Centre for Internet and Society

The Free Basics debate: Trai has a point in imposing temporary ban on net neutrality

sunil — 2015-12-25T14:58:30Z

The argument against net neutrality in India is simple. Regulation cannot be based on dogma – evidence of harm must be provided before you can advocate for rules for ISPs and telecom operators.

The article was published in FirstPost on December 24, 2015.

But net neutrality regardless of your preferred definition is a very complex regulatory question and there is no global or even national consensus on what counts as relevant evidence. To demonstrate the chain of causality between network neutrality violations and a variety of potential harms - expertise in a wide variety of fields such as economics, competition law, telecom policy, spectrum allocation, communications engineering and traffic management is required. Even with a very large research budget and a multidisciplinary team it would be impossible to predict with confidence what the impact of a particular regulatory option will be on the digital divide or innovation. And therefore the advocates of forbearance say that the Indian telecom regulator — Trai — should not regulate unprecedented technical and business model innovations like Facebook's Free Basics since we don't understand them.

Till recently I agreed with this empirical line of argument. But increasingly I am less convinced that scientific experiment and evidence is the only basis for regulation. Perhaps there is a small but necessary role for principles or ideology. Like the subtitle of Nassim Nicholas Taleb's book, we need to ask: How to Live in a World We Don't Understand. Let us take another area of technological regulation – cyber security. Do we really need to build a centralised database containing the passwords of all netizens and perform scientific experiments on it to establish that it can be compromised? A 100 percent centralised system has a single point of failure and therefore from a security perspective centralisation is almost always a bad idea. How are we so sure that such a system will be compromised at some date? To quote Sherlock Holmes: “Once you eliminate the impossible, whatever remains, no matter how improbable, must be the truth.” Decentralisation eliminates the possibility of a single point of failure thereby growing resilience. The Internet is perhaps the most famous example. It is not necessarily true that all decentralized systems are more secure than all centralised system of a decentralized network but it is usually the case. In other words, the principle of decentralisation in cyber security does not require repeated experimental confirmation across
markets and technologies.

To complicate matters, the most optimal solutions developed using economics and engineering may not be acceptable to most stakeholders. Professor Vishal Misra has provided a Shapley Value solution using cooperative game theory in the multi-sided market to determine how surplus should be divided between three types of ISPs [eyeball, transit and content] and Internet companies using transparent paid transit arrangements. But a migration from the current opaque arrangement to the Misra solution may never happen because Internet companies will resist such proposals and are increasingly getting into access provision themselves through projects like Google Fibre and Loom. Walter Brown from South African Communications Forum proposes that billing by minutes for phone calls and billing by message for SMSes should be prohibited because on 4G networks voice and text messages are carried as data and price is the best signal to consumers to ensure optimum use of network resources. This according to Walter Brown will eliminate the incentive for telcos to throttle or block or charge differently for VOIP traffic. Again this solution will not be adopted by any regulator because regulators prefer incremental changes with the least amount of disruption.

So given that we only have numbers that we can't trust - what should be some of the principles that form the bedrock of our net neutrality policy? To begin with there is the obvious principle of non-discrimination. The premise is simple – anyone who has gate-keeping powers might abuse it. Therefore we need to eliminate the possibility through regulation. Non-exclusivity is the result of non-discrimination and transparency is its precondition. That can also be considered as a principle and now we have three core principles to work with. Maybe that is sufficient since we should keep principles to the bare minimum to keep regulation and compliance with regulation simple. Some net
neutrality experts have also identified fairness and proportionality as additional principles. How do we settle this? Through transparent and participatory policy development as has been the case so far. Once we have principles articulated in law - how can we apply them to a specific case such as Facebook's Free Basics? Through the office of the appropriate regulator. As Chris Marsden advocates, net neutrality regulations should ideally be positive and forward looking. Positive in the sense that there should be more positive obligations and incentives than prohibitions and punitive measures. Forward looking in the sense that that the regulations should not retard or block technological and business model innovations. For example zero-rated walled gardens could be regulated by requiring that promoters such as Facebook also provide 50Mb of data per day to all users of Free Basics and also by requiring that Reliance provides the very same free service to other parties that want to compete with Facebook with similar offerings. Alternatively, users of Free Basics should get access to the whole Internet every other hour. All these proposal ensure that Facebook and it business partners have a incentive to innovate but at the same time ensures that resultant harms are mitigated.

