Centre for Internet and Society

Supreme Court Strikes Down Section 66A Of IT Act

praskrishna — 2015-03-25T16:43:53Z

In a major boost to freedom of speech online in India, the Supreme Court on Tuesday struck down Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, reading down a draconian law that was poorly conceived, tragically worded and caused ordinary citizens to be jailed for so much as a comment on Facebook that annoyed just about anyone.

The article by Indrani Basu and Betwa Sharma published in the Huffington Post on March 24, 2015 quotes Sunil Abraham.

In its 122-page judgment, the court struck down the entire section, refusing to heed the government's plea that it will not be misused.

"The apex courts in India have consistently protected the rights of its citizens. And the Supreme Court has once again upheld that great tradition with this decision. There are constitutional exceptions to free speech that exist.

But this judgment will protect against the abuse of this vague and badly drafted law," said Sunil Abraham, executive director at the Centre for Internet and Society.

The section was passed without discussion in Parliament by the UPA government in 2008, adding an amendment to the original 2002 Act. While Narendra Modi supported the repealing of the Act during his prime ministerial campaign, after the BJP came to power, the government defended the provision, even while admitting it was draconian.

The government argued that the provision was necessary to prevent people from posting inflammatory content offending religious or political sentiments, leading to violence.

"I''m so happy with the decision. They have completely struck down the whole section. This is a victory for the country," said Shreya Singhal, the 24-year-old law student on whose petition the Supreme Court was hearing the case. "I don't have a political agenda — both the Congress government and the BJP have misused the section earlier. Section 66A was a blanket provision which was very vague. There are many IPC sections that could be used in its place."

"No one should fear putting anything up on the internet. It is very important for us to protect this right today," she said.

But there are sections in the Indian Penal Code that can deal with such situations.

And the broad and vague wording of 66A meant that it effectively became a tool that muzzled all speech online.

In 2012, Shaheen Dada, a 21-year old Mumbai girl, posted on Facebook comments about Shivsena leader Bal Thackerey. Annoyed party members went to the cops and Dada was arrested. Her friend Rinu Srinivasan, who had 'liked' the comment on Facebook, was also arrested.

The same year, Jadavpur University professor Ambikesh Mahapatra was arrested for sharing a cartoon poking fun at West Bengal chief minister Mamata Banerjee.

Mumbai cartoonist Aseem Trivedi was also arrested under the provision for his cartoons during the Anna Hazare anti-corruption agitation.

Here is what the section said:

66A. Punishment for sending offensive messages through communication service, etc.
Any person who sends, by means of a computer resource or a communication device,—
(a) any information that is grossly offensive or has menacing character; or
(b) any information which he knows to be false, but for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will, persistently by making use of such computer resource or a communication device,
(c) any electronic mail or electronic mail message for the purpose of causing annoyance or inconvenience or to deceive or to mislead the addressee or recipient about the origin of such messages,
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and with fine.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/huffington-post-indrani-basu-betwa-sharma-march-24-2015-supreme-court-strikes-down-section-66a-of-it-act

Shreya Singhal and 66A

sunil — 2015-04-19T08:09:42Z

Most software code has dependencies. Simple and reproducible methods exist for mapping and understanding the impact of these dependencies. Legal code also has dependencies --across court orders and within a single court order. And since court orders are not produced using a structured mark-up language, experts are required to understand the precedential value of a court order.

The article was published in the Economic and Political Weekly Vol-L No.15. Vidushi Marda, programme officer at the Centre for Internet and Society, was responsible for all the research that went into this article. PDF version here.

As a non–lawyer and engineer, I cannot authoritatively comment on the Supreme Court’s order in Shreya Singhal vs Union of India (2015) on sections of the Information Technology Act of 2000, so I have tried to summarise a variety of views of experts in this article. The Shreya Singhal order is said to be unprecedented at least for the last four decades and also precedent setting as its lucidity, some believe, will cause a ripple effect in opposition to a restrictive understanding of freedom of speech and expression, and an expansiveness around reasonable restrictions. Let us examine each of the three sections that the bench dealt with.

The Section in Question

Section 66A of the IT Act was introduced in a hastily-passed amendment. Unfortunately, the language used in this section was a pastiche of outdated foreign laws such as the UK Communications Act of 2003, Malicious Communications Act of 1988 and the US Telecommunications Act, 1996.¹ Since the amendment, this section has been misused to make public examples out of innocent, yet uncomfortable speech, in order to socially engineer all Indian netizens into self-censorship.²

Summary: The Court struck down Section 66A of the IT Act in its entirety holding that it was not saved by Article 19(2) of the Constitution on account of the expressions used in the section, such as "annoying," "grossly offensive," "menacing,", "causing annoyance." The Court justified this by going through the reasonable restrictions that it considered relevant to the arguments and testing them against S66A. Apart from not falling within any of the categories for which speech may be restricted, S66A was struck down on the grounds of vagueness, over-breadth and chilling effect. The Court considered whether some parts of the section could be saved, and then concluded that no part of S66A was severable and declared the entire section unconstitutional. When it comes to regulating speech in the interest of public order, the Court distinguished between discussion, advocacy and incitement. It considered the first two to fall under the freedom of speech and expression granted under Article 19(1)(a), and held that it was only incitement that attracted Article 19(2).

Between Speech and Harm

Gautam Bhatia, a constitutional law expert, has an optimistic reading of the judgment that will have value for precipitating the ripple effect. According to him, there were two incompatible strands of jurisprudence which have been harmonised by collapsing tendency into imminence.³ The first strand, exemplified by Ramjilal Modi vs State of UP⁴ and Kedar Nath Singh vs State of Bihar,⁵ imported an older and weaker American standard, that is, the tendency test, between the speech and public order consequences. The second strand exemplified byRam Manohar Lohia vs State of UP,⁶ S Rangarajan vs P Jagjivan Ram,⁷ andArup Bhuyan vs Union of India,⁸ all require greater proximity between the speech and the disorder anticipated. In Shreya Singhal, the Supreme Court held that at the stage of incitement, the reasonable restrictions will step in to curb speech that has a tendency to cause disorder. Other experts are of the opinion that Justice Nariman was doing no such thing, and was only sequentially applying all the tests for free speech that have been developed within both these strands of precedent. In legal activist Lawrence Liang's analysis, "Ramjilal Modi was decided by a seven judge bench and Kedarnath by a constitutional bench. As is often the case in India, when subsequent benches of a lower strength want to distinguish themselves from older precedent but are unable to overrule them, they overcome this constraint through a doctrinal development by stealth. This is achieved by creative interpretations that chip away at archaic doctrinal standards without explicitly discarding them."⁹

Compatibility with US Jurisprudence

United States (US) jurisprudence has been imported by the Indian Supreme Court in an inconsistent manner. Some judgments hold that the American first amendment harbours no exception and hence is incompatible with Indian jurisprudence, while other judgments have used American precedent when convenient. Indian courts have on occasion imported an additional restriction beyond the eight available in 19(2)-the ground of public interest, best exemplified by the cases of K A Abbas¹⁰ and Ranjit Udeshi.¹¹ The bench in its judgment-which has been characterised by Pranesh Prakash as a masterclass in free speech jurisprudence¹²-clarifies that while the American first amendment jurisprudence is applicable in India, the only area where a difference is made is in the "sub serving of general public interest" made under the US law. This eloquent judgment will hopefully instruct judges in the future on how they should import precedent from American free speech jurisprudence.

Article 14 Challenge

The Article 14 challenge brought forward by the petitioners contended that Section 66A violated their fundamental right to equality because it differentiated between offline and online speech in terms of the length of maximum sentence, and was hence unconstitutional. The Court held that an intelligible differentia, indeed, did exist. It found so on two grounds. First, the internet offered people a medium through which they can express views at negligible or no cost. Second, the Court likened the rate of dissemination of information on the internet to the speed of lightning and could potentially reach millions of people all over the world. Before Shreya Singhal, the Supreme Court had already accepted medium-specific regulation. For example in K A Abbas, the Court made a distinction between films and other media, stating that the impact of films on an average illiterate Indian viewer was more profound than other forms of communication. The pessimistic reading of Shreya Singhal is that Parliament can enact medium-specific law as long as there is an intelligible differentia which could even be a technical difference-speed of transmission. However, the optimistic interpretation is that medium-specific law can only be enacted if there are medium-specific harms, e g, phishing, which has no offline equivalent. If the executive adopts the pessimistic reading, then draconian sections like 66A will find their way back into the IT Act. Instead, if they choose the optimistic reading, they will introduce bills that fill the regulatory vacuum that has been created by the striking down of S66A, that is, spam and cyberbullying.

Section 79

Section 79 was partially read down. This section, again introduced during the 2008 amendment, was supposed to give legal immunity to intermediaries for third party content by giving a quick redressal for those affected by providing a mechanism for takedown notices in the Intermediaries Guidelines Rules notified in April 2011. But the section and rules had enabled unchecked invisible censorship¹³ in India and has had a demonstrated chilling effect on speech¹⁴ because of the following reasons:

One, there are additional unconstitutional restrictions on speech and expression. Rule 3(2) required a standard "rules and regulation, terms and condition or user agreement" that would have to be incorporated by all intermediaries. Under these rules, users are prohibited from hosting, displaying, uploading, modifying, publishing, transmitting, updating or sharing any information that falls into different content categories, a majority of which are restrictions on speech which are completely out of the scope of Article 19(2). For example, there is an overly broad category which contains information that harms minors in any way. Information that "belongs to another person and to which the user does not have any right to" could be personal information or could be intellectual property. A much better intermediary liability provision was introduced into the Copyright Act with the 2013 amendment. Under the Copyright Act, content could be reinstated if the takedown notice was not followed up with a court order within 21 days.¹⁵ A counter-proposal drafted by the Centre for Internet and Society for "Intermediary Due Diligence and Information Removal," has a further requirement for reinstatement that is not seen in the Copyright Act.¹⁶

Two, a state-mandated private censorship regime is created. You could ban speech online without approaching the court or the government. Risk-aversive private intermediaries who do not have the legal resources to subjectively determine the legitimacy of a legal claim err on the side of caution and takedown content.

