Centre for Internet and Society

CIS's Comments on the CCWG-Accountability Draft Proposal

pranesh — 2016-01-29T15:17:48Z

The Centre for Internet & Society (CIS) gave its comments on the failures of the CCWG-Accountability draft proposal as well as the processes that it has followed.

We from the Centre for Internet and Society wishes to express our dismay at the consistent way in which CCWG-Accountability has completely failed to take critical inputs from organizations like ours (and others, some instances of which have been highlighted in Richard Hill’s submission) into account, and has failed to even capture our concerns and misgivings about the process — as expressed in our submission to the CCWG-Accountability’s 2nd Draft Proposal on Work Stream 1 Recommendations — in any document prepared by the CCWG. We cannot support the proposal in its current form.

Time for Comments

We believe firstly that the 21 day comment period itself was too short and is going to result effectively in many groups or categories of people from not being able to meaningfully participate in the process, which flies in the face of the values that ICANN claims to uphold. This extremely short period amounts to procedural unsoundness, and restrains educated discussion on the way forward, especially given that the draft has altered quite drastically in the aftermath to ICANN55.

Capture of ICANN and CCWG Process

The participation in the accountability-cross-community mailing list clearly shows that the process is dominated by developed countries (of the top 30 non-staff posters to the list, 26 were from the ‘WEOG’ UN grouping, with 14 being from the USA, with only 1 from Asia Pacific, 2 from Africa, and 1 from Latin America), by males (27 of the 30 non-staff posters), and by industry/commercial interests (17 of the top 30 non-staff posters). If this isn’t “capture”, what is? There is no stress test that overcomes this reality of capture of ICANN by Western industry interests. The global community is only nominally multistakeholder, while actually being grossly under-representative of the developing nations, women and minority genders, and communities that are not business communities or technical communities. For instance, of the 1010 ICANN-accredited registrars, 624 are from the United States, and 7 from the 54 countries of Africa.

Culling statistics from the accountability-cross-community mailing list, we find that of the top 30 posters (excluding ICANN staff):

57% were, as far as one could ascertain from public records, from a single country: the United States of America.
87% were, as far as one could ascertain from public records, participants from countries which are part of the WEOG UN grouping (which includes Western Europe, US, Canada, Israel, Australia, and New Zealand), which only has developed countries. None of those who participated substantively were from the EEC (Eastern European) group and only 1 was from Asia-Pacific and only 1 was from GRULAC (Latin American and Caribbean Group).
90% were male and 3 were female, as far as one could ascertain from public records.
57% were identifiable as primarily being from industry or the technical community, as far as one could ascertain from public records, with only 2 (7%) being readily identifiable as representing governments.

This lack of global multistakeholder representation greatly damages the credibility of the entire process, since it gains its legitimacy by claiming to represent the global multistakeholder Internet community.

Bogey of Governmental Capture

With respect to Stress Test 18, dealing with the GAC, the report proposes that the ICANN Bylaws, specifically Article XI, Section 2, be amended to create a provision where if two-thirds of the Board so votes, they can reject a full GAC consensus advice. This amendment is not connected to the fear of government capture or the fear that ICANN will become a government-led body; given that the advice given by the GAC is non-binding that is not a possibility. Given the state of affairs described in the submission made above, it is clear that for much of the world, their governments are the only way in which they can effectively engage within the ICANN ecosystem. Therefore, nullifying the effectiveness of GAC advice is harmful to the interests of fostering a multistakeholder ecosystem, and contributes to the strengthening of the kind of industry capture described above.

Jurisdiction

All discussions on the Sole Designator Model seem predicated on the unflinching certainty of ICANN’s jurisdiction continuing to remain in California, as the legal basis of that model is drawn from Californian corporate law. To quote the draft report itself, in Annexe 12, it is stated that:

"Jurisdiction directly influences the way ICANN’s accountability processes are structured and operationalized. The fact that ICANN today operates under the legislation of the U.S. state of California grants the corporation certain rights and implies the existence of certain accountability mechanisms. It also imposes some limits with respect to the accountability mechanisms it can adopt. The topic of jurisdiction is, as a consequence, very relevant for the CCWG-Accountability. ICANN is a public benefit corporation incorporated in California and subject to California state laws, applicable U.S. federal laws and both state and federal court jurisdiction."

Jurisdiction has been placed within the mandate of WS2, to be dealt with post the transition. However, there is no analysis in the 3rd Draft on how the Sole Designator Model would continue to be upheld if future Work Stream 2 discussions led to a consensus that there needed to be a shift in the jurisdiction of ICANN. In the event that ICANN shifts to, say, Delaware or Geneva, would there be a basis to the Sole Designator Model in the law? Therefore this is an issue that needs to be addressed before this model is adopted, else there is a risk of either this model being rendered infructuous in the future, or this model foreclosing open debate and discussion in Work Stream 2.

Right of Inspection

We strongly support the incorporation of the rights of Inspection under this model as per Section 6333 of the California Corporations Code as a fundamental bylaw. As there is a severe gap between the claims that ICANN raises about its own transparency and the actual amount of transparency that it upholds, we opine that the right of inspection needs to be provided to each member of the ICANN community.

Timeline for WS2 Reforms

We support the CCWG’s commitment to the review of the DIDP Process, which they have committed to enhancing in WS2. Our research on this matter indicates that ICANN has in practice been able to deflect most requests for information. It regularly utilised its internal processes and discussions with stakeholders clauses, as well as clauses on protecting financial interests of third parties (over 50% of the total non-disclosure clauses ever invoked - see chart below) to do away with having to provide information on pertinent matters such as its compliance audits and reports of abuse to registrars. We believe that even if ICANN is a private entity legally, and not at the same level as a state, it nonetheless plays the role of regulating an enormous public good, namely the Internet. Therefore, there is a great onus on ICANN to be far more open about the information that they provide. Finally, it is extremely disturbing that they have extended full disclosure to only 12% of the requests that they receive. An astonishing 88% of the requests have been denied, partly or otherwise. See "Peering behind the veil of ICANN's DIDP (II)".

In the present format, there has been little analysis on the timeline of WS2; the report itself merely states that:

"The CCWG-Accountability expects to begin refining the scope of Work Stream 2 during the upcoming ICANN 55 Meeting in March 2016. It is intended that Work Stream 2 will be completed by the end of 2016."

Without further clarity and specification of the WS2 timeline, meaningful reform cannot be initiated. Therefore we urge the CCWG to come up with a clear timeline for transparency processes.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/ciss-comments-on-the-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal

CIS Submission on CCWG-Accountability 2nd Draft Proposal on Work Stream 1 Recommendations

pranesh — 2015-11-23T14:58:58Z

The Centre for Internet & Society (CIS) submitted the below to ICANN's CCWG-Accountability.

The CCWG Accountability proposal is longer than many countries' constitutions. Given that, we will keep our comments brief, addressing a very limited set of the issues in very broad terms.

Human Rights

ICANN is unique in many ways. It is a global regulator that has powers of taxation to fund its own operation. ICANN is not a mere corporation. For such a regulator, ensuring fair process (what is often referred to as "natural justice") as well as substantive human rights (such as the freedom of expression, right against discrimination, right to privacy, and cultural diversity), are important. Given this, the narrow framing of "free expression and the free flow of information" in Option 1, we believe Option 2 is preferable.

