Centre for Internet and Society

Nasscom chief saying full data protection isn’t possible should wake us from our digital slumber

praskrishna — 2017-03-17T01:47:25Z

Considering India is rapidly moving towards a digital economy, the hurdles not withstanding, data and identity security are topics which have to be taken very seriously. Since the demonetisation, a large part of the population who would never bother with digital transactions has suddenly come online. But there is no such thing as complete security of personal data, according to Nasscom chief R Chandrashekhar.

This was published by First Post on March 16, 2017. Pranesh Prakash was quoted.

Attending the World Consumer Rights Day, R Chandrashekhar said that personal data of online consumers cannot be completely secure and stressed on the need to have strict enforcement of consumer protection laws. Speaking to PTI, Chandrashekhar said, “More than 3 million credit card data details were misused recently. Let us face it, these kind of security breaches will take place. There is nothing called fully perfect security in IT.”

It’s high time we call a spade, a spade

R Chandrashekhar, President Nasscom. Image: PIB

Coming from the head of Nasscom, this announcement pertaining to security is very important. According to Chandrashekhar one cannot expect complete cyber security, but there are definitely ways in which such attacks and incidents can be minimised. He very rightly said that that protecting the online consumer data, specially looking at how rapidly e-commerce is growing in the country, is of prime importance.

One cannot help but agree with Chandrashekhar, specially considering the fact India does not have a privacy law ecosystem that is present in countries such as the US and the UK, where online consumer protection is taken very seriously. Germany and other EU nations have always been at the forefront, when it comes to protecting data privacy, and it has ensured that consumer-facing technology companies do not run roughshod when it comes to protecting user data.

Chandrashekhar stated that there was no need for separate regulations for e-commerce sites, but the priority was ensuring means to enforce consumer laws in the digital world.

Lack of dedicated privacy laws

According to cyberlaw and cybersecurity expert, Pavan Duggal, “Going forward, there is an urgent need for India to take a strong view on privacy in terms of legislative frameworks. Unfortunately, at the time of writing, India does not have a dedicated law on privacy.”

Image: Foamy Media

Social media websites for instance have a lot of user data. But what happens when they suddenly change their privacy policies? For instance, a lot of users signed on to WhatsApp when it was an independent company. But post the Facebook acquisition, there have been a lot of instances where WhatsApp has updated its terms and conditions to suit its parent Facebook.

That’s not completely illegal one may say. Loss of privacy is a price you pay for free services. But what if, I as a consumer of WhatsApp do not want the app to share any of my data with Facebook? The only option I am left with is to delete WhatsApp. But then again, I do not know if my data is also deleted from WhatsApp servers or it has already been shared. Social media apps, only let you know what updates are being added. Consent is only required to update the app. You can stall that, up to a point. But there will come a time when you will have to update an app. Then by default you have given approval to all the terms and conditions associated with the app.

Two students had challenged WhatsApp’s revision to its privacy policy before Delhi High Court. The Court dismissed the petition insisting that users could opt out by deleting their accounts.

When a similar challenge was mounted before the authorities in UK, Facebook had to put a pause on their data sharing – and this was because of its strong data protection policy. Under the UK data protection law, the company has to inform the authority established under the Act of any changes in the use of user data. In the case of WhatsApp, the UK authority objected to such sharing.

Aadhaar – the 12-digit biometric storehouse

Aadhaar card is being used for many financial and non financial transactions. Also the Aadhaar number associated with an individual also holds a lot of personal and biometric data. So when recently, there was news about a possible Aadhaar data breach when UIDAI filed a police complaint against Axis Bank, business correspondent Suvidhaa Infoserve and e-sign provider eMudhra, it was naturally a shock to many.

Unlike a password which can be changed, with biometric information there is no scope to do that if it is compromised. Although UIDAI claims that there are multiple levels of security and firewalls to ensure there is no breach of Aadhaar information of an individual, one can only hope that it is robust enough to withstand any attack. Collection of biometric data by the government to form a database, for instance, was debated and ultimately not used in the UK.

Pranesh Prakash, policy director of the Centre for Internet and Society, expressed concern about the pace at which we are progressing when it comes to having a legal and regulatory framework when it comes to the Digital India push. “While the security architecture of Aadhaar Enabled Payment Systems (AEPS) might in itself be good, the idea of providing your fingerprints to merchants for financial transactions is a terrible idea since that is like asking you to give your bank password to a merchant, and the merchant can reuse that password, and you can’t ever change the password,” said Prakash.

Enforcing the correct processes

Last year, a malware affected the systems of Hitachi Payment Services, which provides back end services to ATM machines and Point of Sale nodes across India. As a result of this, around 32 lakh debit cards were compromised including those issued by SBI, HDFC, Yes Bank, Axis, BOB and ICICI. Security experts and consultants have pointed out various holes in the electronic transaction systems in place in India. Intel has also warned that ATM machines in India are vulnerable to malicious attacks. Intel points out that countries in the Asia Pacific region are developing and are particularly vulnerable because of old systems and machines being used.

Image: REUTERS/Amit Dave

According to Mahesh Patel, president and group CTO, AGS Transact Technologies this was more of a governance issue of the data centre than any technical error. “It is not about the software, but it is about the processes and procedures you put in place to ensure that the system is secure. Everything from physical security to computing security to admin management, etc should be process driven. So somewhere there could have been a weak link there. Cloud has to be secure and encrypted which suffices the use case of payments. This cloud is different from the ones used by e-commerce sites to display all their products,” said Patel.

We may have the best of software and security measures, but ensuring that they are implemented the right way is equally important. Plugging the loopholes in current regulations is also important.

Existing laws and regulations, not enough

According to Duggal, “The Information Technology Act, 2000 hardly has effective provisions to protect any data and personal privacy in the digital ecosystem. The Indian Government needs to come up with strong privacy law which can protect both personal privacy and data privacy in an effective manner.”

One may find it really shocking to hear the head of Nasscom saying something to the extent that full data protection for online consumers is not possible, but there is definitely truth to the matter. It will require concerted efforts from not only regulators, governments, digital wallet players and banking industry to come up with these privacy laws, but also you the consumer has to ensure that you are aware of the dangers lurking in the digital world. Educating oneself of the various ways in which your data can be compromised is a good way to protect your online self.

Because, let’s face it, for all practical purposes if you are online, your privacy is dead.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/first-post-march-16-nimish-sawant-nasscom-chief-saying-full-data-protection-isnt-possible-should-wake-us-from-our-digital-slumber

Mandatory Aadhaar card for govt scholarships violates SC order

praskrishna — 2016-07-30T15:55:38Z

There seems to be no end to the government’s legal troubles.

The article by Neelam Pandey and Aloke Tikku was published in the Hindustan Times on July 15, 2016. Sunil Abraham was quoted.

The human resource development (HRD) ministry has made Aadhaar mandatory for government scholarship and fellowship from this academic year, a move that violates the Supreme Court’s order.

Under this decision, the government will transfer the funds to the students’ bank accounts only after they submit their Aadhaar number.

The court had last August barred the government from using Aadhaar for any purpose other than distributing food grain and cooking fuel such as kerosene and LPG. The SC had gone further to rule that production of Aadhaar would not be condition for obtaining any benefits due to a citizen.

It was this SC order that prompted the government to push the Aadhaar law through Parliament to ensure that the court’s restriction did not come in the way of expanding the direct benefit transfer project.

The law – that was passed by Parliament – gave the government powers to make Aadhaar mandatory for receiving any benefit, facility or service that involved any expenditure from the public exchequer.

But most provisions of the Aadhaar law have not come into force yet.

This week, it notified provisions that enabled it to appoint the chairperson of the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) that issues the 12-digit unique number and set up offices in cities outside Delhi.

“This appears to be contempt of court,” said Sunil Abraham, head of the Bengaluru-headquartered advocacy group, Centre for Internet and Society.

Thomas Mathew, one of the petitioners in the case pending before the Supreme Court, agreed. “I am going to move a contempt petition against the HRD ministry and UGC,” Mathew said, pointing that oil companies were also forcing people to get Aadhaar.

The UGC directive to central universities sets July-end as the deadline for scholars at central universities to get their Aadhaar number. Many scholars who did not have an Aadhaar number said the fellowship were an important source of income for them to get by.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/hindustan-times-neelam-pandey-aloke-tikku-july-15-2016-mandatory-aadhaar-card-for-govt-scholarships-violates-sc-order

Making Aadhaar Mandatory: Gamechanger For Governance?

praskrishna — 2016-03-24T06:50:10Z

Why a programme that both the Congress and the BJP have hailed as transformational has divided Parliament this week? The Aadhaar Bill which was passed this week aims at facilitating government benefits and subsidies to citizens said Finance Minister Arun Jaitley.

Yet it became a reason for the Rajya Sabha to raise key questions. On the panel - Chandan Mitra, Rajya Sabha MP, BJP; Ajoy Kumar, Spokesperson, Congress; Tathagat Sathapathy, Lok Sabha MP, Biju Janata Dal; Rajeev Chandrashekhar, Rajya Sabha MP; Sunil Abraham, Executive Director, Centre for Internet & Society; and Shekhar Gupta, Senior Journalist.

Video

Link to NDTV website

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/ndtv-march-20-2016-making-aadhaar-mandatory-gamechanger-for-governance

Live Chat: Aadhaar: An identity crisis?

praskrishna — 2015-04-03T06:54:25Z

The Aadhaar card is not compulsory for citizens and "no person should be denied any benefits or ‘suffer’ for not having the Aadhaar cards issued by Unique Identification Authority of India," the Supreme Court ruled on Monday.

