Centre for Internet and Society

Aadhaar marks a fundamental shift in citizen-state relations: From ‘We the People’ to ‘We the Government’

pranesh — 2017-04-04T16:10:06Z

Your fingerprints, iris scans, details of where you shop. Compulsory Aadhaar means all this data is out there. And it’s still not clear who can view or use it.

The article was published in the Hindustan Times on April 3, 2017.

Until recently, people were allowed to opt out of Aadhaar and withdraw consent to have their data stored. This is no longer going to be an option.
(Siddhant Jumde / HT Illustration)

Imagine you’re walking down the street and you point the camera on your phone at a crowd of people in front of you. An app superimposes on each person’s face a partially-redacted name, date of birth, address, whether she’s undergone police verification, and, of course, an obscured Aadhaar number.

OnGrid, a company that bills itself as a “trust platform” and offers “to deliver verifications and background checks”, used that very imagery in an advertisement last month. Its website notes that “As per Government regulations, it is mandatory to take consent of the individual while using OnGrid”, but that is a legal requirement, not a technical one.

Since every instance of use of Aadhaar for authentication or for financial transactions leaves behind logs in the Unique Identification Authority of India’s (UIDAI) databases, the government can potentially have very detailed information about everything from the your medical purchases to your use of video-chatting software. The space for digital identities as divorced from legal identities gets removed. Clearly, Aadhaar has immense potential for profiling and surveillance. Our only defence: law that is weak at best and non-existent at worst.

The Aadhaar Act and Rules don’t limit the information that can be gathered from you by the enrolling agency; it doesn’t limit how Aadhaar can be used by third parties (a process called ‘seeding’) if they haven’t gathered their data from UIDAI; it doesn’t require your consent before third parties use your Aadhaar number to collate records about you (eg, a drug manufacturer buying data from various pharmacies, and creating profiles using Aadhaar).

It even allows your biometrics to be shared if it is “in the interest of national security”. The law offers provisions for UIDAI to file cases (eg, for multiple enrollments), but it doesn’t allow citizens to file a case against private parties or the government for misuse of Aadhaar or identity fraud, or data breach.

It is also clear that the government opposes any privacy-related improvements to the law. After debating the Aadhaar Bill in March 2016, the Rajya Sabha passed an amendment by MP Jairam Ramesh that allowed people to opt out of Aadhaar, and withdraw their consent to UIDAI storing their data, if they had other means of proving their identity (thus allowing Aadhaar to remain an enabler).

But that amendment, as with all amendments passed in the Rajya Sabha, was rejected by the Lok Sabha, allowing the government to make Aadhaar mandatory, and depriving citizens of consent. While the Aadhaar Act requires a person’s consent before collecting or using Aadhaar-provided details, it doesn’t allow for the revocation of that consent.

In other countries, data security laws require that a person be notified if her data has been breached. In response to an RTI application asking whether UIDAI systems had ever been breached, the Authority responded that the information could not be disclosed for reasons of “national security”.

The citizen must be transparent to the state, while the state will become more opaque to the citizen.

How Did Aadhaar Change?

How did Aadhaar become the behemoth it is today, with it being mandatory for hundreds of government programmes, and even software like Skype enabling support for it?

The first detailed look one had at the UID project was through an internal UIDAI document marked ‘Confidential’ that was leaked through WikiLeaks in November 2009. That 41-page dossier is markedly different from the 170-page ‘Technology and Architecture’ document that UIDAI has on its website now, but also similar in some ways.

In neither of those is the need for Aadhaar properly established. Only in November 2012 — after scholars like Reetika Khera pointed out UIDAI’s fundamental misunderstanding of leakages in the welfare delivery system — was the first cost-benefit analysis commissioned, by when UIDAI had already spent ₹28 billion. That same month, Justice KS Puttaswamy, a retired High Court judge, filed a PIL in the Supreme Court challenging Aadhaar’s constitutionality, wherein the government has argued privacy isn’t a fundamental right.

