our community safe.” Facebook’s Marketing Director, Randi Zuckerberg, bluntly dismissed the idea of online anonymity as one that “has to go away” and that people would “behave much better” if they are made to use their real names. Apart from being a narrow-minded statement, she fails to realise that there are many different kinds of expression on the internet, from stories of sexual abuse victims to the views of political commentators, or indeed, whistleblowers, many of whom may prefer to use the platform without being identified. It has been decided in many cases that humans have a right to anonymity as it provides for the furtherance of free speech without the fear of retaliation or humiliation (see Talley v. California).

While Facebook’s rationale behind wanting users to register for accounts with their own names is based on the goal of maintaining the security of other users, it is still a serious infraction on users’ freedom of expression, particularly when anonymous speech has been protected by various countries. Facebook has evolved from a private space for college students to connect with each other to a very public platform where not just social connections but also discussions take place, often with a heavily political theme. Facebook has been described as instrumental in the facilitation of communication during the Arab Spring, providing a space for citizens to effectively communicate with each other and organise movements. Connections on Facebook are no longer of a purely social nature but have extended to political and legal as well, with it being used to promote movements all through the country. Even in India, Facebook was the most widely adopted medium, along with Twitter and Facebook, for discourse on the political future of the country during, before and after the 2014 elections. Earlier in 2011, Facebook was used intensively during the India Against Corruption movement. There were pages created, pictures and videos uploaded, comments posted by an approximate of 1.5 million people in India. In 2012, Facebook was also used to protest against the Delhi gang rape with many coming forward with their own stories of sexual assault, providing support to the victim, organising rallies and marches and protesting about the poor level of safety of women in Delhi.

Much like its content policy, Facebook exhibits a number of discrepancies in the implementation of the anonymity ban. Salman Rushdie found that his Facebook account had been suspended and when it was reinstated after he sent them proof of identity, Facebook changed his name to the name on his passport, Ahmed Rushdie instead of the name he popularly goes by. Through a series of tweets, he criticised this move by Facebook, forcing him to display his birth name. Eventually Facebook changed his name back to Salman Rushdie but not before serious questions were raised regarding Facebook’s policies. The Moroccan activist Najat Kessler’s account was also suspended as it was suspected that she was using a fake name. Facebook has also not just stopped at suspending individual user accounts but has also removed pages and groups because the creators used pseudonyms to create and operate the pages in question. This was seen in the case of Wael Ghonim who created a group which helped in mobilizing citizens in Egypt in 2011. Ghonim was a Google executive who did not want his online activism to affect his professional life and hence operated under a pseudonym. Facebook temporarily removed the group due to his pseudonymity but later reinstated it.

While Facebook performs its due diligence when it comes to some accounts, it has still done nothing about the overwhelmingly large number of obviously fake accounts, ranging from Santa Claus to Jack the Ripper. On my own Facebook friend list, there are people who have entered names of fictional characters as their own, clearly violating the real name policy. I once reported a pseudonymous account that used the real name of another person. Facebook thanked me for reporting the account but also said that I will “probably not hear back” from them. The account still exists with the same name. The redundancy of the requirement lies in the fact that Facebook does not request users to upload some form identification when they register with the site but only when they suspect them to be using a pseudonym. Since Facebook also implements its policies largely only on the basis of complaints by other users or the government, the real name policy makes many political dissidents and social activists the target of abuse on the internet.

Further, Articles 21 and 22 of the ICCPR grant all humans the right to free and peaceful assembly. As governments increasingly crack down on physical assemblies of people fighting for democracy or against legislation or conditions in a country, the internet has proved to be an extremely useful tool for facilitating this assembly without forcing people to endure the wrath of governmental authorities. A large factor which has promoted the popularity of internet gatherings is the way in which powerful opinions can be voice without the fear of immediate detection. Facebook has become the coveted online space for this kind of assembly but their policies and more particularly, faulty implementation of the policies, lead to reduced flows of communication on the site.

Of course, Facebook’s fears of cyberbullying and harassment are likely to materialise if there is absolutely no check on the identity of users. A possible solution to the conflict between requiring real names to keep the community safe and still allowing individuals to be present on the network without the fear of identification by anybody would be to ask users to register with their own names but still allowing them to create a fictional name which would be the name that other Facebook users can see. Under this model, Facebook can also deal with the issue of safety through their system of reporting against other users. If a pseudonymous user has been reported by a substantial number of people for harassment or any other cause, then Facebook may either suspend the account or remove the content that is offensive. If the victim of harassment chooses to approach a judicial body, then Facebook may reveal the real name of the user so that due process may be followed. At the same time, users who utilise the website to present their views and participate in the online process of protest or contribute to free expression in any other way can do so without the fear of being detected or targeted. Safety on the site can be maintained even without forcing users to reveal their real names to the world. The system that Facebook follows currently does not help curb the presence of fake accounts and neither does it promote completely free expression on the site.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/facebook-and-its-aversion-to-anonymous-and-pseudonymous-speech

DesiSec: Cybersecurity and Civil Society in India

Laird Brown — 2015-06-29T16:25:43Z

As part of its project on mapping cyber security actors in South Asia and South East Asia, the Centre for Internet & Society conducted a series of interviews with cyber security actors. The interviews were compiled and edited into one documentary. The film produced by Purba Sarkar, edited by Aaron Joseph, and directed by Oxblood Ruffin features Malavika Jayaram, Nitin Pai, Namita Malhotra, Saikat Datta, Nishant Shah, Lawrence Liang, Anja Kovacs, Sikyong Lobsang Sangay and, Ravi Sharada Prasad.

Originally the idea was to do 24 interviews with an array of international experts: Technical, political, policy, legal, and activist. The project was initiated at the University of Toronto and over time a possibility emerged. Why not shape these interviews into a documentary about cybersecurity and civil society? And why not focus on the world’s largest democracy, India? Whether in India or the rest of the world there are several issues that are fundamental to life online: Privacy, surveillance, anonymity and, free speech. DesiSec includes all of these, and it examines the legal frameworks that shape how India deals with these challenges.

