Centre for Internet and Society

CIS Comments on the Draft National Policy on Electronics

pranesh — 2011-11-01T00:05:32Z

These were the comments submitted by CIS to the request for comments put out by the Department of Information Technology on its draft 'National Policy on Electronics'.

The Department of Information Technology must be commended for taking the initiative to create this policy which aims to reduce India’s dependence on other countries for crucial electronic hardware requirements, and to increase Indian production to such a capacity as to not only serve India’s increasing demand for electronics, but to fulfil foreign demand as well.

We have mainly focused our comments on the implications of the patent regime on this laudable goal.

Technology Transfer

An area that the policy is silent on is technology transfer. In relation to technology, the main bargain embedded in the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement of the WTO was the increase in the level of protection offered under patent laws of developing countries in exchange for increased transfer of technological know-how from the developed countries. While India has increased patent protection in accordance with the TRIPS Agreement, there has been no commensurate transfer of technology from countries which are currently hubs of electronics know-how.

One important example is China’s policy on transfer of technology along the whole value chain to enable domestic firms to gain technological expertise.

The Association of American Manufacturing notes, “One of the most potent weapons China has used to move up the value chain is forced technology transfer … It is only through the acquisition (rather than internal development) of sophisticated technologies that Chinese companies have been able to rapidly enter and expand in sophisticated industries ….”

This insistence on technology transfer as a national policy has served China well, and their experience should be incorporated into India’s National Policy on Electronics. This is not to say that India should not internally develop our own technological capabilities, but that the Indian government must use the policy space available to it to ensure that acquisition of technological capabilities happens alongside.

Outflow of Foreign Exchange as Royalties Creating Adverse Balance of Payments

The latest data from the World Bank shows that our balance of payments is increasing adversely at an alarming rate, and has now reached over USD 2.38 billion.

Our royalty and licence fee payments have kept on increasing at an astounding rate.

Table: India’s royalty and licence fees payments (current USD)

1991	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
49,565,208	845,949,436	1,159,824,391	1,528,826,913	1,860,283,808	2,437,500,663

Meanwhile India’s income is gaining slowly and erratically, and in 20100 reached USD 59.6 million.

Table: India’s royalty and licence fees, receipts (current USD)

1991	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
615,525	13,445,053	30,690,000	27,211,957	38,128,141	59,560,687

This bleeds the Indian economy through a very inefficient outflow of capital. Insisting on transfer of technology is an important component in slowing down this trend.

Linking of Value Chain and Preferential Treatment

One important clarification that is needed in the policy (specifically clause IV.1.3) is that “domestically manufactured electronic products” is intended to mean not those products for which the last part of value has been added in India. This way essentially non-Indian products with Indian branding can be seen to be “domestically manufactured electronic products”. The longer the Indian part of the value chain, the more preference it should be given, and holding by Indian companies of essential patent rights (or the availability of greater number of components of the product under royalty-free, FRAND and RAND licences) could be an important criteria. This will also encourage the transfer of technological know-how to Indian firms.

Preferential Treatment

Some may argue that the provision of preferential treatment to domestic manufacturers contravenes the GATT Agreement, however the GATT Agreement itself provides a usable exception in Article 3(8):

Article III: National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation

8 (a) The provisions of this Article shall not apply to laws, regulations or requirements governing the procurement by governmental agencies of products purchased for governmental purposes and not with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the production of goods for commercial sale.

(b) The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the payment of subsidies exclusively to domestic producers, including payments to domestic producers derived from the proceeds of internal taxes or charges applied consistently with the provisions of this Article and subsidies effected through governmental purchases of domestic products.

Thus, by crafting any further regulation under this policy to fit within this exception, India would not fall afoul of its obligations under GATT.

Cybersecurity and Source Code

An important aspect of the cybersecurity that is discussed in clause IV.5 is the ability to validate the lack of malicious code in the electronics used in strategically important infrastructure. For this, manufacturers must be required to provide the source code as part of government tenders in strategically important infrastructure.

Distinction between Innovation and Intellectual Property

The Electronic Development Fund must seek to promote innovation, research and development, and commercialization of products, and must be used to strategically acquire patents. Promotion of patents is not an end in itself, unlike promotion of innovation and ensuring that research and development reaches markets through commercialization. Patents are only a means to an end, and may sometimes be strategically useful, and often stand in way of gaining optimal use of technology by markets due to their monopolistic nature. Thus, it is recommended that “promotion of IP” be dropped from this clause, and instead “promotion of strategic acquirement and use of patents” be substituted in its place.

National Electronics Mission

The National Electronics Mission should not only have industry participation but also participation from academia and civil society.

Funding

The issue of funding for the initiatives outlined in this policy must be addressed as well.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/comments-draft-national-policy-on-electronics

CIS Submission on Draft Patent Manual 2010

pranesh — 2014-05-29T06:47:32Z

The patent office has released a revised version of the Draft Manual of Patent Practice and Procedure. Section 8.03.06.10 of the Manual deals with patenting of computer programmes. CIS is happy to note the many improvements in this draft of the Manual from the previous version. CIS made its submission along with a few suggestions that it thinks would make the document even better.

The section has been entirely reformulated and a few of the changes made to the previous version are welcome.

Positive changes in the Manual

The provisions relating to making software with “technological features” and “technical applications” which were present in the previous version have been completely eliminated. Thus, the “technical applications”of a computer programme will not make an otherwise unpatentable computer programme patentable subject matter. This also eliminates the need to arrive at a definition of “technical applications” or “technological features”.
The term “computer implemented inventions” which found no place in the Patent Act, 1970 but was introduced in the previous version of the manual without proper explanation or definition has been eliminated.
The Manual expressly states that mathematical methods (8.03.06.10.b) and business methods (8.03.06.10.c) are not patentable irrespective of the language in which they claims are couched or the form in which they are claimed.
Computer programme products which were considered to be patentable subject matter in the previous version of the manual are considered to be unpatentable subject matter in the new version. The Manual clearly explains computer programme products to be nothing but computer programme per se stored in a computer readable medium. (8.03.06.10.d)
The Manual recognises that no computer programme can be functional without hardware to execute the programme. This means that any computer programme cannot become patentable subject matter merely because it is associated with some hardware. (8.03.06.10.g)
A computer programme which runs on a general purpose known computer is expressly held to be unpatentable subject matter. This is undoubtedly a welcome inclusion since it helps eliminate claims relating to a mere computer programme which may have been considered patentable simply because such computer programme is run using a general purpose computer. This is one of the common ways in which Section 3(k) is circumvented to obtain patent for claims which are for a computer programme per se.

