Centre for Internet and Society

The noose tightens on freedom of speech on the Internet

praskrishna — 2015-03-27T01:06:52Z

A WORRYING trend has emerged in the last few years, where intermediaries around the world are being used as chokepoints to restrict freedom of expression online, and to hold users accountable for content.

The blog post by Gabey Goh was published by Digital News Asia on March 26, 2015. Jyoti Panday gave her inputs.

“All communication across the Internet is facilitated by intermediaries: Service providers, social networks, search engines, and more,” said Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) senior global policy analyst Jeremy Malcolm.

“These services are all routinely asked to take down content, and their policies for responding are often muddled, heavy-handed, or inconsistent.

“That results in censorship and the limiting of people’s rights,” he told Digital News Asia (DNA) on the sidelines of RightsCon, an Internet and human rights conference hosted in Manila from March 24-25.

This year, the government of France is moving to implement regulation that makes Internet operators ‘accomplices’ of hate-speech offences if they host extremist messages.

In February, the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) and the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) urged ICANN (the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) to ensure that domain name registries and registrars “investigate copyright abuse complaints and respond appropriately.”

Closer to home, the Malaysian Government passed a controversial amendment to the Evidence Act 1950 – Section 114A – back in 2012.

Under Section 114A, an Internet user is deemed the publisher of any online content unless proven otherwise. The new legislation also makes individuals and those who administer, operate or provide spaces for online community forums, blogging and hosting services, liable for content published through their services.

Due to the potential negative impact on freedom of expression, a roadmap called the Manila Principles on Internet Liability was launched during RightsCon.

The EFF, Centre for Internet Society India, Article 19, and other global partners unveiled the principles, whose framework outlines clear, fair requirements for content removal requests and details how to minimise the damage a takedown can do.

For example, if content is restricted because it’s unlawful in one country or region, then the scope of the restriction should be geographically limited as well.

The principles also urge adoption of laws shielding intermediaries from liability for third-party content, which encourages the creation of platforms that allow for online discussion and debate about controversial issues.

“Our goal is to protect everyone’s freedom of expression with a framework of safeguards and best practices for responding to requests for content removal,” said Malcolm.

Jyoti Panday from the Centre for Internet and Society India noted that people ask for expression to be removed from the Internet for various reasons, good and bad, claiming the authority of myriad local and national laws.

“It’s easy for important, lawful content to get caught in the crossfire. We hope these principles empower everyone – from governments and intermediaries, to the public – to fight back when online expression is censored,” she said.

The Manila Principles can be summarised in six key points:

Intermediaries should be shielded by law from liability for third-party content.

Content must not be required to be restricted without an order by a judicial authority.

Requests for restrictions of content must be clear, be unambiguous, and follow due process.

Laws and content restriction orders and practices must comply with the tests of necessity and proportionality.

Laws and content restriction policies and practices must respect due process.

Transparency and accountability must be built in to laws and content restriction policies and practices.

“Right now, different countries have differing levels of protection when it comes to intermediary liability, and we’re saying that there should be expansive protection across all content,” said Malcolm (pic).

“In addition, there is no logic in distinguishing between intellectual property (IP) and other forms of content as in the case in the United States for example, where under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, intermediaries are not liable for third party content but that doesn’t apply to IP,” he added.

The Manila Principles have two main targets: Governments and intermediaries themselves. The coalition, led by EFF, will be approaching governments to present the document and discuss the recommendations on how best to establish an intermediary liability regime.

This includes immunising intermediaries from liability and requiring a court order before any content can be taken down.

With intermediaries, the list includes companies such as Facebook, Twitter and Google, to discuss establishing transparency, responsibility and accountability in any actions taken.

“We recognise that a lot of the time, intermediaries are not waiting for a court order before taking down content, and we’re telling them to avoid removing content unless there is a sufficiently good reason and users have been notified and presented that reason,” said Malcolm.

The overall aim with the Manila Principles is to influence policy changes for the better.

Malcolm pointed out that by coincidence, some encouraging developments have taken place in India. On the same day the principles were released, the Indian Supreme Court struck down the notorious Section 66A of the country’s Information Technology Act.

Since 2009, the law had allowed both criminal charges against users and the removal of content by intermediaries based on vague allegations that the content was “grossly offensive or has menacing character,” or that false information was posted “for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will.”

Calling it a “landmark decision”, Malcolm noted that the case shows why the establishment and promotion of the Manila Principles are important.

“Not only is the potential overreach of this provision obvious on its face, but it was, in practice, misused to quell legitimate discussion online, including in the case of the plaintiffs in that case – two young women, one of whom made an innocuous Facebook post mildly critical of government officials, and the other who ‘liked’ it,” he said.

The court however, upheld section 69A of the Act, which allows the Government to block online content; and Section 79(3), which makes intermediaries such as YouTube or Facebook liable for not complying with government orders for censorship of content.

Gabey Goh reports from RightsCon in Manila at the kind invitation of the South-East Asian Press Alliance or Seapa.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/digital-news-asia-gabey-goh-march-26-2015-noose-tightens-on-freedom-of-speech-on-internet

The Making of an Asian City

nishant — 2012-08-10T08:33:48Z

Nishant Shah attended the conference on 'Pluralism in Asia: Asserting Transnational Identities, Politics, and Perspectives' organised by the Asia Scholarship Foundation, in Bangkok, where he presented the final paper based on his work in Shanghai. The paper, titled 'The Making of an Asian City', consolidates the different case studies and stories collected in this blog, in order to make a larger analyses about questions of cultural production, political interventions and the invisible processes that are a part of the IT Cities.

The Promise of Invisibility: The Making of an Asian IT City

Abstract: This paper understands that in emerging Asian contexts, the proliferation and adoption of Internet technologies leads to two distinct changes in the material (re)construction of the city:

1. Built Form of the City: The physical and material aspects of the city are restructured, redesigned and realigned to house the infrastructure of Internet Technology economies.

2. Governance and Administration: The technologies of governance (and also, the governance of technologies) that reconfigure the city for better control, regulation and containment of the subjects of the state.

These changes are articulated and understood, in contemporary scholarship and discourse, through the tropes of Access and Transparency, which propose Technology as neutral. These studies also locate technology as outside of the changing socio-political transformations that the city undergoes in its attempt to emerge as an IT City. The framework, by contextualising technology differently – in larger narratives of continuity and disruption – opens up a dialogue between cybercultures and social sciences to look at conditions of change It also shows how the It demonstrates how such an approach to technology studies enables new and nuanced forms of social sciences inquiry into processes like Dislocation and Migration, which have never addressed the technology question as central to the phenomena.

Context

The 21^st Century has seen accelerated urbanisation and spatial restructuration of cities in emerging information societies around the world. These cities are created as global hubs that shall not only house the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) infrastructure, but also embody the aesthetics, politics, practices and lifestyles that the global cultural revolutions are bringing in. The technologies are significantly involved in the production of the dominant, the hegemonic and the coercive, all under the rubric of economic growth and development, and have affected domains of life, labour and language (Foucault,1998) in different contexts. It is easy to trace the ways in which lifestyle, cultural expression (Bagga, 2005), texture of social interaction and mobilisation, and political and administrative reorganisation (Roy, 2005) have changed in emerging contexts like India and China.

The efforts at creating ‘global countries’ (Kalam, 2004) that can harness the powers of ICT, have lead to three distinct forms of changes. These changes can be seen in the built form of the city, in structures of governance and administration, and in attitudes and Imagination of technologies as they emerge in popular discourse and cultural production. Each of these changes is articulated and explained through the tropes of Transparency and Access. The paper has a specific interest in looking at sites of dislocation and migration, to illustrate the arguments it seeks to make. The paper relies on secondary and tertiary literature (often in translation), unstructured interviews and participant observation to make an argument about how the aesthetics, mechanics and political [i] imaginaries of technology are a part of the physically changing and transforming IT cities in Asia. In order to make the argument, however, a brief context that explains the material signification of these three kinds of changes, is necessary to be explicated.

Beyond the Blogosphere

There has been an equal amount of optimism and scepticism when it comes to talking about the new public spheres that emerge with the Internet. Clubbed under the short-hand ‘Blogosphere’, both the evangelists and the critics of the blogosphere, have explored the Habermassian notion of the engaging public that is crafted with the emergence of new technologies of literacy, expression and participation. In many ways, the governance structures that have been discussed earlier, also endorse the positions taken by these interlocutors. However, much of the discourse, understands the blogosphere as contained in the digital domains. While a cause-and-effect model is often posited, the chief interest and focus remains on the new public, new voices and new spaces within the virtualities of the World Wide Web. This paper challenges such narrow definitions of the public sphere, and in fact, goes back to Habermass to locate technologies and public spaces within a certain historical context. In fact, this paper proposes that the increasing need for the faith in the blogosphere and the clamour that surrounds it is symptomatic of how the physical and built public spaces, in most Asian IT cities, is slowly diminishing.

In Shanghai, it is the loss of a political public space of socialist capital and industry that marks the beginning of this disappearance. 20 years ago, the announcer on every passenger train entering Shanghai would introduce the city as “the largest industrial city in China.” When W. E. B. Du Bois, an African-American writer, visited Shanghai in 1959, he was particularly invited to visit the balcony of Shanghai Mansion, which sits at the mouth of the Suzhou River and was the tallest building of its time, to catch a bird’s eye view of the new urban socialist landscape and the innumerable factory chimneys that speared the sky (Zhang, 2002).[ii] Indeed, an abundant number of factories, warehouses and dockyards cropped up in the three decades after 1950, and, together with the existing industrial constructions, made Shanghai a “new metropolis.” Some of them were clustered in suburban areas, more were scattered in the city area. Some were even squeezed into Longtangs (the narrow alleyways of old Shanghai). The industrial constructions include not only factory buildings but also workers’ residential buildings in factory-concentrated areas. The workers’ residential buildings were targeted primarily at the senior or skilled workers among the industrial population. Life in the residential buildings became an extension of factory life since neighbours were most probably co-workers in the same factory. It is precisely the great number of old and new industrial constructions and the rhythmic life going on in them that composed the socialist industrial space of Shanghai. Needless to say, it was the fastest growing space in the forty years after 1949.

However, nine out of ten such spaces have been wiped out during the fifteen-year urban renewal project, which is perhaps embodied in the restructuring of the Bund as a space of tourist attraction, and eventually the building of the Pudong skyline that has now become the iconic face of the city (Yatsko, 1996, pp 59).[iii] Factories—let alone warehouses—within the Inner Ring Road have either closed down or been removed. With the closing of the factories, the workers also have no place to work anymore. Dr. Wang XiaoMing, in his essay on the changing public space mentions how, once the factory he worked in “had its signboard removed in 1997, the workers have no place to work anymore. The inhabitants of Caoyang New Village have thrown away the signboard off the gate a long time ago and could barely remember that the place was once called the “Workers New Village.” Large factories located on the outskirts of the city are mostly shut down and the places are as quiet as cemeteries” (forthcoming, 2010).

As Americanised industrial parks sprout up in places such as the Pudong District of Shanghai, and Kunshan and Suzhou to the north of Shanghai, the socialist industrial space is shrinking rapidly both within and without Shanghai. Another space that has significantly diminished is the public political space. One of the most important requirements socialism places on urban space is to be able to facilitate large-scale political rallies and parades (Kewen 2006 and Liang 1959).[iv]

Therefore, apart from industrial constructions, the most eye-catching constructions in Shanghai’s new urban constructions from the 1950s to the 1960s were squares and large meeting halls, which include the People’s Square, the Sino-Russian Friendship Building, the Cultural Plaza, and so on.[v] Moreover, government agencies of all levels and factories endeavoured to build conference halls of various sizes for political meetings by transforming theatre halls or building new ones. In the past, tens of thousands of people have paraded down the People’s Square to pay tribute to the officials perched high above on reviewing stands. People rallying in various meeting halls, changing slogans to express joy, and echoing the instructions from the speakers on stage, were frequent occurrences. During the Cultural Revolution, the Rebels staged the final resistance here; in the late 1980s, fervent university students had swarmed into People’s Square to turn it into a place of revelry (Feuchtwang, 2004).

In the blink of an eye, these histories have faded from the public memory and been completely erased from the city’s architectural space. Sino-Russia Friendship Building is renamed Shanghai Exhibition Center, which hosts a constant blur of Expos. After repeated segmentation, People’s Square is now only a nominal square with a long and narrow driveway and most of its space has been occupied by new buildings such as the majestic Shanghai Grand Theatre, the Shanghai Museum, the sunken commercial street and a parking lot. Cultural Plaza was first transformed into a large flower market which was later torn down and pushed to a corner to make way for the new “Music Plaza.” With mass meetings completely eradicated from the life of Shanghai’s residents, the numerous assembly halls and meeting places of various sizes have naturally been restructures for other purposes. People participate with zeal in large assemblies such as concerts, performance competitions, and so on, which have nothing to do with public politics. It is even possible to say that the audience’s shrieks in the stadium symbolize the massive decrease of the public political space in both architectural and spiritual sense (Tang, 2009, pp 327).

Another cluster of spaces that have significantly disappeared are the gossip centres concentrated in areas such as the mouth of NongTang, Lao Hu Zhao [vi], variety store and lane. It is a cultural given that the Shanghainese like to strike up a conversation with strangers and to engage in gossip; this is indeed one of the city’s hallmarks. The Shanghainese can always spare time for gossip: no matter how busy the atmosphere is, there are always some people who loiter around with hands in pockets; even the working class who work from dawn to dusk like to exchange a few words with their neighbours after work. It so happened that the living space was very cramped for the Shanghainese after the 1950s.[vii] The rich can idle away their time in places such as cinemas whereas the low-income people can only manage to find a free space of leisure near their residences. The first choice is the mouth of NongTang adjacent to the footpath, from which all the comings and goings of residents and the traffics on the streets could be perceived. There will always be a Lao Hu Zhao near the mouth of a big NongTang, where you can sit for a whole afternoon and exchange hearsays with neighbours coming for hot water over a cup of tea; or there is a family-run variety store whose female boss is quite fond of trading rumours and gossip with customers across the narrow counter. In times of local or national crises, this is always the first place where the news is spread and gets distorted.

Things have now changed. Lao Huo Zhaos are gone. Variety stores are quickly replaced by different kinds of convenience stores (Huang, 2004, pp 49-50). Although many similar or even smaller family-run variety stores are opened at the newly-formed district bordering the city, a stable communication space cannot form in these stores since the male or female boss is mostly “non-native population”[viii], who not only is unable to blend in with the local residents but also may move away at any time. Although being one of the hallmarks of old Shanghai houses, the nongtangs have been pulled down in large numbers. Those narrow, winding streets have been either diverted, or straightened and widened. Shabby houses on both sides of the streets have disappeared. Also gone are the hustle and bustle, the interfusion of public and private space, and street gossips, which have been replaced by heavy traffic with exhaust gas and noise. With the increasingly neat arrangement of construction space within the city, the influx of transient population, residents increasingly accustomed to shutting doors to the world and to their neighbours, the overwhelming clamour in the media, and the young people’s addiction to internet and game bars, the space where rumours and gossips are spread via mouths and pointing fingers is naturally contracted (Yeung, 1996, pp. 78-84).