Just to be absolutely clear, my defense of principle based regulation does not mean that I see no role for evidence and research. As regulation gets under way – further regulation or forbearance should be informed by evidence. But lack of evidence of harm is not an excuse for regulatory forbearance. India is the last market on the planet where the walled garden can be bigger than the Internet – and Facebook is sure giving it its very best shot. Fortunately for us Trai has acted and acted appropriately by issuing a temporary prohibition till regulation has been finalised. Like the US, coming up with stable regulation may take 10 years and we cannot let Facebook shape the market till then.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/telecom/blog/the-free-basics-debate-trai-has-a-point-in-imposing-temporary-ban-on-net-neutrality

Facebook Shares 10 Key Facts about Free Basics. Here's What's Wrong with All 10 of Them.

sunil — 2015-12-25T14:59:10Z

Shweta Sengar of Catch News spoke to Sunil Abraham about the recent advertisement by Facebook titled "What Net Neutrality Activists won't Tell You or, the Top 10 Facts about Free Basics". Sunil argued against the validity of all the 'top 10 facts'.

Facebook has rebranded internet.org as Free Basics. After suffering from several harsh blows from the net neutrality activists in India, the social media behemoth is positioning a movement in order to capture user attention.

Apart from a mammoth two page advertisement on Free Basics on 23 December in a leading English daily, we spotted a numerous hoardings across the capital.

Unlike Facebook, Wikipedia has a rather upfront approach for raising funds. You must have noticed a pop-up as you open Wikipedia when they are in need of funds. What Facebook has done is branded Free Basics as 'free' as the basic needs of life.

The newspaper advertisement by Facebook was aimed at clearing all the doubts about Free Basics. The 10 facts highlighted a connected India and urging users to take the "first step towards digital equality."

In an interview with Catch, Sunil Abraham, Executive Director of Bangalore based research organisation, the Centre for Internet and Society, shared his thoughts on the controversial subject. Abraham countered each of Facebook's ten arguments. Take a look:

01 Free basics is open to any carriers. Any mobile operator can join us in connecting India.

Sunil Abraham: Free Basics was initially exclusive to only one telecom operator in most markets that it was available in.

The non-exclusivity was introduced only after activists in India complained. But now the arrangement is exclusive to Free Basics as a walled garden provider. But discrimination harms remain until other Internet services can also have what Facebook has from telecom operators ie. free access to their destinations.

02 We do not charge anyone anything for Free Basics. Period.

SA: As Bruce Schneier says "surveillance is the business model of the Internet". Free basics users are subject to an additional layer of surveillance ie. the data retention by the Facebook proxy server. Just as Facebook cannot say that they are ignoring Data Protection law because Facebook is a free product - they cannot say that Free Basics can violate network neutrality law because it is a free service. For ex. Flipkart should get Flipkart Basic on all Indian ISPs and Telcos.

03 We do not pay for the data consumed in Free Basics. Operators participate because the program has proven to bring more people online. Free Basics has brought new people onto mobile networks on average over 50% faster since launching the service.

SA: Facebook has been quoting statistics as evidence to influence the policy formulation process. But we need the absolute numbers and we also need them to be independently verifiable. At the very least we need the means to cross verify these numbers with numbers that telcos and ISPs routinely submit to TRAI.

Theoretical harms must be addressed through net neutrality regulation. For example, you don't have to build a single, centralised database of all Indian citizens to know that it can be compromised - from a security design perspective centralisation is always a bad idea. Gatekeeping powers given to any powerful entity will be compromised. While evidence is useful, regulation can already begin based on well established regulatory principles. After scientific evidence has been made available - the regulation can be tweaked.

04 Any developer or publisher can have their content on Free Basics. There are clear technical specs openly published here ... and we have never rejected an app or publisher who has me these tech specs.

SA: Again this was only done as a retrospective fix after network neutrality activists in India complained about exclusive arrangements. For example, the music streaming service Hungama is not a low-bandwidth destination but since it was included the technical specifications only mentions large images and video files. Many of the other sites are indistinguishable from their web equivalents clearly indicating that this was just an afterthought. At the moment Free Basics has become controversial so most developers and publishers are not approaching them so there is no way for us to verify Facebook's claim.