Contentious provisions of the Manual which require amendment/explanation are as follows:

Clause 8.03.06.10.a

Under this provision, mathematical methods, business methods, computer programmes per se and algorithms are not considered as patentable inventions. In relation to computer programs, the law provides a qualification that what is not patentable is only computer program per se.

While this restates the statute correctly, it does so without offering any explanation, which would be preferable. The Manual should explain the scope of the term “per se” and clear the ambiguity surrounding it. The Manual should clearly provide reasons for any computer programme to fall in either category.

We suggest using the following definition of computer programme per se, which has previously been submitted to the Patent Office1:

Computer programme per se in the relevant clause means (a) any computer programme in the abstract, (b) any computer programme expressed in source code form, including source code recorded on an information storage medium, or (c) any computer programme that can be executed or executes on a general purpose computer,2 including computer programme object code designed for execution on a general purpose computer that is recorded on an information storage medium.3

Clause 8.03.06.10.e

If a claim in a patent application is not directed at a computer programme per se it could be patentable, if all other patentability conditions are met. This provision thus necessitates distinguishing computer programmes per se from other types of inventions that use or implement computer programmes.

The clause, while seeking to distinguish computer programmes per se from inventions which use or implement computer programmes, does make clear what “implement computer programmes” means, nor does it clarify what “computer programme per se” is. A relevant suggestion for a definition for “computer programme per se” has been provided above, which would address this problem.

Clause 8.03.06.10.f

The computer programmes are often claimed in the form of algorithms as method claims or system claims with some ‘means’ indicating the function of flow charts or process steps. The algorithm related claims may be even wider than the computer programme claimed by itself, for a programme represents a particular set, the algorithm expresses the principles .

We find that this clause has no relevance to explaining patentability of computer programmes and thus suggest that the same be deleted from the Manual. The Manual should however make it clear that in algorithm-related claims, if the function claimed to be performed by the invention can be done only by means of a computer programme, such claims are not patentable.

Clause 8.03.06.10.g

Essentially, all computer programmes need a combination with some hardware for their functionality. In an application for patent for a new hardware system, the possibility of a computer programme forming part of the claims cannot be ruled out. It has to be carefully considered as to how integrated is the novel hardware with the computer programme. Further, it is also to be considered whether the machine is programme specific or the programme is machine specific. A computer programme which may work on any general purpose known computer does not meet the requirement of patentability.

With regard to cases of computer programmes being combined with hardware, the Manual seems to suggest that the patentability of the combination is dependent on “how integrated the novel hardware [is] with the computer programme.” This language is very vague and ambiguous. In case of an application for patent for a new hardware system, the Manual should make it clear that such claim is eligible only if the inventive conribution resides entirely in the hardware. The Manual should also require the patent applicant to demonstrate exactly how the inventive step resides in the hardware separable from the computer programme.
We propose a new part to the above test to make the clause clearer. The Manual should specify that “the computer programme portions of any claimed invention should be treated as if it were covered by prior art and patentability should thus be determined with respect to the other features of the invention”. This way, we can ensure that an invention which merely uses or implements a computer programme is not granted patent on the basis of the inventiveness of the computer programme per se.
It is indeed laudable that the Manual makes it clear that a computer programme which may work on any general purpose known computer does not meet the requirement of patentability. This should make it clear that a computer programme cannot be patentable simply because it is executed by a special purpose computer as long as a general purpose computer can also execute the same. We suggest the following definition of a general purpose computer, which has already been proposed to the Patent Office, be used:4

A general-purpose computer here means a device capable of running multiple unrelated programs, often simultaneously for different purposes. It will comprise at least of: (1) one or more central processing units, (2) one or more input devices that are not specific to any one program, (3) memory, (4) one or more non volatile mass storage devices, and (5) one or more output devices. However, a general-purpose computer does not include a device that itself represents an inventive contribution to the art.

Clause 8.03.06.10.h

Method claims, whether independent or dependent, reciting computer programs without process limitations in the form of hardware features are not allowable. For a method reciting computer programme to be patentable, it must clearly recite into it limiting hardware integers that enable the program to function .

The Clause dilutes the standard set in the previous clauses. It seems to suggest that any method claim is patentable as long as it is connected to hardware which enable the program to function and define its limitations/scope. This position is untenable since no method claim can be purely a computer programme and use of computer programmes for any specific task would necessarily require hardware to implement the same. Therefore the requirement of hardware limitation to make a computer programme patentable is essentially allowing for any computer programme to be patentable. Not only is such a limitation redundant but it also renders the “per se” requirement in Section 3(k) meaningless. Further, the meaning of the term “hardware integers” in the Clause is unclear. For the purpose of this comment, we assume that it refers to hardware features. The Manual should ensure that the method claim has significant per or post processing activity and is not merely combined with hardware to be patent-eligible. This ensures that any computer programme is not granted patent merely because it has certain trivial pre or post processing activities associated with it.

Clause 8.03.06.10.i

Claims directed at computer programs coupled to hardware, enabling the hardware to perform a certain function may be allowable, if such an invention meets all other conditions of patentability.

The Clause is restating the content of Clause 8.03.06.10.e and our comments on this Clause remain the same as our comments for Clause 8.03.06.10.e.

Requirement of Disclosure

We suggest that the Manual require that an application claiming patent for a computer programme (which does not constitute computer programme per se) necessarily disclose the entire source code. This ensures that the invention can perform exactly all those functions that are described in the patent application. Since different computer programmes can be written (with each having different source code) to perform the same function, it is of utmost importance that the applicant demonstrate the workability of the invention described in the application and such proof can be provided only by disclosing the source code.

Purpose of the Manual

There is no clarity on the purpose and authority of the Manual. We do not know if the Manual attempts to explain the provisions of the Patent Act, 1970 to an applicant or is meant to provide guidance to patent examiners or be binding upon them. If a patent official acts in a manner contradictory to the Manual, the consequences of such action is unclear. The Manual should clarify these questions.

