Centre for Internet and Society

WSIS+10 High Level Event: A Bird's Eye Report

geetha — 2014-06-20T15:57:32Z

The WSIS+10 High Level was organised by the ITU and collaborative UN entities on June 9-13, 2014. It aimed to evaluate the progress on implementation of WSIS Outcomes from Geneva 2003 and Tunis 2005, and to envision a post-2015 Development Agenda. Geetha Hariharan attended the event on CIS' behalf.

The World Summit on Information Society (WSIS) +10 High Level Event (HLE) was hosted at the ITU Headquarters in Geneva, from June 9-13, 2014. The HLE aimed to review the implementation and progress made on information and communication technology (ICT) across the globe, in light of WSIS outcomes (Geneva 2003 and Tunis 2005). Organised in three parallel tracks, the HLE sought to take stock of progress in ICTs in the last decade (High Level track), initiate High Level Dialogues to formulate the post-2015 development agenda, as well as host thematic workshops for participants (Forum track).

The High Level Track:

Opening Ceremony, WSIS+10 High Level Event (Source)

The High Level track opened officially on June 10, 2014, and culminated with the endorsement by acclamation (as is ITU tradition) of two Outcome Documents. These were: (1) WSIS+10 Statement on the Implementation of WSIS Outcomes, taking stock of ICT developments since the WSIS summits, (2) WSIS+10 Vision for WSIS Beyond 2015, aiming to develop a vision for the post-2015 global information society. These documents were the result of the WSIS+10 Multi-stakeholder Preparatory Platform (MPP), which involved WSIS stakeholders (governments, private sector, civil society, international organizations and relevant regional organizations).

The MPP met in six phases, convened as an open, inclusive consultation among WSIS stakeholders. It was not without its misadventures. While ITU Secretary General Dr. Hamadoun I. Touré consistently lauded the multi-stakeholder process, and Ambassador Janis Karklins urged all parties, especially governments, to “let the UN General Assembly know that the multi-stakeholder model works for Internet governance at all levels”, participants in the process shared stories of discomfort, disagreement and discord amongst stakeholders on various IG issues, not least human rights on the Internet, surveillance and privacy, and multi-stakeholderism. Richard Hill of the Association for Proper Internet Governance (APIG) and the Just Net Coalition writes that like NETmundial, the MPP was rich in a diversity of views and knowledge exchange, but stakeholders failed to reach consensus on crucial issues. Indeed, Prof. Vlamidir Minkin, Chairman of the MPP, expressed his dismay at the lack of consensus over action line C9. A compromise was agreed upon in relation to C9 later.

Some members of civil society expressed their satisfaction with the extensive references to human rights and rights-centred development in the Outcome Documents. While governmental opposition was seen as frustrating, they felt that the MPP had sought and achieved a common understanding, a sentiment echoed by the ITU Secretary General. Indeed, even Iran, a state that had expressed major reservations during the MPP and felt itself unable to agree with the text, agreed that the MPP had worked hard to draft a document beneficial to all.

Concerns around the MPP did not affect the review of ICT developments over the last decade. High Level Panels with Ministers of ICT from states such as Uganda, Bangladesh, Sweden, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and others, heads of the UN Development Programme, UNCTAD, Food and Agriculture Organisation, UN-WOMEN and others spoke at length of rapid advances in ICTs. The focus was largely on ICT access and affordability in developing states. John E. Davies of Intel repeatedly drew attention to innovative uses of ICTs in Africa and Asia, which have helped bridge divides of affordability, gender, education and capacity-building. Public-private partnerships were the best solution, he said, to affordability and access. At a ceremony evaluating implementation of WSIS action-lines, the Centre for Development of Advanced Computing (C-DAC), India, won an award for its e-health application MOTHER.

The Outcome Documents themselves shall be analysed in a separate post. But in sum, the dialogue around Internet governance at the HLE centred around the success of the MPP. Most participants on panels and in the audience felt this was a crucial achievement within the realm of the UN, where the Tunis Summit had delineated strict roles for stakeholders in paragraph 35 of the Tunis Agenda. Indeed, there was palpable relief in Conference Room 1 at the CICG, Geneva, when on June 11, Dr. Touré announced that the Outcome Documents would be adopted without a vote, in keeping with ITU tradition, even if consensus was achieved by compromise.

The High Level Dialogues:

Prof. Vladimir Minkin delivers a statement. (Source)

The High Level Dialogues on developing a post-2015 Development Agenda, based on WSIS action lines, were active on June 12. Introducing the Dialogue, Dr. Touré lamented the Millennium Development Goals as a “lost opportunity”, emphasizing the need to alert the UN General Assembly and its committees as to the importance of ICTs for development.

As on previous panels, there was intense focus on access, affordability and reach in developing countries, with Rwanda and Bangladesh expounding upon their successes in implementing ICT innovations domestically. The world is more connected than it was in 2005, and the ITU in 2014 is no longer what it was in 2003, said speakers. But we lack data on ICT deployment across the globe, said Minister Knutssen of Sweden, recalling the gathering to the need to engage all stakeholders in this task. Speakers on multiple panels, including the Rwandan Minister for CIT, Marilyn Cade of ICANN and Petra Lantz of the UNDP, emphasized the need for ‘smart engagement’ and capacity-building for ICT development and deployment.

A crucial session on cybersecurity saw Dr. Touré envision a global peace treaty accommodating multiple stakeholders. On the panel were Minister Omobola Johnson of Nigeria, Prof. Udo Helmbrecht of the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA), Prof. A.A. Wahab of Cybersecurity Malaysia and Simon Muller of Facebook. The focus was primarily on building laws and regulations for secure communication and business, while child protection was equally considered.

The lack of laws/regulations for cybersecurity (child pornography and jurisdictional issues, for instance), or other legal protections (privacy, data protection, freedom of speech) in rapidly connecting developing states was noted. But the question of cross-border surveillance and wanton violations of privacy went unaddressed except for the customary, unavoidable mention. This was expected. Debates in Internet governance have, in the past year, been silently and invisibly driven by the Snowden revelations. So too, at WSIS+10 Cybersecurity, speakers emphasized open data, information exchange, data ownership and control (the right to be forgotten), but did not openly address surveillance. Indeed, Simon Muller of Facebook called upon governments to publish their own transparency reports: A laudable suggestion, even accounting for Facebook’s own undetailed and truncated reports.

In a nutshell, the post-2015 Development Agenda dialogues repeatedly emphasized the importance of ICTs in global connectivity, and their impact on GDP growth and socio-cultural change and progress. The focus was on taking this message to the UN General Assembly, engaging all stakeholders and creating an achievable set of action lines post-2015.

The Forum Track:

Participants at the UNESCO session on its Comprehensive Study on Internet-related Issues (Source)

The HLE was organized as an extended version of the WSIS Forum, which hosts thematic workshops and networking opportunities, much like any other conference. Running in parallel sessions over 5 days, the WSIS Forum hosted sessions by the ITU, UNESCO, UNDP, ICANN, ISOC, APIG, etc., on issues as diverse as the WSIS Action Lines, the future of Internet governance, the successes and failures of WCIT-2012, UNESCO’s Comprehensive Study on Internet-related Issues, spam and a taxonomy of Internet governance.

Detailed explanation of each session I attended is beyond the scope of this report, so I will limit myself to the interesting issues raised.

At ICANN’s session on its own future (June 9), Ms. Marilyn Cade emphasized the importance of national and regional IGFs for both issue-awareness and capacity-building. Mr. Nigel Hickson spoke of engagement at multiple Internet governance fora: “Internet governance is not shaped by individual events”. In light of criticism of ICANN’s apparent monopoly over IANA stewardship transition, this has been ICANN’s continual response (often repeated at the HLE itself). Also widely discussed was the role of stakeholders in Internet governance, given the delineation of roles and responsibilities in the Tunis Agenda, and governments’ preference for policy-monopoly (At WSIS+10, Indian Ambassador Dilip Sinha seemed wistful that multilateralism is a “distant dream”).

This discussion bore greater fruit in a session on Internet governance ‘taxonomy’. The session saw Mr. George Sadowsky, Dr. Jovan Kurbalija, Mr. William Drake and Mr. Eliot Lear (there is surprisingly no official profile-page on Mr. Lear) expound on dense structures of Internet governance, involving multiple methods of classification of Internet infrastructure, CIRs, public policy issues, etc. across a spectrum of ‘baskets’ – socio-cultural, economic, legal, technical. Such studies, though each attempting clarity in Internet governance studies, indicate that the closer you get to IG, the more diverse and interconnected the eco-system gets. David Souter’s diagrams almost capture the flux of dynamic debate in this area (please see pages 9 and 22 of this ISOC study).

There were, for most part, insightful interventions from session participants. Mr. Sadowsky questioned the effectiveness of the Tunis Agenda delineation of stakeholder-roles, while Mr. Lear pleaded that techies be let to do their jobs without interference. Ms. Anja Kovacs raised pertinent concerns about including voiceless minorities in a ‘rough consensus’ model. Across sessions, questions of mass surveillance, privacy and data ownership rose from participants. The protection of human rights on the Internet – especially freedom of expression and privacy – made continual appearance, across issues like spam (Question 22-1/1 of ITU-D Study Group 1) and cybersecurity.

Conclusion:

The HLE was widely attended by participants across WSIS stakeholder-groups. At the event, a great many relevant questions such as the future of ICTs, inclusions in the post-2015 Development Agenda, the value of muti-stakeholder models, and human rights such as free speech and privacy were raised across the board. Not only were these raised, but cognizance was taken of them by Ministers, members of the ITU and other collaborative UN bodies, private sector entities such as ICANN, technical community such as the ISOC and IETF, as well as (obviously) civil society.

Substantively, the HLE did not address mass surveillance and privacy, nor of expanding roles of WSIS stakeholders and beyond. Processually, the MPP failed to reach consensus on several issues comfortably, and a compromise had to be brokered.

But perhaps a big change at the HLE was the positive attitude to multi-stakeholder models from many quarters, not least the ITU Secretary General Dr. Hamadoun Touré. His repeated calls for acceptance of multi-stakeholderism left many members of civil society surprised and tentatively pleased. Going forward, it will be interesting to track the ITU and the rest of UN’s (and of course, member states’) stances on multi-stakeholderism at the ITU Plenipot, the WSIS+10 Review and the UN General Assembly session, at the least.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/wsis-10-high-level-event-a-birds-eye-report

Will The International Telecommunication Regulations (ITRs) Impact Internet Governance? A Multistakeholder Perspective

pranesh — 2012-12-10T04:40:11Z

Pranesh Prakash made a presentation at the India Internet Governance Conference (IIGC) held at the FICCI, Federation House, Tansen Marg, New Delhi on October 4 and 5, 2012. The event was organised by the Ministry of Communications & Information Technology, FICCI and Internet Society. CIS was one of the supporting organisations.

Principles

I'll outline some broad principles that should be kept in mind while deciding on proposals for the International Telecommunications Regulations (ITR).

Any proposal should be considered for the ITR if an only if it satisfies all the below criteria:

Only if international regulation is needed

If only national regulation is sufficient, then ITR is not the right place for it.
International roaming price transparency, for instance, is an issue where international cooperation is required.

Only if it is a technical issue limited to telecommunications networks and interoperability

On the issues of 'security', if it is strictly about network security, then it is fine.

ITU already does some standard setting work around this.

If it about security of root server operations, or DNS, etc., that's not around telecommunications, despite being a technical issue.
If it is about criminal activities on telecommunications networks, that is not a technical issue.

Only if it is something that can be decided at the level of states.

Multistakeholder issues should not end up at the ITU, since the ITU is not a multistakeholder body.
This principle has been accepted by the ITU itself in the Geneva Declaration as well as the Tunis Agenda.

Only if it proposes to address a proven harm

The ETNO proposal, for instance, does not make it very clear why they think current interconnection system is a problem.

Though the ETNO proposal says that it is required to enable "fair compensation", "sustainable development of telecom", it does so without showing why the current payment mechanisms are unsustainable, or how telecom industry has changed lately, or even how moving from voice to data (even for voice) is going to affect "sustainable development of telecom".
Geoff Huston provides the wonderful example of how ten years ago, content providers were asking for fair compensation from telecom providers ("content is being provided free, while ISPs charge customers; ISPs are worthless without content, hence ISPs need to share revenue with content providers"). Now the opposite argument is being made by telecom operators.

Airtel in India has publicly asked Google and Facebook for revenue sharing.

Rohan Samarajiva of LIRNEasia

He believes ETNO proposal is bad for developing countries.

