Centre for Internet and Society

DIDP #33 On ICANN's 2012 gTLD round auction fund

akriti — 2019-07-09T15:51:47Z

This DIDP was filed to inquire about the state of the funds ICANN received from the last gTLD auctions.

In 2012, after years of deliberation ICANN opened the application round for new top level domains and saw over 1930 applications. Since October 2013, delegation of these extensions commenced with it still going on. However, 7 years since the round was open there has been no consensus on how to utilize the funds obtained from the auctions. ICANN until its last meeting was debating on the legal mechanisms/ entities to be created who will decide on the disbursement of these funds. There is no clear information on how those funds have been maintained over the years or its treatments in terms of whether they have been set aside or invested etc. Thus, our DIDP questions ICANN on the status of these funds and can be found here.

The response to the DIDP received on 24th April, 2019 states that that even though the request asked for information, rather than documentation, our question was answered. Reiterating that the DIDP mechanism was developed to provide documentation rather than information. It stated that on 25 October 2018, Resolution 2018.10.25.23 was passed that compels the President and CEO to allocate $36 million to the Reserve Fund. The gTLD auction proceeds were allocated to separate investment accounts, and the interest accruing from the proceedings was in accordance with the new gTLD Investment Policy.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/akriti-bopanna-april-4-2019-didp-33-on-icann-s-2012-gtld-round-auction-fund

DIDP #32 On ICANN's Fellowship Program

akriti — 2018-11-12T15:58:30Z

In furtherance of its capacity building functions, ICANN selects Fellows for every public meeting. These are individuals from underserved and underrepresented communities who are trained to become active participants in the ICANN community.

These fellows are assigned a mentor and receive training on ICANN's various areas of engagement. They are also given travel assistance to attend the meeting. While the process and selection criteria is detailed on their website, CIS had some questions as to the execution of these.

Our DIDP questioned the following aspects:

Has any individual received the ICANN Fellowship more than the stated maximum limit of 3 times?
If so, whose decision and what was the justification given for awarding it the 4th time and any other times after that?
What countries did any such individuals belong to?
How many times has the limit of 3 been breached while giving fellowships?
What recording mechanisms are being used to ensure that awarding of these fellowships is kept track of, stored and updated? Are these public or privately made available anywhere?

You can access the request here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-31-on-icanns-fellowship-program

DIDP #31 Diversity of employees at ICANN

Akash Sriram — 2018-08-21T09:26:48Z

We have requested ICANN to disclose information pertaining to the diversity of employees based on race and citizenship.

This data is being requested to verify ICANN’s claim of being an equal opportunities employer. ICANN’s employee handbook states that they “...provide equal opportunities and are committed to the principle of equality regardless of race, colour, ethnic or national origin, religious belief, political opinion or affiliation, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, gender reassignment, age or disability.” The data on the diversity of employees based on race and nationality of their employees will depict how much they have stuck to their commitment to delivering equal opportunities to personnel in ICANN and potential employees.

The request filed by CIS can be accessed here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-31-diversity-of-employees-at-icann

Control Shift?

pranesh — 2011-08-02T07:22:12Z

The USA has ceded control of the Internet over to Icann, but only partially. (This post appeared as an article in Down to Earth, in the issue dated November 15, 2009.)

After dominating operations of the Internet for decades Washington has said it will relinquish some control. On September 30, the US department of commerce decided to cede some of its powers to the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the body which manages the net’s phone book—the Internet’s Domain Naming System (dns).

The system deals with online addresses: human understandable names (like google.com) are made to work with computer understandable names (81.198.166.2, for example). Managing this is critical because while Madras can be a city in both Tamil Nadu and Oregon, everyone wishing to go to madras.com must be pointed to the same place. For the Internet to work, everyone in the world must use the same telephone directory.

The Internet is not a single network of computers, but an interconnected set of networks. What does it mean, then, to control the Internet? For those wishing to access YouTube in late February 2008, it seemed as though it was controlled by Pakistan Telecom—the agency had accidentally blocked access to YouTube to the entire world for almost a day. For Guangzhou residents, it seems the censor-happy Chinese government controls the Internet. And for a brief while in January 1998, it seemed the net was controlled by one Jon Postel.

Postel was one of the architects of the Internet involved from the times of the net’s predecessor arpanet project, which the US department of defence funded as an attack-resilient computer network. He was heading the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (iana), an informal body in de facto charge of technical aspects of the Internet, including the domain network system. But iana had no legal sanction. It was contracted by the department to perform its services. The US government retained control of the root servers that directed Internet traffic to the right locations.

On January 28, 1998, Postel got eight of the 12 root servers transferred to iana control. This was when the defence department was ceding its powers to the commerce department. Postal soon received a telephone call from a furious Ira Magaziner, Bill Clinton’s senior science adviser, who instructed him to undo the transfer. Within a week, the commerce department issued a declaration of its control over the dns root servers—it was now in a position to direct Internet traffic all over the world.

Soon after, the US government set up ICANN as a private non-profit corporation to manage the core components of the Internet. A contract from the department of commerce gave the organization in California the authority to conduct its operations. iana and other bodies (such as the regional Internet registries) now function under ICANN.

Right from the outset, ICANN has been criticized as unaccountable, opaque and controlled by vested interests, especially big corporations which manipulated the domain name dispute resolution system to favour trademarks. Its lack of democratic functioning, commercial focus and poor-tolerance of dissent have made ICANN everyone’s target, from those who believe in a libertarian Internet as a place of freedom and self-regulation, to those (the European Union, for instance) who believe the critical components of the Internet should not be in the sole control of the US government.

The department of commerce has from time to time renewed its agreement with ICANN, and the latest such renewal comes in the form of the affirmation of commitments (AoC). Through the AoC, the US government has sought to minimize its role. Instead of being the overseer of ICANN's working, it now holds only one permanent seat in the multi-stakeholder review panel that ICANN will itself have to constitute. But two days after the AoC, ICANN snubbed a coalition of civil society voices calling for representation; the root zone file remains in US control. It is too early to judge the AoC; it will have to be judged by how it is actualized.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann-control-shift

Commonwealth Domain Name System Forum 2014

praskrishna — 2014-07-03T09:27:08Z

This event took place on 19 June 2014 from 09:00-17:30 BST at ICANN50 | London in the Viscount room. It was organized by the CTO, hosted by ICANN, and supported by Nominet and the Public Interest Registry.

Pranesh Prakash was a panelist for this event. The detailed brochure of the event can be downloaded here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/common-wealth-domain-name-system-forum-2014

Comments to ICANN Supporting the DNS Industry in Underserved Regions

jyoti — 2014-07-04T06:48:36Z

Towards exploring ideas and strategies to help promote the domain name industry in regions that have typically been underserved, ICANN published a call for public comments on May 14, 2014. In particular, ICANN sought comments related to existing barriers to Registrar Accreditation and operation and suggestions on how these challenges might be mitigated. CIS contributed to the comments on this report, which will be used to determine next steps to support the domain name industry in underserved regions.