Diversity

We are glad that diversity is being recognized as an important principle. As we noted during the open floor session at ICANN49: [We are] extremely concerned about the accountability of ICANN to the global community. Due to various decisions made by the US government relating to ICANN's birth, ICANN has had a troubled history with legitimacy. While it has managed to gain and retain the confidence of the technical community, it still lacks political legitimacy due to its history. The NTIA's decision has presented us an opportunity to correct this.

However, ICANN can't hope to do so without going beyond the current ICANN community, which while nominally being 'multistakeholder' and open to all, grossly under-represents those parts of the world that aren't North America and Western Europe.

Of the 1010 ICANN-accredited registrars, 624 are from the United States, and 7 from the 54 countries of Africa. In a session yesterday, a large number of the policies that favour entrenched incumbents from richer countries were discussed. But without adequate representation from poorer countries, and adequate representation from the rest of the world's Internet population, there is no hope of changing these policies.

This is true not just of the business sector, but of all the 'stakeholders' that are part of global Internet policymaking, whether they follow the ICANN multistakeholder model or another. A look at the board members of the Internet Architecture Board, for instance, would reveal how skewed the technical community can be, whether in terms of geographic or gender diversity.

Without greater diversity within the global Internet policymaking communities, there is no hope of equity, respect for human rights — civil, political, cultural, social and economic — and democratic functioning, no matter how 'open' the processes seem to be, and no hope of ICANN accountability either.

Meanwhile, there are those who are concerned that diversity should not prevail over skill and experience. Those who have the greatest skill and experience will be those who are insiders in the ICANN system. To believe that being an insider in the ICANN system ought to be privileged over diversity is wrong. A call for diversity isn't just political correctness. It is essential for legitimacy of ICANN as a globally-representative body, and not just one where the developed world (primarily US-based persons) makes policies for the whole globe, which is what it has so far been. Of course, this cannot be corrected overnight, but it is crucial that this be a central focus of the accountability initiative.

Jurisdiction, Membership Models and Voting Rights

The Sole-Member Community Mechanism (SMCM) that has been proposed seems in large part the best manner provided under Californian law relating to public benefit corporations of dealing with accountability issues, and is the lynchpin of the whole accountability mechanism under workstream.

However, the jurisdictional analysis laid down in 11.3 will only be completed post-transition, as part of workstream. Thus the SMCM may not necessarily be the best model under a different legal jurisdiction. It would be useful to discuss the dependency between these more clearly. In this vein, it is essential that the Article XVIII Section 1 not be designated a fundamental bylaw. Further, it would be useful to add that for some limited aspects of the transition (such as IANA functioning), ICANN should seek to enter into a host country agreement to provide legal immunity, thus providing a qualification to para 125 ("ICANN accountability requires compliance with applicable legislation, in jurisdictions where it operates.") since the IANA functions operator ought not be forced by a country not to honour requests made by, for example, North Korea.

It should also be noted that accountability needs independence, which may be of two kinds: independence of financial source, and independence of appointment. From what one could gather from the CCWG proposal, the Independent Review Panel will be funded by the budget the ICANN Board prepares, while the appointment process is still unclear.

One of the most important accountability mechanisms with regard to the IANA functions is that of changing the IANA Functions Operator. As per the CWG Stewardship's current proposal, the "Post-Transition IANA" won't be an entity that is independent of ICANN. If the PTI's governance is permanently made part of ICANN's fundamental bylaws (as an affiliate controlled by ICANN), how is it proposed that the IFO be moved from PTI to some other entity if the IANA Functions Review Team so decides? Additionally, for such an important function, the composition of the IFRT should not be left unspecified.

While it is welcome that a separation is proposed between the IANA budget and budget for rest of ICANN's functioning, the current discussion around budgets seems to be based on the assumption that all IANA functions will be funded by ICANN, whereas if the IANA functions are separated, each community might fund it separately. That provides two levels of insulation to IANA functions operator(s): separate sources of operational revenue, as well as separate budgets within ICANN.

It should be noted that there have been some responses that express concern about the shifting of existing power structures within ICANN through some of the proposed alternative voting allocations in the SMCM. However, rather than present arguments as to why these shifts would be beneficial or harmful for ICANN's overall accountability, these responses seem to assume that shift from the current power structures are harmful. This is an unfounded assumption and cannot be a valid reason, nor can speculation of how the United States Congress will behave be a valid reason for rejecting an otherwise valid proposal. If there are harms, they ought to be clearly articulated: shifts from the status quo and fear of the US Congress aren't valid harms. Thus, while it is important to consider how different voting rights models might change the status quo while arriving at any judgments, that cannot be the sole criterion for judgment of its merits. Further, as the French government notes:

[T]he French Government still considers that linking Stress Test 18 to a risk of capture of ICANN by governments and NTIA’s requirement that no “government-led or intergovernmental organization solution would be acceptable”, makes no sense. . . . Logically, the risk of capture of ICANN by governments in the future is as low as it is now and in any case, it cannot lead to a “government-led or intergovernmental organization solution”.

While dealing with the question of relative voting proportions, the community must remembered that not all parts of the world are equally developed with regard to the domain name industry and with respect to civil society as those countries in North America, Western Europe, and other developed nations, and thus may not find adequate representation via the SOs. In many parts of the world, civil society organizations — especially those focussed on Internet governance and domain name policies — are non-existent. Thus a system that privileges the SOs to the exclusion of other components of a multistakeholder governance model would not be representative or diverse. A multistakeholder model cannot disproportionately represent business interests over all other interests.

In this regard, the comments of former ICANN Chairperson, Rod Beckstrom, at ICANN43 ought to be recalled:

ICANN must be able to act for the public good while placing commercial and financial interests in the appropriate context . . . How can it do this if all top leadership is from the very domain name industry it is supposed to coordinate independently?

As Kieren McCarthy points out about ICANN:

The Board does have too many conflicted members
The NomCom is full of conflicts
There are not enough independent voices within the organization

Reforms in these ought to be as crucial to accountability as the membership model.

The current mechanisms for ensuring transparency, such as the DIDP process, are wholly inadequate. We have summarized our experience with the DIDP process, and how often we were denied information on baseless grounds in this table.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-submission-on-ccwg-accountability-2nd-draft-proposal-on-work-stream-1-recommendations

CIS Statement at ICANN 49's Public Forum

pranesh — 2014-06-04T05:31:44Z

This was a statement made by Pranesh Prakash at the ICANN 49 meeting (on March 27, 2014), arguing that ICANN's bias towards the North America and Western Europe result in a lack of legitimacy, and hoping that the IANA transition process provides an opportunity to address this.

Good afternoon. My name is Pranesh Prakash, and I'm with the Yale Information Society Project and the Centre for Internet and Society.

I am extremely concerned about the accountability of ICANN to the global community. Due to various decisions made by the US government relating to ICANN's birth, ICANN has had a troubled history with legitimacy. While it has managed to gain and retain the confidence of the technical community, it still lacks political legitimacy due to its history. The NTIA's decision has presented us an opportunity to correct this.