These old spaces of early Shanghainese modernity are quickly replaced by three new built forms. The first are the various above-ground, underground, and overhead expressways. Intersecting and intertwining together, they make the whole city look as if it were trapped in a python’s nest. The second thing that comes to the mind is commercial space.[ix] Shopping malls[x] line both the sides of the streets in downtown Shanghai, whereas hypermarkets cluster at the periphery of the city (Diao, 2006)[xi]. With the speedy expansion of space (Li, 2006)[xii], the style of constructions are increasingly uniform: nearly all of them name themselves “squares”; shopping malls are lined with chain stores on every level; chain supermarkets create mazes of different sizes with dense goods shelves; in office buildings, glass doors and plastic boards partition the office into many honeycomb-like cubicles, making the people working in them increasingly look like worker bees; the hospitality industry is overwhelmed with chain hotels of similar facilities and styles, even customers often forget which hotel they stay in last time (Fulong, 1999). The accelerated standardization process in Shanghai’s space highlights a tendency to obtain the standard outlook of the imagined “international metropolis” and an urgency to erase the distinct features inherited from the past.

Thirdly, the office space of governments and state monopolies expands in a unique sense: although the floor area has increased significantly[xiii], it is the upgrading and the move towards luxury that marks the change. Since the early 1990s, luxurious office buildings with halls paved with marble floor, central air conditioning system, shiny wood floors, CEO office suite with separate bathroom, were built first by banks, then revenue departments, telecommunication agencies, newspapers offices, television stations, courts, and police stations of different levels, and at last governments of municipal, district and even lower levels.[xiv] Not only the connotation of “work” has been enriched, but also other business spaces outside the office have expanded with restaurants, coffee bars, official reception hotels, training centers and vacation centers located in the office buildings or on the outskirts of town or other cities (Leaf, 1997, pp. 156-159).

The changes in the built form of the new IT City that has emerged, are particularly important because they signal the ways in which certain kinds of populations are made redundant in the city as it grows physically more hostile to their life in it. The erasure of histories, of public spaces, of spaces of political negotiation is symptomatic of the new ideologies, policies and dreams that Shanghai-Pudong embody. Most of the studies that look at these changes, concentrate only on the physical and material aspects of it, and ignore the aesthetics, politics, and changes that Internet technologies are bringing in, not only in the imagination of what constitutes a city, but also in the material and lived practices of the people in it (Appadurai, 1990). Government policies that ignore technologies, come to dead-ends in their intervention, as they fail to recognise the new geographies and terrains that the technology users navigate through. Interventions by the Development Sector or the Civil Society Movements often fail to recognise the structures of governance as informed by internet technologies, thus perpetrating the very evils that they fight against. Dislocation and Migration, which are complex issues, get reduced to only geography and physical places – leading to a simplified structure of rehabilitation, largely propelled by the vocabulary of the market and the state. Remunerations, economic rights and livelihood are the only questions addressed. In the process Community rights, structures of communication and networking, relationships within families and societies, ineffable ties and bonds that keep the communities coherent – these affective categories which are dislocated and forced to migrate because of the presence of technologies, fail to register either in the scholarship or in the practices in these areas.

This is where the blogosphere needs to be located – as not merely producing a new space of engagement, but helping in recovering the lost spaces of public participation and community communication. The blogosphere is not merely the invention of a technology marked digital native or the discovery of groups seeking alternative narratives. It is recognition of the fact that the regular mainstream public discourse, interacts with the social transformations and politics of our time and depend on the sustenance of public spheres for the socio-cultural categories like communities, neighbourhoods, public space, etc. to survive. The blogosphere, in the quickly changing, hyper-real landscape of Shanghai-Pudong’s geography is the new variety store, the new location for the Lao Hu Zhao and the space that the labyrinthine networks of nongtangs are mapped on.

e-Governance and its discontents

The change in the physical reorganisation of the city is not only a pragmatic decision. This disappearance of the public space of gossip, information dissemination and distortion, of informal conversations and deliberations tied in closely to the three levels of government in Shanghai – district government, street office and alley office – being able to increasingly control the leisure life of the Shanghainese through administrative planning and organisation (Zhang, 2004). There is a clear link between the government’s imagination of its own territory, the notion of the citizen who is to occupy these spaces, and the material practices that happen in these technology marked spaces (Feuchtwang, 2004). While it is an acknowledged fact that the Chinese government does not follow the structures and paradigms that a North-Western Democratic Liberal ideology that has produced the category of Nation-State in most contemporary discourse, there are still two specific forms of technology inflected governance structures which China seems to share with other contexts which might be geo-politically different.

The e-Governance models, which find resonances in most emerging contexts in the Global South, seem to develop two simultaneous and often ironically related approaches towards citizenship and administration, especially in the context of China. With its already forked governance policies, which treat HongKong – its colonial success story – differently from the rest of Mainland China (and the added complication of Taiwan) the governance structures are marked by technology in significant ways. These structures are suffused with irony, because of the tropes of transparency and invisibility that they use to articulate their rationale and processes.

The first is the approach of Rural Development through ICT networks, positing an access based model of participatory citizenship (Tarlo, 2003) and continuing the Development rhetoric of uplift and reform of the deprived citizen. This particular kind of governance structure re-imagines the beneficiary of state/government processes as existing in a condition of invisibility, and outside of the folds of technology. The particular emphasis on e-government, while it is located in the urban settings, is actually intended for reaching the citizen in the remote parts of the country, who does not have any engagement or direct interaction with processes of governance. Despite China’s three tiered government structure, the imagination of e-governance hold a strong currency because it makes visible, the people, practices and communities which otherwise exist in the subliminal and grey areas which were hitherto not in the focus of the government. Fuelling the rhetoric of e-government is the premium on information dissemination and transparent administration in order to enhance the domains of life and labour in the rural parts of the country.

This approach draws its strength from the Development agenda of reform and uplift as it markedly emphasises the distance between the ‘haves and the have-nots’. However, the valourisation of transparency goes hand-in-glove with the production of the invisible (but cognisable) citizen who needs to be reproduced within the paradigms of technology. The peasant, who has been at the back-bone of China’s socialist political ideology, under this new articulation of transparency, becomes invisible – robbed of the historicity, the cultural iconoclasms and the empowerment that such policies earlier provided. Instead, the peasant becomes a worker who needs to be rehabilitated into the changing geographies of Pudong, the new IT city that requires a worker equipped with new skills and lifestyles. This approach draws its strength from the Developmental agenda of reform and uplift as it markedly emphasises the distance between the ‘haves and the have-nots’ (Jaswal, 2005) and offers ICT enabled development as the panacea for the problems of unemployment, illiteracy, chronic poverty, etc. This approach is made manifest in the establishment of Telecentre kiosks, rural BPOs, e-literacy schools and mobile vans, setting up of mobile and internet technology centres, digitisation of the state’s resources, digital access centres to important data-sets, initiation of projects like ‘One Home One Computer’, the e-literacy campaigns, and the building of special economic zones (SEZ) and IT Corridors under the aegis of e-governance (Hawks, 2009).

The second approach is invested in the massive restructuration of the urban spaces to create infrastructure that attracts foreign investment and ICT enabled multinational corporations. This approach uses the language of creating a S.M.A.R.T. (Smart, Moral, Accountable, Responsive, Transparent) State, modelling the new spaces and politics around the new models of capital modernity (Appadurai, 1996) like Singapore, Shanghai, Tokyo and Taipei. This model is nuanced by a vocabulary of ‘global citizenship and globalised economy’ (Abbas, 1997), glorifying the new economic opportunities, flows of foreign capital, enhancement of lifestyle, and the promise of hypervisibility in the globalisation networks. The building up of network-neighbourhoods (Doheny-Farina, 1996), spaces of incessant commercial consumption, post modern digitalised aesthetics of living and housing, (Mitchell, 1996) infrastructure for ICT augmented lifestyles, spaces for sculpting hyperspatial bodies, and recreational zones that offer apolitical aesthetics of living (Chua, 2000), are all a part of this restructuration.

Contemporary analyses that deploy both these approaches are often contained within the language and the universes created by these approaches. Studies on e-governance concentrate on the processes of infrastructure development, the economic parameters of efficient administration, questions of rights and transparency and impact analyses of the public private partnership which is at the basis of most e-governance projects in India. Urban restructuration has found critique from disciplines that focus largely upon the promissory implementation of State policies, on the imbalance in the urban eco-systems, the new patterns of migration in the city, the cultural and class mobility that the new economies offer, and the emergence of the new middle class that becomes the figurehead of the IT revolution (Huang, 2005). Most studies look upon technology as incidental or instrumental; a tool towards an end. The relationship between ICTs and the State, and the kind of technosocial evolution they produce are generally zones of silence in most discourse. Both these discourses produce a certain hyper-visual citizen subject who is either the champion of the new Information societies or the victim of the digital divide that has ensued.

ICTs are often posited as neutral and transparent because they allow us to look at these two kinds of citizenships on the opposite end of the digital spectrum. It can be argued that the divides of ICTs are transparent and hence it offers clearly defined spaces of intervention and uplift. The development sector around the world has accepted this as a given and hence, along with the Governments, they have also been urging a blanket development of infrastructure of access to technology for a particular section of the society, in an attempt to ‘cure’ certain long standing problems. As in the case of India, China is also fuelled by this transparency rhetoric, which allows for the production of the power-user versus the un-networked and has pinned its hopes on the transformative powers of Internet Technologies. With more than two decades of ICT development in the country, and especially in spaces like Shanghai-Pudong, behind them, China seems to be facing a moment of crisis. On the one hand is its promotion and adoption of internet and digital technologies, which encourages younger users entering in “schools, colleges, universities and workforces to transform the economic conditions” (Heng, 2006). On the other hand is the imagination of these IT forces as transgressive, uncontrollable and in need of constant supervision in order to retain existing government-citizenship relationships and power structures. In the middle of this crisis, is another factor that the obvious suspects and users of technology, who are more under the radar, are not the people who are deploying technologies for political negotiation and using technology platforms for political mobilisation. Despite the efforts at green-washing its technologies and the production of the infamous Great Fire-wall of China, there has been a sustained use of internet technologies for resistance and subversion.

The spaces for subversion rises from the fact that with the making of the IT city, there has been a complex phenomenon of dislocation and migration, as several communities were made redundant in the logic of the IT City and were removed from the city. Many people from these communities re-entered the city as the new IT workforce after going through a ‘rehabilitation’ and ‘skill building’ to not only be a part of the IT labour groups but also to support the IT industry in the construction of the physical infrastructure. Moreover, there has been a steady flow of anonymous ‘outsiders’ who have found homes in the older nontangs and factories, and are in the subliminal zones of regulation. As the city is re-formed to make these people invisible (Abbas, 1997), their leisure space and time shrink and they find themselves increasingly forming the new prosumers of internet in Shanghai. However, in the transparency discourse that unfolds, these populations remain invisible and find spaces of resistance and political negotiation that their invisible status provides them. The promise of Invisibility that treats them as Wetware (the biological combination of a network consisting of Software and Hardware), allows for hope in the otherwise diminishing spaces of political articulation in a growing authoritarian regime in China.

Invisibility, Transparency and the Internet

The paper ends by re-formulating the relationship between the making of an IT City and the way in which transparency as a rhetoric and technology-as-instrumental method fail to account for the different kinds of changes that accompany the restructuring of these cities. On the one hand, there is shrinkage of physical space and built form, as new forms of technology infrastructure, global lifestyle and late capitalistic economies expand to fill up the spaces which were earlier available for political mobilisation, organisation and inhabitation. On the other, there is a diminishing political landscape, where, with the integration of the government with the market, there is a tendency to establish larger regulation and censorship in order to retain the status quo relationship between the government and the citizen, in the face of massive governance transition. Both these conditions are produced by the rise and spread of Information Technologies.

In the process, there are also only two kinds of citizenships that are addressed by the e-governance structures which work on a double edge: Firstly, they make the direct access (defined either by abundance or lack of access) citizenships hyper-visual, robbing them of nuances and looking upon them as implicated only in the discursive practices of Internet technologies. Second, they render invisible, the other supporting structures in order to highlight and focus on the economic development and growth propelled by the rise of the IT industries. In other words, they make the citizens who are central to the discourse, invisible, by treating them as embodiments of the new economic markets and aspirations, removing them from their traditional contexts, histories and spaces. Moreover, they make invisible/transparent, populations who are not marked by the aura of the Internet technologies, in order to bring into focus, the extraordinary changes – both in the physical built form as well as in the realms of governance – that have been initiated and accomplished with the making of the IT City Shanghai-Pudong.

References:

Abbas, Ackbar. 1997. Hong Kong: Culture and the Politics of Disappearance. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University press.

Appadurai, Arjun. 1990. "The Coming Community." In Global Culture, edited by Michael Featherstone. London: Sage.

Feuchtwang, Stephen. 2004. Making Place: State Projects, Globalisation and Local Responses in China. New York: Routledge Cavendish

Hawks, F.L. 2009. A Short History of Shanghai: Being an account of the growth and development of the international settlement. Beijing: China Intercontinental Press.

Hiibbard, Peter. 2008. The Bund Shanghai : China Faces the West. Odyssey Books and Guides.

Huang, Tsung-yi Michelle. 2004. Walking Between Slums and Skyscrapers : Illusions of open space in HK, Tokyo and Shanghai. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.

Leaf, Michael. 1998. ‘Urban planning and urban reality under Chinese economic reforms’, Journal of Planning Education and Research. 18(2): 145–153.

Li, Heng. 2006. “Behind the Spectacle of Commercial Real Estate,” Xinmin Weekly, 3rd issue (2006)

Mirsky, Jonathan. 2008. The Britannica Guide to Modern China : A comprehensive introduction to the world’s new economic giant. London: Constable and Robinson Ltd.

Diao Wenjun, “Analysis of the Present situation and Development Trend of Hypermarkets in Shanghai,” Shanghai Articles, 3rd issue (2006)

(STSN) Shanghai Times Square Newsletter. 2008. Issue No. 4. Shanghai.

Shu, Kewen. 2006. “the dynastic History of Tiananmen Square”, Life Week, Issue 11. 27^th March.

Sicheng, Liang. 1959. “Tiananmen Square”, Architectural Journal Issue 9-10. pp. 12.

SSY (Shanghai Statistical Yearbook) 1986, Shanghai Statistics Bureau, (September, 1986), p18, p412.

SSY(a) (shanghai Statistical Yearbook) 2005. Shanghai Statistics Bureau. China Statistics Press. August 2005.

Stanat, Michael. 2005. China’s Generation Y: Understanding the Future Leaders of the World’s Next Superpower. NY: Homa and Sekey Books.

Tang, Shih-che. 2009. ‘The club and the carrot of China’s globalization.’ Inter-Asia Cultural Studies. Volume 10, Number 2. Delhi: Routledge Journals.

Wu, Fulong. 1999. ‘The global and local dimensions of place-making: remaking Shanghai as a world city’. Urban Studies, 37(8): 1359–1377.

Xixian, Xu and Xu JianRong. 2004. A Changing Shanghai. Shangai: Shanghai People’s Fine Arts Publishing House.

Yeung, Yue-man. 1996. Shanghai: Transformation and Modernization Under China's Open Policy. Shanghai: Chinese University Press.

Zhang, Jishun. , “The Linong of Shanghai: the political mobilization of grass-roots and the trend of national social integration (1950-1955),” Chinese Social Sciences Today, 2nd issue, 2004

Zhang, Xudong. 2002. “The Construct of Shanghai: Criticism of Urban Idols, Non-mainstream Writing and the Diminishment of Modern Myths” Literary Review, the 5th edition

[i] The project wants to emphasize that it is not attempting a historiography of the building of the IT City of Shanghai-Pudong. Instead, by drawing selectively, different ways in which the technology imaginaries (technopolises, intellectual labour, globally homogenous geographies and time-lines, bodies marked by technology in their material practices, etc ) of the Internet, find structure and form in the emerging IT cities in Asia.

[ii] Zhang Chunqiao, Secretary of the Culture and Education Department of the Shanghai Municipal Committee who accompanied DuBois to Shanghai Mansion, specially mentioned DuBois’ visit in an article entitled “To Climb the New Summit of Victory.”.