The live chat was published in the Hindu on March 17, 2015. Sunil Abraham took part in the discussions.

Four years after Aadhaar was launched – and touted as a panacea to access social services and subsidies – its users continue to be dogged by an array of problems ranging from technical glitches to procedural delays. And those who do not have an Aadhaar card find themselves quizzed by government authorities.

The Hindu’s Tamil Nadu edition today highlighted the challenges ordinary citizens - both those who have cards and those who do not – face, be it from non-availability of application forms or glitches in the biometrics process.

We will be hosting a live chat on Aadhaar at 5 pm today. You can pose questions and share your views with Sunil Abraham, Executive Director of Bangalore-based research organisation, Centre for Internet and Society; K. Gopinath, Professor at the Computer Science and Automation Department at the Indian Institute of Science (IISc) and The Hindu’s K. Venkatraman.

Comment From Anon

What could have happened such that the current government, who were once in the opposition, were members of the parliamentary committee that strongly opposed UIDAI, now suddenly wants to use it everywhere? What could have transpired such that the PM got so convinced that it would help its citizens more than it could potentially harm?

Sunil Abraham: Usually the party that is in power is pro-surveillance and anti-censorship and the opposition is pro-privacy and pro-free speech. After the elections - if the parties swap positions as a result of the mandate - then they usually also swap positions on surveillance and censorship. This phenomenon is not specific to India.

K. Gopinath: The leakage in the current models is very high. Hence, the attraction.

The issue earlier was whether there was some costs to the use of sw (esp. proprietary) from outside the country. Probably, these have been addressed.

Comment From Saurabh

Aadhaar was supposed to be a good 2 factor authentication mechanism, what happens to it now ?

Sunil Abraham: Aadhaar architecture was designed to allow for multiple authentication factors. Unfortunately biometrics is a poor authentication factor since it cannot be revoked. Any two-factor authentication scheme where one factor is biometrics is in reality only a one-factor scheme. Pin code as with credit cards and debit cards would have been much more secure for authentication.

K Venkataramanan: It will continue to be relevant, but is unlikely to be mandatory for quite some time.

K. Gopinath: Real-time 2-factor auth (biometrics, signatures) are not easy, esp over Internet, and would require a much longer rollout

Comment From Saurabh

I did not get Aadhar for myself or my family. Does this mean, I will not have to as yet.

Sunil Abraham: As per the UIDAI - Aadhaar is not mandatory. Also according to the latest remarks from the Supreme Court - Aadhaar should not be made mandatory without enabling law. But many state and central government agencies have ignored the comments made by the SC and have made Aadhaar mandatory for various programmes and schemes.

The Hindu: Is Aadhaar virtually redundant now following the SC order? Nothing more than an expensive experiment?

K. Gopinath: I think it will be used as an addl auth mechanism (just like elec./ph. receipts). May be once the technology is demo'ed properly (it has not been done seriously anywhere else), it will be taken up again.

Comment From Abubacker

I am an NRI and need to have Aadhaar Card? How to obtain Appointmet - I am from Tuticorin, Tamil Nadu

K Venkataramanan: Your family member or representative living in Tuticorin may apply for Aadhaar through the local body. It may be possible to get a date for recording biometrics. However, you have to come down here for recording biometric details.

Comment From Kishore J

Why is Govt. not able to legalize the Aadhar, I'm assuming the only reason Supreme court keeps blocking it is because its not a law passed by Parliament ?

K. Gopinath: SC goes by the constitution. If there is some concern someone is being "excluded", they will block it.

Sunil Abraham: The NIA bill was proposed in parliament and then referred to a Standing Committee. Our summary and detailed feedback to the Bill is available here: http://cis-india.org/intern... The Standing Committee harshly criticized the Bill. See: http://164.100.47.134/lsscommittee/Finance/42%20Report.pdf After which the Bill has not been reworked by the UIDAI or the Planning Commission /Niti Aayog for re-presentation to the Parliament.

Sunil Abraham: No - it is not just an expensive experiment. It is much more dangerous - it is what security experts call a Honey Pot. A centralized repository of biometrics harvested from residents of India. These biometrics can be used to authenticate transactions in the UIDAI database and other services. If there is a breach - then this huge collection of authentication factors will end us in the hands of criminal elements or some foreign state.

Comment From vaz

Aadhar is a joke, i have so many IDs and i cannot get any benefits out of it, it is simply wasting time, if Govt really want mandate make it easy for people, i pay taxes and Govt should treat me like one , i can not waste my time standing in queues to get that card, get me time slot and don't waste my time.

Sunil Abraham: This is because the process of registration has been outsourced to private agencies. These private agencies have futher outsourced to others and so on and so forth. Consequently, there is very poor management and quality control by these agencies. If indeed corruption was a priority - we should have tackled high-ticket corruption first. We could have had biometric registration just for only the politicians and bureaucrats. We could use biometric authentication with them to create a non-repudiable audit trail of subsidies flowing from the Centre to the Panchayat. Unfortunately, we tried to register everybody simultaneously and that has resulted in poor quality of biometrics and demographic data. We have visited some of the registration centre and have seen the reality on the ground.

Comment From Guest

I have been threatened by Gas Agency people if i don't link Aadhar to Bank Account, won't be given a refilling cylinder.Is this a right one?

K Venkataramanan: There is an option for getting DBT even without Aadhaar. The bank account and the gas agency consumer account can be linked without Aadhar. Please check www.mylpg.in for knowing how to apply for DBT registration without Aadhaar

The Hindu: Your views Prof Gopinath? Do you see it as a biometrics Honey Pot too?

K. Gopinath: From a security pov, it is certainly risky. It needs really robust technologies before one can think of rolling out. For example, we have "denial of service" attacks. ie, a service can be shut out by random bombardment of msgs. Most curr large scale systems are designed to handle it but some cannot handle it if large numbers collude. This only prevents access to service but other attacks can exfiltrate (take out) data, modify data, etc.

The Hindu: And Mr. Venkataramanan, your thoughts?

Comment From kuldeep singh chauhan

We need a strong law for data security. Aadhar is collecting data but there is no provision except some provisions of IT Act and IPC for data security.

K. Gopinath: Yes, the legislation is weak or unnecessarily vague (eg. the IT2000 act) or too broad in scope. I think what we need is a citizen's charter for data access, security and privacy. Also, what needs to be done when systems do not work!

Sunil Abraham: There are two interpretations of Sec. 43A of the IT Act. Acccording to most experts it only applies to Body Corporates in other words it does not apply to the Government when it plays the role of a data controller. According to an order issued by the IT Secy of Maharastra [the court of first instance for 43A of ITA] -this section will also apply to the Government. But beyond that order we have no clarity on this question.

Comment From Pavan

With no privacy laws, isn't it a bad idea to store citizen's data in a database? We all know how inept our government is in ensuring any security/privacy.

Sunil Abraham: With or without laws. Centralized approaches to identity/authentication management are much more fragile and vulnerable compared to decentralized options. The Internet is secured by digital signatures - there is no centralized repository of all these signatures. Therefore there is no centralized point of failure for the Internet. If the Aadhaar project was based on Smart Cards instead of Biometrics - then just like the Internet it would be robust without a central point of failure. http://cis-india.org/intern...

K. Gopinath: Storing all info in a single place is a big security risk. It needs very robust technologies (such as replication and "secret sharing protocols") that work inspite of failures. These have been done here and there but doing it on a large scale requires care.

Comment From Kunal Soni

SC Adhar card recommendations, ok Got it! But what about the banks for example SBI who ask for adhar cards stating its the bank's rule? Who's going to answer the question as they would never listen to common man and they never did.

Comment From Sandeep

Hi,May be it is a strong message, but what exactly is the need to make/introduce the Adhaar card, which is not recognizable worldwide? Why dont we make our passport smart enough and reduce it to a chip as in Europe. This will also enable everyone to get enrolled in our administrative system. Basically, we are only repeating the entire process with no international recognition.

Comment From Krishna Rao

Need to make it mandatory in the lines of SSN in US. Else it would be very difficult to manage and ensure the subsidies and benefits reach the really deserved section.

Comment From Ramesh

It is a great concept it all information like property purchases, tax returns, ration card, pf, esi, bank accounts , rail, air tickets are all linked. will reduce corrupt practice considerably. It should be the main identity of an Indian

Comment From arun

@Sunil what are the privacy safeguards that are in place currently regarding protection of information collected by the government and private agencies designated for this?

Sunil Abraham: Do you mean legal or technical?

K Venkataramanan: @The Hindu: Yes, there are serious privacy issues involved in a centralised database. However, their is a counter-view that this is no different from any other data base available in the hands of the government such as the one relating to PAN. The main concern of those worried about the privacy problem in Aadhaar is that data collection is done by private agencies, and details such as biometric data could be misused

The Hindu: Sunil, a question for you from arun

Comment From Pawan

Govt should give it legal recognition and give legal guarantee about the usage and storage of the data... After that there would be no concern related to identity security or enforcing it on the people.. People would trust it and come forward to register for it.

Sunil Abraham: Legal recognition and guarantees are not sufficient. You cannot use the law to fix poor technology design. The security of the Internet is not a function of good law. It is a function of good technological design.

Comment From Pappan

the so called Europe, US an other developed countries already have Social security numbers, why cant we just look at it like that?