05 Nearly 800 developers in India have signed their support for Free Basics.

SA: I guess these are software developers working in the services industry who don't see themselves as potential competition to Facebook or any of the services within Free Basics. Also since Facebook as been completely disingenuous when it comes to soliciting support for their campaigns it is very hard to believe these claims. It has tried to change the meaning of the phrase "net neutrality" and has framed the debate in an inaccurate manner - therefore I could quite confidently say that these developers must have been fooled into supporting Free Basics.

06 It is not a walled garden: In India, 40% of people who come online through Free Basics are paying for data and accessing the full internet within the first 30 days. In the same time period, 8 times more people are paying versus staying on just

SA: Again, no absolute numbers and also no granularity in the data that makes it impossible for anyone to verify these numbers. Also there is no way to compare these numbers to access options that are respectful of network neutrality such as equal rating. If the numbers are roughly the same for equal rating and zero-rating then there is no strong case to be made for zero-rating.

07 Free Basics is growing and popular in 36 other countries, which have welcomed the program with open arms and seen the enormous benefits it has brought.

SA: Free Basics was one of the most controversial topics at the last Internet Governance Forum. A gratis service is definitely going to be popular but that does not mean forbearance is the only option for the regulator. In countries with strong civil society and/or a strong regulator, Free Basics has ran into trouble. Facebook has been able to launch Free Basics only in jurisdictions where regulators are still undecided about net neutrality. India and Brazil are the last battle grounds for net neutrality and that is why Facebook is spending advertising dollar and using it's infrastructure to win the global south.

08 In a recent representative poll, 86% of Indians supported Free Basics by Facebook, and the idea that everyone deserves access to free basic internet services.

SA: This is the poll which was framed in alarmist language where Indian were asked to choose between perpetuating or bridging the digital divide. This is a false choice that Facebook is perpetuating - with forward-looking positive Network Neutrality rules as advocated by Dr. Chris Marsden it should be possible to bridge digital divide without incurring any free speech, competition, innovation and diversity harms.

09 In the past several days, 3.2 million people have petitioned the TRAI in support of Free Basics.

SA: Obviously - since Free Basics is better than nothing. But the real choice should have been - are you a) against network neutrality ie. would you like to see Facebook play gatekeeper on the Internet OR b) for network neutrality ie. would you like to see Free Basics forced to comply with network neutrality rules and expand access without harms to consumers and innovators.

10 There are no ads in the version of Facebook on Free Basics. Facebook produces no revenue. We are doing this to connect India, and the benefits to do are clear.

SA: As someone who has watched the Internet economy since the first dot com boom - it is absolutely clear that consumer acquisition is as important as revenues. They are doing it to connect people to Facebook and as a result some people will also connect to the Internet. But India is the last market on the planet where the walled garden can be bigger than the Internet, and therefore Facebook is manipulating the discourse through it's dominance of the networked public sphere.

Bravo to TRAI and network neutrality activists for taking Facebook on.

Originally published by Catch News, on December 24, 2015.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/facebook-shares-10-key-facts-about-free-basics-heres-whats-wrong-with-all-10-of-them

Smart Cities in India: An Overview

vanya — 2016-01-11T01:30:07Z

The Government of India is in the process of developing 100 smart cities in India which it sees as the key to the country's economic and social growth. This blog post gives an overview of the Smart Cities project currently underway in India. The smart cities mission in India is at a nascent stage and an evolving area for research. The Centre for Internet and Society will continue work in this area.

Overview of the 100 Smart Cities Mission

The Government of India announced its flagship programme- the 100 Smart Cities mission in the year 2014 and was launched in June 2015 to achieve urban transformation, drive economic growth and improve the quality of life of people by enabling local area development and harnessing technology. Initially, the Mission aims to cover 100 cities across the countries (which have been shortlisted on the basis of a Smart Cities Proposal prepared by every city) and its duration will be five years (FY 2015-16 to FY 2019-20). The Mission may be continued thereafter in the light of an evaluation to be done by the Ministry of Urban Development (MoUD) and incorporation of the learnings into the Mission. The Mission aims to focus on area-based development in the form of redevelopment of existing spaces, or the development of new areas (Greenfield) to accommodate the growing urban population and ensure comprehensive planning to improve quality of life, create employment and enhance incomes for all - especially the poor and the disadvantaged. ^{^[1]} On 27th August 2015 the Centre unveiled 98 smart cities across India which were selected for this Project. Across the selected cities, 13 crore population ( 35% of the urban population will be included in the development plans. ^{^[2]} The mission has been developed for the purpose of achieving urban transformation. The vision is to preserve India's traditional architecture, culture & ethnicity while implementing modern technology to make cities livable, use resources in a sustainable manner and create an inclusive environment. ^{^[3]}

The promises of the Smart City mission include reduction of carbon footprint, adequate water and electricity supply, proper sanitation, including solid waste management, efficient urban mobility and public transport, affordable housing, robust IT connectivity and digitalization, good governance, citizen participation, security of citizens, health and education.