[iii] In 1994, one Shanghai government officer stated, “the government plans to remove or close down two thirds of the factories located within [the range of] 106 square kilometers from the city centre, namely, within the Inner Ring Road.”. Due to different reasons (one of the main reasons is the increase of transferee cost because unsolved problems, such as the proper placement of a large number of former workers, have been bundled with the factory buildings and factory land), some factories still remain in their original places, although most of them have already stopped manufacturing and the workers dismissed. The industrial life/space has disappeared with the disappearance of the factories. Ruins of this life/space become some sort of commodity only because the land under the ruins still has some value.

[iv] On the day (1 October 1949) of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, Mao Zedong suggested rebuilding Tiananmen Square and making it a “grand and magnificent square.” See (Kewen, 2006). Liang Sicheng, who always insisted on preserving the old Beijing and opposed massive makeover, finally realized that the makeover was never about architecture but about politics: “As for the scale of Tiananmen Square … apart from considering the scale of man as a biological being and the scale of construction appropriate to the man’s physiology, we should also take into account the scale for the great collective requested by the political men in the new society.” Liang, 1959, pp 12).

[v] The People’s Square, transformed in 1953 from the original racecourse (which was nationalized in 1951 by the Municipal Military Control Commission), surrounded by woods, and paved with tiled and cemented floor, is the largest public space in Shanghai and can accommodate over one million people. The Sino-Russian Friendship Building, which was built in 1955 and was covering an area of 80,000 square meters, was the city’s largest building after the liberation of Shanghai and still ranks top in terms of its indoor space in today’s Shanghai. The Cultural Plaza, transformed in 1952 from the Greyhound Racecourse, had 12,500 seats and was the largest indoor hall in Shanghai.

[vi] It is a unique store that sells boiled water in Shanghai.

[vii] Shanghai’s housing shortage started in the early 20th century instead of the 1950s. The living space within Shanghai city is 16,100,000 square meters in total but 3.9 square meters per capita. During the 32 years from 1952 to 1985, 21,720,000 square meters of housing were built within the city and the registered population increased from 5,300,000 to 6,980,000. The housing shortage was still serious since by 1985, the living space had only reached 5.4 square meters per capita. (SSY, 1986). What needs to be clarified is that the statics of 1949 does not include the shabby slum houses commonly referred to as “gun di long.”

[viii] This is an increasingly popular new word in Shanghai over the last 20 years, which refers to the people who come from other provinces, especially the rural areas, and live in Shanghai but do not have permanent residence in Shanghai. According to the Shanghai Statistics Bureau’s report on March 2006, the immigrating labor population in Shanghai was 3,750,000. 2,840,000 of this population is in the manufacturing, construction, retail, and catering industry and engaged in low-income manual work. The immigrating population should be over 4 million if the large number of people (such as those in the household service business) and their children be taken into calculation.

[ix] In Shanghai, the floor area of shops has increased seven-fold from 4,030,000 square meters in 1990 to 2,857,000 square meters in 2004 and that of hotels has increased three-fold from 6,580,000 square meters in 1990 to 2,204,000 square meters in 2004. The increase of commercial space is even greater if that of commercial office buildings is calculated as well. (SSY(a), 2005, pp. 198)

[x] Take the area around Zhongshan Park for example, although it was one of the earliest developed leisure areas in Shanghai, there was only one small department store in the mid-1980s and the retail business developed slowly. However, within these ten years, with the completion of Zhongshan Park Station along the subway line 2 and light rail line 3, five multi-story shopping malls have been built, all within a radius of 500 meters. The newest among them is a 58-storey building with four levels of basement and nine levels of shopping mall.

[xi] By the end of 2005, hypermarkets measuring over 5000 square meters within Shanghai have reached 97 and 28 more have chosen their locations and would be opened soon. Because of a large number of hypermarkets and the intense competition brought about, a considerable number of them mainly profit from land appreciation rather than from retail.

[xii] By the end of 2005, the commercial real estate in Shanghai has reached a total of 2,900,000 square meters with 2.6 square meters per capita, far exceeding Hong Kong’s 1.2 square meters per capita.

[xiii] Barely 6 million square meters in 1990, the floor area of office buildings in Shanghai reached a total of 4,012,000 square meters in 2004. See Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 2005. Edited by Shanghai Statistics Bureau, published by China Statistics Press in August 2005, p 198. The statistical material on the increase of floor area of commercial office building cannot be found for the present. Even if the material were obtained, it would not be enough since a large area of commercial office building has been rented by many state-owned monopoly agencies. However, the expansion of government office space is great even if it take up only one tenth of the space of office buildings.

[xiv] Such phenomenon exists not only in Shanghai but all over the country, especially in cities and towns of low economic level. The towering and luxurious government, bank, taxation, and police buildings create an ironic contrast with the low and shabby constructions close by.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/research/grants/the-promise-of-invisibility-technology-and-the-city/finalpaper

The Last Word: Is there a need to review Information Technology Act?

praskrishna — 2012-11-21T12:10:15Z

Does the high-handed arrest of two young girls mean it's time to review and revise the IT Act?

Aryaman Sundaram, Pavan Duggal, Pranesh Prakash and Ravi Visvesvaraya Prasad took part in a discussion with Karan Thapar on section 66A of the IT Act. This was aired on CNN-IBN on November 20, 2012.

Pranesh Prakash said that it was just not a history of misuse of section 66A of the IT Act because that presumes that the law is otherwise fine and it has just been applied wrongly. This law is fundamentally flawed. It is unconstitutional. It is like a law in which there is a provision on rape, murder, theft, nuisance, everything put together in a single section with the same punishment being given for all of them. This obviously is not good law making but that is exactly what has been done in this case by taking bits from laws in the UK and from elsewhere and mashing them all up into one omnibust gargantuan monster which is unconstitutional.

Pranesh Prakash also added that the fact is that if you have bad laws they will be used to harass people. Having good law is one part of that. Apart from that there has been also other laws which have been misapplied in this case. In all these recent cases, section 66A of the IT Act wasn't the only provision used. This particular section has been used in conjunction with some other laws. So section 66A of the IT Act independently is not required. There are other laws in the Indian Penal Code and elsewhere which are usually enough to cover all the things that section 66A of the IT Act is right now covering. It is just an add on provision that really can't justify its existence unless it is really reduced in scope.

Watch the full video that was aired on CNN-IBN

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/ibnlive-videos-november-20-2012-the-last-word-is-there-a-need-to-review-information-technology-act

The Internet Has a New Standard for Censorship

jyoti — 2016-01-30T09:17:54Z

The introduction of the new 451 HTTP Error Status Code for blocked websites is a big step forward in cataloguing online censorship, especially in a country like India where access to information is routinely restricted.

The article was published in the Wire on January 29, 2016. The original can be read here.

Ray Bradbury’s dystopian novel Fahrenheit 451 opens with the declaration, “It was a pleasure to burn.” The six unassuming words offer a glimpse into the mindset of the novel’s protagonist, ‘the fireman’ Guy Montag, who burns books. Montag occupies a world of totalitarian state control over the media where learning is suppressed and censorship prevails. The title alludes to the ‘temperature at which book paper catches fire and burns,’ an apt reference to the act of violence committed against citizens through the systematic destruction of literature. It is tempting to think about the novel solely as a story of censorship. It certainly is. But it is also a story about the value of intellectual freedom and the importance of information.

Published in 1953, Bradbury’s story predates home computers, the Internet, Twitter and Facebook, and yet it anticipates the evolution of these technologies as tools for censorship. When the state seeks to censor speech, they use the most effective and easiest mechanisms available. In Bradbury’s dystopian world, burning books did the trick; in today’s world, governments achieve this by blocking access to information online. The majority of the world’s Internet users encounter censorship even if the contours of control vary depending on the country’s policies and infrastructure.

Online censorship in India

In India, information access blockades have become commonplace and are increasingly enforced across the country for maintaining political stability, for economic reasons, in defence of national security or preserving social values. Last week, the Maharashtra Anti-terror Squad blocked 94 websites that were allegedly radicalising the youth to join the militant group ISIS. Memorably, in 2015 the NDA government’s ham-fisted attempts at enforcing a ban on online pornography resulted in widespread public outrage. Instead of revoking the ban, the government issued yet another vaguely worded and in many senses astonishing order. As reported by Medianama, the revised order delegates the responsibility of determining whether banned websites should remain unavailable to private intermediaries.

The state’s shifting reasons for blocking access to information is reflective of its tendentious attitude towards speech and expression. Free speech in India is messily contested and normally, the role of the judiciary acts as a check on the executive’s proclivity for banning. For instance, in 2010 the Supreme Court upheld the Maharashtra High Court’s decision to revoke the ban on the book on Shivaji by American author James Laine, which, according to the state government, contained material promoting social enmity. However, in the context of communications technology the traditional role of courts is increasingly being passed on to private intermediaries.

The delegation of authority is evident in the government notifying intermediaries to proactively filter content for ‘child pornography’ in the revised order issued to deal with websites blocked as result of its crackdown on pornography. Such screening and filtering requires intermediaries to make a determination on the legality of content in order to avoid direct liability. As international best practices such as the Manila Principles on Intermediary Liability point out, such screening is a slow process and costly and intermediaries are incentivised to simply limit access to information.

Blocking procedures and secrecy

The constitutional validity of Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2008 which grants power to the executive to block access to information unchecked, and in secrecy was challenged in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India. Curiously, the Supreme Court upheld S69A reasoning that the provisions were narrowly-drawn with adequate safeguards and noted that any procedural inconsistencies may be challenged through writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution. Unfortunately as past instances of blocking under S69A reveal the provisions are littered with procedural deficiencies, amplified manifold by the authorities responsible for interpreting and implementing the orders.

Problematically, an opaque confidentiality criteria built into the blocking rules mandates secrecy in requests and recommendations for blocking and places written orders outside the purview of public scrutiny. As there are no comprehensive list of blocked websites or of the legal orders, the public has to rely on ISPs leaking orders, or media reports to understand the censorship regime in India. RTI applications requesting further information on the implementation of these safeguards have at best provided incomplete information.

Historically, the courts in India have held that Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India is as much about the right to receive information as it is to disseminate, and when there is a chilling effect on speech, it also violates the right to receive information. Therefore, if a website is blocked citizens have a constitutional right to know the legal grounds on which access is being restricted. Just like the government announces and clarifies the grounds when banning a book, users have a right to know the grounds for restrictions on their speech online.

Unfortunately, under the present blocking regime in India there is no easy way for a service provider to comply with a blocking order while also notifying users that censorship has taken place. The ‘Blocking Rules’ require notice “person or intermediary” thus implying that notice may be sent to either the originator or the intermediary. Further, the confidentiality clause raises the presumption that nobody beyond the intermediaries ought to know about a block.

Naturally, intermediaries interested in self-preservation and avoiding conflict with the government become complicit in maintaining secrecy in blocking orders. As a result, it is often difficult to determine why content is inaccessible and users often mistake censorship for technical problem in accessing content. Consequently, pursuing legal recourse or trying to hold the government accountable for their censorious activity becomes a challenge. In failing to consider the constitutional merits of the confidentiality clause, the Supreme Court has shied away from addressing the over-broad reach of the executive.

Secrecy in removing or blocking access is a global problem that places limits on the transparency expected from ISPs. Across many jurisdictions intermediaries are legally prohibited from publicising filtering orders as well as information relating to content or service restrictions. For example in United Kingdom, ISPs are prohibited from revealing blocking orders related to terrorism and surveillance. In South Korea, the Korean Communications Standards Commission holds public meetings that are open to the public. However, the sheer volume of censorship (i.e. close to 10,000 URLs a month) makes it unwieldy for public oversight.

As the Manila Principles note, providing users with an explanation and reasons for placing restrictions on their speech and expression increases civic engagement. Transparency standards will empower citizens to demand that companies and governments they interact with are more accountable when it comes to content regulation. It is worth noting, for conduits as opposed to content hosts, it may not always be technically feasible for to provide a notice when content is unavailable due to filtering. A new standard helps improve transparency standards for network level intermediaries and for websites bound by confidentiality requirements. The recently introduced HTTP code for errors is a critical step forward in cataloguing censorship on the Internet.

A standardised code for censorship

On December 21, 2015, the Internet Engineering Standards Group (IESG) which is the organisation responsible for reviewing and updating the internet’s operating standards approved the publication of 451-’An HTTP Status Code to Report Legal Obstacles’. The code provides intermediaries a standardised way to notify users know when a website is unavailable following a legal order. Publishing the code allows intermediaries to be transparent about their compliance with court and executive orders across jurisdictions and is a huge step forward for capturing online censorship. HTTP code 451 was introduced by software engineer Tim Bray and the code’s name is an homage to Bradbury’s novel Fahrenheit 451.

Bray began developing the code after being inspired by a blog post by Terence Eden calling for a censorship error code. The code’s official status comes after two years of discussions within the technical community and is a result of campaigning from transparency and civil society advocates who have been pushing for clearer labelling of internet censorship. Initially, the code received pushback from within the technical community for reasons enumerated by Mark Nottingham, Chair of the IETF HTTP Working Group in his blog. However, soon sites began using the code on an experimental and unsanctioned basis and faced with increasing demand for and feedback, the code was accepted.

The HTTP code 451 works as a machine-readable flag and has immense potential as a tool for organisations and users who want to quantify and understand censorship on the internet. Cataloguing online censorship is a challenging, time-consuming and expensive task. The HTTP code 451 circumvents confidentiality obligations built into blocking or licensing regimes and reduces the cost of accessing blocking orders.

The code creates a distinction between websites blocked following a court or an executive order, and when information is inaccessible due to technical errors. If implemented widely, Bray’s new code will help prevent confusion around blocked sites. The code addresses the issue of the ISP’s misleading and inaccurate usage of Error 403 ‘Forbidden’ (to indicate that the server can be reached and understood the request, but refuses to take any further action) or 404 ‘Not Found’ (to indicate that the requested resource could not be found but may be available again in the future).

Adoption of the new standard is optional, though at present there are no laws in India that prevent intermediaries doing so. Implementing a standardised machine-readable flag for censorship will go a long way in bolstering the accountability of ISPs that have in the past targeted an entire domain instead of the specified URL. Adoption of the standard by ISPs will also improve the understanding of the burden imposed on intermediaries for censoring and filtering content as presently, there is no clarity on what constitutes compliance. Of course, censorious governments may prohibit the use of the code, for example by issuing an order that specifies not only that a page be blocked, but also precisely which HTTP return code should be used. Though such sanctions should be viewed as evidence of systematic rights violation and totalitarian regimes.

In India where access to software code repositories such as Github and Sourceforge are routinely restricted, the need for such code is obvious. The use of the code will improve confidence in blocking practices, allowing users to understand the grounds on which their right to information is being restricted. Improving transparency around censorship is the only way to build trust between the government and its citizens about the laws and policies applicable to internet content.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-wire-jyoti-panday-january-29-2016-internet-has-a-new-standard-for-censorship

The Humpty-Dumpty Censorship of Television in India

bhairav — 2015-11-29T08:37:53Z

The Modi government’s attack on Sathiyam TV is another manifestation of the Indian state’s paranoia of the medium of film and television, and consequently, the irrational controlling impulse of the law.

The article originally published in the Wire on September 8, 2015 was also mirrored on the website Free Speech/Privacy/Technology.

It is tempting to think of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting’s (MIB) attack on Sathiyam TV solely as another authoritarian exhibition of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government’s intolerance of criticism and dissent. It certainly is. But it is also another manifestation of the Indian state’s paranoia of the medium of film and television, and consequently, the irrational controlling impulse of the law.