Domain names and the DNS are used in virtually every aspect of the Internet, and without the DNS, the Internet as we know it, would not exist. The DNS root zone has economic value and ICANN's contract with Verisign delineates the selling of domain names via only ICANN accredited registrars. By the indirect virtue of its control of the root, ICANN has the power and capacity to influence the decisions of entities involved in the management and operations of the DNS, including registrars.

Too far, too many?

We acknowledge some of the efforts for improvements, in particular with reference to barriers to participation in DNS-related business in regions such as Africa and the Middle East, including the creation of a fellowship program, and increased availability of translated materials. However, despite these efforts, the gaps in the distribution of the DNS registrars and registries across the world has become an issue of heightened concern.

This is particularly true, in light of the distribution of registrars and given that, of the 1124 ICANN-accredited registrars, North America has a total of 765 registrars. US and Canada together, have more than double the number of registrars than the rest of the world taken collectively. To put things further into perspective, of the total number of registrars 725 are from the United States alone, and 7 from the 54 countries of Africa.

A barrier to ICANN's capacity building initiatives has been the lack of trust, given the general view that, ICANN focuses on policies that favour entrenched incumbents from richer countries. Without adequate representation from poorer countries, and adequate representation from the rest of the world's Internet population, there is no hope of changing these policies or establishing trust. The entire region of Latin America and the Caribbean, comprising of a population of 542.4 million internet users[1] in 2012, has only 22 registrars spread across a total of 10 countries. In Europe, covering a population of 518.5 million internet users[2], are 158 registrars and 94 of those are spread across Germany, UK, France, Spain and Netherlands. The figures paint the most dismal picture with respect to South Asia, in particular India, where just 16 registrars cater to the population of internet users that is expected to reach 243 million by June 2014[3].

While we welcome ICANN's research and outreach initiatives with regard to the DNS ecosystem in underserved regions, without the crucial first step of clarifying the metrics that constitute an underserved region, these efforts might not bear their intended impact. ICANN cannot hope to identify strategies towards bridging the gaps that exist in the DNS ecosystem, without going beyond the current ICANN community, which, while nominally being 'multistakeholder' and open to all, grossly under-represents those parts of the world that aren't North America and Western Europe.

The lack of registries in the developing world is another significant issue that needs to be highlighted and addressed. The top 5 gTLD registries are in the USA and it is important that users and the community feels that the fees being collected are equivalent compensation for the services they provide. As registries operate in captive markets that is allocated by ICANN, we invite ICANN to improve its financial accountability, by enabling its stakeholders to assess the finances collected on these registrations.

Multistakeholderism—community and consensus

As an organization that holds itself a champion of the bottom-up policy development process, and, as a private corporation fulfilling a public interest function, ICANN, is in a unique position to establish new norms of managing common resources. In theory and under ICANN’s extensive governance rules, the board is a legislative body that is only supposed to approve the consensus decisions of the community and the staff wield executive control. However in reality, both board and the staff have been criticised for decisions that are not backed by the community.

The formal negotiations between ICANN and Registrar Stakeholder Group Negotiating Team (Registrar NT) over the new Registrar Accreditation Agreement (RAA), is an example of processes that have a multistakeholder approach but fail on values of deliberation and pluralistic decision making.[4] ICANN staff insisted on including a "proposed Revocation (or "blow up") Clause that would have given them the ability to unilaterally terminate all registrar accreditations" and another proposal seeking to provide ICANN Board ability to unilaterally amend the RAA (identical to proposal inserted in the gTLD registry agreement - a clause met with strong opposition not only from the Registry Stakeholder Group but from the broader ICANN community).

Both proposals undermine the multistakeholder approach of the ICANN governance framework, as they seek more authority for the Board, rather than the community or protections for registrars and more importantly, registrants. The proposed amendments to the RAA were not issues raised by Law Enforcement, GAC or the GNSO but by the ICANN staff and received considerable pushback from the Registrar Stakeholder Group Negotiating Team (Registrar NT). The bottom-up policy making process at ICANN has also been questioned with reference to the ruling on vertical integration between registries and registrars, where the community could not even approach consensus.[5] Concerns have also been raised about the extent of the power granted to special advisory bodies handpicked by the ICANN president, the inadequacy of existing accountability mechanisms for providing a meaningful and external check on Board decisions and the lack of representation of underserved regions on these special bodies. ICANN must evolve its accountability mechanisms, to go beyond the opportunity to provide comments on proposed policy, and extend to a role for stakeholders in decision making, which is presently a privilege reserved for staff rather than bottom-up consensus.

ICANN was created as a consensus based organisation that would enable the Internet, its stakeholders and beneficiaries to move forward in the most streamlined, cohesive manner.[6] Through its management of the DNS, ICANN is undertaking public governance duties, and it is crucial that it upholds the democratic values entrenched in the multistakeholder framework. Bottom up policy making extends beyond passive participation and has an impact on the direction of the policy. Presently, while anyone can comment on policy issues, only a few have a say in which comments are integrated towards outcomes and action. We would like to stress not just improving and introducing checks and balances within the ICANN ecosystem, but also, integrating accountability and transparency practices at all levels of decision making.

Bridging the gap

We welcome the Africa Strategy working group and the public community process that was initiated by ICANN towards building domain name business industry in Africa, and, we are sure there will be lessons that will applicable to many other underserved regions. In the context of this report CIS, wants to examine the existing criteria of the accreditation process. As ICANN's role evolves and its revenues grow across the DNS and the larger Internet landscape, it is important in our view, that ICANN review and evolve it's processes for accreditation and see if they are as relevant today, as they were when launched.

The relationship between ICANN and every accredited registrar is governed by the individual RAA, which set out the obligations of both parties, and, we recommend simplifying and improving them. The RAA language is complex, technical and not relevant to all regions and presently, there are no online forms for the accreditation process. While ICANN's language will be English, the present framing has an American bias—we recommend—creating an online application process and simplifying the language keeping it contextual to the region. It would also be helpful, if ICANN invested in introducing some amount of standardization across forms, this would reduce the barrier of time and effort it takes to go through complex legal documents and contribute to the growth of DNS business.

The existing accreditation process for registrars requires applicants to procure US$70,000 or more for the ICANN accreditation to become effective. The applicants are also required to obtain and maintain for the length of accreditation process, a commercial general liability insurance with a policy limit of US$500,000 or more. The working capital and the insurance are quite high and create a barrier to entrance of underserved regions in the DNS ecosystem.

With lack of appropriate mechanisms registrars resort to using US companies for insurance, creating more foreign currency pressures on themselves. The commercial general liability insurance requirement for the registrars is not limited to their functioning as a registrar perhaps not the most appropriate option. ICANN should, and must, increase efforts towards helping registrars find suitable insurance providers and scaling down the working capital. Solutions may lie in exploring variable fee structures adjusted against profits, and derived after considering factors such as cost of managing domain names and sub-domain names, expansion needs, ICANN obligations and services, financial capacities of LDCs and financial help pledged to disadvantaged groups or countries.