Questions unanswered

Why and How was the Smart Cities project conceptualized in India? What was the need for such a project in India?
What was the role of the public/citizens at the ideation and conceptualization stage of the project?
Which actors from the Government, Private industry and the civil society are involved in this mission? Though the smart cities mission has been initiated by the Government of India under the Ministry of Urban Development, there is no clarity about the involvement of the associated offices and departments of the Ministry.

How are the Smart Cities being selected?

The 100 cities were supposed to be selected on the basis of Smart cities challenge^{^[4]} involving two stages. Stage I of the challenge involved Intra-State city selection on objective criteria to identify cities to compete in stage-II. In August 2015, The Ministry of Urban Development, Government of India announced 100 smart cities ^{^[5]} evaluated on parameters such as service levels, financial and institutional capacity, past track record, called as the 'shortlisted cities' for this purpose. The selected cities are now competing for selection in the Second stage of the challenge, which is an All India competition. For this crucial stage, the potential 100 smart cities are required to prepare a Smart City Proposal (SCP) stating the model chosen (retrofitting, redevelopment, Greenfield development or a mix), along with a Pan-City dimension with Smart Solutions. The proposal must also include suggestions collected by way of consultations held with city residents and other stakeholders, along with the proposal for financing of the smart city plan including the revenue model to attract private participation. The country saw wide participation from the citizens to voice their aspirations and concerns regarding the smart city. 15th December 2015 has been declared as the deadline for submission of the SCP, which must be in consonance with evaluation criteria set by The MoUD, set on the basis of professional advice. ^{^[6]} On the basis of this, 20 cities will be selected for the first year. According to the latest reports, the Centre is planning to fund only 10 cities for the first phase in case the proposals sent by the states do not match the expected quality standards and are unable to submit complete area-development plans by the deadline, i.e. 15th December, 2015. ^{^[7]}

Questions unanswered

Who would be undertaking the task of evaluating and selecting the cities for this project?
What are the criteria for selection of a city to qualify in the first 20 (or 10, depending on the Central Government) for the first phase of implementation?

How are the smart cities going to be Funded?

The Smart City Mission will be operated as a Centrally Sponsored Scheme (CSS) and the Central Government proposes to give financial support to the Mission to the extent of Rs. 48,000 crores over five years i.e. on an average Rs. 100 crore per city per year. ^{^[8]} The additional resources will have to be mobilized by the State/ ULBs from external/internal sources. According to the scheme, once list of shortlisted Smart Cities is finalized, Rs. 2 crore would have been disbursed to each city for proposal preparation.^{^[9]}

According to estimates of the Central Government, around Rs 4 lakh crore of funds will be infused mainly through private investments and loans from multilateral institutions among other sources, which accounts to 80% of the total spending on the mission. ^{^[10]} For this purpose, the Government will approach the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) for a loan costing £500 million and £1 billion each for 2015-20. If ADB approves the loan, it would be it will be the bank's highest funding to India's urban sector so far.^{^[11]} Foreign Direct Investment regulations have been relaxed to invite foreign capital and help into the Smart City Mission. ^{^[12]}

Questions unanswered

The Government notes on Financing of the project mentions PPPs for private funding and leveraging of resources from internal and external resources. There is lack of clarity on the external resources the Government has/will approach and the varied PPP agreements the Government is or is planning to enter into for the purpose of private investment in the smart cities.

How is the scheme being implemented?