Adverse unintended effect of ETNO proposal ("sending-party network pays") is that less traffic will be directed towards poorer regions without the ability (whether through ad sales, or otherwise) to justify that expenditure by the sender.

ISOC paper is one of the most in-depth analysis so far.

They strongly believe it is going to be bad for Internet

Truth is that there has been no clear economic study so far of the potential impact. Hence counting benefits without proper analysis is risky.

Only if there's no better place than ITU

If another existing organization like ICANN or IETF can look at it, then ITU should not take over.

If all the above principles are satisfied, then the question becomes:

Does the proposal further substantive principles, such as:
Development
Competition and prevention of monopolies
Etc.

If the proposal does advance such substantive principles, then we should ask what kind of regulation is needed: Whether mandatory or not whether it is the minimal amount required to achieve the policy objectives.

Conclusion

Indian government's positions on the specific proposals to the ITR haven't yet been made public.

But the India government has taken a public position on the larger issue before: the IBSA statement on Enhanced Cooperation from December 2010. the IBSA reaffirms its commitment to the stability and security of the Internet as a global facility based on the full participation of all stakeholders, from both developed and developing countries, within their respective roles and responsibilities in line with paragraph 35 of the Tunis Agenda.

"The management of the Internet encompasses both technical and public policy issues and should involve all stakeholders and relevant intergovernmental and international organizations."

Demonization of the ITU is not good, though some in civil society have engaged in it, and is not the issue here. * After all, ITU was a core part of the WSIS process that led to the multistakeholder system. * ITU does have its own role to play in Internet governance.

Importantly, transparency and public participation is required. * We have signed an international civil society letter asking ITU to be more transparent. This has had a little impact; more documents are now out in the public. And there's now WCITLeaks.org * The Indian government must hold inclusive meetings with all relevant experts and stakeholders, including civil society organizations and academics.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/will-the-international-telecommunication-regulations-itrs-impact-internet-governance-a-multistakeholder-perspective

UN agrees to review agencies governing Internet

praskrishna — 2012-12-31T02:40:20Z

Although India’s proposal has been criticized as an effort to control the Net, govt says this will ensure it has more say in policymaking.

The article by Surabhi Agarwal was published in Livemint on December 27, 2012. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

In the fierce debate on who governs the Internet, the Indian government can claim a small victory of sorts after the UN decided to establish a working group to review the mandate of agencies administering the worldwide network of computers.

India last year proposed creating an UN agency, dubbed the Committee on Internet-Related Policies (CIRP), that would decide on issues related to the Internet, including control of resources such as domain names and Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (Icann), a non-governmental organization based in the US, currently administers these.

The US, the UK and Canada refused to sign a new communications treaty proposed at the 3-14 December Dubai conference of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), which sets global telecom technical standards, on fears that it will give national governments greater control over the Internet and may restrict free speech. India, too, hasn’t signed the pact.

“Even though the United Nations has not yet accepted India’s proposal for constituting CIRP, it (the formation of a working group) is a step forward, as now the working group on enhanced cooperation will deliberate on the need for CIRP,” a government official said, requesting anonymity.

Although India’s proposal has been criticized as an effort to control the Internet, the government has said this will ensure it has a greater say in Internet policymaking.

The Commission on Science and Technology for Development, a UN body, has been asked to establish a working group on enhanced cooperation to examine the mandate of the World Summit on the Information Society, which issues non-binding guidelines on the Internet, “through seeking, compiling and reviewing inputs from all member states and all other stakeholders,” according to a 12 December letter from the UN to the Indian government. The working group has been asked to submit its report to the commission in 2014.

Mint has reviewed a copy of the letter and also India’s response to the UN welcoming the move.

The UN’s move reflected India’s growing influence in multilateral policymaking bodies, according to Rajat Kathuria, chief executive and director of Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, a think tank.

“India’s increasing clout not only in the WTO (World Trade Organisation) but also in these kinds of forums is fairly obvious,” he said. The country should be able to stand its ground and use its negotiating powers well, he added. “Everybody is looking at India now and it should not be forced into getting into things it doesn’t want to.” Kathuria also agreed with India’s decision to consider in detail the new global telecom pact, which contains a resolution on the Internet, before signing it.

“We don’t have enough information on the impact of signing this treaty,” Kathuria said. “I agree with what India has done. We need to do our homework and understand clearly what it means.”

Although the treaty is restricted to telecom standards, it contained a non-binding resolution on the Internet. The treaty stated that its purview doesn’t include content over telecommunications networks or the Internet.

However, there have been divergent views on its implications. While some have argued that signing it would mean giving the ITU dominance over Internet governance, others dismiss it as harmless.

“This wasn’t an ITU takeover of the Internet and India’s signing of the treaty will not make it one,” said Pranesh Prakash, policy director at Centre for Internet Studies, a Bangalore-based think tank.

However, India’s cautious approach is a good sign, he said. “I hope civil society is consulted before the decision is taken whether to support ITR (International Telecommunication Regulations) and the resolutions which were passed in Dubai.”

Critical Internet resources such as domain names and IP addresses are like natural resources and no one country should monetize them or have control over them, said another government official.

“It is of utmost importance for India to have a say in the matters of the Internet as the country has huge untapped potential in the area of Internet and technology,” said the official, who too declined to be named.

A white paper on Internet governance by Research and Information System for Developing Countries, chaired by Shyam Saran, former Indian diplomat, has said the Internet continues to be managed by private entities such as Icann “under contractual arrangements with the US government”.

Icann is not controlled by the US government, an official of the Internet administrator said on condition of anonymity. It follows a multi-stakeholder model.

The paper on Internet governance argued against the allegation that India’s proposal of CIRP will lead to government’s control of the Internet.

“India’s proposal for CIRP, a multilateral and multi-stakeholder mechanism, is not intended to control content,” it said. “It does not insist that the governments have the last word in regulating the Internet.”

The paper had argued that India should pursue the establishment of a working group on enhanced cooperation, which will pave the way for further consideration of India’s proposal for the establishment of CIRP.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/livemint-december-27-2012-surabhi-agarwal-un-agrees-to-review-agencies-governing-internet

The Worldwide Web of Concerns

pranesh — 2012-12-10T05:10:47Z

The threat of a ‘UN takeover’ of the Internet through the WCIT is non-existent. However, that does not mean that activists have been crying themselves hoarse in vain.

Pranesh Prakash's column was published in the Asian Age on December 10, 2012.

The International Telecommunication Union’s World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT-12) is currently under way in Dubai, after a gap of 25 years. At this conference, the International Telecommunication Regulations — a binding treaty containing high-level principles — are to be revised.

Much has changed since the 1988 Melbourne conference. Since 1988, mobile telephony has grown by leaps and bounds, the Internet has expanded and the World Wide Web has come into existence. Telecommunications is now, by and large, driven by the private sector and not by state monopolies.

While there are welcome proposals (consumer protection relating to billing of international roaming), there have also been contentious issues that Internet activists have raised: a) process-related problems with the ITU; b) scope of the ITRs, and of ITU’s authority; c) content-related proposals and “evil governments” clamping down on free speech; d) IP traffic routing and distribution of revenues.

Process-related problems: The ITU is a closed-door body with only governments having a voice, and only they and exorbitant fees-paying sector members have access to documents and proposals. Further, governments generally haven’t held public consultations before forming their positions. This lack of transparency and public participation is anathema to any form of global governance and is clearly one of the strongest points of Internet activists who’ve raised alarm bells over WCIT.

Scope of ITRs: Most telecom regulators around the world distinguish between information services and telecom services, with regulators often not having authority over the former. A few countries even believe that the wide definition of telecommunications in the ITU constitution and the existing ITRs already covers certain aspects of the Internet, and contend that the revisions are in line with the ITU constitution. This view should be roundly rejected, while noting that there are some legitimate concerns about the shift of traditional telephony to IP-based networks and the ability of existing telecom regulations (such as those for mandatory emergency services) to cope with this shift.

ITU’s relationship with Internet governance has been complicated. In 1997, it was happy to take a hands-off approach, cooperating with Internet Society and others, only to seek a larger role in Internet governance soon after. In part this has been because the United States cocked a snook at the ITU and the world community in 1998 through the way it established Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) as a body to look after the Internet’s domain name system. While the fact that the US has oversight over ICANN needs to change (with de-nationalisation being the best option), Russia wants to supersede ICANN and that too through current revisions of the ITRs. Russia’s proposal is a dreadful idea, and must not just be discarded lightly but thrown away with great force. The ITU should remain but one among multiple equal stakeholders concerned with Internet governance.

One important, but relatively unnoticed, proposed change to ITU’s authority is that of making the standards that ITU’s technical wing churns out mandatory. This is a terrible idea (especially in view of the ITU’s track record at such standards) that only a stuffy bureaucrat without any real-world insight into standards adoption could have dreamt up.

Content-related proposals: Internet activists, especially US-based ones, have been most vocal about the spectre of undemocratic governments trying to control online speech through the ITRs. Their concerns are overblown, especially given that worse provisions already exist in the ITU’s constitution. A more real threat is that of increasing national regulation of the Internet and its subsequent balkanisation, and this is increasingly becoming reality even without revisions to the ITRs. Having said that, we must ensure that issues like harmonisation of cyber-security and spam laws, which India has been pushing, should not come under ITU’s authority. A further worry is the increasing militarisation of cyberspace, and an appropriate space must be found by nation-states to address this pressing issue, without bringing it under the same umbrella as online protests by groups like Anonymous.

Division of revenue: Another set of proposals is being pushed by a group of European telecom companies hoping to revive their hard-hit industry. They want the ITU to regulate how payments are made for the flow of Internet traffic, and to prevent so-called “net neutrality” laws that aim to protect consumers and prevent monopolistic market abuse. They are concerned that the Googles and Facebooks of the world are free-riding on their investments. That all these companies pay to use networks just as all home users do, is conveniently forgotten. Thankfully, most countries don’t seem to be considering these proposals seriously.

Can general criteria be framed for judging these proposals? In submissions to the Indian government, the Centre for Internet and Society suggested that any proposed revision of the ITRs be considered favourably only if it passes all the following tests: if international regulation is required, rather than just national-level regulation (i.e., the principle of subsidiarity); if it is a technical issue limited to telecommunications networks and services, and their interoperability; if it is an issue that has to be decided exclusively at the level of nation-states; if the precautionary principle is satisfied; and if there is no better place than the ITRs to address that issue. If all of the above are satisfied, then it must be seen if it furthers substantive principles, such as equity and development, competition and prevention of monopolies, etc. If it does, then we should ask what kind of regulation is needed: whether it should be mandatory, whether it is the correct sort of intervention required to achieve the policy objectives.

The threat of a “UN takeover” of the Internet through the WCIT is non-existent. Since the ITU’s secretary-general is insisting on consensus (as is tradition) rather than voting, the possibility of bad proposals (of which there are many) going through is slim. However, that doesn’t mean that activists have been crying themselves hoarse in vain. That people around the world are a bit more aware about the linkage between the technical features of the Internet and its potential as a vehicle for free speech, commerce and development, is worth having to hear some shriller voices out there.

The writer is policy director at the Centre for Internet and Society, Bengaluru

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/asian-age-column-december-10-2012-pranesh-prakash-the-worldwide-web-of-concerns

The Worldwide Web of Concerns

pranesh — 2012-12-27T04:31:39Z

The International Telecommunication Union’s World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT-12) is currently under way in Dubai, after a gap of 25 years. At this conference, the Inter-national Telecommunication Regulations — a binding treaty containing high-level principles — are to be revised.

Pranesh Prakash's column was published in the Deccan Chronicle on December 10, 2012.

Much has changed since the 1988 Melbourne conference. Since 1988, mobile telephony has grown by leaps and bounds, the Internet has expanded and the World Wide Web has come into existence.

Telecommunications is now, by and large, driven by the private sector and not by state monopolies.

Process-related problems: The ITU is a closed-door body with only governments having a voice, and only they and exorbitant fees-paying sector members have access to documents and proposals. Further, governments generally haven’t held public consultations before forming their positions. This lack of transparency and public participation is anathema to any form of global governance and is clearly one of the strongest points of Internet activists who’ve raised alarm bells over WCIT.

w Scope of ITRs: Most telecom regulators around the world distinguish between information services and telecom services, with regulators often not having authority over the former. A few countries even believe that the wide definition of telecommunications in the ITU constitution and the existing ITRs already covers certain aspects of the Internet, and contend that the revisions are in line with the ITU constitution. This view should be roundly rejected, while noting that there are some legitimate concerns about the shift of traditional telephony to IP-based networks and the ability of existing telecom regulations (such as those for mandatory emergency services) to cope with this shift.