Every time you use Aadhaar, you leave behind logs in the UIDAI databases. This means that the government can potentially have very detailed information about everything from the your medical purchases to your use of video-chatting software.

Even today, whether the ‘deduplication’ process — using biometrics to ensure the same person can’t register twice — works properly is a mystery, since UIDAI hasn’t published data on this since 2012. Instead of welcoming researchers to try to find flaws in the system, UIDAI recently filed an FIR against a journalist doing so.

At least in 2009, UIDAI stated it sought to prevent anyone from “[e]ngaging in or facilitating profiling of any nature for anyone or providing information for profiling of any nature for anyone”, whereas the 2014 document doesn’t. As OnGrid’s services show, the very profiling that the UIDAI said it would prohibit is now seen as a feature that all, including private companies, may exploit.

UID has changed in other ways too. In 2009, it was as a system that never sent out any information other than ‘Yes’ or ‘No’, which it did in response to queries like ‘Is Pranesh Prakash the name attached to this UID number’ or ‘Is April 1, 1990 his date of birth’, or ‘Does this fingerprint match this UID number’.

With the addition of e-KYC (wherein UIDAI provides your demographic details to the requester) and Aadhaar-enabled payments to the plan in 2012, the fundamentals of Aadhaar changed. This has made Aadhaar less secure.

Security Concerns

With Aadhaar Pay, due to be launched on April 14, a merchant will ask you to enter your Aadhaar number into her device, and then for your biometrics — typically a fingerprint, which will serve as your ‘password’, resulting in money transfer from your Aadhaar-linked bank account.

Basic information security theory requires that even if the identifier (username, Aadhaar number etc) is publicly known — millions of people names and Aadhaar numbers have been published on dozens of government portals — the password must be secret. That’s how most logins works, that’s how debit and credit cards work. How are you or UIDAI going to keep your biometrics secret?

In 2015, researchers in Carnegie Mellon captured the iris scans of a driver using car’s side-view mirror from distances of up to 40 feet. In 2013, German hackers fooled Apple iOS’s fingerprint sensors by replicating a fingerprint from a photo taken off a glass held by an individual. They even replicated the German Defence Minister’s fingerprints from photographs she herself had put online. Your biometrics can’t be kept secret.

Typically, even if your username (in this case, Aadhaar number) is publicly known, your password must be secret. That’s how most logins works, that’s how debit and credit cards work. How are you or UIDAI going to keep your biometrics secret?

In the US, in a security breach of 21.5 million government employees’ personnel records in 2015, 5.2 million employees’ fingerprints were copied. If that breach had happened in India, those fingerprints could be used in conjunction with Aadhaar numbers not only for large-scale identity fraud, but also to steal money from people’s bank accounts.

All ‘passwords’ should be replaceable. If your credit card gets stolen, you can block it and get a new card. If your Aadhaar number and fingerprint are leaked, you can’t change it, you can’t block it.

The answer for Aadhaar too is to choose not to use biometrics alone for authentication and authorisation, and to remove the centralised biometrics database. And this requires a fundamental overhaul of the UID project.

Aadhaar marks a fundamental shift in citizen-state relations: from ‘We the People’ to ‘We the Government’. If the rampant misuse of electronic surveillance powers and wilful ignorance of the law by the state is any precedent, the future looks bleak. The only way to protect against us devolving into a total surveillance state is to improve rule of law, to strengthen our democratic institutions, and to fundamentally alter Aadhaar. Sadly, the political currents are not only not favourable, but dragging us in the opposite direction.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/hindustan-times-pranesh-prakash-april-3-2017-aadhaar-marks-a-fundamental-shift-in-citizen-state-relations

Aadhaar Bill 2016 Evaluated against the National Privacy Principles

Pooja Saxena and Amber Sinha — 2016-03-21T08:38:34Z

In this infographic, we evaluate the privacy provisions of the Aadhaar Bill 2016 against the national privacy principles developed by the Group of Experts on Privacy led by the Former Chief Justice A.P. Shah in 2012. The infographic is based on Vipul Kharbanda’s article 'Analysis of Aadhaar Act in the Context of A.P. Shah Committee Principles,' and is designed by Pooja Saxena, with inputs from Amber Sinha.