From the time it was shot till the final edit there has only been one change in the juridical topography: the dreaded 66A of the IT Act has been struck down. Otherwise, all else is in tact. DesiSec was produced by Purba Sarkar, shot and edited by Aaron Joseph, and directed by Oxblood Ruffin. It took our team from Bangalore to Delhi and, Dharamsala. We had the honour of interviewing: Malavika Jayaram, Nitin Pai, Namita Malhotra, Saikat Datta, Nishant Shah, Lawrence Liang, Anja Kovacs, Sikyong Lobsang Sangay and, Ravi Sharada Prasad. Everyone brought something special to the discussion and we are grateful for their insights. Also, we are particularly pleased to include the music of Charanjit Singh for the intro/outro of DesiSec. Mr. Singh is the inventor of acid house music, predating the Wikipedia entry for that category by five years. Someone should correct that.

DesiSec is released under the Creative Commons License Attribution 3.0 Unported (CC by 3.0). You can watch it on Vimeo: https://vimeo.com/123722680 or download it legally and free of charge via torrent. Feel free to show, remix, and share with your friends. And let us know what you think!

Video

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/desi-sec-cybersecurity-and-civil-society-in-india

DeitY says 143 URLs have been Blocked in 2015; Procedure for Blocking Content Remains Opaque and in Urgent Need of Transparency Measures

jyoti — 2015-04-30T07:37:40Z

Across India on 30 December 2014, following an order issued by the Department of Telecom (DOT), Internet Service Providers (ISPs) blocked 32 websites including Vimeo, Dailymotion, GitHub and Pastebin.

In February 2015, the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) requested the Department of Electronics and Information Technology (DeitY) under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (RTI Act) to provide information clarifying the procedures for blocking in India. We have received a response from DeitY which may be seen here.

In this post, I shall elaborate on this response from DeitY and highlight some of the accountability and transparency measures that the procedure needs. To stress the urgency of reform, I shall also touch upon two recent developments—the response from Ministry of Communication to questions raised in Parliament on the blocking procedures and the Supreme Court (SC) judgment in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India.

Section 69A and the Blocking Rules

Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2008 (S69A hereinafter) grants powers to the central government to issue directions for blocking of access to any information through any computer resource. In other words, it allows the government to block any websites under certain grounds. The Government has notified rules laying down the procedure for blocking access online under the Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public Rules, 2009 (Rules, 2009 hereinafter). CIS has produced a poster explaining the blocking procedure (download PDF, 2.037MB).

There are three key aspects of the blocking rules that need to be kept under consideration:

Officers and committees handling requests

Designated Officer (DO) – Appointed by the Central government, officer not below the rank of Joint Secretary.
Nodal Officer (NO) – Appointed by organizations including Ministries or Departments of the State governments and Union Territories and any agency of the Central Government.
Intermediary contact–Appointed by every intermediary to receive and handle blocking directions from the DO.
Committee for Examination of Request (CER) – The request along with printed sample of alleged offending information is examined by the CER—committee with the DO serving as the Chairperson and representatives from Ministry of Law and Justice; Ministry of Home Affairs; Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and representative from the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In). The CER is responsible for examining each blocking request and makes recommendations including revoking blocking orders to the DO, which are taken into consideration for final approval of request for blocking by the Secretary, DOT.
Review Committee (RC) – Constituted under rule 419A of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1951, the RC includes the Cabinet Secretary, Secretary to the Government of India (Legal Affairs) and Secretary (Department of Telecom). The RC is mandated to meet at least once in 2 months and record its findings and has to validate that directions issued are in compliance with S69A(1).

Provisions outlining the procedure for blocking

Rules 6, 9 and 10 create three distinct blocking procedures, which must commence within 7 days of the DO receiving the request.

a) Rule 6 lays out the first procedure, under which any person may approach the NO and request blocking, alternatively, the NO may also raise a blocking request. After the NO of the approached Ministry or Department of the State governments and Union Territories and/or any agency of the Central Government, is satisfied of the validity of the request they forward it to the DO. Requests when not sent through the NO of any organization, must be approved by Chief Secretary of the State or Union Territory or the Advisor to the Administrator of the Union Territory, before being sent to the DO.

The DO upon receiving the request places, must acknowledge receipt within 24 four hours and places the request along with printed copy of alleged information for validation by the CER. The DO also, must make reasonable efforts to identify the person or intermediary hosting the information, and having identified them issue a notice asking them to appear and submit their reply and clarifications before the committee at a specified date and time, within forty eight hours of the receipt of notice.

Foreign entities hosting the information are also informed and the CER gives it recommendations after hearing from the intermediary or the person has clarified their position and even if there is no representation by the same and after examining if the request falls within the scope outlined under S69A(1). The blocking directions are issued by the Secretary (DeitY), after the DO forwards the request and the CER recommendations. If approval is granted the DO directs the relevant intermediary or person to block the alleged information.

b) Rule 9 outlines a procedure wherein, under emergency circumstances, and after the DO has established the necessity and expediency to block alleged information submits recommendations in writing to the Secretary, DeitY. The Secretary, upon being satisfied by the justification for, and necessity of, and expediency to block information may issue an blocking directions as an interim measure and must record the reasons for doing so in writing.

Under such circumstances, the intermediary and person hosting information is not given the opportunity of a hearing. Nevertheless, the DO is required to place the request before the CER within forty eight hours of issuing of directions for interim blocking. Only upon receiving the final recommendations from the committee can the Secretary pass a final order approving the request. If the request for blocking is not approved then the interim order passed earlier is revoked, and the intermediary or identified person should be directed to unblock the information for public access.

c) Rule 10 outlines the process when an order is issued by the courts in India. The DO upon receipt of the court order for blocking of information submits it to the Secretary, DeitY and initiates action as directed by the courts.

Confidentiality clause

Rule 16 mandates confidentiality regarding all requests and actions taken thereof, which renders any requests received by the NO and the DO, recommendations made by the DO or the CER and any written reasons for blocking or revoking blocking requests outside the purview of public scrutiny. More detail on the officers and committees that enforce the blocking rules and procedure can be found here.

Response on blocking from the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology

The response to our RTI from E-Security and Cyber Law Group is timely, given the recent clarification from the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology to a number of questions, raised by parliamentarian Shri Avinash Pande in the Rajya Sabha. The questions had been raised in reference to the Emergency blocking order under IT Act, the current status of the Central Monitoring System, Data Privacy law and Net Neutrality. The Centre for Communication Governance (CCG), National Law University New Delhi have extracted a set of 6 questions and you can read the full article here.

