Centre for Internet and Society

Department of Telecommunications Order u/s. 69A IT Act Blocking 32 URLS

pranesh — 2014-12-31T14:36:01Z

On December 17, 2014, the Dept. of Telecommunications blocked 32 URLs (as it was ordered to do so by the by Dept. of Electronics & IT — specifically the Designated Officer under section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and under the Information Technology (Procedures and Safeguards for Blocking of Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009), those being: 01) https://justpaste.it/ 02) http://hastebin.com 03) http://codepad.org 04) http://pastie.org 05) https://pasteeorg 06) http://paste2.org 07) http://slexy.org 08) http://paste4btc.com/ 09) http://0bin.net 10) http://www.heypasteit.com 11) http://sourceforge.net/projects/phorkie 12) http://atnsoft.com/textpaster 13) https://archive.org 14) http://www.hpage.com 15) http://www.ipage.com/ 16) http://www.webs.com/ 17) http://www.weebly.com/ 18) http://www.000webhost.com/ 19) https://www.freehosting.com 20) https://vimeo.com/ 21) http://www.dailymotion.com/ 22) http://pastebin.com 23) https://gist.github.com 24) http://www.ipaste.eu 25) https://thesnippetapp.com 26) https://snipt.net 27) http://tny.ct (Tinypaste) 28) https://github.com (gist-it) 29) http://snipplr.com/ 30) http://termbin.com 31) http://www.snippetsource.net 32) https://cryptbin.com

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/2014-12-17_DoT-32-URL-Block-Order.pdf

Delhi High Court Orders Blocking of Websites after Sony Complains Infringement of 2014 FIFA World Cup Telecast Rights

sinha — 2014-07-08T07:02:16Z

Of late the Indian judiciary has been issuing John Doe orders to block websites, most recently in Multi Screen Media v. Sunit Singh and Others. The order mandated blocking of 472 websites, out of which approximately 267 websites were blocked as on July 7, 2014. This trend is an extremely dangerous one because it encourages flagrant censorship by intermediaries based on a judicial order which does not provide for specific blocking of a URL, instead provides for blocking of the entire website.

The High Court of Delhi on June 23, 2014 issued a John Doe injunction restraining more than 400 websites from broadcasting 2014 FIFA world cup matches. News reports indicate that the Single judge bench of Justice V. Kameswar Rao directed the Department of Telecom to issue appropriate directions to ISPs to block the websites that Multi Screen Media provided, as well as “any other website identified by the plaintiff” in the future. On July 4, Justice G. S. Sistani permitted reducing the list to 219 websites.

Background

Multi Screen Media (MSM) is the official broadcaster for the ongoing 2014 FIFA World Cup tournament. FIFA (the Governing body) had exclusively licensed rights to MSM which included live, delayed, highlights, on demand, and repeat broadcast of the FIFA matches. MSM complained that the defendants indulged in hosting, streaming, providing access to, etc, thereby infringing the exclusive rights and broadcast and reproduction rights of MSM.

The court in the instant order held that the defendants had prima facie infringed MSM’s broadcasting rights, which are guaranteed by section 37 of the Copyright Act, 1957. In an over-zealous attempt to pre-empt infringement the court called for a blanket ban on all websites identified by MSM. Further, the court directed the concerned authorities to ensure ISPs complied with this order and block the websites mentioned by MSM presently, and other websites which may be subsequently be notified by MSM.

Where the Court went Wrong

The court stated that MSM successfully established a prima facie case, and on its basis granted a sweeping injunction to MSM ordering blocking 471 second level domains. I’d like to point out numerous flaws with the order-

Dissatisfactory "Prima facie case"

In my opinion the court could have scrutinised the list of websites provided by MSM more carefully. There is nothing in the order to suggest that evidence was proffered by MSM in support of the list. The order reveals that the list was prepared by MarkScan, a “consulting boutique dedicated to (the client’s) IP requirements in the cyberspace and the Indian sub-continent.” The list throws up names such as docs.google.com, goo.gl & ad.ly (provide URL shortening service only), torrent indexing websites, IP addresses, online file streaming websites, etc., at a cursory glance. Evidently, perfectly legitimate websites have been targeted by an ill conducted search and shoddily prepared list which may lead to blocking of legitimate content on account of no verification by the court. 471 websites out of 472 mentioned in the first list are second level domains and 23 websites have been listed twice.

2. Generic order which abysmally fails to identify specific infringing URLS

Out of the 472 websites (list provided in the order by MarkScan)-

471 are file streaming websites, video sharing websites, file lockers, URL shorteners, file storage websites; only one is a specific URL [http://www.24livestreamtv.com/brazil-2014-fifa-world-cup-football-%20%C2%A0%C2%A0live-streaming-online-t ].

The order calls for blocking of complete websites. This is in complete contradiction to the 2012 Madras High Court’s order in R K Productions v BSNL which held that only a particular URL where the infringing content is kept should be blocked, rather than the entire website. The Madras High Court order had also made it mandatory for the complainants to provide exact URLs where they find illegal content, such that ISPs could block only that content and not the entire site. MSM did not adhere to this and I have serious doubts if the defendants brought the distinguishing Madras High Court judgment to the attention of the bench. The entire situation is akin to MarkScan scamming MSM by providing their clients a dodgy list, and MSM scamming the court and the public at large.

3. Lack of Transparency – Different blocking messages on different ISPs

The message displayed uniformly on blocked websites was:

"This website/URL has been blocked until further notice either pursuant to court orders or on the directions issued by the Department of Telecommunications."

I observed that a few websites showed the message “Error 404 – File or Directory not found” without the blocking message (above) on the network provider Reliance, and same Error 404 with the blocking message on the network provider Airtel highlighting the non-transparent manner of adherence to the order. Further, both the messages do not indicate the end period of the block.

Legality of John Doe orders in Website Blocking

It is pertinent to reiterate the ‘misuse’ of John Doe orders to block websites in India. The judiciary has erred in applying the John Doe order to protect copyrightable content on the internet. While the R K Productions v BSNL case appears reasonable in terms of permitting blocking of only URL specific content, the application of John Doe order to block websites remains unfounded in law. Ananth Padmanabhan in a three part study (Part I, II and III) had earlier analysed the improper use of John Doe injunctions to block websites in India. The John Doe order was conceived by US courts to pre-emptively remedy the irreparable damages suffered by copyright holders on account of unidentified/unnamed infringers. The interim injunction allowed collection of evidence from infringers, who were identified later as certain defendants and the final relief was accordingly granted. The courts routinely advocated judicious use of the order, and ensured that the identified defendants were provided and informed of their right to apply to the court within twenty four hours for a review of the order and a right to claim damages in an appropriate case. Therefore, the John Doe order applied against primary infringers per se.

On the other hand, whilst extending this remedy in India the courts have unfortunately placed onus on the conduit i.e. the ISP to block websites. This is tantamount to providing final relief at the interim stage, since all content definitely gets blocked; however, this hardly helps in identifying the actual infringer on the internet. The court is prematurely doling out blocking remedies to the complaining party, which, legally speaking should be meted out only during the final disposition of the case after careful examination of the evidence available. Thus, the intent of a John Doe order is miserably lost in such an application. Moreover, this lends an arbitrary amount of power in the hands of intermediaries since ISPs may or may not choose to approach the court for directions to specifically block URLs which provide access to infringing content only.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/delhi-high-court-orders-blocking-of-websites-after-sony-complains-infringement-of-2014-fifa-world-cup-telecast-rights

Delhi government in consultation with Centre to block Uber's Internet address

praskrishna — 2015-03-09T02:12:15Z

The Delhi transport department has started consultation with the central government to block the internet address of taxi hailing app Uber if the San Francisco-based startup does not obtain a radio taxi licence to ply its cabs in the national capital.

The article by Harsimran Julka was published in the Economic Times on February 25, 2015. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

Blocking Uber's IP will mean the company's website and mobile phone application will no longer be accessible in India, effectively shutting down operations in a country which the startup estimates is its largest market outside the United States.

Uber has operations across 10 cities in India with over 10,000 cabs registered on its platform."We have initiated a process with the central government to block (Uber's) IP address in India if the company doesn't abide by law," said a senior official in the Delhi transport department.

Uber and other taxi app companies were banned from operating in Delhi after the alleged rape of a passenger by a driver on the Uber network in December 2014. Subsequently, the transport department modified radio taxi laws and directed Uber and rivals OlaCabs and Taxiforsure to obtain licences to operate legally in the city. While Ola has obtained a licence, Uber, which terms itself as a technology company and not a transport provider, has been demanding that it be regulated under the Information Technology Act. "There has to be an end to the matter somewhere," said the official quoted above. The department has given Uber time until February 25 to submit a revised application for a radio taxi licence.

"We are waiting to see if they comply and apply for a licence before issuing a written request (to block the IP address),' said a second official who confirmed that the transport department had already begun discussions with the department of IT. Zubeda Begum, the standing counsel for the Delhi government is likely to submit an affidavit on Wednesday in the Delhi High Court on the method to be adopted to block the IP address.

The court, which is hearing the case of the alleged rape, had raised the issue of banning IP addresses of taxi app companies after the state government complained that the companies continued to ply in the national despite the ban.

"It is the central government which will have to block the website. The Delhi government just has to make a request," Begum told ET.

Pawan Duggal, cyber law expert and a Supreme Court advocate, said that the blocking of websites in India can be done under Section 69A of the Information Technology Act but the rules to get them unblocked are unclear.

"A court order may be needed to get it unblocked," said Duggal.

A spokeswoman for Uber said the company will continue to work with the authorities and is "evaluating the perceived deficiencies in the time period provided to us by the government."

This is not the first time that the website of a foreign company will be banned in India. Last December, about 32 websites including SourceForge, Archive, Vimeo, Dailymotion were banned on grounds of national security. Uber itself has had its IP address blocked in countries such as Spain. Last December, a Madrid Court ordered Spain's telcos to block access to Uber.

"Any state government department can request the designated authority to block a website. The authority has to then forward the request to a committee, which takes the decision," said Pranesh Prakash, at the Centre for Internet and Society in Bengaluru.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/economic-times-harsimran-julka-february-25-2015-delhi-government-in-consultation-with-centre-to-block-ubers-internet-address

Delhi defends Internet blocking

praskrishna — 2012-08-27T04:13:10Z

India on Friday defended itself against accusations of heavy-handed online censorship, saying it had been successful in blocking content blamed for fuelling ethnic tensions.

Published in Gulf Today on August 25, 2012. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

The government over the past week has ordered Internet service providers to block 309 webpages, images and links on sites including Facebook, Twitter, Wikipedia, news channel ABC of Australia and Qatar-based Al Jazeera.

The orders were an effort to halt the spread of “hateful” material and rumours that Muslims planned to attack students and workers who have migrated from the northeast region to live in Bangalore and other southern cities.

“We have met with success. These pages were a threat to India’s national security and we demanded their immediate deletion,” Kuldeep Singh Dhatwalia, a spokesman for India’s home ministry said.

“Spreading rumours to encourage violence or cause tension will not be tolerated. The idea is not to restrict communication.” But Twitter users, legal experts and analysts criticised the government’s approach, which appeared to have resulted in only partial blocking of material, much of which was still accessible.

“The officials who are trusted with this don’t know the law or modern technology well enough,” Pranesh Prakash, programme manager at the Centre for Internet and Society research group, told AFP.

“It is counter-productive. I accuse them of monumental incompetence, given that the main problem is that they are getting really bad advice.

“I hope that this fiasco shows the folly of excessive censorship and encourages the government to make better use of social networks and technology to reach out to people.”

In a strange irony, account of none other than Minister of State for Communication and Information Technology Milind Deora was suspended by Twitter.

But at the same time, a fake account similar to Deora’s remained active.

The followers of Deora on Twitter were in for a surprise when they found a search for his name showed “No people results for Milind Deora.”

Deora’s tweets gave the government’s version on the crackdown on the microblogging site and other social networking websites.

Deora in his tweet on Thursday night had defended the government’s efforts to block hate content on the Internet.

“Ironically, let me clarify on Twitter that there is absolutely no intent of the government to curb freedom of social media platforms,” Deora’s tweet read.

“Account suspended. The profile you are trying to view has been suspended...,” was the automated message that was seen on the Twitter.

The news of Deora’s account suspension spread like wild fire on the microblogging site with some making sarcastic comments.

“Communication Minister Milind Deora’s Twitter Account ‘Suspended.’ It’s like the home minister losing his house key,” read one of the tweets, while another user’s tweet read: “Ah! I know what happened. Milind Deora sent Twitter a list of people to (be) banned and signed his name under it.”

The government has asked Internet service providers to block select 16 Twitter accounts, including that of some journalists.

Twitter has also removed six accounts, which resembled that of the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) amid government’s assertion that action would be taken against those allowing objectionable content.