Download the infographic: PDF and PNG.

License: It is shared under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/aadhaar-bill-2016-evaluated-against-the-national-privacy-principles

Aadhaar Act and its Non-compliance with Data Protection Law in India

vanya — 2016-04-18T11:43:02Z

This post compares the provisions of the Aadhaar Act, 2016, with India's data protection regime as articulated in the Information Technology (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data or Information) Rules, 2011.

Download the file: PDF.

Amidst all the hue and cry, the Aadhaar Act 2016, which was introduced with the aim of providing statutory backing to the use of Aadhaar, was passed in the Lok Sabha in its original form on March 16, 2016, after rejecting the recommendations made by Rajya Sabha . Though the Act has been vehemently opposed on several grounds, one of the concerns that has been voiced is regarding privacy and protection of the demographic and biometric information collected for the purpose of issuing the Aadhaar number.

In India, for the purpose of data protection, a body corporate is subject to section 43A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 ("IT Act ") and subsequent Rules, i.e. -The Information Technology (Reasonable security practices and procedures and sensitive personal data or information) Rules, 2011 ("IT Rules"). Section 43A of the IT Act, 2000 holds a body corporate, which is possessing, dealing or handling any sensitive personal data or information, and is negligent in implementing and maintaining reasonable security practices resulting in wrongful loss or wrongful gain to any person, liable to compensate the affected person and pay damages.

Rule 3 of the IT Rules enlists personal information that would amount to Sensitive personal data or information of a person and includes the biometric information. Even the Aadhaar Act states under section 30 that the biometric information collected shall be deemed as "sensitive personal data or information", which shall have the same meaning as assigned to it in clause (iii) of the Explanation to section 43A of the IT Act; this reflects that biometric data collected in the Aadhaar scheme will receive the same level of protection as is provided to other sensitive personal data under Indian law. This implies that, the agencies contracted by the UIDAI (and not the UIDAI itself) to perform functions like collection, authentication, etc. like the Registrars, Enrolling Agencies and Requesting Entities, which meet the criteria of being a 'body corporate' as defined in section 43A, could be held responsible under this provision, as well as the Rules, to ensure security of the data and information of Aadhaar holder and could potentially be held liable for breach of information that results in loss to an individual if it can be proven that they failed to implement reasonable security practices and procedures.

In light of the fact that some actors in the Aadhaar scheme could be held accountable and liable under section 43A and associated Rules, this article compares the regulations regarding data security as found in section 43A and IT Rules 2011 with the provisions of Aadhaar Act 2016, and discusses the implications of the differences, if any.

1. Compensation and Penalty

Section 43A: Section 43A of the IT Act, 2000 (Amended in 2008) provides for compensation for failure to protect data. It states that a body corporate, which is possessing, dealing or handling any sensitive personal data or information, and is negligent in implementing and maintaining reasonable security practices resulting in wrongful loss or wrongful gain to any person, is liable to compensate the affected person and pay damages not exceeding five crore rupees.

Aadhaar Act : Chapter VII of the Act provides for offences and penalties, but does not talk about damages to the affected party.