The governments response as quoted by CCG, clarifies under rule 9—the Government has issued directions for emergency blocking of a total number of 216 URLs from 1st January, 2014 till date and that a total of 255 URLs were blocked in 2014 and no URLs has been blocked in 2015 (till 31 March 2015) under S69A through the Committee constituted under the rules therein. Further, a total of 2091 URLs and 143 URLs were blocked in order to comply with the directions of the competent courts of India in 2014 and 2015 (till 31 March 2015) respectively. The government also clarified that the CER, had recommended not to block 19 URLs in the meetings held between 1^stJanuary 2014 upto till date and so far, two orders have been issued to revoke 251 blocked URLs from 1st January 2014 till date. Besides, CERT-In received requests for blocking of objectionable content from individuals and organisations, and these were forwarded to the concerned websites for appropriate action, however the response did not specify the number of requests.

We have prepared a table explaining the information released by the government and to highlight the inconsistency in their response.

Applicable rule and procedure outlined under the Blocking Rules	Number of websites
	2014	2015	Total
Rule 6 - Blocking requests from NO and others	255	None	255
Rule 9 - Blocking under emergency circumstances	-	-	216
Rule 10 - Blocking orders from Court	2091	143	2234
Requests from individuals and orgs forwarded to CERT-In	-	-	-
Recommendations to not block by CER	-	-	19
Number of blocking requests revoked	-	-	251

In a response to an RTI filed by the Software Freedom Law Centre, DeitY said that 708 URLs were blocked in 2012, 1,349 URLs in 2013, and 2,341 URLs in 2014.

Shreya Singhal v. Union of India

In its recent judgment, the SC of India upheld the constitutionality of 69A, stating that it was a narrowly-drawn provision with adequate safeguards. The constitutional challenge on behalf of the People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) considered the manner in which the blocking is done and the arguments focused on the secrecy present in blocking.

The rules may indicate that there is a requirement to identify and contact the originator of information, though as an expert has pointed out, there is no evidence of this in practice. The court has stressed the importance of a written order so that writ petitions may be filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. In doing so, the court seems to have assumed that the originator or intermediary is informed, and therefore held the view that any procedural inconsistencies may be challenged through writ petitions. However, this recourse is rendered ineffective not only due to procedural constraints, but also because of the confidentiality clause. The opaqueness through rule 16 severely reigns in the recourse that may be given to the originator and the intermediary. While the court notes that rule 16 requiring confidentality was argued to be unconstitutional, it does not state its opinion on this question in the judgment. One expert, holds the view that this, by implication, requires that requests cannot be confidential. However, such a reading down of rule 16 is yet to be tested.

Further, Sunil Abraham has pointed out, “block orders are unevenly implemented by ISPs making it impossible for anyone to independently monitor and reach a conclusion whether an internet resource is inaccessible as a result of a S69A block order or due to a network anomaly.” As there are no comprehensive list of blocked websites or of the legal orders through which they are blocked exists, the public has to rely on media reports and filing RTI requests to understand the censorship regime in India. CIS has previously analysed the leaked block lists and lists received as responses to RTI requests which have revealed that the block orders are full of errors and blocking of entire platforms and not just specific links has taken place.

While the state has the power of blocking content, doing so in secrecy and without judical scrutiny, mark deficiencies that remain in the procedure outlined under the provisions of the blocking rules . The Court could read down rule 16 except for a really narrow set of exceptions, and in not doing so, perhaps has overlooked the opportunities for reform in the existing system. The blocking of 32 websites, is an example of the opaqueness of the system of blocking orders, and where the safeguards assumed by the SC are often not observed such as there being no access to the recommendations that were made by the CER, or towards the revocation of the blocking orders subsequently. CIS filed the RTI to try and understand the grounds for blocking and related procedures and the response has thrown up some issues that must need urgent attention.

Response to RTI filed by CIS

Our first question sought clarification on the websites blocked on 30^thDecember 2014 and the response received from DeitY, E-Security and Cyber Law Group reveals that the websites had been blocked as “they were being used to post information related to ISIS using the resources provided by these websites”. The response also clarifies that the directions to block were issued on 18-12-2014 and as of 09-01-2015, after obtaining an undertaking from website owners, stating their compliance with the Government and Indian laws, the sites were unblocked.

It is not clear if ATS, Mumbai had been intercepting communication or if someone reported these websites. If the ATS was indeed intercepting communication, then as per the rules, the RC should be informed and their recommendations sought. It is unclear, if this was the case and the response evokes the confidentiality clause under rule 16 for not divulging further details. Based on our reading of the rules, court orders should be accessible to the public and without copies of requests and complaints received and knowledge of which organization raised them, there can be no appeal or recourse available to the intermediary or even the general public.

We also asked for a list of all requests for blocking of information that had been received by the DO between January 2013 and January 2015, including the copies of all files that had accepted or rejected. We also specifically, asked for a list of requests under rule 9. The response from DeitY stated that since January 1, 2015 to March 31, 2015 directions to block 143 URLs had been issued based on court orders. The response completely overlooks our request for information, covering the 2 year time period. It also does not cover all types of blocking orders under rule 6 and rule 9, nor the requests that are forwarded to CERT-In, as we have gauged from the ministry's response to the Parliament. Contrary to the SC's assumption of contacting the orginator of information, it is also clear from DeitY's response that only the websites had been contacted and the letter states that the “websites replied only after blocking of objectionable content”.

Further, seeking clarification on the functioning of the CER, we asked for the recent composition of members and the dates and copies of the minutes of all meetings including copies of the recommendations made by them. The response merely quotes rule 7 as the reference for the composition and does not provide any names or other details. We ascertain that as per the DeitY website Shri B.J. Srinath, Scientist-G/GC is the appointed Designated Officer, however this needs confirmation. While we are already aware of the structure of the CER which representatives and appointed public officers are guiding the examination of requests remains unclear. Presently, there are 3 Joint Secretaries appointed under the Ministry of Law and Justice, the Home Ministry has appointed 19, while 3 are appointed under the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Further, it is not clear which grade of scientist would be appointed to this committee from CERT-In as the rules do not specify this. While the government has clarified in their answer to Parliament that the committee had recommended not to block 19 URLs in the meetings held between 1st January 2014 to till date, it is remains unclear who is taking these decisions to block and revoke blocked URLs. The response from DeitY specifies that the CER has met six times between 2014 and March 2015, however stops short on sharing any further information or copies of files on complaints and recommendations of the CER, citing rule 16.