Three, the principles of natural justice are not observed by the rules of the new censorship regime. The creator of information is not required to be notified nor given a chance to be heard by the intermediary. There is no requirement for the intermediary to give a reasoned decision.

Four, different classes of intermediaries are all treated alike. Since the internet is not an uniform assemblage of homogeneous components, but rather a complex ecosystem of diverse entities, the different classes of intermediaries perform different functions and therefore contribute differently to the causal chain of harm to the affected person. If upstream intermediaries like registrars for domain names are treated exactly like a web-hosting service or social media service then there will be over-blocking of content.

Five, there are no safeguards to prevent abuse of takedown notices. Frivolous complaints could be used to suppress legitimate expressions without any fear of repercussions and given that it is not possible to expedite reinstatement of content, the harm to the creator of information may be irreversible if the information is perishable. Transparency requirements with sufficient amounts of detail are also necessary given that a human right was being circumscribed. There is no procedure to have the removed information reinstated by filing a counter notice or by appealing to a higher authority.

The judgment has solved half the problem by only making intermediaries lose immunity if they ignore government orders or court orders. Private takedown notices sent directly to the intermediary without accompanying government orders or courts order no longer have basis in law. The bench made note of the Additional Solicitor General's argument that user agreement requirements as in Rule 3(2) were common practice across the globe and then went ahead to read down Rule 3(4) from the perspective of private takedown notices. One way of reading this would be to say that the requirement for standardised "rules and regulation, terms and condition or user agreement" remains. The other more consistent way of reading this part of the order in conjunction with the striking down of 66A would be to say those parts of the user agreement that are in violation of Article 19(2) have also been read down.

This would have also been an excellent opportunity to raise the transparency requirements both for the State and for intermediaries: for (i) the person whose speech is being censored, (ii) the persons interested in consuming that speech, and (iii) the general public. It is completely unclear whether transparency in the case of India has reduced the state appetite for censorship. Transparency reports from Facebook, Google and Twitter claim that takedown notices from the Indian government are on the rise.¹⁷ However, on the other hand, the Department of Electronics and Information Technology (DEITY) claims that government statistics for takedowns do not match the numbers in these transparency reports.¹⁸ The best way to address this uncertainty would be to require each takedown notice and court order to be made available by the State, intermediary and also third-party monitors of free speech like the Chilling Effects Project.

Section 69A

The Court upheld S69A which deals with website blocking, and found that it was a narrowly-drawn provision with adequate safeguards, and, hence, not constitutionally infirm. In reality, unfortunately, website blocking usually by internet service providers (ISPs) is an opaque process in India. Blocking under S69A has been growing steadily over the years. In its latest response to an RTI (right to information)¹⁹ query from the Software Freedom Law Centre, DEITY said that 708 URLs were blocked in 2012, 1,349 URLs in 2013, and 2,341 URLs in 2014. On 30 December 2014 alone, the centre blocked 32 websites to curb Islamic State of Iraq and Syria propaganda, among which were "pastebin" websites, code repository (Github) and generic video hosting sites (Vimeo and Daily Motion).²⁰ Analysis of leaked block lists and lists received as responses to RTI requests have revealed that the block orders are full of errors (some items do not exist, some items are not technically valid web addresses), in some cases counter speech which hopes to reverse the harm of illegal speech has also been included, web pages from mainstream media houses have also been blocked and some URLs are base URLs which would result in thousands of pages getting blocked when only a few pages might contain allegedly illegal content.²¹

Pre-decisional Hearing

The central problem with the law as it stands today is that it allows for the originator of information to be isolated from the process of censorship. The Website Blocking Rules provide that all "reasonable efforts" must be made to identify the originator or the intermediary who hosted the content. However, Gautam Bhatia offers an optimistic reading of the judgment, he claims that the Court has read into this "or" and made it an "and"-thus requiring that the originator must also be notified of blocks when he or she can be identified.²²

Transparency

Usually, the reasons for blocking a website are unknown both to the originator of material as well as those trying to access the blocked URL. The general public also get no information about the nature and scale of censorship unlike offline censorship where the court orders banning books and movies are usually part of public discourse. In spite of the Court choosing to leave Section 69A intact, it stressed the importance of a written order for blocking, so that a writ may be filed before a high court under Article 226 of the Constitution. While citing this as an existing safeguard, the Court seems to have been under the impression that either the intermediary or the originator is normally informed, but according to Apar Gupta, a lawyer for the People's Union for Civil Liberties, "While the rules indicate that a hearing is given to the originator of the content, this safeguard is not evidenced in practice. Not even a single instance exists on record for such a hearing."²³ Even worse, block orders have been unevenly implemented by ISPs with variations across telecom circles, connectivity technologies, making it impossible for anyone to independently monitor and reach a conclusion whether an internet resource is inaccessible as a result of a S69A block order or due to a network anomaly.

Rule 16 under S69A requires confidentiality with respect to blocking requests and complaints, and actions taken in that regard. The Court notes that this was argued to be unconstitutional, but does not state their opinion on this question. Gautam Bhatia holds the opinion that this, by implication, requires that requests cannot be confidential. Chinmayi Arun, from the Centre for Communication Governance at National Law University Delhi, one of the academics supporting the petitioners, holds the opinion that it is optimism carried too far to claim that the Court noted the challenge to Rule 16 but just forgot about it in a lack of attention to detail that is belied by the rest of the judgment.

Free speech researchers and advocates have thus far used the RTI Act to understand the censorship under S69A. The Centre for Internet and Society has filed a number of RTI queries about websites blocked under S69A and has never been denied information on grounds of Rule 16.²⁴ However, there has been an uneven treatment of RTI queries by DEITY in this respect, with the Software Freedom Law Centre²⁵ being denied blocking orders on the basis of Rule 16. The Court could have protected free speech and expression by reading down Rule 16 except for a really narrow set of exceptions wherein only aggregate information would be made available to affected parties and members of the public.

Conclusions

In Shreya Singhal, the Court gave us great news: S66A has been struck down; good news: S79(3) and its rules have been read down; and bad news: S69A has been upheld. When it comes to each section, the impact of this judgment can either be read optimistically or pessimistically, and therefore we must wait for constitutional experts to weigh in on the ripple effect that this order will produce in other areas of free speech jurisprudence in India. But even as free speech activists celebrate Shreya Singhal, some are bemoaning the judgment as throwing the baby away with the bathwater, and wish to reintroduce another variant of S66A. Thus, we must remain vigilant.

Notes

1 G S Mudur (2012): "66A 'Cut and Paste Job,'" The Telegraph, 3 December, visited on 3 April, 2015, http://www.telegraphindia.com/1121 203/jsp/frontpage/story_16268138.jsp

2 Sunil Abraham (2012): "The Five Monkeys and Ice Cold Water," Centre for Internet and Society, 26 September, visited on 3 April 2015, http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/www-deccan-chronicle-sep-16-201...

3 Gautam Bhatia (2015): "The Striking Down of 66A: How Free Speech Jurisprudence in India Found Its Soul Again," Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy, 26 March, visited on 4 April 2015, https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2015/03/26/the-striking-down-of-sect...

4 Ramjilal Modi vs State of UP, 1957, SCR 860.

5 Kedar Nath Singh vs State of Bihar, 1962, AIR 955.

6 Ram Manohar Lohia vs State of UP, AIR, 1968 All 100.

7 S Rangarajan vs P Jagjivan Ram, 1989, SCC(2), 574.

8 Arup Bhuyan vs Union of India, (2011), 3 SCC 377.

9 Lawrence Liang, Alternative Law Forum, personal communication to author, 6 April 2015.

10 K A Abbas vs Union of India, 1971 SCR (2), 446.

11 Ranjit Udeshi vs State of Maharashtra,1965 SCR (1) 65.

12 Pranesh Prakash (2015): "Three Reasons Why 66A Verdict Is Momentous"/ Times of India/(29 March). Visited on 6 April 2015, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/sunday-times/all-that-matters/Th...

13 Pranesh Prakash (2011): "Invisble Censorship: How the Government Censors Without Being Seen," The Centre for Internet and Society, 14 December, visited on 6 April 2015, http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/invisible-censorship

14 Rishabh Dara (2012): "Intermediary Liability in India: Chilling Effects on Free Expression on the Internet," The Centre for Internet and Society, 27 April, visited on 6 April 2015, http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/chilling-effects-on-free-expres... .

15 Rule 75, Copyright Rules, 2013.

16 The Draft Counter Proposal is available at http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/counter-proposal-by-cis-draft-i...

17 According to Facebook's transparency report, there were 4,599 requests in the first half of 2014, followed by 5,473 requests in the latter half. Available at https://govtrequests.facebook. com/country/India/2014-H2/ also see Google's transparency report available at http: //www.google. com/transparencyreport/removals/government/IN/?hl=en and Twitter's report, available at https:// transparency.twitter.com/country/in

18 Surabhi Agarwal (2015): "Transparency Reports of Internet Companies are Skewed: Gulashan Rai," Business Standard, 31 March, viewed on 5 April 2015, http://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/transparency-re... .