Content-related proposals: Internet activists, especially US-based ones, have been most vocal about the spectre of undemocratic governments trying to control online speech through the ITRs. Their concerns are overblown, especially given that worse provisions already exist in the ITU’s constitution. A more real threat is that of increasing national regulation of the Internet and its subsequent balkanisation, and this is increasingly becoming reality even without revisions to the ITRs.

Having said that, we must ensure that issues like harmonisation of cyber-security and spam laws, which India has been pushing, should not come under ITU’s authority. A further worry is the increasing militarisation of cyberspace, and an appropriate space must be found by nation-states to address this pressing issue, without bringing it under the same umbrella as online protests by groups like Anonymous.

Division of revenue: Another set of proposals is being pushed by a group of European telecom companies hoping to revive their hard-hit industry. They want the ITU to regulate how payments are made for the flow of Internet traffic, and to prevent socalled “net neutrality” laws that aim to protect consumers and prevent monopolistic market abuse. They are concerned that the Googles and Facebooks of the world are free-riding on their investments. That all these companies pay to use networks just as all home users do, is conveniently forgotten. Thankfully, most countries don’t seem to be considering these proposals seriously.

Can general criteria be framed for judging these proposals? In submissions to the Indian government, the Centre for Internet and Society suggested that any proposed revision of the ITRs be considered favourably only if it passes all the following tests: if international regulation is required, rather than just national-level regulation (i.e., the principle of subsidiarity); if it is a technical issue limited to telecommunications networks and services, and their interoperability; if it is an issue that has to be decided exclusively at the level of nation-states; if the precautionary principle is satisfied; and if there is no better place than the ITRs to address that issue. If all of the above are satisfied, then it must be seen if it furthers substantive principles, such as equity and development, competition and prevention of monopolies, etc. If it does, then we should ask what kind of regulation is needed: whether it should be mandatory, whether it is the correct sort of intervention required to achieve the policy objectives.

The writer is policy director at the Centre for Internet and Society, Bengaluru

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/deccan-chronicle-pranesh-prakash-december-10-2012-the-worldwide-web-of-concerns

The Trouble with Hurried Solutions

chinmayi — 2012-12-20T04:23:08Z

The World Conference on International Telecommunication showed that countries are not yet ready to arrive at a consensus on regulation and control of the Internet

Chinmayi Arun's Op-ed was published in the Hindu on December 15, 2012.

The World Conference on International Telecommunication (WCIT) that concluded on December 14 saw much heated debate. Some countries wanted to use the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to gain intergovernmental control of the World Wide Web. Some saw it as an opportunity to democratise the Internet, by replacing U.S. and corporate domination of Internet policy, with a more intergovernmental process. Others insisted that the Internet must be left alone.

The result is that after many days’ deliberations, there was no consensus. The amended International Telecommunication Regulations (ITRs) document has not yet been signed by over 50 countries, of which some like the United States have refused to sign altogether, while others have said that they will need to consult with their national governments before signing.

This article discusses the broader issue under question, which is, whether ITU is the best forum to solve the cross-border problems that arise in relation to the Internet.

WCIT, ITU and ITRs

The ITU has been creating international policy from the days in which the telegraph was prevalent. Although it is now a United Nations agency, its existence predates the U.N. As technology evolved, forcing the telegraph to give way to the telephone, the ITU created new standards for telephony. It even rechristened itself from ‘International Telegraph Union’ to ‘International Telecommunications Union’.

The ITU performs an essential role in ensuring that multiple states with their varying technology, standards and legal systems, are able to interconnect and co-ordinate. Its harmonising rules and standards make co-ordination easier and cheaper than having each state come to an agreement with every other state. The ITRs within the ITU framework facilitate co-ordination by creating binding rules for member states.

Some countries’ proposals for the amendment of the ITRs would have affected content on the Internet substantially. However, after prolonged negotiation, the final draft that was under consideration contained an explicit statement excluding such content from the ITRs’ purview. This draft also came with a resolution that made reference to states’ elaborating their Internet related public policy positions in ITU fora, which was a source of controversy.

Some of the initial suggestions like Russia’s controversial proposal would have given the ITU greater sway over the Internet, permitting it to lay down global standards. These standards may have encouraged countries to inspect data transmitted across the Internet to check whether it is undesirable content raising serious privacy and freedom of speech concerns, especially in countries that do not protect these rights.

The global standards created by the ITU would have permeated to the companies that create the web-based applications that we use, and the resulting law and technological choices would have affected individual users.

Internet governance

The ITU makes its decisions using a traditional model that only seeks consensus between governments, and this is far removed from the way in which the Internet has been governed thus far. Therefore, although expanding the ITU’s mandate to the Internet may seem natural to those who have followed its evolution mirroring the evolution of information technology, the ITU’s manner of functioning is viewed by many as being at odds with the more multi-stakeholder and ad hoc system used to build Internet policy.

In the 1990s, John Perry Barlow proclaimed that cyberspace was outside national borders, and questioned the authority and legitimacy of a national government’s attempts to govern it. Over the years, it has become clear that national governments can exert jurisdiction in cyberspace: filtering content, launching surveillance of users, and creating law that impacts citizens’ behaviour online directly and indirectly.

However, governments’ exertion of will on Internet users is tempered greatly by the other forces that have a strong influence on the Internet. User-behaviour and content often depend on the policies of major service providers like Google, Yahoo, Twitter and Facebook.

Key standards and functions like the allocation of domain names and developing of Internet standards are managed by organisations like ICANN and IETF, which are not governmental organisations. Features like user anonymity are based on technological choices on the World Wide Web. Therefore, governments face significant obstacles and counterbalancing power when they attempt to impose their will on citizens online.

The ITU can weigh this power balance in favour of governments. Many fear that more government power will lead to more censorship, surveillance and stifling of the innovation that is integral to the evolution of Internet. But others support ITU intervention, in the belief that an international inter-governmental regulatory body would be more accountable, and would prevent corporate abuse of power.

Several of the aforementioned corporations, as well as regulatory bodies under question, are headquartered in the United States. There are those who see this as excessive U.S. influence on the Internet, eroding the sovereignty of other states, which have relatively limited influence over what their citizens can transmit and access online. These people see the ITU as a forum that can democratise Internet Governance, giving states shared influence over the web. However, this shared influence is resisted by those who find that the U.S. influence offers them more leverage and protection for their freedom of speech, than increased influence of countries that threaten this internationally accepted human right.

Powerful arguments in favour of increased ITU involvement include highlighting the dangers of abandoning the Internet to the free market. It is true that markets need some regulation to guard against malfunction and abuse of power by stronger players. However, the significant question is not whether these markets should be regulated, but how they should be regulated. Unfortunately, many of the arguments that supported expansion of the ITU’s mandate failed to establish why the ITU is the best solution to the problems plaguing the Internet, rather than being the most readily available reaction.

Any regulatory intervention must have very clear objectives, and some estimate of its likely impact. The intervention must not be considered in isolation but in contrast with other ways to achieve the same goals. Although some of the serious transnational issues plaguing the Internet need international solutions, the ITU, at least in its current avatar, is not necessarily the best remedy. It also remains unclear exactly what effect ITU intervention would have on the Internet — whether it would really offer solutions as intended, or whether it would prove more detrimental than useful, condoning of human rights violations and slowing the blistering innovation that is characteristic of the Internet.

Lack of consensus

Therefore, some of the initial concerns expressed by the countries that refused to sign the ITRs were legitimate. However, the final ITRs document addressed many of these concerns. The dissent emerged over the insertion of text in the preamble that recognised member states’ rights to access international telecommunication networks. These rights, being expressed only in the preamble, are not enforceable, even if they express intentions that are unacceptable to some.

The debates at the WCIT made it clear that the world is not yet ready to come to a unified position on this subject. Perhaps the ITU’s continuation in its path towards increasing, and making effective, multi-stakeholder participation will be the unifying factor some day, if it evolves into a forum which everyone sees as sufficiently democratic, transparent and accountable for Internet policy.

(The writer is Assistant Professor of Law at National Law University, Delhi, and a Fellow of the Centre for Internet and Society, Bangalore. She attended the WCIT from December 3-14)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-hindu-opinion-lead-december-15-2012-chinmayi-arun-the-trouble-with-hurried-solutions

Submission on India's Draft Comments on Proposed Changes to the ITU's ITRs

pranesh — 2012-12-07T04:15:56Z

Given below are the responses from the representatives of civil society in India (The Society for Knowledge Commons, Centre for Internet & Society, The Delhi Science Forum, Free Software Movement of India, Internet Democracy Project and Media for Change) to the Government of India's proposals for the upcoming WCIT meeting, in December 2012, in Dubai.

Our detailed comments on India's draft proposals can be found here. Also read the final version of Indian Government's submission to ITU on November 3, 2012.

Background

We believe that, aspects of Internet governance that have been and are presently addressed by bodies other than ITU should not be brought under the mandate of the ITU through the ITRs.

Some of the proposed changes to the ITR's could have a significant negative impact on the openness of the Internet.

In addition, the processes related to the WCIT lack openness and transparency: the WCIT / ITU excludes civil society, academia and other stakeholders from participation in and access to most dialogues and documents, contrary to established principles of Internet governance as laid down in the Tunis Agenda and as supported by the Indian government at several national and international fora. The WCIT process needs to be improved both at the domestic and global level. We urge the Indian government to support a more open process in the future, with respect to deliberations that will have a significant impact on the people.

We recognise that concerns regarding cyber-security, spam, fraud, etc. are real and that some of these concerns require to be addressed at the global level. However, we believe that as a number of parallel processes are working on these specific issues, these need not be brought under the ITRs.

We therefore strongly recommend that the ITRs continue to be restricted to the infrastructure layer that has traditionally been the area of its focus and not the content or the application layer of the Internet. Any measure that impinges on these layers should be kept out of ITRs and taken up at other appropriate (multi-stakeholder) fora.

We note that the proposal ARB/7/24 defines an "operating agency" as "any individual, company, corporation or governmental agency which operates a telecommunication installation intended for an international telecommunication service or capable of causing harmful interference with such a service" and believe that this definition is too broad in scope and ambit. Inclusion of such a term would broaden the mandate of the ITU to regulate numerous actors in the Internet sphere who do not fall under the infrastructure layer of the Internet. We call on the Indian government to ensure that the term "operating agency" is defined in a narrower or more restrictive manner and only used in exceptional cases. Normally, the obligations of member states should be with respect to "recognised operating agencies" and not omnibus all "operating agencies".

Follow-up

We would like to note that we have never officially received this document directly from the Indian government. In view of the support the Indian government continually espouses for multi-stakeholder Internet governance, this is a matter of deep regret.

We are aware that the official closing date for proposals is early November. However, we also know that several governments intend to submit proposals right upto the beginning of the WCIT meeting. In addition, several governments have included civil society representatives on their official delegation.

We therefore call upon the Department of Telecommunications to organise an open consultation with civil society representatives, to discuss both India's proposals and the comments of various civil society representatives on them, in greater depth, as part of DoT’s preparation for the WCIT meeting and in line with India's espoused commitment to multi-stakeholderism. We look forward to discussing our inputs with the Government to make the decision making process on governance more participatory and inclusive.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/submission-on-indias-draft-comments-on-proposed-changes-to-itus-itrs

Submission by Indian Civil Society Organisations on Proposals for the Future ITRs and Related Processes

pranesh — 2012-12-07T08:00:19Z

The Centre for Internet & Society was one of the signatories of this submission which was sent in November 2012, in response to the International Telecommunication Union's call for public comments in relation to the revision of International Telecommunication Regulations that are to take place at the ITU's World Conference on International Telecommunications in Dubai from December 3 to 14, 2012.

We, the undersigned civil society organisations from India, respectfully acknowledge the important role that the ITU has played in the spread of telecommunications around the world. However, we are concerned about the lack of transparency and openness of the processes related to the WCIT: the WCIT/ITU excludes civil society, academia and other stakeholders from participation in and access to most dialogues and documents. The documents that are publicly available show that some of the proposals might deal with Internet governance. According to established principles as laid down in the Tunis Agenda - which process the ITU helped to lead - Internet governance processes are required to be multistakeholder in nature. The WCIT and ITU processes require urgent improvement with regard to openness, inclusiveness and transparency. While we appreciate the current opportunity to share our comments, we would like to encourage the ITU and its Member States to adopt a genuine multistakeholder approach at the earliest.

As mentioned, we do welcome the current opportunity to share our thoughts. Though this list is not exhaustive, some of our major concerns are as follows:

We believe that, given the historical development of present methods of internet regulation, aspects of Internet governance that have been and are presently addressed by bodies other than ITU should not be brought under the mandate of the ITU through the ITRs.