This is true not just of the business sector, but of all the 'stakeholders' that are part of global Internet policymaking, whether they follow the ICANN multistakeholder model or another. A look at the boardmembers of the Internet Architecture Board, for instance, would reveal how skewed the technical community can be, whether in terms of geographic or gender diversity.

Without greater diversity within the global Internet policymaking communities, there is no hope of equity, respect for human rights -- civil, political, cultural, social and economic --, and democratic funtioning, no matter how 'open' the processes seem to be, and no hope of ICANN accountability either.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann49-public-forum-statement

CIS Response to ICANN's proposed renewal of .org Registry

akriti — 2019-04-28T02:16:40Z

We thank ICANN for the opportunity to comment on this issue of its proposed renewal of the .org Registry Agreement with the operator, Public Interest Registry (PIR). Supporting much of the community , we too find severe issues with the proposed agreement. These centre around the removal of price caps and imposing obligations being currently deliberated in an ongoing Policy Development Process (PDP).

Presumption of Renewal

CIS has, in the past, questioned the need for a presumption of renewal in registry contracts and it is important to emphasize this within the context of this comment as well. We had, also, asked ICANN for their rationale on having such a practice with reference to their contract with Verisign to which they responded saying:

“Absent countervailing reasons, there is little public benefit, and some significant potential for disruption, in regular changes of a registry operator. In addition, a significant chance of losing the right to operate the registry after a short period creates adverse incentives to favor short term gain over long term investment.”

This logic can presumably be applied to the .org registry, as well, yet a re-auction of ,even, legacy top-level domains can only serve to further a fair market, promote competition and ensure that existing registries do not become complacent.

These views were supported in the course of the PDP on Contractual Conditions - Existing Registries in 2006 wherein competition was seen useful for better pricing, operational performance and contributions to registry infrastructure. It was also noted that most service industries incorporate a presumption of competition as opposed to one of renewal.

Download the file to access our full response.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/akriti-bopanna-april-28-2019-cis-response-to-icanns-proposed-renewal-of-org-registry

CIS representation at ICANN 58

praskrishna — 2017-03-28T14:22:22Z

The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) organized ICANN 58 at Copenhagen from March 9 to March 16, 2017. On behalf of the Centre for Internet & Society (CIS), Vidushi Marda participated in the event and made a presentation.

CIS' focus at ICANN can broadly be divided into four heads: human rights, jurisdiction, transparency and accountability. Since March last year, we have also been pushing for changes in ICANN's expected standards of behavior, along with adoption of an anti harassment policy. After the IANA transition in September last year, the community is now divided into sub groups (SGs) that look into different issues for ICANN post transition, including the 4 that CIS works on. More information on ICANN 58 can be accessed here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/cis-representation-at-icann-58

CIS Policy Brief: IANA Transition Fundamentals & Suggestions for Process Design

geetha — 2014-07-08T08:39:41Z

In March 2014, the US government announced that it would transfer oversight of IANA functions to an as-yet-indeterminate global multi-stakeholder body. This policy brief, written by Smarika Kumar and Geetha Hariharan, explains the process concisely.

Short Introduction:

In March 2014, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) announced its intention to transition key Internet domain name functions to the global multi-stakeholder community. Currently, the NTIA oversees coordination and implementation of IANA functions through contractual arrangements with ICANN and Verisign, Inc.

The NTIA will not accept a government-led or inter-governmental organization to steward IANA functions. It requires the IANA transition proposal to have broad community support, and to be in line with the following principles: (1) support and enhance the multi-stakeholder model; (2) maintain the security, stability, and resiliency of the Internet DNS; (3) meet the needs and expectation of the global customers & partners of IANA services; (4) maintain the openness of the Internet.

ICANN was charged with developing a proposal for IANA transition. It initiated a call for public input in April 2014. Lamentably, the scoping document for the transition did not include questions of ICANN’s own accountability and interests in IANA stewardship, including whether it should continue to coordinate the IANA functions. Public Input received in May 2014 revolved around the composition of a Coordination Group, which would oversee IANA transition. Now, ICANN will hold an open session on June 26, 2014 at ICANN-50 to gather community feedback on issues relating to IANA transition, including composition of the Coordination Group.

CIS Policy Brief:

CIS' Brief on IANA Transition Fundamentals explains the process further, and throws light on the Indian government's views. To read the brief, please go here.

Suggestions for Process Design

As convenor of the IANA stewardship transition, ICANN has sought public comments on issues relating to the transition process. We suggest certain principles for open, inclusive and transparent process-design:

Short Introduction:

In March 2014, the US government through National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) announced its intention to transition key Internet domain name functions (IANA) to the global multi-stakeholder community. The NTIA announcement states that it will not accept a government-led or intergovernmental organization solution to replace its own oversight of IANA functions. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) was charged with developing a Proposal for the transition.

At ICANN-49 in Singapore (March 2014), ICANN rapidly gathered inputs from its community to develop a draft proposal for IANA transition. It then issued a call for public input on the Draft Proposal in April 2014. Some responses were incorporated to create a Revised Proposal, published on June 6, 2014.

Responses had called for transparent composition of an IANA transition Coordination Group, a group comprising representatives of ICANN’s Advisory Committees and Supporting Organizations, as well as Internet governance organizations such as the IAB, IETF and ISOC. Also, ICANN was asked to have a neutral, facilitative role in IANA transition. This is because, as the current IANA functions operator, it has a vested interest in the transition. Tellingly, ICANN’s scoping document for IANA transition did not include questions of its own role as IANA functions operator.

ICANN is currently deliberating the process to develop a Proposal for IANA transition. At ICANN-50, ICANN will hold a governmental high-level meeting and a public discussion on IANA transition, where comments and concerns can be voiced. In addition, discussion in other Internet governance fora is encouraged.

CIS Policy Brief:

CIS' Brief on IANA Transition Principles explains our recommendations for transition process-design. To read the brief, please go here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-policy-brief-iana-transition-fundamentals-and-suggestions-for-process-design

CIS Participation at ICANN 54

praskrishna — 2016-01-18T12:47:19Z

Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), India participated in the 54th meeting of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) held at the Convention Center in Dublin from 17 October 2015 to 22 October 2015. Pranesh Prakash, Jyoti Panday and Padmini Baruah attended the meeting.

CIS representation was possible at the meeting due to the generous support of MacArthur grant, NCUC ICANN Travel Grant and financial support from the National Internet Exchange of India (NIXI). The issue-wise detail of CIS engagement is set out below.

At the Public Forum, Jyoti Panday asked the ICANN Board to clarify its role and the role of the community in the development of the proposal with Verisign on its role as the Root Zone Maintainer. ICANN CEO confirmed what many feared, that there will be no community involvement on this proposal as ICANN's relationship with Verisign is an "implementation" detail. He added the assurance that post transition, on the decision of renewal of the contract and whether it will be awarded to Verisign, ICANN will seek inputs from the community. Jyoti's statement is replicated below:

"I want to ask the Board why when asked by the NTIA to develop a draft proposal for the with Verisign on its Root Zone Maintainer role, did you not pass on that mandate to the community, to the CWG which already exists, and ask the community to draft out the proposal with VeriSign? Will the ICANN Board seek public comments on the final proposal before it is approved? After all, ICANN cannot claim that it is an inverted pyramid where all decisions start from the community and flow up to the Board when on a crucial issue like this, the ICANN Board and staff have not taken the community in confidence nor invited its participation."