This definition was formulated and submitted by Knowledge Commons, Delhi to the Indian Patent Office in response to the earlier version of the draft manual. The definition was formulated through the collective efforts of Prabir Purkayastha, Richard Fontana of Red Hat, Venkatesh Hariharan, Tahir Amin, Mishi Chowdhury of Software Freedom Law Centre and Jaijit Bhattacharya. See http://osindia.blogspot.com/2009/04/computer-programme-per-se-conundrum.html
We propose the following definition of a general purpose computer - A general-purpose computer here means a device capable of running multiple unrelated programs, often simultaneously for different purposes. It will comprise at least of: (1) one or more central processing units, (2) one or more input devices that are not specific to any one program, (3) memory, (4) one or more non volatile mass storage devices, and (5) one or more output devices. However, a general-purpose computer does not include a device that itself represents an inventive contribution to the art. See also Infra n. 3.
An information storage medium means any disc, tape, perforated media or other information storage device, which, if fed into or located in a computer or computer based equipment is capable of reproducing any information, other than an information storage medium that itself represents an inventive contribution to the art.
This definition was formulated and submitted by Knowledge Commons, Delhi to the Indian Patent Office in response to the earlier version of the draft manual. See http://osindia.blogspot.com/2009/04/computer-programme-per-se-conundrum.html

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-submission-draft-patent-manual-2010

A Guide to Key IPR Provisions of the Proposed India-European Union Free Trade Agreement

glover — 2011-08-30T13:06:03Z

The Centre for Internet and Society presents a guide for policymakers and other stakeholders to the latest draft of the India-European Union Free Trade Agreement, which likely will be concluded by the end of the year and may hold serious ramifications for Indian businesses and consumers.

In its ongoing negotiation for a FTA with the EU, a process that began in 2007 and is expected to end sometime this year, India has won several signicant IP-related concessions. But there remain several IP issues critical to the maintenance of its developing economy, including its robust entrepreneurial environment, that India should contest further before ratifying the treaty. This guide covers the FTA's IP provisions that are within the scope of CIS' policy agenda and on which India has negotiated favorable language, as well as those provisions that it should re-negotiate or oppose.

Download the guide here, and please feel free to comment below.

You may also download a chart comparing the language proposed by India and the EU respectively with that included in the WTO's Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).

Following is a summary of CIS' findings:

India has become a de facto leader of developing countries at the WTO, and an India-EU FTA seems likely to provide a model for FTAs between developed and developing states well into the future.
The EU has proposed articles on reproduction, communication, and broadcasting rights which could seriously undermine India's authority to regulate the use of works under copyright as currently provided for in the Berne Convention, as well as narrowing exceptions and limitations to rights under copyright.
The EU asserts that copyright includes "copyright in computer programs and in databases," without indicating whether such copyright exceeds that provided for in the Berne Convention. Moreover, by asserting that copyright "includes copyright in computer programs and in databases," the EU has left open the door for the extension of copyright to non-original databases.
India should explicitly obligate the EU to promote and encourage technology transfer -- an obligation compatible with and derived from TRIPS -- as well as propose a clear definition of technology transfer.
The EU has demanded India's accession to the WIPO Internet Treaties, the merits of which are currently under debate as India moves towards amending its Copyright Act, as well as several other international treaties that India either does not explicitly enforce or to which it is not a contracting party.
In general, the EU's provisions would extend terms of protection for material under copyright, within certain constraints, further endangering India's consumer-friendly copyright regime.
An agreement to establish arrangements between national organizations charged with collecting and distributing royalty payments may obligate such organizations in India collect royalty payments for EU rights holders on the same basis as they do for Indian rights holders, and vice versa in the EU, but more heavily burden India.
The EU has proposed a series of radical provisions on the enforcement of IPRs that are tailored almost exclusively to serve the interests of rights holders, at the expense of providing safety mechanisms for those accused of infringing or enabling infringers.
The EU has proposed, under cover of protecting intermediate service providers from liability for infringement by their users, to increase and/or place the burden on such providers of policing user activity.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/a-guide-to-the-proposed-india-european-union-free-trade-agreement

Arguments Against Software Patents in India

pranesh — 2012-03-13T10:43:12Z

CIS believes that software patents are harmful for the software industry and for consumers. In this post, Pranesh Prakash looks at the philosophical, legal and practical reasons for holding such a position in India. This is a slightly modified version of a presentation made by Pranesh Prakash at the iTechLaw conference in Bangalore on February 5, 2010, as part of a panel discussing software patents in India, the United States, and the European Union.

This blog post is based on a presentation made at the iTechLaw conference held on February 5, 2010. The audience consisted of lawyers from various corporations and corporate law firms. As is their wont, most lawyers when dealing with software patents get straight to an analysis of law governing the patenting of computer programmes in India and elsewhere, and seeing whether any loopholes exist and can be exploited to patent software. It was refreshing to see at least some lawyers actually going into questions of the need for patents to cover computer programs. In my presentation, I made a multi-pronged case against software patents: (1) philosophical justification against software patents based on the nature of software; (2) legal case against software patents; (3) practical reasons against software patents.

Preamble

Through these arguments, it is sought to be shown that patentability of software is not some arcane, technical question of law, but is a real issue that affect the continued production of new software and the everyday life of the coder/hacker/software programmer/engineer as well as consumers of software (which is, I may remind you, everywhere from your pacemaker to your phone). A preamble to the arguments would note that the main question to ask is: why should we allow for patenting of software? Answering this question will lead us to ask: who benefits from patenting of software. The conclusion that I come to is that patenting of software helps three categories of people: (1) those large software corporations that already have a large number of software patents; (2) those corporations that do not create software, but only trade in patents / sue on the basis of patents ("patent trolls"); (3) patent lawyers. How they don't help small and medium enterprises nor society at large (since they deter, rather than further invention) will be borne out by the rest of these arguments, especially the section on practical reasons against software patents.

What are Patents?

Patents are a twenty-year monopoly granted by the State on any invention. An invention has to have at least four characteristics: (0) patentable subject matter; (1) novelty (it has to be new); (2) inventive step / non-obviousness (even if new, it should not be obvious); (3) application to industry. A monopoly over that invention, thus means that if person X has invented something, then I may not use the core parts of that invention ("the essential claims") in my own invention. This prohibition applies even if I have come upon my invention without having known about X's invention. (Thus, independent creation is not a defence to patent infringement. This distinguishes it, for instance, from copyright law in which two people who created the same work independently of each other can both assert copyright.) Patents cover non-abstract ideas/functionality while copyright covers specific expressions of ideas. To clarify: imagine I make a drawing of a particular machine and describe the procedure of making it. Under patent law, no one else can make that particular machine, while under copyright law, no one can copy that drawing.