19 http://sflc.in/deity-says-2341-urls-were-blocked-in-2014-refuses-to-reve...

20 "32 Websites Go Blank," The Hindu, 1 January 2015, viewed on 6 April 2015, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/now-modi-govt-blocks-32-websites/a...

21 Pranesh Prakash (2012): "Analysing Latest List of Blocked Sites (Communalism and Rioting Edition)," 22 August, viewed on 6 April 2015, http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/analysing-blocked-sites-ri... . Also, see Part II of the same series at http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/analyzing-the-latest-list-of-bl... and analysis of blocking in February 2013, at http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/analyzing-latest-list-of-b...

22 Gautam Bhatia (2015): "The Supreme Court's IT Act Judgment, and Secret Blocking," Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy, 25 March, viewed on 6 April 2015, https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2015/03/25/the-supreme-courts-it-act...

23 Apar Gupta (2015): "But What about Section 69A?," Indian Express, 27 March, viewed on 5 April 2015, http://indianexpress. com/article/opinion/ columns/but-what-about-section-69a/

24 Pranesh Prakash (2011): DIT's Response to RTI on Website Blocking, The Centre for Internet and Society, 7 April, viewed on 6 April 2015, http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/rti-response-dit-blocking ). Also see http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/analysis-dit-response-2nd-... and http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/reply-to-rti-applicat...

25 http://sflc.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/RTI-blocking-final-reply-from-...

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/economic-and-political-weekly-sunil-abraham-april-11-2015-shreya-singhal-and-66a

SECTION 66A: DELETE

praskrishna — 2015-03-30T01:32:18Z

The Supreme Court has killed a law that allowed the Government to control social media. What’s the Net worth of freedom hereafter?

The article by Kumar Anshuman was published in the Open Magazine on March 27, 2015. Sunil Abraham gave his inputs.

It was in 2009 that Section 66A was added as an amendment to India’s IT Act by the then UPA Government, but it took three years before it came to the notice of Shreya Singhal, a student of Law at Delhi University. By then, the Section had already earned itself a fair amount of notoriety for how much leeway it provided for the police and politicians to abuse the law.

The first time was in September 2011 when Musafir Baitha, a famous poet and government employee in Bihar, was suspended from his job because he criticised the state government on Facebook. An uproar followed, as people realised that freedom of speech in social media could now be construed as a criminal activity. Ambikesh Mahapatra, a professor at Jadavpur Unversity, became a target of the Mamata Banerjee government in April 2012 when he made cartoons of her. In September 2012, cartoonist Aseem Trivedi was arrested in Mumbai for a caricature of corruption under the UPA. But the case that caught Shreya Singhal’s attention was perhaps the most shocking of all. In November 2012, after Shiv Sena founder Bal Thackeray’s death, Shaheen Dhada, a Thane resident, posted a comment on her Facebook page criticising the near-total shutdown of Mumbai for the funeral. She wrote that Mumbai was shut not in respect, but fear, and that a leader should earn respect instead of forcing it out of people. Her friend Renu Srinivasan ‘liked’ this post. Hours later, both were arrested and booked under Section 66A. "I was shocked when I heard of this news," Singhal says, "I went and checked the post and there was nothing which could have provoked such an outrage." Her mother, Manali Singhal, a lawyer at the Supreme Court, advised her to file a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) against the Section.

The case continued for two years in the Supreme Court, while arbitrary arrests continued to be made. The UPA Government first defended 66A in court, taking the position that the current NDA Government took as well. It argued that the law would be used only in extreme cases where a person overreaches his or her online freedom to curtail the rights of others. Unconvinced, on 24 March, the apex court struck 66A down, saying that it could not allow such a law to exist on mere government assurances. The Court found several terms in the Act, such as ‘grossly offensive’ and ‘insult’, that were not clearly defined and could be interpreted arbitrarily to suit one’s convenience. ‘It is clear that Section 66A is unconstitutionally vague and it takes away a guaranteed freedom,’ observed the bench of Justice J Chelameswar and Justice Rohinton Nariman.

"We can celebrate the scrapping of Section 66A, but with caution," says Sunil Abraham, executive director at The Centre for Internet & Society in Bangalore. "[As for] those who are booked under Section 66A, the police also imposes different sections of the Indian Penal Code to justify their arrest." There are examples to support his statement, a recent one being the arrest of a Bareilly-based student, Gulrez Khan, who had posted a picture on Facebook of UP minister Azam Khan along with some derogatory comments about Hindus that he allegedly made. Gulrez Khan denied the comments, saying that his image was being maligned. The boy was arrested and booked. "People are making it out as a moment of triumph against the UP government. The fact is this boy had been arrested under Section 153A and 504 of the IPC along with Section 66A of the IT Act. We have said this even in the Supreme Court," says Gaurav Bhatia, a spokesperson of the Samajwadi Party and also a senior advocate.

But the import of scrapping Section 66A is that there is now one less law that can be misused, one that specifically stifles online freedom. "It’s an excellent judgment," says Lawrence Liang of Alternative Law Forum, Bangalore. “It couldn’t have been better than this. The fact that the apex court termed it ‘vague and overreaching’ signifies how important it was to scrap this."

Once the 122-page judgment arrived, there was a rush to welcome it—even by those who were responsible for Section 66A to begin with. Former Congress minister Kapil Sibal was one of them. "The Supreme Court has scrapped Section 66A to allow freedom of speech in cyberspace and we should welcome it,” he said. His former cabinet colleague P Chidambaram went to the extent of saying that it was poorly drafted. But the Congress as a party also warned of the possible misuse of this freedom, saying that it had woven various safeguards into Section 66A, including the condition that an arrest could only be made after an officer of the level of Inspector General or Superintendent of Police had okayed it. "The Supreme Court, it appears, has not found the safeguards sufficient," says Congress spokesperson and senior lawyer Abhishek Manu Singhvi. “It is now up to the current Government [to decide] how to strike the right balance between freedom of speech on one hand and [prevention of] abuse and hounding of groups or individuals through obscene or incorrigibly false information [on the other] to deter unbridled defamation in cyberspace." The Left parties, which were supporting the UPA Government back when Section 66A was imposed, have expressed happiness over the verdict. “The draconian provision of 66A was used to arrest people who express dissenting views against the Government and the State and to suppress criticism of those in power,” says senior CPM leader Sitaram Yechury.

The NDA Government has also welcomed the verdict. "The Government absolutely respects the right to freedom of speech and expression on social media and has no intention of curbing it," says Ravi Shankar Prasad, Union Minister for Information Technology.

But the scrapping of the Section leaves the Government with very little power to act against real abuse of online freedoms. Like Congress leader Milind Deora says, "An unregulated internet can be more dangerous than a regulated one." This argument is easily countered: there are enough provisions in existing laws that prevent a person from misusing freedom of speech. Says Apar Gupta, a senior lawyer, “Section 66A was a bailable section and arrests were made only with further imposition of IPC acts." While Article 19 (1) of the Constitution guarantees freedom of expression, at the same time Article 19 (2) provides a list of reasonable restrictions on freedom of speech. This is enough, experts believe, to curtail misuse of the internet. The court judgment also grants the Centre the freedom to enact any other law specific to the internet, provided it does not violate the provisions of freedom of speech as laid down by the Constitution of India.

This does, however, put a question mark on the necessity of Section 66A to begin with, if existing laws were quite enough to address freedom-of- speech abuses. "Section 66A of the IT Act, 2000, was enacted to prevent online abuse and hounding of groups and individuals, check the propagation of obscene or incorrigibly false information with the intent to create social divides and unrest, and deter unbridled defamation in cyberspace. This Act came into effect in 2008 when social media was yet evolving," says Singhvi. But experts disagree with this argument. "It is a perfect case of confusion and mixing up of facts,” says Sunil Abraham. “The purpose of this law was to curb unsolicited messages, spamming and harassing someone through fake identities in the internet space." He says that the Government claimed to borrow law provisions from the US, Canada and other countries, but the legislation was so poorly drafted that it didn’t have any teeth for action against spammers. "Even words like ‘unsolicited commercial mails’ were not included in the Act and that is the reason not a single person has been arrested in India for spam mails even after this Act came into being."

A section of the Indian legal fraternity believes that the country’s apex court should also have made a statement about the problem of spamming and harassment on the internet.

But there is bad news too. The same judgment that struck down Section 66A has upheld Section 69A of the IT Act as constitutionally valid. This allows the Government to block any website which it deems a direct threat to public order and security that might spread propaganda.

"In this case, the Government [can decide] to block a website without notifying [it with any] reason for it. If I am an internet user who wants to visit this site, I am also not notified why that website has been taken down. It is just the whims and fancies of a few officials in the Government, what to block and what not," says Apar Gupta. Using the section, the Union Government had blocked 32 websites just this January, saying that anti- national groups were using these websites for ‘jihadi propaganda’.

All major democracies have some form of legal net regulation. "Laws in foreign jurisdictions vary widely as per the guarantees of civil rights afforded to citizens in any legal system," adds Gupta. "The legislations of the United States, which borrowed certain phrases in Section 66A, have already been declared unconstitutional. In the United Kingdom, similar phrases have come under fierce critique and have been limited by guidelines issued by the office of prosecutions. In these jurisdictions, as in India, existing criminal law applies equally to online speech as much as to offline."

Also, while social media enthusiasts rejoice over their first big victory against restrictions on online freedom of speech, the internet is still a matter of great concern for any government, thanks to its reach and influence. The Union Government walks a thin line while dealing with instances of abuse on social media, and many believe India needs an IT Act drafted in proper consultation with all stakeholders.