We therefore strongly recommend that the ITRs continue to be restricted to aspects of the physical layer that have traditionally been the areas of its focus. The ITRs scope should not be expanded to other layers, nor to content - any measure that impinges on these layers should be kept out of ITRs and taken up at other appropriate (multi-stakeholder) fora. In addition, it is crucial that “ICTs” and the term “processing” be excluded from the definition of telecommunication as this clearly opens up the possibility for Member States to regulate/attempt to regulate the “content/“application” layer on the internet at the ITU.

We also recommend that provisions regarding international naming, numbering, addressing and identification resources will be restricted to telephony, as should provisions regarding transit rate, originating identification and end-to-end QoS. Provisions regarding the routing of Internet traffic should not find a place in the ITRs at all.

We recognise that concerns regarding cyber security, spam, fraud, etc. are real and that some of these concerns require to be addressed at the global level. However, as these are being discussed in many other fora, we believe that the ITRs are not the best place to address these. Their inclusion here could inhibit the further evolution and expansion of the Internet. We also believe that any fora discussing cyber security should be multistakeholder, open and transparent.

We note that the proposal ARB/7/24 defines an “operating agency” as “any individual, company, corporation or governmental agency which operates a telecommunication installation intended for an international telecommunication service or capable of causing harmful interference with such a service” and believe that this definition is too broad in scope and ambit. Inclusion of such a term would broaden the mandate of the ITU to regulate numerous actors in the Internet sphere who do not fall under the infrastructure layer of the Internet. The term “operating agency” should be defined in a narrower or more restrictive manner and, irrespective of its exact definition, only be used in exceptional cases. Normally, the obligations of member states should be with respect to “recognised operating agencies” and not omnibus all “operating agencies”.

Signed:

Centre for Internet and Society
Delhi Science Forum
Free Software Movement India
Internet Democracy Project
Knowledge Commons (India)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/submission-on-proposals-for-future-itrs-and-related-processes

Statement of Civil Society Members and Groups Participating in the "Best Bits" pre-IGF meeting at Baku in 2012

pranesh — 2012-12-07T08:06:25Z

The Centre for Internet & Society was one of the signatories for this submission made to the ITU on November 16, 2012.

Read the statement of civil society members and groups participating in the “Best Bits” pre-IGF meeting at Baku in 2012

We thank the Secretariat of the ITU for making the opportunity to submit our views.

Nevertheless, the process of the revision of the International Telecommunication Regulations (ITRs) has not been sufficiently inclusive and transparent, despite some recent efforts to facilitate public participation. Fundamental to the framing of public policy must be the pursuit of the public interest and fundamental human rights, and we urge Member States to uphold and protect these values.

We as civil society organizations wish to engage with the World Conference on International Telecommunication (WCIT) process in this spirit. Member States, in most cases, have not held open, broad-based, public consultations in the lead up to the WCIT, nor have they indicated such a process for the WCIT itself.

In order to address this deficiency, and at a minimum, we would urge:

All Member States and regional groups to make their proposals available to the public in sufficient time to allow for meaningfulpublic participation;
All delegates to support proposals to open sessions of the WCIT meeting to the public;
The ITU Secretariat to increase transparency of the WCIT including live webcast with the video, audio, and text transcripts, as far as possible, to enable participation by all, including persons with disabilities;
The ITU Secretariat, Member States, and regional groups to make as much documentation publicly available as possible on the ITU's website, so that civil society can provide substantive input on proposals as they are made available;
Member States to encourage and facilitate civil society participation in their national delegations;
The ITU to create spaces during the WCIT for civil society to express their views, as was done during the WSIS process.

Given the uncertainty about the nature of final proposals that will be presented, we urge delegates that the following criteria be applied to any proposed revisions of the ITRs.

That any proposed revisions are confined to the traditional scope of the ITRs, where international regulation is required around technical issues is limited to telecommunications networks and interoperability standards.
There should be no revisions to the ITRs that involve regulation of the Internet Protocol and the layers above.
There should be no revisions that could have a negative impact on affordable access to the Internet or the public's rights to privacy and freedom of expression.

More generally we call upon the ITU to promote principles of net neutrality, open standards, affordable access and universal service, and effective competition.

Signatories:

Access (Global)
Association for Progressive Communications (Global)
Bangladesh NGOs Network for Radio and Communication (Bangladesh)
Bytes for All (Pakistan)
Center for Democracy and Technology (United States of America)
Centre for Community Informatics Research (Canada)
Centre for Internet and Society (India)
Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (Eastern and Southern Africa)
Consumer Council of Fiji (Fiji)
Consumers International (Global)
Dynamic Coalition on Internet Rights and Principles (IRP) (Global)
Electronic Frontier Finland (Finland)
Imagining the Internet Center (United States of America)
Instituto Nupef (Brazil)
Internet Democracy Project (India)
Internet Research Project (Pakistan)
Global Partners and Associates (United Kingdom)
GobernanzadeInternet.co (Colombia)
ICT Watch Indonesia (Indonesia)
Instituto Brasileiro de Defesa do Consumidor / Brazilian Institute for
Consumer Defense (Brazil)
InternetNZ (New Zealand)
IT for Change (India)
Media Education Center (Armenia)
ONG Derechos Digitales (Chile)
OpenMedia (Canada)
Public Knowledge (United States of America)
Thai Netizen Network (Thailand)
Ginger Paque (Venezuala)
Nnenna Nwakanma (Côte d'Ivoire)
Sonigitu Ekpe (Nigeria)
Wolfgang Kleinwächter (Denmark)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/statement-of-civil-society-members-and-groups-at-best-bits-pre-igf-meeting

No fear of losing internet freedom till Jan 15: Experts

praskrishna — 2012-12-31T02:20:31Z

There is no need to get scared about losing internet freedom, at least till January 2015.

The article by Kim Arora was published in the Times of India on December 22, 2012. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

That's the view of top telecom policy watchers, who closely monitored the World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT) of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) that ended in uncertainty earlier this month in Dubai.

Policy experts say the changes affecting internet users in India, if any, would be slow and minor with little or no changes existing laws and governments largely retaining their current control. The resolutions are not binding and member-states are free to opt out of it. India is yet to ratify the treaty that lays out a broad framework on international co-operation over telecommunication resources.

The ITR (International Telecom Regulations), decided by the ITU were last updated in 1988 when the internet, as we know it today, did not exist. And the hullabaloo was caused by the proliferation of internet in the intervening years had created a lot of complications and misgiving among nation states. The Dubai conference also included alarmed internet evangelists who feared that the meeting would result in UN control of the internet. But with the US, the UK and several other countries vehemently refusing to sign on the dotted line, most decisions have been withheld till January 2015 when the treaty is expected to be ratified.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/times-of-india-december-22-2012-kim-arora-no-fear-of-losing-internet-freedom-till-jan-15

Multi-stakeholder Models of Internet Governance within States: Why, Who & How?

geetha — 2014-06-16T14:27:38Z

Internet governance, for long a global exercise, has found new awareness within national frameworks in recent times. Especially relevant for developing countries, effective national IG mechanisms are important to raise awareness and ensure multi-stakeholder participation at technical, infrastructural and public policy levels.

This post is a surface-level overview of national IG bodies, and is intended to inform introductory thoughts on national IG mechanisms.

A Short Introduction

The previous decade has seen a proliferation of regional, sub-regional and national initiatives for Internet governance (IG). Built primarily on the multi-stakeholder model, these initiatives aim at creating dialogue on issues of regional, local or municipal importance. In Asia, Bangladesh has instituted a national IGF, the Bangladesh IGF, with the stated objective of creating a national multi-stakeholder forum that is specialized in Internet governance issues, and to facilitate informed dialogue on IG policy issues among stakeholders. India, too, is currently in the process of instituting such a forum. At this juncture, it is useful to consider the rationale and modalities of national IG bodies.

The Internet has long been considered a sphere of non-governmental, multi-stakeholder, decentralized, bottom-up governance space. The Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace, John Perry Barlow’s defiant articulation of the Internet’s freedom from governmental control, is a classic instance of this. The Internet is a “vast ocean”, we claimed; “no one owns it”.[1] Even today, members of the technical community insist that everyone ought to “let techies do their job”: a plea, if you will, of the complexity of cyber-walls and –borders (or of their lack).

But as Prof. Milton Mueller argues in Ruling the Root, the Internet has always been a contentious resource: battles over its governance (or specifically, the governance of the DNS root, both the root-zone file and the root servers) have leapt from the naïveté of the Declaration of Independence to a private-sector-led, contract-based exploitation of Internet resources. The creation of ICANN was a crucial step in this direction, following arbitrary policy choices by Verizon and entities managing the naming and numbering resources of the Internet.

The mushrooming of parallel tracks of Internet governance is further evidence of the malleability of the space. As of today, various institutions – inter-governmental and multi-stakeholder – extend their claims of governance. ICANN, the World Summit of Information Society, the World Conference on International Telecommunications, the Internet Governance Forum and the Working Group on Enhanced Cooperation under the ECOSOC Committee for Science, Technology and Development are a few prominent tracks. As of today, the WSIS process has absorbed various UN special bodies (the ITU, UNESCO, UNCTAD, UNDP are but a few), with the UNESCO instituting a separate study on Internet-related issues. A proposal for a multilateral Committee on Internet-Related Policies remains stillborn.

Amongst these, the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) remains a strong contender for a truly multi-stakeholder process facilitating dialogue on IG. The IGF was set up following the recommendation of the Working Group of Internet Governance (WGIG), constituted after the Geneva phase of the WSIS.

Rationale: Why Have National IG bodies?

The issue of national multi-stakeholder cooperation/collaboration in IG is not new; it has been alive since the early 2000s. The Tunis Agenda, in paragraph 80, encourages the “development of multi-stakeholder processes at the national, regional and international levels to discuss and collaborate on the expansion and diffusion of the Internet as a means to support development efforts to achieve internationally agreed development goals and objectives, including the Millennium Development Goals” (emphasis supplied).

In its June 2005 Report, the Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) emphasizes that “global Internet governance can only be effective if there is coherence with regional, subregional and national-level policies”. Towards this end it recommends that “coordination be established among all stakeholders at the national level and a multi-stakeholder national Internet governance steering committee or similar body be set up” (emphasis supplied). The IGF, whose creation the WGIG recommended, has since been commended for its impact on the proliferation of national IGFs.

The rationale, then, was that multi-stakeholder steering committees at the national level would help to create a cohesive body to coordinate positions on Internet governance. In Reforming Internet Governance, WGIG member Waudo Siganga writes of the Internet Steering Committee of Brazil as a model, highlighting lessons that states (especially developing countries) may learn from CGI.br.

The Brazilian Internet Steering Committee (CGI.br) was set up in 1995 and is responsible, inter alia, for the management of the .br domain, distribution of Internet addresses and administration of metropolitan Internet exchange points. CERT.br ensures network security and extends support to network administrators. Siganga writes that CGI.br is a “well-structured multistakeholder entity, having representation from government and democratically chosen representatives of the business sector, scientific and technological community and an Internet expert”.

Why is CGI.br a model for other states? First, CGI.br exemplifies how countries can structure in an effective manner, a body that is involved in creating awareness about IG issues at the national level. Moreover, the multi-stakeholder nature of CGI.br shows how participation can be harnessed effectively to build capacity across domestic players. This also reflects the multi-stakeholder aspects of Internet governance at the global level, clarifying and implementing the WSIS standards (for instance). Especially in developing countries, where awareness and coordination for Internet governance is lacking at the national level, national IG committees can bridge the gap between awareness and participation. Such awareness can translate into local solutions for local issues, as well as contributing to an informed, cohesive stance at the global level.

Stakeholders: Populating a national IG body

A national IG body – be in steering committee, IGF or other forum – should ideally involve all relevant stakeholders. As noted before, since inception, the Internet has not been subject to exclusive governmental regulation. The World Summit on Information Society recognized this, but negotiations amongst stakeholders resulted in the delegation of roles and responsibilities: the controversial and much-debated paragraph 35 of the Tunis Agenda reads:

Policy authority for Internet-related public policy issues is the sovereign right of States. They have rights and responsibilities for international Internet-related public policy issues.
The private sector has had, and should continue to have, an important role in the development of the Internet, both in the technical and economic fields.
Civil society has also played an important role on Internet matters, especially at community level, and should continue to play such a role.
Intergovernmental organizations have had, and should continue to have, a facilitating role in the coordination of Internet-related public policy issues.
International organizations have also had and should continue to have an important role in the development of Internet-related technical standards and relevant policies.