Sunil Abraham: Social Security Number are an additional identifier. The database just contains a collection of identifiers. If that database is compromised the information cannot be used to authenticate transactions. This is very unlike the UIDAI centralized database which is a collection of authentication factors. Think of it as a database filled with the passwords of all Indian residents.

K Venkataramanan: @Kunal Soni - SBI can't insist on it as of now. The person who issued any circular to that effect may be hauled up in court

Comment From Guest

I have two questions. First, why is the honourable supreme court strking down aadhar, on what grounds? Second, how can the government come around those objections and allay the courts fears/objections? The informed panelists may please give their opinions too. Thank you

Sunil Abraham: There are 3 sets of petitioners who are being heard by the SC in the combined case. Some of them associated with the right are arguing that the UID is a threat to national security as it legitimizes illegal immigrants. Those associated with the left are arguing that it is a violation of the right to privacy. Still other who are ex-officers from the armed forces are arguing that the project is mired in corrupt practices.

K Venkataramanan: The Court has not struck down Aadhaar. It has only passed interim orders protecting the access to services of those who have not yet had them.

Comment From Aashish Gupta

Aadhaar was supposed to usher in portability of benefits. That is, you could migrate to a different state and still get the benefit you deserved.

Sunil Abraham: The Aadhaar database only contains information that identifies you and also allow you to authenticate against that database. It does not indicate eligibility for various schemes/subsidies. The migration across State level eligibility lists has to be done by the State. It is not a functionality provided by the UIDAI.

Comment From Ramesh

Supreme Court should have suggested a better option instead of coming down heavily on the Aadhar Card. The card will straight eliminate multiple rations cards and voter ids.

Sunil Abraham: The previous technology adopted by the NDA government - smart cards or SCOSTA [for the MNIC]. This technology option is free from many of the flaws of UIDAI's current design.

Comment From Mrigesh

Why is Aadhaar needed? I am for a middle class or for the elite class?

Comment From Geetha

Has the government (or concerned agencies/departments) formulated any policy on using the Aadhar information collected? For instance, what agency can use the information, under what conditions, with whose approval, for what limited purposes? Is this policy publicly available?

Sunil Abraham: No. Anyone who is approved by the UIDAI as a legitimate can use the KYC API. Absolutely anyone can use the Authentication API. There is no policy on what data collection/retention practices must be adhered to by the users of both these APIs.

Comment From Arun Jayapal

Has the government ever considered/analyzed a way to link the existing resources (such as ration card, DL, passport, voter id, etc.,) and not have come up with a completely new system (aadhaar). Is this not an absolute waste of time and resources?

Sunil Abraham: Yes, you are absolutely right. The government should have used biometrics as a means to dedup an existing high value database like the Electoral Rolls or more importantly the PAN Card database. That would have been better RoI for our anti-corruption Rupee.

K Venkataramanan: @Ramesh The Court has come down heavily on only officials who insist on Aadhar for delivery of services when there are clear orders that it should not be mandatory

Comment From George J

I'm an NRI. I presently work and live in a country where the first order of business on landing/Birth is to register one self and get a unique ID number and ID. This the case for expats as well as residents be they foreigners or Citizens. The registration process includes collection of Biometric data. This single No and Id is used for everything from Bank Accounts to School Admissions. It is good that India is doing something similar. It is high time people with multiple ration cards, Passports and the like are weeded out and provided a single verifiable identity. Data Security is of essence and necessary safeguards are available.

Sunil Abraham: Could you name the country? And can you use biometrics your country to authenticate transactions in a centralized database for all sorts of transactions? If yes, then the technology design in your country is as poor as in ours and it is only a question of time when the centralized database leaks.

Comment From Aashish Gupta

Apart from the Honey Pot, Aadhaar does not serve its primary purpose: tackling corruption. Most pilots of Aadhaar have crash landed, and as a result, state governments have created their own simpler systems to tackle corruption.

Sunil Abraham: See: http://www.thehindu.com/opi... If the authentication match is not working [1:1 match]. Then basically the dedup will not work [1:n] match. That is why they are doing demographic dedup before biometric dedup - because they know that the biometric dedup is fallible.

Comment From Balu

A citizenship card , backed with a strond database is a must for every citixen . Some serious thoughts should be done in this matter at the earliest , instead of wasting time and money on different schemes .

Sunil Abraham: We should use decentralized Internet scale technologies based on open standards that are already proven. If we had used smart cards based on SCOSTA or EMV standard we would be in a much better place.

Comment From PRASHANTH

Comment From vikash

supreme court should not have to push such legal hurdles given that the 750 million card has already been generated.A lot of money has been investad in the project

Comment From Saket

Aaadhar card is full of errors. At the place where I got registered person was issuing it in a hurry which creates lots of typing errors in DOB and Place.

Comment From Aashish Gupta

The supreme court has not struck down aadhaar, it has said that aadhaar cannot be mandatory. This is to make sure that people who do not have an aadhaar card do not miss out on their entitlements.

Comment From Ramesh

Aadhaar should be made mandatory with necessary safeguards. Unless there is an ultimatum and time frame to get the card it will never be implemented. Even now many do not know where to get it done.

Comment From Aadharam

Could you clarify whether this is an interim order or a final order on Aadhar? Is there scope for a retraction/shift on the Supreme Court's part?

Comment From Onkar Tiwari

Why supreme court doesnt understand Adhar is necessary? it can curb corruption. it wll reduce corruption specially in manrega where people enters fake details and grab the money.

K Venkataramanan: It is only an interim order. The Court will, hopefully, resolve the questions raised by the petitioners about privacy and data security issues

Comment From George J

I have taken Aadhar Card. The procedure asks the applicant themselves to verify the data entered for typing mistakes etc. before being uploaded, in fact where I registered they had asked for a sign off on the final data on a printout. So how errors can creep in is beyond me. However the photography equipment and skill of the data entry operator leave much to be desired as the mug shot is not very kind to me!

Comment From Guest

There should be a guide line which need to be followed as it is in the hands of private partners who are also ask for bribe from the poor people for the aadhar and they have no other option to pay for it as they thought that this only can help them to get the govt. facilities and subsidies.

K Venkataramanan: @Onkar Tiwari, It is up to the government to convince the court that Aadhaar will help curb corruption, and how. The Court is unlikely to stop the use of technology to improve delivery of services and curb corruption.

Comment From v subrahmanian

help line over phone and the email correspondence is total waste.. they themselves are helpless. Any query has never been replied to the caller's satisfaction. Getting them on line itself is a challenge. It's so complex. Of course, every eligible citizen of this complex country must have the identity card. Why not if it is done through employer in case of organized salaried employees?

Comment From Ramakrishna Rao

Hi !! I request the panelists to kindly sum up in few 4 or 5 points the reasons/grounds on which the parliamentary committee has rejected the aadhar

Comment From Guest

The agencies who are collecting data for Aadhar Card are not doing good. The aadhar card is full with many kind of errors including Name and DOB.. Even a person is able to register twice under this scheme.

The Hindu: Mr. Venkataramanan would you like to respond to Ramakrishna Rao?

Comment From Guest

@K Gopinath - how robust is the de-duplication UID claims to have. And in real time transactions, is it possible to authenticate n request without 'false positives' or 'negatives'?

K. Gopinath: Dedup claims assume “good” conditions. For example, a farmhand may have rough skin, etc that may make the fingerprints problematic. 1% errors have been reported in the past. Real time txns: I think the current Aadhar is not geared for it. The connectivity is not there. Also, with fingerprint technologies, the ability to check large number of fingerprints for a match is not good enough. It has never been scaled to the extent that is being planned.

Comment From Sandeep

Still not sure if Aadhaar then other ID cards not needed ? Or Still all along with Aadhaar ? then what is meaning of Aadhaar ? Only for LPG connection? Why not govt making Aadhaar is mandatory in all other fields as well , As Govt spent huge money for Aadhaar

Comment From Guest

@ Sunil - How plausible is the idea that govt can use UID data to profile public?

Comment From Sushubh

I for one is very happy that at least the Supreme Court is not falling for this privacy infringing scam. People defending this card here on this platform needs to read more about it.

Comment From Guest

Govt. created panic among public regarding adhaar. Public is highly annoyed with the way the government is handling this adhaar project. Only court reprimands,govt. backtracks as far as the adhaar is concerned. It is high time for govt. to have serious insight into this.

K Venkataramanan: The parliamentary committee on Finance had objected to the UID being extended to non-citizens on the ground that it may end up in illegal immigrants getting Aadhaar numbers.

It had also questioned the rollout ofthe scheme before legislation was passed. It had objected to its implementation without regard to its consequences.

Comment From Srinivasa

I believe Nandan Nilkeni had mentioned certain very good examples of the system flagging duplicates. So I assume the system is robust. We need to make it mandatory for all services delivery and have suitable policy and technology to protect data.

Sunil Abraham: I don't think we can go by the assurance of someone no longer associated with the project. It is not persons that keep us safe it is proper technology and law.

The Hindu: Welcome back Sunil! Lots of questions await you

K Venkataramanan: The committee had said UIDAI had no conceptual clarity, no proper assessment of the costs involved, and that it could end up in the hands of private agencies, that the technology was untested and the UID may not meet the objectives for which it was conceived

Sunil Abraham: Sorry I was logged out.

Comment From Guest

There was a recent news in The Hindu about linking of Adhar cards to election voter ID cards in Andhra Pradesh. Do you think that adopting such moves by every state result in mandating the procedure eventually?