Philosophical Justification Against Software Patents

Even without going into the case against patents per se (lack of independent creation as a defence; lack of 'harm' as a criterion leading to internalization of all positive externalities; lack of effective disclosure and publication; etc.), which has been done much more ably by others like Bessen & Meurer (especially in their book Patent Failure) and Boldrin & Levine (in their book Against Intellectual Monopoly, the full text of which is available online).

But there is one essentially philosophical argument against software as subject matter of a patent. Software/computer programs ("instructions for a computer"), as any software engineer would tell you, are merely algorithms ("an effective method for solving a problem using a finite sequence of instructions") that are meant to be understood by a computer or a human who knows how to read that code.

Algorithms are not patentable subject matter, as they are mere expressions of abstract ideas, and not inventions in themselves. Computer programs, similarly, are abstract ideas. They only stop being abstract ideas when embodied in a machine or a process in which it is the machine/process that is the essential claim and not the software. That machine or process being patented would not grant protection to the software itself, but to the whole machine or process. Thus the abstract part of that machine/process (i.e., the computer program) could be used in any other machine/process, as it it is not the subject matter of the patent. Importantly, just because software is required to operate some machine would then not mean that the machine itself is not patentable, just that the software cannot be patented in guise of patenting a machine.

Legal Case Against Software Patents

In India, section 3(k) of the Patent Act reads:

(3) The following are not inventions within the meaning of this Act: (k) a mathematical or business method or computer programme (sic) per se or algorithms.

As one can see, computer programs are place in the same category as "mathematical methods", "algorithms", and "business methods", hence giving legal validity to the idea propounded in the previous section that computer programs are a kind of algorithms (just as algorithms are a kind of mathematical method).

Be that as it may, the best legal minds in India have had to work hard at understanding what exactly "computer programme per se" means. They have cited U.S. case law, U.K. case law, E.U. precedents, and sought to arrive at an understanding of how per se should be understood. While understanding what per se means might be a difficult job, it is much easier to see what it does not mean. For that, we can look at the 2004 Patent Ordinance that Parliament rejected in 2005. In that ordinance, sections 3(k) and (ka) read as follows:

(3) The following are not inventions within the meaning of this Act: (k) a computer programme per se other than its technical application to industry or a combination with hardware; (ka) a mathematical method or a business method or algorithms.

Thus, it is clear that the interpretation that "computer programme per se" excludes "a computer programme that has technical application to industry" and "a computer programme in combination with hardware" is wrong. By rejecting the 2004 Ordinance wording, Parliament has clearly shown that "technical application to industry" and "combination with hardware" do not make a computer programme patentable subject matter.

Indeed, what exactly is "technical application to industry"? "Technical" has various definitions, and a perusal through those definitions would show that barely any computer program can be said not to relate to a technique, not involve "specialized knowledge of applied arts and sciences" (it is code, after all; not everyone can write good algorithms), or not relate to "a practical subject that is organized according to scientific principles" or is "technological". Similarly, all software is, by definition, meant to be used in combination with hardware. Thus, it being used in combination with hardware must not, as argued above, give rise to patentability of otherwise unpatentable subject matter category.

In 2008, the Patent Office published a new 'Draft Manual Of Patent Practice And Procedure' in which it sought to allow patenting of certain method claims for software inventions (while earlier the Patent Office objected to method claims, allowing only device claims with hardware components). This Draft Manual was withdrawn from circulation, with Shri N.N. Prasad (then Joint Secretary of DIPP, the department administering the Patent Office) noting that the parts of the Manual on sections 3(d) and 3(k) had generated a lot of controversy, and were ultra vires the scope of the Manual (which could not override the Patent Act). He promised that those parts would be dropped and the Manual would be re-written. A revised draft of the Manual has not yet been released. Thus the interpretation provided in the Draft Manual (which was based heavily on the interpretation of the U.K. courts) cannot not be relied upon as a basis for arguments in favour of the patentability of software in India.

In October 2008, CIS helped organize a National Public Meeting on Software Patents in which Indian academics, industry, scientists, and FOSS enthusiasts all came to the conclusion that software patents are harmful for both the industry as well as consumers.

Practical Reasons Against Software Patents

This is going to be an attempt at distilling and simplifying some of the main practical arguments against patenting of software.

There are traditionally four incentives that the patent system caters to: (1) incentive to invent; (2) incentive to disclose; (3) incentive to commercialize; and (4) incentive to invent substitutes. Apart from the last, patenting of software does not really aid any of them.

Patent Landmines / Submarine Patents / Patent Gridlocks / No Exception for Independent Creation

Given that computer programs are algorithms, having monopolies over such abstract ideas is detrimental to innovation. Just the metaphors say a lot about software patents: landmines (they cannot be seen/predicted); submarines (they surface out of the blue); gridlocks (because there are so many software patents around the same area of computing, they prevent further innovation in that area, since no program can be written without violating one patent or the other).

Imagine the madness that would have ensued had patents been granted when computer programming was in its infancy. Imagine different methods of sorting (quick sort, bubble sort) that are part of Computer Science 101 had been patented. While those particular instances aren't, similar algorithms, such as data compression algorithms (including the infamous LZW compression method), have been granted patents. Most importantly, even if one codes certain functionality into software independently of the patent holder, that is still violative of the patent. Computer programs being granted patents makes it extremely difficult to create other computer programs that are based on the same abstract ideas. Thus incentives # (1) and (3) are not fulfilled, and indeed, they are harmed. There is no incentive to invent, as one would always be violating one patent or the other. Given that, there is no incentive to commercialize what one has invented, because of fear of patent infringement suits.