Under this scheme, each city is required to establish a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) having flexibility regarding planning, implementation, management and operations. The body will be headed by a full-time CEO, with nominees of Central Government, State Government and ULB on its Board. The SPV will be a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act, 2013 at the city-level, in which the State/UT and the Urban Local Body (ULB) will be the promoters having equity shareholding in the ratio 50:50. The private sector or financial institutions could be considered for taking equity stake in the SPV, provided the shareholding pattern of 50:50 of the State/UT and the ULB is maintained and the State/UT and the ULB together have majority shareholding and control of the SPV. Funds provided by the Government of India in the Smart Cities Mission to the SPV will be in the form of tied grant and kept in a separate Grant Fund.^{^[13]}

For the purpose of implementation and monitoring of the projects, the MoUD has also established an Apex Committee and National Mission Directorate for National Level Monitoring^{^[14]}, a State Level High Powered Steering Committee (HPSC) for State Level Monitoring^{^[15]} and a Smart City Advisory Forum at the City Level ^{^[16]}.

Also, several consulting firms^{^[17]} have been assigned to the 100 cities to help them prepare action plans.^{^[18]} Some of them include CRISIL, KPMG, McKinsey, etc. ^{^[19]}

Questions unanswered

What policies and regulations have been put in place to account for the smart cities, apart from policies looking at issues of security, privacy, etc.?
What international/national standards will be adopted while development of the smart cities? Though the Bureau of Indian Standards is in the process of formulating standardized guidelines for the smart cities in India^{^[20]}, yet there is lack of clarity on adoption of these national standards, along with the role of international standards like the ones formulated by ISO.

What is the role of Foreign Governments and bodies in the Smart cities mission?

Ever since the government's ambitious project has been announced and cities have been shortlisted, many countries across the globe have shown keen interest to help specific shortlisted cities in building the smart cities and are willing to invest financially. Countries like Sweden, Malaysia, UAE, USA, etc. have agreed to partner with India for the mission.^{^[21]} For example, UK has partnered with the Government to develop three India cities-Pune, Amravati and Indore.^{^[22]} Israel's start-up city Tel Aviv also entered into an agreement to help with urban transformation in the Indian cities of Pune, Nagpur and Nashik to foster innovation and share its technical know-how.^{^[23]} France has piqued interest for Nagpur and Puducherry, while the United States is interested in Ajmer, Vizag and Allahabad. Also, Spain's Barcelona Regional Agency has expressed interest in exchanging technology with the Delhi. Apart from foreign government, many organizations and multilateral agencies are also keen to partner with the Indian government and have offered financial assistance by way of loans. Some of them include the UK government-owned Department for International Development, German government KfW development bank, Japan International Cooperation Agency, the US Trade and Development Agency, United Nations Industrial Development Organization and United Nations Human Settlements Programme. ^{^[24]}

Questions unanswered

Do these governments or organization have influence on any other component of the Smart cities?
How much are the foreign governments and multilateral bodies spending on the respective cities?
What kind of technical know-how is being shared with the Indian government and cities?

What is the way ahead?

On the basis of the SCP, the MoUD will evaluate, assess the credibility and select 20 smart cities out of the short-listed ones for execution of the plan in the first phase. The selected city will set up a SPV and receive funding from the Government.

Questions unanswered

Will the deadline of submission of the Smart Cities Proposal be pushed back?
After the SCP is submitted on the basis of consultation with the citizens and public, will they be further involved in the implementation of the project and what will be their role?
How will the MoUD and other associated organizations as well as actors consider the implementation realities of the project, like consideration of land displacement, rehabilitation of the slum people, etc.
How are ICT based systems going to be utilized to make the cities and the infrastructure "smart"?
How is the MoUD going to respond to the concerns and criticism emerging from various sections of the society, as being reflected in the news items?
How will the smart cities impact and integrate the existing laws, regulations and policies? Does the Government intend to use the existing legislations in entirety, or update and amend the laws for implementation of the Smart Cities Mission?

^{^[1]} Smart Cities, Mission Statement and Guidelines, Ministry of Urban Development, Government of India, June 2015, Available at : http://smartcities.gov.in/writereaddata/SmartCityGuidelines.pdf

^{^[2]} http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-08-27/news/65929187_1_jammu-and-kashmir-12-cities-urban-development-venkaiah-naidu

^{^[3]} http://india.gov.in/spotlight/smart-cities-mission-step-towards-smart-india

^{^[4]} http://smartcities.gov.in/writereaddata/Process%20of%20Selection.pdf

^{^[5]} Full list : http://www.scribd.com/doc/276467963/Smart-Cities-Full-List

^{^[6]} http://smartcities.gov.in/writereaddata/Process%20of%20Selection.pdf

^{^[7]} http://www.ibtimes.co.in/modi-govt-select-only-10-cities-under-smart-city-project-this-year-report-658888