In a communication to the PMO, Twitter has said it has “removed the reported profile(s) from circulation due to violation of our Terms of Service regarding impersonation.”

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/gulf-today-aug-25-2012-delhi-defends-internet-blocking

DeitY says 143 URLs have been Blocked in 2015; Procedure for Blocking Content Remains Opaque and in Urgent Need of Transparency Measures

jyoti — 2015-04-30T07:37:40Z

Across India on 30 December 2014, following an order issued by the Department of Telecom (DOT), Internet Service Providers (ISPs) blocked 32 websites including Vimeo, Dailymotion, GitHub and Pastebin.

In February 2015, the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) requested the Department of Electronics and Information Technology (DeitY) under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (RTI Act) to provide information clarifying the procedures for blocking in India. We have received a response from DeitY which may be seen here.

In this post, I shall elaborate on this response from DeitY and highlight some of the accountability and transparency measures that the procedure needs. To stress the urgency of reform, I shall also touch upon two recent developments—the response from Ministry of Communication to questions raised in Parliament on the blocking procedures and the Supreme Court (SC) judgment in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India.

Section 69A and the Blocking Rules

Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2008 (S69A hereinafter) grants powers to the central government to issue directions for blocking of access to any information through any computer resource. In other words, it allows the government to block any websites under certain grounds. The Government has notified rules laying down the procedure for blocking access online under the Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public Rules, 2009 (Rules, 2009 hereinafter). CIS has produced a poster explaining the blocking procedure (download PDF, 2.037MB).

There are three key aspects of the blocking rules that need to be kept under consideration:

Officers and committees handling requests

Designated Officer (DO) – Appointed by the Central government, officer not below the rank of Joint Secretary.
Nodal Officer (NO) – Appointed by organizations including Ministries or Departments of the State governments and Union Territories and any agency of the Central Government.
Intermediary contact–Appointed by every intermediary to receive and handle blocking directions from the DO.
Committee for Examination of Request (CER) – The request along with printed sample of alleged offending information is examined by the CER—committee with the DO serving as the Chairperson and representatives from Ministry of Law and Justice; Ministry of Home Affairs; Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and representative from the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In). The CER is responsible for examining each blocking request and makes recommendations including revoking blocking orders to the DO, which are taken into consideration for final approval of request for blocking by the Secretary, DOT.
Review Committee (RC) – Constituted under rule 419A of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1951, the RC includes the Cabinet Secretary, Secretary to the Government of India (Legal Affairs) and Secretary (Department of Telecom). The RC is mandated to meet at least once in 2 months and record its findings and has to validate that directions issued are in compliance with S69A(1).

Provisions outlining the procedure for blocking

Rules 6, 9 and 10 create three distinct blocking procedures, which must commence within 7 days of the DO receiving the request.

a) Rule 6 lays out the first procedure, under which any person may approach the NO and request blocking, alternatively, the NO may also raise a blocking request. After the NO of the approached Ministry or Department of the State governments and Union Territories and/or any agency of the Central Government, is satisfied of the validity of the request they forward it to the DO. Requests when not sent through the NO of any organization, must be approved by Chief Secretary of the State or Union Territory or the Advisor to the Administrator of the Union Territory, before being sent to the DO.

The DO upon receiving the request places, must acknowledge receipt within 24 four hours and places the request along with printed copy of alleged information for validation by the CER. The DO also, must make reasonable efforts to identify the person or intermediary hosting the information, and having identified them issue a notice asking them to appear and submit their reply and clarifications before the committee at a specified date and time, within forty eight hours of the receipt of notice.

Foreign entities hosting the information are also informed and the CER gives it recommendations after hearing from the intermediary or the person has clarified their position and even if there is no representation by the same and after examining if the request falls within the scope outlined under S69A(1). The blocking directions are issued by the Secretary (DeitY), after the DO forwards the request and the CER recommendations. If approval is granted the DO directs the relevant intermediary or person to block the alleged information.

b) Rule 9 outlines a procedure wherein, under emergency circumstances, and after the DO has established the necessity and expediency to block alleged information submits recommendations in writing to the Secretary, DeitY. The Secretary, upon being satisfied by the justification for, and necessity of, and expediency to block information may issue an blocking directions as an interim measure and must record the reasons for doing so in writing.

Under such circumstances, the intermediary and person hosting information is not given the opportunity of a hearing. Nevertheless, the DO is required to place the request before the CER within forty eight hours of issuing of directions for interim blocking. Only upon receiving the final recommendations from the committee can the Secretary pass a final order approving the request. If the request for blocking is not approved then the interim order passed earlier is revoked, and the intermediary or identified person should be directed to unblock the information for public access.

c) Rule 10 outlines the process when an order is issued by the courts in India. The DO upon receipt of the court order for blocking of information submits it to the Secretary, DeitY and initiates action as directed by the courts.

Confidentiality clause

Rule 16 mandates confidentiality regarding all requests and actions taken thereof, which renders any requests received by the NO and the DO, recommendations made by the DO or the CER and any written reasons for blocking or revoking blocking requests outside the purview of public scrutiny. More detail on the officers and committees that enforce the blocking rules and procedure can be found here.

Response on blocking from the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology

The response to our RTI from E-Security and Cyber Law Group is timely, given the recent clarification from the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology to a number of questions, raised by parliamentarian Shri Avinash Pande in the Rajya Sabha. The questions had been raised in reference to the Emergency blocking order under IT Act, the current status of the Central Monitoring System, Data Privacy law and Net Neutrality. The Centre for Communication Governance (CCG), National Law University New Delhi have extracted a set of 6 questions and you can read the full article here.

The governments response as quoted by CCG, clarifies under rule 9—the Government has issued directions for emergency blocking of a total number of 216 URLs from 1st January, 2014 till date and that a total of 255 URLs were blocked in 2014 and no URLs has been blocked in 2015 (till 31 March 2015) under S69A through the Committee constituted under the rules therein. Further, a total of 2091 URLs and 143 URLs were blocked in order to comply with the directions of the competent courts of India in 2014 and 2015 (till 31 March 2015) respectively. The government also clarified that the CER, had recommended not to block 19 URLs in the meetings held between 1^stJanuary 2014 upto till date and so far, two orders have been issued to revoke 251 blocked URLs from 1st January 2014 till date. Besides, CERT-In received requests for blocking of objectionable content from individuals and organisations, and these were forwarded to the concerned websites for appropriate action, however the response did not specify the number of requests.

We have prepared a table explaining the information released by the government and to highlight the inconsistency in their response.

Applicable rule and procedure outlined under the Blocking Rules	Number of websites
	2014	2015	Total
Rule 6 - Blocking requests from NO and others	255	None	255
Rule 9 - Blocking under emergency circumstances	-	-	216
Rule 10 - Blocking orders from Court	2091	143	2234
Requests from individuals and orgs forwarded to CERT-In	-	-	-
Recommendations to not block by CER	-	-	19
Number of blocking requests revoked	-	-	251

In a response to an RTI filed by the Software Freedom Law Centre, DeitY said that 708 URLs were blocked in 2012, 1,349 URLs in 2013, and 2,341 URLs in 2014.

Shreya Singhal v. Union of India

In its recent judgment, the SC of India upheld the constitutionality of 69A, stating that it was a narrowly-drawn provision with adequate safeguards. The constitutional challenge on behalf of the People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) considered the manner in which the blocking is done and the arguments focused on the secrecy present in blocking.

The rules may indicate that there is a requirement to identify and contact the originator of information, though as an expert has pointed out, there is no evidence of this in practice. The court has stressed the importance of a written order so that writ petitions may be filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. In doing so, the court seems to have assumed that the originator or intermediary is informed, and therefore held the view that any procedural inconsistencies may be challenged through writ petitions. However, this recourse is rendered ineffective not only due to procedural constraints, but also because of the confidentiality clause. The opaqueness through rule 16 severely reigns in the recourse that may be given to the originator and the intermediary. While the court notes that rule 16 requiring confidentality was argued to be unconstitutional, it does not state its opinion on this question in the judgment. One expert, holds the view that this, by implication, requires that requests cannot be confidential. However, such a reading down of rule 16 is yet to be tested.

Further, Sunil Abraham has pointed out, “block orders are unevenly implemented by ISPs making it impossible for anyone to independently monitor and reach a conclusion whether an internet resource is inaccessible as a result of a S69A block order or due to a network anomaly.” As there are no comprehensive list of blocked websites or of the legal orders through which they are blocked exists, the public has to rely on media reports and filing RTI requests to understand the censorship regime in India. CIS has previously analysed the leaked block lists and lists received as responses to RTI requests which have revealed that the block orders are full of errors and blocking of entire platforms and not just specific links has taken place.

While the state has the power of blocking content, doing so in secrecy and without judical scrutiny, mark deficiencies that remain in the procedure outlined under the provisions of the blocking rules . The Court could read down rule 16 except for a really narrow set of exceptions, and in not doing so, perhaps has overlooked the opportunities for reform in the existing system. The blocking of 32 websites, is an example of the opaqueness of the system of blocking orders, and where the safeguards assumed by the SC are often not observed such as there being no access to the recommendations that were made by the CER, or towards the revocation of the blocking orders subsequently. CIS filed the RTI to try and understand the grounds for blocking and related procedures and the response has thrown up some issues that must need urgent attention.

Response to RTI filed by CIS

Our first question sought clarification on the websites blocked on 30^thDecember 2014 and the response received from DeitY, E-Security and Cyber Law Group reveals that the websites had been blocked as “they were being used to post information related to ISIS using the resources provided by these websites”. The response also clarifies that the directions to block were issued on 18-12-2014 and as of 09-01-2015, after obtaining an undertaking from website owners, stating their compliance with the Government and Indian laws, the sites were unblocked.

It is not clear if ATS, Mumbai had been intercepting communication or if someone reported these websites. If the ATS was indeed intercepting communication, then as per the rules, the RC should be informed and their recommendations sought. It is unclear, if this was the case and the response evokes the confidentiality clause under rule 16 for not divulging further details. Based on our reading of the rules, court orders should be accessible to the public and without copies of requests and complaints received and knowledge of which organization raised them, there can be no appeal or recourse available to the intermediary or even the general public.

We also asked for a list of all requests for blocking of information that had been received by the DO between January 2013 and January 2015, including the copies of all files that had accepted or rejected. We also specifically, asked for a list of requests under rule 9. The response from DeitY stated that since January 1, 2015 to March 31, 2015 directions to block 143 URLs had been issued based on court orders. The response completely overlooks our request for information, covering the 2 year time period. It also does not cover all types of blocking orders under rule 6 and rule 9, nor the requests that are forwarded to CERT-In, as we have gauged from the ministry's response to the Parliament. Contrary to the SC's assumption of contacting the orginator of information, it is also clear from DeitY's response that only the websites had been contacted and the letter states that the “websites replied only after blocking of objectionable content”.

Further, seeking clarification on the functioning of the CER, we asked for the recent composition of members and the dates and copies of the minutes of all meetings including copies of the recommendations made by them. The response merely quotes rule 7 as the reference for the composition and does not provide any names or other details. We ascertain that as per the DeitY website Shri B.J. Srinath, Scientist-G/GC is the appointed Designated Officer, however this needs confirmation. While we are already aware of the structure of the CER which representatives and appointed public officers are guiding the examination of requests remains unclear. Presently, there are 3 Joint Secretaries appointed under the Ministry of Law and Justice, the Home Ministry has appointed 19, while 3 are appointed under the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Further, it is not clear which grade of scientist would be appointed to this committee from CERT-In as the rules do not specify this. While the government has clarified in their answer to Parliament that the committee had recommended not to block 19 URLs in the meetings held between 1st January 2014 to till date, it is remains unclear who is taking these decisions to block and revoke blocked URLs. The response from DeitY specifies that the CER has met six times between 2014 and March 2015, however stops short on sharing any further information or copies of files on complaints and recommendations of the CER, citing rule 16.

Finally, answering our question on the composition of the RC the letter merely highlights the provision providing for the composition under 419A of the Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951. The response clarifies that so far, the RC has met once on 7th December, 2013 under the Chairmanship of the Cabinet Secretary, Department of Legal Affaits and Secretary, DOT. Our request for minutes of meetings and copies of orders and findings of the RC is denied by simply stating that “minutes are not available”. Under 419A, any directions for interception of any message or class of messages under sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 issued by the competent authority shall contain reasons for such direction and a copy of such order shall be forwarded to the concerned RC within a period of seven working days. Given that the RC has met just once since 2013, it is unclear if the RC is not functioning or if the interception of messages is being guided through other procedures. Further, we do not yet know details or have any records of revocation orders or notices sent to intermediary contacts. This restricts the citizens’ right to receive information and DeitY should work to make these available for the public.