Sathiyam TV’s transgressions

Sathiyam’s transgressions began more than a year ago, on May 9, 2014, when it broadcast a preacher saying of an unnamed person: “Oh Lord! Remove this satanic person from the world!” The preacher also allegedly claimed this “dreadful person” was threatening Christianity. This, the MIB reticently claims, “appeared to be targeting a political leader”, referring presumably to Prime Minister Modi, to “potentially give rise to a communally sensitive situation and incite the public to violent tendencies.”

The MIB was also offended by a “senior journalist” who, on the same day, participated in a non-religious news discussion to allegedly claim Modi “engineered crowds at his rallies” and used “his oratorical skills to make people believe his false statements”. According to the MIB, this was defamatory and “appeared to malign and slander the Prime Minister which was repugnant to (his) esteemed office”.

For these two incidents, Sathiyam was served a show-cause notice on 16 December 2014 which it responded to the next day, denying the MIB’s claims. Sathiyam was heard in-person by a committee of bureaucrats on 6 February 2015. On 12 May 2015, the MIB handed Sathiyam an official an official “Warning” which appears to be unsupported by law. Sathiyam moved the Delhi High Court to challenge this.

As Sathiyam sought judicial protection, the MIB issued the channel a second warning August 26, 2016 citing three more objectionable news broadcasts of: a child being subjected to cruelty by a traditional healer in Assam; a gun murder inside a government hospital in Madhya Pradesh; and, a self-immolating man rushing the dais at a BJP rally in Telangana. All three news items were carried by other news channels and websites.

Governing communications

Most news providers use multiple media to transmit their content and suffer from complex and confusing regulation. Cable television is one such medium, so is the Internet; both media swiftly evolve to follow technological change. As the law struggles to keep up, governmental anxiety at the inability to perfectly control this vast field of speech and expression frequently expresses itself through acts of overreach and censorship.

In the newly-liberalised media landscape of the early 1990s, cable television sprang up in a legal vacuum. Doordarshan, the sole broadcaster, flourished in the Centre’s constitutionally-sanctioned monopoly of broadcasting which was only broken by the Supreme Court in 1995. The same year, Parliament enacted the Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act, 1995 (“Cable TV Act”) to create a licence regime to control cable television channels. The Cable TV Act is supplemented by the Cable Television Network Rules, 1994 (“Cable Rules”).

The state’s disquiet with communications technology is a recurring motif in modern Indian history. When the first telegraph line was laid in India, the colonial state was quick to recognize its potential for transmitting subversive speech and responded with strict controls. The fourth iteration of the telegraph law represents the colonial government’s perfection of the architecture of control. This law is the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, which continues to dominate communications governance in India today including, following a directive in 2004, broadcasting.

Vague and arbitrary law

The Cable TV Act requires cable news channels such as Sathiyam to obey a list of restrictions on content that is contained in the Cable Rules (“Programme Code“). Failure to conform to the Programme Code can result in seizure of equipment and imprisonment; but, more importantly, creates the momentum necessary to invoke the broad powers of censorship to ban a programme, channel, or even the cable operator. But the Programme Code is littered with vague phrases and undefined terms that can mean anything the government wants them to mean.

By its first warning of May 12, 2015, the MIB claimed Sathiyam violated four rules in the Programme Code. These include rule 6(1)(c) which bans visuals or words “which promote communal attitudes”; rule 6(1)(d) which bans “deliberate, false and suggestive innuendos and half-truths”; rule 6(1)(e) which bans anything “which promotes anti-national attitudes”; and, rule 6(1)(i) which bans anything that “criticises, maligns or slanders any…person or…groups, segments of social, public and moral life of the country” (sic).

The rest of the Programme Code is no less imprecise. It proscribes content that “offends against good taste” and “reflects a slandering, ironical and snobbish attitude” against communities. On the face of it, several provisions of the Programme Code travel beyond the permissible restrictions on free speech listed in Article 19(2) of the Constitution to question their validity. The fiasco of implementing the vague provisions of the erstwhile section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 is a recent reminder of the dangers presented by poorly-drafted censorship law – which is why it was struck down by the Supreme Court for infringing the right to free speech. The Programme Code is an older creation, it has simply evaded scrutiny for two decades.

The arbitrariness of the Programme Code is amplified manifold by the authorities responsible for interpreting and implementing it. An Inter-Ministerial Committee (IMC) of bureaucrats, supposedly a recommendatory body, interprets the Programme Code before the MIB takes action against channels. This is an executive power of censorship that must survive legal and constitutional scrutiny, but has never been subjected to it. Curiously, the courts have shied away from a proper analysis of the Programme Code and the IMC.

Judicial challenges

In 2011, a single judge of the Delhi High Court in the Star India case (2011) was asked to examine the legitimacy of the IMC as well as four separate clauses of the Programme Code including rule 6(1)(i), which has been invoked against Sathiyam. But the judge neatly sidestepped the issues. This feat of judicial adroitness was made possible by the crass indecency of the content in question, which could be reasonably restricted. Since the show clearly attracted at least one ground of legitimate censorship, the judge saw no cause to examine the other provisions of the Programme Code or even the composition of the IMC.

This judicial restraint has proved detrimental. In May 2013, another single judge of the Delhi High Court, who was asked by Comedy Central to adjudge the validity of the IMC’s decision-making process, relied on Star India (2011) to uphold the MIB’s action against the channel. The channel’s appeal to the Supreme Court is currently pending. If the Supreme Court decides to examine the validity of the IMC, the Delhi High Court may put aside Sathiyam’s petition to wait for legal clarity.

As it happens, in the Shreya Singhal case (2015) that struck down section 66A of the IT Act, the Supreme Court has an excellent precedent to follow to demand clarity and precision from the Programme Code, perhaps even strike it down, as well as due process from the MIB. On the accusation of defaming the Prime Minister, probably the only clearly stated objection by the MIB, the Supreme Court’s past law is clear: public servants cannot, for non-personal acts, claim defamation.

Censorship by blunt force

Beyond the IMC’s advisories and warnings, the Cable TV Act contains two broad powers of censorship. The first empowerment in section 19 enables a government official to ban any programme or channel if it fails to comply with the Programme Code or, “if it is likely to promote, on grounds of religion, race, language, caste or community or any other ground whatsoever, disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial, linguistic or regional groups or castes or communities or which is likely to disturb the public tranquility.”

The second empowerment is much wider. Section 20 of the Cable TV Act permits the Central Government to ban an entire cable television operator, as opposed to a single channel or programmes within channels, if it “thinks it necessary or expedient so to do in public interest”. No reasons need be given and no grounds need be considered. Such a blunt use of force creates an overwhelming power of censorship. It is not a coincidence that section 20 resembles some provisions of nineteenth-century telegraph laws, which were designed to enable the colonial state to control the flow of information to its native subjects.

A manual for television bans

Film and television have always attracted political attention and state censorship. In 1970, Justice Hidayatullah of the Supreme Court explained why: “It has been almost universally recognised that the treatment of motion pictures must be different from that of other forms of art and expression. This arises from the instant appeal of the motion picture… The motion picture is able to stir up emotions more deeply than any other product of art.”

Within this historical narrative of censorship, television regulation is relatively new. Past governments have also been quick to threaten censorship for attacking an incumbent Prime Minister. There seems to be a pan-governmental consensus that senior political leaders ought to be beyond reproach, irrespective of their words and deeds.

But on what grounds could the state justify these bans? Lord Atkins’ celebrated war-time dissent in Liversidge (1941) offers an unlikely answer:

“When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less.’”

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-wire-bhairav-acharya-humpty-dumpty-censorship-of-tv-in-india

The generation of e-Emergency

sunil — 2015-06-29T16:40:54Z

The next generation of censorship technology is expected to be ‘real-time content manipulation’ through ISPs and Internet companies.

The article was published in Livemint on June 22, 2015.

Censorship during the Emergency in the 1970s was done by clamping down on the media by intimidating editors and journalists, and installing a human censor at every news agency with a red pencil. In the age of both multicast and broadcast media, thought and speech control is more expensive and complicated but still possible to do. What governments across the world have realized is that traditional web censorship methods such as filtering and blocking are not effective because of circumvention technologies and the Streisand effect (a phenomenon in which an attempt to hide or censor information proves to be counter-productive). New methods to manipulate the networked public sphere have evolved accordingly. India, despite claims to the contrary, still does not have the budget and technological wherewithal to successfully pull off some of the censorship and surveillance techniques described below, but thanks to Moore’s law and to the global lack of export controls on such technologies, this might change in the future.

First, mass technological-enabled surveillance resulting in self-censorship and self-policing. The coordinated monitoring of Occupy protests in the US by the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) counter-terrorism units, police departments and the private sector showcased the bleeding edge of surveillance technologies. Stingrays or IMSI catchers are fake mobile towers that were used to monitor calls, Internet traffic and SMSes. Footage from helicopters, drones, high-res on-ground cameras and the existing CCTV network was matched with images available on social media using facial recognition technology. This intelligence was combined with data from the global-scale Internet surveillance that we know about thanks to the National Security Agency (NSA) whistle-blower Edward Snowden, and what is dubbed “open source intelligence” gleaned by monitoring public social media activity; and then used by police during visits to intimidate activists and scare them off the protests.

Second, mass technological gaming—again, according to documents released by Snowden, the British spy agency, GCHQ (Government Communications Headquarters), has developed tools to seed false information online, cast fake votes in web polls, inflate visitor counts on sites, automatically discover content on video-hosting platform and send takedown notices, permanently disable accounts on computers, find private photographs on Facebook, monitor Skype activity in real time and harvest Skype contacts, prevent access to certain websites by using peer-to-peer based distributed denial of service attacks, spoof any email address and amplify propaganda on social media. According to The Intercept, a secret unit of GCHQ called the Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group (JTRIG) combined technology with psychology and other social sciences to “not only understand, but shape and control how online activism and discourse unfolds”. The JTRIG used fake victim blog posts, false flag operations and honey traps to discredit and manipulate activists.

Third, mass human manipulation. The exact size of the Kremlin troll army is unknown. But in an interview with Radio Liberty, St. Petersburg blogger Marat Burkhard (who spent two months working for Internet Research Agency) said, “there are about 40 rooms with about 20 people sitting in each, and each person has their assignments.” The room he worked in had each employee produce 135 comments on social media in every 12-hour shift for a monthly remuneration of 45,000 rubles. According to Burkhard, in order to bring a “feeling of authenticity”, his department was divided into teams of three—one of them would be a villain troll who would represent the voice of dissent, the other two would be the picture troll and the link troll. The picture troll would use images to counter the villain troll’s point of view by appealing to emotion while the link troll would use arguments and references to appeal to reason. In a day, the “troika” would cover 35 forums.

The next generation of censorship technology is expected to be “real-time content manipulation” through ISPs and Internet companies. We have already seen word filters where blacklisted words or phrases are automatically expunged. Last week, Bengaluru-based activist Thejesh GN detected that Airtel was injecting javascript into every web page that you download using a 3G connection. Airtel claims that it is injecting code developed by the Israeli firm Flash Networks to monitor data usage but the very same method can be used to make subtle personalized changes to web content. In China, according to a paper by Tao Zhu et al titled The Velocity of Censorship: High-Fidelity Detection of Microblog Post Deletions, “Weibo also sometimes makes it appear to a user that their post was successfully posted, but other users are not able to see the post. The poster receives no warning message in this case.”

More than two decades ago, John Gilmore, of Electronic Frontier Foundation, famously said, “the Net interprets censorship as damage and routes around it.” That was when the topology of the Internet was highly decentralized and there were hundreds of ISPs that competed with each other to provide access. Given the information diet of the average netizen today, the Internet is, for all practical purposes, highly centralized and therefore governments find it easier and easier to control.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/livemint-june-22-2015-sunil-abraham-the-generation-of-e-emergency

The freedom of expression debate: The State must mend fences with The Web

praskrishna — 2013-01-07T10:30:21Z

A fortnight after her arrest, Renu Srinivasan spends her free time singing Ashley Tisdale's number Suddenly. The lyrics - Suddenly people know my name, suddenly, everything has changed - resonate with the story of her life ever since she 'liked' and 'shared' her friend, Shaheen Dhada's, 21, controversial post regarding Shiv Sena chief Bal Thackeray's funeral on Facebook on November 18 and got arrested for it.

The article by Rahul Jayaram was published in India Today on December 18, 2012. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

She's now flooded with "hundreds" of messages on FB; some congratulatory, others abusive and gets at least a dozen friend requests on the social networking site. When Renu went to the doctor last week, two constables accompanied her.

"All of a sudden, there's too much attention on me," says the Botany graduate from Dandekar College and a budding singer who is making new friends in the virtual world. There's, however, a word from caution from her father P.A. Srinivasan: "Don't comment on controversial issues you don't understand."

Bloggers are careful. Krish Ashok, a well-known blogger is disappointed with the government's lack of engagement with India's surging online community. In a blog post in August 2010, he made fun of the Ramayana and the fact that women couldn't enter the Sabarimala temple in Kerala. A group called Hindu Janajagruti Samiti threatened to take him to court. Ashok spoke to his lawyer.

"I was amazed. She said no individual could take action against me. But a group or organisation could," he says. Since then, he has become more aware of his Internet rights.

Gursimran Khamba, who has over 30,000 followers on Twitter, kept his cool during Thackeray's death and funeral. When all the media went gaga over him, televising his family photo albums, Khamba, re-tweeted reports and accounts of the Shiv Sena's role during the Mumbai riots of 1992-93. "In my head, I am not courageous to say anything about it myself," he says. He didn't want to incite. He'd rather help his followers get a more nuanced picture of a venerated leader.

Palghar and after, has made Ashok think. "I would reduce the number of provocative posts I might make," he says. Khamba says he will stick to comedy and doesn't believe in offence for the sake of offending although "taking offence is our national sport."

It is a shame, for the Internet is growing in India like nobody's business. It's the medium of the age.

According to comScore, a company that measures Internet trends, India is the fastest growing online market in the last 12 months among BRIC nations. There were 44.5 million unique visitors in July 2011 and in July 2012 there were 62.6 million unique visitors. That is, a growth of 44 per cent in one year. The total Internet usage of 124.7 million users in July 2012, that is, a 41 per cent growth from last year (July 2011).

With 124 million users as of July 2012, India has an Internet penetration of 10 per cent. 75 per cent of India's online users are below the age of 35 making it one of the youngest Net-connected populations. 39.3 per cent of India's Internet population consists of females. It has the highest growth seen among 15 to 24 male and female segments. India has 56.2 million Facebook users and 4.1 million Twitter users. Facebook had 35.3 million users in July 2011 and it jumped to 52.1 million in July 2012. That's a growth of 47% in just one year!

Growth of the Internet is one thing. Freedom of the Internet is another. Freedom House, an American organisation that tracks political and civil liberties worldwide, is blunt in its assessment. India is third in terms of Internet penetration, after the United States and China. Before November 2008, government control over the Internet was limited. All that changed after the November 2008 Mumbai attacks.

Since then it says, "The need, desire, and ability of the Indian government to monitor, censor, and control the communication sector have grown. Given the range of security threats facing the country, many Indians feel that the government should be allowed to monitor personal communications such as telephone calls, email messages, and financial transactions. It is in this context that Parliament passed amendments to the Information Technology Act (ITA) in 2008, expanding censorship and monitoring capabilities. This trend continued in 2011 with the adoption of regulations increasing surveillance in cyber cafes. Meanwhile, the government and non-state actors have intensified pressure on intermediaries, including social media applications, to remove upon request a wide range of content vaguely defined as "offensive" and potentially pre-screen user-generated content. Despite new comprehensive data protection regulations adopted in 2011, the legal framework and oversight surrounding surveillance and interception remains weak, and several instances of abuse have emerged in recent years."