Presently, the start-up capital required is too high for developing countries, and this is reflected in the number of registries in these areas. Any efforts to improve the DNS ecosystem in underserved regions, must tackle this by scaling down the capital in proportion to the requirements of the region.

Another potential issue that ICANN should consider, is that users getting sub-domain names from local registrars located in their own country, are usually taxed on the transaction, however, online registration through US registrars spares users from paying taxes in their country.[7] This could create a reverse incentive for registering domain sub-names online from US registrars. ICANN should push forward on efforts to ensure that registrars are sustainable by providing incentives for registering in underserved regions and help towards maintain critical mass of the registrants. The Business Constituency (BC)—the voice of commercial Internet users within ICANN, could play a role in this and ICANN should endeavour to either, expand the BC function or create a separate constituency for the representation of underserved regions.

[1] Internet Users and Population stats 2012. http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats2.htm

[2] Internet Users and Population stats 2012. http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats4.htm

[3] Times of India IAMAI Report. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/tech/tech-news/India-to-have-243-million-internet-users-by-June-2014-IAMAI/articleshow/29563698.cms

[4] Mar/07/2013 - Registrar Stakeholder Group Negotiating Team (Registrar NT) Statement Regarding ICANN RAA Negotiations.http://www.icannregistrars.org/calendar/announcements.php

[5] Kevin Murphy, Who runs the internet? An ICANN 49 primer. http://domainincite.com/16177-who-runs-the-internet-an-icann-49-primer

[6] Stephen Ryan, Governing Cyberspace: ICANN, a Controversial Internet Standards Body http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/governing-cyberspace-icann-a-controversial-internet-standards-body

[7] Open Root-Financing LDCs in the WSIS process. See: http://www.open-root.eu/about-open-root/news/financing-ldcs-in-the-wsis-process

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-comments-supporting-the-dns-industry-in-underserved-regions

Comments on the Proposed ICANN Community Anti-Harassment Policy

Padma Venkataraman, Rohini Lakshané, Sampada Nayak and Vidushi Marda — 2017-01-13T15:56:40Z

ICANN sought community input on the Proposed ICANN Community Anti-Harassment Policy on 7 November 2016. In response to this the Centre for Internet & Society (CIS) submitted its comments.

We at CIS are grateful for the opportunity to comment on the proposed ICANN Community Anti-Harassment Policy (“Policy”). We provide our specific comments to the Policy below, in three sections. The first section addresses the Terms of Participation, the second deals with the Reporting and Complaint Procedure, and the third places on record our observations on questions and issues for further consideration which have not been covered by the Policy.

Besides various other observations, CIS broadly submitted:

The attempt to provide an exhaustive definition of “Specified Characteristics” results in its meaning being unclear and exclusionary.
CIS strongly supports the phrase “including, but not limited to” that is followed by a bulleted list of inappropriate conduct.
The word “consent” is entirely missing from the draft policy even though the deciding factor in the “appropriateness” of an act or conduct is active and explicit consent to the act by both/ all individuals involved.
There is a need for clarity of communication platforms. The current Policy fails to specify instances of face-to-face and online communications.
The policy fails to account for a body of persons (as is provided for in the IETF policy) for the redressal of harassment complaints.
The provision for an informal resolution of a harassment issue is problematic as it could potentially lead to negative consequences for the complainant.
The Ombudsperson’s discretion in the determination of remedial action is detrimental to transparency and accountability.
The Policy in its current form lacks provisions for ensuring privacy and confidentiality of the complainant as well as interim relief while the Ombudsperson is looking into the complaint

Read the Complete Submission here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-on-the-proposed-icann-community-anti-harassment-policy

Comments on the Draft Outcome Document of the UN General Assembly’s Overall Review of the Implementation of WSIS Outcomes (WSIS+10)

geetha — 2015-11-18T06:33:13Z

Following the comment-period on the Zero Draft, the Draft Outcome Document of the UN General Assembly's Overall Review of implementation of WSIS Outcomes was released on 4 November 2015. Comments were sought on the Draft Outcome Document from diverse stakeholders. The Centre for Internet & Society's response to the call for comments is below.

The WSIS+10 Overall Review of the Implementation of WSIS Outcomes, scheduled for December 2015, comes as a review of the WSIS process initiated in 2003-05. At the December summit of the UN General Assembly, the WSIS vision and mandate of the IGF are to be discussed. The Draft Outcome Document, released on 4 November 2015, is towards an outcome document for the summit. Comments were sought on the Draft Outcome Document. Our comments are below.

The Draft Outcome Document of the UN General Assembly’s Overall Review of the Implementation of WSIS Outcomes (“the current Draft”) stands considerably altered from the Zero Draft. With references to development-related challenges, the Zero Draft covered areas of growth and challenges of the WSIS. It noted the persisting digital divide, the importance of innovation and investment, and of conducive legal and regulatory environments, and the inadequacy of financial mechanisms. Issues crucial to Internet governance such as net neutrality, privacy and the mandate of the IGF found mention in the Zero Draft.
The current Draft retains these, and adds to them. Some previously-omitted issues such as surveillance, the centrality of human rights and the intricate relationship of ICTs to the Sustainable Development Goals, now stand incorporated in the current Draft. This is most commendable. However, the current Draft still lacks teeth with regard to some of these issues, and fails to address several others.
In our comments to the Zero Draft, CIS had called for these issues to be addressed. We reiterate our call in the following paragraphs.

(1) ICT for Development

In the current Draft, paragraphs 14-36 deal with ICTs for development. While the draft contains rubrics like ‘Bridging the digital divide’, ‘Enabling environment’, and ‘Financial mechanisms’, the following issues are unaddressed:
Equitable development for all;
Accessibility to ICTs for persons with disabilities;
Access to knowledge and open data.

Equitable development

In the Geneva Declaration of Principles (2003), two goals are set forth as the Declaration’s “ambitious goal”: (a) the bridging of the digital divide; and (b) equitable development for all (¶ 17). The current Draft speaks in detail about the bridging of the digital divide, but the goal of equitable development is conspicuously absent. At WSIS+10, when the WSIS vision evolves to the creation of inclusive ‘knowledge societies’, equitable development should be both a key principle and a goal to stand by.
Indeed, inequitable development underscores the persistence of the digital divide. The current Draft itself refers to several instances of inequitable development; for ex., the uneven production capabilities and deployment of ICT infrastructure and technology in developing countries, landlocked countries, small island developing states, countries under occupation or suffering natural disasters, and other vulnerable states; lack of adequate financial mechanisms in vulnerable parts of the world; variably affordable (or in many cases, unaffordable) spread of ICT devices, technology and connectivity, etc.
What underscores these challenges is the inequitable and uneven spread of ICTs across states and communities, including in their production, capacity-building, technology transfers, gender-concentrated adoption of technology, and inclusiveness.
As such, it is essential that the WSIS+10 Draft Outcome Document reaffirm our commitment to equitable development for all peoples, communities and states.
We suggest the following inclusion to paragraph 5 of the current Draft:

“5. We reaffirm our common desire and commitment to the WSIS vision to build an equitable, people-centred, inclusive, and development-oriented Information Society…”

Accessibility for persons with disabilities

10. Paragraph 13 of the Geneva Declaration of Principles (2003) pledges to “pay particular attention to the special needs of marginalized and vulnerable groups of society” in the forging of an Information Society. Particularly, ¶ 13 recognises the special needs of older persons and persons with disabilities.