For now, a young law student has found a place in the legal history of India. "It will always be remembered as Shreya Singhal vs Union of India," says Singhal.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT

‘66A. Punishment for sending offensive messages through communication service, etc. Any person who sends, by means of a computer resource or a communication device:

Any information that is grossly offensive or has menacing character; or
Any information which he knows to be false, but for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will, persistently by making use of such computer resource or a communication device;
Any electronic mail or message for the purpose of causing annoyance or inconvenience or to deceive or to mislead the addressee or recipient about the origin of such messages...

shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and with fine’

SUPREME COURT ORDER

‘In conclusion, we may summarise what has been held by us: Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 is struck down in its entirety being violative of Article 19(1)(a) and not saved under Article 19(2)’

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/open-magazine-march-27-2015-kumar-anshuman-section-66a-delete

SC has set a high threshold for tolerance: Lawrence Liang

praskrishna — 2015-03-28T16:18:18Z

Lawyer-activist Lawrence Liang on why SC upheld section 69A and the implications of striking down section 66A.

The article by Dhamini Ratnam was published in Livemint on March 28, 2015. Lawrence Liang gave his inputs.

Tuesday marked a landmark in the fight for free speech in our country, as the Supreme Court struck down the contentious section 66A of the Information Technology Act of 2000. The section, which was introduced through an amendment in 2009, penalized those who wrote messages online that could be deemed as being false or grossly offensive. However, the apex court turned down a plea to strike down sections 69A (procedure for blocking websites) and 79 (exemption from liability of intermediaries) of the same law. Lawrence Liang, a lawyer who co-founded the Alternative Law Forum in Bengaluru, a fellow at the Centre for Internet and Society, and author of The Public is Watching: Sex, Laws and Videotape and A Guide to Open Content Licenses, spoke in an interview on the wide-ranging implications of the judgement. Edited excerpts:

What was the impetus to fight section 66A?

Over the past few years, there have been numerous cases in which section 66A has been used in bad faith against individuals online. One of the cases that became well-known by virtue of just how ridiculous it was involved the arrest of Shaheen Dhada and her friend Renu Srinivasan (which led petitioner Shreya Singhal to file a public interest litigation in the Supreme Court that eventually led to this judgement), but there have been more, so it was inevitable that a law as draconian as section 66A would be challenged for its constitutional validity.

The judgement begins by noting a distinction between three forms of speech—discussion, advocacy and incitement—and says discussion and advocacy of a particular cause, howsoever unpopular, is at the heart of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution (all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression). Only when they reach the level of incitement can they be legitimately prohibited. While the judgement does not provide a new definition of incitement, it affirms what was laid down in the Rangarajan test (1989), in which the courts had established that for censorship to be justified, the “expression of thought should be intrinsically dangerous to the public interest”. There should be an immediate and direct relation between speech and effect.

The court said that section 66A is “cast so widely that virtually any opinion on any subject would be covered by it, as any serious opinion dissenting with the mores of the day would be caught within its net”. The courts have also historically held that Article 19(1)(a) is as much about the right to receive information as it is to disseminate, and when there is a chilling effect on speech, it also violates the right to receive information. However, I would say that the court missed an opportunity to consider the blocking of websites under section 69A.

Why did the court uphold section 69A, and which other parts of the IT Act did it examine?

If section 66A was found to be arbitrary, then the procedure for blocking websites, as laid out in section 69A, is also beset with similar problems. The court, however, upheld this section and the rules under the IT Act on the grounds that there are internal safeguards and reasonable procedures. This section allows the government to block any site or information that violates Article 19(2) of the Constitution (which enables the legislature to impose certain restrictions on free speech).

The problem is that often there is no hearing or notice given to the owner of information, there is no transparency since blocks can happen on a confidential basis and these can have serious implications for the right to receive information.

The court read down section 79, which used to provide an intermediary exemption from liability with the exception that if it received “actual knowledge” of any illegal content, it was obliged to act within 36 hours. A study by the Centre for Internet and Society showed that even on sending frivolous takedown notices, intermediaries tended to comply to be on the safe side. The court’s decision has read down section 79 now to mean that “actual knowledge” means either an order of a court or the government. It moves it away from a subjective determination by intermediaries.

The court could have, like it did with section 79, retained section 66A while clarifying a procedure that would maintain a balance between the need sometimes to block and public interest, and transparency.

What does the judgement open up for the free speech debate?

The judgement speaks of chilling effects, because if one is not careful, one runs the risk of endangering political discourse through self-censorship. This is terrible for a democratic culture, which is premised on the ability to debate and dissent. Much of the use of section 66A has been politically motivated to silence criticism, and the judgement goes a long way towards promoting a culture of critique.

As the first major Supreme Court case on free speech in the 21st century, it sets the tone on how we think of free speech in a context where every individual with a smartphone is potentially a writer, a publisher and a distributor. By setting a high threshold for what is tolerated in online speech, it ensures that the online space is not doomed to be infantilized.

What position must the law take to protect rights and minority identities?

I think it is important to distinguish between different effects of speech. The court has merely reaffirmed a position that has been held in India for a long time (such as through the Ram Manohar Lohia judgement of 1960, which interpreted what “restriction made in the interests of public order” in Article 19(2) means). In other words, if someone is inciting violence, especially if they have the power to effect such violence (such as a politician), then their speech can be regulated, but the court also held that the idea of threat to public order is often imaginary.

For instance, in what way would Shaheen Dhada’s post on Facebook have incited violence? (In November 2012, Dhada, then a student and based in Palghar, Maharashtra, had written a post on Facebook commenting on the state of shutdown that followed politician Bal Thackeray’s death. Her comment was liked by her friend Srinivasan, and both of them were charged under section 66A.) So, the court is distinguishing between speech that is critical and speech that is dangerous. There are laws that deal with the latter, such as 153A and 295A of the IPC (Indian Penal Code).

It must be noted, however, that provisions also suffer from the same vice of vagueness. What we need is a more nuanced understanding of hate speech that addresses speech that incites violence or hatred against a community, but one in which the test is not of subjective hurt sentiment. The problem with hate speech laws is that they collapse questions of law and order with questions of subjective hurt, and we run the risk of becoming a republic of hurt sentiments where anyone can claim that their sentiments are hurt, especially their religious sentiments.

What happens to existing cases that are being tried under section 66A, such as the one against the organizers and participants of the All India Bakchod Roast?

Court judgements do not necessarily have retrospective effect, so cases that have been filed will continue. We must also remember that the cases filed under section 66A were also accompanied by other provisions. Of course, a judgement as significant as this, which completely delegitimizes section 66A, will have a profound impact on the ongoing cases insofar as they relate to the offence under the section, but the other charges remain.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/livemint-dhamini-ratnam-march-28-2015-sc-has-set-a-high-threshold-for-tolerance

Ruling in India shields Web posts

praskrishna — 2015-03-27T00:38:34Z

The Supreme Court in India struck down a section of its country’s information technology act Tuesday that had made it illegal for anyone to spread ‘‘offensive messages’’ on electronic devices and resulted in arrests over posts on Facebook and other social media.

This is the modified version of the article originally published by Washington Post and mirrored in Boston Globe. Sunil Abraham is quoted. Picture by Manjunath Kiran, AFP.

Supreme Court Judge Rohinton Fali Nariman wrote in the ruling that the section of the law, known as 66A, was unconstitutional, saying the vaguely worded legislation had wrongly swept up innocent people and had a ‘‘chilling’’ effect on free speech in the world’s most populous democracy.

‘‘Section 66A is cast so widely that virtually any opinion on any subject would be covered by it,’’ the judge wrote. ‘‘If it is to withstand the test of constitutionality, the chilling effect on free speech would be total.’’

India had first passed its Information Technology Act in 2000, but stricter provisions were added in 2008 and ratified in 2009 that gave police sweeping authority to arrest citizens for their personal posts on social media, a crime punishable for up to three years in jail and a fine.

Sunil Abraham, the executive director of the Center for Internet and Society in Bangalore, said that the section was originally intended to protect citizens from electronic spam, but it did not turn out that way.

‘‘Politicians who didn’t like what people were saying about them used it to crack down on online criticism,’’ he said.

In the end, there were more than 20 high-profile arrests, including a professor who posted an unflattering cartoon of a state political leader and an artist who drew a set of cartoons lampooning the government and Parliament.

The most well-known was the case of two young women arrested in the western town of Palghar after one of them posted a comment on Facebook that argued that the city of Mumbai should not have been shut down for the funeral of a famous conservative leader. A friend, who merely ‘‘liked’’ the post, was also arrested. After much outcry, the two were released on bail and the charges eventually dropped.

The case of the ‘‘Palghar Girls’’ inspired a young law student, Shreya Singhal, to take on the government’s law. Singhal became the chief petitioner for the case, along with other free speech advocates and an Indian information technology firm.

‘‘It’s a big victory,’’ Singhal said after the ruling. ‘‘The Internet is so far-reaching and so many people use it now, it’s very important for us to protect this right.’’

Singhal and other petitioners had also argued that another section of India’s technology act that allowed the government to block websites containing questionable material were also unconstitutional, but the court disagreed, saying there was a sufficient review process in place to avoid misuse.

Free speech in India is enshrined in the country’s constitution but has its limits. Books and movies are often banned or censored out of consideration for religious and minority groups.