This position remains endorsed by the WSIS process; the recent WSIS+10 High Level Event endorsed by acclamation the WSIS+10 Vision for WSIS Beyond 2015, which “respect mandates given by Tunis Agenda and respect for the multi-stakeholder principles”. In addition to government, the private sector and civil society, the technical community is identified as a distinct stakeholder group. Academia has also found a voice, as demonstrated by stakeholder-representation at NETmundial 2014.

A study of the Internet Society (ISOC) on Assessing National Internet Governance Arrangements, authored by David Souter, maps IG stakeholders at the global, regional and national levels. At the global level, primary stakeholders include ICANN (not-for-profit, private sector corporation involved in governance and technical coordination of the DNS), the IETF, IAB and W3C (technical standards), governments and civil society organizations, all of which participate with different levels of involvements at the IGF, ICANN, ITU, etc.

At the national/municipal level, the list of stakeholders is as comprehensive. Governmental stakeholders include: (1) relevant Ministries (in India, these are the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, and the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology – the Department of Electronics and Information Technology under the MCIT is particularly relevant), and (2) regulators, statutory and independent (the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, for example). At the national level, these typically seek inputs from other stakeholders while making recommendations to governments, which then enact laws or make policy. In India, for instance, the TRAI conducts consultations prior to making recommendations to the government.

Within the private sector, there may be companies (1) on the supply-side, such as infrastructure networks, telecommunications service companies, Internet Service Providers, search engines, social networks, cybercafés, etc., and (2) on the demand-side, online businesses, advertising/media, financial service providers, etc. who use the Internet. There may also be national registries managing ccTLDs, such as the Registro.br or the National Internet Exchange of India (NIXI). There may also the press and news corporations representing both corporate and public interest under specific circumstances (media ownership and freedom of expression, for distinct examples).

Civil society organisations, including consumer organisations, think-tanks and grassroots organisations, participate at various levels of policy-making in the formal institutional structure, and are crucial in representing users and public interest. The complexity of stakeholders may be seen from Souter’s report, and this enumeration is but a superficial view of the national stakeholder-population.

Processes: Creating effective national IG bodies

National IG bodies – be they steering committees, IGFs, consultative/working groups or other forums – may be limited by formal institutional governmental settings. While limited by the responsibility-gradient in paragraph 35 of the Tunis Agenda, an effective national IG body requires robust multi-stakeholder participation, as Souter notes, in technical governance, infrastructure and public policy issues. Its effectiveness also lies in governmental acquiescence of its expertise and recommendations; in short, in the translation of the IG body’s decisions into policy.

How do these stakeholders interact at the national level? In addition to the Brazilian example (CGI.br), an ISOC study by Souter and Monica Kerretts-Makau, Internet Governance in Kenya: An Assessment, provides a detailed answer. At the technical level, the registry KENIC manages the .ke domain, while the Kenya Computer Incident Response Team Coordination Centre coordinates national responses to incidents and collaborates internationally on cyber-security issues. A specific IPv6 Force to promote Kenya’s transition to IPv6 was also created.

At the infrastructural level, both the government and the private sector play important roles. Directly, ministries and government departments consult with infrastructure providers in creating policy. In India, for instance, the TRAI conducts multi-stakeholder consultations on issues such as telecom tariffs, colocation tariffs for submarine cable stations and mobile towers, etc. The government may also take a lead in creating infrastructure, such as the national optic fibre networks in India and Kenya, as also creating investment opportunities such as liberalizing FDI. At the public policy level, there may exist consultations initiated by government bodies (such as the TRAI or the Law Commission), in which other stakeholders participate.

As one can see, government-initiated consultations by ministries, regulators, law commissions or specially constituted committees. Several countries have also set up national IGFs, which typically involve all major stakeholders in voluntary participation, and form a discussion forum for existing and emerging IG issues. National IGFs have been considered particularly useful to create awareness within the country, and may best address IG issues at the domestic policy level. However, Prof. Mueller writes that what is necessary is a “reliable mechanism reliable mechanisms for consistently feeding the preferences expressed in these forums to actual global policy-making institutions like ICANN, RIRs, WIPO, and WTO which impact distributional outcomes”.

[1] M. Mueller, Ruling the Root: Internet Governance and the Taming of Cyberspace 57 (2002).

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/multi-stakeholder-models-of-internet-governance-within-states-why-who-how

Indian Government's Submission to ITU

pranesh — 2012-12-09T00:48:10Z

The following is the text of the submission made by the Government of India to the World Conference of International Telecommunications, Dubai on November 3, 2012. This is the final version of a draft that was circulated earlier.

Read the detailed comments on India's draft proposal on the Proposed Amendments to the ITU’s ITR’s – November 3, 2012

World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT-12) Dubai, 3-14 December 2012
PLENARY MEETING														Document 21-E 3 November 2012 Original: English

India (Republic of)

PROPOSALS FOR THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE

Introduction

We recognise and appreciate the efforts of International Telecommunication Union in preparing the Draft on proposed ITRs for WCIT 2012.

The attached proposal is developed through a consultation process involving various stakeholder groups, both, in Indian Public and Private sectors. Due consideration has been given to the existing legislations and government policies in the preparation of this proposal. We acknowledge that since 1988, there have been significant changes and challenges in Telecommunications / ICTs in terms of Technological breakthroughs, New Services and Market Structure. Acknowledging this fact, India’s proposal is offered in the form of addition (ADD) or modification (MOD) only on some of the relevant proposals, by giving reference to the appropriate CWG/4/XXX number mentioned in the Annex 2 of the ITU Document 4(Add.2)-E. Considering the magnitude of issues in International Telecommunications, India may take appropriate stand on other provisions of the draft ITR document during the WCIT discussions.

Further, the proposals from different regions to the conference as well as its preparatory process were carefully studied. In order to help the conference achieve a consensus on the various issues being discussed, the content of this proposal has been largely drawn from the output of the Council Working Group on WCIT (WCIT/4 Add.2 ” Draft of the future ITRs”).

A new proposal on 5A: Confidence and Security of Telecommunications/ICTs is also included as India believes that an international framework on Security is of importance in today’s connected world.

INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION
REGULATIONS
PREAMBLE

MOD	IND/21/1

1 While the sovereign right of each Member State to regulate its telecommunications is fully recognized, the provisions of the present International Telecommunication Regulations (hereinafter “Regulations”) complement the Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunication Union, with a view to attaining the purposes of the International Telecommunication Union in promoting the development of telecommunication services and their most efficient operation while harmonizing the development of facilities for world-wide telecommunications.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/3.

Article 1

Purpose and Scope of the Regulations

ADD IND/21/2

3A c) These Regulations recognize that Member States should endeavour to take the necessary measures to prevent interruptions of services and ensure that no harm is caused by their operating agencies to the operating agencies of other Member States which are operating in accordance with the provisions of these Regulations.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/12.

ADD IND/21/3

3B d) These Regulations recognize the absolute priority for safety of life telecommunications, including distress telecommunications, emergency telecommunications services and telecommunications for disaster relief as provided in Article.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/14.

Article 2

Definitions

ADD IND/21/4

14A 2.1A Telecommunication/ICT: Any transmission, emission or reception, including processing, of signs, signals, writing, images and sounds or intelligence of any nature by wire, radio, optical or other electromagnetic systems, having a bearing on Telecommunication Technologies and Services.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/48.

ADD IND/21/5

27A 2.11 Transit rate: a rate set by the point of transit in a third country (indirect relation).

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/74.

ADD IND/21/6

27C 2.13 Spam: information transmitted over telecommunication networks as text, sound, image, tangible data used in a man-machine interface bearing advertizing nature or having no meaningful message, simultaneously or during a short period of time, to a large number of particular addressees without prior consent of the addressee (recipient) to receive this information or information of this nature.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/78.

ADD IND/21/7

27D 2.14 Hub: a transit center (or network operator) that offers to other operators a telecommunication traffic termination service to nominated destinations contained in the offer.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/80.

ADD IND/21/8

27E 2.15 Hubbing: the routing of telecommunication traffic in hubbing mode consists in the use of hub facilities to terminate telecommunication traffic to other destinations.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/82.

ADD IND/21/9

27F 2.16 Network fraud: (fraud on international telecommunication networks): The causing of harm to operating agencies or to the public, the wrongful obtaining of gain in the provision of international telecommunication services through abuse of trust or deception, including through inappropriate use of numbering resources.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/87.

ADD IND/21/10

27G 2.17 Global telecommunication service (GTS): A service which enables communication to be established through a global number between subscribers whose physical location and national jurisdiction have no bearing on the tariff to be set for the service’s use; which satisfies and complies with recognized and accepted international standards; and which is provided over the public telecommunication network by operating agencies having obtained the relevant numbering resources from ITU-T.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/89.

ADD IND/21/11

27H 2.21 Originating Identification: The Originating Identification is the service by which the terminating party shall receive the identity information in order to identify the origin of the communication.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/81.

ADD IND/21/12

27L 2.25 Stability of the international telecommunication network: The capability of the international telecommunication network to carry international traffic in the event of failure of telecommunication nodes or links and also in the face of internal and external destructive actions and to return to its original state.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/99.

ADD IND/21/13

27M 2.26 Security of the international telecommunication network: The capability of the international telecommunication network to withstand internal and external destabilizing actions liable to compromise its functioning.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/101.

ADD IND/21/14

27N 2.27 International Roaming: Provision to the subscriber of the opportunity to use telecommunication services offered by other operating agencies of other member states, with which the subscriber has not concluded an agreement.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/103.

ADD IND/21/15

27O 2.28 IP interconnection: IP interconnection refers to means and rules employed to ensure the delivery of IP traffic through different networks.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/105.

ADD IND/21/16

27P 2.29 End to end quality of service delivery and best effort delivery: End to End quality of service delivery refers to the delivery of PDU (Packet Data Unit) with predefined end-to-end performance objectives; Best-effort delivery refers delivery to of a PDU without predefined performance targets.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/107.

Article 3

International Network

ADD IND/21/17

31A 3.5 Member States shall ensure that international naming, numbering, addressing and identification resources are used only by the assignees and only for the purposes for which they were assigned; and that unassigned resources are not used. The provisions of the relevant ITU-T Recommendations shall be applied.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/134.

ADD IND/21/18

31B 3.6 International calling party number delivery shall be provided in accordance with relevant ITU-T Recommendations.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/142.

Article 4

International Telecommunication Services

MOD IND/21/19

34 4.3 Subject to national law, Member States shall endeavour to ensure that operating agencies provide and maintain, to the greatest extent practicable, a satisfactory quality of service corresponding to the relevant ITU-T Recommendations with respect to:

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/168.

MOD IND/21/20

35 a) access to the international network by users using terminals which are permitted to be connected to the network and which do not cause harm or diminish the level of safety and security of technical facilities and personnel;

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/174.

MOD IND/21/21

36 b) international telecommunication facilities and services available to customers for their use;

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/176.

MOD IND/21/22

37 c) at least a form of telecommunication service which is reasonably accessible to the public, including those who may not be subscribers to a specific telecommunication service; and

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/179.

MOD IND/21/23

38 d) a capability for interworking between different services, as appropriate, to facilitate international telecommunication services.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/181.

ADD IND/21/24

38A 4.4 Member States shall ensure that operating agencies providing international telecommunication services, including roaming, make available to subscribers information on tariffs and taxes. Each subscriber should be able to have access to such information and receive it in a timely manner and free of charge when roaming (entering into roaming), except where the subscriber has previously declined to receive such information.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/188.

ADD IND/21/25

38B 4.5 Given the particular characteristics of GTS, which allows subscribers to have a worldwide number, implement GTSs in accordance with the National regulations.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/195.

ADD IND/21/26

38E 4.8 Member States, subject to national security requirements, may foster the establishment of mutual agreements on mobile services accessed within a predetermined border zone in order to prevent or mitigate inadvertent roaming charges.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/201.

Article 5

Safety of Life and Priority of Telecommunications

MOD IND/21/27

39 5.1 Safety of life telecommunications, including distress telecommunications, emergency telecommunication services and telecommunications for disaster relief, shall be entitled to transmission as of right and shall, where technically practicable, have absolute priority over all other telecommunications, in accordance with the relevant Articles of the Constitution, Convention and relevant ITU-T Resolutions and Recommendations.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/204.

ADD IND/21/28

41B 5.5 Member States should cooperate to introduce in addition to their existing national emergency numbers, a global number for calls to the emergency services globally.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/217.

ADD IND/21/29

41C 5.6 Member States shall ensure that operating agencies inform every roaming subscriber of the number to be used for calls to the emergency services, while entering into roaming, free of charge.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/219.

ADD IND/21/30

Article 5A

Confidence and security of telecommunications/ICTs

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/221.