Padmini Baruah reiterated CIS message at the Public Forum on the lack of diversity observed through the transition and presented new data. Padmini's statement is replicated below:
Today, more than 50% of Internet users are in the Asia-Pacific region, and less than 10% are in North America. Yet, when one studies diversity within the ICANN community and in ICANN processes, one finds that diversity is sorely lacking, and it is dominated by people from the United States of America. Take the IANA transition, for instance. CIS studied participant data from ICANN, NRO, and IETF's lists related to the IANA transition. Of the substantive contributors, of which there were 98, we found:
* 1 in 4 (39 of 98) were from a single country: the United States of America.
* 4 in 5 (77 of 98) were from countries which are part of the WEOG grouping, which only has developed countries.
* None were from readily identifiable as being based in Eastern European and Russia, and only 5 of 98 from all of Latin American and the Caribbean.
* 4 in 5 (77 of 98) were male and 21 were female.
* 4 in 5 (76 of 98) were from industry or the technical community, and only 4 (or 1 in 25) were identifiable as primarily speaking on behalf of governments.
It would be a travesty of language to call this the "global multistakeholder community".
Further this problem is pervasive in the ICANN community:
* 66% (34 of 51) of the Business Constituency at ICANN, as per their own data, are from a single country: the United States of America.
* 3 in 5 registrars are from the United States of America (624 out of 1010, as of March 2014, according to ICANN's accredited registrars list), with only 0.6% being from the 54 countries in Africa (7 out of 1010).
* 45% of all the registries are from the United States of America! (307 out of 672 registries listed in ICANN’s registry directory in August 2015.)
Please take this as your top priority, since ICANN's legitimacy depends on being able to call itself globally representative.

CIS attended also raised a series of concerns at the following sessions:

Enhancing ICANN Accountability Open Engagement: CIS intervened with its stance on jurisdiction and their enforcement models, and our concerns about transparency.
GAC sessions
NCSG meeting
IANA Transition Stewardship Transition Engagement Session
CCWG Accountability Working Session
Illicit Internet Pharmacies
NCUC Meeting+engagement with Larry Strickling: Jyoti Panday asked about the dual role of Verisign as a Root zone maintainer and TLD operator. Padmini Baruah asked him about jurisdiction. He said the US Congress will not support a shift in ICANN's jurisdiction.
NCSG/gNSO (CIS work on DIDP got public mention)
Contractual Compliance Programme Update
CWG Stewardship working session
Role of Voluntary Practices in Combating Abuse and Illegal Activity
Joint meeting of the ICANN Board and NCSG

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/icann-54

CIS Comments: Enhancing ICANN Accountability

geetha — 2014-06-10T13:03:57Z

On May 6, 2014, ICANN published a call for public comments on "Enhancing ICANN Accountability". This comes in the wake of the IANA stewardship transition spearheaded by ICANN and related concerns of ICANN's external and internal accountability mechanisms. Centre for Internet and Society contributed to the call for comments.

Introduction:

On March 14, 2014, the US National Telecommunications and Information Administration announced its intent to transition key Internet domain name functions to the global multi-stakeholder Internet governance community. ICANN was tasked with the development of a proposal for transition of IANA stewardship, for which ICANN subsequently called for public comments. At NETmundial, ICANN President and CEO Fadi Chehadé acknowledged that the IANA stewardship transition and improved ICANN accountability were inter-related issues, and announced the impending launch of a process to strengthen and enhance ICANN accountability in the absence of US government oversight. The subsequent call for public comments on “Enhancing ICANN Accountability” may be found here.

Suggestions for improved accountability:

In the event, Centre for Internet and Society (“CIS”) wishes to limit its suggestions for improved ICANN accountability to matters of reactive or responsive transparency on the part of ICANN to the global multi-stakeholder community. We propose the creation and implementation of a robust “freedom or right to information” process from ICANN, accompanied by an independent review mechanism.

Article III of ICANN Bye-laws note that “ICANN and its constituent bodies shall operate to the maximum extent feasible in an open and transparent manner and consistent with procedures designed to ensure fairness”. As part of this, Article III(2) note that ICANN shall make publicly available information on, inter alia, ICANN’s budget, annual audit, financial contributors and the amount of their contributions, as well as information on accountability mechanisms and the outcome of specific requests and complaints regarding the same. Such accountability mechanisms include reconsideration (Article IV(2)), independent review of Board actions (Article IV(3)), periodic reviews (Article IV(4)) and the Ombudsman (Article V).

Further, ICANN’s Documentary Information Disclosure Policy (“DIDP”) sets forth a process by which members of the public may request information “not already publicly available”. ICANN may respond (either affirmatively or in denial) to such requests within 30 days. Appeals to denials under the DIDP are available under the reconsideration or independent review procedures, to the extent applicable.

While ICANN has historically been prompt in its response to DIDP Requests, CIS is of the view that absent the commitments in the AoC following IANA stewardship transition, it would be desirable to amend and strengthen Response and Appeal procedures for DIDP and other, broader disclosures. Our concerns stem from the fact that, first, the substantive scope of appeal under the DIDP, on the basis of documents requested, is unclear (say, contracts or financial documents regarding payments to Registries or Registrars, or a detailed, granular break-up of ICANN’s revenue and expenditures); and second, that grievances with decisions of the Board Governance Committee or the Independent Review Panel cannot be appealed.

Therefore, CIS proposes a mechanism based on “right to information” best practices, which results in transparent and accountable governance at governmental levels.

First, we propose that designated members of ICANN staff shoulder responsibility to respond to information requests. The identity of such members (information officers, say) ought to be made public, including in the response document.

Second, an independent, third party body should be constituted to sit in appeal over information officers’ decisions to provide or decline to provide information. Such body may be composed of nominated members from the global multi-stakeholder community, with adequate stakeholder-, regional- and gender-representation. However, such members should not have held prior positions in ICANN or its related organizations. During the appointed term of the body, the terms and conditions of service ought to remain beyond the purview of ICANN, similar to globally accepted principles of an independent judiciary. For instance, the Constitution of India forbids any disadvantageous alteration of privileges and allowances of judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts during tenure.

Third, and importantly, punitive measures ought to follow unreasonable, unexplained or illegitimate denials of requests by ICANN information officers. In order to ensure compliance, penalties should be made continuing (a certain prescribed fine for each day of information-denial) on concerned officers. Such punitive measures are accepted, for instance, in Section 20 of India’s Right to Information Act, 2005, where the review body may impose continuing penalties on any defaulting officer.

Finally, exceptions to disclosure should be finite and time-bound. Any and all information exempted from disclosure should be clearly set out (and not merely as categories of exempted information). Further, all exempted information should be made public after a prescribed period of time (say, 1 year), after which any member of the public may request for the same if it continues to be unavailable.

CIS hopes that ICANN shall deliver on its promise to ensure and enhance its accountability and transparency to the global multi-stakeholder community. To that end, we hope our suggestions may be positively considered.