In 2014, a conservative Hindu group persuaded Penguin India to withdraw a book on Hinduism by Wendy Doniger, a professor of religion at the University of Chicago, from the Indian market. And more recently, the government of India blocked a planned television debut of a documentary film on a 2012 gang rape case, ‘‘India’s Daughter.’’

Along with India, other nations have sharply increased monitoring and crackdowns on perceived insulting Web posts in recent years.

Across the Gulf Arab states, dozens of activists have been arrested for social media posts considered insulting to the country’s rulers or tarnishing the national image.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/boston-globe-march-25-2015-annie-gowen-ruling-in-india-shields-web-posts

Role of Intermediaries in Countering Online Abuse

jyoti — 2015-08-02T16:38:36Z

The Internet can be a hostile space and protecting users from abuse without curtailing freedom of expression requires a balancing act on the part of online intermediaries.

This got published as two blog entries in the NALSAR Law Tech Blog. Part 1 can be accessed here and Part 2 here.

As platforms and services coalesce around user-generated content (UGC) and entrench themselves in the digital publishing universe, they are increasingly taking on the duties and responsibilities of protecting rights including taking reasonable measures to restrict unlawful speech. Arguments around the role of intermediaries tackling unlawful content usually center around the issue of regulation—when is it feasible to regulate speech and how best should this regulation be enforced?

Recently, Twitter found itself at the periphery of such questions when an anonymous user of the platform, @LutyensInsider, began posting slanderous and sexually explicit comments about Swati Chaturvedi, a Delhi-based journalist. The online spat which began in February last year, culminated into Swati filing an FIR against the anonymous user, last week. Within hours of the FIR, the anonymous user deleted the tweets and went silent. Predictably, Twitter users hailed this as a much needed deterrence to online harassment. Swati’s personal victory is worth celebrating, it is an encouragement for the many women bullied daily on the Internet, where harassment is rampant. However, while Swati might be well within her legal rights to counter slander, the rights and liabilities of private companies in such circumstances are often not as clear cut.

Should platforms like Twitter take on the mantle of deciding what speech is permissible or not? When and how should the limits on speech be drawn? Does this amount to private censorship?The answers are not easy and as the recent Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) judgment in the case of Delfi AS v. Estonia confirms, the role of UGC platforms in balancing the user rights, is an issue far from being settled. In its ruling, the ECtHR reasoned that because of their role in facilitating expression, online platforms have a requirement “to take effective measures to limit the dissemination of hate speech and speech inciting violence was not ‘private censorship”.

This is problematic because the decision moves the regime away from a framework that grants immunity from liability, as long as platforms meet certain criteria and procedures. In other words the ruling establishes strict liability for intermediaries in relation to manifestly illegal content, even if they may have no knowledge. The 'obligation' placed on the intermediary does not grant them safe harbour and is not proportionate to the monitoring and blocking capacity thus necessitated. Consequently, platforms might be incentivized to err on the side of caution and restrict comments or confine speech resulting in censorship. The ruling is especially worrying, as the standard of care placed on the intermediary does not recognize the different role played by intermediaries in detection and removal of unlawful content. Further, intermediary liability is its own legal regime and is at the same time, a subset of various legal issues that need an understanding of variation in scenarios, mediums and technology both globally and in India.

Law and Short of IT

Earlier this year, in a leaked memo, the Twitter CEO Dick Costolo took personal responsibility for his platform's chronic problem and failure to deal with harassment and abuse. In Swati's case, Twitter did not intervene or take steps to address harrassment. If it had to, Twitter (India), as all online intermediaries would be bound by the provisions established under Section 79 and accompanying Rules of the Information Technology Act. These legislations outline the obligations and conditions that intermediaries must fulfill to claim immunity from liability for third party content. Under the regime, upon receiving actual knowledge of unlawful information on their platform, the intermediary must comply with the notice and takedown (NTD) procedure for blocking and removal of content.

Private complainants could invoke the NTD procedure forcing intermediaries to act as adjudicators of an unlawful act—a role they are clearly ill-equipped to perform, especially when the content relates to political speech or alleged defamation or obscenity. The SC judgment in Shreya Singhal addressing this issue, read down the provision (Section 79 by holding that a takedown notice can only be effected if the complainant secures a court order to support her allegation. Further, it was held that the scope of restrictions under the mechanism is restricted to the specific categories identified under Article 19(2). Effectively, this means Twitter need not take down content in the absence of a court order.

Content Policy as Due Diligence

Another provision, Rule 3(2) prescribes a content policy which, prior to the Shreya Singhal judgment was a criteria for administering takedown. This content policy includes an exhaustive list of types of restricted expressions, though worryingly, the terms included in it are not clearly defined and go beyond the reasonable restrictions envisioned under Article 19(2). Terms such as “grossly harmful”, “objectionable”, “harassing”, “disparaging” and “hateful” are not defined anywhere in the Rules, are subjective and contestable as alternate interpretation and standard could be offered for the same term. Further, this content policy is not applicable to content created by the intermediary.

Prior to the SC verdict in Shreya Singhal, actual knowledge could have been interpreted to mean the intermediary is called upon its own judgement under sub-rule (4) to restrict impugned content in order to seek exemption from liability. While liability accrued from not complying with takedown requests under the content policy was clear, this is not the case anymore. By reading down of S. 79 (3) (b) the court has addressed the issue of intermediaries complying with places limits on the private censorship of intermediaries and the invisible censorship of opaque government takedown requests as they must and should adhere, to the boundaries set by Article 19(2). Following the SC judgment intermediaries do not have to administer takedowns without a court order thereby rendering this content policy redundant. As it stands, the content policy is an obligation that intermediaries must fulfill in order to be exempted from liability for UGC and this due diligence is limited to publishing rules and regulations, terms and conditions or user agreement informing users of the restrictions on content. The penalties for not publishing this content policy should be clarified.

Further, having been informed of what is permissible users are agreeing to comply with the policy outlined, by signing up to and using these platforms and services. The requirement of publishing content policy as due diligence is unnecessary given that mandating such ‘standard’ terms of use negates the difference between different types of intermediaries which accrue different kinds of liability. This also places an extraordinary power of censorship in the hands of the intermediary, which could easily stifle freedom of speech online. Such heavy handed regulation could make it impossible to publish critical views about anything without the risk of being summarily censored.

Twitter may have complied with its duties by publishing the content policy, though the obligation does not seem to be an effective deterrence. Strong safe harbour provisions for intermediaries are a crucial element in the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of expression online. By absolving platforms of responsibility for UGC as long as they publish a content policy that is vague and subjective is the very reason why India’s IT Rules are in fact, in urgent need of improvement.

Size Matters

The standards for blocking, reporting and responding to abuse vary across different categories of platforms. For example, it may be easier to counter trolls and abuse on blogs or forums where the owner or an administrator is monitoring comments and UGC. Usually platforms outline monitoring and reporting policies and procedures including recourse available to victims and action to be taken against violators. However, these measures are not always effective in curbing abuse as it is possible for users to create new accounts under different usernames. For example, in Swati’s case the anonymous user behind @LutyensInsider account changed their handle to @gregoryzackim and @gzackim before deleting all tweets. In this case, perhaps the fear of criminal charges ahead was enough to silence the anonymous user, which may not always be the case.

Tackling the Trolls

Most large intermediaries have privacy settings which restrict the audience for user posts as well as prevent strangers from contacting them as a general measure against online harassment. Platforms also publish monitoring policy outlining the procedure and mechanisms for users to register their complaint or report abuse. Often reporting and blocking mechanisms rely on community standards and users reporting unlawful content. Last week Twitter announced a new feature allowing lists of blocked users to be shared between users. An improvement on existing mechanism for blocking, the feature is aimed at making the service safer for people facing similar issues and while an improvement on standard policies defining permissible limits on content, such efforts may have their limitations.

The mechanisms follow a one-size-fits-all policy. First, such community driven efforts do not address concerns of differences in opinion and subjectivity. Swati in defending her actions stressed the “coarse discourse” prevalent on social media, though as this article points out she might be assumed guilty of using offensive and abusive language. Subjectivity and many interpretations of the same opinion can pave the way for many taking offense online. Earlier this month, Nikhil Wagle’s tweets criticising Prime Minister Narendra Modi as a “pervert” was interpreted as “abusive”, “offensive” and “spreading religious disharmony”. While platforms are within their rights to establish policies for dealing with issues faced by users, there is a real danger of them doing so for “political reasons” and based on “popularity” measures which may chill free speech. When many get behind a particular interpretation of an opinion, lawful speech may also be stifled as Sreemoyee Kundu found out. A victim of online abuse her account was blocked by Facebook owing to multiple reports from a “faceless fanatical mob”. Allowing the users to set standards of permissible speech is an improvement, though it runs the risk of mob justice and platforms need to be vigilant in applying such standards.

While it may be in the interest of platforms to keep a hands off approach to community policies, certain kind of content may necessiate intervention by the intermediary. There has been an increase in private companies modifying their content policy to place reasonable restriction on certain hateful behaviour in order to protect vulnerable or marginalised voices. Twitter and Reddit's policy change in addressing revenge porn are reflective of a growing understanding amongst stakeholders that in order to promote free expression of ideas, recognition and protection of certain rights on the Internet may be necessary. However, any approach to regulate user content must assess the effect of policy decisions on user rights. Google's stand on tackling revenge porn may be laudable, though the decision to push down 'piracy' sites in its search results could be seen to adversely impact the choice that users have. Terms of service implemented with subjectivity and lack of transparency can and does lead to private censorship.