Over this year we have had the cases of cartoonist Aseem Trivedi being put in jail and later released in September. In April, Ambikesh Mahaptra of Jadavpur University in Kolkata was arrested for a cartoon poking fun at West Bengal chief minister Mamta Banerjee and Railway Minister Mukul Roy. In October, Ravi, owner of plastic packaging material factory was arrested and let off on bail for joking about Finance Minister P. Chidambaram's son, Karti. The list gets longer. The Web and the State are at loggerheads. Why?

Lawyers and bloggers haul up Internet laws. And for such a community, we have laws like Section 66 (A) of the Information Technology Act of 2000. The law states that "any person who sends by means of a computer resource or a communication device, any information that is grossly offensive or has menacing character," can be booked for online crime.

Legal experts think Section 66 (A) and the whole of the IT Act of 2000, needs revisiting. According to cyber lawyer Pavan Duggal, Section 66 (A) "is a vanilla provision that can be used for anything online."

Section 66(A) seeks to empower the police and the complainant. "The words 'grossly offensive' and 'menacing character' of Section 66 (A) have no definition given. Normal, legitimate bona fide conversation between boyfriend and girlfriend at noble times online is fine. Once relationship sours, and they are gone."

"It's not clear what the purpose of Section 66A is. It's like having a single provision covering murder, assault, intimidation, and nuisance, and prescribing the same penalty for all of them," says Pranesh Prakash of the Center for Internet and Society, Bangalore. Terminology and the law's purpose are massive concerns.

"The extent of the ambiguity of Section 66A is worrying. Laws need to be very clear about what they want to achieve. If it is murder, then it must say murder. If its attempted murder, it must be clear it is attempted murder. Section 66 A is trying to do too many things at the same time. Its canvas is too vast," says Rajeev Chandrasekar.

As a country, we look to imitate the West, and often copy it badly. Some wonder if we need to mime the West. Pranesh Prakash thinks the Indian Constitution is stronger on free speech grounds than the (unwritten) UK Constitution, and the judiciary has wide powers of judicial review of statutes (i.e., the ability of a court to strike down a law passed by Parliament as 'unconstitutional').

Judicial review of statutes does not exist in the UK (with review under its EU obligations being the exception) as they believe that Parliament is supreme, unlike India. Putting those two aspects together, a law that is valid in the UK might well be unconstitutional in India for failing to fall within the eight octagonal walls of the reasonable restrictions allowed under Article 19(2).

Rajeev Chandrasekar thinks the Brits got it right. During the London riots of June 2011, "the UK government kept a tab on social media networking sites so as to check incitement, he says. It was a good example of clear legislation and effective execution, in an extreme scenario." To defuse online paranoia he wants the government to have a multi-stakeholder arrangement in fixing IT laws. This must involve users, IT companies, cyber cafe owners and the government. The State must mend fences with the Web.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/india-today-rahul-jayaram-december-18-2012-the-freedom-of-expression-debate

The Case of Whatsapp Group Admins

Japreet Grewal — 2015-12-08T10:25:42Z

Censorship laws in India have now roped in group administrators of chat groups on instant messaging platforms such as Whatsapp (group admin(s)) for allegedly objectionable content that was posted by other users of these chat groups. Several incidents[1] were reported this year where group admins were arrested in different parts of the country for allowing content that was allegedly objectionable under law. A few reports mentioned that these arrests were made under Section 153A[2] read with Section 34[3] of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 67[4] of the Information Technology Act (IT Act).

Targeting of a group admin for content posted by other members of a chat group has raised concerns about how this liability is imputed. Whether a group admin should be considered an intermediary under Section 2 (w) of the IT Act? If yes, whether a group admin would be protected from such liability?

Group admin as an intermediary

Whatsapp is an instant messaging platform which can be used for mass communication by opting to create a chat group. A chat group is a feature on Whatsapp that allows joint participation of Whatsapp users. The number of Whatsapp users on a single chat group can be up to 100. Every chat group has one or more group admins who control participation in the group by deleting or adding people. [5] It is imperative that we understand that by choosing to create a chat group on Whatsapp whether a group admin can become liable for content posted by other members of the chat group.

Section 34 of the IPC provides that when a number of persons engage in a criminal act with a common intention, each person is made liable as if he alone did the act. Common intention implies a pre-arranged plan and acting in concert pursuant to the plan. It is interesting to note that group admins have been arrested under Section 153A on the ground that a group admin and a member posting content on a chat group that is actionable under this provision have common intention to post such content on the group. But would this hold true when for instance, a group admin creates a chat group for posting lawful content (say, for matchmaking purposes) and a member of the chat group posts content which is actionable under law (say, posting a video abusing Dalit women)? Common intention can be established by direct evidence or inferred from conduct or surrounding circumstances or from any incriminating facts.[6]

We need to understand whether common intention can be established in case of a user merely acting as a group admin. For this purpose it is necessary to see how a group admin contributes to a chat group and whether he acts as an intermediary.

We know that parameters for determining an intermediary differ across jurisdictions and most global organisations have categorised them based on their role or technical functions.[7] Section 2 (w) of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act) defines an intermediary as any person, who on behalf of another person, receives, stores or transmits messages or provides any service with respect to that message and includes the telecom services providers, network providers, internet service providers, web-hosting service providers, search engines, online payment sites, online-auction sites, online marketplaces and cyber cafés. Does a group admin receive, store or transmit messages on behalf of group participants or provide any service with respect to messages of group participants or falls in any category mentioned in the definition? Whatsapp does not allow a group admin to receive, or store on behalf of another participant on a chat group. Every group member independently controls his posts on the group. However, a group admin helps in transmitting messages of another participant to the group by allowing the participant to be a part of the group thus effectively providing service in respect of messages. A group admin therefore, should be considered an intermediary. However his contribution to the chat group is limited to allowing participation but this is discussed in further detail in the section below.

According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), in a 2010 report[8], an internet intermediary brings together or facilitates transactions between third parties on the Internet. It gives access to, hosts, transmits and indexes content, products and services originated by third parties on the Internet or provide Internet-based services to third parties. A Whatsapp chat group allows people who are not on your list to interact with you if they are on the group admins’ contact list. In facilitating this interaction, according to the OECD definition, a group admin may be considered an intermediary.

Liability as an intermediary

Section 79 (1) of the IT Act protects an intermediary from any liability under any law in force (for instance, liability under Section 153A pursuant to the rule laid down in Section 34 of IPC) if an intermediary fulfils certain conditions laid down therein. An intermediary is required to carry out certain due diligence obligations laid down in Rule 3 of the Information Technology (Intermediaries Guidelines) Rules, 2011 (Rules). These obligations include monitoring content that infringes intellectual property, threatens national security or public order, or is obscene or defamatory or violates any law in force (Rule 3(2)).[9] An intermediary is liable for publishing or hosting such user generated content, however, as mentioned earlier, this liability is conditional. Section 79 of IT Act states that an intermediary would be liable only if it initiates transmission, selects receiver of the transmission and selects or modifies information contained in the transmission that falls under any category mentioned in Rule 3 (2) of the Rules. While we know that a group admin has the ability to facilitate sharing of information and select receivers of such information, he has no direct editorial control over the information shared. Group admins can only remove members but cannot remove or modify the content posted by members of the chat group. An intermediary is liable in the event it fails to comply with due diligence obligations laid down under rule 3 (2) and 3 (3) of the Rules however, since a group admin lacks the authority to initiate transmission himself and control content, he can’t comply with these obligations. Therefore, a group admin would be protected from any liability arising out of third party/user generated content on his group pursuant to Section 79 of the IT Act.

It is however relevant to note whether the ability of a group admin to remove participants amounts to an indirect form of editorial control.

Other pertinent observations

In several reports[10] there have been discussions about how holding a group admin liable makes the process convenient as it is difficult to locate all the users of a particular group. This reasoning may not be correct as the Whatsapp policy[11] makes it mandatory for a prospective user to provide his mobile number in order to use the platform and no additional information is collected from group admins which may justify why group admins are targeted. Investigation agencies can access mobile numbers of Whatsapp users and gain more information from telecom companies.

It is also interesting to note that the group admins were arrested after a user or someone familiar to a user filed a complaint with the police about content being objectionable or hurtful. Earlier this year, the apex court had ruled in the case of Shreya Singhal v. Union of India[12] that an intermediary needed a court order or a government notification for taking down information. With actions taken against group admins on mere complaints filed by anyone, it is clear that the law enforcement officials have been overriding the mandate of the court.

Conclusion

According to a study conducted by a global research consultancy, TNS Global, around 38 % of internet users in India use instant messaging applications such as Snapchat and Whatsapp on a daily basis, Whatsapp being the most widely used application. These figures indicate the scale of impact that arrests of group admins may have on our daily communication.

It is noteworthy that categorising a group admin as an intermediary would effectively make the Rules applicable to all Whatsapp users intending to create groups and make it difficult to enforce and would perhaps blur the distinction between users and intermediaries.

The critical question however is whether a chat group is considered a part of the bundle of services that Whatsapp offers to its users and not as an independent platform that makes a group admin a separate entity. Also, would it be correct to draw comparison of a Whatsapp group chat with a conference call on Skype or sharing a Google document with edit rights to understand the domain in which censorship laws are penetrating today?

Valuable contribution by Pranesh Prakash and Geetha Hariharan

[1] http://www.nagpurtoday.in/whatsapp-admin-held-for-hurting-religious-sentiment/06250951 ; http://www.catchnews.com/raipur-news/whatsapp-group-admin-arrested-for-spreading-obscene-video-of-mahatma-gandhi-1440835156.html ; http://www.financialexpress.com/article/india-news/whatsapp-group-admin-along-with-3-members-arrested-for-objectionable-content/147887/

[2] Section 153A. “Promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc., and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony.— (1) Whoever— (a) by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise, promotes or attempts to promote, on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community or any other ground whatsoever, disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities…” or 2) Whoever commits an offence specified in sub-section (1) in any place of worship or in any assembly engaged in the performance of religious worship or religious ceremonies, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine.

[3] Section 34. Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention – When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.

[4] Section 67 Publishing of information which is obscene in electronic form. -Whoever publishes or transmits or causes to be published in the electronic form, any material which is lascivious or appeals to the prurient interest or if its effect is such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely, having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter contained or embodied in it, shall be punished on first conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years and with fine which may extend to one lakh rupees and in the event of a second or subsequent conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and also with fine which may extend to two lakh rupees."

[5] https://www.whatsapp.com/faq/en/general/21073373

[6] Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad AIR 1955 SC 216

[7]https://www.eff.org/files/2015/07/08/manila_principles_background_paper.pdf; http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002311/231162e.pdf

[8] http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/44949023.pdf

[9] Rule 3(2) (b) of the Rules

[10]http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/if-you-are-a-whatsapp-group-admin-better-be-careful/article7531350.ece; http://www.newindianexpress.com/states/tamil_nadu/Social-Media-Administrator-You-Could-Land-in-Trouble/2015/10/10/article3071815.ece; http://www.medianama.com/2015/10/223-whatsapp-group-admin-arrest/; http://www.thenewsminute.com/article/whatsapp-group-admin-you-are-intermediary-and-here%E2%80%99s-what-you-need-know-35031

[11] https://www.whatsapp.com/legal/

[12] http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/FileServer/2015-03-24_1427183283.pdf

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-case-of-whatsapp-group-admins

The block heads

praskrishna — 2015-05-07T11:51:48Z

An entire government department is on the job, but can it really take down ‘offending’ online content?

The article by Sibi Arasu was published in the Hindu Businessline on April 3, 2015. Sunil Abraham gave his inputs.

The Department of Electronics and Information Technology’s (Deity) offices are as layered as its official website. From inside ‘Electronics Niketan’ at the Central Government Offices (CGO) complex in south Delhi, Deity’s army of director-generals, joint secretaries, department heads, scientists, clerks and staff of various grades and ranks keep an eye on how the country engages with the world wide web.

One set of cubicles is dedicated to the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), the nodal agency meant to combat hacking, phishing and generally fortify the internet in India. This includes the task of blocking and unblocking websites. A rather complicated job in a country where, according to one senior government official, “it’s technically infeasible to completely block content. If it’s at the gateway level, then we can filter it out. But for videos and other similar content, it is just not possible to completely block them.”

No bandwidth

Be it the AIB roasts that were taken down from YouTube or the controversial documentary India’s Daughter, which was blocked within eight hours of going online, the CERT and other allied departments have been kept busy over the past few months.

In a classic example of how blocking can go wrong, more than 36 websites were taken down in December last year to “prevent the spread of ISIS propaganda” only to be unblocked within weeks. Like elsewhere in the world, the attempt to “protect” citizens had unwittingly ended up hurting legitimate websites, including video sharing sites vimeo.com, dailymotion.com and the reference site archive.org. It was embarrassingly similar to the Chinese government’s actions in 2010 when it blocked all images of empty chairs, stools and tables as it attempted to staunch discussions about Liu Xiabo, the Nobel Peace Prize winner that year, who was missing from the awards ceremony as he was incarcerated in China.

Terming such government actions as dangerous and Orwellian, Apar Gupta, a cyber law specialist in Delhi who appeared for the People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) in the PIL against Section 66A of the IT Act, says, “Any piece of content is contained within several file formats and obscured through technical devices like encryption, making its complete removal and eradication impossible.”

Internet freedom campaigners have maintained that Section 66A, which prescribed “punishment for sending offensive messages through a communication service”, was created solely to muzzle dissent and differences of opinion.

Although Section 66A was recently struck down, the law authorising blocking of content — namely, Section 69A — remains intact. The Central Government can block content it believes threatens the security of the State; the sovereignty, integrity or defence of India; friendly relations with foreign States; public order; or incites committing a cognisable offence related to any of the above. The government must, however, adhere to a set of procedures and safeguards, known as Blocking Rules.

“Larger, overbroad technical blocks can impede the functioning of the internet,” says internet policy analyst Raman Chima. “When a large website ‘blacklist’ and internet filter was proposed for Australia in 2009-10, research established that it would likely result in double-digit reductions in the internet’s speed and efficiency in that country.”

The ‘Streisand effect’, named after the Hollywood actress, is another common consequence of blocking. As Chima says, “Specific bans tend to be counterproductive and, more often than not, result in more awareness and interest in the banned content.”

Political manoeuvres

‘Ethical hacktivist’ and Hackers Hat founder Satish Ashwin sees banning and blocking as purely vote bank politics.

“Technically anything can be blocked or banned and it’s not a big deal, but the sheer volume of data uploaded makes it next to impossible to monitor and censor,” he says.

To those heralding the striking down of 66A as a victory for free speech, Sunil Abraham, executive director of the Bengaluru-based Centre for Internet and Society, points to the larger picture. “Nobody is really aware of the scale of censorship in India. Thousands of websites are blocked under Section 69A, mostly due to the maximalist enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). While 66A is gone, there are many other provisions within the IT Act that still regulate speech online. It is important to have quality laws drafted through an open, participatory process, where all stakeholders are consulted and responded to before bills are introduced in Parliament."

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/hindu-businessline-april-3-2015-sibi-arasu-the-block-heads

Text of DIT's Response to Second RTI on Website Blocking

pranesh — 2011-10-28T14:37:34Z

CIS had filed a request under the Right to Information Act with the government, asking a number of questions relating to blocking of content under the IT Act. We have reproduced below the response we got from the government.

Government of India
Ministry of Communications & Information Technology
Department of Information Technology
Electronics Niketan, 6 CGO Complex,
New Delhi-110003

No: 14(12)/2011-ESD
10.6.2011

Shri Pranesh Prakash,
Centre for Internet and Society,
194, 2C Cross, Domlur Stage II,
Bangalore - 560071

Subject: Request for information under RTI Act, 2005.