Comment repository:

All comments received by ICANN during the comment period (May 6, 2014 to June 6, 2014) may be found at this link.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-comments-enhancing-icann-accountability

CIS Comment on ICANN's Draft FY20 Operating Plan and Budget

akriti — 2019-02-12T23:44:46Z

At the Centre for Internet and Society, we are grateful for the opportunity to provide our comments on the proposed draft of ICANN’s FY20 Operating Plan and Budget along with their Five-Year Operating Plan Update. As part of the public comment process, ICANN provided a list of documents which can be found here that included their highlights of the budget, the total draft budget for FY20, an operating plan segregated by portfolios, amongst others.

The following are our comments on relevant aspects from the different documents:

There are several significant undertakings which have not found adequate support in this budget, chief among them being the implementation of the ICANN Workstream 2 recommendations on Accountability. The budget accounts for any expenses that arise from WS2 as emanating from its contingency fund which is a mere 4%. Totalling more than 100 recommendations across 8 sub groups, execution of these would require significant expenditure. Ideally, this should have been budgeted for in the FY20 budget considering the final report was submitted in June, 2018 and conversations about its implementation have been carried out ever since. It is wondered if this is because the second Workstream does not have the effectuation of its recommendations in its mandate and hence it is easier for ICANN to be slow on it.^[1] As a member of the community deeply interested in integrating human rights better in ICANN’s various processes, it is concerning to note the glacial pace of the approval of the aforementioned recommendations especially coupled with the lack of funds allocated to it. Further, there is 1 one person assigned to work on the WS2 implementation work which seems insufficient for the magnitude of work involved.^[2]

A topical issue with ICANN currently is its tussle with the implementation of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and despite the prominence and extent of the legal burden involved, resources to complying with it have not been allocated. Again, it is within the umbrella of the contingency budget.

The Cross Community Working Group on New gTLD Auction Proceeds is also, presently, developing recommendations on how to distribute the proceeds. It is unclear where these will be funded from since their work is funded by the core ICANN budget yet it is assumed that the recommendations will be funded by the auction proceeds. Almost 7 years after the new gTLD round was open, it is alarming that ICANN has not formulated a plan for the proceeds and are still debating the merits of the entity which would resolve this question, as recently as the last ICANN meeting in October, 2018.

Another important policy development process being undertaken right now is the Working Group who is reviewing the current new gTLD policies to improve the process by proposing changes or new policies. There are no resources in the FY20 budget to implement the changes that will arise from this but only those to support the Working Group activities.

Lastly, the budgets lack information on how much each individual RIR contributes.

Staff costs

ICANN’s internal costs on their personnel have been rising for years and slated to account for more than half their annual budget with an estimated 56% or $76.3 million in the next financial year. The community has been consistent in calling upon them to revise their staff costs with many questioning if the growth in staff is justified.^{^[3]} There was criticism from all quarters such as the GNSO Council who stated that it is “not convinced that the proposed budget funds the policy work it needs to do over the coming year”.^{^[4]} The excessive use of professional service consultants has come under fire too.

As pointed out in a mailing list, in comments on the FY19 budget, every single constituency and stakeholder group remarked that personnel costs presented too high a burden on the budget. One of the suggestions presented by the NCSG was to relocate positions from from the LA headquarters to less expensive countries such as those in Asia. This can be seen from the high increase this budget of $200,000 in operational costs though no clear breakdown of that entails was given.

The view seems to be that ICANN repeatedly chooses to retain higher salaries while reducing funding for the community. This is even more of an issue since there employment remuneration scheme is opaque. In a DIDP I filed enquiring about the average salary across designations, gender, regions and the frequency of bonuses, the response was either to refer to their earlier documents which do not have concrete information or that the relevant documents were not in their possession.^{^[5]}

ICANN Fellowship

The budget of the fellowship has been reduced which is an important initiative to involve individuals in ICANN who cannot afford the cost of flying to the global ICANN meetings. The focus should be not only be on arriving at a suitable figure for the funding but also to ensure that people who either actively contribute or are likely to are supported as opposed to individuals who are already known in this circle.

Again, our attempts at understanding the Fellowship selection were met with resistance from ICANN. In a DIDP filed regarding it with questions such as if anyone had received it more than the maximum limit of thrice and details on the selection criteria, no clarity was provided.^{^[6]}

Lobbying and Sponsorship

At ICANN 63 in Barcelona, I enquired about ICANN’s sponsorship strategies and how the decision making is done with respect to which all events in each region to sponsor and for a comprehensive list of all sponsorship ICANN undertakes and receives. I was told such a document would be published soon but in the 4 months since then, none can be found. It is difficult to comment on the budget for such a team where there is not much information on the work it specifically carries out and the impact of such sponsoring activities. When questioned to someone on their team, I was told that it depends on the needs of each region and events that are significant in such regions. However without public accountability and transparency about these, sponsorship can be seen as a vague heading which could be better spent on community initiatives.

Talking of Transparency, it has also been pointed out that the Information Transparency Initiative has 3 million dollars set aside for its activities in this budget. It sounds positive yet with no deliverables to show in the past 2 years, it is difficult to ascertain the value of the investment in this initiative.

Lobbying activities do not find any mention in the budget and neither do the nature of sponsorship from other entities in terms of whether it is travel and accommodation of personnel or any other kind of institutional sponsorship.

^{^[1]} https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann-work-stream-2-recommendations-on-accountability

^{^[2]} https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/proposed-opplan-fy20-17dec18-en.pdf

^{^[3]} http://domainincite.com/22680-community-calls-on-icann-to-cut-staff-spending

^{^[4]} Ibid

^{^[5]}https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-30-enquiry-about-the-employee-pay-structure-at-icann

^{^[6]} https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-31-on-icanns-fellowship-program

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/akriti-bopanna-february-8-2019-comment-on-icann-draft-fy-20-operating-plan-and-budget

Breaking Down ICANN Accountability: What It Is and What the Internet Community Wants

ramya — 2015-11-05T15:29:26Z

At the recent ICANN conference held in Dublin (ICANN54), one issue that was rehashed and extensively deliberated was ICANN's accountability and means to enhance the same. In light of the impending IANA stewardship transition from the NTIA to the internet's multi-stakeholder community, accountability of ICANN to the internet community becomes that much more important. In this blog post, some aspects of the various proposals to enhance ICANN's accountability have been deconstructed and explained.

The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, known as ICANN, is a private not-for-profit organization, registered in California. Among other functions, it is tasked with carrying out the IANA function[1], pursuant to a contract between the US Government (through the National Telecommunications and Information Administration – NTIA) and itself. Which means, as of now, there exists legal oversight by the USG over ICANN with regard to the discharge of these IANA functions.[2]

However, in 2014, the NTIA, decided to completely handover stewardship of the IANA functions to the internet’s ‘global multistakeholder community’. But the USG put down certain conditions before this transition could be effected, one of which was to ensure that there exists proper accountability within the ICANN.[3]

The reason for this, was that the internet community feared a shift of ICANN to a FIFA-esque organization with no one to keep it in check, post the IANA transition if these accountability concerns weren’t addressed.[4]

And thus, to answer these concerns, the Cross Community Working Group (CCWG-Accountability) has come up with reports that propose certain changes to the structure and functioning of ICANN.