ADD IND/21/31

41D 5A1. Member‐States shall have the right to take appropriate measures to protect and Secure the ICT Network infrastructure and data contained in or flowing through the Network and also to prevent the misuse of ICT network and services within their state.

5A2. The Member States should endeavour to take appropriate measures, individually or in cooperation with other Member states, to ensure Security of the ICT Network and information, including user information, contained in or flowing through the ICT network within their jurisdiction.

5A3. Member‐States should endeavour to oversee that Operating Agencies in their territory do not engage in activities which impinge on the security and integrity of ICT network such as denial of service attack, unsolicited electronic communication (spam), unsolicited access to network elements and devices etc., to enable effective functioning of ICTs in secure and trustworthy conditions.

5A4. Member States should endeavour to cooperate to harmonize national laws, jurisdictions, and practices in the relevant areas.

Reasons: Combined proposal on clauses proposed from CWG /4 A 2/222 to 232 in 5A and 5B.

Article 6

Charging and Accounting

ADD IND/21/32

43A 6.1.1A Cost of International Roaming Services

a) Member States shall encourage competition in the international roaming market;

b) Member States are encouraged to cooperate to develop policies for reducing charges on international roaming services.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/243.

MOD IND/21/33

45 6.1.3 Member States are free to levy fiscal taxes on international telecommunication services in accordance with their national laws; however, the Member States should endeavour to avoid international double taxation on such services.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/249.

ADD IND/21/34

54E 6.10 Subject to national law, Member States shall ensure that Operating Agencies collaborate in preventing and controlling fraud in international telecommunications by:

– Identifying and transmitting to the transit and destination Operating Agencies the pertinent information required for the purposes of payment for the routing of international traffic, in particular the originating Country Code, National Destination Code and the Calling Party Number.

– Following up requests of other Member States or their Operating Agencies to investigate calls that cannot be billed, and helping to resolve outstanding accounts.

– Following up requests of other Member States or their Operating Agencies to identify the source of calls originated from their territories exerting potential fraudulent activity.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/287.

ADD IND/21/35

54F 6.11 The ITU Standardization Sector shall be responsible for disseminating the regulatory frameworks in place in administrations having an impact on matters related to fraud.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/289.

ADD IND/21/36

54H 6.12A Member States shall foster the establishment of international roaming mobile services prices based on principles of reasonability, competitiveness and non-discrimination relative to prices applied to local users of the visited country.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/293.

ADD IND/21/37

54K 6.14 Member States should foster continued investment in high-bandwidth infrastructures.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/299.

ADD IND/21/38

54L 6.15 Member States shall promote cost-oriented pricing. Regulatory measures may be imposed to the extent that this cannot be achieved through market mechanisms and to the extent that such measures do not hinder competition.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/301.

ADD IND/21/39

54N 6.17 Member States shall promote transparency of end-user prices, in particular to avoid surprising bills for international services (e.g mobile roaming and data roaming).

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/305.

ADD IND/21/40

54S 6.D Member States should endeavour to take measures to ensure that an adequate return is provided on investments in network infrastructures in identified areas. If this cannot be achieved through market mechanisms, then other mechanisms may be used.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/315.

ADD IND/21/41

54O 6.18 Member States should consider measures to favour special interconnection rates for landlocked countries.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/307.

ADD IND/21/42

54P 6.18A Member States should endeavour that Recognized Operating Agencies establish charging units and parameters that bill telecommunication service consumers according to what is effectively consumed.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/309.

ADD IND/21/43

54R 6.20 Rendering and Settlement of Accounts

6.20.1 The settlement of international accounts shall be regarded as current transactions and shall be effected in accordance with the current international obligations of the Member States and Sector Members concerned in those cases where their governments have concluded arrangements on this subject. Where no such arrangements have been concluded, and in the absence of special agreements made under Article 42 of the Constitution, these settlements shall be effected in accordance with the Administrative Regulations.

6.20.2 Administrations of Member States and Sector Members which operate international telecommunication services shall come to an agreement with regard to the amount of their debits and credits.

6.20.3 The statement of accounts with respect to debits and credits referred to in No. 498 above shall be drawn up in accordance with the provisions of the Administrative Regulations, unless special arrangements have been concluded between the parties concerned.

Reasons: The text is taken from CV 497, 498 and 499. This proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/313.

ADD IND/21/44

57B Member States shall encourage the provision of global services based on international standards that ensure accessible telecommunications and ICT services to persons with disabilities.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on HNG /5/2.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/indian-govts-submission-to-itu

India's Statement at ITU Plenipotentiary Conference, 2014

geetha — 2014-11-04T05:50:06Z

India's Draft Resolution at the ITU Plenipot, which we have previously blogged about, was not passed following discussions at the Ad Hoc Working Group on Internet-related Resolutions. Subsequently, India made a statement at the Working Group of the Plenary, emphasizing the importance of the issues and welcoming further discussions. The statement was delivered by Mr. Ram Narain, DDG-IR, Department of Telecommunications and Head of India's Delegation at PP-14. The full text of the statement is provided below.

"Chairman of Working Group Plenary, Mr Musab Abdulla, Head of Delegations, delegates, ladies and gentlemen, good morning/afternoon to you all. I was indeed impressed with the camaraderie with which discussions were held inspite of the fact that delegates discussing the issues have different cultures, languages, nuances, impressions and sometime interests.

"Governance of packet-switched data telecom Networks based on Internet Protocol (IP), popularly known as Internet, has become an important and contentious issue due to several reasons known to all of us. We put up a draft resolution to address some of these key issues pertaining to IP based networks. When we put up the proposal, I had thought that the proposal would contribute in diminishing some of the differences. These issues and their probable solutions are given in our draft resolution, document 98, about which we were ready to take constructive inputs.

"Information is power these days. The wise Lord Acton said about hundred and fifty years ago that Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely. The countries in modern times have become great on the principles of equality, liberty and justice. As and when these principles were compromised great powers lost their hold. Broadband penetration and connectivity has been the important running theme of this conference. We believe this, like great empires, can only be built on the principles of fairness, justice, and equality. No Telecom Network whether IP based or otherwise can function without naming and numbering, which is the lifeline of a network. Their availability in a fair, just and equitable manner, therefore, is an important public policy issue and need to be dealt that way. We believe that respecting the principle of sovereignty of information through network functionality and global norms will go a long way in increasing the trust and confidence in use of ICT.

"There are number of existing Internet related resolutions, but they only touch the issue in general and, therefore, without focus concrete action does not happen. Our Resolution was with a view to deal with the issues in a focused manner. Some countries supported our draft resolution, while some other were not able to support it. Some stated since the proposal is a comprehensive one, dealing with number of important issues, more time is needed for them to develop a view on it. Due to the number of proposals with Ad Hoc Group lined up before our draft resolution, there was no time left for detailed discussion on the proposal. Therefore, India agreed not to press the resolution for discussion due to paucity of time, with an understanding that for these issues of concerns for many Member States, contributions can be made in various fora dealing with development of IP based networks and future networks, including ITU. India would like that discussion should take place on these issues and look forward to these discussions. We would request that this Statement is included in the records of Plenipotentiary-14 meeting.

"We would like to thank for the cooperation extended by various Member States, particularly USA, for appreciating our concerns and all those who shared our concerns and supported the draft resolution. I would also like to thank Mr. Fabio Bigi, Chairman of Ad Hoc Working Group for giving patient hearing to all us and tolerating all our idiosyncrasies and still arriving at consensus. This is because of his wisdom, which comes with experience.

Thank you all."

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/indias-statement-at-itu-plenipotentiary-conference-2014

Good Intentions, Recalcitrant Text – II: What India’s ITU Proposal May Mean for Internet Governance

geetha — 2014-11-03T07:07:16Z

The UN's International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is hosting its Plenipotentiary Conference (PP-14) this year in South Korea. At PP-14, India introduced a new draft resolution on ITU's Role in Realising Secure Information Society. The Draft Resolution has grave implications for human rights and Internet governance. Geetha Hariharan explores.

Disclaimer and update (2 November 2014): India's Draft Resolution was discussed during the meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Internet-related Resolutions at the ITU Plenipot on the evening of November 1, 2014 (KST). After the discussion, India revised the text of the resolution, seeking to address concerns raised by ITU member states. The revised resolution may be found here. However, this blog post was written with reference to the original text of India's Draft Resolution.

***

As I mentioned in my last post, India’s Draft Resolution on ‘ITU’s Role in Realising Secure Information Society’ raises security and equity concerns. The Draft Resolution has 3 security concerns: (i) security weaknesses in the network architecture that permit “camouflaging the identity of the originator of the communication” and make “tracing of communication difficult”; (ii) non-systematic, non-contiguous allocation of naming, numbering and addressing resources on the Internet, which makes it difficult to identify both the users and what states the IP addresses are located in; (iii) non-local routing and address resolution relating to traffic originating and terminating in the same country. Op. §§1, 3-7 seek to address these. It also identifies the present system of allocation of naming, numbering and addressing resources as inequitable, unfair, unjust and undemocratic (Op. §2 of the Draft Resolution offers a solution). I discussed some human rights implications of India’s Draft Resolution in my last post.

In this post, I explore the implications of the Draft Resolution for Internet governance and multi-stakeholder approaches (most notably, an equal footing model).[1] Given the uncertainties around defining multi-stakeholderism for Internet governance, this is rather ambitious. So I will try to point to concerns with certain textual interpretations of the Draft Resolution, map that against the positions India’s representatives have taken on Internet governance in the past, and the motivations/concerns that underlie the tabling of the Draft Resolution. This Resolution may not be the best way to allay India's concerns, for there are technical and rights implications. But the concerns it raises are worth discussion and knowledge, and at forums where concerns are heard, acknowledged and discussed collectively. The text of the Draft Resolution and its attendant implications are not, then, the sole subjects of this post.

The Draft Resolution and Internet governance:

The text of the Draft Resolution is problematic. Many of its clauses may be seen as taking positions against multi-stakeholder approaches to Internet governance. Introducing such a resolution at the ITU may itself bring back memories of the controversies surrounding Resolution 3 of the World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT), 2012.[2] In 3 ways, the text of the Draft Resolution has indications for multi-stakeholder approaches.

First, the Draft Resolution frames issues primarily from the perspective security. In its preamble, the Draft Resolution makes several references to security threats posed by and on the Internet. For instance, it points to the ability of the network to “camouflage the identity of the originator of the communication” (Pream. §(e) [recognizing]), as well as national security concerns in the present-day system of routing Internet traffic through multiple countries (Pream. §§(f) and (g), [recognizing]). The apparent difficulty in tracing IP addresses, due to their random allocation, is another concern (Pream. §(h), [recognizing]). Among the “significant public policy issues” identified in telecom/ICT management, “security and safety of the Telecom/ICTs” is specifically noted (Pream. §(i) [considering]). In the Context note to the Draft Resolution and in several places in the Preamble, there are references to ITU Resolution 130 (‘Strengthening the role of ITU in building confidence and security in the use of information and communication technologies’) and ITU’s Cyber-security Agenda. Given the (legitimate or otherwise) disproportionate involvement of governments and not other stakeholders in matters of cyber-security, the framing of issues from a security perspective may lend itself to worries for multi-stakeholderism. Specifically, the Draft Resolution notes: “ensuring security of ICT networks is sovereign right of Member States” (Pream. §(b) [recognizing]).

Second, the Draft Resolution emphasizes the sovereign right of states to regulate and control telecom/ICT. It says, for instance, “it is the sovereign right of each state to regulate its telecommunication” (Pream. §(b) [considering]). With regard to the Internet, the Context note to the Draft Resolution (page 1) considers the Internet to be synonymous with telecom/ICTs: “the Telecom/ICTs, which in common lexicon is used interchangeably many times as Internet…”. Public telecom networks managed by telecom service providers, interconnected with other networks, are necessary for “proper functioning of a telecom network resources namely, among others, naming, numbering and addressing” (Pream. §(k) [considering]). It is worth noting that the sovereign authority of states over Internet public policy issues is settled text from §35 of the Tunis Agenda, though expressing it as synonymous with telecom may lead to possibilities of licensing and registration, which Bulgaria, for instance, does not do.

Third, the Draft Resolution identifies issues of equity and fairness in the allocation of Internet resources such as naming, numbering and addressing (Pream. §(g) [consdering], Op. §2). It states that to correct this inequity, “facilitation and collaboration among international, inter-governmental organizations and individual member states to ensure planning, implementation, monitoring and cooperation in its policies” is required (Pream. §(g) [considering]). In operative paragaphs, our Draft Resolution calls for collaboration with “all the concerned stakeholders including International and intergovernmental organizations to develop policies for allocation, assignment and management of IP resources including naming, numbering and addressing which is systematic, equitable, fair, just, democratic and transparent” (Op. §2). One may pay attention to the oversight over implementation and the necessity of inter-governmental involvement in planning and monitoring as problematic to iterations of multi-stakeholderism.