Sir,
Reference your request dated 13 May 2011, which was received in this office on 18.5.2011 on the above subject.

The information as received from the custodian of information is attached herewith (Annexure-I, II and III).

Yours faithfully,
(A.K.Kaushik)
Additional Director & CPIO
Cyber Laws & E-Security Division
Tel: 011-24364803

Annexure I

Reply to Shri Pranesh Prakash

How many orders have been issued for blocking of computer resources prior to the coming into force of the Information Technology (Amendment) Act, 2008 (i.e., before October 27, 2009) under the Information Technology Act, 2000, or any other law for the time being in force.

Reply - Five orders were issued for blocking access to web content.

Please provide a list of all the websites for which the DIT has issued blocking orders and the dates on which each website was blocked.

Reply - The following websites have been blocked pursuant to court orders

Sl	Website	Date of issuing direction by designated officer
1.	www.zone-h.org	08.03.2010
2.	http://donotdiall00.webs.com (IP 216.52.115.50)	08.08.2010
3.	www.bloggernews.net/124029	15.11.2010
4.	http://www.google.co.in/#hl=en&source=hp&biw=-1276&bih=843&=dr+babasaheb+ambedkar+wallpaper&aq=4&aqi=gl0&aql=&oq=dr+babas& gs_ rfai=&fp=e791fe993fa412ba	20.12.2010
5.	http://www.cinemahd.net/desktopenhancements/wallpaper/23945-wallpapers-beautiful-girl-wallpaper.html	20.12.2010
6.	http://www.chakpak.com/find/images/kamasutra-hindi-movie	20.12.2010
7.	http://www.submitlink.khatana.net/2010/09/jennifer-stano-is-engaged-to.html	20.12.2010
8.	http://www.result.khatana.net/2010/11/im-no-panty-girl-yana-gupta-wardrobe.html	20.12.2010
9.	http://www.facebook.com/pages/I-Hate-Ambedkar/172025102828076	25.02.2011
10.	www.indybay.org	17.03.2011
11.	www.arizona.indymedia.org	17.03.2011

Please provide a list of all the persons to whom such orders were issued.

Reply - The directions were issued to Department of Telecommunications.
Please provide a list of all the requests for blocking of information that have been received by the Designated Officer under the Information Technology (Procedures and Safeguards for Blocking Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009 ("Rules").
Please provide a list of all persons/authorities from whom the Designated Officer under the Rules has received requests for blocking of information and the dates these requests were received.

Reply 4 & 5 - The details are given in Annexure-II.
Please provide the files on all the complaints and requests that have been rejected, including file noting.
Please provide the files on all the complaints and requests that have been accepted, including file noting.
Please provide the files on all the complaints and requests that are still being processed (e.g. more information has been sought on the request), including file notings.

Reply 6,7 & 8 - Files are available in section and can be viewed.
Please provide us copies of the minutes of all meetings held by the Committee for Examination of Requests under Rule 8(4) of the Rules.
Please provide copies of all the recommendations of the Committee for Examination of requests under Rule 8(4) of the Rules.

Reply 9 & 10 - Copy of the minutes/recommendation of the meeting of the Committee is at Annexure III.
Please provide us the dates and copies of the minutes of all meetings held by the Review Committee under Rule 14 of the Rules to periodically review the blocked resources.
Please provide us copies of all the findings of the Review Committee.
If the Review Committee has not met, please provide us the reason for the meetings not happenings as per the requirement of Rule 14 of the Rules.

Reply 11, 12 & 13 - This meeting is coordinated by Department of Telecommunications and DIT is not in possession of details.
Does "intermediary" in Rule 13 include intermediaries not located in India?

Reply - Such type of information is not permitted under RTI Act as per DOPT OM No. 1/7/2009 - IR dated 1st June 2009.
Has any block ordered by the DIT ever been revoked by the DIT or any other governmental authority?

Reply - Such questions are not permitted under RTI Act as per DOPT OM No. 1 /7/2009 IR dated 1st June 2009.
On what basis does the DIT decide whether the appropriate intermediary is the person who has put up content, the web host, or the different Internet service providers in India?

Reply - Such type of information is not permitted under RTI Act as per DOPT OM No. 1/7/2009 - IR dated 1st June 2009.
Does Rule 16 of the Rules override the Right to Information Act?

Reply - Such type of information is not admissible under RTI Act as per DOPT OM No. 1/7/2009 - IR dated 1st June 2009.
If the answer to the previous question is yes, please provide any correspondence with any legal officer who provided the DIT advice that it could override the Right to Information Act through delegated legislation.

Reply - Such type of information is not admissible under RTI Act as per DOPT OM No. 1/7/2009 - IR dated 1st June 2009.

Annexure II

Request received by Designated Officer

Website	Date of receipt of request	Request by
www.tamil.net.in	29.03.2010	Secretary Public (Law & Order) Deptt. Secretariat, Chennai 600 009
www.betfair.com	28.06.2010	Sr. Inspector, Cyber Crime Cell, Mumbai
http://www.youtube.com/ch?watv=tHUNESaC0E4	05.07.2010	Jt. Commissioner of Police (Crime), Mumbai
http://ulaginazhagiyamuthalpenn.blogspot.com	21.07.2010	Principal Secretary, IT Department, Chennai–600 009
en.wikipedia.org/Wiki/Sukhbir Singh Badal	11.08.2010	Principal Secretary to Govt. of Punjab, Dept. of IT, Chandigarh
http://www.exbii.com http://www.topix.net	05.10.2010	Commissioner, Maharashtra State, Colaba, Mumbai–400 001
http://ashsyumul.blogspot.com/2009/12/penginaan-terhadap-islam.html	20.08.2010	Shri Haneef Ali, State President, Bharatiya Janata Minority Morcha, Andhra Pradesh
http://www.angelsofindia.com/ http://www.adult-gals.com/ http://www.indianangels.net/ http://www.arabexposed.com/ http://indiamafia.com/ http://www.indianasfuckers.com http://www.indianpronvideos.in/ http://www.peterporntube.com http://www.bollywood-sex.net/ http://www.indianworldsex.com/ http://indianhomevideo.com/ http://indian-pakistani-girls.com http://indianvidz.com http://indianparadise.net/ http://bollywoodscandals.net/ http://indiansexpics.net/ http://www.indian-hardcore-movies.com/ http://www.bollywoodnudesex.net/ http://www.bangmyindianwife.com/ http://www.indian-angel-teens.com/ http://south-indian-sex.com/ http://www.indianseduction.com/ http://www.indiansexuniversity.com http://www.indianpassion.com/ http://fuckmyindianass.com http://indiansexwebcams.com/ http://exoticpics4u.com/ http://www.indianfreesexmovies.com/ http://www.newsindiansexmovies.com/ http://www.peterporn.net/ http://www.3xindianmovies.com/ http://www.amateur-indian-girls.com/ http://www.bollywoodhardcore.net http://www. indiansexpost.com/ http://www.desi-amateurs.com/ http://www.3xasianmovies.com/ http://allindiansex.com/ http://www.indiapornmovies.com http://www.3xindiansex.com/ http://www.indianxclips.com/ http://indiansexvideos.org http://www.pureindianporn.com/ http://indian-porn-sex.com http://www.newsindianpornmovies.com http://juicyindiangirls.com http://www/hardcoreindiansex.net http://bollywoodboobs.com http://indianmovietgp.com/ http://www.365indian.com http://www.indian-sex-hoes.com/ http://www.indian-sex-photos.net/ http://www.indian-free-sex.com/ http://www.indian-sex-movies.org http://ww.tamil-sex-movies.net/ http://www.indianteens.org/ http://www.sexyindianbooty.com http://www.indianposing.com http://www.pornhub.com/ http://www.indianpornhub.com/ http://www.exvideos.com	25.11.2010	Jt.Commissioner of Police (Crime), Mumbai

Annexure III

Minutes of the meeting held on 24-08-2010 for the request for blocking of website www.betfair.com

A meeting of "Committee for examination of request" constituted under the provisions of Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009 under section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 was held on 24.08.2010 at Electronics Niketan. New Delhi to examine the Request sent by Government of Maharashtra to block the website www.betfair.com. The meeting was participated by the following members:

Dr. Gulshan Rai, Group Coordinator, Department of Information Technology
Shri Dharmendra Sharma, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs
Shri Arvind Kumar, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting
Shri Ashok C. Prakash, Additional L.A., Department of Legal Affairs
Shri B.J. Srinath, Sr. Director, CERT-In

The Committee discussed the case and observed that Govt. of Maharashtra has requested for blocking of website www.betfair.com on the grounds of "public order". The Committee also noted the reply from Cyber Crime Cell, Mumbai that no case has been registered against www.betfair.com. Further, no details suggesting the "impact" of the said site on public order has been made available by the State Government.

Keeping in view the directions of the Hon'ble High Court to dispose the application strictly as per law, the Committee assessed that based on the data/facts/details provided by Government of Maharashtra and Cyber Crime Cell, Mumbai, violation of section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 is not being established.

Download a scanned version of the letter received from the DIT office here [PDF, 1.74 MB]

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/dit-response-2nd-rti-blocking

Tata Photon unblocks Wordpress.com

praskrishna — 2012-09-03T01:53:47Z

As of yesterday, the Tata Photon service of the Internet service provider (ISP) Tata Teleservices seems to have lifted the block it had put on the Wordpress.com domain for over a week.

The post was published in tech2 on August 30, 2012. Pranesh Prakash is quoted in it.

Tech2 had reported on Saturday that the free platform of Wordpress was put under a blanket ban across India by the ISP following government orders to block around 309 URLs carrying disruptive or inflammatory content. Directives issued by the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) to ISPs between August 18 and 21 state that only the URLs mentioned be blocked, not entire domains. Users could neither view Wordpress blogs nor edit or post new content on them, the first instance of which was noticed by us on August 20.

Our repeated efforts to contact Tata Teleservices' officials drew a blank. Numerous users who contacted customer service did not receive any replies or resolution. Through the course of the blockade, the ISP did not even display any message to Wordpress visitors that the domain was blocked, nor did it notify the owners of Wordpress blogs about it. Puzzled users tried resetting their Internet connections, clearing DNS caches, and calling the customer service helpline only to realise that they were experiencing an ISP-level block.

The reactions of Wordpress users ranged from annoyance to distress. Human rights activist and lawyer Kamayani Bali Mahabal commented on Tech2, "Yes, my wordpress blog is blocked and I have 4 blogs...have also written to TATA. I can access through [an] anonymous browser but I cannot log in, edit and do admin functions, I can do about 50 percent work on my blog. Dashboard not accessible[,] barely manage to post, will be suing TATA soon". In a blog post, she has described her experience of the block.

Blogger Shantanu Adhicary who goes by the nom de blog Tantanoo says, "My blogs are self-hosted [on Wordpress] so I was not affected. But it was annoying that I was unable to access, read or comment on other Wordpress blogs, especially in the absence of any message whatsoever that this site has been blocked".

The move by Tata Teleservices is being seen as ham handed; around 25 million Wordpress blogs were made inaccessible to deal with a few rotten eggs. Blogger and social media consultant Prateek Shah opines, "Blanket bans on domains because content on some of their pages is objectionable are akin to jailing a certain section of society just because some people from the community broke the law. Wordpress plays an extremely important role on the Internet and if such a site were to go down even for a few hours, it would mean mayhem for bloggers as well as readers who count on the platform to get the latest updates and information. ISPs need to mature and grow up to the fact that one can't put millions of people in jeopardy when apparently trying to protect the interests of some".

In June, the Madras High Court had granted relief to netizens in India by urging that there be no more John Doe orders. “The order of interim injunction dated 25/04/2012 is hereby clarified that the interim injunction is granted only in respect of a particular URL where the infringing movie is kept and not in respect of the entire website. Further, the applicant is directed to inform about the particulars of URL where the interim movie is kept within 48 hours.”

Pranesh Prakash, Policy Director at Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), agrees the move was wrong but shares insights about the position of the ISPs. He says, "It was obviously wrong. It contravenes the government's orders to not block the base URL but individual pages. Action should be taken against them for causing inconvenience to users. This is not the first time an ISP has gone overboard in implementing censorship, be it copyright issues, piracy or inflammatory content. In 2006, the government had chastised ISPs for over-censoring content and blocking unintended websites and pages. Having said that, ISPs have numerous grouses against the government. They do not possess the technical capabilities to implement the government's orders, at times, whether about surveillance or censorship".

ISPs that are also telecom services providers, find themselves unable to decipher government notifications about shutting off content on the Internet or introducing curbs on mobile communication. Prakash's analysis of the 300-odd URLs blocked by the Indian government reveals glaring mistakes in the government directives "that made blocking pointless and effectual". When asked to opine about what ISPs and telcos should do when the orders from the government were not crystal clear, Prakash said, "They should ask for clarifications from the government. The operators sought clarifications from the Ministry of Telecommunications about the recent orders to ban bulk text messages and MMSes. The ministry was unable to resolve them, and in turn, sought further clarifications from the Home Ministry. The government should coordinate better".

Tata Teleservices was not the only ISP guilty of throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Sify too reportedly imposed a blanket block on the Wordpress domain. Airtel went overboard by temporarily blocking Youtu.be URLs last week citing orders by the court or the DoT.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/tech-2-in-com-aug-30-2012-tata-photon-unblocks-wordpress

Supreme Court Strikes Down Section 66A Of IT Act

praskrishna — 2015-03-25T16:43:53Z

In a major boost to freedom of speech online in India, the Supreme Court on Tuesday struck down Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, reading down a draconian law that was poorly conceived, tragically worded and caused ordinary citizens to be jailed for so much as a comment on Facebook that annoyed just about anyone.

The article by Indrani Basu and Betwa Sharma published in the Huffington Post on March 24, 2015 quotes Sunil Abraham.

In its 122-page judgment, the court struck down the entire section, refusing to heed the government's plea that it will not be misused.

"The apex courts in India have consistently protected the rights of its citizens. And the Supreme Court has once again upheld that great tradition with this decision. There are constitutional exceptions to free speech that exist.

But this judgment will protect against the abuse of this vague and badly drafted law," said Sunil Abraham, executive director at the Centre for Internet and Society.

The section was passed without discussion in Parliament by the UPA government in 2008, adding an amendment to the original 2002 Act. While Narendra Modi supported the repealing of the Act during his prime ministerial campaign, after the BJP came to power, the government defended the provision, even while admitting it was draconian.

The government argued that the provision was necessary to prevent people from posting inflammatory content offending religious or political sentiments, leading to violence.

"I''m so happy with the decision. They have completely struck down the whole section. This is a victory for the country," said Shreya Singhal, the 24-year-old law student on whose petition the Supreme Court was hearing the case. "I don't have a political agenda — both the Congress government and the BJP have misused the section earlier. Section 66A was a blanket provision which was very vague. There are many IPC sections that could be used in its place."

"No one should fear putting anything up on the internet. It is very important for us to protect this right today," she said.

But there are sections in the Indian Penal Code that can deal with such situations.

And the broad and vague wording of 66A meant that it effectively became a tool that muzzled all speech online.

In 2012, Shaheen Dada, a 21-year old Mumbai girl, posted on Facebook comments about Shivsena leader Bal Thackerey. Annoyed party members went to the cops and Dada was arrested. Her friend Rinu Srinivasan, who had 'liked' the comment on Facebook, was also arrested.

The same year, Jadavpur University professor Ambikesh Mahapatra was arrested for sharing a cartoon poking fun at West Bengal chief minister Mamata Banerjee.

Mumbai cartoonist Aseem Trivedi was also arrested under the provision for his cartoons during the Anna Hazare anti-corruption agitation.