Section 37 states that intentional disclosure or dissemination of identity information, to any person not authorised under the Aadhaar Act, or in violation of any agreement entered into under the Act, will be punishable with imprisonment up to three years or a fine up to ten thousand rupees (in case of an individual), and fine up to one lakh rupees (in case of a company).
Section 38 prescribes penalty with imprisonment up to three years and a fine not less than ten lakh rupees in case any of the acts listed under the provision are performed without authorisation from the UIDAI.
Section 39 prescribes penalty with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees for tampering with data in Central Identities Data Repository.
Section 40 holds a requesting entity liable for penalty for use of identity information in violation of Section 8 (3) with imprisonment up to three years and/or a fine up to ten thousand rupees (in case of an individual), and fine up to one lakh rupees (in case of a company).
Section 41 holds a requesting entity or enrolling agency liable for penalty for violation of Section 8 (3) or Section 3 (2) with imprisonment up to one year and/or a fine up to ten thousand rupees (in case of an individual), and fine up to one lakh rupees (in case of a company).
Section 42 provides general penalty for any offence against the Act or regulations made under it, for which no specific penalty is provided, with imprisonment up to one year and/or a fine up to twenty five thousand rupees (in case of an individual), and fine up to one lakh rupees (in case of a company).

Though the Aadhaar Act prescribes penalty in case of unauthorised access, use or any other act contravening the Regulations, it fails to guarantee protection to the information and does not provide for compensation in case of violation of the provisions.

2. Privacy Policy

IT Rules: Rule 4 requires a body corporate to provide a privacy policy on their website, which is easily accessible, provides for the type and purpose of personal, sensitive personal information collected and used, and Reasonable security practices and procedures.

Aadhaar Act: Though in practise the contracting agencies (the body corporates under the Aadhaar ecosystem) may maintain a privacy policy on their website, the Aadhaar Act does not require a privacy policy for the UIDAI or other actors.

Implications: Because contracting agencies will be covered by the IT Rules if they are 'body corporates', the requirement to maintain a privacy policy will be applicable to them.

3. Consent

IT Rules: Rule 5 requires that prior to the collection of sensitive personal data, the body corporate must obtain consent, either in writing or through fax regarding the purpose of usage before collection of such information.

Aadhaar Act: The Act is silent regarding consent being acquired in case of the enrolling agency or registrars. However, section 8 provides that any requesting entity will take consent from the individual before collecting his/her Aadhaar information for authentication purposes, though it does not specify the nature (written/through fax).

Implications: If the enrolling agency is a body corporate, they will also be required to take consent prior to collecting and processing biometrics. It is possible that since the Aadhaar Act envisages a scheme which is quasi-compulsory in nature, a consent provision was deliberately left out. This circumstance would give the enrolling agencies an argument against taking consent, by saying that the Aadhaar Act is a specific legislation which is also later in point of time than the IT Rules, and a deliberate omission of consent coupled with the compulsory nature of the Aadhaar scheme would mean that they are not required to take consent of the individuals before enrolment.

4. Collection Limitation

IT Rules: Rule 5 (2) requires that a body corporate should only collect sensitive personal data if it is connected to a lawful purpose and is considered necessary for that purpose.

Aadhaar Act: Section 3(1) of the Act states that every resident shall be entitled to obtain an aadhaar number by submitting his demographic information and biometric information by undergoing the process of enrolment.

5. Notice

IT Rules: Rule 5(3) requires that while collecting information directly from an individual, the body corporate must provide the following information:

The fact that information is being collected
The purpose for which the information is being collected
The intended recipients of the information
The name and address of the agency that is collecting the information
The name and address of the agency that will retain the information

Aadhaar Act: Section 3 of the Act states that at the time of enrolment and collection of information, the enrolling agency shall notify the individual as to how their information will be used; what type of entities the information will be shared with; and that they have a right to see their information and also tell them how they can see their information. However, the Act is silent regarding notice of name and address of the agency collecting and retaining the information.

6. Retention Limitation

IT Rules: Rule 5(4) requires that body corporate must retain sensitive personal data only for as long as it takes to fulfil the stated purpose or otherwise required under law.

Aadhaar Act: The Act is silent regarding this and does not mention the duration for which the personal information of an individual shall be retained by the bodies/organisations contracted by UIDAI.