11. Moreover, ¶ 31 of the Geneva Declaration of Principles calls for the special needs of persons with disabilities, and also of disadvantaged and vulnerable groups, to be taken into account while promoting the use of ICTs for capacity-building. Accessibility for persons with disabilities is thus core to bridging the digital divide – as important as bridging the gender divide in access to ICTs.

12. Not only this, but the WSIS+10 Statement on the Implementation of WSIS Outcomes (June 2014) also reaffirms the commitment to “provide equitable access to information and knowledge for all… including… people with disabilities”, recognizing that it is “crucial to increase the participation of vulnerable people in the building process of Information Society…” (¶8).

13. In our previous submission, CIS had suggested language drawing attention to this. Now, the current Draft only acknowledges that “particular attention should be paid to the specific ICT challenges facing… persons with disabilities…” (paragraph 11). It acknowledges also that now, accessibility for persons with disabilities constitutes one of the core elements of quality (paragraph 22). However, there is a glaring omission of a call to action, or a reaffirmation of our commitment to bridging the divide experienced by persons with disabilities.

14. We suggest, therefore, the addition of the following language the addition of paragraph 24A to the current Draft. Sections of this suggestion are drawn from ¶8, WSIS+10 Statement on the Implementation of WSIS Outcomes.

"24A. Recalling the UN Convention on the rights of people with disabilities, the Geneva principles paragraph 11, 13, 14 and 15, Tunis Commitment paras 20, 22 and 24, and reaffirming the commitment to providing equitable access to information and knowledge for all, building ICT capacity for all and confidence in the use of ICTs by all, including youth, older persons, women, indigenous and nomadic peoples, people with disabilities, the unemployed, the poor, migrants, refugees and internally displaced people and remote and rural communities, it is crucial to increase the participation of vulnerable people in the building process of information Society and to make their voice heard by stakeholders and policy-makers at different levels. It can allow the most fragile groups of citizens worldwide to become an integrated part of their economies and also raise awareness of the target actors on the existing ICTs solution (such as tolls as e- participation, e-government, e-learning applications, etc.) designed to make their everyday life better. We recognise need for continued extension of access for people with disabilities and vulnerable people to ICTs, especially in developing countries and among marginalized communities, and reaffirm our commitment to promoting and ensuring accessibility for persons with disabilities. In particular, we call upon all stakeholders to honour and meet the targets set out in Target 2.5.B of the Connect 2020 Agenda that enabling environments ensuring accessible telecommunication/ICT for persons with disabilities should be established in all countries by 2020.”

Access to knowledge and open data

15. The Geneva Declaration of Principles dedicates a section to access to information and knowledge (B.3). It notes, in ¶26, that a “rich public domain” is essential to the growth of Information Society. It urges that public institutions be strengthened to ensure free and equitable access to information (¶26), and also that assistive technologies and universal design can remove barriers to access to information and knowledge (¶25). Particularly, the Geneva Declaration advocates the use of free and open source software, in addition to proprietary software, to meet these ends (¶27).

16. It was also recognized in the WSIS+10 Statement on the Implementation of WSIS Outcomes (‘Challenges-during implementation of Action Lines and new challenges that have emerged’) that there is a need to promote access to all information and knowledge, and to encourage open access to publications and information (C, ¶¶9 and 12).

17. In our previous submission, CIS had highlighted the importance of open access to knowledge thus: “…the implications of open access to data and knowledge (including open government data), and responsible collection and dissemination of data are much larger in light of the importance of ICTs in today’s world. As Para 7 of the Zero Draft indicates, ICTs are now becoming an indicator of development itself, as well as being a key facilitator for achieving other developmental goals. As Para 56 of the Zero Draft recognizes, in order to measure the impact of ICTs on the ground – undoubtedly within the mandate of WSIS – it is necessary that there be an enabling environment to collect and analyse reliable data. Efforts towards the same have already been undertaken by the United Nations in the form of ‘Data Revolution for Sustainable Development’. In this light, the Zero Draft rightly calls for enhancement of regional, national and local capacity to collect and conduct analyses of development and ICT statistics (Para 56). Achieving the central goals of the WSIS process requires that such data is collected and disseminated under open standards and open licenses, leading to creation of global open data on the ICT indicators concerned.”

18. This crucial element is missing from the current Draft of the WSIS+10 Outcome Document. Of course, the current Draft notes the importance of access to information and free flow of data. But it stops short of endorsing and advocating the importance of access to knowledge and free and open source software, which are essential to fostering competition and innovation, diversity of consumer/ user choice and ensuring universal access.

19. We suggest the following addition – of paragraph 23A to the current Draft:

"23A. We recognize the need to promote access for all to information and knowledge, open data, and open, affordable, and reliable technologies and services, while respecting individual privacy, and to encourage open access to publications and information, including scientific information and in the research sector, and particularly in developing and least developed countries.”

(2) Human Rights in Information Society

20. The current Draft recognizes that human rights have been central to the WSIS vision, and reaffirms that rights offline must be protected online as well. However, the current Draft omits to recognise the role played by corporations and intermediaries in facilitating access to and use of the Internet.

21. In our previous submission, CIS had noted that “the Internet is led largely by the private sector in the development and distribution of devices, protocols and content-platforms, corporations play a major role in facilitating – and sometimes, in restricting – human rights online”.

22. We reiterate our suggestion for the inclusion of paragraph 43A to the current Draft:

"43A. We recognize the critical role played by corporations and the private sector in facilitating human rights online. We affirm, in this regard, the responsibilities of the private sector set out in the Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, A/HRC/17/31 (21 March 2011), and encourage policies and commitments towards respect and remedies for human rights.”

(3) Internet Governance

The support for multilateral governance of the Internet

23. While the section on Internet governance is not considerably altered from the zero draft, there is a large substantive change in the current Draft. The current Draft states that the governance of the Internet should be “multilateral, transparent and democratic, with full involvement of all stakeholders” (¶50). Previously, the zero draft recognized the “the general agreement that the governance of the Internet should be open, inclusive, and transparent”.

24. A return to purely ‘multilateral’ Internet governance would be regressive. Governments are, without doubt, crucial in Internet governance. As scholarship and experience have both shown, governments have played a substantial role in shaping the Internet as it is today: whether this concerns the availability of content, spread of infrastructure, licensing and regulation, etc. However, these were and continue to remain contentious spaces.

25. As such, it is essential to recognize that a plurality of governance models serve the Internet, in which the private sector, civil society, the technical community and academia play important roles. We recommend returning to the language of the zero draft in ¶32: “open, inclusive and transparent governance of the Internet”.