Given the response to our RTI, the Ministry's response to Parliament and the SC judgment we recommend the following steps be taken by the DeitY to ensure that we create a procedure that is just, accountable and follows the rule of law.

The revocation of rule 16 needs urgent clarification for two reasons:

Under Section 22 of the RTI Act provisions thereof, override all conflicting provisions in any other legislation.
In upholding the constitutionality of S69A the SC cites the requirement of reasons behind blocking orders to be recorded in writing, so that they may be challenged by means of writ petitions filed under A rticle 226 of the Constitution of India.

If the blocking orders or the meetings of the CER and RC that consider the reasons in the orders are to remain shrouded in secrecy and unavailable through RTI requests, filing writ petitions challenging these decisions will not be possible, rendering this very important safeguard for the protection of online free speech and expression infructuous. In summation, the need for comprehensive legislative reform remains in the blocking procedures and the government should act to address the pressing need for transparency and accountability. Not only does opacity curtial the strengths of democracy it also impedes good governance. We have filed an RTI seeking a comprehensive account of the blocking procedure, functioning of committees from 2009-2015 and we shall publish any information that we may receive.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/deity-says-143-urls-blocked-in-2015

Decline in web freedom steepest in India: Report

praskrishna — 2013-10-24T03:50:51Z

In a report on the state of internet in 60 countries, Freedom House, a US-based organization, said that in 2013 India saw the "most significant year-on-year decline" in terms of the web freedom.

The article by Javed Anwer was published in the Times of India on October 3, 2013. Sunil Abraham is quoted.

The report said that that the internet in India was "partly free". This is the same status that India had in 2012. But the country's score is now 47 points (higher means more censorship) in 2013 compared to 39 in 2012. The 8-point fall is the steepest Freedom House found among all 60 countries that the group surveyed. Freedom House said it recorded 5-point fall in Brazil, Venezuela and the US.

Despite mass surveillance revealed by Edward Snowden, a former contractor for National Security Agency in the US, Freedom House calls the web in the country "free".

The Freedom House report said that in 2013 India "suffered from deliberate interruptions of mobile and internet service to limit unrest, excessive blocks on content during rioting in northeastern states, and an uptick in the filing of criminal charges against ordinary users for posts of social media sites".

In 2013, India's commitment to the web freedom has not only been worse than developed countries but has also been inferior to countries like Malawi, Tunisia and Mexico.

In the case of India, Freedom House particularly singles out Central Monitoring System, which Indian government is putting in place to regulate and monitor the web usage within the country. "Surveillance (under CMS) requires no judicial oversight. While some of this activity might be justifiable, the lack of transparency surrounding the system, which was never reviewed by Parliament, is concerning," it notes in the report. "The system's potential for abuse is also disquieting, as is its inadequate legal framework.

The report cites the case of the girl who was arrested for liking a Facebook post in Maharashtra, blocking of some Twitter accounts belonging to Indian users, overly broad court directives that have resulted in blocking of websites and a general lack of transparency in how Indian government blocks or filters content reach a conclusion that Indians now have less freedom on how they use the web.

Sunil Abraham, director at Bangalore-based Centre for Internet and Society, says that Freedom House reports are not very accurate because they don't factor in censorship by copyright holders. But he agreed with its basic premise that in India conditions for web users are getting more difficult.

"The report is absolutely right in pointing out that censorship and surveillance in India is increasing. Despite protests from many quarters, it is a real pity that the government is not taking steps to amend the IT act and has joined other nation states in the global race to the bottom of the internet freedom," said Abraham.

Anja Kovacs, founder of Delhi-based Internet Democracy Project, agrees. "I have some issues with Freedom House reports due to how they are prepared and their methodologies. But yes I can say that last year has been very eventful and difficult," said. "But at the same time, there has also been a lot of push back from web users and activists. There have been conversations around the issue of web censorship, which is good."

Globally, the web surveillance is on the rise. "Broad surveillance, new laws controlling web content, and growing arrests of social-media users drove a worldwide decline in internet freedom in the past year," noted Freedom House.

Overall, 34 out of 60 countries part of the report saw a decline in the web freedom. "Vietnam and Ethiopia continued on a worsening cycle of repression; Venezuela stepped up censorship during presidential elections; and three democracies—India, the United States, and Brazil—saw troubling declines," noted the report.

Iceland and Estonia topped the list of countries with the greatest degree of internet freedom. China, Cuba, and Iran were found to be the most repressive countries.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/times-of-india-october-3-2013-javed-anwer-decline-in-web-freedom-steepest-in-india

Dark days for the creative class in India: Siddiqui

praskrishna — 2014-02-17T09:14:43Z

As India’s literacy rate improves, governments, courts, media, publishers and big business are all stifling free speech.

Haroon Siddiqui's article was published in thestar.com on February 16, 2014. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

In contrast to North America and Europe, India’s book publishers, newspapers and TV/radio stations are doing well, thanks to a rising literacy rate and a growing middle class. Authors, artists, journalists and filmmakers are enjoying big audiences and relatively good paycheques. Yet, paradoxically, free speech has never been so imperilled in the world’s largest democracy, for several reasons.

Governments are using colonial-era laws to stifle free speech. The lower courts and police are caving in to religious bigots who demand bans on what they don’t want to see and hear. Vigilante groups are using goon tactics to intimidate the creative class. Big business is slapping lawsuits and creating libel chill. Publishing houses are capitulating to legal, political and economic pressure. The media are too busy mollycoddling governments and advertisers to stand up for free speech.

Legal framework

The constitution guarantees free speech but, as in Canada and several European nations, it also imposes “reasonable restrictions” to maintain peace and public order. The Supreme Court has set a high bar for imposing any restrictions, yet both the federal and state governments routinely shut down anything that might flare communal riots, especially between Hindus and Muslims — a real and ever-present danger. Politicians don’t want blood on their hands to uphold the right of a preening writer to poke people in the eye. Critics counter that the political class doesn’t really care for intellectual freedom.

Libel and defamation laws criminalize speech and prescribe jail terms. This, again, is not much different than, say, the Canadian Criminal Code, under which those convicted of hate speech may be jailed for up to three years. (That’s what we are left with after the Stephen Harper Conservatives axed the civilian remedy that was available under the Human Rights Act.)

India’s Anti-Sedition Act prohibits words and actions that may cause “hatred or contempt or disaffection” toward government. This is used even against journalists, activists and those protesting government policies. As many as 6,000 farmers and fishermen were charged for opposing a nuclear plant along the southeast coast.

The Penal Code makes it an offence, punishable by up to three years in jail, to hurt anyone’s religious sensibilities; promote enmity between different religious groups; circulate “any statement or report containing rumour or alarming news with intent to create or promote, or which is likely to create or promote, on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community feelings of enmity,” etc., etc.

Worse, the code allows anyone offended by anything to demand that the offensive material be removed.

Indians are easily offended, indeed are “desperate to be offended,” jokes novelist Manu Joseph. The milieu allows religious leaders and politicians to stoke real or imagined grievances and rush to the courts and the police, both of which usually cave in rather than risk the wrath of frenzied protesters.

“Instead of protecting the right of free expression, the state defends the offended,” writes Salil Tripathi on the website Index on Censorship.

Adds Kian Ganz, editor of the website Legally India: “Many of these British-colonial laws were written and enforced to ‘control’ a multi-ethnic and religious population. Yet they are still around and are regularly used to stifle free speech.”

Religious bigotry

While we hear mostly of angry Muslims taking offence to alleged insults to Islam — the 1988 ban on Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses being the prime example — increasingly it is Hindu fundamentalists who have been agitating successfully against what they do not like.

“Hindu bigots have matched, or perhaps even outperformed, their Islamic counterparts,” writes Ramachandra Guha, India’s pre-eminent historian. He was condemning Penguin India’s decision last week to recall and pulp American academic Wendy Doniger’s The Hindus: an Alternative History, under pressure from a Hindu group that said the 2009 book contained “heresies” and was focused on “sex and eroticism.”

There has been no bigger victim of Hindu wrath than the late M.F. Hussain, the “Picasso of India.” His priceless work was vandalized, he was slapped with hundreds of lawsuits and threatened with death for painting Hindu deities in the nude. He went into exile in Doha, Qatar, where I spoke to him on the phone in 2011 and heard his pain at having been hounded out of his beloved India. We agreed to meet later but he died soon after, at age 95.

Last year, India’s leading intellectual Ashish Nandy was threatened with arrest for ostensibly offending Dalits (Hindus of a lower caste, formerly known as untouchables).

In 2012, Mumbai police arrested a young woman who complained on Facebook about the shutdown of the city of 18 million on the death of Bal Thackeray, leader of a chauvinist regional Hindu party. Another woman who “liked” the page was also detained,both for “hurting religious sentiments.”

In 2011, the western state of Gujarat stopped the sale of American journalist Joseph Lelyveld’s biography of Mahatma Gandhi, which suggested that the great leader may have had a sexual relationship with a male German architect. The chief minister (premier), Narendra Modi, is now the prime ministerial candidate of the Hindu nationalist Bharata Janata Party for federal elections in May, which he is favoured to win.

In 2010, Canadian author Rohinton Mistry’s 1995 book, A Fine Balance, was removed from the syllabus of Bombay University, his alma mater, following objections by a student, the grandson of Thackeray. The head of the university’s English Department had to go into hiding after receiving death threats.

In 2008, Delhi University expunged from its history course an essay by A.K. Ramanujam on Hinduism following complaints by a Hindu group, and Oxford University Press India temporarily stopped printing it.

Other examples:

In 2007, a court issued an arrest warrant for actor Richard Gere for kissing Bollywood actress Shilpa Shetty, following complaints by irate Hindus. An institute in the western city of Pune was vandalized because American academic James Laine had done part of his research there for his book, Shivaji: Hindu King in Islamic India. An art gallery in Bangalore hastily removed partially nude pictures of Hindu deities fearing retaliation by a Hindu moral squad.

Guha, the historian, once suggested that both Rushdie and Hussain, one pilloried by Muslims and the other by Hindus, be conferred India’s highest civilian honours. “That would have been a blow for artistic freedom. And it’d have equally offended Hindu and Islamic bigots.”

Libel chill

There has been a steady rise in what free speech advocates see as nuisance lawsuits by corporate houses, businessmen and political parties.

In December, Jitender Bhargava, executive director of Air India until 2010, saw his book on the national airline withdrawn by Bloomsbury India, allegedly under political pressure.

The same month, another book, Sahara: The Untold Story, on the controversial finance and real estate conglomerate, was held back under a court order.

In 2011, Penguin removed a chapter in The Beautiful and the Damned from its Indian edition after Arindam Chaudhuri, who runs business schools, sued about his profile in it. He also sued Caravan, a journal of politics and culture, for an article on how he had “made a fortune off the aspirations and insecurities of India’s middle class.” The Delhi-based businessman still has the Delhi-based magazine entangled in the case he filed in a jurisdiction 1,750 kilometres away — and 300 kilometres from the nearest airport.

Penguin also held back a biography of J. Jayalalithaa, chief minister of the southern state of Tamil Nadu, who had a stay order issued against it.

In 1998, a book about the head of a textile conglomerate, Dhirubhai Ambani, was not published in India after the publisher was threatened with lawsuits. A second edition of The Polyester Prince was issued in India but with the offending material cut out.

It is difficult for outsiders, especially without the benefit of reading the materials in dispute, to judge the timidity of the publishers. But there’s no questioning the creeping self-censorship.

Obeisant media

Vinod Jose, executive editor of Caravan, writes in its annual media issue:

“Media owners bargained with the government to secure lucrative licences to mine coal blocks in return for their power to influence the public. Editors got caught on tape striking deals with lobbyists but remained arrogantly unapologetic. Owners fired political editors who wrote about politics independently . . . Forbes India pulled a story because it irked the finance ministry.”

Jose said that in 2013, the year surveyed, “the dominant mood of the press was docility.” If in the 1950s and 1960s, the media served the state, now they serve big business. They have begun to expose government corruption but remain mostly mum on corporate malfeasance. The Times of India, the country’s largest English daily, takes equity in some companies it provides advertising space to.

State surveillance

India, like the United States and other democracies, is under heavy criticism for invasion of citizen privacy under sweeping state surveillance, especially by its eight intelligence agencies that operate under mostly secretive powers.

“The real problem is that we don’t know what powers they do have — we only know bits and pieces about the Centralised Monitoring System (CMS), from some tender documents that indicate that the government intends to track web usage, phone calls, text messages and map location information, apparently without the knowledge of even telecom operators,” says Nikhil Pahwa of MediaNama (Media Journal), a website that provides news and analysis of digital media. “The issue is even less obvious here than that of the NSA,” the National Security Agency in the United States.