An apt illustration of this is the current difficulty of choosing a royalty-free video format for HTML 5, as it shows, in practical terms, how difficult it is to create a video format without violating one patent or the other. While the PNG image format was created to side-step the patent over the LZW compression method used in the GIF image format, bringing Ogg Theora or Dirac (both patent-free video format) to surpass the levels of H.264/MPEG-4 AVC or VC-1 will be very difficult without infringing dozens if not hundreds of software patents. Chris DiBona of Google, while talking about improving Ogg Theora as part of its inclusion in HTML 5 specifications said, "Here’s the challenge: Can Theora move forward without infringing on the other video compression patents?" Just the number of companies and organization that hold patents over H.264 is astounding, and includes: Columbia University, Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute of Korea (ETRI), France Télécom, Fujitsu, LG Electronics, Matsushita, Mitsubishi, Microsoft, Motorola, Nokia, Philips, Robert Bosch GmbH, Samsung, Sharp, Sony, Toshiba, and Victor Company of Japan (JVC). As is the amount of royalties to be paid ("[t]he maximum royalty for these rights payable by an Enterprise (company and greater than 50% owned subsidiaries) is $3.5 million per year in 2005-2006, $4.25 million per year in 2007-08 and $5 million per year in 2009-10"; with royalty per unit of a decoder-encoder costing upto USD 0.20.)

Indeed, even the most diligent companies cannot guard themselves against software patents. FFII estimates that a very simple online shopping website would violate twenty different patents at the very least. Microsoft recently lost a case against i4i when i4i surfaced with a patent covering custom XML as implemented in MS Office 2003 and MS Office 2007. As a result Microsoft had to ship patches to its millions of customers, to disable the functionality and bypass that patent. The manufacturers of BlackBerry, the Canadian company Research in Motion, had to shell out USD 617 million as settlement to NTP over wireless push e-mail, as it was otherwise faced with the possibility of the court shutting down the BlackBerry service in the U.S. This happened despite there being a well-known method of doing so pre-dating the NTP patents. NTP has also filed cases against AT&T, Sprint Nextel, T-Mobile, Verizon Wireless, and Palm Inc. Microsoft was also hit by Visto Corporation over those same NTP patents, which had been licensed to Visto (a startup).
- Don't These Cases Show How Software Patents Help Small Companies?
  
  The astute reader might be tempted to ask: are not all of these examples of small companies getting their dues from larger companies? Doesn't all of this show that software patents actually help small and medium enterprises (SMEs)? The answer to that is: no. To see why, we need to note the common thread binding i4i, NTP, and Visto. None of them were, at the time of their lawsuits, actually creating new software, and NTP was an out-and-out "non-practising entity"/"patent holding company" AKA, patent troll. i4i was in the process of closing shop, and Visto had just started up. None of these were actually practising the patent. None of these were producing any other software. Thus, none of these companies had anything to lose by going after big companies. In other words, the likes of Microsoft, RIM, Verizon, AT&T, etc., could not file counter-suits of patent infringement, which is normally what happens when SMEs try to assert patent rights against larger corporations. For every patent that the large corporation violates of the smaller corporation, the smaler corporation would be violating at least ten of the larger corporation's. Software patents are more helpful for software companies as a tool for cross-licensing rather than as a way of earning royalties. Even this does not work as a strategy against patent trolls.
Thus, the assertion that was made at the beginning is borne out: software patents help only patent trolls, large corporations that already have large software patent portfolios, and the lawyers who draft these patents and later argue them out in court.
Term of Patents

Twenty years of monopoly rights is outright ludicrous in an industry where the rate of turnover of technology is much faster -- anywhere between two years and five months.
Software Industry Progressed Greatly Without Patents

In India, software patents have never been asserted in courts (even though many have been illegally granted), yet the software industry in India is growing in leaps and bounds. Similarly, most of the big (American) giants of the software industry today grew to their stature by using copyright to "protect" their software, and not patents.
Copyright Exists for Software

As noted above, the code/expression of any software is internationally protected by copyright law. There is no reason to protect the ideas/functionality of that software as well.
Insufficient Disclosure

When ordinary computer programmers cannot understand what a particular software patent covers (which is the overwhelming case), then the patent is of no use. One of the main incentives of the patent system is to encourage gifted inventors to share their genius with the world. It is not about gifted inventors paying equally gifted lawyers to obfuscate their inventions into gobbledygook so that other gifted inventors can at best hazard a guess as to precisely what is and is not covered by that patent. Thus, this incentive (#2) is not fulfilled by the current system of patents either -- not unless there is a major overhaul of the system. This ties in with the impossibility of ensuring that one is not violating a software patent. If a reasonably smart software developer (who are often working as individuals, and as part of SMEs) cannot quickly ascertain whether one is violating patents, then there is a huge disincentive against developing software in that area at all.
Software Patents Work Against Free/Libre/Open Source Software

Software patents hinder the development of software and FOSS licences, as the licensee is not allowed to restrict the rights of the sub-licensees over and above the restrictions that the licensee has to observe. Thus, all patent clearances obtained by the licensee must be passed on to the sub-licensees. Thus, patented software, though most countries around the world do not recognize them, are generally not included in the default builds of many FOSS operating systems. This inhabits the general adoption of FOSS, since many of the software patents, even though not enforceable in India, are paid heed to by the software that Indians download, and the MP3 and DivX formats are not enabled by default in standard installations of a Linux OS such as Ubuntu.

Conclusion

Currently, the U.S. patent system is being reviewed at the administrative level, the legislative level, as well as the judicial level. At the judicial level, the question of business method patents (and, by extension, software patents) is before the Supreme Court of the United States of America in the form of Bilski v. Kappos. Judge Mayer of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC, which heard In re Bilksi) noted that "the patent system has run amok". The Free Software Foundation submitted a most extensive amicus curiae brief to the U.S. Supreme Court, filled with brilliant analysis of software patents and arguments against the patentability of software that is well worth a read.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/arguments-against-software-patents

Arguments Against the PUPFIP Bill

pranesh — 2011-09-12T11:03:09Z

The Protection and Utilisation of Public Funded Intellectual Property Bill (PUPFIP Bill) is a new legislation being considered by Parliament, which was introduced in the 2008 winter session of the Rajya Sabha. It is modelled on the American Bayh-Dole Act (University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act) of 1980. On this page, we explore some of the reasons that the bill is unnecessary, and how it will be harmful if passed.

Summary

How is the legislation unnecessary?

The Indian government does not have vast reserves of underutilized patents, as the U.S. did in 1980.
Technology transfer is very important, but pushing IPRs aggressively is not the best way of ensuring technology transfer.

How is the legislation harmful?