Governance of Critical Internet Resources

26. It is curious that the section on Internet governance in both the zero and the current Draft makes no reference to ICANN, and in particular, to the ongoing transition of IANA stewardship and the discussions surrounding the accountability of ICANN and the IANA operator. The stewardship of critical Internet resources, such as the root, is crucial to the evolution and functioning of the Internet. Today, ICANN and a few other institutions have a monopoly over the management and policy-formulation of several critical Internet resources.

27. While the WSIS in 2003-05 considered this a troubling issue, this focus seems to have shifted entirely. Open, inclusive, transparent and global Internet are misnomer-principles when ICANN – and in effect, the United States – continues to have monopoly over critical Internet resources. The allocation and administration of these resources should be decentralized and distributed, and should not be within the disproportionate control of any one jurisdiction.

28. Therefore, we reiterate our suggestion to add paragraph 53A after Para 53:

"53A. We affirm that the allocation, administration and policy involving critical Internet resources must be inclusive and decentralized, and call upon all stakeholders and in particular, states and organizations responsible for essential tasks associated with the Internet, to take immediate measures to create an environment that facilitates this development.”

Inclusiveness and Diversity in Internet Governance

29. The current Draft, in ¶52, recognizes that there is a need to “promote greater participation and engagement in Internet governance of all stakeholders…”, and calls for “stable, transparent and voluntary funding mechanisms to this end.” This is most commendable.

30. The issue of inclusiveness and diversity in Internet governance is crucial: today, Internet governance organisations and platforms suffer from a lack of inclusiveness and diversity, extending across representation, participation and operations of these organisations. As CIS submitted previously, the mention of inclusiveness and diversity becomes tokenism or formal (but not operational) principle in many cases.

31. As we submitted before, the developing world is pitifully represented in standards organisations and in ICANN, and policy discussions in organisations like ISOC occur largely in cities like Geneva and New York. For ex., 307 out of 672 registries listed in ICANN’s registry directory are based in the United States, while 624 of the 1010 ICANN-accredited registrars are US-based.

32. Not only this, but 80% of the responses received by ICANN during the ICG’s call for proposals were male. A truly global and open, inclusive and transparent governance of the Internet must not be so skewed. Representation must include not only those from developing countries, but must also extend across gender and communities.

33. We propose, therefore, the addition of a paragraph 51A after Para 51:

"51A. We draw attention to the challenges surrounding diversity and inclusiveness in organisations involved in Internet governance, including in their representation, participation and operations. We note with concern that the representation of developing countries, of women, persons with disabilities and other vulnerable groups, is far from equitable and adequate. We call upon organisations involved in Internet governance to take immediate measures to ensure diversity and inclusiveness in a substantive manner.”

Prepared by Geetha Hariharan, with inputs from Sunil Abraham and Japreet Grewal. All comments submitted towards the Draft Outcome Document may be found at this link.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-on-the-draft-outcome-document-of-the-un-general-assembly2019s-overall-review-of-the-implementation-of-wsis-outcomes-wsis-10

Comments from the Centre for Internet and Society on Renewal of .NET Registry Agreement

vidushi — 2017-06-06T13:35:53Z

The Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) is grateful for the opportunity to comment on the proposed renewal of the .NET Registry Agreement.

With inputs from Sunil Abraham and Pranesh Prakash

CIS would like to express its strong opposition to the proposed renewal. This is for three primary reasons:

Inconsistency with ICANN’s core values

It is important to consider the proposed renewal in light of two Core Values which are meant to guide the decisions and actions of ICANN.

Section 1.2.(b)(iii) of the Bylaws contemplates ICANN’s responsibility to, “ Where feasible and appropriate, depending on market mechanisms to promote and sustain a competitive environment in the DNS market;” and S ection 1.2(b)(iv) envisages, “Introducing and promoting competition in the registration of domain names where practicable and beneficial to the public interest as identified through the bottom-up, multistakeholder policy development process;”.

The presumptive renewal of the .NET Registry agreement precludes an open tender, thereby significantly undermining competition in the DNS market. It ignores the public interest consideration, as the absence of competitive pressure on the contract also means the absence of pressure to lower user costs.

Historical accident

Verisign’s operations over .NET is a historical accident; one that does not justify its collection of .NET revenues in perpetuity. Policies for Contractual Compliance of Existing Registries was approved in 2007 to include presumptive renewal. However, during the deliberations in that Policy Development Process, there was significant objection to presumption of renewal of registry contracts; with constituencies and individuals pointing out that such renewal was blatantly anti competitive, and allowed for presumption to prevail even in the case of material breaches.

The proposed agreement contemplates using a portion of Registry Level
Transaction Fees to create a “special restricted fund for developing country Internet communities to enable further participation in the ICANN mission for these stakeholders.” This form of tokenism to the global south will do little to achieve meaningful participation and diversity of civil society. .NET should instead, be opened to a competitive bid and open tender, in order to encourage innovators from around the world to benefit from it.

Irregularity of contract

The argument that the proposed changes are to bring the contract in line with other gTLD registry agreements doesn't hold because this contract is in itself completely irregular: it was not entered into after a competitive process that other gTLD registry agreements are subject to; and it is not subject to the price sensitivity that other contracts are either.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-from-the-centre-for-internet-and-society-on-renewal-of-net-registry-agreement

CIS’ Efforts Towards Greater Financial Disclosure by ICANN

Padma Venkataraman — 2017-10-31T02:10:11Z

CIS has been working towards enhancing transparency and accountability at ICANN since 2014. While initial efforts have resulted in ICANN revealing its sources of income in a granular fashion in 2015, we are yet to see this level of transparency become a default approach within ICANN. Here, Padma Venkataraman chronologically maps CIS’ efforts at enhancing financial transparency and accountability at ICANN, while providing an outline of what remains to be done.

With the $135 million sale of .web,^[1] the much protested renewal of the .net agreement^[2] and the continued annual increase in domain name registrations,^[3] among other things, it is no surprise that there are still transparency and accountability concerns within the ICANN Community. CIS, as part of its efforts to examine the functioning of ICANN’s accountability mechanisms, has filed many DIDP requests till date, in a bid for greater transparency of the organisation’s sources of revenues.

1.Efforts towards disclosure of revenue break-up by ICANN

- 2014

- 2015

- 2017

2.The need for granularity regarding historical revenues

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1.Efforts towards disclosure of revenue break-up by ICANN

- 2014

In 2014, CIS’ Sunil Abraham demanded greater financial transparency of ICANN at both the Asia Pacific IGF and the ICANN Open Forum at the IGF. Later that year, CIS was provided with a list of ICANN’s sources of revenue for the financial year 2014, including payments from registries, registrars, sponsors, among others, by ICANN India Head Mr. Samiran Gupta.^[4] This was a big step for CIS and the Internet community, as before this, no details on granular income had ever been publicly divulged by ICANN on request.