Finally, answering our question on the composition of the RC the letter merely highlights the provision providing for the composition under 419A of the Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951. The response clarifies that so far, the RC has met once on 7th December, 2013 under the Chairmanship of the Cabinet Secretary, Department of Legal Affaits and Secretary, DOT. Our request for minutes of meetings and copies of orders and findings of the RC is denied by simply stating that “minutes are not available”. Under 419A, any directions for interception of any message or class of messages under sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 issued by the competent authority shall contain reasons for such direction and a copy of such order shall be forwarded to the concerned RC within a period of seven working days. Given that the RC has met just once since 2013, it is unclear if the RC is not functioning or if the interception of messages is being guided through other procedures. Further, we do not yet know details or have any records of revocation orders or notices sent to intermediary contacts. This restricts the citizens’ right to receive information and DeitY should work to make these available for the public.

Given the response to our RTI, the Ministry's response to Parliament and the SC judgment we recommend the following steps be taken by the DeitY to ensure that we create a procedure that is just, accountable and follows the rule of law.

The revocation of rule 16 needs urgent clarification for two reasons:

Under Section 22 of the RTI Act provisions thereof, override all conflicting provisions in any other legislation.
In upholding the constitutionality of S69A the SC cites the requirement of reasons behind blocking orders to be recorded in writing, so that they may be challenged by means of writ petitions filed under A rticle 226 of the Constitution of India.

If the blocking orders or the meetings of the CER and RC that consider the reasons in the orders are to remain shrouded in secrecy and unavailable through RTI requests, filing writ petitions challenging these decisions will not be possible, rendering this very important safeguard for the protection of online free speech and expression infructuous. In summation, the need for comprehensive legislative reform remains in the blocking procedures and the government should act to address the pressing need for transparency and accountability. Not only does opacity curtial the strengths of democracy it also impedes good governance. We have filed an RTI seeking a comprehensive account of the blocking procedure, functioning of committees from 2009-2015 and we shall publish any information that we may receive.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/deity-says-143-urls-blocked-in-2015

Cry, you nasty trolls

praskrishna — 2015-05-09T15:05:23Z

Micro-blogging site Twitter has introduced a tool that identifies abusive tweets and hides them from their targets. Will it stem the tide of viciousness online, asks Prasun Chaudhuri.

The article by Prasun Chaudhuri was published in the Telegraph on April 26, 2015. Rohini was quoted.

When India's star batsman Virat Kohli failed to perform at the India vs Australia semi-final match at the World Cup, a section of Indian fans started venting their fury on his girlfriend Anushka Sharma on Twitter. The actress, who had flown to Sydney to watch the match, was blamed for India's loss and her Twitter account was flooded with abusive posts. One Atul Khatri tweeted: Hey Anushka, can you please distract the Aussie fielders on the boundary by showing them your lip job? Plleeeaasee. One anonymous tweet requested the "public to boycott Anushka Sharma's films (sic)" while another by Bollywood producer Kamal R. Khan incited his followers to "stone Anushka's house".

The star couple are not alone. Media persons, scholars and celebrities - especially if they are women - often face such vicious attacks on Twitter. Ask Chinmayi Sripada, the Chennai-based singer, or Sagarika Ghose, a prime time TV anchor, or scholar and columnist Ramachandra Guha who have endured worse forms of assaults - ranging from threats of gang rape, torture and murder. Many Twitter users across the world have gone silent and even deactivated their Twitter accounts after being harassed on the platform.

With more and more people around the world facing such vitriolic attacks, Twitter - the San Francisco-based online social networking service - recently decided to protect its users from abusive tweets. It switched on an anti-abuse tool that automatically identifies abusive tweets and hides them from their intended target. According to Twitter, the tool will search for patterns of misuse and identify repeat offenders so as to enable the social media platform to impose account suspension on them. "Users must feel safe on Twitter in order to fully express themselves and we need to ensure that voices are not silenced because people are afraid to speak up," wrote Shreyas Doshi, director of product management at Twitter, in a blog post.

Dick Costolo, Twitter's CEO, admitted two months ago at an internal forum that his company "sucked" at dealing with bullies and abusers. He said he would "start kicking these [abusive] people off... and making sure that when they issue their ridiculous attacks, nobody hears them."

Hemanshu Nigam, former chief security officer of social media platform MySpace and software giant Microsoft in the US, hails Twitter's new move. "The new tools are meant to honour human dignity and safety. Now that online and offline persona of many social media users have converged, it's become essential for tech companies to take steps to protect people from assaults in the cyber world." Nigam, a founder of SSP Blue, a leading online security firm, had sifted through thousands of offensive comments and abusive images during his earlier avatar in social media companies. "People with such evil intentions are minuscule but their twisted expressions can have a profound impact not only on the victims but thousands of impressionable minds of young users," he says.

Abuse on social media platforms can be extremely brutal and traumatising. According to Debarati Halder, a lawyer and cyber victim counsellor based in Tirunelveli, Tamil Nadu, a large proportion of these attacks - especially those where explicit pictures and videos of sexual acts are sent - are perpetrated on women by their former boyfriends or husbands to seek revenge on their ex-partners.

She feels that social media giants have failed to protect their users and that these so-called "new tools" and automated systems fail to screen most cases of abuse. "They (social media platforms) also don't react to reports of abusive behaviour unless they are lodged by celebrities or other influential people," she adds.

While announcing the new policy, Twitter's general counsel Vijaya Gadde wrote in The Washington Post, "At times, this (tweet) takes the form of hateful speech directed at women or minority groups; at others, it takes the form of threats aimed to intimidate those who take a stand on issues. These users often hide behind the veil of anonymity on Twitter and create multiple accounts expressly for the purpose of intimidating and silencing people." She also wrote how technicians at Twitter are going to erect a "better framework to protect vulnerable users, such as banning the posting of non-consensual intimate images."

Rohini Lakshane, programme officer at the Bangalore-based Centre for Internet and Society, says that Twitter had simplified and enhanced its system of reporting abuse in December last year. "Measures such as muting and blocking users and manual review of reports were already in place. The changes included mechanisms for Twitter's review teams to expedite responses from dire forms of abuse," she says.