Comment From Guest

First Passport then PAN , voter id and now adahar, in any country there is only passport and SSN, why india needs so many identity cards

K. Gopinath: The PAN database has been problematic just as the voter id. Hence, every technology cycle, a new system is usually attempted that attempts to be "better" than the before. However, this requires care which is not in good supply in the govt where the "lowest" bidder wins or outsourcing happens.

The Hindu: We have Prof Gopinatha back too. Sorry about that technical glitch.

Comment From Deepak Vasudevan

Why are different apex agencies managing Aadhar like UIDAI, Census and NPR? There should be one root (apex) body and others should report onto it.

Sunil Abraham: Yes. The division of work between UIDAI and NPR is not very clear and has added to the confusion.

K Venkataramanan: The parliamentary standing committee, too pointed out the overlap of functions involving UIDAI and NPR

The Hindu: There was this question for you earlier on the thread @K Gopinath - how robust is the de-duplication UID claims to have. And in real time transactions, is it possible to authenticate n request without 'false positives' or 'negatives'?

Comment From Guest

When Union Of India aimed to greater transparency... these are the road blocks they get... If Aadhar is not mandatory... then make Voter ID, PAN Card, Ration card also not mandatory in their respective Govt Businesses ... make self declaration as mandatory .. lets go to the stone age in this Information age. Instead SC should direct the center to come up with procedure to accommodate legitimate citizens of India into the scheme in a time bound manner and frame policies to avoid misuse of the personal data. are we looking the current world Information age thru the same old glasses... it is time to adopt the change...

Sunil Abraham: Indeed we need more transparency. But privacy protections must be inversely proportionate to power and as Julian Assange says transparency requirements should be directly proportionate to power See: http://openup2014.org/priva...

K Venkataramanan: Linking Aadhaar and voter ID cards is also being tried out in other states It is only one more means of eliminating fake voters or duplicates, but is unlikely tobe a ground to make Aadhaar mandatory

Comment From Ganesh

@Mr.Sunil, The current technology adopted for UIDAI is not good compared to last regime?

Sunil Abraham: Please see my our open letter on this question http://cis-india.org/intern...

Comment From Madhavan R

Just because UPA government bring this, its not good for NDA to object it.. STOP wasting our money.. Just try to make best out of it..

Sunil Abraham: Pouring more money into a failed project will not save it. It has serious technological flaw and without addressing it we are just making a bad situation worse.

Comment From George J

Currently all embassy's are collecting biometric data when you apply for a visa. Most of this collection is done by private parties on behalf of the respective governments. So if an Indian has travelled abroad the chances of his Biometric data being available to foreign govts is 99%. So what is the big scare about this? The need that it should be secure and should not be misused is sacrosanct. with the kind of revelations that have been made about mass eavesdropping I think people should get used to living in glass houses!

Comment From Pappan

@Sunil, please clarify about your comment on technology inadequecy

Comment From Yuvaraj

I strongly support Adhaar card implemenataion. intially they may face challeneges but for the long run its very effective mechanism to monitor every thing

Sunil Abraham: Monitoring everything means you monitor nothing. The bigger the haystack the harder it is to find the needle. Good surveillance practices means targetting survelliance not en masse data collection.

Comment From Guest

It is heard that privacy of citizens is at stake with adhaar card. can panelists respond to this?

Sunil Abraham: I have dealt with your question here: http://www.business-standar...

Comment From Srinivasa

That comparison of the two standards (SCOSTA and Aadhar) made interesting reading. Why not a system where you collect biometrics and iris and then issue a SCOSTA card? the biometrics and iris can be used to remove duplicates and maintain a clean registry by failing the duplicate SCOSTA cards. And all further transactions will only need a card based access.

Comment From Loganathan

This is one the worst move by any government in the center to remember. With no motive for the card, they introduced just to add to the loss in exchequer and there is no benefit out of it. Many have wrong data entered against their name and totally the waste one of all

Comment From Sabari Arasu

I am aware of someone who is not Indian citizen got Aadhar card for himself and his family. This scares me a lot as anyone(read Bangaladheshis, Sri Lankans, Pakintanis, etc..) can get Aadhar card. Is there a measure taken by Government to identify these issues?

Sunil Abraham: This is possible because the technology [biometrics] cannot verify citizenship. Even worse biometrics can be imported from foreign countries and can be used to create resident ghosts. This is because the technology cannot even verify if the person in India. We will need surveillance cameras at every point of registration to take care of this possible fraud.

Comment From Chandra Sekhar

Aadhaar card was a huge opportunity for the government to improve the efficiency of governance.It was a challenging task and required great amount accuracy.The way this project was executed is a question mark on efficiency of governance.

The Hindu: Sunil, Venkatramanan, Gopinath - would you agree that Aadhaar was an opportunity to improve governance? @chandra sekhar

Comment From Guest

Freebee lovers/netas will always oppose when you want to implement some thing which might deny them the benefit.

Sunil Abraham: Any evidence to backup this statement?

Comment From Guest

if the ASDHAAR is nt necessary as per SC then why everywhere it is being preferred identity such as Subsidy, Passport etc.

Sunil Abraham: Preference is not the same as a mandatory requirement.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-hindu-march-17-2015-aadhaar-an-identity-crisis

List of Recommendations on the Aadhaar Bill, 2016 - Letter Submitted to the Members of Parliament

Amber Sinha, Sumandro Chattapadhyay, Sunil Abraham, and Vanya Rakesh — 2016-03-21T08:50:09Z

On Friday, March 11, the Lok Sabha passed the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Bill, 2016. The Bill was introduced as a money bill and there was no public consultation to evaluate the provisions therein even though there are very serious ramifications for the Right to Privacy and the Right to Association and Assembly. Based on these concerns, and numerous others, we submitted an initial list of recommendations to the Members of Parliaments to highlight the aspects of the Bill that require immediate attention.

Download the submission letter: PDF.

Text of the Submission

On Friday, March 11, the Lok Sabha passed the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Bill, 2016. The Bill was introduced as a money bill and there was no public consultation to evaluate the provisions therein even though there are very serious ramifications for the Right to Privacy and the Right to Association and Assembly. The Bill has made it compulsory for all Indian to enroll for Aadhaar in order to receive any subsidy, benefit, or service from the Government whose expenditure is incurred from the Consolidate Fund of India. Apart from the issue of centralisation of the national biometric database leading to a deep national vulnerability, the Bill also keeps unaddressed two serious concerns regarding the technological framework concerned:

Identification without Consent: Before the Aadhaar project it was not possible for the Indian government or any private entity to identify citizens (and all residents) without their consent. But biometrics allow for non-consensual and covert identification and authentication. The only way to fix this is to change the technology configuration and architecture of the project. The law cannot be used to correct the problems in the technological design of the project.
Fallible Technology: The Biometrics Standards Committee of UIDAI has acknowledged the lack of data on how a biometric authentication technology will scale up where the population is about 1.2 billion. The technology has been tested and found feasible only for a population of 200 million. Further, a report by 4G Identity Solutions estimates that while in any population, approximately 5% of the people have unreadable fingerprints, in India it could lead to a failure to enroll up to 15% of the population. For the current Indian population of 1.2 billion the expected proportion of duplicates is 1/121, a ratio which is far too high. [1]

Based on these concerns, and numerous others, we sincerely request you to ensure that the Bill is rigorously discussed in Rajya Sabha, in public, and, if needed, also by a Parliamentary Standing Committee, before considering its approval and implementation. Towards this, we humbly submit an initial list of recommendations to highlight the aspects of the Bill that require immediate attention:

Implement the Recommendations of the Shah and Sinha Committees: The report by the Group of Experts on Privacy chaired by the Former Chief Justice A P Shah [2] and the report by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance (2011-2012) chaired by Shri Yashwant Sinha [3] have suggested a rigorous and extensive range of recommendations on the Aadhaar / UIDAI / NIAI project and the National Identification Authority of India Bill, 2010 from which the majority sections of the Aadhaar Bill, 2016, are drawn. We request that these recommendations are seriously considered and incorporated into the Aadhaar Bill, 2016.
Authentication using the Aadhaar number for receiving government subsidies, benefits, and services cannot be made mandatory: Section 7 of the Aadhaar Bill, 2016, states that authentication of the person using her/his Aadhaar number can be made mandatory for the purpose of disbursement of government subsidies, benefits, and services; and in case the person does not have an Aadhaar number, s/he will have to apply for Aadhaar enrolment. This sharply contradicts the claims made by UIDAI earlier that the Aadhaar number is “optional, and not mandatory”, and more importantly the directive given by the Supreme Court (via order dated August 11, 2015). The Bill must explicitly state that the Aadhaar number is only optional, and not mandatory, and a person without an Aadhaar number cannot be denied any democratic rights, and public subsidies, benefits, and services, and any private services.
Vulnerabilities in the Enrolment Process: The Bill does not address already documented issues in the enrolment process. In the absence of an exhaustive list of information to be collected, some Registrars are permitted to collect extra and unnecessary information. Also, storage of data for elongated periods with Enrollment agencies creates security risks. These vulnerabilities need to be prevented through specific provisions. It should also be mandated for all entities including the Enrolment Agencies, Registrars, CIDR and the requesting entities to shift to secure system like PKI based cryptography to ensure secure method of data transfer.
Precisely Define and Provide Legal Framework for Collection and Sharing of Biometric Data of Citizens: The Bill defines “biometric information” is defined to include within its scope “photograph, fingerprint, iris scan, or other such biological attributes of an individual.” This definition gives broad and sweeping discretionary power to the UIDAI / Central Government to increase the scope of the term. The definition should be exhaustive in its scope so that a legislative act is required to modify it in any way.
Prohibit Central Storage of Biometrics Data: The presence of central storage of sensitive personal information of all residents in one place creates a grave security risk. Even with the most enhanced security measures in place, the quantum of damage in case of a breach is extremely high. Therefore, storage of biometrics must be allowed only on the smart cards that are issued to the residents.
Chain of Trust Model and Audit Trail: As one of the objects of the legislation is to provide targeted services to beneficiaries and reduce corruption, there should be more accountability measures in place. A chain of trust model must be incorporated in the process of enrolment where individuals and organisations vouch for individuals so that when a ghost is introduced someone has can be held accountable blame is not placed simply on the technology. This is especially important in light of the questions already raised about the deduplication technology. Further, there should be a transparent audit trail made available that allows public access to use of Aadhaar for combating corruption in the supply chain.
Rights of Residents: There should be specific provisions dealing with cases where an individual is not issued an Aadhaar number or denied access to benefits due to any other factor. Additionally, the Bill should make provisions for residents to access and correct information collected from them, to be notified of data breaches and legal access to information by the Government or its agencies, as matter of right. Further, along with the obligations in Section 8, it should also be mandatory for all requesting entities to notify the individuals of any changes in privacy policy, and providing a mechanism to opt-out.
Establish Appropriate Oversight Mechanisms: Section 33 currently specifies a procedure for oversight by a committee, however, there are no substantive provisions laid down that shall act as the guiding principles for such oversight mechanisms. The provision should include data minimisation, and “necessity and proportionality” principles as guiding principles for any exceptions to Section 29.
Establish Grievance Redressal and Review Mechanisms: Currently, there are no grievance redressal mechanism created under the Bill. The power to set up such a mechanism is delegated to the UIDAI under Section 23 (2) (s) of the Bill. However, making the entity administering a project, also responsible for providing for the frameworks to address the grievances arising from the project, severely compromises the independence of the grievance redressal body. An independent national grievance redressal body with state and district level bodies under it, should be set up. Further, the NIAI Bill, 2010, provided for establishing an Identity Review Committee to monitor the usage pattern of Aadhaar numbers. This has been removed in the Aadhaar Bill 2016, and must be restored.

Endnotes

[1] See: http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/Flaws_in_the_UIDAI_Process_0.pdf.

[2] See: http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/genrep/rep_privacy.pdf.

[3] See: http://164.100.47.134/lsscommittee/Finance/15_Finance_42.pdf.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/list-of-recommendations-on-the-aadhaar-bill-2016

Linking Aadhaar with social media or ending encryption is counterproductive

sunil — 2019-08-28T01:39:47Z

Should Aadhaar be used as KYC for social media accounts? We have recently seen a debate on this question with even the courts hearing arguments in favour and against such a move.

The article was published in Prime Time on August 26, 2019.

The case began in Madras High Court and later Facebook moved the SC seeking transfer of the petition to the Apex court. The original petition was filed in July, 2018 and sought linking of Aadhaar numbers with user accounts to further traceability of messages.

Before we try and answer this question, we need to first understand the differences between the different types of data on social media and messaging platforms. If a crime happens on an end to end cryptographically secure channel like WhatsApp the police may request the following from the provider to help solve the case:

Identity data: Phone numbers of the accused. Names and addresses of the accused.
Metadata: Sender, receiver(s), time, size of message, flag identifying a forwarded messages, delivery status, read status, etc.
Payload Data: Actual content of the text and multimedia messages.

Different countries have taken different approaches to solving different layers of the surveillance problem. Let us start with identity data. Some like India require KYC for sale of SIM cards while others like the UK allow anonymous purchases. Corporations also have policies when it comes to anonymous speech on their platforms – Facebook for instance enforces a soft real ID policy while Twitter does not crack down on anonymous speech. The trouble with KYC the old fashioned way is that it exposes citizens to further risk. Every possessor of your identity documents is a potential attack surface. Indian regulation should not result in Indian identity documents being available in the millions to foreign corporations. Technical innovations are possible, like tokenisation, Aadhaar paperless local e-KYC or Aadhaar offline QR code along with one time passwords. These privacy protective alternatives must be mandatory for all and the Aadhaar numbers must be deleted from previously seeded databases. Countries that don’t require KYC have an alternative approach to security and law enforcement. They know that if someone like me commits a crime, it would be easy to catch me because I have been using the same telecom provider for the last fifteen years. This is true of long term customers regardless if they are pre-paid or post-paid. The security risk lies in the new numbers without this history that confirms identity. These countries use targeted big data analytics to determine risk and direct surveillance operations to target new SIM cards. My current understanding is that when it comes to basic user data – all the internet giants in India comply with what they consider as legitimate law enforcement requests. Some proprietary and free and open source [FOSS] alternatives to services offered by the giants don’t provide such direct cooperation in India.

When it comes to payload data – it is almost impossible (meaning you will need supercomputers) to access the data unless the service/software provider breaks end-to-end cryptography. It is unwise, like some policy-makers are proposing, to prohibit end-to-end cryptography or mandate back doors because our national sovereignty and our capacity for technological self-determination depends on strong cryptography. A targeted ban or prohibition against proprietary providers might have a counterproductive consequence with users migrating to FOSS alternatives like Signal which won’t even give the police identity data. As a supporter of the free software movement, I would see this as a positive development but as a citizen I am aware that the fight against crime and terror will become harder. So government must pursue other strategies to getting payload data such as a comprehensive government hacking programme.

Meta-data is critical when it comes to separating the guilty from the innocent and apportioning blame during an investigation. For example, who was the originator of a message? Who got it and read it last? WhatsApp claims that it has implemented the Signal protocol faithfully meaning that they hold no meta-data when it comes to the messages and calls. Currently there is no regulation which mandates data retention for over the top providers but such requirements do exist for telecom providers. Just like access to meta-data provides some visibility into illegal activities it also provides visibility into legal activities. Therefore those using end-to-end cryptography on platforms with comprehensive meta-data retention policies will have their privacy compromised even though the payload data remains secure. Here is a parallel example to understand why this is important. Early last year, the Internet Engineering Task Force chose a version of TLS 1.3 that revealed less meta-data over one that provided greater visibility into the communications. This hardening of global open standards, through the elimination of availability of meta-data for middle-boxes, makes it harder for foreign governments to intercept Indian military and diplomatic communications via imported telecom infrastructure. Courts and policy makers across the world have to grapple with the following question: Are meta-data retention mandates for the entire population of users a “necessary and proportionate” legal measure to combat crime and terror. For me, it should not be illegal for a provider who voluntarily wishes to retain data, provided it is within legally sanctioned limits but it should not be requirement under law.

There are technical solutions that are yet to be properly discussed and developed as an alternative to blanket meta-data retention measures. For example, Dr. V Kamakoti has made a traceability proposal at the Madras High Court. This proposal has been critiqued by Anand Venkatanarayanan as being violative in spirit of the principles of end-to-end cryptography. Other technical solutions are required for those seeking justice and for those who wish to serve as informers for terror plots. I have proposed client side metadata retention. If a person who has been subjected to financial fraud wishes to provide all the evidence from their client, it should be possible for them to create a digital signed archive of messages for the police. This could be signed by the sender, the provider and also the receiver so that technical non-repudiation raises the evidentiary quality of the digital evidence. However, there may be other legal requirements such as the provision of notice to the sender so that they know that client side data retention has been turned on.

The need of the hour is sustained research and development of privacy protecting surveillance mechanisms. These solutions need to be debated thoroughly amongst mathematicians, cryptographers, scientists, technologists, lawyers, social scientists and designers so that solutions with the least negative impact can be rolled out either voluntarily by providers or as a result of regulation.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/prime-time-august-26-2019-sunil-abraham-linking-aadhaar-with-social-media-or-ending-encryption-is-counterproductive

It’s the technology, stupid

sunil — 2017-04-07T12:53:21Z

Eleven reasons why the Aadhaar is not just non-smart but also insecure.

The article was published in Hindu Businessline on March 31, 2017.

Aadhaar is insecure because it is based on biometrics. Biometrics is surveillance technology, a necessity for any State. However, surveillance is much like salt in cooking: essential in tiny quantities, but counterproductive even if slightly in excess. Biometrics should be used for targeted surveillance, but this technology should not be used in e-governance for the following reasons:

One, biometrics is becoming a remote technology. High-resolution cameras allow malicious actors to steal fingerprints and iris images from unsuspecting people. In a couple of years, governments will be able to identify citizens more accurately in a crowd with iris recognition than the current generation of facial recognition technology.

Two, biometrics is covert technology. Thanks to sophisticated remote sensors, biometrics can be harvested without the knowledge of the citizen. This increases effectiveness from a surveillance perspective, but diminishes it from an e-governance perspective.

Three, biometrics is non-consensual technology. There is a big difference between the State identifying citizens and citizens identifying themselves to the state. With biometrics, the State can identify citizens without seeking their consent. With a smart card, the citizen has to allow the State to identify them. Once you discard your smart card the State cannot easily identify you, but you cannot discard your biometrics.