Excessive patenting lead to gridlocks and retards innovation.
The legislation makes mandatory that which is optional now, and is anyway being followed in many institutions.
Copyright, trademark, etc., seem to be covered under the definition of “public funded IP”.
It will result in a form of double taxation for research, and will increase the consumer cost of all products based on publicly-funded research.
It could have unintended consequences of varied kinds, including discouraging fundamental research as well as discouraging industrial research.
Non-disclosure requirements in the Bill restricts the dissemination of research within the academic community, and curtails freedom of speech.
Exclusive licensing enables restriction on the dissemination of academic research in the marketplace, and increase in cost of products based on public-funded research.

Arguments

How is the legislation unnecessary?

1) The Indian government does not have vast reserves of underutilized patents, as the U.S. did in 1980.

The idea behind the Bayh-Dole Act was that the research funded by the government (and owned, in the US, by the government) was being underutilized. In 1980, over 28,000 unlicensed patents lay with the U.S. government.[1] The Act shifted the title of such works from the government to the University or small business that conducted the research, thus allowing them to take out patents on the research outputs. In India, under present laws, the researcher(s) own the rights over their research whether they be government-funded or not. Usually, due to employment contracts, the research institutes already have the right to patent their inventions. Thus, currently, there is no need for an enabling legislation in this regard, as there was in the U.S.

In fact, currently, the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) has over 5173 patents (counting both those in force and those under dispute), while only 222 patents are licensed (with 68 of them being under dispute). Thus, even with the IP being in the institute's hands, there is a "problem" situation similar to that which necessitated Bayh-Dole in the U.S. Thus, quite contrary to the aims of the Act, further patenting will only lead to a situation of even more underutilized patents.

2) Technology transfer is very important, but pushing IPRs aggressively is not the best way of ensuring technology transfer.

At a recent seminar held at NUJS Kolkata on the PUPFIP Bill, it was revealed that while IIT-Kharagpur’s TTO-equivalent (called the Sponsored Research & Industrial Consultancy division - SRIC) currently handles over Rs.300 crores through 850 projects, only around Rs. 5-15 crores (exact figures weren't available) are currently made through its patent portfolio.[2] Thus patents don't seem, on the face of things, to be the best way of ensuring technology transfer. Indeed, the oft-cited 28,0000 unlicensed patents held by the U.S. government were composed primarily of patents for which industry had refused to take exclusive licences.[3]

Many contend that one of the most important functions of a patent is to get inventors to disclose their inventions rather than keep them as secrets. This reason for awarding a patent is invalidated if stronger protection is granted to trade secrets (no term limit, for instance) than for patents. Secondly, this reason for granting patents is not valid in case of government-funded research in academia and research institutes. The culture of publication and the economy of reputation are sufficient to ensure disclosure. Even without these intrinsic factors, there grant requirements can necessitate publication. If mere publication is believed to be insufficient, then the government would do well to ask for technology dissemination plans before grants are made. At any rate, monopoly rights in the form of patents are thoroughly unnecessary.

How is the legislation harmful?

1) Excessive patenting lead to gridlocks and retard innovation.

It sees protection of IPR as the sole means of encouraging innovation and driving research to the doorstep of consumers. The trend around the world is that of exploring alternative forms of spurring innovation. Even in India, CSIR has gone for an innovative "Open Source Drug Discovery" project, which has proven very successful so far. Furthermore, recent literature shows that excessive patenting is harming research and innovation by creating gridlocks.[4] If platform technologies and basic research (such as SNP) gets mired in patents, then the transaction costs increase (not only in terms of money, but more importantly in administrative terms). This ends up in research clearances getting blocked, and thus retards innovation. It must be remembered that intellectual property is not only an output, but also an input. The more aggressively the outputs are guarded and prevented from being shared, the more the inputs will be affected. The study of patent thickets and gridlocks has reached such a stage that the U.S. law has been changed to reflect this. Firstly, the Bayh-Dole Act was amended in 2000 to state that the objectives of the Bayh-Dole Act were to be carried out "without unduly encumbering future research and discovery". Now, the courts (in the Bilski case) have increased the standard of obviousness in patent law (which means that less patents will be granted). Furthermore, the U.S.P.T.O. and the U.S. Senate are currently considering means of overhauling the U.S. patent system, which many fear is close to breaking down due to over-patenting. All these are signs that the footsteps we are seeking to follow are themselves turning back.

2) The legislation makes mandatory that which is optional now, and is anyway being followed in many institutions.

While the CSIR labs pursue patents aggressively, they also run the OSSD project. The latter might not be permissible if the Act is passed as it stands. Furthermore, this would increase the number of underutilized patents, which is a problem faced currently by CSIR, which has had an aggressive patent policy since the 1990s. Unlicensed patents constitute around 93% of CSIR's total patent portfolio. (In contrast, MIT averages around 50% licensing of patents.) If aggressive patenting is made mandatory, it adds substantially to administrative costs of all institutes which receive any grants from the government. These institutes might not be large enough to merit a dedicated team of professionals to handle

3) Copyright, trademark, etc., seem to be covered under the definition of "public funded IP".

This leads to a ridiculous need to attempt to commercialise all government-funded research literature (and the government funds science research, social sciences, arts, etc.). Furthermore, while the definition of "public funded IP" includes copyrights, trademarks, etc., yet the substantive provisions seem to only include those forms of IP which have to be registered compulsorily (copyright and trademark don't -- copyright comes into existence when an original work is expressed in a medium, and trademark can come into existence by use). Importantly, seeking to commercialise all copyrighted works of research would hamper the movement for open access to scholarly literature. The inititative towards open access to scholarly literature is something that National Knowledge Commission has recommended, and is a move that would result in increased dissemination of public-funded research, which seems to be an aim of the PUPFIP Bill as well.

4) It will result in a form of double taxation for research, and will increase the consumer cost of all products based on publicly-funded research.

This bill would increase the consumer cost of all products based on publicly-funded research, because of the additional burden of patent royalties.

Public funds research -> Institute patents research -> Pharma MNC gets exclusive license over research -> Drug reaches market.

Assuming an exclusive licence: Cost of the drug = cost of manufacturing, storage, etc. + mark-up (monopolistic) cost + cost of licence.

Thus, in effect, the public has to pay twice for the research: it pays once to enable the scientist to conduct the research, and once again in the form of royalties to have that research brought to the marketplace.

5) It could have unintended consequences of varied kinds, including discouraging fundamental research as well as discouraging industrial research.