Evidently, these measures have not been too effective. Says Lakshane, "Women are still disproportionately targeted on Twitter and several users simply choose to leave rather than face the strain of dealing with abuse, rape and death threats, and insults."

Singer Sripada, however, is one of those few Twitter users who stood up against her abusers. When she tweeted in support of Tamil fishermen who were attacked by the Sri Lankan Navy, she was flooded with abusive tweets that were tantamount to sexual harassment. She says, "I took on the abusers - one of them a professor at a top fashion institute. I filed a case under Section 66A of the IT Act (which is now defunct) and they were jailed for two weeks. That was when I saw the worst face of online abuse."

Advocate Halder rues the recent scrapping of Section 66A of the IT Act to protect freedom of speech. "The act could have have been modified to protect victims of abuse." She believes the new Twitter policy to check abuse may not be able to check the spread of the meta data of a post as it is replicated across thousands of sites.

"If the visuals or texts depict explicit sex, these spread like wildfire in voyeuristic websites, mirror sites and caches before any law enforcer anywhere in the world can react," says Siddhartha Chakraborty, a cyber expert based in Calcutta. A single tweet, a Facebook comment or a YouTube video "gone viral" often causes significant damage to an individual or a company before they can even report the abuse, says Rajiv Pratap, a data analyst based in Calcutta and California.

The problem also lies with over 20 million robot users - or automated accounts, not actively operated by humans but remotely controlled by groups of anonymous people - who are difficult to track. "These bots generate a lot of spam and even abusive comments," says Harsh Ajmera, a social media expert based in New Delhi. "Twitter is not striking at all the nasty content, but putting various checks like limiting the reach, asking you to get rid of those tweets which can protect genuine users."

On the other hand, stresses Lakshane, using parameters such as the number of flags (reports of abuse) a tweet receives can have implications for free speech - an unpopular but non-abusive view could also be targeted. Moreover, it's essential for reviewers to understand cultural and linguistic connotations to be able to effectively address abuse.

Still, Nigam is hopeful. He says, "Social media companies are going through a learning curve. As they evolve they will learn how to rein in abusers."

Twitter's 288 million users worldwide are waiting for that to happen.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-telegraph-april-26-2015-prasun-chaudhuri-cry-you-nasty-trolls

Criminal Defamation: The Urgent Cause That has United Rahul Gandhi, Arvind Kejriwal and Subramanian Swamy

praskrishna — 2015-07-16T13:45:04Z

Three years ago when the then Janata Party president Subramanian Swamy accused Congress vice president Rahul Gandhi and his mother of misappropriation of funds while trying to revive the National Herald newspaper, the Nehru-Gandhi scion threatened to sue him.

The article by Betwa Sharma was published in Huffington Post on July 15, 2015. Sunil Abraham gave his inputs.

Swamy's response was characteristic: "Grow up and file a defamation case".

In a strange turn of events, the matter of criminal defamation has brought together an unlikely cast of characters in an ongoing petition in the Supreme Court--Swamy, Gandhi and Delhi chief minister Arvind Kejriwal, who knows a thing or two about making allegations.

They are petitioning the Apex Court to strike down penal provisions criminalising defamation, which they argue, has a "chilling effect" on the fundamental right to free speech. Opinion is divided around the world on whether or not defamation ought to be a criminal offence. Because some jurisdictions have stricter defamation laws, some indulge in a practise known as 'forum shopping', or suing in jurisdictions with harsher views on libel and slander.

The three leaders have filed separate petitions that are now being jointly heard by the court. They are challenging the constitutional validity of Sections 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code which make defamation a criminal offence punishable with up to two years in prison.

A verdict striking down the colonial-era S. 499, used by the British to suppress those opposing their rule, could prove to be a huge victory for free speech in India. Earlier this year, the Supreme Court struck down the draconian Section 66A of the Information Technology Act as "unconstitutional and void".

There is cause for optimism. The Supreme Court has already said that the validity of criminal defamation laws must be tested against the free speech guarantees of the constitution. The bench comprising of Justices Dipak Misra and Prafulla C Pant have observed that political debates maybe excluded as a criminal defamation offence.

While Gandhi, Subramanian and Kejriwal have been slapped with defamation suits by political rivals, there have been long-standing concerns over the threat posed by these provisions to the media and those who use social media to express their opinions against the rich and the powerful.

The government of the day is keen to maintain the status quo. In a recent submission, it has argued that S.499 is now the only provision to deal with defamation on social media and the only protection for reputation of citizens. But free speech activists say there is no evidence to show that a defamation law deters a person who is out to spread lies.

The questionable utility of S.499, the scope for its abuse and the culture of self-censorship, they argue, removes it from the ambit of "reasonable restrictions" which the state can impose on free speech under article 19 (2) of the constitution.

"Hardly a day goes by in India without some rich and powerful person initiating or threatening to initiate defamation suits against rivals or traditional media or ordinary citizens on social media," said Sunil Abraham, executive director of the Bangalore-based Centre for Internet & Society. "It is unclear how much self-censorship is going on because Indians fearing jail terms avoid speaking truth to power.

On the issue of protecting people's dignity, Abraham said there is no prima facie evidence in India that criminalising defamation in India has resulted in the protection of the reputations of citizens from falsehoods.

"On the the other hand every other national media house and quite of few investigative journalists have been and continue to be harassed by criminal suits filed by the powerful," he told HuffPost India. "The chilling effect on speech is a disproportionate price for citizenry to pay for what is only a personal harm."

Under the leadership of Chief Minister J Jayalalithaa, the Tamil Nadu government filed 125 defamation cases against The Hindu and other publications between 2001 and 2004. On Tuesday, she filed a defamation suit against news portal Rediff.com for running two articles related to speculations about her health.

In the United States, defamation claims by public officials and public figures were severely curtailed after its Supreme Court ruled in 1964 that the complainant needs to prove actual malice with "clear and convincing" evidence. Further, truth is an absolute defence against defamation in the U.S.

On Tuesday, Swamy and Gandhi also argued that truth should be defence in defamation suits. “Truth is not a complete defence in criminal defamation. For a nation with a national motto of Satyameva Devata it is ironic," Swamy said.

BJP leader Swamy is of the view that defamation should only be subject to a civil suit which can be redressed by payment of monetary compensation. But the central government has argued that a defamer could be too poor to compensate the complainant.