“The rules give the Indian government the ability to gag free speech, and block any website it deems fit, without publicly disclosing why or who blocked it — or providing adequate recourse for getting the block removed.”

“Intelligence agencies are not answerable to parliament, only to the Home ministry,” says Anja Kovacs of the Centre for Internet and Society. There are few checks and balances, little or no civilian oversight.

“The Indian government’s centralized monitoring is chilling, given its reckless and irresponsible use of the sedition and Internet laws,” says Human Rights Watch. “New surveillance capabilities have been used . . . to target critics, journalists and human rights activists.”

“Every month at the federal level, 7,000 to 9,000 phone taps are authorized or re-authorized,” writes Pranesh Prakash, policy director for the Centre for Internet and Society.

Conclusion

It is useful to remember that whatever is true of India, the exact opposite may also be true. So, while the situation is getting bleaker on the free speech front, in India the state is not the sole culprit, unlike in Russia, China or other authoritarian places. India also has a vibrant civil society that’s hammering away — is free to hammer away — at the need for a liberal polity to be liberal. The intellectuals, activists and NGOs I have quoted, testify to that. Here’s another:

The PEN All-India Centre in Mumbai and the newly formed Delhi Pen, both part of the global network of writers dedicated to free speech, said this last week:

“The removal of books from our bookshops, bookshelves and libraries, whether through state-sanctioned censorship, private vigilante action or publisher capitulation are all egregious violations of free speech that we shall oppose in all forms at all times.”

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/the-star-op-ed-february-16-2014-haroon-siddiqui-dark-days-for-creative-class-in-india

Criticism mounts over India censorship

praskrishna — 2012-08-27T06:38:51Z

India’s government is facing fierce criticism from privacy groups, political opponents and irate internet users accusing it of an excessive and poorly targeted censorship drive as it seeks to contain social alarm triggered by communal unrest.

This article written by James Crabtree in Mumbai and Tim Bradshaw in San Francisco was published in Financial Times on August 24, 2012. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

Following panicked scenes among groups from the nation’s troubled north-east and fearing an escalation of urban violence between Muslim and Hindu groups, the administration this week instructed internet companies, including Facebook and Google, to block more than 300 web pages and more than a dozen Twitter accounts it claimed were inflaming communal tensions.

But by Friday the order was being assailed as an example of administrative incompetence, as internet analysts revealed that many of the pages contained seemingly harmless material from foreign media organisations, political columnists and critics of India’s government.

Pranesh Prakash, a legal expert at the Bangalore-based Centre for Internet and Society, said: “I am not questioning their original motives, but I do think this is excessive and incompetent censorship.”

Political opponents also accused the government of over-reach, including Narendra Modi, the controversial chief minister of the state Gujarat and a member of the Hindu nationalist BJP party, who on Friday used a Twitter post to call the moves a “crackdown on freedom of speech”.

The government denies it is being heavy handed. “We are only taking strict action against those accounts or people which are causing damage or spreading rumours,” said Kuldeep Dhatwalia, an Indian home ministry spokesman. “We are not taking action against other accounts, be it on Facebook, Twitter or even SMSes.”

Twitter found itself at the centre of the growing controversy, as government spokespeople accused the US-based social networking site of failing to respond to requests to block users, some of which involved accounts appearing to impersonate Manmohan Singh, the prime minister.

Twitter responded by suspending a number of impersonator accounts and is now in discussions with the prime minister’s office in an attempt to defuse the row, according to people familiar with the matter. A spokesperson for Twitter declined to comment.

Angry users also used the site to attack the restrictions using the hashtags #GOIblocks and #Emergency2012, the latter a highly charged reference to prime minister Indira Gandhi’s two-year period of rule by decree in the late 1970s.

India has a long history of censorship measures designed to prevent communal violence, ranging from restrictions introduced under the British Raj in the early 20th century to more recent edicts banning Salman Rushdie’s novel The Satanic Verses and restricting derogatory portrayals of religious figures in Bollywood movies.

“Blocking content to help mitigate a volatile situation involving civilian security could be justified,” says Meenakshi Ganguly, South Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “But when the government expresses equal concern about fake Twitter handles or criticism of political leaders, it begins to look like censorship.”

The online restrictions followed related measures restricting to five the number of text messages that could be sent from most Indian mobile phones, although this was lifted to 20 on Thursday.

They also came during a week of deepening political crisis in the world’s largest democracy, as opposition leaders repeatedly halted parliamentary proceedings and called for Mr Singh’s resignation in the aftermath of a critical report from India’s government auditor.

“These threats to social harmony are real, but like almost everything the Indian state is doing at present, the restrictions incompetently deal with a few symptoms rather than addressing causes,” says Pratap Bhanu Mehta of the Centre for Policy Research, a think tank in New Delhi. “They are simply exacerbating a crisis of trust, not solving it.”

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/www-ft-com-aug-24-2012-james-crabtree-tim-bradshaw-criticism-mounts-over-india-censorship

Criminal Defamation: The Urgent Cause That has United Rahul Gandhi, Arvind Kejriwal and Subramanian Swamy

praskrishna — 2015-07-16T13:45:04Z

Three years ago when the then Janata Party president Subramanian Swamy accused Congress vice president Rahul Gandhi and his mother of misappropriation of funds while trying to revive the National Herald newspaper, the Nehru-Gandhi scion threatened to sue him.

The article by Betwa Sharma was published in Huffington Post on July 15, 2015. Sunil Abraham gave his inputs.

Swamy's response was characteristic: "Grow up and file a defamation case".

In a strange turn of events, the matter of criminal defamation has brought together an unlikely cast of characters in an ongoing petition in the Supreme Court--Swamy, Gandhi and Delhi chief minister Arvind Kejriwal, who knows a thing or two about making allegations.

They are petitioning the Apex Court to strike down penal provisions criminalising defamation, which they argue, has a "chilling effect" on the fundamental right to free speech. Opinion is divided around the world on whether or not defamation ought to be a criminal offence. Because some jurisdictions have stricter defamation laws, some indulge in a practise known as 'forum shopping', or suing in jurisdictions with harsher views on libel and slander.

The three leaders have filed separate petitions that are now being jointly heard by the court. They are challenging the constitutional validity of Sections 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code which make defamation a criminal offence punishable with up to two years in prison.

A verdict striking down the colonial-era S. 499, used by the British to suppress those opposing their rule, could prove to be a huge victory for free speech in India. Earlier this year, the Supreme Court struck down the draconian Section 66A of the Information Technology Act as "unconstitutional and void".

There is cause for optimism. The Supreme Court has already said that the validity of criminal defamation laws must be tested against the free speech guarantees of the constitution. The bench comprising of Justices Dipak Misra and Prafulla C Pant have observed that political debates maybe excluded as a criminal defamation offence.

While Gandhi, Subramanian and Kejriwal have been slapped with defamation suits by political rivals, there have been long-standing concerns over the threat posed by these provisions to the media and those who use social media to express their opinions against the rich and the powerful.

The government of the day is keen to maintain the status quo. In a recent submission, it has argued that S.499 is now the only provision to deal with defamation on social media and the only protection for reputation of citizens. But free speech activists say there is no evidence to show that a defamation law deters a person who is out to spread lies.

The questionable utility of S.499, the scope for its abuse and the culture of self-censorship, they argue, removes it from the ambit of "reasonable restrictions" which the state can impose on free speech under article 19 (2) of the constitution.

"Hardly a day goes by in India without some rich and powerful person initiating or threatening to initiate defamation suits against rivals or traditional media or ordinary citizens on social media," said Sunil Abraham, executive director of the Bangalore-based Centre for Internet & Society. "It is unclear how much self-censorship is going on because Indians fearing jail terms avoid speaking truth to power.

On the issue of protecting people's dignity, Abraham said there is no prima facie evidence in India that criminalising defamation in India has resulted in the protection of the reputations of citizens from falsehoods.

"On the the other hand every other national media house and quite of few investigative journalists have been and continue to be harassed by criminal suits filed by the powerful," he told HuffPost India. "The chilling effect on speech is a disproportionate price for citizenry to pay for what is only a personal harm."

Under the leadership of Chief Minister J Jayalalithaa, the Tamil Nadu government filed 125 defamation cases against The Hindu and other publications between 2001 and 2004. On Tuesday, she filed a defamation suit against news portal Rediff.com for running two articles related to speculations about her health.

In the United States, defamation claims by public officials and public figures were severely curtailed after its Supreme Court ruled in 1964 that the complainant needs to prove actual malice with "clear and convincing" evidence. Further, truth is an absolute defence against defamation in the U.S.

On Tuesday, Swamy and Gandhi also argued that truth should be defence in defamation suits. “Truth is not a complete defence in criminal defamation. For a nation with a national motto of Satyameva Devata it is ironic," Swamy said.

BJP leader Swamy is of the view that defamation should only be subject to a civil suit which can be redressed by payment of monetary compensation. But the central government has argued that a defamer could be too poor to compensate the complainant.

"I am not saying there is no such thing as defamation. You can sue someone for defamation, but you cannot deprive someone of his liberty," he said in a recent interview with The Sunday Guardian.

Jayalalithaa filed a defamation suit against the senior BJP leader who alleged that most of the boats of Indian fishermen captured by Sri Lanka belong to the AIADMK chief, her close aide Sasikala and DMK leader TR Baalu.

The suit against the Congress Vice President was filed by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh for allegedly blaming the Hindu right-wing organisation for the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi.

BJP leader Nitin Gadkari sued Kejriwal after his name was included in AAP's list of "India's most corrupt."

"The accused is in the habit of making false and defamatory statements without any basis. The statements made by the accused and his party members have damaged and tarnished my image in the eyes of the people," Gadkari told the court, last year.

Legal analysts also find it hard to predict just how far the Supreme Court will go to protect free speech. Its judgment against S.66A of the IT Act is regarded as one of the biggest victories for free speech in India. Justice Misra was on the bench that struck down the provision for being “open-ended and unconstitutionally vague," and not fit to be covered under Article 19 (2).

But last month, in a judgment regarded as a blow to free speech, it was Justices Misra and Pant who ruled that freedom of speech is not an absolute right.

Senior Advocate Gopal Subramanium had argued, "Freedom to offend is also a part of freedom of speech.”

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/huffington-post-july-16-2015-betwa-sharma-criminal-defamation-the-urgent-cause-that-has-united-rahul-gandhi-arvind-kejriwal-and-subramanian-swamy

Criminal defamation remains and so does the debate

Japreet Grewal — 2016-05-23T06:05:17Z

The judgment on the plea to de-criminalise defamation is out and despite its verbosity and rich vocabulary is an embarrassment to our recent judicial milestone of constitutional challenges. In the case of Subramanian Swamy vs. Union of India, a two judge bench headed by Justice Dipak Misra, has upheld the constitutionality of Section 499 and Section 500 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Section199 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) that criminalise defamation.

The judgment has not satisfactorily answered several pertinent questions. Various significant issues relating to the existing regime of defamation have been touched upon in the judgment but the bench has skipped the part where it is required to analyse and give its own reasoning for upholding or reading down the law. This post points out what should have been looked at.

A. Whether defamation is a public or a private wrong? What is the State’s interest in protecting the reputation of an individual against other private individuals? Is criminal penalty for defamatory statements an appropriate, adequate or disproportionate remedy for loss of reputation?

At the core of the debate to decriminalise defamation lies the question, whether defamation is a public or a private wrong. The question was raised in the Subramanian Swamy case and the court held that defamation is a public wrong. Our problem with the court’s decision lies in its failure to provide a sound and comprehensive analysis of the issue. In order to understand whether defamation is a public or a private wrong, it is necessary that we look at what reputation means, what happens when reputation is harmed and whose interests are affected by such harm.

Reputation is not defined in law, however the Supreme Court has held that reputation is a right to enjoy the good opinion of others and the good name, the credit, honour or character which is derived from such favourable public opinion. The definition reflects several elements that constitute reputation which when harmed have different bearing on the reputation of an individual. Academic Robert C Post in his paper, The Social Foundations on Defamation Law: Reputation and Constitution, says that reputation can be understood as a form of intangible property akin to goodwill or as dignity (the respect including self-respect that arises from observance of rules of the society). While reputation when seen as property can be estimated in money and thus adequately compensated through a civil action for damages, loss of dignity is not a materially quantifiable loss, and thus, monetary compensation appears irrelevant. The purpose of the defamation law could either be to ensure that reputation is not wrongfully deprived of its proper market value or the respect/acceptance of the society. Explanation 4 to Section 499 of the IPC accommodates both such situations and provides that reputation is harmed if it directly or indirectly, in the estimation of others, lowers the moral or intellectual character of that person, or lowers the character of that person in respect of his caste or of his calling, or lowers the credit of that person, or causes it to be believed that the body of that person is in a loathsome state, or in a state generally considered as disgraceful.