7. Purpose Limitation

IT Rules: Rule 5(5) requires that information must be used for the purpose that it was collected for.

Aadhaar Act Section 57 contravenes this and states that the Act will not prevent use of Aadhaar number for other purposes under law by the State or other bodies. Section 8 of the Act states that for the purpose of authentication, a requesting entity is required to take consent before collection of Aadhaar information and use it only for authentication with the CIDR. Section 29 of the Act states that the core biometric information collected will not be shared with anyone for any reason, and must not be used for any purpose other than generation of Aadhaar numbers and authentication. Also, the Identity information available with a requesting entity will not be used for any purpose other than what is specified to the individual, nor will it be shared further without the individual's consent.

Act will not prevent use of Aadhaar number for other purposes under law by the State or other bodies.

8. Right to Access and Correct

IT Rules : Rule 5(6) requires a body corporate to provide individuals with the ability to review the information they have provided and access and correct their personal or sensitive personal information.

Aadhaar Act : The Act provides under section 3 that at the time of enrolment, the individual needs to be informed about the existence of a right to access information, the procedure for making requests for such access, and details of the person or department in-charge to whom such requests can be made. Section 28 of the Act provides that every aadhaar number holder may access his identity information except core biometric information. Section 32 provides that every Aadhaar number holder may obtain his authentication record. Also, if the demographic or biometric information about any Aadhaar number holder changes, is lost or is found to be incorrect, they may request the UIDAI to make changes to their record in the CIDR.

9. Right to 'Opt Out' and Withdraw Consent

IT Rules: Rule 5(7) requires that the individual must be provided with the option of 'opting out' of providing data or information sought by the body corporate. Also, they must have the right to withdraw consent at any point of time.

Aadhaar Act: The Aadhaar Act does not provide an opt- out provision and also does not provide an option to withdraw consent at any point of time. Section 7 of the Aadhaar Act actually implies that once the Central or State government makes aadhaar authentication mandatory for receiving a benefit then the individual has no other option but to apply for an Aadhaar number. The only concession that is made is that if an Aadhaar number is not assigned to an individual then s/he would be offered some alternative viable means of identification for receiving the benefit.

10. Grievance Officer

IT Rules: Rule 5(9) requires that body corporate must designate a grievance officer for redressal of grievances, details of which must be posted on the body corporate's website and grievances must be addressed within a month of receipt.

Aadhaar Act: The Aadhaar Act does not provide for any such mechanism for grievance redressal by the registrars, enrolling agencies or the requesting entities. However, since the contracting agencies will also get covered by the IT Rules if they are 'body corporates', the requirement to designate a grievance officer would be applicable to them as well due to the IT Rules.

11. Disclosure with Consent, Prohibition on Publishing and Further Disclosure

IT Rules: Rule 6 requires that body corporate must have consent before disclosing sensitive personal data to any third person or party, except in the case with Government agencies for the purpose of verification of identity, prevention, detection, investigation, on receipt of a written request. Also, the body corporate or any person on its behalf shall not publish the sensitive personal information and the third party receiving the sensitive personal information from body corporate or any person on its behalf shall not disclose it further.

Aadhaar Act: Regarding the requesting entities, the Act provides that they shall not disclose the identity information except with the prior consent of the individual to whom the information relates. The Act also states that the Authority shall take necessary measures to ensure confidentiality of information against disclosures. However, as an exception under section 33, the UIDAI may reveal identity information, authentication records or any information in the CIDR following a court order by a District Judge or higher. The Act also allows disclosure made in the interest of national security following directions by a Joint Secretary to the Government of India, or an officer of a higher rank, authorised for this purpose. The Act is silent on the issue of obtaining consent of the individual under these exceptions. Additionally, the Act also states that the Aadhaar number or any core biometric information collected or created regarding an individual under the Act shall not be published, displayed or posted publicly, except for the purposes specified by regulations.