However, as no details of historical revenue had been provided, CIS filed a DIDP request in December 2014, seeking financial disclosure of revenues for the years 1999 to 2014, in a detailed manner - similar to the 2014 report that had been provided.^[5] It sought a list of individuals and entities who had contributed to ICANN’s revenues over the mentioned time period.

In its response, ICANN stated that it possessed no documents in the format that CIS had requested, that is, it had no reports that broke down domain name income and revenue received by each legal entity and individual.^[6] It stated that as the data for years preceding 2012 were on a different system, compiling reports of the raw data for these years would be time-consuming and overly burdensome. ICANN denied the request citing this specific provision for non-disclosure of information under the DIDP.^[7]

- 2015

In July 2015, CIS filed a request for disclosure of raw data regarding granular income for the years 1999 to 2014.^[8] ICANN again said that it would be a huge burden ‘to access and review all the raw data for the years 1999 to 2014 in order to identify the raw data applicable to the request’.^[9] However, it mentioned its commitment to preparing detailed reports on a go-forward basis - all of which would be uploaded on its Financials page.^[10]

- 2017

To follow up on ICANN’s commitment to granularity, CIS sought a detailed report on historical data for income and revenue contributions from domain names for FY 2015 and FY 2016 in June 2017.^[11] In its reply, ICANN stated that the Revenue Detail by Source reports for the last two years would be out by end July and that the report for FY 2012 would be out by end September.^[12]

2.The need for granularity regarding historical revenues

In 2014, CIS asked for disclosure of a list of ICANN’s sources of revenue and detailed granular income for the years 1999 to 2014. ICANN published the first but cited difficulty in preparing reports of the second. In 2015, CIS again sought detailed reports of historical granular revenue for the same period, and ICANN again denied disclosure claiming that it was burdensome to handle the raw data for those years. However, as ICANN agreed to publish detailed reports for future years, CIS recently asked for publication of reports for the FYs 2012, 2015 and 2016. Reports for these three years were uploaded according to the timeline provided by ICANN.

CIS appreciates ICANN’s cooperation with its requests and is grateful for their efforts to make the reports for FYs 2012 to 2016 available (and on a continued basis). However, it is important that detailed information of historical revenue and income from domain names for the years 1999 to 2014 be made publicly available. It is also crucial that consistent accounting and disclosure practices are adopted and made known to the Community, in order to avoid omissions of statements such as Detail Revenue by Source and Lobbying Disclosures, among many others, in the annual reports - as has evidently happened for the years preceding 2012. This is necessary to maintain financial transparency and accountability, as an organisation’s sources of revenues can inform the dependant Community about why it functions the way it does.

It will also allow more informed discussions about problems that the Community has faced in the past and continues to struggle with. For example, while examining problems such as ineffective market competition or biased screening processes for TLD applicants, among others, this data can be useful in assessing the long-term interests, motives and influences of different parties involved.

^[1] https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-07-28-en

^[2] Report of Public Comment Proceeding on the .net Renewal. https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/report-comments-net-renewal-13jun17-en.pdf

^[3] https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/cct-metrics-domain-name-registration-2016-06-27-en

^[4] https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-receives-information-on-icanns-revenues-from-domain-names-fy-2014

^[5] DIDP Request no - 20141222-1, 22 December 2014. https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-2

^[6] https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/cis-response-21jan15-en.pdf

^[7] Defined Conditions for Non-Disclosure - Information requests: (i) which are not reasonable; (ii) which are excessive or overly burdensome; (iii) complying with which is not feasible; or (iv) are made with an abusive or vexatious purpose or by a vexatious or querulous individual.

https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/didp-2012-02-25-en

^[8] DIDP Request no - 20150722-2, 22 July 2015. https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-12-revenues

^[9] https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/didp-response-20150722-2-21aug15-en.pdf

^[10] https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/didp-response-20150722-2-21aug15-en.pdf; https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/financials-en

^[11] DIDP Request No. 20170613-1, 14 June 2017.

^[12] https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/didp-20170613-1-marda-obo-cis-response-13jul17-en.pdf

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis2019-efforts-towards-greater-financial-disclosure-by-icann

CIS's Comments on the CCWG-Accountability Draft Proposal

pranesh — 2016-01-29T15:17:48Z

The Centre for Internet & Society (CIS) gave its comments on the failures of the CCWG-Accountability draft proposal as well as the processes that it has followed.

We from the Centre for Internet and Society wishes to express our dismay at the consistent way in which CCWG-Accountability has completely failed to take critical inputs from organizations like ours (and others, some instances of which have been highlighted in Richard Hill’s submission) into account, and has failed to even capture our concerns and misgivings about the process — as expressed in our submission to the CCWG-Accountability’s 2nd Draft Proposal on Work Stream 1 Recommendations — in any document prepared by the CCWG. We cannot support the proposal in its current form.

Time for Comments

We believe firstly that the 21 day comment period itself was too short and is going to result effectively in many groups or categories of people from not being able to meaningfully participate in the process, which flies in the face of the values that ICANN claims to uphold. This extremely short period amounts to procedural unsoundness, and restrains educated discussion on the way forward, especially given that the draft has altered quite drastically in the aftermath to ICANN55.

Capture of ICANN and CCWG Process

The participation in the accountability-cross-community mailing list clearly shows that the process is dominated by developed countries (of the top 30 non-staff posters to the list, 26 were from the ‘WEOG’ UN grouping, with 14 being from the USA, with only 1 from Asia Pacific, 2 from Africa, and 1 from Latin America), by males (27 of the 30 non-staff posters), and by industry/commercial interests (17 of the top 30 non-staff posters). If this isn’t “capture”, what is? There is no stress test that overcomes this reality of capture of ICANN by Western industry interests. The global community is only nominally multistakeholder, while actually being grossly under-representative of the developing nations, women and minority genders, and communities that are not business communities or technical communities. For instance, of the 1010 ICANN-accredited registrars, 624 are from the United States, and 7 from the 54 countries of Africa.

Culling statistics from the accountability-cross-community mailing list, we find that of the top 30 posters (excluding ICANN staff):

57% were, as far as one could ascertain from public records, from a single country: the United States of America.
87% were, as far as one could ascertain from public records, participants from countries which are part of the WEOG UN grouping (which includes Western Europe, US, Canada, Israel, Australia, and New Zealand), which only has developed countries. None of those who participated substantively were from the EEC (Eastern European) group and only 1 was from Asia-Pacific and only 1 was from GRULAC (Latin American and Caribbean Group).
90% were male and 3 were female, as far as one could ascertain from public records.
57% were identifiable as primarily being from industry or the technical community, as far as one could ascertain from public records, with only 2 (7%) being readily identifiable as representing governments.

This lack of global multistakeholder representation greatly damages the credibility of the entire process, since it gains its legitimacy by claiming to represent the global multistakeholder Internet community.