Post adds that an individual’s reputation is a product of his interaction with the society by following the norms of conduct (which he calls rules of civility) created by the society, thus the society has an interest in enforcing its rules of civility through defamation law by policing breaches of these rules. Criminal defamation acknowledges that loss of reputation is a wrong to the societal interests; however these interests have not been deliberated upon by the courts in India.

The Subramanian Swamy case was an occasion where, it was imperative that the court took up this exercise and explained what interest the society had in protecting the reputation of an individual for it to be classified as a public wrong. The court stated, “the law relating to defamation protects the reputation of each individual in the perception of the public at large. It matters to an individual in the eyes of the society. There is a link and connect between individual rights and the society; and this connection gives rise to community interest at large. Therefore, when harm is caused to an individual, the society as a whole is affected and the danger is perceived” With this reasoning it can be inferred that the society has an interest in all private wrongs. Where would that inference land us? This reasoning is ambiguous and inadequate.

On the other hand, criminal penalty for perfectly private wrongs such as copyright infringement and dishonour of cheques urges us to ask if there is a problem with the rigid distinction of public and private wrongs. Should we be asking the question differently?

The judgment has provided extremely inadequate answers to this question and has left matters ambiguous.

B. Can the right to reputation under Article 21 be enforced against another individual’s freedom of expression and are safeguards already built in law so as not to unreasonably restrict and stifle free expression in this regard?

Defamation finds a place in the list of constitutionally allowed restrictions on freedom of speech under Article 19 (2). Defamation protects the right to reputation of an individual thus free expression by this reason is subject to the right to reputation of an individual. The court had repeatedly observed that right to reputation is a part of the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution. The question of enforceability of right to reputation under Article 21 against freedom of expression under Article 19 (1) (a) came into question in the instant case; it was contended that a fundamental right is enforceable against the State but cannot be invoked to serve a private interest of an individual. Thus, the right to reputation as manifested in defamation being a wrong committed against a private person by another person is unconnected and falls outside the scope of Article 19 (2). It is pertinent to note that Article 21 (which includes right to reputation) is enforceable not only against the state but also against private individuals. What is relevant here is an understanding of horizontal enforceability of fundamental rights (certain fundamental rights can be enforced against private individuals and non-state actors). This would help explain the dilemma in enforcing the right to reputation of an individual against free speech of another individual. It is vaguely mentioned in the judgment (see para 88) but has not been deliberated upon.

What follows from the discussion of enforceability of right to reputation, is the discussion on how reasonably it restricts speech. The Supreme Court has previously held that while determining reasonableness, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the judicial verdict. We briefly analyse the critical aspects of the regime of criminal defamation on these parameters.

Underlying purpose

At the heart of the defamation law is the need to find the most suitable remedy for loss of reputation of an individual. How does one restore reputation of an individual in the society and whether criminal penalty an appropriate remedy?

Extent of restriction

The extent to which defamation law restricts free speech could be analysed by looking at various aspects such as what kind of speech is considered defamatory, what procedure is followed to bring action against the alleged wrong doer and scope of abuse of the law. Explanation 1 to Section 499 of IPC provides that a statement or imputation is defamatory if it is not made in public good. It is not sufficient to prove that such statement or imputation is in fact true. The idea of public good is at best vague without any means to evaluate it. Further, under Section 199 of CrPC allows multiple complaints to be filed in different jurisdictions for a single offensive publication. Besides, usage of terms like “some person aggrieved” leaves room for parties other than the person in respect of whom defamatory material is published to bring action and the provision also allows the privilege of two sets of procedures for prosecution (in official capacity and in private capacity) to public servants without satisfactory reasoning provided for such discrimination. These provisions have the potential to be used to file frivolous complaints and could be a handy tool for harassment of journalists or activists among others.

Proportionality

Does the publication or imputation of defamatory material warrant payment of fine and imprisonment? Earlier in the post, we brought up the question of relevance of such measures to the act of defamation. Assuming that it is relevant, do we think it is harsh or commensurate to the wrongful act. It is necessary to look at the process of prosecution before we determine the proportionality of the restriction. Criminal law assumes that the accused is innocent until he is proven guilty. Therefore until the judiciary determines that the act of defamation was committed, how does the process help the accused in maintaining status quo. It is also pertinent to look at the threshold for civil defamation. Under the civil wrong of defamation, truth works as a complete defence while under criminal defamation, a statement despite being true could invite penalty if it is not published in public good. Thus a lower threshold for criminal liability would upset the balance of proportionality. These aspects are critical to determine the reasonableness of criminal defamation and it is unfortunate that the judgment that runs into hundreds of pages has not evaluated them.

Conclusion

The convoluted debate on criminal defamation remains intact post the pronouncement of this judgment. Questions of competing interests of society and individuals or individuals per se, and ambiguous rationale behind imposition of liability, arbitrariness of procedure for prosecution have not been examined. Further, the hardship in compartmentalising free speech, the right to reputation and the right to privacy remains unanswered.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/criminal-defamation-remains-and-so-does-the-debate

Creativity, Politics, and Internet Censorship

sneha-pp — 2016-06-17T07:07:40Z

In collaboration with Karnataka for Kashmir, we organised a discussion on 'Creativity, Politics and Internet Censorship' on May 25, 2016. Mahum Shabir, a legal activist and artist, Mir Suhail, political cartoonist with Kashmir Reader and Rising Kashmir, and Habeel Iqbal, a lawyer who has worked with several justice groups in Kashmir, shared some of their work and experiences. This discussion was organised as part of Port of Kashmir 2016, a series of events bringing together a small collective of people using different modes of art and activism to address crucial challenges to free speech and democracy in the state.

Mahum Shabir talking about the Handwara case. Source: Swar Thounaojam.

The discussion began with Mahum Shabir giving an overview of the work at the Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society, specifically on the Handwara case. She spoke of the role of the internet, and social media in particular, in perpetuating the gaze of the state, while also bringing up the larger question of how media propagates a certain way of looking at Kashmir, particularly women, marginalised groups and victims of violence. Internet blockades and media censorship pose several obstacles for the circulation of information, resulting in the need for surreptitious ways of communication as a necessary way to counter predominant narratives in the discourse around occupation. The implications of these for the rights of women in particular, the curbs on freedom at different levels, and the undercurrent of violence that is prevalent in everyday life, came up as significant questions.

Mir Suhail presented some of his cartoons, and shared some poignant personal experiences of growing up in a state under military occupation. His works reflect his concerns about a changing society, from understanding strife as an almost normalised state of existence, to now a phase of industrialization and control of resources. He spoke on the politics of exercising creative freedom in the present, and his attempt to encourage conversations on contemporary issues through his art. The role of technology in facilitating these conversations is as crucial as it is contentious, for it also brings up questions of surveillance and privacy;his art tries to navigate through some of these questions in different ways.

Habeel Iqbal, a lawyer who has worked on the Shopian and Handwara cases, spoke on some of the legal aspects of censorship and surveillance related issues in Kashmir, particularly in instances involving social media. He discussed some of the challenges faced by activists, social workers and political groups in working on certain cases, particularly in gathering and circulating information or in writing about sensitive issues. Self-censorship is often the only option for people working on these issues, as he elaborated through some personal experiences.

The discussion included questions on the possibilities opened up by privacy tools, such the use of encryption and to the extent to which they affect communication. Access to these technologies is a factor here; besides, transparency is also a goal for most human rights organisations working in the state. Social media, and social messaging apps in particular often function as an alternative to mainstream media as a means of communication, and it is interesting to see the questions it opens up for censorship. Examples of activism using not just the internet, but the network (through USBs and hard drives) were also discussed. The responses to such forms of activism, from across the world were interesting to engage with, as it tries to tackle predominant perceptions about the state. The economic aspects of different strategies of censorship and surveillance, through curfews and blockades and its broader implications for socio-economic development in the state were also discussed. The talk provided several insights into the problems and challenges to freedom of speech, the censorship of ideas, and its repercussions for creative freedom and politics in Kashmir.

Postcards of cartoons by Mir Suhail. Source: Swar Thounaojam.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/creativity-politics-and-internet-censorship-20160525

Content takedown and users' rights

Torsha Sarkar, Gurshabad Grover — 2020-02-17T05:18:25Z

After Shreya Singhal v Union of India, commentators have continued to question the constitutionality of the content takedown regime under Section 69A of the IT Act (and the Blocking Rules issued under it). There has also been considerable debate around how the judgement has changed this regime: specifically about (i) whether originators of content are entitled to a hearing, (ii) whether Rule 16 of the Blocking Rules, which mandates confidentiality of content takedown requests received by intermediaries from the Government, continues to be operative, and (iii) the effect of Rule 16 on the rights of the originator and the public to challenge executive action. In this opinion piece, we attempt to answer some of these questions.

This article was first published at the Leaflet. It has subsequently been republished by Scroll.in, Kashmir Observer and the CyberBRICS blog.

Introduction

Last year, several Jio users from different states reported that sites like Indian Kanoon, Reddit and Telegram were inaccessible through their connections. While attempting to access the website, the users were presented with a notice that the websites were blocked on orders from the Department of Telecommunications (DoT). When contacted by the founder of Indian Kanoon, Reliance Jio stated that the website had been blocked on orders of the government, and that the order had been rescinded the same evening. However, in response to a Right to Information (RTI) request, the DoT said they had no information about orders relating to the blocking of Indian Kanoon.

Alternatively, consider that the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) expressed concern last year that the Indian government was forcing Twitter to suspend accounts or remove content relating to Kashmir. They reported that over the last two years, the Indian government suppressed a substantial amount of information coming from the area, and prevented Indians from accessing more than five thousand tweets.

These instances are symptomatic of a larger problem of opaque and arbitrary content takedown in India, enabled by the legal framework under the Information Technology (IT) Act. The Government derives its powers to order intermediaries (entities storing or transmitting information on behalf of others, a definition which includes internet service providers and social media platforms alike) to block online resources through section 69A of the IT Act and the rules [“the blocking rules”] notified thereunder. Apart from this, section 79 of the IT Act and its allied rules also prescribe a procedure for content removal. Conversations with one popular intermediary revealed that the government usually prefers to use its powers under section 69A, possibly because of the opaque nature of the procedure that we highlight below.

Under section 69A, a content removal request can be sent by authorised personnel in the Central Government not below the rank of a Joint Secretary. The grounds for issuance of blocking orders under section 69A are: “the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of India, defence of India, the security of the state, friendly relations with foreign states or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognisable offence relating to the above.” Specifically, the blocking rules envisage the process of blocking to be largely executive-driven, and require strict confidentiality to be maintained around the issuance of blocking orders. This shrouds content takedown orders in a cloak of secrecy, and makes it impossible for users and content creators to ascertain the legitimacy or legality of the government action in any instance of blocking.

Issues

The Supreme Court had been called to determine the constitutional validity of section 69A and the allied rules in Shreya Singhal v Union of India. The petitioners had contended that as per the procedure laid down by these rules, there was no guarantee of pre-decisional hearing afforded to the originator of the information. Additionally, the petitioners pointed out that the safeguards built into section 95 and 96 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), which allow state governments to ban publications and persons to initiate legal challenges to those actions respectively, were absent from the blocking procedures. Lastly, the petitioners assailed rule 16 of the blocking rules, which mandated confidentiality of blocking procedures, on the grounds that it was affecting their fundamental rights.

The Court, however, found little merit in these arguments. Specifically, the Court found that section 69A was narrowly drawn and had sufficient procedural safeguards, which included the grounds of issuance of a blocking order being specifically drawn, and mandating that the reasons of the website blocking be in writing, thus making it amenable to judicial review. Further, the Court also found that the provision of setting up of a review committee saved the law from being constitutional infirmity. In the Court’s opinion, the mere absence of additional safeguards, as the ones built into the CrPC, did not mean that the law was unconstitutional.

But do the ground realities align with the Court’s envisaged implementation of these principles? Apar Gupta, a counsel for the petitioners, pointed out that there was no recorded instance of pre-decisional hearing being granted to show that this safeguard contained in the rules was actually being implemented. However, Gautam Bhatia read Shreya Singhal to make an important advance: that the right of hearing be mandatorily extended to the ‘originator’, i.e. the content creator.

Additionally, Bhatia also noted that the Court, while upholding the constitutionality of the procedure under section 69A, held that the “reasons have to be recorded in writing in such blocking order so that they may be assailed in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.”

There are two important takeaways from this. Firstly, he argued that the broad contours of the judgment invoke an established constitutional doctrine — that the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) does not merely include the right of expression, but also the right of access to information. Accordingly, the right of challenging a blocking order was not only vested in the originator or the concerned intermediary, but may rest with the general public as well. And secondly, by the doctrine of necessary implication, it followed that for the general public to challenge any blocking order under Article 226, the blocking orders must be made public. While Bhatia concedes that public availability of blocking orders may be an over-optimistic reading of the judgment, recent events suggest that even the commonly-expected result, i.e. that the content creators having the right to a hearing, has not been implemented by the Government.