"I am not saying there is no such thing as defamation. You can sue someone for defamation, but you cannot deprive someone of his liberty," he said in a recent interview with The Sunday Guardian.

Jayalalithaa filed a defamation suit against the senior BJP leader who alleged that most of the boats of Indian fishermen captured by Sri Lanka belong to the AIADMK chief, her close aide Sasikala and DMK leader TR Baalu.

The suit against the Congress Vice President was filed by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh for allegedly blaming the Hindu right-wing organisation for the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi.

BJP leader Nitin Gadkari sued Kejriwal after his name was included in AAP's list of "India's most corrupt."

"The accused is in the habit of making false and defamatory statements without any basis. The statements made by the accused and his party members have damaged and tarnished my image in the eyes of the people," Gadkari told the court, last year.

Legal analysts also find it hard to predict just how far the Supreme Court will go to protect free speech. Its judgment against S.66A of the IT Act is regarded as one of the biggest victories for free speech in India. Justice Misra was on the bench that struck down the provision for being “open-ended and unconstitutionally vague," and not fit to be covered under Article 19 (2).

But last month, in a judgment regarded as a blow to free speech, it was Justices Misra and Pant who ruled that freedom of speech is not an absolute right.

Senior Advocate Gopal Subramanium had argued, "Freedom to offend is also a part of freedom of speech.”

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/huffington-post-july-16-2015-betwa-sharma-criminal-defamation-the-urgent-cause-that-has-united-rahul-gandhi-arvind-kejriwal-and-subramanian-swamy

Ban on pornography temporary, says government

pranesh — 2015-09-13T08:46:24Z

The government has taken a dramatic U-turn from its stated position on internet pornography.

The article was published in Business Standard on August 4, 2015. Pranesh Prakash has been quoted.

A year after conveying to the Supreme Court that a blanket ban on internet pornography was not possible, through the department of electronics and information technology, it has asked internet providers to disable 857 websites that carry adult content. A senior official from the department of telecommunications (DoT) said the ban was a temporary measure, till the final order is announced by the apex court on August 10.

The government is looking at setting up an ombudsman to oversee cyber content, which will have representatives from NGOs, child activists and the government. The DoT official said, “There has to be some kind of regulatory oversight away from the government intervention… An ombudsman might be set up for overseeing cyber related content issues.”

The genesis of the current notification lies in the public interest litigation (PIL) filed by advocate Vijay Panjwani in April 2013. The PIL has sought curbs on these websites on the internet, especially the ones showing child pornography. The senior DoT official conveyed that the blocking of 857 websites was in compliance with the SC directive asking for measures to block porn sites, particularly those dealing with child pornography.

The July 31 notification from DoT has advised internet service licensees to disable content on 857 websites, as the content "hosted on these websites relates to morality and decency as given in Article 19(2) of the Constitution of India". The government had stated last year that it was not technologically feasible to monitor such contents as it would require physical intervention, which would impact data speeds.

In December 2014, the government had approached telecom providers and internet service providers to help identify such sites, but the service providers did not cooperate. Consequently, the government has gone ahead and identified 857 websites. However, the government has not given any detail as what was the criterion to identify such websites.

Pranesh Prakash, policy director at the Centre for Internet and Society, says DoT has used the provision of 79 (3) (b) of the IT Act, which is a convoluted Section that the intermediatory (ISPs) may lose protection from liability. This section is very convulated, the provisions for website blocking does not allow blocking porn. In section 69 (a), the entire procedure is that it allows an opportunity for the blocked website to be heard. “I can't comment on the reasons that the government for doing this. I know the order says the ban relates to morality, decency," adds Prakash.

Last year, the government took a position that said blocking these websites was not feasible, given that these sites are hosted outside India. In case of any ban, these sites can be relocated within hours to bypass it. Pavan Duggal, an advocate who specialises in cyber laws, has called the disablement 'cosmetic,' as it will not have the requisite deterrent effect. Duggal says: "This is a lost battle from the word go, as it is impossible to disable access permanently."

Watching such content in India is currently not an offence and, thus, the government is invoking “morality and decency” while seeking a curb on a fundamental right — Freedom of Speech & Expression. Under Article 19 (2) of the Constitution, the state can curb a fundamental right in order to maintain public order, decency or morality.

TO BAN OR NOT TO BAN

2013

Advocate Vijay Panjwani & Kamlesh Vaswani file PIL seeking curbs on internet pornography

Aug 2014

Supreme Court bench under Chief Justice R M Lodha agreed with the PIL and sought strict laws to curb online content

8 Jul 2015

Chief Justice of India H L Dattu upholds personal liberty and refuses to pass an interim order. Asks government to take a stand on the issue
CJI, heading a three-judge Bench, asks government to a detailed affidavit within four weeks

Jul 31

DoT sends notification seeking ban on 857 websites
Currently, there are no laws banning internet pornography in India, other than those related to children
Government’s stated position has been that it is difficult to curb online content

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/business-standard-august-4-2015-ban-on-pornography-temporary-says-government

‘A safe Internet and a free Internet can co-exist’

praskrishna — 2015-03-25T15:58:02Z

Striking down of 66A kicked off celebrations in the IT capital.

The article was published in the Hindu on March 25, 2015. Sunil Abraham is quoted.

Social media was celebrating on Tuesday. “Such a party going on on Twitter today #66A!” said one exuberant user, while another put a rap on it: “Made an FB post and didn’t go to jail. I gotta say today was a good day.” Another group was quick to point though: “Enjoy the freedom “responsibly!"

The day the Supreme Court struck down Section 66A of the Information Technology (IT) Act, those who had consistently termed it a “tyrannical” and “draconian” legal provision did a victory lap, calling it a “triumph for free speech in India”. Bengaluru, often called the information technology capital of the country, can stake claim for some of the legwork, with many from the city having either campaigned for the cause or took part in the PIL.

MP Rajeev Chandrasekhar, one of the litigants, said, “A free and fair Internet is crucial for innovation, connection and economic growth. By repealing section 66A, India is now ready for a technological leap. A safe Internet and a free Internet can co-exist, and the government should now draft carefully worded amendments that enable this co-existence.”