^{^[8]} http://smartcities.gov.in/writereaddata/Financing%20of%20Smart%20Cities.pdf

^{^[9]} Smart Cities presentation by MoUD : http://smartcities.gov.in/writereaddata/Presentation%20on%20Smart%20Cities%20Mission.pdf

^{^[10]} http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/smart-cities-projectfrom-france-to-us-a-rush-to-offer-assistance-funds/

^{^[11]} http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/funding-for-smart-cities-key-to-coffer-lies-outside-india/#sthash.5lnW9Jsq.dpuf

^{^[12]} http://india.gov.in/spotlight/smart-cities-mission-step-towards-smart-india

^{^[13]} http://smartcities.gov.in/writereaddata/SPVs.pdf

^{^[14]} http://smartcities.gov.in/writereaddata/National%20Level%20Monitoring.pdf

^{^[15]} http://smartcities.gov.in/writereaddata/State%20Level%20Monitoring.pdf

^{^[16]} http://smartcities.gov.in/writereaddata/City%20Level%20Monitoring.pdf

^{^[17]} http://smartcities.gov.in/writereaddata/List_of_Consulting_Firms.pdf

^{^[18]} http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=128457

^{^[19]} http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/49242050.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst

^{^[20]} http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/in-a-first-bis-to-come-up-with-standards-for-smart-cities-115060400931_1.html

^{^[21]} http://accommodationtimes.com/foreign-countries-have-keen-interest-in-development-of-smart-cities/

^{^[22]} http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-11-20/news/68440402_1_uk-trade-three-smart-cities-british-deputy-high-commissioner

^{^[23]} http://www.jpost.com/Business-and-Innovation/Tech/Tel-Aviv-to-help-India-build-smart-cities-435161?utm_campaign=shareaholic&utm_medium=twitter&utm_source=socialnetwork

^{^[24]} http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/smart-cities-projectfrom-france-to-us-a-rush-to-offer-assistance-funds/#sthash.nCMxEKkc.dpuf

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/smart-cities-in-india-an-overview

Seminar on Open Access in Research Area: A Strategic Approach

sumandro — 2015-12-22T05:37:44Z

The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI), Delhi, is organising a seminar on open access in research on Tuesday, December 22, 2015. The seminar will focus on: 1) wider access to scientific publications and research data, 2) access to scientific information, and 3) challenges and opportunities of research data. The Centre for Internet and Society is supporting the event as a Knowledge Partner.

Background

Open Access has become central importance to advancing the interests of researchers, scholars, students, business, and the public as well as librarians. Increasingly, research institutions require researchers to publish articles that report research findings openly accessible in open domain.

Open Access pursues to yield scholarly publishing to spread knowledge and allow that knowledge to be built upon. Price barriers should not stop researchers from getting access to research data. Open Access, and the open availability and search ability of scholarly research that it entails, will have a significant positive impact on everything from education to the research practice in various fields.

To explore why Open Access is so important to a number of groups, TERI Library along with The Centre for Internet & Society (CIS) as Knowledge Partner is organizing a half day seminar on Open Access in Research Areas: a Strategic Approach on December 22, 2015 at TERI Seminar Hall, IHC, Lodhi Road, New Delhi.

The Seminar will focus on:

wider access to scientific publications and research data
access to scientific information, and
challenges and opportunities of research data.

Schedule

No registration is required to attend the seminar. Seats are limited, and will be provided on first-come-first-served basis.

13:45 - 14:00		Registration and Networking
14:00 - 14:10		Welcome Address - Mr. Prabir Sengupta, Distinguished Fellow and Director, Knowledge Management Division, TERI
14:10 - 14:20		Special Address - Sumandro Chattapadhyay, Research Director, The Centre for Internet and Society
14:20 - 14:35		Keynote Address - Dr. K.R. Murali Mohan, Advisor, Big Data Initiatives Division, Department of Science and Technology
14:35 - 14:50		Inaugural Address - Dr. Chandrima Shaha, Director, National Institute of Immunology, New Delhi
14:50 - 15:00		Setting the Theme and Vote of Thanks - Dr. P.K. Bhattacharya, Fellow and Area Convenor, Knowledge Management Division, TERI
15:00 - 15:30		Tea and Refreshments
15:30 - 17:15		Plenary Session Chair: Dr. Ramesh Sharma, Director, CEMCA Puneet Kishor, Researcher and Independent Consultant - "Science, Data, and Creative Commons" Dr. Beth Sandore Namachchivaya, Associate Dean of Libraries and Professor University of Illinois - "Developing Services, Infrastructure, and Best Practices to Conserve and Provide Access to Research Data: Challenges and Opportunities" Dr. Usha Mujoo Munshi, Librarian, Indian institute of Public Administration