Consider the blocking of the satirical website DowryCalculator.com in September 2019 on orders from the government. The website displayed a calculator that suggests a ‘dowry’ depending on the salary and education of a prospective groom: even if someone misses the satire, the contents of the website are not immediately relatable to any grounds of removal listed under section 69A of the IT Act.

Tanul Thakur, the creator of the website, was not granted a hearing despite the fact that he had publicly claimed the ownership of the website at various times and that the website had been covered widely by the press. The information associated with the domain name also publicly lists Thakur’s name and contact information. Clearly, the government made no effort to contact Thakur when passing the order. Perhaps even more worryingly, when he tried to access a copy of the blocking order by filing a RTI, the MeitY cited the confidentiality rule to deny him the information.

This incident documents a fundamental problem plaguing the rules: the confidentiality clause is still being used to deny disclosure of key information on content takedown orders. The government has also used the provision to deny citizens a list of blocked websites , as responses to RTI requests have proven time and again.

Clearly, the Supreme Court’s rationale in considering Section 69A and the blocking rules as constitutional is not one that is implemented in reality. The confidentiality clause is preventing legal challenges to content blocking in totality: content creators are unable access the orders, and hence are unable to understand the executive’s reasoning in ordering their content to be blocked from public access.

As we noted earlier, the grounds of issuing a blocking order under section 69A pertain to certain reasonable restrictions on expression permitted by Article 19(2), which are couched in broad terms. The government’s implementation of section 69A and the rules make it impossible for any judicial review or accountability on the conformity of blocking orders with the mentioned grounds under the rules, or any reasonable restriction at all.

The Way Forward

From the opacity of proceedings under the law, to the lack of information regarding the same on public domain, the Indian content takedown regime leaves a lot to be desired from both the government and intermediaries at play.

First, we believe the Supreme Court’s decision in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India casts an obligation on the government to attempt to contact the content creator if they are passing a content takedown order to an intermediary. Second, even if the content creator is unavailable for a hearing at that instance, the confidentiality clause should not be used to prevent future disclosure of information to the content creator, so that affected citizens can access and challenge these orders.

While we wait for legal reform, intermediaries can also step up to ensure the rights of users online are upheld. On receiving formal orders, intermediaries should assess the legality of the received request. This should involve ensuring that only authorised agencies and personnel have sent the content removal orders, that the order specifically mentions what provision the government is exercising the power under, and that the content removal requests relate to the grounds of removal that are permissible under section 69A. For instance, intermediaries should refuse to entertain content removal requests under section 69A of the IT Act if they relate to obscenity, a ground not covered by the provision.

The representatives of the intermediary should also push for the committee to grant a hearing to the content creator. Here, the intermediary can act as a liaison between the uploader and the governmental authorities.

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India offers a glimmer of hope for user rights online. While the case primarily challenged the orders imposing section 144 of the CrPC and a communication blockade in Jammu and Kashmir, the final decision does affirm the fundamental principle that government-imposed restrictions on the freedom of expression and assembly must be made available to the public and affected parties to enable challenges in a court of law.

The judiciary has yet another opportunity to consider the provision and the rules: late last year, Tanul Thakur approached the Delhi High Court to challenge the orders passed by the government to ISPs to block his website. One hopes that the future holds robust reforms to the content takedown regime.

We live in an era where the ebb and flow of societal discourse is increasingly channeled through intermediaries on the internet. In the absence of a mature, balanced and robust framework that enshrines the rule of law, we risk arbitrary modulation of the marketplace of ideas by the executive.

Torsha Sakar and Gurshabad Grover are researchers at the Centre for Internet and Society.

Disclosure: The Centre for Internet and Society is a recipient of research grants from Facebook and Google.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/content-takedown-and-users-rights-1

Content Removal on Facebook — A Case of Privatised Censorship?

jessie — 2014-06-16T05:23:09Z

Any activity on Facebook, be it creating an account, posting a picture or status update or creating a group or page, is bound by Facebook’s Terms of Service and Community Guidelines. These contain a list of content that is prohibited from being published on Facebook which ranges from hate speech to pornography to violation of privacy.

Facebook removes content largely on the basis of requests either by the government or by other users. The Help section of Facebook deals with warnings and blocking of content. It says that Facebook only removes content that violates Community Guidelines and not everything that has been reported.

I conducted an experiment to primarily look at Facebook’s process of content removal and also to analyse what kind of content they actually remove.

I put up a status which contained personal information of a person on my Friend List (the information was false). I then asked several people (including the person about whom the status was made) to report the status — that of being harassed or for violation of privacy rights. Seven people reported the status. Within half an hour of the reports being made, I received the following notification:
"Someone reported your post for containing harassment and 1 other reason."

The notification also contained the option to delete my post and said that Facebook would look into whether it violated their Community Guidelines.

A day later, all those who had reported the status received notifications stating the following:

"We reviewed the post you reported for harassment and found it doesn't violate our Community Standards."

I received a similar notification as well.
I, along with around thirteen others, reported a Facebook page which contained pictures of my friend and a few other women with lewd captions in various regional languages. We reported the group for harassment and bullying and also for humiliating someone we knew. The report was made on 24 March, 2014. On 30 April, 2014, I received a notification stating the following:

"We reviewed the page you reported for harassment and found it doesn't violate our Community Standards.

Note: If you have an issue with something on the Page, make sure you report the content (e.g. a photo), not the entire Page. That way, your report will be more accurately reviewed."

I then reported each picture on the page for harassment and received a series of notifications on 5 May, 2014 which stated the following:

"We reviewed the photo you reported for harassment and found it doesn't violate our Community Standards."

These incidents are in stark contrast with repeated attempts by Facebook to remove content which it finds objectionable. In 2013, a homosexual man’s picture protesting against the Supreme Court judgment in December was taken down. In 2012, Facebook removed artwork by a French artist which featured a nude woman. In the same year, Facebook removed photographs of a child who was born with defect and banned the mother from accessing Facebook completely. Facebook also removed a picture of a breast cancer survivor who posted a picture of a tattoo that she had following her mastectomy. Following this, however, Facebook issued an apology and stated that mastectomy photographs are not in violation of their Content Guidelines. Even in the sphere of political discourse and dissent, Facebook has cowered under government pressure and removed pages and content, as evidenced by the ban on the progressive Pakistani band Laal’s Facebook page and other anti-Taliban pages. Following much social media outrage, Facebook soon revoked this ban. These are just a few examples of how harmless content has been taken down by Facebook, in a biased exercise of its powers.

After incidents of content removal have been made public through news reports and complaints, Facebook often apologises for removing content and issues statements that the removal was an “error.” In some cases, they edit their policies to address specific kinds of content after a takedown (like the reversal of the breastfeeding ban).

On the other hand, however, Facebook is notorious for refusing to take down content that is actually objectionable, partially evidenced by my own experiences listed above. There have been complaints about Facebook’s refusal to remove misogynistic content which glorifies rape and domestic violence through a series of violent images and jokes. One such page was removed finally, not because of the content but because the administrators had used fake profiles. When asked, a spokesperson said that censorship “was not the solution to bad online behaviour or offensive beliefs.” While this may be true, the question that needs answering is why Facebook decides to draw these lines only when it comes to certain kinds of ‘objectionable’ content and not others.

All of these examples represent a certain kind of arbitrariness on the part of Facebook’s censorship policies. It seems that Facebook is far more concerned with removing content that will cause supposed public or governmental outrage or defy some internal morality code, rather than protecting the rights of those who may be harmed due to such content, as their Statement of Policies so clearly spells out.

There are many aspects of the review and takedown process that are hazy, like who exactly reviews the content that is reported and what standards they are made to employ. In 2012, it was revealed that Facebook outsourced its content reviews to oDesk and provided the reviewers with a 17-page manual which listed what kind of content was appropriate and what was not. A bare reading of the leaked document gives one a sense of Facebook’s aversion to sex and nudity and its neglect of other harm-inducing content like harassment through misuse of content that is posted and what is categorised as hate speech.

In the process of monitoring the acceptability of content, Facebook takes upon itself the role of a private censor with absolutely no accountability or transparency in its working. A Reporting Guide was published to increase transparency in its content review procedures. The Guide reveals that Facebook provides for an option where the reportee can appeal the decision to remove content in “some cases.” However, the lack of clarity on what these cases are or what the appeal process is frustrates the existence of this provision as it can be misused. Additionally, Facebook reserves the right to remove content with or without notice depending upon the severity of the violation. There is no mention of how severe is severe enough to warrant uninformed content removal. In most of the above cases, the user was not notified that their content was found offensive and would be liable for takedown. Although Facebook publishes a transparency report, it only contains a record of takedowns following government requests and not those by private users of Facebook. The unbridled nature of the power that Facebook has over our personal content, despite clearly stating that all content posted is the user’s alone, threatens the freedom of expression on the site. A proper implementation of the policies that Facebook claims to employ is required along with a systematic record of the procedure that is used to remove content that is in consonance with natural justice.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/content-removal-on-facebook

Communications from DeitY regarding blocking of Traffic emanating from IP addresses from States assessed to be sensitive in the current prevailing situation

praskrishna — 2012-09-11T14:27:46Z

(DS Cell)

No.813-7/25/2011-DS

Subject: Communications from DeitY regarding blocking of Traffic emanating from IP addresses from States assessed to be sensitive in the current prevailing situation.

Notes on pre pages (24/N to 25/N) may kindly seen.

PUC at (70/C) is a communications [D.O No - 6(30)/2012-CLFE dated 23/08/2012] from Secretary, Department of Electronics & Information Technology. It has been communicated that Ministry of Home Affairs has sent an Office Memorandum No. II/21021/221/2012-IS-II/M dated 23.08.2012 (copy enclosed). MHA has requested that "Twitter Inc may be directed to all traffic emanating from IP addresses in the States assessed by the Central Intelligence Agencies to be sensitive in the current prevailing situation viz. Kerala, Assam, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra. Karnataka, Gujarat and Uttar Pradesh by 6.00 PM today. In case of non- compliance of this geographical specific blocking which flows from sensitive assessment of prevailing situation, then Twitter may be blocked on All India level".

2. Department of Telecom has been requested to consider the technical feasibility of the request of MHA and advice the DIT accordingly. In this regard feedbacks have been collected from the major service providers on the following issues:

(i) allocation of State-wise IP address
(ii) technical feasibility of specific area wise /state wise blocking of website/URL.

Feedbacks received from Tata Communications, (67/C & 73/C) Bharti
Airtel (68/C & 77/C), BSNL (75/C), Reliance Communications (72/C),
IDEA (76/C) & ISPAI (74/C). These comments are compiled as below

Sr.	Name of the company	Comments on state-wise IP address allocation & specific area wise /state-wise blocking of website/URL.
1	Tata Communications	TCL does not allocate IP addresses to its customers on a state-wise basis and there is no IP Address range specific to any of the States of India. Specific area wise /state wise blocking of website /URL is technically not feasible.
2	BSNL	IP addresses in the BSNL Network is as below. 1) Leased line:- On national Basis 2) Wimax/CDMA.GSM - on Zonal Basis 3) ADSL Broadband :- On Circle basis.
3	M/s Bharti Airtel	IP addresses are allocated internally hubwise. In mobile network, we have 7 hubs and the IP address pools are internally allocated to different hubs. The blocking of website/ URL can be done at the gateway only as: 1) There is no state wise IP pool allocation to the customers, and; 2) Airtel has deployed URL blocking system at Chennai and Mumbai Internet gateway.
4	M/s Reliance Communications	IP addresses are not allotted Statewise. The blocking has been implemented at the Gateway locations. Hence specific area wise /' stale wise blocking of website / URL is not possible.
5	M/s Idea	Currently our ISP operation can't block region wise as we give bulk service to GGSN and are in a way blind to the traffic distribution after GGSN. We can only block sites/links at gateway level which will affect the complete GGSN.
6	Internet Service Providers Association of India (ISPAI)	We would like to inform that it is technically not feasible to block website/URL area wise / state wise.

With reference to aforesaid feedbacks from Internet Service Providers Association of India (ISPAI) and major Internet Service Providers it has come out that in the present scenario Internet Service Providers having majority of Internet subscribers have not allocated IP addresses area wise /state-wise and it would not be possible for them at present to carry out specific area wise /slate-wise blocking of website/URL.

3. In view of above it is proposed to reply to Secretary, DeitY as per draft placed at (.l?/C).

Put up for kind considerations and approval please.