Bogey of Governmental Capture

With respect to Stress Test 18, dealing with the GAC, the report proposes that the ICANN Bylaws, specifically Article XI, Section 2, be amended to create a provision where if two-thirds of the Board so votes, they can reject a full GAC consensus advice. This amendment is not connected to the fear of government capture or the fear that ICANN will become a government-led body; given that the advice given by the GAC is non-binding that is not a possibility. Given the state of affairs described in the submission made above, it is clear that for much of the world, their governments are the only way in which they can effectively engage within the ICANN ecosystem. Therefore, nullifying the effectiveness of GAC advice is harmful to the interests of fostering a multistakeholder ecosystem, and contributes to the strengthening of the kind of industry capture described above.

Jurisdiction

All discussions on the Sole Designator Model seem predicated on the unflinching certainty of ICANN’s jurisdiction continuing to remain in California, as the legal basis of that model is drawn from Californian corporate law. To quote the draft report itself, in Annexe 12, it is stated that:

"Jurisdiction directly influences the way ICANN’s accountability processes are structured and operationalized. The fact that ICANN today operates under the legislation of the U.S. state of California grants the corporation certain rights and implies the existence of certain accountability mechanisms. It also imposes some limits with respect to the accountability mechanisms it can adopt. The topic of jurisdiction is, as a consequence, very relevant for the CCWG-Accountability. ICANN is a public benefit corporation incorporated in California and subject to California state laws, applicable U.S. federal laws and both state and federal court jurisdiction."

Jurisdiction has been placed within the mandate of WS2, to be dealt with post the transition. However, there is no analysis in the 3rd Draft on how the Sole Designator Model would continue to be upheld if future Work Stream 2 discussions led to a consensus that there needed to be a shift in the jurisdiction of ICANN. In the event that ICANN shifts to, say, Delaware or Geneva, would there be a basis to the Sole Designator Model in the law? Therefore this is an issue that needs to be addressed before this model is adopted, else there is a risk of either this model being rendered infructuous in the future, or this model foreclosing open debate and discussion in Work Stream 2.

Right of Inspection

We strongly support the incorporation of the rights of Inspection under this model as per Section 6333 of the California Corporations Code as a fundamental bylaw. As there is a severe gap between the claims that ICANN raises about its own transparency and the actual amount of transparency that it upholds, we opine that the right of inspection needs to be provided to each member of the ICANN community.

Timeline for WS2 Reforms

We support the CCWG’s commitment to the review of the DIDP Process, which they have committed to enhancing in WS2. Our research on this matter indicates that ICANN has in practice been able to deflect most requests for information. It regularly utilised its internal processes and discussions with stakeholders clauses, as well as clauses on protecting financial interests of third parties (over 50% of the total non-disclosure clauses ever invoked - see chart below) to do away with having to provide information on pertinent matters such as its compliance audits and reports of abuse to registrars. We believe that even if ICANN is a private entity legally, and not at the same level as a state, it nonetheless plays the role of regulating an enormous public good, namely the Internet. Therefore, there is a great onus on ICANN to be far more open about the information that they provide. Finally, it is extremely disturbing that they have extended full disclosure to only 12% of the requests that they receive. An astonishing 88% of the requests have been denied, partly or otherwise. See "Peering behind the veil of ICANN's DIDP (II)".

In the present format, there has been little analysis on the timeline of WS2; the report itself merely states that:

"The CCWG-Accountability expects to begin refining the scope of Work Stream 2 during the upcoming ICANN 55 Meeting in March 2016. It is intended that Work Stream 2 will be completed by the end of 2016."

Without further clarity and specification of the WS2 timeline, meaningful reform cannot be initiated. Therefore we urge the CCWG to come up with a clear timeline for transparency processes.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/ciss-comments-on-the-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal

CIS Submission on CCWG-Accountability 2nd Draft Proposal on Work Stream 1 Recommendations

pranesh — 2015-11-23T14:58:58Z

The Centre for Internet & Society (CIS) submitted the below to ICANN's CCWG-Accountability.

The CCWG Accountability proposal is longer than many countries' constitutions. Given that, we will keep our comments brief, addressing a very limited set of the issues in very broad terms.

Human Rights

ICANN is unique in many ways. It is a global regulator that has powers of taxation to fund its own operation. ICANN is not a mere corporation. For such a regulator, ensuring fair process (what is often referred to as "natural justice") as well as substantive human rights (such as the freedom of expression, right against discrimination, right to privacy, and cultural diversity), are important. Given this, the narrow framing of "free expression and the free flow of information" in Option 1, we believe Option 2 is preferable.

Diversity

We are glad that diversity is being recognized as an important principle. As we noted during the open floor session at ICANN49: [We are] extremely concerned about the accountability of ICANN to the global community. Due to various decisions made by the US government relating to ICANN's birth, ICANN has had a troubled history with legitimacy. While it has managed to gain and retain the confidence of the technical community, it still lacks political legitimacy due to its history. The NTIA's decision has presented us an opportunity to correct this.

However, ICANN can't hope to do so without going beyond the current ICANN community, which while nominally being 'multistakeholder' and open to all, grossly under-represents those parts of the world that aren't North America and Western Europe.

Of the 1010 ICANN-accredited registrars, 624 are from the United States, and 7 from the 54 countries of Africa. In a session yesterday, a large number of the policies that favour entrenched incumbents from richer countries were discussed. But without adequate representation from poorer countries, and adequate representation from the rest of the world's Internet population, there is no hope of changing these policies.

This is true not just of the business sector, but of all the 'stakeholders' that are part of global Internet policymaking, whether they follow the ICANN multistakeholder model or another. A look at the board members of the Internet Architecture Board, for instance, would reveal how skewed the technical community can be, whether in terms of geographic or gender diversity.

Without greater diversity within the global Internet policymaking communities, there is no hope of equity, respect for human rights — civil, political, cultural, social and economic — and democratic functioning, no matter how 'open' the processes seem to be, and no hope of ICANN accountability either.

Meanwhile, there are those who are concerned that diversity should not prevail over skill and experience. Those who have the greatest skill and experience will be those who are insiders in the ICANN system. To believe that being an insider in the ICANN system ought to be privileged over diversity is wrong. A call for diversity isn't just political correctness. It is essential for legitimacy of ICANN as a globally-representative body, and not just one where the developed world (primarily US-based persons) makes policies for the whole globe, which is what it has so far been. Of course, this cannot be corrected overnight, but it is crucial that this be a central focus of the accountability initiative.

Jurisdiction, Membership Models and Voting Rights

The Sole-Member Community Mechanism (SMCM) that has been proposed seems in large part the best manner provided under Californian law relating to public benefit corporations of dealing with accountability issues, and is the lynchpin of the whole accountability mechanism under workstream.

However, the jurisdictional analysis laid down in 11.3 will only be completed post-transition, as part of workstream. Thus the SMCM may not necessarily be the best model under a different legal jurisdiction. It would be useful to discuss the dependency between these more clearly. In this vein, it is essential that the Article XVIII Section 1 not be designated a fundamental bylaw. Further, it would be useful to add that for some limited aspects of the transition (such as IANA functioning), ICANN should seek to enter into a host country agreement to provide legal immunity, thus providing a qualification to para 125 ("ICANN accountability requires compliance with applicable legislation, in jurisdictions where it operates.") since the IANA functions operator ought not be forced by a country not to honour requests made by, for example, North Korea.