Here is what the section said:

66A. Punishment for sending offensive messages through communication service, etc.
Any person who sends, by means of a computer resource or a communication device,—
(a) any information that is grossly offensive or has menacing character; or
(b) any information which he knows to be false, but for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will, persistently by making use of such computer resource or a communication device,
(c) any electronic mail or electronic mail message for the purpose of causing annoyance or inconvenience or to deceive or to mislead the addressee or recipient about the origin of such messages,
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and with fine.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/huffington-post-indrani-basu-betwa-sharma-march-24-2015-supreme-court-strikes-down-section-66a-of-it-act

Super Cassettes v. MySpace (Redux)

sinha — 2017-01-18T14:31:25Z

The latest judgment in the matter of Super Cassettes v. MySpace is a landmark and progressive ruling, which strengthens the safe harbor immunity enjoyed by Internet intermediaries in India. It interprets the provisions of the IT Act, 2000 and the Copyright Act, 1957 to restore safe harbor immunity to intermediaries even in the case of copyright claims. It also relieves MySpace from pre-screening user-uploaded content, endeavouring to strike a balance between free speech and censorship. CIS was one of the intervenors in the case, and has been duly acknowledged in the judgment.

On 23rd December 2016, Justice Ravindra Bhat and Justice Deepa Sharma of the Delhi High Court delivered a decision overturning the 2012 order in the matter of Super Cassettes Industries Limited v. MySpace. The 2012 order was heavily criticized, for it was agnostic to the technological complexities of regulating speech on the Internet and cast unfathomable burdens on MySpace. In the following post I summarise the decision of the Division Bench. Click here to read the judgment.

Brief Facts

In 2007, Super Cassettes Industries Limited (SCIL) filed a suit against MySpace, a social networking platform, alleging copyright infringement against MySpace. The platform allowed users to upload and share media files, inter alia, and it was discovered that users were sharing SCIL’s copyrighted works sans authorisation. SCIL promptly proceeded to file a civil suit against MySpace for primary infringement under section 51(a)(i) of the Copyright Act as well as secondary infringement under section 51(a)(ii).

The 2012 order was extremely worrisome as it had turned the clock several decades back on concepts of internet intermediary liability. The court had held MySpace liable for copyright infringement despite it having shown no knowledge about specific instances of infringement; that it removed infringing content upon complaints; and that Super Cassettes had failed to submit songs to MySpace's song ID database. The most impractical burden of duty that the court pronounced was that MySpace was required to pre-screen content, rather than relying on post-infringement measures to remove infringing content. This was a result of interpreting due diligence to include pre-screening.

The court injuncted MySpace from permitting any uploads of SCIL's copyrighted content, and directed to expeditiously execute content removal requests. To read CIS' analysis of the Single Judge's interim order, click here.

In the instant judgment, the bench limited their examination to MySpace’s liability for secondary infringement, and left the direct infringement determination to the Single Judge at the subsequent trial stage. In doing so, the court answered the following three questions:

1) Whether MySpace could be said to have knowledge of infringement so as to attract liability for secondary infringement under Section 51(a)(ii)?

No. According to the Court, in the case of internet intermediaries, section 51(a)(ii) contemplates actual knowledge and not general awareness.

Elaborating re the circumstances of the case, the Court held that to attract liability for secondary infringement, MySpace should have had actual knowledge and not mere awareness of the infringement. Appreciating the difference between virtual and physical worlds, the judgment stated “the nature of internet media is such that the interpretation of knowledge cannot be the same as that is used for a physical premise.”

As per the court, the following facts only amounted to a general awareness, which was not sufficient to establish secondary liability:

Existence of user agreement terms which prohibited users from unauthorised uploading of content;
Operation of post-infringement mechanisms instituted by MySpace to identify and remove content;
SCIL sharing a voluminous catalogue of 100,000 copyrighted songs with MySpace, expecting the latter to monitor and quell any infringement;
Modifying videos to insert ads in them: SCIL contended that MySpace invited users to share and upload content which it would use to insert ads and make revenues – and this amounted to knowledge. The Court found that video modification for ad insertion only changed the format of the video and not the content; further, it was a pure automated process and there was no human intervention.

Additionally, no constructive knowledge could be attributed to MySpace to demonstrate reasonable ground for believing that infringement had occurred. A reasonable belief could emerge only after MySpace had perused all the content uploaded and shared on its platform – a task that was impossible to perform due to the voluminous catalogue handed to it and existing technological limitations.

The Court imposed a duty on SCIL to specify the works in which it owned copyright and being shared without authorisation on MySpace. It held that merely giving names of all content it owned without expressly pointing out the infringing works was contrary to the established principles of copyright law. Further, MySpace contended and the judge agreed, that in many instances the works were legally shared by distributors and performers – and often users created remixed works which only bore semblance to the title of the copyright work.

In such cases it becomes even more important for a plaintiff such as MySpace to provide specific titles, because while an intermediary may remove the content fearing liability and damages, an authorized individual’s license and right to fair use will suffer or stand negated. (Para 38 in decision)

Thus, where as MySpace undoubtedly permitted a place of profit for communication of infringing works uploaded by users, it did not have specific knowledge, nor reasonable belief of the infringement.

2) Does proviso to Section 81 override the "safe harbor" granted to intermediaries under Section 79 of the IT Act, 2000?

and

3) Whether it was possible to harmoniously read and interpret Sections 79 and 81 of the IT Act, and Section 51 of the Copyright Act?

No, the proviso does not override the safe harbor, i.e. the safe harbor defence cannot be denied to the intermediary in the case of copyright actions.The three sections have to be read harmoniously, indeed.

The judgment referred to the Parliamentary Standing Committee report as a relevant tool in interpreting the two provisions, declaring that the rights conferred under the IT Act, 2000 are supplementary and not in derogation of the Patents Act or the Copyright Act. The proviso was inserted only to permit copyright owners to demand action against intermediaries who may themselves post infringing content – the safe harbor only existed for circumstances when content was third party/user generated.

Given the supplementary nature of the provisions- one where infringement is defined and traditional copyrights are guaranteed and the other where digital economy and newer technologies have been kept in mind, the only logical and harmonious manner to interpret the law would be to read them together. Not doing so would lead to an undesirable situation where intermediaries would be held liable irrespective of their due diligence. (Para 49 in decision)

Regarding section 79, the court reiterated that the section only granted a limited immunity to intermediaries by granting a measured privilege to an intermediary, which was in the nature of an affirmative defence and not a blanket immunity to avoid liability. The very purpose of section 79 was to regulate and limit this liability; where as the Copyright Act granted and controlled rights of a copyright owner.

The Court found Judge Whyte’s decision in Religious Technology Centre v. Netcom Online Communication Services (1995), to be particularly relevant to the instant case, and agreed with its observations. To recall, Netcom was the landmark US ruling which established that when a subscriber was responsible for direct infringement, and the service providers did nothing more than setting up and operating tech systems which were necessary for the functioning of the Internet, it was illogical to impute liability on the service provider.

On MySpace Complying with Safe Harbor Requirements under Section 79 of the IT Act, 2000 (and Intermediary Rules, 2011)

The court held that MySpace's operations were in compliance with section 79(2)(b). The content transmission was initiated at the behest of the users, the recipients were not chosen by MySpace, neither was there modification of content. On the issue of modification, the court reasoned that since modification was an automated process (MySpace was inserting ads) which changed the format only, without MySpace's tacit or expressed control or knowledge, it was in compliance of the legislative requirement.

Despite several safeguard tools and notice and take down regimes, infringed videos find their way. The remedy here is not to target intermediaries but to ensure that infringing material is removed in an orderly and reasonable manner. A further balancing act is required which is that of freedom of speech and privatized censorship. If an intermediary is tasked with the responsibility of identifying infringing content from non-infringing one, it could have a chilling effect on free speech; an unspecified or incomplete list may do that. (Para 62 in decision)

On the second aspect of due-diligence, the court held that Mypace complied with the due diligence procedure specified in the Rules - it published rules, regulations, privacy policy and user agreement for access of usage. Reading Rule 3(4) with section 79(2)(c), the court held that it due diligence required MySpace to remove content within 36 hours of gaining actual knowledge or receiving knowledge by another person of the infringing content. If MySpace failed to take infringing content down accordingly, then only will safe harbour be denied to MySpace.

This liberal interpretation of due diligence is a big win for internet intermediaries in India.

Additional Issues Considered by the Court

MySpace also tried to defend its activities by claiming the shield of the fair dealing section of the Indian Copyright Act. However, the Court refused, stating that the fair dealing defence was inapplicable to the case as the provisions protected transient and incidental storage. Whereas, in the instant circumstances, the content in question was stored/hosted permanently.

MySpace also contended that the Single Judge's injunction order was vague and general and had foisted unimplementable duties on MySpace, disregarding the way the Internet functioned. If MySpace had to strictly comply with the order, it would have to shut its business in India. The Court said that the Single Judge's order, if enforced, would create a system of unwarranted private censorship, running contrary to the principles of a free speech regime, devoid of considerations of peculiarities of the internet intermediary industry. Private censorship would also invite upon the ISP the legal risk of wrongfully terminating a user account.

Finally, the Court urged MySpace to explore and innovate techniques to protect the interests of traditional copyright holders in a more efficient manner.

Relief Granted

Setting aside the Single Judge's order aside, the Court directed SCIL to provide a specific catalogue of infringing works which also pointed to the URL of the files. Upon receiving such specific knowledge, MySpace has been directed to remove the content within 36 hours of the issued notice. MySpace will also keep an account of the removals, and the revenues earned from ads placed for calculating damages at the trial stage.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/super-cassettes-v-myspace

Summary Report Internet Governance Forum 2015

jyoti — 2015-11-30T10:47:13Z

Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), India participated in the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) held at Poeta Ronaldo Cunha Lima Conference Center, Joao Pessoa in Brazil from 10 November 2015 to 13 November 2015. The theme of IGF 2015 was ‘Evolution of Internet Governance: Empowering Sustainable Development’. Sunil Abraham, Pranesh Prakash & Jyoti Panday from CIS actively engaged and made substantive contributions to several key issues affecting internet governance at the IGF 2015. The issue-wise detail of their engagement is set out below.

INTERNET GOVERNANCE

I. The Multi-stakeholder Advisory Group to the IGF organised a discussion on Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and Internet Economy at the Main Meeting Hall from 9:00 am to 12:30 pm on 11 November, 2015. The discussions at this session focused on the importance of Internet Economy enabling policies and eco-system for the fulfilment of different SDGs. Several concerns relating to internet entrepreneurship, effective ICT capacity building, protection of intellectual property within and across borders were availability of local applications and content were addressed. The panel also discussed the need to identify SDGs where internet based technologies could make the most effective contribution. Sunil Abraham contributed to the panel discussions by addressing the issue of development and promotion of local content and applications. List of speakers included:

Lenni Montiel, Assistant-Secretary-General for Development, United Nations
Helani Galpaya, CEO LIRNEasia
Sergio Quiroga da Cunha, Head of Latin America, Ericsson
Raúl L. Katz, Adjunct Professor, Division of Finance and Economics, Columbia Institute of Tele-information
Jimson Olufuye, Chairman, Africa ICT Alliance (AfICTA)
Lydia Brito, Director of the Office in Montevideo, UNESCO
H.E. Rudiantara, Minister of Communication & Information Technology, Indonesia
Daniel Sepulveda, Deputy Assistant Secretary, U.S. Coordinator for International and Communications Policy at the U.S. Department of State
Deputy Minister Department of Telecommunications and Postal Services for the republic of South Africa
Sunil Abraham, Executive Director, Centre for Internet and Society, India
H.E. Junaid Ahmed Palak, Information and Communication Technology Minister of Bangladesh
Jari Arkko, Chairman, IETF
Silvia Rabello, President, Rio Film Trade Association
Gary Fowlie, Head of Member State Relations & Intergovernmental Organizations, ITU

Detailed description of the workshop is available here http ://www .intgovforum .org /cms /igf 2015-main -sessions

Transcript of the workshop is available here http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2327-2015-11-11-internet-economy-and-sustainable-development-main-meeting-room

Video link Internet economy and Sustainable Development here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D6obkLehVE8

II. Public Knowledge organised a workshop on The Benefits and Challenges of the Free Flow of Data at Workshop Room 5 from 11:00 am to 12:00 pm on 12 November, 2015. The discussions in the workshop focused on the benefits and challenges of the free flow of data and also the concerns relating to data flow restrictions including ways to address them. Sunil Abraham contributed to the panel discussions by addressing the issue of jurisdiction of data on the internet. The panel for the workshop included the following.

Vint Cerf, Google
Lawrence Strickling, U.S. Department of Commerce, NTIA
Richard Leaning, European Cyber Crime Centre (EC3), Europol
Marietje Schaake, European Parliament
Nasser Kettani, Microsoft
Sunil Abraham, CIS India

Detailed description of the workshop is available here http ://www .intgovforum .org /cms /workshops /list -of -published -workshop -proposals

Transcript of the workshop is available here http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2467-2015-11-12-ws65-the-benefits-and-challenges-of-the-free-flow-of-data-workshop-room-5

Video link https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KtjnHkOn7EQ

III. Article 19 and Privacy International organised a workshop on Encryption and Anonymity: Rights and Risks at Workshop Room 1 from 11:00 am to 12:30 pm on 12 November, 2015. The workshop fostered a discussion about the latest challenges to protection of anonymity and encryption and ways in which law enforcement demands could be met while ensuring that individuals still enjoyed strong encryption and unfettered access to anonymity tools. Pranesh Prakash contributed to the panel discussions by addressing concerns about existing south Asian regulatory framework on encryption and anonymity and emphasizing the need for pervasive encryption. The panel for this workshop included the following.

David Kaye, UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression
Juan Diego Castañeda, Fundación Karisma, Colombia
Edison Lanza, Organisation of American States Special Rapporteur
Pranesh Prakash, CIS India
Ted Hardie, Google
Elvana Thaci, Council of Europe
Professor Chris Marsden, Oxford Internet Institute
Alexandrine Pirlot de Corbion, Privacy International

Detailed description of the workshop is available here http ://www .intgovforum .org /cms /worksh o ps /list -of -published -workshop -proposals

Transcript of the workshop is available here http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2407-2015-11-12-ws-155-encryption-and-anonymity-rights-and-risks-workshop-room-1

Video link available here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hUrBP4PsfJo

IV. Chalmers & Associates organised a session on A Dialogue on Zero Rating and Network Neutrality at the Main Meeting Hall from 2:00 pm to 4:00 pm on 12 November, 2015. The Dialogue provided access to expert insight on zero-rating and a full spectrum of diverse views on this issue. The Dialogue also explored alternative approaches to zero rating such as use of community networks. Pranesh Prakash provided a detailed explanation of harms and benefits related to different approaches to zero-rating. The panellists for this session were the following.

Jochai Ben-Avie, Senior Global Policy Manager, Mozilla, USA
Igor Vilas Boas de Freitas, Commissioner, ANATEL, Brazil
Dušan Caf, Chairman, Electronic Communications Council, Republic of Slovenia
Silvia Elaluf-Calderwood, Research Fellow, London School of Economics, UK/Peru
Belinda Exelby, Director, Institutional Relations, GSMA, UK
Helani Galpaya, CEO, LIRNEasia, Sri Lanka
Anka Kovacs, Director, Internet Democracy Project, India
Kevin Martin, VP, Mobile and Global Access Policy, Facebook, USA
Pranesh Prakash, Policy Director, CIS India
Steve Song, Founder, Village Telco, South Africa/Canada
Dhanaraj Thakur, Research Manager, Alliance for Affordable Internet, USA/West Indies
Christopher Yoo, Professor of Law, Communication, and Computer & Information Science, University of Pennsylvania, USA

Detailed description of the workshop is available here http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf2015-main-sessions

Transcript of the workshop is available here http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2457-2015-11-12-a-dialogue-on-zero-rating-and-network-neutrality-main-meeting-hall-2

V. The Internet & Jurisdiction Project organised a workshop on Transnational Due Process: A Case Study in MS Cooperation at Workshop Room 4 from 11:00 am to 12:00 pm on 13 November, 2015. The workshop discussion focused on the challenges in developing an enforcement framework for the internet that guarantees transnational due process and legal interoperability. The discussion also focused on innovative approaches to multi-stakeholder cooperation such as issue-based networks, inter-sessional work methods and transnational policy standards. The panellists for this discussion were the following.