(Subodh Saxena)

Dir.(DS-II)

DDG(DS)

Member (T)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/september-4-dot-mha-regional-twitter-blocking

Comments on the Draft Rules under the Information Technology Act

pranesh — 2011-09-21T06:13:42Z

The Centre for Internet and Society commissioned an advocate, Ananth Padmanabhan, to produce a comment on the Draft Rules that have been published by the government under the Information Technology Act. In his comments, Mr. Padmanabhan highlights the problems with each of the rules and presents specific recommendations on how they can be improved. These comments were sent to the Department of Information and Technology.

Comments on the Draft Rules under the Information Technology Act as Amended by the Information Technology (Amendment) Act, 2008

Submitted by the Centre for Internet and Society, Bangalore

Prepared by Ananth Padmanabhan, Advocate in the Madras High Court

Interception, Monitoring and Decryption

Section 69

The section says:

Where the Central Government or a State Government or any of its officer specially authorised by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, in this behalf may, if satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do in the interest of the sovereignty or integrity of India, defence of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to above or for investigation of any offence, it may subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), for reasons to be recorded in writing, by order, direct any agency of the appropriate Government to intercept, monitor or decrypt or cause to be intercepted or monitored or decrypted any information generated, transmitted, received or stored in any computer resource.
The procedure and safeguards subject to which such interception or monitoring or decryption may be carried out, shall be such as may be prescribed.
The subscriber or intermediary or any person in-charge of the computer resource shall, when called upon by any agency referred to in sub-section (1), extend all facilities and technical assistance to-

(a) provide access to or secure access to the computer resource generating transmitting, receiving or storing such information; or

(b) intercept, monitor, or decrypt the information, as the case may be; or

The subscriber or intermediary or any person who fails to assist the agency referred to in sub-section (3) shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.

Recommendation #1
Section 69(3) should be amended and the following proviso be inserted:

Provided that only those intermediaries with respect to any information or computer resource that is sought to be monitored, intercepted or decrypted, shall be subject to the obligations contained in this sub-section, who are, in the opinion of the appropriate authority, prima facie in control of such transmission of the information or computer resource. The nexus between the intermediary and the information or the computer resource that is sought to be intercepted, monitored or decrypted should be clearly indicated in the direction referred to in sub-section (1) of this section.

Reasons for the Recommendation
In the case of any information or computer resource, there may be more than one intermediary who is associated with such information. This is because “intermediary” is defined in section 2(w) of the amended Act as,

“with respect to any electronic record means any person who on behalf of another person receives, stores or transmits that record or provides any service with respect to that record, including telecom service providers, network service providers, internet service providers, webhosting service providers, search engines, online payment sites, online-auction sites, online-market places and cyber cafes”.

The State or Central Government should not be given wide-ranging powers to enforce cooperation on the part of any such intermediary without there being a clear nexus between the information that is sought to be decrypted or monitored by the competent authority, and the control that any particular intermediary may have over such information.

To give an illustration, merely because some information may have been posted on an online portal, the computer resources in the office of the portal should not be monitored unless the portal has some concrete control over the nature of information posted in it. This has to be stipulated in the order of the Central or State Government which authorizes interception of the intermediary.

Recommendation #2
Section 69(4) should be repealed.

Reasons for the Recommendation
The closest parallels to Section 69 of the Act are the provisions in the Telegraph Rules which were brought in after the decision in PUCL v. Union of India, (1997) 1 SCC 301, famously known as the telephone tapping case.

Section 69(4) fixes tremendous liability on the intermediary for non-cooperation. This is violative of Article 14. Similar provisions in the Indian Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure, which demand cooperation from members of the public as regards production of documents, letters etc., and impose punishment for non-cooperation on their part, impose a maximum punishment of one month. It is bewildering why the punishment is 7 years imprisonment for an intermediary, when the only point of distinction between an intermediary under the IT Act and a member of the public under the IPC and CrPC is the difference in the media which contains the information.

Section 69(3) is akin to the duty cast upon members of the public to extend cooperation under Section 39 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by way of providing information as to commission of any offence, or the duty, when a summons is issued by the Court or the police, to produce documents under Sections 91 and 92 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The maximum punishment for non-cooperation prescribed by the Indian Penal Code for omission to cooperate or wilful breach of summons is only a month under Sections 175 and 176 of the Indian Penal Code. Even the maximum punishment for furnishing false information to the police is only six months under Section 177 of the IPC. When this is the case with production of documents required for the purpose of trial or inquiry, it is wholly arbitrary to impose a punishment of six years in the case of intermediaries who do not extend cooperation for providing access to a computer resource which is merely apprehended as being a threat to national security etc. A mere apprehension, however reasonable it may be, should not be used to pin down a liability of such extreme nature on the intermediary.

This would also amount to a violation of Articles 19(1)(a) as well as 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, not to mention Article 20(3). To give an example, much of the information received from confidential sources by members of the press would be stored in computer resources. By coercing them, through the 7 year imprisonment threat, to allow access to this computer resource and thereby part with this information, the State is directly infringing on their right under Article 19(1)(a). Furthermore, if the “subscriber” is the accused, then section 69(4) goes against Article 20(3) by forcing the accused to bear witness against himself.

Draft Rules under Section 69

Rule 3
Directions for interception or monitoring or decryption of any information generated, transmitted, received or stored in any computer resource under sub- section (2) of section 69 of the Information Technology (Amendment) Act, 2008 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) shall not be issued except by an order made by the concerned competent authority who is Union Home Secretary in case of Government of India; the Secretary in-charge of Home Department in a State Government or Union Territory as the case may be. In unavoidable circumstances, such order may be made by an officer, not below the rank of a Joint Secretary to the Government of India, who has been duly authorised by the Union Home Secretary or by an officer equivalent to rank of Joint Secretary to Government of India duly authorised by the Secretary in-charge of Home Department in the State Government or Union Territory, as the case may be:

Provided that in emergency cases –
(i) in remote areas, where obtaining of prior directions for interception or monitoring or decryption of information is not feasible; or
(ii) for operational reasons, where obtaining of prior directions for interception or monitoring or decryption of any information generated, transmitted, received or stored in any computer resource is not feasible;

the required interception or monitoring or decryption of any information generated, transmitted, received or stored in any computer resource shall be carried out with the prior approval of the Head or the second senior most officer of the Security and Law Enforcement Agencies (hereinafter referred to as the said Security Agencies) at the Central Level and the officers authorised in this behalf, not below the rank of Inspector General of Police or an officer of equivalent rank, at the State and Union Territory level. The concerned competent authority, however, shall be informed of such interceptions or monitoring or decryption by the approving authority within three working days and that such interceptions or monitoring or decryption shall be got confirmed by the concerned competent authority within a period of seven working days. If the confirmation from the concerned competent authority is not received within the stipulated seven working days, such interception or monitoring or decryption shall cease and the same information shall not be intercepted or monitored or decrypted thereafter without the prior approval of the concerned competent authority, as the case may be.

Recommendation #3
In Rule 3, the following proviso may be inserted:

“Provided that in the event of cooperation by any intermediary being required for the purpose of interception, monitoring or decryption of such information as is referred to in this Rule, prior permission from a Supervisory Committee headed by a retired Judge of the Supreme Court or the High Courts shall be obtained before seeking to enforce the Order mentioned in this Rule against such intermediary.”

Reasons for the Recommendation
Section 69 and the draft rules suffer from absence of essential procedural safeguards. This has come in due to the blanket emulation of the Telegraph Rules. Additional safeguards should have been prescribed to ensure that the intermediary is put to minimum hardship when carrying on the monitoring or being granted access to a computer resource. Those are akin to a raid, in the sense that it can stop an online e-commerce portal from carrying out operations for a day or even more, thus affecting their revenue. It is therefore recommended that in any situation where cooperation from the intermediary is sought, prior judicial approval has to be taken. The Central or State Government cannot be the sole authority in such cases.

Furthermore, since access to the computer resource is required, an executive order should not suffice, and a search warrant or an equivalent which results from a judicial application of the mind (by the Supervisory Committee, for instance) should be required.

Recommendation #4
The following should be inserted after the last line in Rule 22:

The Review Committee shall also have the power to award compensation to the intermediary in cases where the intermediary has suffered loss or damage due to the actions of the competent authority while implementing the order issued under Rule 3.

Reasons for the Recommendation
The Review Committee should be given the power to award compensation to the loss suffered by the intermediary in cases where the police use equipment or software for monitoring/decryption that causes damage to the intermediary’s computer resources / networks. The Review Committee should also be given the power to award compensation in the case of monitoring directions which are later found to be frivolous or even worse, borne out of mala fide considerations. These provisions will act as a disincentive against the abuse of power contained in Section 69.

Blocking of Access to Information

Section 69A

The section provides for blocking of websites if the government is satisfied that it is in the interests of the purposes enlisted in the section. It also provides for penalty of up to seven years for intermediaries who fail to comply with the directions under this section.
The rules under this section describe the procedure which have to be followed barring which the review committee may, after due examination of the procedural defects, order an unblocking of the website.

Section 69A(3)
The intermediary who fails to comply with the direction issued under sub-section (1) shall be punished with an imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and also be liable to fine.

Recommendation #5
The penalty for intermediaries must be lessened.

Reasons for Recommendations
The penal provision in this section which prescribes up to seven years imprisonment and a fine on an intermediary who fails to comply with the directions so issued is also excessively harsh. Considering the fact that various mechanisms are available to escape the blocking of websites, the intermediaries must be given enough time and space to administer the block effectively and strict application of the penal provisions must be avoided in bona fide cases.

The criticism about Section 69 and the draft rules in so far as intermediary liability is concerned, will also apply mutatis mutandis to these rules as well as Section 69A.

Draft Rules under Section 69A

Rule 22: Review Committee
The Review Committee shall meet at least once in two months and record its findings whether the directions issued under Rule (16) are in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 69A of the Act. When the Review Committee is of the opinion that the directions are not in accordance with the provisions referred to above, it may set aside the directions and order for unblocking of said information generated, transmitted, received, stored or hosted in a computer resource for public access.

Recommendation #6
A permanent Review Committee should be specially for the purposes of examining procedural lapses.

Reasons for Recommendation
Rule 22 provides for a review committee which shall meet a minimum of once in every two months and order for the unblocking of a site of due procedures have not been followed. This would mean that if a site is blocked, there could take up to two months for a procedural lapse to be corrected and it to be unblocked. Even a writ filed against the policing agencies for unfair blocking would probably take around the same time. Also, it could well be the case that the review committee will be overborne by cases and may fall short of time to inquire into each. Therefore, it is recommended that a permanent Review Committee be set up which will monitor procedural lapses and ensure that there is no blocking in the first place before all the due procedural requirements are met.

Monitoring and Collection of Traffic Data

Draft Rules under Section 69B

The section provides for monitoring of computer networks or resources if the Central Government is satisfied that conditions so mentioned are satisfied.

The rules provide for the manner in which the monitoring will be done, the process by which the directions for the same will be issued and the liabilities of the intermediaries and monitoring officers with respect to confidentiality of the information so monitored.

Grounds for Monitoring
Rule 4
The competent authority may issue directions for monitoring and collection of traffic data or information generated, transmitted, received or stored in any computer resource for any or all of the following purposes related to cyber security:
(a) forecasting of imminent cyber incidents;
(b) monitoring network application with traffic data or information on computer resource;
(c) identification and determination of viruses/computer contaminant;
(d) tracking cyber security breaches or cyber security incidents;
(e) tracking computer resource breaching cyber security or spreading virus/computer contaminants;
(f) identifying or tracking of any person who has contravened, or is suspected of having contravened or being likely to contravene cyber security;
(g) undertaking forensic of the concerned computer resource as a part of investigation or internal audit of information security practices in the computer resource;
(h) accessing a stored information for enforcement of any provisions of the laws relating to cyber security for the time being in force;
(i) any other matter relating to cyber security.

Rule 6
No direction for monitoring and collection of traffic data or information generated, transmitted, received or stored in any computer resource shall be given for purposes other than those specified in Rule (4).

Recommendation #7
Clauses (a), (b), (c), and (i) of Rule 4 must be repealed.

Reasons for Recommendations
The term “cyber incident” has not been defined, and “cyber security” has been provided a circular definition. Rule 6 clearly states that no direction for monitoring and collection of traffic data or information generated, transmitted, received or stored in any computer resource shall be given for purposes other than those specified in Rule 4. Therefore, it may prima facie appear that the government is trying to lay down clear and strict safeguards when it comes to monitoring at the expense of a citizens' privacy. However, Rule 4(i) allows the government to monitor if it is satisfied that it is “any matter related to cyber security”. This may well play as a ‘catch all’ clause to legalise any kind of monitoring and collection and therefore defeats the purported intention of Rule 6 of safeguarding citizen’s interests against arbitrary and groundless intrusion of privacy. Also, the question of degree of liability of the intermediaries or persons in charge of the computer resources for leak of secret and confidential information remains unanswered.