Stating that the Section was more your foe than a friend, cyber law expert Pavan Duggal said, “Section 66A symbolised the tyranny of ambiguous vague terms over the purity of legitimate free speech. It represented a tool for suppressing bonafide free speech, which was extensively misused. Freedom of speech and expression on the Internet is sacrosanct and only subject to reasonable restrictions given under Article 19(2) of the Constitution of India.”

Intermediaries

Sunil Abraham, Executive Director of the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), said there were other positives in the landmark judgement.

“For the first time since the 1960s, the SC has struck down a section of law deeming it unconstitutional. Section 79 gave an adjudicatory position to intermediaries (such as Facebook, Twitter or bloggers). They were liable if they took the wrong decision or if they did not act on ‘take down’ requests within 36 hours. Now they are immune either way,” he explained. He said small-time bloggers, newspapers, and open source encyclopaedia, such as Wikipedia, will now be protected.

‘Retain spirit of Section 66A(b)’

K.V. Aditya Bharadwaj

Bengaluru: While even cops handling cyber crimes have welcomed scrapping sub-sections (a) and (c) of Section 66A of IT Act, 2000, they make a case for retaining the spirit of sub-section (b) in an amended law expected to be brought in shortly.

Section 66A(b) deals with a person sending out messages using electronic medium, which he knows to be false. It was under this provision that cops booked rumour-mongers who spread hatred messages through WhatsApp and other social media, which was scrapped.

A classic case was the one were two men were arrested for sending out provocative WhatsApp messages in July 2012, leading to an exodus of North-East Indians from the city. “Similar baseless WhatsApp messages led to chaos after the December 2014 Church Street blast and D.K. Ravi’s death. Even twitter was abuzz with parody profiles and fake claims made by people after the bomb blast. Rumour mongering and sending provocative messages have turned out to be a major area of concern in urban centres,” said a senior official.

An official said that in the absence of Section 66A(b), such rumour-mongers could only be booked under the Karnataka Police Act, which carries a very light punishment.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-hindu-march-25-2015-a-safe-internet-and-a-free-internet-can-co-exist

66A DEAD. LONG LIVE 66A!

praskrishna — 2015-04-01T02:11:27Z

Last Tuesday, Twitter CEO Dick Costolo walked into Prime Minister Narendra Modi's office. India's most compulsive and most-followed tweeter, Modi, as Gujarat chief minister, had protested when the Manmohan Singh government blocked the micro-blogging site of a few journalists. Modi had blacked out his own Twitter profile and tweeted: “May God give good sense to everyone.”

The article by Soni Mishra was published in the Week on March 28, 2015. T. Vishnu Vardhan gave his inputs.

Today, with 11 million followers on Twitter, and 27.6 million likes on Facebook, Modi rules the virtual world and India. He received Costolo warmly and told him how Twitter could help his Clean India, girl child and yoga campaigns. Impressed, Costolo told Modi how Indian youth were innovating on Twitter.

But, the greatest and the most fundamental boost for all social media in India was being effected a few minutes drive away from the PMO. Ironically, in the Supreme Court of India, Modi's lawyers were defending a law made by the United Progressive Alliance government—section 66A of the Information Technology Act, which curbed free speech on social media.

Anything posted on the internet can go viral worldwide and reach millions in no time, argued Additional Solicitor General Tushar Mehta. While the traditional media is ruled by licences and checks, social media has nothing, he said. Finally, Mehta made an impassioned plea that the government meant well. Section 66A will be administered reasonably and will not be misused, he assured the court.

It seemed he, and the government, had forgotten an old saying: if there is a bad law, someone will use it. Luckily for India, and its liberal democracy, the judges saw a bad law and struck it down. “If section 66A is otherwise invalid, it cannot be saved by an assurance from the learned additional solicitor general,” said the bench comprising Justice Rohinton Nariman and Justice J. Chelameswar.

The fact is that 66A was knee-jerk legislation. Almost as thoughtless and compulsive as a netizen's derisive tweet. On December 22, 2008, the penultimate day of the winter session, the UPA government had got seven bills passed in seven minutes in the Lok Sabha; the opposition BJP had played along.

One of the bills was to amend the IT Act. It went to the Rajya Sabha the next day, when members were hurrying to catch their trains and flights home for the year-end vacation. They just okayed the bill and hurried home.

The argument then was that there was no need to discuss the bill as it had been examined by a standing committee of Parliament. Indeed, it had been. But, the committee, headed by Nikhil Kumar of the Congress, had met only for 23 hours and five minutes. Nine of its 31 members had not attended a single meeting. Ravi Shankar Prasad, the current Union minister for IT, was one among the 31.

Apparently, everyone wanted the bill, so did not bother to apply their minds. Only a CPI(M) member, A. Vijayaraghavan, had a few dissenting suggestions to the committee report. No one else bothered to mull over a law that was “unconstitutional, vague” and which would have a “chilling effect” on free speech.

Once the law was made, it was constable raj across India. Shaheen Dhada from Palghar simply commented on Facebook about a Shiv Sena bandh on the death of Bal Thackeray. Her friend Rinu Srinivasan liked it. The two teenagers were bundled into a police station. Rinu still remembers with a chill how “a mob of about 200 people gathered outside the police station that day.” This was when the Congress was ruling Maharashtra.

Jadavpur University professor Ambikesh Mahapatra was picked up by the police in Trinamool Congress-ruled West Bengal in April 2012, for posting a cartoon ridiculing Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee. “I was thrashed several times in police custody,” said the professor, who got relief from the West Bengal Human Rights Commission.

Vickey Khan, 22, was arrested in Rampur, UP, for a Facebook post on Samajwadi Party leader Azam Khan. Rampur is, of course, Khan's pocket borough. The Uttar Pradesh Police, controlled by the Samajwadi Party government, also arrested dalit writer Kanwal Bharti from Rampur for criticising the UP government's suspension of IAS officer Durga Shakti Nagpal in 2013.

At least 30 people in AIADMK-ruled Chennai have been booked under 66A; four of them this year. Ravi Srinivasan, general secretary of the Aam Aadmi Party in Puducherry, was picked up in October 2012 for his tweets on Karti Chidambaram, son of then Union home minister P. Chidambaram. “He was not even in India when I tweeted,” said Ravi. “He sent the complaint by fax from abroad and everything happened [fast] as Puducherry is a Union Territory and can be controlled by the home ministry.”