The Way Forward

Harassment is damaging, because of the feeling of powerlessness that it invokes in the victims and online intermediaries represent new forms of power through which users' negotiate and manage their online identity. Content restriction policies and practices must address this power imbalance by adopting baseline safeguards and best practices. It is only fair that based on principles of equality and justice, intermediaries be held responsible for the damage caused to users due to wrongdoings of other users or when they fail to carry out their operations and services as prescribed by the law. However, in its present state, the intermediary liability regime in India is not sufficient to deal with online harassment and needs to evolve into a more nuanced form of governance.

Any liability framework must evolve bearing in mind the slippery slope of overbroad regulation and differing standards of community responsibility. Therefore, a balanced framework would need to include elements of both targeted regulation and soft forms of governance as liability regimes need to balance fundamental human rights and the interests of private companies. Often, achieving this balance is problematic given that these companies are expected to be adjudicators and may also be the target of the breach of rights, as is the case in Delfi v Estonia. Global frameworks such as the Manila Principles can be a way forward in developing effective mechanisms. The determination of content restriction practices should always adopt the least restrictive means of doing so, distinguishing between the classes of intermediary. They must evolve considering the proportionality of the harm, the nature of the content and the impact on affected users including the proximity of affected party to content uploader.

Further, intermediaries and governments should communicate a clear mechanism for review and appeal of restriction decisions. Content restriction policies should incorporate an effective right to be heard. In exceptional circumstances when this is not possible, a post facto review of the restricton order and its implementation must take place as soon as practicable. Further, unlawful content restricted for a limited duration or within a specific geography, must not extend beyond these limits and a periodic review should take place to ensure the validity of the restriction. Regular, systematic review of rules and guidelines guiding intermediary liability will go a long way in ensuring that such frameworks are not overly burdensome and remain effective.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/role-of-intermediaries-in-counting-online-abuse

Proxies and VPNs: Why govt can't ban porn websites?

pranesh — 2015-09-13T08:26:17Z

The government's move to block more than 800 pornographic websites has led experts to question whether this latest attempt to police the internet is even feasible.

The article by Siladitya Ray was published in the Hindustan Times on August 3, 2015. Pranesh Prakash was quoted.

Internet service providers (ISPs) have confirmed they received letters from the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) on Saturday that directed them to block certain websites. But can the government stop users from visiting porn sites?

The answer seems to be no.

"It is extremely easy to circumvent these blocks, using virtual private networks (VPNs) and proxies that anonymise your traffic," said Pranesh Prakash, policy director at the Centre for Internet and Society in Bengaluru.

A cursory Google search on how to unblock porn websites throws up millions of how-tos and guides on using proxies and VPNs to get around restrictions set by authorities. All these services anonymise users’ web traffic by routing them through foreign servers.

According to data from Pornhub, one of the world's biggest porn sites, India ranks fifth for the most daily visitors to the website. Pornhub saw a total of 78.9 billion video views globally in 2014.

The government can try to keep up with proxies and block them too. But as proxies change on a daily basis and there are always dozens of functioning proxies to choose from across, blocking all of them will be a near impossible task.

Tor, an anonymity network, is also a popular way to surf blocked sites.

But is it legal to circumvent blocks put in place by authorities by using VPNs and proxies?

There is no law in India that prohibits viewing pornography, experts say. Section 67 of the Information Technology Act only deals with "publishing obscene information in electronic form".

This provision has been interpreted as a measure to criminalise the posting of pornographic content online. However, accessing "obscene" content privately – such as within the four walls of a person’s home – is not illegal, say experts.

In July, while hearing a petition seeking the blocking of pornographic websites, Supreme Court Chief Justice HL Dattu wondered whether the court could restrain an adult from watching pornography within his home and described such a ban as a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution, which grants the right to personal liberty to its citizens.

But what about the legality of using VPNs and proxies? “There are no laws preventing the use of VPNs and proxies in India," said Prakash.

Are proxies and VPNs safe?

While the use of proxies and VPNs is very simple, they do come with their own set of problems. These services have access to all your browsing data and may push adware and other forms of malware.

Prakash advised that users should only choose services that are well known and have a good reputation.

"Sites like TorrentFreak put out annual lists of the top VPNs available," he said. These can be used as a guide to determine what services are safe.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/hindustan-times-august-3-2015-siladitya-ray-proxies-and-vpns

Porn block in India sparks outrage

pranesh — 2015-08-05T02:10:46Z

India’s government has triggered a storm of protest after blocking 857 alleged pornography websites, with privacy and internet freedom campaigners, as well as consumers, condemning the move as arbitrary and unlawful.

The article by Amanda Hodge was published in the Australian on August 5, 2015. Pranesh Prakash gave his inputs.

The order, enforced since Sunday by the country’s main internet service providers, comes amid debate about the influence of pornography on sex crime in India, and as the Supreme Court considers a petition by lawyer Kamlesh Vaswani to ban pornographic websites that harm children.

The government has been forced to defend the move, saying it was taken in response to Supreme Court criticism at inaction against child pornography websites, although the Supreme Court itself has refused to impose any interim ban while it considers the petition. The websites — a fraction of the world’s millions of internet pornography sites — will remain blocked until the government figures out how to restrict access, a spokesman said.

Critics have slammed the measure as unconstitutional and pointed out the list includes adult humour sites that contain no pornographic content. Others have suggested it is another intrusion into the private lives of ordinary Indians by an administration intent on pushing a puritanical Hindu agenda, citing the recent ban on beef in several states and an alleged “Hindu-isation” of school textbooks.

That prompted outrage from Telecom Minister Ravi Shankar Prasad. “I reject with contempt the charge that it is a Talibani government. Our government supports free media, respects communication on social media and has respected freedom of communication always,” he said.

While India has no law preventing citizens accessing internet pornography, regulations do restrict the publishing of “obscene information in electronic form”. Centre for Internet and Society policy director Pranesh Prakash told The Australian yesterday that some elements of that act were welcome — such as prohibition of child pornography and the uploading of a person’s private parts without consent — but “the provisions relating to ‘sexually explicit materials’ are far too broad, with no exceptions made for art, architecture, education or literature”.

Mr Prakash said the pornography ban amounted to an “abdication of the government’s duty”, given the list of sites blocked was provided on request to the government by one of the Vaswani petitioners. “The additional solicitor-general essentially asked one of the petitioners to provide a list of websites, which she passed on to the Department of Information Technology, which in turn passed to Department of Telecommunications asking for them to be blocked or disabled.

“That is not acceptable in a democracy where it is not the government which has actually found any of these websites to be unlawful.” Mr Prakash also criticised the secrecy surrounding the order, which he said contravened Indian law requiring a public declaration of any intended ban so that it might be challenged. The bans were made under “Rule 12” of India’s IT Act, which empowers the government to force ISPs to block sites when it is “necessary or expedient”.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-australian-news-august-5-2015-amanda-hodge-porn-block-in-india-sparks-outrage

Porn ban: People will soon learn to circumvent ISPs and govt orders, expert says

pranesh — 2015-08-05T01:47:52Z

The article by Karthikeyan Hemalatha was published in the Times of India on August 2. Pranesh Prakash gave inputs.

The government used other sections of the Act to circumvent this provision. Sources in the Department of Telecommunication, which comes under the ministry of communications and information technology, said a notification had been issued under Section 79 (b) of IT Act under which internet service providers could be penalized for not following government orders. "Though the section protects an internet service provider (ISP) from legal action for the content it may allow, it can be penalized for not following government orders to ban them," said Prakash.

Last month, the Supreme Court declined to pass an interim order to block websites which have pornographic content. "Such interim orders cannot be passed by this court. Somebody may come to the court and say 'look I am above 18 and how can you stop me from watching it within the four walls of my room?' It is a violation of Article 21 [right to personal liberty]," said Chief Justice H L Dattu.

The judge was reacting to a public interest litigation filed by advocate Kamlesh Vashwani who was seeking to block porn websites in the country. "The issue is definitely serious and some steps need to be taken. The Centre is expected to take a stand. Let us see what stand the Centre will take," the Chief Justice said and directed the Centre to reply within four weeks. Over the weekend, the stance became clear.

Sources also say that Section 19 (2) of the Constitution was used for the ban. The section allows the government to impose "reasonable restrictions in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the state, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court."

For netizens, the government could actually be providing crash courses on proxy sites. "This is the best way to teach people on how to circumvent ISPs and government orders," said Prakash, adding that real abusive porn sites might still be available.

"There is no dynamic mechanism to block all sites with pornographic content. The government has to individually pick URLs (uniform resource locator) to ban websites. Right now, only popular websites have been banned and the little known abusive sites like those that propagate revenge porn or child porn," said Prakash. "No ban can be comprehensive," he added.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-times-of-india-august-2-2015-karthikeyan-hemalatha-porn-ban

Pastebin, Dailymotion, Github blocked after DoT order: Report

praskrishna — 2015-01-03T04:17:48Z

A number of Indian users are reporting they're not able to access websites such as Pastebin, DailyMotion and Github while accessing the internet through providers such as BSNL and Vodafone.

The article by Anupam Saxena was published in the Times of India on December 31, 2014. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

The block was first reported by Pastebin, a website where you can store text online for a set period of time, through its social media accounts on December 19. In a follow-up post on December 26, the site posted that it was still blocked in India on the directions of the Indian government.A number of users also posted about the blocks on Reddit threads confirming that the sites have been blocked by Vodafone, BSNL and Hathway, among others.It now appears that the blocks are being carried out on the instructions of DoT (Department of Telecom). The telecom body reportedly issued a notification regarding the same on December 17. A screenshot of the circular has been posted on Twitter by Pranesh Prakash.