Four, biometrics is very similar to symmetric cryptography. Modern cryptography is asymmetric. Where there is both a public and a private key, the user always has the private key, which is never in transit and, therefore, intermediaries cannot intercept it. Biometrics, on the other hand, needs to be secured during transit. The UIDAI’s (Unique Identification Authority of India overseeing the rollout of Aadhaar) current fix for its erroneous choice of technology is the use of “registered devices”; but, unfortunately, the encryption is only at the software layer and cannot prevent hardware interception.

Five, biometrics requires a centralised network; in contrast, cryptography for smart cards does not require a centralised store for all private keys. All centralised stores are honey pots — targeted by criminals, foreign States and terrorists.

Six, biometrics is irrevocable. Once compromised, it cannot be secured again. Smart cards are based on asymmetric cryptography, which even the UIDAI uses to secure its servers from attacks. If cryptography is good for the State, then surely it is good for the citizen too.

Seven, biometrics is based on probability. Cryptography in smart cards, on the other hand, allows for exact matching. Every biometric device comes with ratios for false positives and false negatives. These ratios are determined in near-perfect lab conditions. Going by press reports and even UIDAI’s claims, the field reality is unsurprisingly different from the lab. Imagine going to an ATM and not being sure if your debit card will match your bank’s records.

Eight, biometric technology is proprietary and opaque. You cannot independently audit the proprietary technology used by the UIDAI for effectiveness and security. On the other hand, open smart card standards like SCOSTA (Smart Card Operating System for Transport Applications) are based on globally accepted cryptographic standards and allow researchers, scientists and mathematicians to independently confirm the claims of the government.

Nine, biometrics is cheap and easy to defeat. Any Indian citizen, even children, can make gummy fingers at home using Fevicol and wax. You can buy fingerprint lifting kits from a toystore. To clone a smart card, on the other hand, you need a skimmer, a printer and knowledge of cryptography.

Ten, biometrics undermines human dignity. In many media photographs — even on the @UIDAI’s Twitter stream — you can see the biometric device operator pressing the applicant’s fingers, especially in the case of underprivileged citizens, against the reader. Imagine service providers — say, a shopkeeper or a restaurant waiter — having to touch you every time you want to pay. Smart cards offer a more dignified user experience.

Eleven, biometrics enables the shirking of responsibility, while cryptography requires a chain of trust.

Each legitimate transaction has repudiable signatures of all parties responsible. With biometrics, the buck will be passed to an inscrutable black box every time things go wrong. The citizens or courts will have nobody to hold to account.

The precursor to Aadhaar was called MNIC (Multipurpose National Identification Card). Initiated by the NDA government headed by Atal Bihari Vajpayee, it was based on the open SCOSTA standard. This was the correct technological choice.

Unfortunately, the promoters of Aadhaar chose biometrics in their belief that newer, costlier and complex technology is superior to an older, cheaper and simpler alternative.

This erroneous technological choice is not a glitch or teething problem that can be dealt with legislative fixes such as an improved Aadhaar Act or an omnibus Privacy Act. It can only be fixed by destroying the centralised biometric database, like the UK did, and shifting to smart cards.

In other words, you cannot fix using the law what you have broken using technology.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-hindu-businessline-march-31-2017-sunil-abraham-its-the-technology-stupid

iSpirt's Sharad Sharma: Sorry, I trolled Aadhaar critics

praskrishna — 2017-05-26T00:13:38Z

Sharad Sharma, the man who is seen as one of the critical backbones of India's digital drive, profusely apologized on Tuesday for anonymously trolling those arguing for better privacy and security standards in Aadhaar.

The article by Shalina Pillai and Anand J was published in the Times of India on May 24, 2017.

The apology came a few days after Kiran Jonnalagadda, co-founder of developer community platform HasGeek and one of those who were at the receiving end of the trolling, used internet tools to discover the faces behind the trolling.

The trolls allegedly included several other members of iSpirt, the software product association co-founded by Sharma and which leads IndiaStack, a set of technologies that can be used to digitise many everyday processes used by common people. The issue has divided India's nascent startup community like never before, and coming soon after the division over the arrest of Stayzilla co-founder Yogendra Vasupal, there are many who now worry for the ecosystem.This may also explain the apology by Sharma, who has been at the forefront of building this ecosystem.

In the apology mail that he tweeted, Sharma said: "There was a lapse of judgment on my part. I condoned tweets with uncivil comments. So I would like to unreservedly apologise to everybody who was hurt by them. Anonymity seemed easier than propriety, and tired as I was by personal events and attack on iSpirt's reputation, I slipped. I won't be part of anything like this again nor passively allow such behaviour to happen, even in the worst of times."

Nandan Nilekani tweeted in response to Sharma's apology that it was brave of him to do so. Several others in iSpirt also backed Sharma after the public apology . There was a surge of tweets in response to Sharma's and Nilekani's tweets, some welcoming the turn of events and others saying it wasn't enough. Jonnalagadda is among those who are not satisfied. "There were several individuals at iSpirt behind these trolls and Sharma's apology is not enough," he told TOI.

Aadhaar, aggressively pushed by the government, is being fiercely questioned by privacy and security advocates. Though most of these activists say they are asking for implementation of safeguards, the Twitter hashtags used by some of them include #antiaadhaar, #destroyaadhaar and #attackaadhaar, which seem to suggest they are entirely opposed to the authentication mechanism.

Both sides have used intemperate and often abusive language on social media -many using anonymous names. The latest flashpoint was a report by the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) released earlier this month that said some 135 million Aadhaar numbers were leaked through government databases. There have also been accusations that private companies that verify Aadhaar credentials often get access to the full Aadhaar information of individuals. These provoked the proAadhaar trolls. Jonnalagadda, Nikhil Pahwa, co-founder of the Internet Freedom Foundation, which works on issues including net neutrality, and free expression and privacy on the internet, and Sunil Abraham of CIS were under particular attack.

Some of the iSpirt fellows and volunteers TOI spoke to had little remorse. "I am not saying iSpirt should have done what it did. But I can imagine why iSpirt reacted like this as we all have been under constant personal attack for a year now," said an iSpirt fellow, who did not want to be identified. Jas Gulati, co-founder and CEO at Nowfloats and a volunteer at iSprit, said iSpirt was an open organisation. "Sharad was upfront about it and I think it's very positive."

The Aadhaar privacy advocates, including Jonnalagadda and Pahwa, are clear they value iSpirt, but say it was undermining itself by its actions. One pointed to a February meeting of iSpirt where they created a programme called Sudham that distributed prominent Aadhaar critiques into four quadrants -`Misinformed, fearful and engaging', `Informed, fearful and engaging', `Misinformed and trolling' and `Informed and trolling' -and assigned different members to deal with each quadrant. Some of those who were assigned responsibilities appear to have taken their job too seriously .

Pahwa told TOI, "The work done by the Product Nation initiative at iSpirt is what makes it an important organization. But when people raise questions of IndiaStack and Aadhaar, many in that team respond with venom. iSpirt is unique, in that it is a thinktank that plays the role of an activist and lobbyist with a high degree of influence with the government and so they must develop processes for better governance, transparency and accountability ."

Anand Venkatanarayanan, a senior engineer at NetApp and independent Aadhaar researcher, said iSpirt should not be judged based on what Sharma did. "What we are trying to do is strengthen the Aadhaar system. Currently, they do not even have a process to report bugs. Large companies all have SOPs (standard operating procedures) to deal with issues. UIDAI does not," he said, noting that his views are personal and not that of his employer's.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-times-of-india-may-24-2017-shalina-pillai-anand-j-ispirts-sharad-sharma-sorry-i-trolled-aadhaar-critics

Is your personal information under lock and key?

Admin — 2018-01-16T16:54:33Z

Customers, be more careful about how you log in and log off!

The article by Sravanthi Challapalli was published by Hindu Businessline on January 16, 2018.

We’re coming off a year that was highlighted by several data breaches around the world. In India, the Aadhaar debate continues to make headlines, with allegations about its data theft and Big Brother potential for surveillance. And for quite a while now, the marketing world has been suffused with mention of artificial intelligence, chatbots, big data, data-driven analytics, and other such buzzwords. The ultimate, stated aim is to make life simpler for the citizen/customer. But how secure is our data, which we put out there both voluntarily and by mandate, and what can we do to protect it?

Laziness will hurt

A study by security services provider Gemalto found that retailers (76 per cent), banks (74 per cent) and social media sites (71 per cent) operating in India have a lot of work to do on this front. Consumers would leave if their personal information suffered a breach, it said. Even as the majority of customers said businesses don’t treat their data with due respect, they did not take enough precautions themselves, it observed. Fifty-one per cent of the study’s respondents used the same password across several online accounts and many did not use even available solutions such as two-factor authentication to protect social media accounts, making them susceptible to data breaches. They also believed the onus of protecting data lay on the business.

Caveats of little help

The Government has set up a committee of experts headed by Justice BN Srikrishna to look into the issue, invite comments and propose a draft law. The objective is to “ensure growth of the digital economy while keeping personal data of citizens secure and protected.” As of now, there is no law that exclusively deals with data protection though there are some provisions in the Information Technology Act of 2011.

So, caveat emptor? “Caveat emptor has meaning only when the customer has enough knowledge to protect himself,” says Sunil Abraham, Executive Director of the Bangalore-based Centre for Internet and Society. Using the sausage factory analogy (no one knew what went into the products and how clean they were), he says few know how big data is used. Regulation can help in this regard. He expects India to have data protection rules in place in a couple of years.
The Government has set up a committee of experts headed by Justice BN Srikrishna to look into the issue, invite comments and propose a draft law. The objective is to “ensure growth of the digital economy while keeping personal data of citizens secure and protected.” As of now, there is no law that exclusively deals with data protection though there are some provisions in the Information Technology Act of 2011.