Rule 24: Disclosure of monitored data
Any monitoring or collection of traffic data or information in computer resource by the employee of an intermediary or person in-charge of computer resource or a person duly authorised by the intermediary, undertaken in course of his duty relating to the services provided by that intermediary, shall not be unlawful, if such activities are reasonably necessary for the discharge his duties as per the prevailing industry practices, in connection with :
(vi) Accessing or analysing information from a computer resource for the purpose of tracing a computer resource or any person who has contravened, or is suspected of having contravened or being likely to contravene, any provision of the Act that is likely to have an adverse impact on the services provided by the intermediary.

Recommendation #8
Safeguards must be introduced with respect to exercise of powers conferred by Rule 24(vi).

Reasons for Recommendations
Rule 24(vi) provides for access, collection and monitoring of information from a computer resource for the purposes of tracing another computer resource which has or is likely to contravened provisions of the Act and this is likely to have an adverse impact on the services provided by the intermediary. Analysis of a computer resource may reveal extremely confidential and important data, the compromise of which may cause losses worth millions. Therefore, the burden of proof for such an intrusion of privacy of the computer resource, which is first used to track another computer resource which is likely to contravene the Act, should be heavy. Also, this violation of privacy should be weighed against the benefits accruing to the intermediary. The framing of sub rules under this clearly specifying the same is recommended.

The disclosure of sensitive information by a monitoring agency for purposes of ‘general trends’ and ‘general analysis of cyber information’ is uncalled for as it dissipates information among lesser bodies that are not governed by sufficient safeguards and this could result in outright violation of citizen’s privacy.

Manner of Functioning of CERT-In

Draft Rules under Section 70B(5)

Section 70B provides for an Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) which shall serve as a national agency for performing duties as prescribed by clause 4 of this section in accordance to the rules as prescribed.
The rules provide for CERT-In’s authority, composition of advisory committee, constituency, functions and responsibilities, services, stakeholders, policies and procedures, modus operandi, disclosure of information and measures to deal with non compliance of orders so issued. However, there are a few issues which need to be addressed as under:

Definitions
In these Rules, unless the context otherwise requires, “Cyber security incident” means any real or suspected adverse event in relation to cyber security that violates an explicit or implied security policy resulting in unauthorized access, denial of service/ disruption, unauthorized use of a computer resource for processing or storage of information or changes to data, information without authorization.

Recommendation #9
The words ‘or implied’’ must be excluded from rule 2(g) which defines ‘cyber security incident’, and the term ‘security policy’ must be qualified to state what security policy is being referred to.

Reasons for Recommendation
“Cyber security incident” means any real or suspected adverse event in relation to cyber security that violates an explicit or implied security policy resulting in unauthorized access, denial of service/disruption, unauthorized use of a computer resource for processing or storage of information or changes to data, information without authorization.

Thus, the section defines any circumstance where an explicit or implied security policy is contravened as a ‘cyber security incident’. Without clearly stating what the security policy is, an inquiry into its contravention is against an individual’s civil rights. If an individual’s actions are to be restricted for reasons of security, then the restrictions must be expressly defined and such restrictions cannot be said to be implied.

Rule 13(4): Disclosure of Information
Save as provided in sub-rules (1), (2), (3) of rule 13, it may be necessary or expedient to so to do, for CERT-In to disclose all relevant information to the stakeholders, in the interest of sovereignty or integrity of India, defence of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of an offence relating to cognizable offence or enhancing cyber security in the country.

Recommendation #10
Burden of necessity for disclosure of information should be made heavier.

Reasons for the Recommendation
Rule 13(4) allows the disclosure of information by CERT-In in the interests of ‘enhancing cyber security’. This enhancement however needs to be weighed against the detriment caused to the individual and the burden of proof must be on the CERT-In to show that this was the only way of achieving the required.

Rule 19: Protection for actions taken in Good Faith
All actions of CERT-In and its staff acting on behalf of CERT-In are taken in good faith in fulfillment of its mandated roles and functions, in pursuance of the provisions of the Act or any rule, regulations or orders made thereunder. CERT-In and its staff acting on behalf of CERT-In shall not be held responsible for any unintended fallout of their actions.

Recommendation #11
CERT-In should be made liable for their negligent action and no presumption of good faith should be as such provided for.

Reasons for the Recommendation
Rule 19 provides for the protection of CERT-In members for the actions taken in ‘good faith’. It defines such actions as ‘unintended fallouts’. Clearly, if information has been called for and the same is highly confidential, then this rule bars the remedy for any leak of the same due to the negligence of the CERT-In members. This is clearly not permissible as an agency that calls for delicate information should also be held responsible for mishandling the same, intentionally or negligently. Good faith can be established if the need arises, and no presumption as to good faith needs to be provided.

Draft Rules under Section 52

These rules, entitled the “Cyber Appellate Tribunal (Salary, Allowances and Other Terms and Conditions of Service of Chairperson and Members) Rules, 2009” are meant to prescribe the framework for the independent and smooth functioning of the Cyber Appellate Tribunal. This is so because of the specific functions entrusted to this Appellate Tribunal. Under the IT Act, 2000 as amended by the IT (Amendment) Act, 2008, this Tribunal has the power to entertain appeals against orders passed by the adjudicating officer under Section 47.

Recommendation #12
Amend qualifications Information Technology (Qualification and Experience of Adjudicating Officers and Manner of Holding Enquiry) Rules, 2003, to require judicial training and experience.

Reasons for the Recommendation
It is submitted that an examination of these rules governing the Appellate Tribunal cannot be made independent of the powers and qualifications of Adjudicating Officers who are the original authority to decide on contravention of provisions in the IT Act dealing with damage to computer system and failure to furnish information. Even as per the Information Technology (Qualification and Experience of Adjudicating Officers and Manner of Holding Enquiry) Rules, 2003, persons who did not possess judicial experience and training, such as those holding the post of Director in the Central Government, were qualified to perform functions under Section 46 and decide whether there has been unauthorized access to a computer system. This involves appreciation of evidence and is not a merely administrative function that could be carried on by any person who has basic knowledge of information technology.

Viewed from this angle, the qualifications of the Cyber Appellate Tribunal members should have been made much tighter as per the new draft rules. The above rules when read with Section 50 of the IT Act, as amended in 2008, do not say anything about the qualification of the technical members apart from the fact that such person shall not be appointed as a Member, unless he is, or has been, in the service of the Central Government or a State Government, and has held the post of Additional Secretary or Joint Secretary or any equivalent post. Though special knowledge of, and professional experience in, information technology, telecommunication, industry, management or consumer affairs, has been prescribed in the Act as a requirement for any technical member.

Draft Rules under Section 54

These Rules do not suffer any defect and provide for a fair and reasonable enquiry in so far as allegations made against the Chairperson or the members of the Cyber Appellate Tribunal are concerned.

Penal Provisions

Section 66A

Any person who sends, by means of a computer resource or a communication device,
    (a) any information that is grossly offensive or has menacing character; or
    (b) any information which he knows to be false, but for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will, persistently by making use of such computer resource or a communication device,
    (c) any electronic mail or electronic mail message for the purpose of causing annoyance or inconvenience or to deceive or to mislead the addressee or recipient about the origin of such messages,
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and with fine.
Sec. 32 of the 2008 Act inserts Sec. 66A which provides for penal measures for mala fide use of electronic resources to send information detrimental to the receiver. For the section to be attracted the ‘information’ needs to be grossly offensive, menacing, etc. and the sender needs to have known it to be false.

While the intention of the section – to prevent activities such as spam-sending – might be sound and even desirable, there is still a strong argument to be made that words is submitted that the use of words such as ‘annoyance’ and ‘inconvenience’ (in s.66A(c)) are highly problematic. Further, something can be grossly offensive without touching upon any of the conditions laid down in Article 19(2). Without satisfying the conditions of Article 19(2), this provision would be ultra vires the Constitution.

Recommendation #13
The section should be amended and words which lead to ambiguity must be excluded.

Reasons for the Recommendation
A clearer phrasing as to what exactly could convey ‘ill will’ or cause annoyance in the electronic forms needs to be clarified. It is possible in some electronic forms for the receiver to know the content of the information. In such circumstances, if such a possibility is ignored and annoyance does occur, is the sender still liable? Keeping in mind the complexity of use of electronic modes of transmitting information, it can be said that several such conditions arise which the section has vaguely covered. Therefore, a stricter and more clinical approach is necessary.

Recommendation #14
A proviso should be inserted to this section providing for specific exceptions to the offence contained in this section for reasons such as fair comment, truth, criticism of actions of public officials etc.

Reasons for the Recommendation
The major problem with Section 66A lies in clause (c) as per which any electronic mail or electronic mail message sent with the purpose of causing annoyance or inconvenience is covered within the ambit of offensive messages. This does not pay heed to the fact that even a valid and true criticism of the actions of an individual, when brought to his notice, can amount to annoyance. Indeed, it may be brought to his attention with the sole purpose of causing annoyance to him. When interpreting the Information Technology Act, it is to be kept in mind that the offences created under this Act should not go beyond those prescribed in the Indian Penal Code except where there is a wholly new activity or conduct, such as hacking for instance, which is sought to be criminalized.

Offensive messages have been criminalized in the Indian Penal Code subject to the conditions specified in Chapter XXII being present. It is not an offence to verbally insult or annoy someone without anything more being done such as a threat to commit an offence, etc. When this is the case with verbal communications, there is no reason to make an exception for those made through the electronic medium and bring any electronic mail or message sent with the purpose of causing annoyance or inconvenience within the purview of an offensive message.

Section 66F

The definition of cyber-terrorism under this provision is too wide and can cover several activities which are not actually of a “terrorist” character.
Section 66F(1)(B) is particularly harsh and goes much beyond acts of “terrorism” to include various other activities within its purview. As per this provision,
“[w]hoever knowingly or intentionally penetrates or accesses a computer resource without authorisation or exceeding authorised access, and by means of such conduct obtains access to information, data or computer database that is restricted for reasons for the security of the State or foreign relations, or any restricted information, data or computer database, with reasons to believe that such information, data or computer database so obtained may be used to cause or is likely to cause injury to the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence, or to the advantage of any foreign nation, group of individuals or otherwise, commits the offence of cyber terrorism.”

This provision suffers from several defects and hence ought to be repealed.

Recommendation #15
Section 66F(1)(B) has to be repealed or suitably amended to water down the excessively harsh operation of this provision. The restrictive nature of the information that is unauthorisedly accessed must be confined to those that are restricted on grounds of security of the State or foreign relations. The use to which such information may be put should again be confined to injury to the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, or public order. A mere advantage to a foreign nation cannot render the act of unauthorized access one of cyber-terrorism as long as such advantage is not injurious or harmful in any manner to the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, or public order. A mens rea requirement should also be introduced whereby mere knowledge that the information which is unauthorisedly accessed can be put to such uses as given in this provision should not suffice for the unauthorised access to amount to cyber-terrorism. The unauthorised access should be with the intention to put such information to this use. The amended provision would read as follows:

“[w]hoever knowingly or intentionally penetrates or accesses a computer resource without authorisation or exceeding authorised access, and by means of such conduct obtains access to information, data or computer database that is restricted for reasons for the security of the State or foreign relations, with the intention that such information, data or computer database so obtained may be used to cause injury to the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, or public order, commits the offence of cyber terrorism.”

Reasons for the Recommendation
The ambit of this provision goes much beyond information, data or computer database which is restricted only on grounds of security of the State or foreign relations and extends to “any restricted information, data or computer database”. This expression covers any government file which is marked as confidential or saved in a computer used exclusively by the government. It also covers any file saved in a computer exclusively used by a private corporation or enterprise. Even the use to which such information can be put need not be confined to those that cause or are likely to cause injury to the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, or friendly relations with foreign States. Information or data which is defamatory, amounting to contempt of court, or against decency / morality, are all covered within the scope of this provision. This goes way beyond the idea of a terrorist activity and poses serious questions. While there is no one globally accepted definition of cyberterrorism, it is tough to conceive of slander as a terrorist activity.

To give an illustration, if a journalist managed to unauthorisedly break into a restricted database, even one owned by a private corporation, and stumbled upon information that is defamatory in character, he would have committed an act of “cyber-terrorism.” Various kinds of information pertaining to corruption in the judiciary may be precluded from being unauthorisedly accessed on the ground that such information may be put to use for committing contempt of court. Any person who gains such access would again qualify as a cyber-terrorist. The factual situations are numerous where this provision can be put to gross misuse with the ulterior motive of muzzling dissent or freezing access to information that may be restricted in nature but nonetheless have a bearing on probity in public life etc. It is therefore imperative that this provision may be toned down as recommended above.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-draft-rules