In light of the discussions that took place at ICANN54 in Dublin, this blog post is directed towards summarizing some of these proposals - those pertaining to the Independent Review Process or IRP (explained below) as well the various accountability models that are the subject of extensive debate both on and off the internet.

Building Blocks Identified by the CCWG-Accountability

The CCWG-Accountability put down four “building blocks”, as they call it, on which all their work is based. One of these is what is known as the Independent Review Process (or IRP). This is a mechanism by which internal complaints, either by individuals or by SOs/ACs[5], are addressed. However, the current version of the IRP is criticized for being an inefficient mechanism of dispute resolution.[6]

And thus the CCWG-Accountability proposed a variety of amendments to the same.

Another building block that the CCWG-Accountability identified is the need for an “empowered internet community”, which means more engagement between the ICANN Board and the internet community, as well as increased oversight by the community over the Board. As of now, the USG acts as the oversight-entity. Post the IANA transition however, the community feels they should step in and have an increased say with regard to decisions taken by the ICANN Board.

As part of empowering the community, the CCWG-Accountability identified five core areas in which the community needs to possess some kind of powers or rights. These areas are – review and rejection of the ICANN budget, strategic plans and operating plans; review, rejection and/or approval of standard bylaws as well fundamental bylaws; review and rejection of Board decisions pertaining to IANA functions; appointment and removal of individual directors on the Board; and recall of the entire Board itself. And it is with regard to what kind of powers and rights are to be vested with the community that a variety of accountability models have been proposed, both by the CCWG-Accountability as well as the ICANN Board. However, of all these models, discussion is now primarily centered on three of them – the Sole Member Model (SMM), the Sole Designator Model (SDM) and the Multistakeholder Empowerment Model (MEM).

What is the IRP?

The Independent Review Process or IRP is the dispute resolution mechanism, by which complaints and/or oppositions by individuals with regard to Board resolutions are addressed. Article 4 of the ICANN bylaws lay down the specifics of the IRP. As of now, a standing panel of six to nine arbitrators is constituted, from which a panel is selected for hearing every complaint. However, the primary criticism of the current version of the IRP is the restricted scope of issues that the panel passes decisions on.[7]

The bylaws explicitly state that the panel needs to focus on a set on procedural questions while hearing a complaint – such as whether the Board acted in good faith or exercised due diligence in passing the disputed resolution.

Changes Proposed by the Internet Community to Enhance the IRP

To tackle this and other concerns with the existing version of the IRP, the CCWG-Accountability proposed a slew of changes in the second draft proposal that they released in August this year. What they proposed is to make the IRP arbitral panel hear complaints and decide the matter on both procedural (as they do now) and substantive grounds. In addition, they also propose a broadening of who all have locus to initiate an IRP, to include individuals, groups and other entities. Further, they also propose a more precedent-based method of dispute resolution, wherein a panel refers to and uses decisions passed by past panels in arriving at a decision.

At the 19^th October “Enhancing ICANN-Accountability Engagement Session” that took place in Dublin as part of ICANN54, the mechanism to initiate an IRP was explained by Thomas Rickert, CCWG Co-Chair.[8]

Briefly, the modified process is as follows -

An objection may be raised by any individual, even a non-member.
This individual needs to find an SO or an AC that shares the objection.
A “pre-call” or remote meeting between all the SOs and ACs is scheduled, to see if objection receives prescribed threshold of approval from the community.
If this threshold is met, dialogue is undertaken with the Board, to see if the objection is sustained by the Board.
If this dialogue also fails, then IRP can be initiated.

The question of which “enforcement model” empowers the community arises post the initiation of this IRP, and in the event that the community receives an unfavourable decision through the IRP or that the ICANN Board refuses to implement the IRP decision. Thus, all the “enforcement models” retain the IRP as the primary method of internal dispute resolution.

The direction that the CCWG-Accountability has taken with regard to enhancement of the IRP is heartening. And these proposals have received large support from the community. What is to be seen now is whether these proposals will be fully implemented by the Board or not, in addition to all the other proposals made by the CCWG.

Enforcement – An Overview of the Different Models

In addition to trying to enhance the existing dispute resolution mechanism, the CCWG-Accountability also came up with a variety of “enforcement models”, by which the internet community would be vested with certain powers. And in response to the models proposed by the CCWG-Accountability, the ICANN Board came up with a counter proposal, called the MEM.

Below is a tabular representation of what kinds of powers are vested with the community under the SMM, the SDM and the MEM.

Power	SMM	SDM	MEM
Reject/Review Budget, Strategies and OPs. + Review/Reject Board decisions with regard to IANA functions.	Sole Member has the reserved power to reject the budget up to 2 times. Member also has standing to enforce bylaw restrictions on the budget, etc.	Sole Designator can only trigger Board consultations if opposition to budget, etc exists. Further, bylaws specify how many times such a consultation can be triggered. Designator only possesses standing to enforce this consultation.	Community can reject Budget up to two times. Board is required by bylaws to reconsider budget post such rejection, by consulting with the community. If still no change is made, then community can initiate process to recall the Board.
Reject/Review amendments to Standard bylaws and Fundamental bylaws	Sole Member has right to veto these changes. Further, member also standing to enforce this right under the relevant Californian law.	Sole Designator can also veto these changes. However, ambiguity regarding standing of designator to enforce this right.	No veto power granted to any SO or AC. Each SO and AC evaluate if they want to voice the said objection. If certain threshold of agreement reached, then as per the bylaws, the Board cannot go ahead with the amendment.
Appointment and Removal of individual ICANN directors	Sole Member can appoint and remove individual directors based on direction from the applicable Nominating Committee.	Sole Member can appoint and remove individual directors based on direction from the applicable Nominating Committee.	The SOs/ACs cannot appoint individual directors. But they can initiate process for their removal. However, directors can only be removed for breach of or on the basis of certain clauses in a “pre-service letter” that they sign.
Recall of ICANN Board	Sole Member has the power to recall Board. Further, it has standing to enforce this right in Californian courts.	Sole Designator also has the power to recall the Board. However, ambiguity regarding standing to enforce this right.	Community is not vested with power to recall the Board. However, if simultaneous trigger of pre-service letters occurs, in some scenarios, only then can something similar to a recall of the Board occur.

A Critique of these Models

SMM:

The Sole Member Model (or SMM) was discussed and adopted in the second draft proposal, released in August 2015. This model is in fact the simplest and most feasible variant of all the other membership-based models, and has received substantial support from the internet community. The SMM proposes only one amendment to the ICANN bylaws - a move from having no members to one member, while ICANN itself retains its character as a non-profit mutual-benefit corporation under Californian laws.

This “sole member” will be the community as a whole, represented by the various SOs and ACs. The SOs and ACs require no separate legal personhood to be a part of this “sole member”, but can directly participate. This participation is to be effected by a voting system, explained in the second draft, which allocates the maximum number of votes each SO and AC can cast. This ensures that each SO/AC doesn’t have to cast a unanimous vote, but each differing opinion within an SO/AC is given equal weight.

SDM:

A slightly modified and watered down version of the SMM, proposed by the CCWG-Accountability as an alternative to the same, is the “Sole Designator Model” or the SDM. Such a model requires an amendment to the ICANN bylaws, by which certain SOs/ACs are assigned “designator” status. By virtue of this status, they may then exercise certain rights - the right to recall the Board in certain scenarios and the right to veto budgets and strategic plans.