12. Requirements for Transfer of Sensitive Personal Data

IT Rules : Rule 7 requires that body corporate may transfer sensitive personal data into another jurisdiction only if the country ensures the same level of protection and may be allowed only if it is necessary for the performance of the lawful contract between the body corporate or any person on its behalf and provider of information or where such person has consented to data transfer.

Aadhaar Act : The Act is silent regarding transfer of personal data into another jurisdiction by the any of the contracting bodies like the Registrar, Enrolling agencies or the requesting entities. However, if these agencies satisfy the requirement of being "body corporates" as defined under section 43A, then the above requirement regarding transfer of data to another jurisdiction under IT Rules would be applicable to them. However, considering the sensitive nature of the data involved, the lack of a prohibition of transferring data to another jurisdiction under the Aadhaar Act appears to be a serious lacuna.

13. Security of Information

IT Rules: Rule 8 requires that the body corporate must secure information in accordance with the ISO 27001 standard or any other best practices notified by Central Government. These practices must be audited annually or when the body corporate undertakes a significant up gradation of its process and computer resource.

Aadhaar Act: Section 28 of the Act states that the UIDAI must ensure the security and confidentiality of identity information and authentication records. It also states that the Authority shall adopt and implement appropriate technical and organisational security measures, and ensure the same are imposed through agreements/arrangements with its agents, consultants, advisors or other persons. However, it does not mention which standards/measures have to be adopted by all the actors in Aadhaar ecosystem for ensuring the security of information, though it can be argued that if the contractors employed by the UIDAI are body corporate then the standards prescribed under the IT Rules would be applicable to them.

Implications of the Differences for Body Corporates in Aadhaar Ecosystem

An analysis of the Rules in comparison to the data protection measures under the Aadhaar Act shows that the requirements regarding protection of personal or sensitive personal information differ and are not completely in line with each other.

Though the Aadhaar Act takes into account the provisions regarding consent of the individual, notice, restriction on sharing, etc., the Act is silent regarding many core measures like sharing of information across jurisdictions, taking consent before collection of information, adoption of security measures for protection of information, etc. which a body corporate in the Aadhaar ecosystem must adopt to be in compliance with section 43A of the IT Act. It is therefore important that the bodies collecting, handling, sharing the personal information and are governed by the Aadhaar Act, must adhere to section 43A and the IT Rules 2011. However, applicability of Aadhaar Act as well as section 43A and IT Rules 2011 would lead to ambiguity regarding interpretation and implementation of the Law. The differences must be duly taken into account and more clarity is required to make all the bodies under this Legislation like the enrolling agencies, Registrars and the Requesting Entities accountable under the correct provisions of Law. However, having two separate legislations governing the data protection standards in the Aadhaar scheme seems to have been overlooked. A harmonized and overarching privacy legislation is critical to avoid unclarity in the applicability of data protection standards and would also address many privacy concerns associated to the scheme.

Appendix I

The Rajya Sabha had proposed five amendments to the Aadhaar Act 2016, which are as follows:

i. Opt-out clause: A provision to allow a person to "opt out" of the Aadhaar system, even if already enrolled.

ii. Voluntary: To ensure that if a person chooses not to be part of the Aadhaar system, he/she would be provided "alternate and viable" means of identification for purposes of delivery of government subsidy, benefit or service.

iii. Amendment restricting the use of Aadhaar numbers only for targeting of government benefits or service and not for any other purpose.

iv. Amendment seeking change of the term "national security" to "public emergency or in the interest of public safety" in the provision specifying situations in which disclosure of identity information of an individual to certain law enforcement agencies can be allowed.

v. Oversight Committee: The oversight committee , which would oversee the possible disclosure of information, should include either the Central Vigilance Commissioner or the Comptroller and Auditor-General.

Sources:

Appendix II - Section 43A: Compensation for Failure to Protect Data

Where a body corporate, possessing, dealing or handling any sensitive personal data or information in a computer resource which it owns, controls or operates, is negligent in implementing and maintaining reasonable security practices and procedures and thereby causes wrongful loss or wrongful gain to any person, such body corporate shall be liable to pay damages by way of compensation to the person so affected.