Efficiency all round

ICICI Prudential Life Insurance Executive Director Puneet Nanda says digital data storage has catalysed efficiency on several fronts. “Technology helps us swiftly identify the nominee and facilitates faster payouts as compared to the times when the information was stored physically. It has improved turnaround times and enabled delivery of superior service leading to higher customer satisfaction. Corporations can provide customers instant gratification. Today, we can issue a policy in minutes. Proliferation of technology has enabled corporations to identify customer needs and make offers best suited to their requirements.”

CIS will offer comments to the Srikrishna Committee. Abraham says such laws in other countries define what personal information is, establish the office of the regulator, have powers to receive and investigate complaints and ensure marketers fall in line. Regulators have punitive powers as well. In 2014, telecom major Verizon had to pay $7.4 million in the US to settle a Federal Communications Commission complaint about advertising to customers without letting them know they had an opt-out option. The privacy conditions one routinely “agrees” to online does not give the data controller a free ticket to do what they want with the information, he says.

Not much one can do

Abraham says there is very little the customer can do, other than “acts of civil disobedience, tell lies, fill out false information” when there’s little protection. Rana Gupta, Vice President – APAC, Identity and Data Protection, Gemalto, says one is not left with many choices in an increasingly digital world, not to mention the social pressure. Imagine asking for time off from work to withdraw some cash from your bank because you are suspicious of ATMs? “Users have to rely on organisations doing the right thing,” he says. Regulation making data encryption and second-factor authentication mandatory will help. Customers have begun to ask how data is being secured, and whether it is encrypted. Addressing such concerns would help businesses such as e-commerce and banks, which are increasingly dependent on an online presence.

Even though they’re painful to remember and key in, long passwords that include a capital letter, a special character and a number are deterrents to misuse, as are one-time passwords and messages that alert/ confirm users logging in to an account or transacting a deal. Rohan Bhargava, Co-founder of cashback and coupons site CashKaro.com, says businesses have to design the best methods to thwart the worst intentions. “Companies are vulnerable when they take short cuts at basic processes.”

Bhargava says his company prefers to build most of the technical products it needs, itself, rather than resort to third-party builders/providers. Marketers, he says, experiment with a lot of untested products and the scripts they use can be the root of the problem.

Checks and balances at every stage, running security reviews whenever something changes, effectively managing the life cycle of the encryption keys and limiting access to customer data are vital. The responsibility for securing data lies with both customer and marketer but the latter’s is the larger responsibility as it is they who implement and have the infrastructure that the user does not, says Gemalto’s Gupta.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/hindu-businessline-january-16-2018-sravanthi-challapalli-is-your-personal-information-under-lock-and-key

Is Your Aadhar Biometrics Safe? Firms Accused Of Storing Biometrics And Using Them Illegally

praskrishna — 2017-02-27T01:56:28Z

Fears of Aadhar biometric security have been compounded as the government is sprinting towards the next phase of ‘cashless India’ and digitization

Pranesh Prakash and Sunil Abraham have been quoted in this article published by Outlook on February 24, 2017.

The biggest fear regarding misuse of Aadhar biometrics and security loopholes are becoming real.

Three firms are being probed for attempting unauthorised authentication and impersonation by using stored Aadhaar biometrics, reported The Times of India.

The paper reported that the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) has lodged a criminal complaint with the cyber cell of Delhi Police, saying it is a clear violation of the law.

“The firms are Axis Bank, Suvidhaa Infoserve and eMudhra. They have been served a “notice for action“ under Aadhaar regulations”.

The firms have been accused of storing biometrics and using them illegally.

The fears of biometric security have been compounded as the government is sprinting towards the next phase of ‘cashless India’ and digitization. They are preparing to launch Aadhaar Pay, an initiative that will supersede the need to use credit cards, debit cards, smartphones and PINs to make payments or transfer money.

The proposed system of payments will use a person’s biometric data and fingerprints to make payments through Aadhaar-linked bank accounts.

Outlook’s Senior Associate Editor Arindam Mukherjee had in a clairvoyant article for the magazine raised the fears of biometrics being manipulated.

In the article, critics of Aadhaar and Aadhaar-based services raised the issue of privacy and security of biometric and personal data.

Pranesh Prakash, policy director with the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), recently tweeted, “As long as Aadhar-Enabled Payment Services encourages biometric authorisation of transactions, it is bound to be a security nightmare, with widespread fraud.” Would you tell a shopkeeper your debit card’s PIN? No. Then why share your fingerprint? A fingerprint, in this system, becomes a kind of unchangeable Aadhaar Enabled Payment System PIN, he asks.

Pointing out a possible danger, Usha Ramanathan, an independent law researcher who has been following Aadhaar since its inception, says, “In many payments, biometric data is authenticated and then it remains in the system where there are leakages. Intermediaries then have access to the data, which is thus made insecure.”

According to the UIDAI, however, once biometric data is provided by the consumer while making Aadhaar-based payments, it gets encrypted and a merchant doesn’t get access to that data. The Aadhaar Act also prohibits any storing of biometric data in local devices.

And yet, there are many like CIS executive director Sunil Abraham who believe it is a mistake to use biometrics for authentication, especially when payments are concerned.

“Our concern with Aadhaar Pay is about the biometric component of the project,” says Abraham. “Biometrics is an identification technology. Unfortunately, it is being presented as an authentication technology. It is not a secure authentication technology as biometric data can be stolen easily. It is also irrevocable; once biometric data is stolen, it cannot be re-issued like a smart card.”

Then there is the problem of availability of fingerprints. In the case of many people from rural areas and the working class, fingerprints get affected due to the manual nature of their work. This makes it difficult for this target group of UIDAI to conduct transactions properly through Aadhaar Pay. “In Rajasthan, 30 per cent of the households are not even able to procure ration using fingerprints,” says Ramanathan.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/outlook-february-24-2017-is-your-aadhar-biometrics-safe-firms-accused-of-storing-biometrics-and-using-them-illegally

Is Aadhaar Essential To Achieve Error-Free Electoral Rolls?

praskrishna — 2018-12-25T01:21:45Z

The Election Commission’s plans to link Aadhaar with electoral rolls may have stirred a hornet’s nest.

The article was published in Bloomberg's Quint on December 16, 2018. Pranesh Prakash was quoted.

The commission plans to undertake the exercise to clean up electoral rolls—which need to be updated frequently to avoid duplication and errors, The Economic Times newspaper reported citing people aware of the matter. But with privacy concerns raised against the Aadhaar, is this the best way to achieve error-free voter data?

Pranesh Prakash, policy director at the Centre for Internet and Society, doesn’t think so. Using Aadhaar data without the consent of the user poses legal problems, he told BloombergQuint in a conversation. “For the Election Commission to link Aadhaar with citizens’ voter ID would require amending the law.”

It is questionable whether this will fall within the bounds that the SC has set for usage of Aadhaar.

Pranesh Prakash, Policy Director, Centre for Internet and Society

The former legal advisor of the Election Commission SK Mendiratta, however, brushed aside privacy concerns relating to the process. The Election Commission, according to him, is a constitutional body and can use information with the government to ensure purity of the electoral roll.

Reetika Khera, associate professor at Indian Institute of Management-Ahmedabad, said this could be bad for voters. She cited the mass deletion of voters from electoral rolls in Telangana ahead of the recent elections, and urged that due process must be followed.

There are serious problems with the use of algorithmic approaches in various spheres. Aadhaar as a tool to clean up the electoral rolls is the problem.

Reetika Khera, Associate Professor, IIM Ahmedabad

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/bloomberg-quint-december-16-2018-is-aadhaar-essential-to-achieve-error-free-electoral-rolls

Intelligence agencies will not have open access to Aadhaar data: UIDAI chief

praskrishna — 2016-10-21T01:32:56Z

Intelligence agencies will not have free access to Aadhaar data, a top government official said on Thursday, looking to assuage fears of abuse of personal information.

The article by Aloke Tikku was published in the Hindustan Times on October 20, 2016. Sunil Abraham was quoted.

The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI), which issued identity cards to 1.07 billion Indians, last month decided to retain data related to the verification of Aadhaar-enabled transactions for seven years, leading to security concerns over data safety.

As reported by HT on Monday, privacy experts expressed concerns that transaction data retained for so long could be accessed by the security establishment for surveillance on individuals without sufficient grounds.

“This fear is completely misplaced,” ABP Pandey, UIDAI’s chief executive officer told HT in an interview.

Security agencies can access the data only in case of national security after they get the nod of an oversight committee headed by the cabinet secretary. This committee has to clear every order made by the designated joint secretary-level officer before the information is shared, he said.

“You cannot have any legal protection stronger than this,” Pandey added.

Aadhaar transaction data is not only protected by the most powerful, contemporary law to restrict access but also by strong cryptography.

“Even if someone attempts, the 2048-bit encryption is so strong that it will take them millions of computers and billions of years to decrypt the data,” he said.

A vocal critic of Aadhaar’s design, Sunil Abraham of the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) suggested he wouldn’t rely too much on the legal framework. “You cannot put a legal band-aid on a broken technological solution. You need to get privacy and security right by design,” the director of the Bengaluru-based research body said.