The former could happen since institutions and individual scientists have a financial incentive to shift their focus away from fundamental research; the latter, conversely, because the filings and bureaucracy involved could drive scientists away from reporting or even engaging in industrial research [pdf]. Faculty and researcher involvement in the business of licensing is a sub-optimal usage of their talents, and there are scientists who would rather stay away from business (as is shown by the intake of former industry-researchers into government-funded labs such as those of CSIR).

6) Non-disclosure requirements in the Bill restricts the dissemination of research within the academic community, and curtails freedom of speech.

This will bring about a shift in science and research which is always done upon others' work. This is why in the U.S., the National Institute of Health (N.I.H.) has sought to ensure (without any legal authority) that it only finances that research that on single nucleotide polymorphism (S.N.P.) which is not patented, and is shared freely amongst scholars. Since this requirement of the N.I.H.'s does not have any legal backing (since it is contradictory to the Bayh-Dole Act), institutions are free to get the grant from N.I.H. and then go ahead and patent their inventions.

7) Exclusive licensing enables restriction on the dissemination of academic research in the marketplace, and increase in cost of products based on public-funded research.

The bill allows for both assignment of licences as well as exclusive licences. Both of these enable monopolistic pricing to be undertaken by the licensee/assignee. There are not even any mechanisms in the Act to ensure, for instance, that a public call is made to ascertain that no parties are willing to consider a non-exclusive licence. Patents are generally said to grant a monopoly right because of the opportunity to recover costs of research and development. When the research is being done by public-funded money, there is no justification for monopoly rights on that research, since there are no excessive costs to recover.

Footnotes:

[1] See So et al. and Thursby and Thursby, quoted in the National Knowledge Commission's letter to the Prime Minister.

[2] See Prof. Vivekanandans' presentation "Patenting and Technology Transfer-the IIT Khargpur Experience"

[3] See Anthony So et al., Is Bayh-Dole Good for Developing Countries, 6 PLoS Biol e262 (2008)

[4] See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Science 698 (1998)

Additional Resources

On the PUPFIP Bill

February 5, 2004: NIPER holds parallel session of Indian Science Congress (Express Pharma)
October 27, 2006: Susan Finston, India to Propose New Technology Transfer Legislation (Bayh-Dole 25)
January 16, 2007: National Knowledge Commision's Letter to Indian Prime Minister (National Knowledge Commission)
April 15, 2007: Archita Bhatta, Proposed IPR law raises concern (Down to Earth)
May 31, 2007: Science & Technology needs to be core of the economic development says Kapil Sibal (PIB Press Release)
November 13, 2007: Government Accords Approval to National Biotechnology Development Strategy (PIB Press Release)
February 1, 2008: Yudhijit Bhattacharjee, Indian Government Hopes Bill Will Stimulate Innovation (Science)
February 19, 2008: Shamnad Basheer, Exporting Bayh Dole to India: Whither Transparency? (Part 1) (Part 2) (SpicyIP)
March 17, 2008: Kalpana Pathak, Varsities may soon own patent rights (Business Standard)
March 17, 2008: P.T. Jyothi Datta, Public-funded research may pay dividends for scientists (Business Line)
March 17, 2008: Joff Wild, India considers Bayh-Dole style legislation (IAM Magazine)
April 30, 2008: M.K. Unnikrishnan and Pradeepti Nayak, Lessons from Bayh Dole Act and its relevance to India (PharmaBiz)
July 2008: Sean M. O'Connor, Historical Context of U.S. Bayh-Dole Act: Implications for Indian Government Funded Research Patent Policy (STEM Newsletter)
July 7, 2008: Shamnad Basheer, Mysterious Indian "Bayh Dole" Bill: SpicyIP Procures a Copy (SpicyIP)
July 09, 2008: Latha Jishnu, Does India need a Bayh-Dole Act? (Business Standard)
September 2008: V.C. Vivekanandan, Transplanting Bayh-Dole Act- Issues at Stake Authors (13 Journal of Intell. Prop. 480)
September 18, 2008: Shamnad Basheer, Indian Patent Bill: Let's not be too hasty (SciDev.net)
October 28, 2008: Anthony So et al., Is Bayh-Dole Good for Developing Countries, 6 PLoS Biol e262 (2008)
October 31, 2008: Cabinet gives approval for Protection and Utilization of Public Funded Intellectual Property Bill, 2008 (PIB Press Release)
November 2008: Annette Lin et al., The Bayh-Dole Act and Promoting the Transfer of Technology of Publicly Funded-Research (UAEM White Paper on the Proposed Indian Bayh-Dole Analogue)
November 1, 2008: Editorial: Not in Public Interest (Mint)
November 12, 2008: Ben Butkus, As India Mulls Bill Modeled on Bayh-Dole, Critics Claim It May Stifle Innovation (Biotech Transfer Weekly)
December 16, 2008: Pranesh Prakash, Indian "Bayh Dole" Bill before Parliament (Commons Law)
January 23, 2009: Editorial: Time to Rethink Intellectual Property Laws (SciDev.net)
March 12, 2009: Feroz Ali Khader, Does Patenting Research Change the Culture of Science? (The Hindu)
April 24, 2009: Sunil Abraham & Pranesh Prakash, Does India Need Its Own Bayh-Dole? (Indian Express)
September 21, 2009: C.H. Unnikrishnan, Proposed Patent Bill Is Flawed, Say Experts (Mint)
September 23, 2009: Editorial: An Idea That's A Patent Misfit (Mint)
October 2009: Bhaven N. Sampat, The Bayh-Dole Model in Developing Countries: Reflections on the Indian Bill on Publicly Funded Intellectual Property (UNCTAD - ICTSD Policy Brief No. 5)
January 2010: Amit Shovon Ray & Sabyasachi Saha, Patenting Public-Funded Research for Technology Transfer: A Conceptual-Empirical Synthesis of US Evidence and Lessons for India (ICRIER Working Paper No. 244)
January 2010: Mrinalini Kochupillai, The Protection and Utilization of Public Funded Intellectual Property Bill, 2008: A Critique in the Light of India's Innovation Environment, 15 J. Intell. Prop. Rights 19 (2010)
January 16, 2010: Amit Shovon Ray & Sabyasachi Saha, Intellectual Bottlenecks (Financial Express)
January 21, 2010: Latha Jishnu, Perils of the US Model (Business Standard)
January 22, 2010: Rema Nagarajan, Scientists Fume Over New Patent Bill (Times of India)
January 26, 2010: Shamnad Basheer, The Problem with Patents (Mint)
February 5, 2010: Shalini Butani, Public Research May Become More Private (Business Line)
February 8, 2010: Anika Gupta, Scientists Want Changes in Innovation Bill (Mint)
February 9, 2010: C.H. Unnikrishnan, Parliament Panel Wants Govt Review on Innovation Bill (Mint)
February 15, 2010: Leena Menghaney, A Bad Example from the U.S. (Down to Earth)
February 19, 2010: Pranesh Prakash, A Patent Conundrum (Indian Express)
SpicyIP coverage by tag 'Bayh Dole'
Presentations from NUJS, Kolkata conference on the PUPFIP Bill