For the purposes of this section:

"body corporate" means any company and includes a firm, sole proprietorship or other association of individuals engaged in commercial or professional activities;
"reasonable security practices and procedures" means security practices and procedures designed to protect such information from unauthorised access, damage, use, modification, disclosure or impairment, as may be specified in an agreement between the parties or as may be specified in any law for the time being in force and in the absence of such agreement or any law, such reasonable security practices and procedures, as may be prescribed by the Central Government in consultation with such professional bodies or associations as it may deem fit;
"sensitive personal data or information" means such personal information as may be prescribed by the Central Government in consultation with such professional bodies or associations as it may deem fit.'.

The term 'body corporate' has been defined under section 43A as "any company and includes a firm, sole proprietorship or other association of individuals engaged in commercial or professional activities"

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/aadhaar-act-and-its-non-compliance-with-data-protection-law-in-india

130 Million at Risk of Fraud After Massive Leak of Indian Biometric System Data

praskrishna — 2017-05-20T12:36:06Z

A series of potentially calamitous leaks in India leave as many as 130 million people at risk of fraud or worse after caches of biometric and other personal data became accessible online.

The article by Dell Cameron was published by Gizmodo on May 3, 2017.

That’s according to a new report from the Bangalore-based Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), which details breaches at four national- and state-run databases, all of which are said to contain purportedly “uniquely-identifying” Aadhaar numbers.

Launched in 2009, the Aadhaar system is an ambitious, albeit flawed program aimed at assigning unique identity numbers, not only to Indian citizens, but everyone who resides and works in the country. It is the largest program of its kind in the world. The 12-digit Aadhaar codes are assigned and maintained in a central database by the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) and link to biometric data of fingerprint and iris scans combined.

For security purposes, since 2002, all U.S. passports issued to international travelers at embassies and consulates around the world have contained biometric data, including a ten fingerprint scan, contained in a microchip embedded in the back cover. In 2007, the law was extended to cover U.S. citizens, and since at least 2013, so-called “e-passports” have been the standard.

With a very different intention in mind, the Aadhaar system was created to employ biometrics as a means to ensure that Indian residents have access to the social safety net, including programs for welfare, health, and education. But due to the sheer scale—again, the largest biometric project in history—the program has been fraught with controversy since day one. Since inception, more than 1.13 billion Aadhaar numbers have since been assigned, according to UIDAI data. (India has a population of roughly 1.32 billion.)

Former World Bank economist Salman Anees , a member of the Indian National Congress (INC), points to migrant laborers as an example of those the program is intended to help. The often carry no identification, he said, and therefore can rarely prove who they are when traveling from state to state. The purpose of the Aadhaar system, he said, is to provide every Indian with a “digital identity.”

“At least, that was the original idea,” adds Soz.

After the INC was battered in the 2014 general election, plans were put forth to expand the scope of the Aadhaar program, inflaming public concern over security and privacy. “Basically, you take this Aadhaar number and you start seeding different [government] databases,” Soz says. “And that, in effect, creates this huge data structure that people are very uncomfortable with.”

“In some ways,” he continued, “what you have is this amazingly modern system with huge data collection potential—and of course, many positives can come from this, but in the wrong hands it can become a huge problem for India. At the same time, your legal framework, your regulatory framework, your policies and procedures are not there. People aren’t aware of what their rights are. They have no idea what this thing can do.”

One problem, Soz says, is that Aadhaar numbers are not always checked against a cardholder’s fingerprints or iris scans in all cases, defeating its purpose entirely. When someone provides an Aadhaar number to prove their identity online or by phone, for example, their identities cannot adequately verified. In this way, Aadhaar numbers are not wholly unlike Social Security numbers in the United States. Were 130 million Social Security numbers to be leaked online, confidence in the ability to use that number to confirm an Americans’ identities would be shaken, if not destroyed.