These concerns are valid and legitimate, and it is desirable that the text of the resolution be altered to address them. The text should also be altered to address the human rights concerns I point out in my previous post. But human rights enforcement or implementation is within the domain of states, though civil society may be a careful watchdog. The Draft Resolution's text, most certainly, will face certain oppositions: for instance, that it is outside the scope and mandate of the ITU. That the ITU does not deal with content regulation – and this issue touches upon content – will be mentioned. That Internet governance is already being discussed and performed in multiple other multi-stakeholder fora, such as ICANN, the NRO and RIRs, IGF and WSIS, will be emphasized. That the Draft Resolution implicates national security concerns will be mentioned as well. But as an aside, on national security: under international law, states always mention their prerogative over national security, and so as a matter of international custom, national security is outside the scope of agreements unless expressly surrendered.

At the same time, debates around the role of ITU in Internet governance are not new, and those familiar will remember the ITU’s views right before the creation of ICANN (also see Mueller, Ruling the Root 145-48 (2002)), Resolution 3 of the WCIT, and the constant tug-of-war since then. The new Secretary-General of the ITU, Mr. Houlin Zhao, wrote a note in October 2004, before the Tunis phase of the WSIS, justifying ITU’s involvement in Internet governance, advocating that IPv6 address blocks be allocated to countries. Mr. Zhao describes, with specific examples, ITU's role in the development and widespread growth of the Internet. He takes the examples of standards developed within the ITU and ITU's policy role in liberalisation and spread of telecommunications (such as Articles 4 & 9 of the 1988 ITRs).

Mr. Zhao’s concrete proposals are rendered inapplicable by the creation of the NRO and RIRs, and the growth and entrenchment of ICANN. But it may be argued that his principled justifications for ITU involvement remain. It is these that India hopes to highlight, I was told, along with the inequities in resource allocation (IPv4 was spoken of), and the disproportionate weight some states enjoy in Internet governance. Her concerns are, I am told, also shared by some other states. Given that the text exhibits a less-than-friendly approach to multi-stakeholderism, India's previous positions on the issue are of interest. While this would not correct the snags in the Draft Resolution's text, allaying these concerns may be ideal to craft an inclusive and transparent multi-stakeholder model for Internet governance.

India and Multi-stakeholderism in Internet Governance:

India’s position on multi-stakeholder models for Internet governance is a matter of some obscurity. Statements at various forums exhibit a certain disagreement – or at the least, lack of engagement – among India’s ministries on our position on multi-stakeholder approaches, particularly the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), the Department of Telecommunications (DOT) and the Department of Electronics and Information Technology (DeitY), both within the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MCIT). While both the MEA and DOT have been cautious supporters of a diluted form of multi-stakeholderism (they have repeatedly emphasized §35 of the Tunis Agenda), DeitY has been more open in entertaining multi-stakeholder approaches for Internet governance.

At the 66^th session of UN General Assembly, Mr. Dushyant Singh, Member of India’s Parliament from the Bharatiya Janata Party, presented our proposal for a Committee on Internet-related Policies. The proposal sought the establishment of a UN committee comprising 50 member-states, with advisory groups including the private sector and civil society, to deal with Internet-related matters.[3] Though India was not opposed to multi-stakeholder advisories in its CIRP proposal, it was less than inviting in this regard.

At NETmundial (April 2014), the Indian government’s contribution document highlighted §35 of the Tunis Agenda, which delineates ‘roles and responsibilities’ of ‘respective stakeholders’ – i.e., governments (with whom reside “sovereign policy authority”), the private sector (technical and economic development of the Internet) and civil society (grassroots participation). At NETmundial, Mr. Vinay Kwatra of the MEA echoed this, also noting the lack of consensus on what multi-stakeholderism means for Internet governance (page 64).

Admittedly, this is a legitimate concern. Internet governance at various fora does not seem to have a clear answer on what multi-stakeholderism means. The debate was/is alive, for instance, at NETmundial 2014, the ICANN-convened IANA transition process, the World Economic Forum’s new NETmundial Initiative, and in the many calls and suggestions (pages 38-46) made over the years on strengthening the IGF (see also, Malcolm, Multi-stakeholder Governance and the IGF (2008), chapter 6). It is hardly surprising then, that India and other states raise this as a concern.

With regard to multi-stakeholderism, the DeitY in India has been the outlier. Speaking at the 2014 IGF in Istanbul, Mr. R.S. Sharma, Secretary (DeitY), expressed “no doubt that Internet Governance mechanism require the involvement of all the stakeholders, since the evolution of Internet has been a product of many different diverse groups working together in a loosely coordinated manner”, advocating strengthening of the IGF and pointing to India’s proposed India-IGF as an example of multi-stakeholderism at home. Most interestingly, Mr. Sharma did not focus on international Internet-related policies being the “sovereign policy authority of states”. Also in the transcripts of the four meetings of the Working Group on Enhanced Cooperation under the Committee for Science, Technology and Development (CSTD), I have been unable to find outright rejections of multi-stakeholder approaches, though India has not advocated multi-stakeholderism unequivocally either.

But this – the emphasis on “sovereign policy authority of states” in Internet governance – has been a consistent position for India, especially the MEA and DOT. Here at the ITU PP-14 as well, members of the Indian delegation also emphasized states’ sovereign monopoly over policy matters. “Why not take this to the ITU”, I was asked, as “many governments are uncomfortable” with the way Internet governance is being conducted at other fora. There are grave concerns, I was told, about the possibility of excessive control some governments have over both user and government data of other states (government-speak, of course, for the Snowden revelations).

These are, of course, concerns similar to those of authoritarian governments, or those reluctant to open up to multi-stakeholderism and looking for excuses to retain/increase government control. But it is equally possible that these concerns need not be limited only to such states. Perhaps for developing countries as well, these are real concerns. In conversation with members of the Indian delegation at the ITU Plenipot, I was able to discern 3 broad concerns. First, the definition of multi-stakeholderism in Internet governance. India has not shown herself comfortable with an all-out endorsement of multi-stakeholderism. This is troubling. Civil society and the private sector in India will attest to the difficulties in engaging with our government at all levels. For instance, seeking a place on India's delegation for the Plenipot proved a disheartening exercise for some members of India's civil society.

But there are also conflicting indications. India is in the process of instituting an India-IGF, and CIS' Executive Director, Sunil Abraham, is on the MAG. India expressed agreement, at least in informal conversation, to opening up ITU documents to the public on grounds of public interest. The Law Commission of India recently conducted a multi-stakeholder consultation on media laws in India, and Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) regularly conducts consultations, though the private sector is more active there. What is lacking in India, however, is a set of clear procedures and processes for multi-stakeholder engagement, particularly on Internet issues. Clear, public, accessible, foreseeable and predictable set of rules or processes on participation from civil society, private sector and academia would make a world of difference to multi-stakeholderism within India. But this lack should not blind states or other stakeholders to the genuineness of privacy/security or equity concerns - for instance, of the protection of our information from mass surveillance or the feasibility and actual participation of developing countries at many Internet governance fora.

Second, members of the delegation expressed concern over inequalities in the allocation of naming, numbering and addressing resources. While I am uncertain how IPv6 allocation falls within this concern, the inequalities of IPv4 allocations are well documented. To gather a sense of this, it would be useful to read chapter 5 of Professor DeNardis’ Protocol Politics, and to glance at Figure 5.7 (page 173). Africa controls, for instance, a mere 1% of all available IPv4 addresses, while North America and Europe control about 63%. A study on engagement from the Asia-Pacific in Internet standards organisations shows, for instance, greater participation from Western countries and from some states like Japan.[4] India and other states from Asia and Africa have lesser participation. Even at ICANN, with efforts to increase participation, meaningful engagement is still from a majority of Western countries. Perhaps states and other stakeholders on the other side of the table can address these concerns through clear, inclusive, non-discriminatory commitments and implementation.

Third, India emphasized how the Draft Resolution does not propose that ITU be involved in content management or resources control, but only seeks to systematize allocation by asking the ITU Secretary General to collaborate and coordinate with other Internet governance organisations to create a set of principles for fair, equitable, transparent and democratic - as well as secure - allocation of resources. ITU Resolution 101 already instructs the Secretary General to collaborate with relevant Internet governance organisations, and the Draft Resolution merely seeks to spell out his tasks. However, as I pointed out in my previous post, the text of the Draft Resolution is at odds with this intention of India's. By dint of its drafting, it gravely implicates human rights, as well as touching upon resource allocation oversight ("needs to be adhere to" in Op. §2). To reflect the above stated intention, the Draft Resolution would need to be redrafted.

Finally, the text of the Draft Resolution exhibits, unfortunately, a certain disregard for existing network architecture and efficiency within the Internet, and to the principles of a free, open and inter-operable and unified Internet, when it seeks to develop a network architecture that facilitates (domestic) localization of traffic-routing, address resolution and allocation of naming, numbering and addressing. An argument may, of course, be made in favour of efficiency and costs, including reduced latency. But it is clear that this has the potential to increase domestic surveillance capabilities and government censorship of content. In any case, traffic localization (if not local address resolution) can be achieved without ITU coordination: through Internet Exchange Points, and through more efficient and better-negotiated peering and transit arrangements (pages 14-17). Internationally coordinated rules for localized traffic routing is not necessary; you just need to have a more efficient Internet Exchange Point. How to get more ISPs to interconnect through India’s National Internet Exchange (NIXI) is one of the very questions that India’s Telecom Regulatory Authority has taken up in its recent consultation on expanding broadband access (page 49). So it is possible that India's concerns could be addressed without ITU involvement, though I am unsure of its impact on the global Internet.

The Draft Resolution will be discussed at the ITU Plenipot today. The discussion will allow India and sympathetic countries to raise several of their concerns relating to the present system of Internet governance, and the direction of its progress. I will report on these discussions upon their completion.

A Note on Limitations:

The aim of this post is to clarify. I would caution against its being the last word on anything, much less India’s positions on Internet governance. An issue as important as this needs far greater access to and confirmation from India’s government – and a more in-depth understanding of the politics – than I do, at the moment.

At the same time, India has not been a model for civil society engagement, as illustratively, the Narmada Bachao Andolan and/or P. Sainath’s evaluation of government policies in Everybody Loves a Good Drought reveal. It has been harder to effectively engage with India’s government than in many states in North America, Latin America and Europe. But I believe the complex dynamics of that is not unique to India. The NSA and GCHQ revelations (as an example of governmental trust deficit of unmatched proportions) have shown that where governments want to keep everyone out and oblivious, they do it well.

I am not in favour of a purely multilateral approach to Internet governance. But at the same time, I share concerns over definition and the evolution of processes as well, as I am sure others in civil society also do. Particularly on the issue of Internet governance and multi-stakeholderism, evidence reveals inconsistency among India’s various ministries. Until this is addressed by our government (hopefully in consultation with all concerned stakeholders), an open mind would probably be the best thing we - including states - could keep.

Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Sunil Abraham, Pranesh Prakash, Rishabh Dara, Arun Sukumar, Anja Kovacs and Parminder Jeet Singh for the freedom to bounce ideas, feedback and the many discussions about multi-stakeholder approaches and Internet governance. I also wish to acknowledge Samir Saran’s article in CFR, which offers an interesting perspective on India’s Draft Resolution.

[1] For this post, I will use ‘multi-stakeholder approaches’ as an umbrella term, but would urge readers to keep in mind the many uncertainties and disagreements about defining multi-stakeholderism for Internet governance. These disagreements exist among and within all stakeholders, including government and civil society. In addition to various iterations of the ‘equal footing model’, the model proposed in §35 of the Tunis Agenda is also multi-stakeholder, albeit in a different – and for many in civil society, less desirable – sense.

[2] For those unacquainted with WCIT, see Mueller, ITU Phobia: Why WCIT was derailed, Internet Governance Blog (18 December 2012), http://www.internetgovernance.org/2012/12/18/itu-phobia-why-wcit-was-derailed/; Kleinwächter, WCIT and Internet governance: Harmless resolution or Trojan horse?, CircleID Blog (17 December 2012), http://www.circleid.com/posts/20121217_wcit_and_internet_governance_harmless_resolution_or_trojan_horse/.