On Bayh-Dole

Newspapers and Magazines

Academic Journals

Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for University Innovation, 20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1031 (2005)
Anthony So et al., Is Bayh-Dole Good for Developing Countries, 6 PLoS Biol. e262 (2008)
Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 289 (2003)
David C. Mowery & Arvids A. Aiedonis, Numbers, Quality, and Entry: How Has the Bayh-Dole Act Affected U.S. University Patenting and Licensing?, 1 Innovation Pol'y Econ. 187 (2000)
David C. Mowery, et al., Learning to Patent: Institutional Experience, Learning, and the Characteristics of U.S. University Patents After the Bayh-Dole Act, 1981-1992, 48 Mgmt. Sci. 73 (2002)
Donald Kennedy, Editorial: Enclosing the Research Commons, 294 Science 2249 (2001)
F.M. Scherer, The Political Economy of Patent Policy Reform in the United States, 7 Colorado J. Telecomm. High Tech. L. 167 (2009)
Henry Steck, Corporatization of the University: Seeking Conceptual Clarity, 585 Annals of Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 66 (2003)
Jason Owen-Smith, Trends and Transitions in the Institutional Environment for Public and Private Science, 49 Higher Educ. 91 (2005)
Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, University Licensing and the Bayh-Dole Act, 301 Science 1052 (2003)
Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, Who is Selling the Ivory Tower? Sources of Growth in University Licensing, 48 Mgmt. Sci. 90 (2002)
Josh Lerner, Review of 'Ivory Tower', 43 J. Econ. Litt. 510 (2005)
Joshua B. Powers, R&D Funding Source and University Technology Transfer: What is Stimulating Universities to Be More Entrepreneurial?, 45 Research in Higher Educ. 1 (2004)
Lita Nelsen, The Rise of Intellectual Property Protection in the American University, 279 Science 1460 (1998)
Marcia Angell & Arnold S. Relman, Patents, Profits & American Medicine: Conflicts of Interest in the Testing & Marketing of New Drugs, 131 Daedalus 102 (2002)
Maria Jelenik, Review: Two Books on Technology Transfer, 50 Admin. Sci. Q. 131 (2005) (Review of 'Ivory Tower')
Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Science 698 (1998)
Rebecca Henderson, et al., Universities as a Source of Commercia Technology: A Detailed Analsis of University Patenting, 1965-1988, 80 Rev. Econ. Statistics 119 (1998)
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsorded Research, 82 Virginia L. Rev. 1663 (1996)
Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Richard R. Nelson, Public vs. Proprietary Science: A Fruitful Tension?, 131 Daedalus 89 (2002)
Richard Jensen & Marie Thursby, Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The Licensing of University Inventions, 91 Am. Econ. Rev. 240 (2001)
Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, Economic Theories about the Benefits and Costs of Patents, 32 J. Econ. Issues 1031 (1998)
Thomas A. Massaro, Innovation, Technology Transfer, and Patent Policy: The University Contribution, 82 Virginia L. Rev. 1729 (1996)
Walter W. Powell & Jason Owen-Smith, Universities and the Market for Intellectual Property in the Life Sciences, 17 J. Pol'y Analysis Mgmt. 253 (1998)
William M. Sage, Funding Fairness: Public Investment, Proprietary Rights and Access to Health Care Technology, 82 Virginia L. Rev. 1737 (1996)
Zach W. Hall & Christopher Scott, University-Industry Partnership, 291 Science 553 (2001)

Resources

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/publications/pupfip/why-no-pupfip

Centre for Internet and Society

CIS Comments on the Draft National Policy on Electronics

Technology Transfer

Outflow of Foreign Exchange as Royalties Creating Adverse Balance of Payments

Table: India’s royalty and licence fees payments (current USD)

Table: India’s royalty and licence fees, receipts (current USD)

Linking of Value Chain and Preferential Treatment

Preferential Treatment

Cybersecurity and Source Code

Distinction between Innovation and Intellectual Property

National Electronics Mission

Funding

CIS Submission on Draft Patent Manual 2010

Positive changes in the Manual

A Guide to Key IPR Provisions of the Proposed India-European Union Free Trade Agreement

Arguments Against Software Patents in India

Preamble

What are Patents?

Philosophical Justification Against Software Patents

Legal Case Against Software Patents

Practical Reasons Against Software Patents

Patent Landmines / Submarine Patents / Patent Gridlocks / No Exception for Independent Creation

Don't These Cases Show How Software Patents Help Small Companies?

Term of Patents

Software Industry Progressed Greatly Without Patents

Copyright Exists for Software

Insufficient Disclosure

Software Patents Work Against Free/Libre/Open Source Software

Conclusion

Arguments Against the PUPFIP Bill

Summary

How is the legislation unnecessary?

How is the legislation harmful?

Additional resources

Arguments

How is the legislation unnecessary?

1) The Indian government does not have vast reserves of underutilized patents, as the U.S. did in 1980.

2) Technology transfer is very important, but pushing IPRs aggressively is not the best way of ensuring technology transfer.

How is the legislation harmful?

1) Excessive patenting lead to gridlocks and retard innovation.

2) The legislation makes mandatory that which is optional now, and is anyway being followed in many institutions.

3) Copyright, trademark, etc., seem to be covered under the definition of "public funded IP".

4) It will result in a form of double taxation for research, and will increase the consumer cost of all products based on publicly-funded research.

5) It could have unintended consequences of varied kinds, including discouraging fundamental research as well as discouraging industrial research.

6) Non-disclosure requirements in the Bill restricts the dissemination of research within the academic community, and curtails freedom of speech.

7) Exclusive licensing enables restriction on the dissemination of academic research in the marketplace, and increase in cost of products based on public-funded research.

Additional Resources

On the PUPFIP Bill

On Bayh-Dole