Last month, a central government database containing thousands of Aadhaar numbers—as well as dates of birth, addresses, and tax IDs (PAN)—reportedly leaked, exposing thousands of Indian residents to potential abuse. According to The Wire, the information, which was contained in Microsoft Excel spreadsheets, could be easily located on Google.

According to CIS, roughly 130-135 million Aadhaar numbers have now been exposed in this most recent leak. With the growing use of the numbers in areas such as insurance and banking, and without proper mechanisms in place to biometrically confirm the identities of cardholders in every case, the threat of financial fraud is pervasive. “All of these leaks are symptomatic of a significant and potentially irreversible privacy harm,” the report says, noting that such incidents “create a ripe opportunity for financial fraud.”

While Aadhaar is not mandatory everywhere, CIS says, the Indian government continues collecting information about the participants under various social programs. Inevitably, that information is combined with other databases containing even more sensitive data. As that happens, there’s a heightened risk to those whose Aadhaar numbers have been compromised. How the Indian government will address its apparently inadequate security controls before fraud overwhelms the system remains unknown.

Read the full report: Information Security Practices of Aadhaar (or lack thereof): A documentation of public availability of Aadhaar Numbers with sensitive personal financial information

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/gizmodo-may-3-2017-130-million-at-risk-of-fraud-after-massive-leak-of-indian-biometric-system-data

"Will the Magic Number Deliver?" - Roundtable on Aadhaar at CSLG, JNU, April 26

sumandro — 2016-04-20T10:49:58Z

The Centre for the Study of Law and Governance (CSLG), Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), will organise a roundtable discussion on Tuesday, April 26, to discuss the Aadhaar project and Act. Along with Rajeev Chandrasekhar, Prasanna S, Apar Gupta, and Chirashree Dasgupta, Sumandro Chattapadhyay will be one of the discussants. It will take place in the CSLG Conference Room at 6 pm.

Discussion Note

The Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016, was enacted by the Parliament on March 16. Thereafter it has been notified on March 26.

The Act empowers the UIDAI (Unique Identification Authority of India) to collect biometric and demographic information of residents to provide them with a unique number. This unique number is to be used for enumeration, identification and targeting of beneficiaries of government subsidies and services.

Since the creation of the UIDAI as an executive authority in 2009, this process of enumeration has been ongoing. Recently, it was announced that more than 100 crore residents have been given their aadhaar cards. Alongside, however, legal challenges have continued in the Supreme Court.

Given this context, this Roundatable Discussion will focus on the following set of questions (among others):

Can the Aadhaar Number enable better delivery of government subsidies and services?
How does the Act ensure data protection?
Is there a right to privacy in India? What are the implications in the context of Aadhaar?
Does the Act ensure public access to statutory remedies in case of violations?
Did the Aadhaar Bill fulfil the requirements of a money bill?

Discussion Format

Setting the Theme - Short Introduction to the Topic by Natasha Goyal

Speakers' comments, 15 minutes each, consecutive, no power points

Rajeev Chandrasekhar, Member of Parliament, Rajya Sabha
Sumandro Chattapadhyay, the Centre for Internet and Society
Prasanna S, Lawyer
Apar Gupta, Advocate, Delhi High Court
Dr. Chirashree Dasgupta, Centre for the Study of Law and Governance

Open Session (Moderated Q and A)

Followed by Tea

Directions to Venue

From JNU main gate, proceed straight until you get to a T-junction. Turn left. Continue until you reach a second T-junction. Turn right. Follow the road for just 0.7 km until you see a bus stop labelled “Paschimmabad.” About 50 m past the bus stop turn right at a sign that reads: “Centre for the Study of Law and Governance”. The CSLG building is on the right. The conference room is on the first floor.

Poster

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/will-the-magic-number-deliver-aadhaar-cslg-26042016