However, there is some uncertainty in Californian law regarding who can be a designator - an individual or an entity as well. So whether unincorporated associations, such as the SOs and ACs, can be a “designator” as per the law is a question that doesn’t have a clear answer yet.

Where most discussion with respect to the SDM has occurred has been in the area of the designator being vested with the power to “spill” or remove all the members of the ICANN Board. The designator is vested with this power as a sort of last-resort mechanism for the community’s voice to be heard. However, an interesting point raised in one of the Accountability sessions at ICANN54 was the almost negligible probability of this course of action ever being taken, i.e. the Board being “spilled”. So while in theory this model seems to vest the community with massive power, in reality, because the right to “spill” the Board may never be invoked, the SDM is actually a weak enforceability model.

Other Variants of the Designator Model:

The CCWG-Accountability, in both its first and second report, discussed variants of the designator model as well. A generic SO/AC Designator model was discussed in the first draft. The Enhanced SO/AC Designator model, discussed in the second draft, also functions along similar lines. However, only those SOs and ACs that wanted to be made designators apply to become so, as opposed to the requirement of a mandatory designator under the SDM model.

After the second draft released by the CCWG-Accountability and the counter-proposal released by the ICANN Board (see below for the ICANN Board’s proposal), discussion was mostly directed towards the SMM and the MEM. However, the discussion with regard to the designator model has recently been revived by members of the ALAC at ICANN54 in Dublin, who unanimously issued a statement supporting the SDM.^{^[9]} And following this, many more in the community have expressed their support towards adopting the designator model.[10]

MEM:

The Multi-stakeholder Enforcement Model or MEM was the ICANN Board’s counter-model to all the models put forth by the CCWG-Accountability, specifically the SMM. However, there is no clarity with regard to the specifics of this model. In fact, the vagueness surrounding the model is one of the biggest criticisms of the model itself.

The CCWG-Accountability accounts for possible consequences of implementation every model by a mechanism known as “stress-tests”. The Board’s proposal, on the other hand, rejects the SMM due to its “unintended consequences”, but does not provide any clarity on what these consequences are or what in fact the problems with the SMM itself are.[11]

In addition, many are opposed to the Board proposal in general because it wasn’t created by the community, and therefore not reflective of the community’s views, as opposed to the SMM.[12]

Instead, the Board’s solution is to propose a counter-model that doesn’t in fact fix the existing problems of accountability.

What is known of the MEM though, gathered primarily from an FAQ published on the ICANN community forum, is this: The community, through the various SOs and ACs, can challenge any action of the Board that is CONTRADICTORY TO THE FUNDAMENTAL BYLAWS only, through a binding arbitration. The arbitration panel will be decided by the Board and the arbitration itself will be financed by ICANN. Further, this process will not replace the existing Independent Review Process or IRP, but will run parallely.

Even this small snippet of the MEM is filled with problems. Concerns of neutrality with regard to the arbitral panel and challenge of the award itself have been raised.[13]

Further, the MEM seems to be in direct opposition to the ‘gold standard’ multi-stakeholder model of ICANN. Essentially, there is no increased accountability of the ICANN under the MEM, thus eliciting severe opposition from the community.

What is interesting to note about all these models, is that they are all premised on ICANN continuing to remain within the jurisdiction of the United States. And even more surprising is that hardly anyone questions this premise. However, at ICANN54 this issue received a small amount of traction, enough for the setting up of an ad-hoc committee to address these jurisdictional concerns. But even this isn’t enough traction. The only option now though is to wait and see what this ad-hoc committee, as well as the CCWG-Accountability through its third draft proposal to be released later this year, comes up with.

[1]. The IANA functions or the technical functions are the name, number and protocol functions with regard to the administration of the Domain Name System or the DNS.

[2]. http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/sep/21/icann-internet-us-government

[3]. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/10/19/congress_tells_icann_quit_escaping_accountability/?page=1

[4]. http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/sep/21/icann-internet-us-government

[5]. SOs are Supporting Organizations and ACs are Advisory Committees. They form part of ICANN’s operational structure.

[6]. Leon Sanchez (ALAC member from the Latin American and Caribbean Region) speaking at the Enhancing ICANN Accountability Engagement Session !, ICANN54, Dublin (see page 5) https://meetings.icann.org/en/dublin54/schedule/mon-enhancing-accountability/transcript-enhancing-accountability-19oct15-en

[7]. Leon Sanchez (ALAC member from the Latin American and Caribbean Region) speaking at the Enhancing ICANN Accountability Engagement Session !, ICANN54, Dublin (see page 5) https://meetings.icann.org/en/dublin54/schedule/mon-enhancing-accountability/transcript-enhancing-accountability-19oct15-en

[8]. Thomas Rickert (GNSO-appointed CCWG co-chair) speaking at the Enhancing ICANN Accountability Engagement Session !, ICANN54, Dublin (see page 15,16) https://meetings.icann.org/en/dublin54/schedule/mon-enhancing-accountability/transcript-enhancing-accountability-19oct15-en

[9]. http://www.brandregistrygroup.org/alac-throws-spanner-in-icann-accountability-discussions

[10]. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/10/22/internet_community_icann_accountability/

[11]. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/09/07/icann_accountability_latest/

[12]. http://www.circleid.com/posts/20150923_empire_strikes_back_icann_accountability_at_the_inflection_point/

[13]. http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/09/06/icann-accountability-a-three-hour-call-trashes-a-year-of-work/

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/breaking-down-icann-accountability-what-it-is-and-what-the-internet-community-wants

Brazil passes Marco Civil; the US-FCC Alters its Stance on Net Neutrality

geetha — 2014-04-24T10:05:32Z

Hopes for the Internet rise and fall rapidly. Yesterday, on April 23, 2014, Marco Civil da Internet, the Brazilian Bill of Internet rights, was passed by the Brazilian Senate into law.

Marco Civil, on which we blogged previously, includes provisions for the protection of privacy and freedom of expression of all users, rules mandating net neutrality, etc. Brazil celebrated the beginning of NETmundial, a momentous first day about which Achal Prabhala blogs, with President Rousseff’s approval of the Marco Civil.

At about the same time, news broke that the US Federal Communications Commission is set to propose new net neutrality rules. In the wake of the Verizon net neutrality decision in January, the proposed new rules will prohibit Internet service providers such as Comcast from slowing down or blocking traffic to certain websites, but permit fast lane traffic for content providers who are willing to pay for it. This fast lane would prioritise traffic from content providers like Netflix and Youtube on commercially reasonable terms, and result in availability of video and other content at higher speeds or quality. An interesting turn-around, as Marco Civil expressly mandates net neutrality for all traffic.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/brazil-passes-marco-civil-us-fcc-alters-stance-on-net-neutrality

Analysis of ICANN revenue shows ambiguity in their records

Sunil Abraham, Arjun Venkatraman and Akriti Bopanna — 2018-04-27T10:01:26Z

We, The Centre for Internet and Society, have been instrumental in having ICANN become transparent about their revenue with our persistent requests for their sources of revenue.