[3] For a commentary, see Mueller, A United Nations Committee for Internet-related Policies? A Fair Assessment, Internet Governance Blog (29 October 2011), http://www.internetgovernance.org/2011/10/29/a-united-nations-committee-for-internet-related-policies-a-fair-assessment/.

[4] Contreras, Divergent Patterns of Engagement in Internet Standardization: Japan, Korea and China. I am unable to find this paper online. Please email me for information.

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Good Intentions, Recalcitrant Text - I: Why India’s Proposal at the ITU is Troubling for Internet Freedoms

geetha — 2014-11-02T15:13:45Z

At the 2014 Plenipotentiary Conference (‘PP-14’ or ‘Plenipot’) of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), India has tabled a draft proposal on “ITU’s Role in Realising Secure Information Society” [Document 98, dated 20 October 2014] (“Draft Resolution”). India’s proposal has incited a great deal of concern and discussion among Plenipot attendees, governments and civil society alike. Before offering my concerns and comments on the Draft Resolution, let us understand the proposal.

Our Draft Resolution identifies 3 security concerns with exchange of information and resource allocation on the Internet:

First, it is troubling for India that present network architecture has “security weaknesses” such as “camouflaging the identity of the originator of the communication”;[1] random IP address distribution also makes “tracing of communication difficult”;[2]
Second, India is concerned that under the present allocation system of naming, numbering and addressing resources on the Internet, it is impossible or at the very least, cumbersome to identify the countries to which IP address are allocated;[3]
Third, India finds it insecure from the point of view of national security that traffic originating and terminating in the same country (domestic traffic) often routes through networks overseas;[4] similarly, local address resolution also routes through IP addresses outside the country or region, which India finds troubling.[5]

In an effort to address these concerns, the Draft Resolution seeks to instruct the ITU Secretary General:

First, to develop and recommend a ‘traffic routing plan’ that can “effectively ensure the traceability of communication”;[6]
Second, to collaborate with relevant international and intergovernmental organisations to develop an “IP address plan” which facilitates identification of locations/countries to which IP addresses are allocated and coordinates allocation accordingly;[7]
Third, to develop and recommend “a public telecom network architecture” that localizes both routing[8] as well as address resolution[9] for local/domestic traffic to “within the country”.

Admittedly, our Draft Resolution is intended to pave a way for “systematic, fair and equitable allocation” of, inter alia, naming, numbering and addressing resources,[10] keeping in mind security and human rights concerns.[11] In an informal conversation, members of the Indian delegation echoed these sentiments. Our resolution does not, I was told, raise issues about the “concentration of control over Internet resources”, though “certain governments” have historically exercised more control. It also does not, he clarified, wish to make privacy or human rights a matter for discussion at the ITU. All that the Draft Resolution seeks to do is to equip the ITU with the mandate to prepare and recommend a “roadmap for the systematization” of allocation of naming, numbering and addressing resources, and for local routing of domestic traffic and address resolution. The framework for such mandate is that of security, given the ITU’s role in ‘building confidence and security in the use of ICTs’ under Action Line C5 of the Geneva Plan of Action, 2003.

Unfortunately, the text of our Draft Resolution, by dint of imprecision or lack of clarity, undermines India’s intentions. On three issues of utmost importance to the Internet, the Draft Resolution has unintended or unanticipated impacts. First, its text on tracing communication and identity of originators, and systematic allocation of identifiable IP address blocks to particular countries, has impacts on privacy and freedom of expression. Given Edward Snowden’s NSA files and the absence of adequate protections against government incursions or excesses into privacy,[12] either in international human rights law or domestic law, such text is troublesome. Second, it has the potential to undermine multi-stakeholder approaches to Internet governance by proposing text that refers almost exclusively to sovereign monopolies over Internet resource allocation, and finally, displays a certain disregard for network architecture and efficiency, and to principles of a free, open and unified Internet, when it seeks to develop global architecture that facilitates (domestic) localization of traffic-routing, address resolution and allocation of naming, numbering and addressing.

In this post, I will address the first concern of human rights implications of our Draft Resolution.

Unintended Implications for Privacy and Freedom of Expression:

India’s Draft Resolution has implications for individual privacy. At two different parts of the preamble, India expresses concerns with the impossibility of locating the user at the end of an IP address:

Pream. §(e): “recognizing… that the modern day packet networks, which at present have many security weaknesses, inter alia, camouflaging the identity of originator of the communication”;
Pream. §(h): “recognizing… that IP addresses are distributed randomly, that makes the tracing of communication difficult”.

The concerns here surround difficulties in tracking IP addresses due to the widespread use of NATs, as also the existence of IP anonymisers like Tor. Anonymisers like Tor permit individuals to cover their online tracks; they conceal user location and Internet activity from persons or governments conducting network surveillance or traffic analysis. For this reason, Tor has caused much discomfort to governments. Snowden used Tor while communicating with Laura Poitras. Bradley (now Chelsea) Manning of Wikileaks fame is reported to have used Tor (page 24). Crypto is increasingly the safest – perhaps the only safe – avenue for political dissidents across the world; even Internet companies were coerced into governmental compliance. No wonder, then, that governments are doing all they can to dismantle IP anonymisers: the NSA and GCHQ have tried to break Tor; the Russian government has offered a reward to anyone who can.

Far be it from me to defend Tor blindly. There are reports suggesting that Tor is being used by offenders, and not merely those of the Snowden variety. But governments must recognize the very obvious trust deficit they face, especially after Snowden’s revelations, and consider the implications of seeking traceability and identity/geolocation for every IP address, in a systematic manner. The implications are for privacy, a right guaranteed by Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Privacy has been recognized by the UN General Assembly as applicable in cases of surveillance, interception and data collection, in Pream. §4 of its resolution The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age. But many states do not have robust privacy protections for individuals and data. And while governments may state the necessity to create international policy to further effective criminal investigations, such an aim cannot be used to nullify or destroy the rights of privacy and free speech guaranteed to individuals. Article 5(1), ICCPR, codifies this principle, when it states that States, groups or persons may not “engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein…”.

Erosion of privacy has a chilling effect on free speech [New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254], so free speech suffers too. Particularly with regard to Tor and identification of IP address location and users, anonymity in Internet communications is at issue. At the moment, most states already have anonymity-restrictions, in the form of identification and registration for cybercafés, SIM cards and broadband connections. For instance, Rule 4 of India’s Information Technology (Guidelines for Cyber Cafe) Rules, 2011, mandates that we cannot not use computers in a cybercafé without establishing our identities. But our ITU Draft Resolution seeks to dismantle the ability of Internet users to operate anonymously, be they political dissidents, criminals or those merely acting on their expectations of privacy. Such dismantling would be both violative of international human rights law, as well as dangerous for freedom of expression and privacy in principle. Anonymity is integral to democratic discourse, held the US Supreme Court in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission [514 U.S. 334 (1995)].[13] Restrictions on Internet anonymity facilitate communications surveillance and have a chilling effect on the free expression of opinions and ideas, wrote Mr. Frank La Rue, Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression (¶¶ 48-49).

So a law or international policy for blanket identification and traceability of IP addresses has grave consequences for and prima facie violates privacy, anonymity and freedom of speech. But these rights are not absolute, and can be validly restricted. And because these human rights are implicated, the ITU with its lack of expertise in the area may not be the adequate forum for discussion or study.

To be valid and justified interference, any law, policy or order interfering with privacy and free speech must meet the standards of reasonableness and proportionality, even if national security were the government’s legitimate aim, laid down in Articles 19(3) and 17 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) [Toonen v. Australia, Communication No. 488/1992, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994), ¶6.4]. And as the European Court of Human Rights found in Weber & Saravia v. Germany [Application no. 54934/00, 29 June 2006 (ECHR), ¶95], law or executive procedure that enables surveillance without sufficient safeguards is prima facie unreasonable and disproportionate. Re: anonymity, in Delfi AS v. Estonia [Application no. 64569/09, 17 February 2014, ¶83], while considering the liability of an Internet portal for offensive anonymous comments, the ECHR has emphasized the importance of balancing freedom of expression and privacy. It relied on certain principles such as “contribution to a debate of general interest, subject of the report, the content, form and consequences of the publication” to test the validity of government’s restrictions.

The implications of the suggested text of India’s Draft Resolution should then be carefully thought out. And this is a good thing. For one must wonder why governments need perfect traceability, geolocation and user identification for all IP addresses. Is such a demand really different from mass or blanket surveillance, in scale and government tracking ability? Would this not tilt the balance of power strongly in favour of governments against individuals (citizens or non-citizens)? This fear must especially arise in the absence of domestic legal protections, both in human rights, and criminal law and procedure. For instance, India’s Information Technology Act, 2000 (amended in 2008) has Section 66A, which criminalizes offensive speech, as well as speech that causes annoyance or inconvenience. Arguably, arrests under Section 66A have been arbitrary, and traceability may give rise to a host of new worries.

In any event, IP addresses and users can be discerned under existing domestic law frameworks. Regional Internet Registries (RIR) such as APNIC allocate blocks of IP addresses to either National Internet Registries (NIR – such as IRINN for India) or to ISPs directly. The ISPs then allocate IP addresses dynamically to users like you and me. Identifying information for these ISPs is maintained in the form of WHOIS records and registries with RIRs or NIRs, and this information is public. ISPs of most countries require identifying information from users before Internet connection is given, i.e., IP addresses allocated (mostly by dynamic allocation, for that is more efficient). ISPs of some states are also regulated; in India, for instance, ISPs require a licence to operate and offer services.

If any government wished, on the basis of some reasonable cause, to identify a particular IP address or its user, then the government could first utilize WHOIS to obtain information about the ISP. Then ISPs may be ordered to release specific IP address locations and user information under executive or judicial order. There are also technical solutions, such as traceroute or IP look-up that assist in tracing or identifying IP addresses. Coders, governments and law enforcement must surely be aware of better technology than I.

If we take into account this possibility of geolocation of IP addresses, then the Draft Resolution’s motivation to ‘systematize’ IP address allocations on the basis of states is unclear. I will discuss the implication of this proposal, and that of traffic and address localization, in my next post.

[1] Pream. §(e), Draft Resolution: “recognizing… that the modern day packet networks, which at present have many security weaknesses, inter alia, camouflaging the identity of originator of the communication”.

[2] Pream. §(h), Draft Resolution: “recognizing… that IP addresses are distributed randomly, that makes the tracing of communication difficult”.

[3] Op. §1, Draft Resolution: “instructs the Secretary General… to collaborate with all stakeholders including International and intergovernmental organizations, involved in IP addresses management to develop an IP address plan from which IP addresses of different countries are easily discernible and coordinate to ensure distribution of IP addresses accordingly”.

[4] Pream. §(g), Draft Resolution: “recognizing… that communication traffic originating and terminating in a country also many times flows outside the boundary of a country making such communication costly and to some extent insecure from national security point of view”.

[5] Pream. §(f), Draft Resolution: “recognizing… that even for local address resolution at times, system has to use resources outside the country which makes such address resolution costly and to some extent insecure from national security perspective”.

[6] Op. §6, Draft Resolution: “instructs the Secretary General… to develop and recommend a routing plan of traffic for optimizing the network resources that could effectively ensure the traceability of communication”.

[7] Op. §1, Draft Resolution; see note 3.

[8] Op. §5, Draft Resolution: “instructs the Secretary General… to develop and recommend public telecom network architecture which ensures that effectively the traffic meant for the country, traffic originating and terminating in the country remains within the country”.

[9] Op. §4, Draft Resolution: “instructs the Secretary General… to develop and recommend public telecom network architecture which ensures effectively that address resolution for the traffic meant for the country, traffic originating and terminating in the country/region takes place within the country”.

[10] Context Note to Draft Resolution, ¶3: “Planning and distribution of numbering and naming resources in a systematic, equitable, fair and just manner amongst the Member States…”

[11] Context Note to Draft Resolution, ¶2: “…there are certain areas that require critical attention to move in the direction of building the necessary “Trust Framework” for the safe “Information Society”, where privacy, safety are ensured”.

[12] See, for instance, Report of the Office of the High Commission for Human Rights (“OHCHR”), Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, A/HRC/27/37 (30 June 2014), ¶34-35, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session27/Documents/A.HRC.27.37_en.pdf. See esp. note 30 of the Report, ¶35.

[13] Many thorny political differences exist between the US and many states (including India and Kenya, who I am told has expressed preliminary support for the Draft Resolution) with regard to Internet governance. Irrespective of this, the US Constitution’s First Amendment and judicial protections to freedom of expression remain a yardstick for many states, including India. India, for instance, has positively referred to the US Supreme Court’s free speech protections in many of its decisions; ex. see Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1963 Cri. L.J. 329; R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1995 SC 264.

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