The notification mentions that 32 URLs including Pastebin, video sharing sites Vimeo and DailyMotion, Internet archive site archive.org and Github.com( a web-based software code repository), have been blocked under Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000. DoT has also asked ISPs to submit compliance reports. However, we have not been able to verify the authenticity of the circular.

At the time of writing this story, we could not access Pastebin, DailyMotion and Github on Vodafone 3G and our office network that has access via dedicated lines. Vodafone is not displaying any errors and is simply blocking access. However, a number of users report that they're getting an error that says 'the site is blocked as per the instructions of Competent Authority.' However, we were able to access all the websites on Airtel 3G.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/times-of-india-anupam-saxena-december-31-2014-pastein-dailymotion-github-blocked-after-dot-order

Noose tightens on freedom of speech on the Internet

praskrishna — 2015-03-27T01:01:18Z

A worrying trend has emerged in the last few years, where intermediaries around the world are being used as chokepoints to restrict freedom of expression online, and to hold users accountable for content.

The blog post by Gabey Goh was originally published by Digital News Asia and mirrored in Malaymail Online on March 26, 2015. Jyoti Panday gave her inputs.

“All communication across the Internet is facilitated by intermediaries: Service providers, social networks, search engines, and more,” said Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) senior global policy analyst Jeremy Malcolm.

“These services are all routinely asked to take down content, and their policies for responding are often muddled, heavy-handed, or inconsistent.

“That results in censorship and the limiting of people’s rights,” he told Digital News Asia (DNA) on the sidelines of RightsCon, an Internet and human rights conference hosted in Manila from March 24-25.

This year, the government of France is moving to implement regulation that makes Internet operators “accomplices” of hate-speech offences if they host extremist messages.

In February, the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) and the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) urged ICANN (the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) to ensure that domain name registries and registrars “investigate copyright abuse complaints and respond appropriately.”

Closer to home, the Malaysian Government passed a controversial amendment to the Evidence Act 1950 – Section 114A – back in 2012.

Under Section 114A, an Internet user is deemed the publisher of any online content unless proven otherwise. The new legislation also makes individuals and those who administer, operate or provide spaces for online community forums, blogging and hosting services, liable for content published through their services.

Due to the potential negative impact on freedom of expression, a roadmap called the Manila Principles on Internet Liability was launched during RightsCon.

The EFF, Centre for Internet Society India, Article 19, and other global partners unveiled the principles, whose framework outlines clear, fair requirements for content removal requests and details how to minimise the damage a takedown can do.

For example, if content is restricted because it’s unlawful in one country or region, then the scope of the restriction should be geographically limited as well.

The principles also urge adoption of laws shielding intermediaries from liability for third-party content, which encourages the creation of platforms that allow for online discussion and debate about controversial issues.

“Our goal is to protect everyone’s freedom of expression with a framework of safeguards and best practices for responding to requests for content removal,” said Malcolm.

Jyoti Panday from the Centre for Internet and Society India noted that people ask for expression to be removed from the Internet for various reasons, good and bad, claiming the authority of myriad local and national laws.

“It’s easy for important, lawful content to get caught in the crossfire. We hope these principles empower everyone – from governments and intermediaries, to the public – to fight back when online expression is censored,” she said.

The Manila Principles can be summarised in six key points:

Intermediaries should be shielded by law from liability for third-party content
Content must not be required to be restricted without an order by a judicial authority
Requests for restrictions of content must be clear, be unambiguous, and follow due process
Laws and content restriction orders and practices must comply with the tests of necessity and proportionality
Laws and content restriction policies and practices must respect due process
Transparency and accountability must be built in to laws and content restriction policies and practices

“Right now, different countries have differing levels of protection when it comes to intermediary liability, and we’re saying that there should be expansive protection across all content,” said Malcolm.

“In addition, there is no logic in distinguishing between intellectual property (IP) and other forms of content as in the case in the United States for example, where under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, intermediaries are not liable for third party content but that doesn’t apply to IP,” he added.

The Manila Principles have two main targets: Governments and intermediaries themselves. The coalition, led by EFF, will be approaching governments to present the document and discuss the recommendations on how best to establish an intermediary liability regime.

This includes immunising intermediaries from liability and requiring a court order before any content can be taken down.

With intermediaries, the list includes companies such as Facebook, Twitter and Google, to discuss establishing transparency, responsibility and accountability in any actions taken.

“We recognise that a lot of the time, intermediaries are not waiting for a court order before taking down content, and we’re telling them to avoid removing content unless there is a sufficiently good reason and users have been notified and presented that reason,” said Malcolm.

The overall aim with the Manila Principles is to influence policy changes for the better.

Malcolm pointed out that by coincidence, some encouraging developments have taken place in India. On the same day the principles were released, the Indian Supreme Court struck down the notorious Section 66A of the country’s Information Technology Act.

Since 2009, the law had allowed both criminal charges against users and the removal of content by intermediaries based on vague allegations that the content was “grossly offensive or has menacing character,” or that false information was posted “for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will.”

Calling it a “landmark decision,” Malcolm noted that the case shows why the establishment and promotion of the Manila Principles are important.

“Not only is the potential overreach of this provision obvious on its face, but it was, in practice, misused to quell legitimate discussion online, including in the case of the plaintiffs in that case – two young women, one of whom made an innocuous Facebook post mildly critical of government officials, and the other who ‘liked’ it,” he said.

The court however, upheld section 69A of the Act, which allows the Government to block online content; and Section 79(3), which makes intermediaries such as YouTube or Facebook liable for not complying with government orders for censorship of content. — Digital News Asia

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/malaymail-online-gabey-goh-march-26-2015-noose-tightens-on-freedom-of-speech-on-the-internet

No more 66A!

geetha — 2015-03-26T02:01:31Z

In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court has struck down Section 66A. Today was a great day for freedom of speech on the Internet! When Section 66A was in operation, if you made a statement that led to offence, you could be prosecuted. We are an offence-friendly nation, judging by media reports in the last year. It was a year of book-bans, website blocking and takedown requests. Facebook’s Transparency Report showed that next to the US, India made the most requests for information about user accounts. A complaint under Section 66A would be a ground for such requests.

Section 66A hung like a sword in the middle: Shaheen Dhada was arrested in Maharashtra for observing that Bal Thackeray’s funeral shut down the city, Devu Chodankar in Goa and Syed Waqar in Karnataka were arrested for making posts about Narendra Modi, and a Puducherry man was arrested for criticizing P. Chidambaram’s son. The law was vague and so widely worded that it was prone to misuse, and was in fact being misused.

Today, the Supreme Court struck down Section 66A in its judgment on a set of petitions heard together last year and earlier this year. Stating that the law is vague, the bench comprising Chelameshwar and Nariman, JJ. held that while restrictions on free speech are constitutional insofar as they are in line with Article 19(2) of the Constitution. Section 66A, they held, does not meet this test: The central protection of free speech is the freedom to make statements that “offend, shock or disturb”, and Section 66A is an unconstitutional curtailment of these freedoms. To cross the threshold of constitutional limitation, the impugned speech must be of such a nature that it incites violence or is an exhortation to violence. Section 66A, by being extremely vague and broad, does not meet this threshold. These are, of course, drawn from news reports of the judgment; the judgment is not available yet.

Reports also say that Section 79(3)(b) has been read down. Previously, any private individual or entity, and the government and its departments could request intermediaries to take down a website, without a court order. If the intermediaries did not comply, they would lose immunity under Section 79. The Supreme Court judgment states that both in Rule 3(4) of the Intermediaries Guidelines and in Section 79(3)(b), the "actual knowledge of the court order or government notification" is necessary before website takedowns can be effected. In effect, this mean that intermediaries need not act upon private notices under Section 79, while they can act upon them if they choose. This stops intermediaries from standing judge over what constitutes an unlawful act. If they choose not to take down content after receiving a private notice, they will not lose immunity under Section 79.

Section 69A, the website blocking procedure, has been left intact by the Court, despite infirmities such as a lack of judicial review and non-transparent operation. More updates when the judgment is made available.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/no-more-66a

Netizens Rejoice Over SC Ruling to Keep the Net Free

praskrishna — 2015-03-25T15:16:03Z

The Supreme Court ruling to strike down Section 66A of the Information Technology (IT) Act has been welcomed by the city’s netizens.

The article by Parina Dhilla was published in the New Indian Express on March 25, 2015. T. Vishnu Vardhan gave his inputs.

Sharanya Gopinathan, a recent graduate, was overjoyed at the decision. The youngster, who is now pursuing her masters in London, recalls the time her post on Facebook about Prime Minister Narendra Modi was reported for being offensive.

“It was just a sentence about how I felt about Mr Modi. Nothing obscene but it still got reported,” she says. She believes the Internet to be “the last guard of freedom”, where free speech has real meaning because there is no government and corporate control.

Forums propagating freedom on the World Wide Web too have applauded the verdict.

T Vishnu Vardhan, programme director of Access to Knowledge at the Centre for Internet and Society, says the draconian aspect of the IT Act has finally been removed.

The other laws coming under the IT Act’s ambit too need to be reviewed and changed, he said.

Lawyers told Express that many times, they have advised clients to take down posts that could be construed as offensive under Section 66A.

Lawrence Liang, a lawyer with the Alternative Law Forum, says, “Recently, we were approached by a woman saying she was being harassed by a mob after she tweeted about the beef ban in Maharashtra. We asked her to delete the tweet and lie low.”

“But now, I won’t advise people to take down their posts from the internet. It is a good ruling and gives people their freedom of speech and expression on the Internet,” Lawrence says.

Change on the Horizon

With bans raining down in the country, many believe the apex court’s decision will bring about change.