Anne Carblanc Head of Division, Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry, OECD
Eileen Donahoe Director Global Affairs, Human Rights Watch
Byron Holland President and CEO, CIRA (Canadian ccTLD)
Christopher Painter Coordinator for Cyber Issues, US Department of State
Sunil Abraham Executive Director, CIS India
Alice Munyua Lead dotAfrica Initiative and GAC representative, African Union Commission
Will Hudsen Senior Advisor for International Policy, Google
Dunja Mijatovic Representative on Freedom of the Media, OSCE
Thomas Fitschen Director for the United Nations, for International Cooperation against Terrorism and for Cyber Foreign Policy, German Federal Foreign Office
Hartmut Glaser Executive Secretary, Brazilian Internet Steering Committee
Matt Perault, Head of Policy Development Facebook

Detailed description of the workshop is available here http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals

Transcript of the workshop is available here http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2475-2015-11-13-ws-132-transnational-due-process-a-case-study-in-ms-cooperation-workshop-room-4

Video link Transnational Due Process: A Case Study in MS Cooperation available here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M9jVovhQhd0

VI. The Internet Governance Project organised a meeting of the Dynamic Coalition on Accountability of Internet Governance Venues at Workshop Room 2 from 14:00 – 15:30 on 12 November, 2015. The coalition brought together panelists to highlight the challenges in developing an accountability framework for internet governance venues that include setting up standards and developing a set of concrete criteria. Jyoti Panday provided the perspective of civil society on why acountability is necessary in internet governance processes and organizations. The panelists for this workshop included the following.

Robin Gross, IP Justice
Jeanette Hofmann, Director Alexander von Humboldt Institute for Internet and Society
Farzaneh Badiei, Internet Governance Project
Erika Mann, Managing Director Public PolicyPolicy Facebook and Board of Directors ICANN
Paul Wilson, APNIC
Izumi Okutani, Japan Network Information Center (JPNIC)
Keith Drazek , Verisign
Jyoti Panday, CIS
Jorge Cancio, GAC representative

Detailed description of the workshop is available here http://igf2015.sched.org/event/4c23/dynamic-coalition-on-accountability-of-internet-governance-venues?iframe=no&w=&sidebar=yes&bg=no

Video link https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UIxyGhnch7w

VII. Digital Infrastructure Netherlands Foundation organized an open forum at Workshop Room 3 from 11:00 – 12:00 on 10 November, 2015. The open forum discussed the increase in government engagement with “the internet” to protect their citizens against crime and abuse and to protect economic interests and critical infrastructures. It brought together panelists topresent ideas about an agenda for the international protection of ‘the public core of the internet’ and to collect and discuss ideas for the formulation of norms and principles and for the identification of practical steps towards that goal. Pranesh Prakash participated in the e open forum. Other speakers included

Bastiaan Goslings AMS-IX, NL
Pranesh Prakash CIS, India
Marilia Maciel (FGV, Brasil
Dennis Broeders (NL Scientific Council for Government Policy)

Detailed description of the open forum is available here http://schd.ws/hosted_files/igf2015/3d/DINL_IGF_Open%20Forum_The_public_core_of_the_internet.pdf

Video link available here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=joPQaMQasDQ

VIII. UNESCO, Council of Europe, Oxford University, Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, Google, Internet Society organised a workshop on hate speech and youth radicalisation at Room 9 on Thursday, November 12. UNESCO shared the initial outcome from its commissioned research on online hate speech including practical recommendations on combating against online hate speech through understanding the challenges, mobilizing civil society, lobbying private sectors and intermediaries and educating individuals with media and information literacy. The workshop also discussed how to help empower youth to address online radicalization and extremism, and realize their aspirations to contribute to a more peaceful and sustainable world. Sunil Abraham provided his inputs. Other speakers include

1. Chaired by Ms Lidia Brito, Director for UNESCO Office in Montevideo

2.Frank La Rue, Former Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression

3. Lillian Nalwoga, President ISOC Uganda and rep CIPESA, Technical community

4. Bridget O’Loughlin, CoE, IGO

5. Gabrielle Guillemin, Article 19

6. Iyad Kallas, Radio Souriali

7. Sunil Abraham executive director of Center for Internet and Society, Bangalore, India

8. Eve Salomon, global Chairman of the Regulatory Board of RICS

9. Javier Lesaca Esquiroz, University of Navarra

10. Representative GNI

11. Remote Moderator: Xianhong Hu, UNESCO

12. Rapporteur: Guilherme Canela De Souza Godoi, UNESCO

Detailed description of the workshop is available here http://igf2015.sched.org/event/4c1X/ws-128-mitigate-online-hate-speech-and-youth-radicalisation?iframe=no&w=&sidebar=yes&bg=no

Video link to the panel is available here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eIO1z4EjRG0

INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY

IX. Electronic Frontier Foundation, Centre for Internet Society India, Open Net Korea and Article 19 collaborated to organize a workshop on the Manila Principles on Intermediary Liability at Workshop Room 9 from 11:00 am to 12:00 pm on 13 November 2015. The workshop elaborated on the Manila Principles, a high level principle framework of best practices and safeguards for content restriction practices and addressing liability for intermediaries for third party content. The workshop saw particpants engaged in over lapping projects considering restriction practices coming togetehr to give feedback and highlight recent developments across liability regimes. Jyoti Panday laid down the key details of the Manila Principles framework in this session. The panelists for this workshop included the following.

Kelly Kim Open Net Korea,
Jyoti Panday, CIS India,
Gabrielle Guillemin, Article 19,
Rebecca McKinnon on behalf of UNESCO
Giancarlo Frosio, Center for Internet and Society, Stanford Law School
Nicolo Zingales, Tilburg University
Will Hudson, Google

Detailed description of the workshop is available here http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals

Transcript of the workshop is available here http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2423-2015-11-13-ws-242-the-manila-principles-on-intermediary-liability-workshop-room-9

Video link available here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kFLmzxXodjs

ACCESSIBILITY

X. Dynamic Coalition on Accessibility and Disability and Global Initiative for Inclusive ICTs organised a workshop on Empowering the Next Billion by Improving Accessibility at Workshop Room 6 from 9:00 am to 10:30 am on 13 November, 2015. The discussion focused on the need and ways to remove accessibility barriers which prevent over one billion potential users to benefit from the Internet, including for essential services. Sunil Abraham specifically spoke about the lack of compliance of existing ICT infrastructure with well established accessibility standards specifically relating to accessibility barriers in the disaster management process. He discussed the barriers faced by persons with physical or psychosocial disabilities. The panelists for this discussion were the following.

Francesca Cesa Bianchi, G3ICT
Cid Torquato, Government of Brazil
Carlos Lauria, Microsoft Brazil
Sunil Abraham, CIS India
Derrick L. Cogburn, Institute on Disability and Public Policy (IDPP) for the ASEAN(Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Region
Fernando H. F. Botelho, F123 Consulting
Gunela Astbrink, GSA InfoComm

Detailed description of the workshop is available here http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals

Transcript of the workshop is available here http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2438-2015-11-13-ws-253-empowering-the-next-billion-by-improving-accessibility-workshop-room-3

Video Link Empowering the next billion by improving accessibility https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7RZlWvJAXxs

OPENNESS

XI. A workshop on FOSS & a Free, Open Internet: Synergies for Development was organized at Workshop Room 7 from 2:00 pm to 3:30 pm on 13 November, 2015. The discussion was focused on the increasing risk to openness of the internet and the ability of present & future generations to use technology to improve their lives. The panel shred different perspectives about the future co-development of FOSS and a free, open Internet; the threats that are emerging; and ways for communities to surmount these. Sunil Abraham emphasised the importance of free software, open standards, open access and access to knowledge and the lack of this mandate in the draft outcome document for upcoming WSIS+10 review and called for inclusion of the same. Pranesh Prakash further contributed to the discussion by emphasizing the need for free open source software with end‑to‑end encryption and traffic level encryption based on open standards which are decentralized and work through federated networks. The panellists for this discussion were the following.

Satish Babu, Technical Community, Chair, ISOC-TRV, Kerala, India
Judy Okite, Civil Society, FOSS Foundation for Africa
Mishi Choudhary, Private Sector, Software Freedom Law Centre, New York
Fernando Botelho, Private Sector, heads F123 Systems, Brazil
Sunil Abraham, CIS India
Pranesh Prakash, CIS India
Nnenna Nwakanma- WWW.Foundation
Yves MIEZAN EZO, Open Source strategy consultant
Corinto Meffe, Advisor to the President and Directors, SERPRO, Brazil
Frank Coelho de Alcantara, Professor, Universidade Positivo, Brazil
Caroline Burle, Institutional and International Relations, W3C Brazil Office and Center of Studies on Web Technologies

Detailed description of the workshop is available here http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals

Transcript of the workshop is available here http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2468-2015-11-13-ws10-foss-and-a-free-open-internet-synergies-for-development-workshop-room-7

Video link available here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lwUq0LTLnDs

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/summary-report-internet-governance-forum-2015

Stop Press Carousel

praskrishna — 2013-03-06T04:27:15Z

The silent blocking of URLs by the DoT assaults freedom of expression.

Arindam Mukherjee's article was published in the Outlook on February 22, 2013. Sunil Abraham is quoted.

Five Questions

On what grounds did the DoT ask for a ban on the 55 Facebook URLs pertaining to Afzal Guru?
Why did the Gwalior court rush into blocking of 73 URLs related to IIPM even though the content was very old and clearly some of it was even prima facie non-defamatory?
Why is the Gwalior court order not being made public?
Why doesn’t DoT keep the whole process transparent by putting up all its block orders on its website, giving reasons in each case?
How many URLs in all has the DoT asked for a ban on so far?

***

It’s the perfect recipe for a potboiler—a sudden, mysterious and arbitrary blocking of web pages, sparked off by an irate ‘educationist’; several upset publications (Outlook included); a government department with a blocked web page; a ministry trying to figure out how to react to a court order that is at the root of all the action, but which no one has been able to see.

As the cliche goes, truth is often stranger than fiction—as the affected parties discovered on February 15. That’s when it became known that the government had sought to block 78 web pages, reportedly following an order from a court in Gwalior. Around 73 of these articles sought to be blocked are on the controversial Indian Institute of Planning and Management (IIPM), promoted by self-styled management guru Arindam Chaudhuri.

What has taken everyone by surprise is how the blocks were executed—in a clandestine manner, without informing the affected parties, without serving them a notice or a copy of the order, or giving them a chance to react or defend themselves. The enormity of the ban is evident from the list of websites targeted, which include The Economic Times, The Indian Express, The Wall Street Journal, FirstPost, Careers360, Rediff.com and Caravan. When it came to Outlook, there was a clear case of overreach, as not just the web pages, but the entire blogs area was blocked for more than eight hours (see Jump Cut).

What is even more surprising is the smokescreen that is being maintained over the Gwalior court order that has caused this consternation on the Internet. At the time of going to print, no one—the affected websites, authors, lawyers or activists—had access to the order or had seen it, and the government was evading media queries on details of the order and the case. Despite repeated requests, the head of the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), Gulshan Rai, did not speak to Outlook.

So, in the absence of the order, no one even knows who the complainant is. Significantly, IIPM’s Chaudhuri has said that one of his ‘channel partners’ approached the court, though he clearly is the chief beneficiary of the episode. What this entire episode serves up is a blatant use of the law to muzzle press criticism while the government and official machinery have been willy-nilly forced to become mute players.

This surreal, Kafkaesque scenario continues apace at Outlook’s website, where on protesting the block on its blogs, the ISP said, “As only some of the URLs are mentioned in the DoT letter, we have reactivated the website and requested you to delete the mentioned contents,” adding that they had “attached the DoT instructions alongwith”. What they had attached was not one but two DoT orders, both dated February 14. One was, of course, the order about the 78 URLs. The other order came as news: an order on 55 Facebook URLs on Afzal Guru that the DoT wanted blocked.

As expected, internet activists and advocates of freedom of speech are livid. Shivam Vij, founder of kafila.org, one of the blogs that was blocked in the IIPM matter, says, “We were never given a chance to defend or explain. If only the DoT had put up the notice on their website, there would have been a healthier debate on regulation or censorship. But this was done in an opaque and arbitrary manner. If a book is banned, everyone gets to know. Why was there so much secrecy here?”

The arbitrariness of the twin government action also stems from the new IT Act which authorises the government or a competent authority to block or take down content considered “harmful”. And, according to the law, there is no obligation on the authorities’ part to inform the defendants. Cyber law expert Apar Gupta says, “Under the blocking rules, there is nothing that says that a copy of the court order has to be given to the affected parties. The rules also do not talk about the authors being given a chance to explain. It permits ad interim injunction to block content.”

Says Nikhil Pahwa, internet activist and editor of Medianama, which first reported about the IIPM blocks, “It is not clear why the DoT has taken this cloak-and-dagger approach. These are legitimate issues being raised by people regarding IIPM and its students. This is an infringement on the freedom of speech and expression. The DoT should have executed the blocks in a transparent manner by sending the affected parties a copy of the court order and making it public.”

That’s important, because legal experts feel that full facts may not have been considered in the IIPM case. “For this kind of a blocking order, the content should have come to the notice of the plaintiff recently. In this case, most of the content was much older. But sometimes plaintiffs also do not provide full details in a case,” says Gupta. Lawyers also feel that the Gwalior court may not be equipped to deal with litigation on new technologies.

There are other issues. In the IIPM case, the issue is primarily of defamation. But it is not clear whether defamation was established in all the articles that were sought to be taken down, especially a University Grants Commission (UGC) notice. Thus, the evidence that was presented to the court is important. Once again, till the court order becomes public, no one will know who the complainant was or what evidence was presented. The temporary ban on UGC’s web page is particularly surprising—and this has been noted by Shashi Tharoor—considering it is an independent regulator. “The regulatory body’s job is to regulate and nobody considers its notice as defamatory,” says Parminder Jeet Singh of IT for Change, an organisation dealing with internet issues.

The real purpose of such exercises, say experts, is to create a scare and embroil people in the legal process so that the process itself becomes a punishment and acts as a deterrent to others to engage in such writing. And that is why such cases are filed in remote and unusual destinations like Gwalior, Silchar, Dehradun and Guwahati. “There is a concept of forum shopping and forum shifting where cases are filed at remote destinations and by asking for huge damages, an attempt is made to scare people away from free speech. There are also many bullies who use defamation to create a scare effect. IIPM seems to have pioneered forum shopping in India,” says Sunil Abraham, executive director of the Bangalore-based Centre for Internet and Society (CIS).

The problem, everyone agrees, stems from the faulty nature of the Information Technology Act, which is open to interpretation and misuse. Says Singh, “The law tries to cover everything under a single head. It does not look specifically at the nuances of new media and give an appropriate response. So it is misused.” It is time that DoT became transparent and stopped its arbitrary, covert war against freedom of expression.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/outlook-feb-22-2013-arindam-mukherjee-stop-press-counsel