It should also be noted that accountability needs independence, which may be of two kinds: independence of financial source, and independence of appointment. From what one could gather from the CCWG proposal, the Independent Review Panel will be funded by the budget the ICANN Board prepares, while the appointment process is still unclear.

One of the most important accountability mechanisms with regard to the IANA functions is that of changing the IANA Functions Operator. As per the CWG Stewardship's current proposal, the "Post-Transition IANA" won't be an entity that is independent of ICANN. If the PTI's governance is permanently made part of ICANN's fundamental bylaws (as an affiliate controlled by ICANN), how is it proposed that the IFO be moved from PTI to some other entity if the IANA Functions Review Team so decides? Additionally, for such an important function, the composition of the IFRT should not be left unspecified.

While it is welcome that a separation is proposed between the IANA budget and budget for rest of ICANN's functioning, the current discussion around budgets seems to be based on the assumption that all IANA functions will be funded by ICANN, whereas if the IANA functions are separated, each community might fund it separately. That provides two levels of insulation to IANA functions operator(s): separate sources of operational revenue, as well as separate budgets within ICANN.

It should be noted that there have been some responses that express concern about the shifting of existing power structures within ICANN through some of the proposed alternative voting allocations in the SMCM. However, rather than present arguments as to why these shifts would be beneficial or harmful for ICANN's overall accountability, these responses seem to assume that shift from the current power structures are harmful. This is an unfounded assumption and cannot be a valid reason, nor can speculation of how the United States Congress will behave be a valid reason for rejecting an otherwise valid proposal. If there are harms, they ought to be clearly articulated: shifts from the status quo and fear of the US Congress aren't valid harms. Thus, while it is important to consider how different voting rights models might change the status quo while arriving at any judgments, that cannot be the sole criterion for judgment of its merits. Further, as the French government notes:

[T]he French Government still considers that linking Stress Test 18 to a risk of capture of ICANN by governments and NTIA’s requirement that no “government-led or intergovernmental organization solution would be acceptable”, makes no sense. . . . Logically, the risk of capture of ICANN by governments in the future is as low as it is now and in any case, it cannot lead to a “government-led or intergovernmental organization solution”.

While dealing with the question of relative voting proportions, the community must remembered that not all parts of the world are equally developed with regard to the domain name industry and with respect to civil society as those countries in North America, Western Europe, and other developed nations, and thus may not find adequate representation via the SOs. In many parts of the world, civil society organizations — especially those focussed on Internet governance and domain name policies — are non-existent. Thus a system that privileges the SOs to the exclusion of other components of a multistakeholder governance model would not be representative or diverse. A multistakeholder model cannot disproportionately represent business interests over all other interests.

In this regard, the comments of former ICANN Chairperson, Rod Beckstrom, at ICANN43 ought to be recalled:

ICANN must be able to act for the public good while placing commercial and financial interests in the appropriate context . . . How can it do this if all top leadership is from the very domain name industry it is supposed to coordinate independently?

As Kieren McCarthy points out about ICANN:

The Board does have too many conflicted members
The NomCom is full of conflicts
There are not enough independent voices within the organization

Reforms in these ought to be as crucial to accountability as the membership model.

The current mechanisms for ensuring transparency, such as the DIDP process, are wholly inadequate. We have summarized our experience with the DIDP process, and how often we were denied information on baseless grounds in this table.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-submission-on-ccwg-accountability-2nd-draft-proposal-on-work-stream-1-recommendations

CIS Statement at ICANN 49's Public Forum

pranesh — 2014-06-04T05:31:44Z

This was a statement made by Pranesh Prakash at the ICANN 49 meeting (on March 27, 2014), arguing that ICANN's bias towards the North America and Western Europe result in a lack of legitimacy, and hoping that the IANA transition process provides an opportunity to address this.

Good afternoon. My name is Pranesh Prakash, and I'm with the Yale Information Society Project and the Centre for Internet and Society.

I am extremely concerned about the accountability of ICANN to the global community. Due to various decisions made by the US government relating to ICANN's birth, ICANN has had a troubled history with legitimacy. While it has managed to gain and retain the confidence of the technical community, it still lacks political legitimacy due to its history. The NTIA's decision has presented us an opportunity to correct this.

This is true not just of the business sector, but of all the 'stakeholders' that are part of global Internet policymaking, whether they follow the ICANN multistakeholder model or another. A look at the boardmembers of the Internet Architecture Board, for instance, would reveal how skewed the technical community can be, whether in terms of geographic or gender diversity.

Without greater diversity within the global Internet policymaking communities, there is no hope of equity, respect for human rights -- civil, political, cultural, social and economic --, and democratic funtioning, no matter how 'open' the processes seem to be, and no hope of ICANN accountability either.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann49-public-forum-statement

CIS Response to ICANN's proposed renewal of .org Registry

akriti — 2019-04-28T02:16:40Z

We thank ICANN for the opportunity to comment on this issue of its proposed renewal of the .org Registry Agreement with the operator, Public Interest Registry (PIR). Supporting much of the community , we too find severe issues with the proposed agreement. These centre around the removal of price caps and imposing obligations being currently deliberated in an ongoing Policy Development Process (PDP).

Presumption of Renewal

CIS has, in the past, questioned the need for a presumption of renewal in registry contracts and it is important to emphasize this within the context of this comment as well. We had, also, asked ICANN for their rationale on having such a practice with reference to their contract with Verisign to which they responded saying:

“Absent countervailing reasons, there is little public benefit, and some significant potential for disruption, in regular changes of a registry operator. In addition, a significant chance of losing the right to operate the registry after a short period creates adverse incentives to favor short term gain over long term investment.”

This logic can presumably be applied to the .org registry, as well, yet a re-auction of ,even, legacy top-level domains can only serve to further a fair market, promote competition and ensure that existing registries do not become complacent.

These views were supported in the course of the PDP on Contractual Conditions - Existing Registries in 2006 wherein competition was seen useful for better pricing, operational performance and contributions to registry infrastructure. It was also noted that most service industries incorporate a presumption of competition as opposed to one of renewal.

Download the file to access our full response.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/akriti-bopanna-april-28-2019-cis-response-to-icanns-proposed-renewal-of-org-registry

CIS representation at ICANN 58

praskrishna — 2017-03-28T14:22:22Z

The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) organized ICANN 58 at Copenhagen from March 9 to March 16, 2017. On behalf of the Centre for Internet & Society (CIS), Vidushi Marda participated in the event and made a presentation.

CIS' focus at ICANN can broadly be divided into four heads: human rights, jurisdiction, transparency and accountability. Since March last year, we have also been pushing for changes in ICANN's expected standards of behavior, along with adoption of an anti harassment policy. After the IANA transition in September last year, the community is now divided into sub groups (SGs) that look into different issues for ICANN post transition, including the 4 that CIS works on. More information on ICANN 58 can be accessed here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/cis-representation-at-icann-58