Yogita Dakshina, a freelance content writer who regularly posts about the hardships faced by the LGBT community, says she has always posted fearlessly but some of her family members were always scared that she would court trouble due to the provisions of Section 66A.

Prabahan Chakravorty, a PhD student, is of the view that this will be a big lift for those in the creative field. “The rights to freedom and expression need to be given to all citizens, especially writers and artists. Some people may consider a few posts offensive, but then, the world is offensive and people need to deal with that.”

On the responsibility that falls upon netizens with this verdict, Ankura Nayak, a student of Mount Carmel College, says, “People are responsible and they know what to post. There were a few people who posted irresponsible content even before this ruling. But these are few in number compared to responsible netizens.”

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/new-indian-express-march-25-2015-parina-dhilla-netizens-rejoice-over-sc-ruling-to-keep-the-net-free

Net neutrality: Net activism packs a punch

praskrishna — 2015-05-09T09:02:03Z

For the first time in the history of internet campaigns in India, a protest movement has successfully changed the course of a debate without having to take to the streets. The net neutrality movement is being fought almost totally in the virtual world. Hashtag activism isn't new in India. In recent times, several big campaigns have been bolstered by the internet which helped mobilize mass support and kept people constantly updated on events. Pink Chaddi, Jan Lokpal and the Nirbhaya movements were some examples of successful on-the-ground campaigns that were galvanized by social media. But they still needed public action — dharnas, candlelight vigils and actual pink undies — to make a difference.

The article by Sandhya Soman was published in the Times of India on April 19, 2015. Pranesh Prakash was quoted.

But the ongoing battle for internet freedom has proved that clicktivism isn't just about passive engagement with a cause. While it's all too easy to 'like' a cause, leading to what David Carr describes as "favoriting fatigue" in an article in the New York Times, some clicks can count in the real world.

It all started when the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (Trai) posted a vaguely worded and complicated discussion paper on net neutrality and called for public responses to it. "Clearly, many people understood that some of the proposals put forward by Trai in its paper threatened the internet as they knew it," says Anja Kovacs, who directs the Internet Democracy Project and has closely followed online activism in India.

Soon, an unlikely collective of techies, lawyers, journalists and even stand-up comics had banded together. Some of them — such as tech entrepreneur Kiran Jonnalagadda and journalist Nikhil Pahwa — had been writing and tweeting about the issue for a while but the Trai paper galvanized them. "I dropped everything and asked for help. Kiran, (lawyers) Apar Gupta amd Raman Chima, Sandeep Pillai, standup group All India Bakchod and several Reddit India users (some of whom remain anonymous), started getting involved," says Pahwa, who is the founder of Medianama. The only common factor was their love for internet and an acute worry what this policy consultation might do to destroy its open and equal nature.

Though scattered across India, once they came together online, this 'apolitical collective' was able to rope in engineers, developers, open source activists, entrepreneurs, policy experts, lawyers and journalists as volunteers.

The best way to counter propaganda and opposition was to get people involved. An abridged version of the voluminous Trai paper was posted online, and a FAQ section created on a public Google Doc. "Many came forward to answer the questions and that exercise helped create an understanding of the situation," explains Pahwa. By the time, Jonnalagadda and a few other developers set up the savetheinternet.in website by April 1, there was enough information and data points. Lawyers Gupta and Chima had also decoded the legalese and prepared cogent answers to Trai's 20 questions. This was turned into a ready-to-use email template for users to hit 'send'.

And send they did. The flood of emails to the Trai inbox number is already 803,723 and counting. The results of the social media backlash are evident — with e-commerce retailer Flipkart pulling out of Airtel Zero and several websites backing out of Facebook and Reliance's internet.org. "I was hoping to get around 15,000 responses to counter, say, 15 from the telecom lobby. Now, people make fun of me because I said that," laughs Pahwa. In this case, what also struck a chord was the idea of a bunch of young guys using tech to take on mismanagement by the older generation and corporate greed, says entrepreneur Mahesh Murthy. "We were telling them we like things on the internet as they are now."

But it is hard to sustain online outrage without an action plan, relentless groundwork and some comic warfare. So, when the contentious paper came out on March 27, the website was followed by AIB's punchy video that decoded the concept and took irreverent potshots at those who wanted to limit access while urging people to write to Trai. A lot of the lessons for the campaign came from the US where a John Oliver video turned the tide in the net neutrality debate. "We had seen that several people don't take internet petitions seriously. Also, we wanted to follow the proper legal course in this issue and not hold dharnas," says Jonnalagadda.

It is also important for campaigns to result in doable action. As Kovacs points out, savetheinternet.in and netneutrality. in gave users practical tools to respond before the April 24 deadline. The team also kept clarifying doubts and complex concepts on social media and also had an AMA (ask me anything) chat on Scrollback on Saturday while the 'other side' stuck to big words and jargon.

Of course, like every movement, this one too has attracted criticism. The proneutrality band has been branded as socialist and utopian and there were intense arguments amongst supporters. "Disagreements and arguments are not unique to the activism online," says Pranesh Prakash, policy director at Centre for Internet and Society.

Earlier in the debate, Prakash had said he'd received strong pushback from friends and allies when he spoke about the possible benefits of non-competitive zero rating, an example would be allowing companies to offer free access to their sites and apps via an arrangement with a telecom company — if effective competition exists. Airtel Zero and Reliance's Internet.org claim to do the same though most supporters remain critical. Says Prakash: "There might've been differences. But the fact that a lot of people are thinking about effects of 'free', and comparing it to predatory pricing shows that #savetheinternet is one of the better examples of engaged activism."

Online campaigns have previously also successfully mobilized people to get involved in issues they do not know much about, says author Nilanajana Roy, who is an influential voice on Twitter. The J&K flood relief efforts last year started on Twitter but got volunteers moving on the ground, she says. "People don't always realize what they care strongly about so, despite the risk of compassion fatigue or armchair volunteerism, it's worth having some online activism," says Roy.

Meanwhile, those behind the savetheinternet campaign are struggling with their new-found identity as "activists". "I think of myself as a venture capitalist and marketing consultant, not a khadi kurta-jholawala from JNU," says Mahesh Murthy, among those who strongly support the movement.

And at the end of the day, most of these activists would like to go back to their cubicles, free to browse or start a business. But not before they've tried to keep the internet open.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-times-of-india-sandhya-soman-april-19-2015-net-neutrality-net-activism-packs-a-punch

Nanny state rules porn bad for you

praskrishna — 2015-08-05T01:39:28Z

The article by Anahita Mukherji was published in the Times of India on August 4, 2015. Pranesh Prakash gave his inputs.

Half a century ago, India banned the DH Lawrence classic, Lady Chatterley's Lover. The ban, though lambasted for its Victorian view of modesty and obscenity, was fair and square; the matter was debated in the Supreme Court, which upheld the ban. Over 50 years later, a diverse spectrum of civil society has slammed a much more insidious and far less transparent ban on internet pornography.

For starters, the 857 sites that vanished from India's internet sphere haven't been officially banned, they just don't show up when you type the url. The order blocking them isn't public. For a list of the 857 sites, one must rely on leaked documents put out on Twitter by Pranesh Prakash, policy director, Centre for Internet and Society. "The ban on Lady Chatterley's Lover was public. As for the blocked websites, the government has gone out of its way to hide the list of sites pulled down. A secret order banning material violates all principles of transparency in a democracy," says Prakash.

The document, with 'Restricted' written on it, is a letter from the department of telecom asking ISPs to disable 857 sites as they bear content related to "morality" and "decency," violating Article 19 (2).

Strangely, the order's been issued under Sec 79 (3)(b) of the IT Act dealing with intermediaries having to remove material used to commit unlawful acts. "Watching porn isn't illegal in India. Disseminating 'obscene' content can be illegal, but for that, the government must file a case against the sites, and they must be allowed a representation," says Prakash.

"Sec 79 (3)(b) of the IT act isn't the section under which governments can block sites. It should use Sec 69 that has a review process," says Nikhil Pahwa, a champion of internet freedom.

The government drew up its list of 857 sites even as SC is in the process of hearing a petition to ban porn and is yet to pass an order. It includes playboy.com that, says Prakash, is a legitimate adult site. Pahwa points to the ban's "bizarrely moralistic undertones".

"As society evolves, government and regulatory regime are stuck in medieval ages," he says, adding a ban on websites will be rendered ineffective, pushing users to VPNs, a black hole for government monitoring mechanisms.

"A government that hasn't succeeded with Make in India is trying to prevent Make out in India," says venture capitalist Mahesh Murthy, who earlier backed net neutrality.

"The government is blocking websites to keep Rightwing lunatic fringes happy after its unsuccessful bid to pass the land bill," says Murthy.

"It isn't merely looking at blocking porn, but is trying to bring back Sec 66A (IT Act), ruled unconstitutional by the SC," he adds. "It's part of the bid to restrict individual freedom, create an artificial separation between Indian culture and anything erotic, driven by a diktat from Hindutva forces. It's ironic as Modi came to power as someone looking to activate individual agency. Now he's wary about where that leads to," says Subir Sinha, professor at the School of Oriental and African Studies (London). Murthy and Sinha believe the issue stems from a refusal to accept Indian culture in totality. "Victorian morality is considered Hindu, Khajuraho isn't," says Murthy.

"The government seems to be acting in a more high-handed manner than previous ones. The press and public opinion should wake up to this," says sociologist Andre Beteille.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-times-of-india-august-4-2015-anahita-mukherji-nanny-state-rules-porn-bad-for-you