Click to download a PDF of the Analysis

In 2014, CIS' Sunil Abraham demanded greater financial transparency of ICANN at both the Asia Pacific IGF and the ICANN Open Forum at the IGF. Later that year, CIS was provided with a list of ICANN's sources of revenue for the financial year 2014, including payments from registries, registrars, sponsors, among others, by ICANN India Head Mr. Samiran Gupta.This was a big step for CIS and the Internet community, as before this, no details on granular income had ever been publicly divulged by ICANN on request.¹ Our efforts have resulted in this information now being publicly available from the years 2012 onwards. We then decided to analyze all these years of financial data collaborating with Ashoka fellow Arjun Venkatraman and following are our observations:

To get a clear picture of ICANN's revenue, it can be seen that over the years it has been growing steadily. In 2016 it was 1.7 times the revenue it made in 2012.

A breakdown by country reveals that a significantly higher proportion of their revenue is from sources registered in the United States.

It is also interesting to note that revenue from China has seen a spike in the past 2 years, especially in the period of 2015-2016. Verisign CEO, James Bidzos confirmed in an interview to analysts that Chinese activity had surprised them as well though they expected the activity to slow down in the second quarter of 2016.²

Verisign also happens to be the top paying customer for ICANN every year, running the .com/.net names. Their payments are orders of magnitude greater than payments made by any other single entity or even several collective entities.

ICANN differentiates its sources of revenues by each class of entity which stand for the following:

RYN - Registry
OTH - Other
RYG - Registry
RIR - Regional Internet Registry
RYC - ccTLD (Top Level Domains)
IDN - Internationalized Domain Names
RAR - Registrar
SPN - Sponsor

It is evident that the Registries and Registrars contribute the most to revenue however the classification of these groups in itself is ambiguous. RYG and RYN both stand for registry but we do not find any explanation given for the double entry for a single group. Secondly, Sponsors are included yet it is unclear how they have sponsored ICANN, whether through travel and accommodation of personnel or any other mode of institutional sponsorship. The Regional Internet Registries are clubbed under one heading and as a consequence it is not possible to determine individual RIR contribution such as how much did APNIC pay for the Asia and Pacific region. The total payment made by RIRs is a small fraction of the payments made by many other entities and they all pay through the Numbers Resources Organization (NRO), who is listed as paying from Uruguay however the MOU creating the NRO does not specify their location as being there. The NRO website states that " RIRs may be audited by external parties with regards to their financial activities or their operations. RIRs may also allow third parties to report security incidents with regards to their services." ³ Their records show that financial disclosure is done in an inconsistent manner with the last publication from AFRINIC being for the year 2013 ⁴ while the RIPE NCC who coordinates the area of Central Europe, Middle East and Russia last published an annual report for the year 2016 but had no financial information in it. ⁵

The most frequently found words in their sources which can give us an idea of the structure of the contributing entity yields the following result.

Several clients have registered multiple corporate entities to increase their payments to ICANN such as DropCatch, Everest and Camelot. ⁶ The first of them, DropCatch, is a domain drop catcher, essentially selling expired domain names to the highest bidder. By the end of 2016, about 43% of all ICANN-accredited registrars were controlled by them. ⁷

Many clients have reported themselves from different countries over the years as well such as 'Verisign Sarl' which has been reported as originating from Switzerland and in a different year from the United States. ⁸ Another curious case is of the entity, 'Afilias plc', which when categorized as a sponsor (SPN) is reported from Ireland however as a registry (both RYG and RYN) is reported from the United States. Some entities have originated from one place such as the United Arab Emirates and then moved to other countries such as India.

To summarize, the key takeaways from the information we have dissected so far are:

- ICANN's revenue has been steadily increasing with the 2016 seeing a 1.6 times increase of its revenue generated in 2012.

- United States is the country that most of the revenue originates from.

- After the US, China is now the largest contribution to ICANN revenue, significantly increase their contributions from 2015.

- Verisign is the top contributing entity, their contribution much greater than other entities.

- Registries and Registrars are the main sources of revenue though there is ambiguity as to the classifications provided by ICANN such as the difference between RYG and RYN. The mode of contribution of sponsors exactly is not highlighted either.

- Several entities have been listed from different places in different years, sometimes depending on the role they have played such as whether they are a sponsor or registry. Registering multiple corporate entities to acquire more registrars has occurred as well.

1. Venkataraman, P. (2017). CIS' Efforts Towards Greater Financial Disclosure by ICANN . [online] The Centre for Internet and Society.[Accessed 14 Mar. 2018].

2. Murphy, K. (2016). Verisign has great quarter but sees China growth slowing | Domain Incite - Domain Name Industry News, Analysis & Opinion . [online] DomainIncite. [Accessed 14 Mar. 2018].

3. Nro.net. (2018). RIR Accountability Questions and Answers | The Number Resource Organization . [online] [Accessed 11 Mar. 2018].

4. African Network Information Centre - Annual Report

5. RIPE Network Coordination Centre Annual Report 2016

6. Murphy, K. (2016). DropCatch spends millions to buy FIVE HUNDRED more registrars | Domain Incite - Domain Name Industry News, Analysis & Opinion . [online] DomainIncite.[Accessed 13 Mar. 2018].

7. Id

8. Detailed list is available on request

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/analysis-of-icann-financials-from-2012-2016

'Delink ICANN from US jurisdiction'

praskrishna — 2016-11-15T14:16:36Z

Eight Indian civil society organisations involved with internet governance have called for complete delinking of ICANN from US jurisdiction, saying an important global public infrastructure being subject to a single country’s control is unacceptable.

The article was published by Deccan Herald on November 12.

The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is a not-for-profit public-benefit corporation with participants from all over the world dedicated to keeping the Internet secure, stable and interoperable.

The demand from Bengaluru-based Centre for Internet and Society and IT for Change as well as Delhi-based Software Freedom Law Centre among others came against the backdrop of ICANN’s meeting in Hyderabad that ended on Wednesday.

The other organisations involved in the campaign are Free Software Movement of India (Hyderabad), Society for Knowledge Commons, Digital Empowerment Foundation, Delhi Science Forum and Third World Network (all in New Delhi).

“Urgent steps (should) be taken to transit ICANN from its current US jurisdiction. Only then can ICANN become a truly global organisation . We would like to make it clear that our objection is not directed particularly against the US, we are simply against an important global public infrastructure being subject to a single country’s jurisdiction,” a joint statement said.

Though the US has given up its role of signing entries to the Internet’s root zone file, which represents the addressing system for the global Internet, the groups said, the organisation that manages ICANN continues to be under US jurisdiction and hence subject to its courts, legislature and executive agencies.

“Keeping such an important global public infrastructure under US jurisdiction is expected to become a very problematic means of extending US laws and policies across the world,” the statement said.

Explaining the issue, it said country domain names like .br and .ph remain subject to US jurisdiction.

“Iran’s .ir was recently sought to be seized by some US private parties because of alleged Iranian support to terrorism. Although the plea was turned down, another court in another case may decide otherwise. Other countries cannot feel comfortable to have at the core of the Internet’s addressing system an organisation that can be dictated by one government,” the statement said.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/deccan-herald-november-12-2016-delink-icann-from-us-jurisdiction