Whistleblower A. Shankar of Chennai was pulled up by the Madras High Court for the content on his blog, Savukku. The Orissa Police, controlled by the Biju Janata Dal (BJD) government, took Facebook to court in 2011 asking who created a Facebook page in the name of Chief Minister Naveen Patnaik. It is another thing that the page had no content.

Indeed, there had been stray political voices opposing the law. In Parliament, the CPI(M)'s P. Rajeeve, the BJD's Jay Panda and independent MP Rajeev Chandrasekhar pushed several times for scrapping 66A. Panda moved a private members bill, and Rajeeve moved a resolution. “I only wish we in Parliament had heeded the people's voice and repealed it, instead of yet again letting the judiciary do our work for us,” Panda said after the law was scrapped.

Finally, it was left to a young law student, Shreya Singhal, to move the Supreme Court on behalf of the Palghar girls. Singhal pointed out that several provisions in 66A violated fundamental rights guaranteed by article 19(1)(a)—the right to freedom of speech and expression. Several more cases followed and, finally, the court heard them together.

Indeed, Justices Nariman and Chelameswar have been extremely restrained in their comments. But, the fact that Parliament had not applied its mind comes through in the judgment.

The court “had raised serious concerns with the manner in which section 66A of the IT Act has been drafted and implemented across the country,” pointed out Supreme Court lawyer Shivshankar Panicker. Added Kiran Shanmugam, a cyber forensic expert and CEO of ECD Global Bengaluru: “The law lacked foresight in estimating the magnitude of the way the electronic media would grow.”

Apparently the government, too, knew it was defending the indefensible, and tried to win the case highlighting the benign nature of the democratic state. But, the court was not impressed. “Governments may come and governments may go, but section 66A goes on forever,” the judges noted. “An assurance from the present government, even if carried out faithfully, would not bind any successor government.”

Clearly, Mehta was defending the indefensible, a law that, the court found, would have a “chilling effect on free speech”. Moreover, as the judges found out, the new law did not provide even the safeguards that the older Criminal Procedure Code had provided. “Safeguards that are to be found in sections 95 and 96 of the CrPC are also absent when it comes to section 66A,” the judges said. For example, according to the CrPC, a book or document that contained objectionable matter could be seized by the police, but it also allowed the publisher to move court. The new law did not provide even such a cushion.

All the same, the court was careful and did not overturn the entire law. It scrapped section 66A, and section 118(D) of the Kerala Police Act, but upheld section 69A and section 79 of the IT Act, which too had been questioned by the litigants (see box on page 45).

The judgment has set the cyberworld rocking. “I am so happy now, I do not know how to express it,” said Rinu, now an audio-engineering student in Kerala. Shaheen is married and lives in Bengaluru. Vickey Khan is relieved. “Some people had told me that I could be jailed for three years,” he said. But, Azam Khan took it out on the media and said it “favours criminals”.

Karti, who claims to be a votary of free speech, however, wants “some protection” against defamation. “I filed a complaint in an existing provision of law,” he said. “If that provision is not available, then I will have to seek other provisions to safeguard my reputation.”

Mahapatra is still apprehensive. “The government will still try to harass me,” he said. “But I know that in the end I will win.” Shankar of Chennai called it “a huge relief for people like me, who are active on social media.” Ravi Srinivasan, who locked horns with Karti, said he felt “relieved and happy”.

The hard rap on the knuckles for their legislative laxity has sobered the political class. The Congress, the progenitor of 66A, admitted that the vagueness of the law was its undoing. “If in a particular area, the local constabulary took action to stifle dissent, it was never the purpose of the act,” said Congress spokesperson Abhishek Manu Singhvi. The Modi government officially welcomed the judgment, and its spokespersons are blaming the UPA for the law.

Apparently, the scrapped law was made after a series of grossly offensive posts appeared on the social media five years ago. “If such content is not blocked online, it would immediately lead to riots,” said a law ministry official, who said the posts had been shown to the court, too. He said the government would take some time to draft a new law.

But, is a new law required? Opinion is still divided. What if someone is defamed on the net? “There are defamation laws which can deal with these,” said T. Vishnuvardhan, programme director, Centre for Internet and Society, Bengaluru. “Also, the IT Act has various provisions. If somebody misuses your picture on social media, you can report it to the website immediately. The website is liable to take action on it within 36 hours.”

Smarika Kumar of Bengaluru-based Alternative Law Forum said the scrapping of 66A does not mean one can post anything online. “The Supreme Court has said that speech can be censored when it falls under the restrictions provided under article 19(2) of the Constitution,” she said. “But, if you prevent speech on any other ground, it is going to be unconstitutional.”

But, even critics of 66A think a replacement law is needed. Said Rajeev Chandrasekhar: “The government needs to act quickly and create a much more contemporaneous Act, via multi-stakeholder consultations, general consensus and collaboration, so that there is less ambiguity and freedom of expression is preserved.”

Senior Supreme Court advocate Pravin H. Parekh said, “As the cyberworld is growing day by day and there is increase in the number of social media users, we do require a proper mechanism which can regulate the expression of views on the internet.”

The government is putting forth the argument of national security. “If the security establishment says the present act is not sufficient, we will look into it. The government will consider it, but only with adequate safeguards,” said Ravi Shankar Prasad.

That will call for a legislative process undertaken in a cool and calm house, and not hurried through when the members are ready to hurry home.

Sound judgment

Thumbs down
The Supreme Court set aside section 66A of the IT act, which says any person who sends offensive, menacing or false information to cause annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will, or uses email to trouble its recipient or deceive him/her about the origin of such messages, can be punished with a jail term up to three years and a fine.

The court also struck down section 118(d) of the Kerala Police Act, which says any person who makes indecent comments by calls, mails, messages or any such means causing grave violation of public order or danger can be punished with imprisonment up to three years or a fine not exceeding Rs10,000, or both.

Thumbs up
The Supreme Court upheld section 69A of the IT act, which allows the government to block the public's access to information in national interest and penalise intermediaries [telecom or internet service providers and web hosting services] who fail to comply with the government's directives.

Section 79 of the IT Act, which deals with intermediaries' exemption from liability in certain cases, too, was upheld.

With R. Prasanan, Mini P. Thoma, Ajay Uprety, Lakshmi Subramanian, Rabi Banerjee and Sharmista Chaudhury

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-week-march-28-2015-soni-mishra-66a-dead-long-live-66a