Abraham said the problem could have been averted if the UIDAI did not store the data in a centralised form. Instead, it could have used its digital signature to sign proof of authentication that could be stored by the authenticating agency and the citizen on a smart card.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/hindustan-times-aloke-tikku-october-20-2016-intelligence-agencies-will-not-have-open-access-to-aadhaar-data

Indian Cricket Board Exposes Personal Data of Thousands of Players

Admin — 2018-05-18T05:01:50Z

The IT security researchers at Kromtech Security Center discovered a trove of personal and sensitive data belonging to around 15,000 to 20,000 Indian applicants participating in cricket seasons 2015-2018.

The blog post was published on Hack Read on May 15, 2018.

The authority responsible for protecting this data was The Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) but it was left exposed to the public in two misconfigured AWS (Amazon Web Service) S3 cloud storage buckets.

According to the analysis from Kromtech researchers, the data was divided into different categories of players including those under 19 years old. The data was accessible to anyone with an Internet connection and basic knowledge of using AWS cloud storage.

The data was discovered earlier this month and included names, date of birth, place of birth, permanent addresses, email IDs, proficiency details, medical records, birth certificate number, passport number, SSC certificate number, PAN card number, mobile number, landline and phone number of the person who can be contacted in case of emergency.

Screenshot of one of the files that were exposed (Image credit: Kromtech)

At the time of publishing this article, the BCCI was informed by Kromtech researchers and both misconfigured buckets were secured. However, this is not the first time when such sensitive information was leaked online. In 2017, Bangalore-based Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) found that names, addresses, date of birth, PAN card details, Aadhaar card numbers and other relevant details of millions of Indian citizen could be found with just a simple Google search.

On the other hand, lately, AWS buckets have been making headlines for the wrong reasons. Until now, there have been tons of cases in which misconfigured AWS buckets have been found carrying highly sensitive and confidential data such as classified NSA documents or details about US Military’s social media spying campaign.

In two such cases, malicious hackers were able to compromise AWS buckets belonging to Tesla Motors and LA Times to secretly mine cryptocurrency. Therefore, if you are an AWS user make sure your cloud server is properly secured.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/hack-read-waqas-may-15-2018-indian-cricket-board-exposes-personal-data-of-thousands-of-players

India’s Supreme Court hears challenge to biometric authentication system

praskrishna — 2017-05-20T06:44:02Z

Two lawsuits being heard this week before India’s Supreme Court question a requirement imposed by the government that individuals should quote a biometrics-based authentication number when filing their tax returns.

The post by John Riberio, IDG News Service was mirrored by IT World on May 3, 2017.

Civil rights groups have opposed the Aadhaar biometric system, which is based on centralized records of all ten fingerprints and iris scans, as their extensive use allegedly encroach on the privacy rights of Indians. “Aadhaar is surveillance technology masquerading as secure authentication technology,” said Sunil Abraham, executive director of Bangalore-based research organization, the Centre for Internet and Society.

The Indian government has in the meantime extended the use of Aadhaar, originally meant to identify beneficiaries of state schemes for the poor, to other areas such as filing of taxes, distribution of meals to school children and payment systems.

Hearings on the writ petitions, challenging the amendment to the Income Tax Act, are going on in Delhi before a Supreme Court bench consisting of Justices A.K. Sikri and Ashok Bhushan.

Tax payers are required to have the Aadhaar number in addition to their permanent account number (PAN), which they have previously used to file their tax returns. Their failure to produce the Aadhaar number would lead to invalidation of the PAN number, affecting people who are already required to quote this number for other transactions such as buying cars or opening bank accounts.

The stakes in this dispute are high. The petitioners have argued for Aadhaar being voluntary and question the manner in which the new amendment to the tax law has been introduced. The government has said both in court and in other public forums that it needs a reliable and mandatory biometric system to get around the issue of fake PAN numbers.

The lawyer for one of the plaintiffs, Shyam Divan, has argued for the individual’s absolute ownership of her body, citing Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, which protects a person from being “deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.” The government has countered by saying that citizens do not have absolute rights over their bodies, citing the law against an individual committing suicide as an example.

The Supreme Court in another lawsuit looking into privacy issues and the constitutionality of the Aadhaar scheme had ruled in an interim order in 2015 that the biometric program had to be voluntary and could not be used to deprive the poor of benefits.

"The production of an Aadhaar card will not be condition for obtaining any benefits otherwise due to a citizen," the top court ruled.

The government holds that the Aadhaar Act, passed in Parliament last year, provides the legal backing for making the biometric identification compulsory.

The current lawsuits against Aadhaar have not been argued on grounds of privacy, reportedly because the court would not allow this line of argument, which is already being heard in the other case. The Supreme Court has made current petitioners “fight this battle with one arm tied behind their backs!,” wrote lawyer Gautam Bhatia in a blog post Wednesday.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/idg-news-service-john-riberio-may-3-2017-indias-supreme-court-hears-challenge-to-biometric-authentication-system

India’s National ID Program May Be Turning The Country Into A Surveillance State

praskrishna — 2017-04-07T12:49:30Z

For seven years, India’s government has been scanning the irises and fingerprints of its citizens into a massive database. The once voluntary program was intended to fix the country’s corrupt welfare schemes, but critics worry about its Orwellian overtones.

The blog post by Pranav Dixit was published by BuzzFeedNews on April 4, 2017. Sunil Abraham was quoted.

An abridged version of the blog post containing Sunil Abraham's quotes are reproduced below:

“You can’t change your fingerprints”

Sunil Abraham, the CIS director, calls himself a “technological critic” of the Aadhaar platform. For years, he’s been warning of the security risks associated with a centralized repository of the demographic and biometric details of a billion or so people.

“Aadhaar is a sitting duck,” Abraham told BuzzFeed News. That’s not an unreasonable assessment considering that India’s track record for protecting people’s private data is far from stellar. Earlier this year, for example, a security researcher discovered a website that was leaking the Aadhaar demographic data of more than 500,000 minors. The website was subsequently shut down, but the incident raised questions about Aadhaar’s security protocols — particularly those around data shared with third parties.

Abraham’s concerns are not without global precedent. In 2012, Ecuadorian police jailed blogger Paul Moreno for breaking into the country’s online national identity database and registering himself as Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa. In April 2016, hackers posted a database containing names, national IDs, addresses, and birth dates of more than 50 million Turkish citizens, including Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan; later that month, Mexico’s entire voter database — over 87 million national IDs, addresses, and more — was leaked onto Amazon’s cloud servers by as-yet-untraced sources; and in the Philippines, more than 55 million voters had their private information — including fingerprints — released on the Dark Web.

“When this database is hacked — and it will be — it will be because someone breaches the computer security that protects the computers actually using the data.”

“What is the price that we pay as a nation if our database of over a billion people — complete with all 10 fingerprints and iris scans — leaks?” Abraham asked. The consequences, he said, will be permanent. Unlike a password, which you can reset at any time, your biometrics, if compromised, are the ultimate privacy breach. “You can’t change your fingerprints.”

The UIDAI claims that the Aadhaar database is protected using the “highest available public key cryptography encryption (PKI-2048 and AES-256)” and would take “billions of years” to crack.

“Encryption like this doesn’t typically get broken, it gets circumvented,” security researcher Troy Hunt told BuzzFeed News. “For example, the web application that sits in front of it is compromised and data is retrieved after decryption.” Or alternatively, he said, the encryption key itself is compromised. “Naturally, governments will offer all sorts of assurances on these things, but the simple, immutable fact is that once large volumes are centralized like this, there is a heightened risk of security incidents and of the data consequently being lost or exposed,” he added.

Cryptographer and cybersecurity expert Bruce Schneier echoed Hunt’s assessment. “When this database is hacked — and it will be — it will be because someone breaches the computer security that protects the computers actually using the data,” he said. “They will go around the encryption.”

Nilekani — who did not respond to BuzzFeed News’ requests for comment — recently dismissed concerns around the project’s privacy implications as “hand-waving.” In an interview with the Economic Times, he repeatedly stressed how secure Aadhaar’s “advanced encryption technology” was. “I can categorically say that it’s the most secure system in India and among the most secure systems in the world,” he said.

Abraham is unconvinced by such assurances. He believes Aadhaar fundamentally changes the equation between a citizen and a state. “There’s a big difference between you identifying yourself to the government, and the government identifying who you are,” he said.

Aadhaar’s opponents say the program’s implementation has left India’s poorest people with no choice but to use it. “If you link people’s food subsidies, wages, bank accounts, and other crucial things to Aadhaar, you hit them where it hurts the most,” Ramanathan argued. “You leave them with no choice but to sign up.”

“Can you imagine if the United States passed a law that said that every person who wished to get food stamps would need their fingerprints registered in a government-owned database?” a journalist turned Aadhaar activist who did not wished to be named told BuzzFeed News. “Imagine what a scandal that would be.”

For Nilekani, such criticism is just overstatement and drama. “I think this so-called anti-Aadhaar lobby is really just a small bunch of liberal elites who are in some echo chamber,” he said during a recent interview with Indian business news channel ET Now. “The reality is that a billion people are using Aadhaar. A lot of the accusations are just delusional. Aadhaar is not a system for surveillance. [The critics] live in a bubble and are not connected to reality.”

Abraham laughed off Nilekani’s comments. “The Unique Identification Authority of India will become the monopoly provider of identification and authentication services in India,” he said. “That sounds like a centrally planned communist state to me. I don’t know which left liberal elites he’s talking about.”

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/buzzfeednews-pranav-dixit-april-4-2017-indias-national-id-program-may-be-turning-the-country-into-a-surveillance-state