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/teri-seminar-on-open-access-in-research

CIS's Position on Net Neutrality

sunil — 2015-12-09T13:06:06Z

As researchers committed to the principle of pluralism we rarely produce institutional positions. This is also because we tend to update our positions based on research outputs. But the lack of clarity around our position on network neutrality has led some stakeholders to believe that we are advocating for forbearance. Nothing can be farther from the truth. Please see below for the current articulation of our common institutional position.

Net Neutrality violations can potentially have multiple categories of harms — competition harms, free speech harms, privacy harms, innovation and ‘generativity’ harms, harms to consumer choice and user freedoms, and diversity harms thanks to unjust discrimination and gatekeeping by Internet service providers.
Net Neutrality violations (including some those forms of zero-rating that violate net neutrality) can also have different kinds benefits — enabling the right to freedom of expression, and the freedom of association, especially when access to communication and publishing technologies is increased; increased competition [by enabling product differentiation, can potentially allow small ISPs compete against market incumbents]; increased access [usually to a subset of the Internet] by those without any access because they cannot afford it, increased access [usually to a subset of the Internet] by those who don't see any value in the Internet, reduced payments by those who already have access to the Internet especially if their usage is dominated by certain services and destinations.
Given the magnitude and variety of potential harms, complete forbearance from all regulation is not an option for regulators nor is self-regulation sufficient to address all the harms emerging from Net Neutrality violations, since incumbent telecom companies cannot be trusted to effectively self-regulate. Therefore, CIS calls for the immediate formulation of Net Neutrality regulation by the telecom regulator [TRAI] and the notification thereof by the government [Department of Telecom of the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology]. CIS also calls for the eventual enactment of statutory law on Net Neutrality. All such policy must be developed in a transparent fashion after proper consultation with all relevant stakeholders, and after giving citizens an opportunity to comment on draft regulations.
Even though some of these harms may be large, CIS believes that a government cannot apply the precautionary principle in the case of Net Neutrality violations. Banning technical innovations and business model innovations is not an appropriate policy option. The regulation must toe a careful line to solve the optimization problem: refraining from over-regulation of ISPs and harming innovation at the carrier level (and benefits of net neutrality violations mentioned above) while preventing ISPs from harming innovation and user choice. ISPs must be regulated to limit harms from unjust discrimination towards consumers as well as to limit harms from unjust discrimination towards the services they carry on their networks.
Based on regulatory theory, we believe that a regulatory framework that is technologically neutral, that factors in differences in technological context, as well as market realities and existing regulation, and which is able to respond to new evidence is what is ideal.

This means that we need a framework that has some bright-line rules based, but which allows for flexibility in determining the scope of exceptions and in the application of the rules. Candidate principles to be embodied in the regulation include: transparency, non-exclusivity, limiting unjust discrimination.
The harms emerging from walled gardens can be mitigated in a number of ways. On zero-rating the form of regulation must depend on the specific model and the potential harms that result from that model. Zero-rating can be: paid for by the end consumer or subsidized by ISPs or subsidized by content providers or subsidized by government or a combination of these; deal-based or criteria-based or government-imposed; ISP-imposed or offered by the ISP and chosen by consumers; Transparent and understood by consumers vs. non-transparent; based on content-type or agnostic to content-type; service-specific or service-class/protocol-specific or service-agnostic; available on one ISP or on all ISPs. Zero-rating by a small ISP with 2% penetration will not have the same harms as zero-rating by the largest incumbent ISP. For service-agnostic / content-type agnostic zero-rating, which Mozilla terms ‘equal rating’, CIS advocates for no regulation.
CIS believes that Net Neutrality regulation for mobile and fixed-line access must be different recognizing the fundamental differences in technologies.
On specialized services CIS believes that there should be logical separation and that all details of such specialized services and their impact on the Internet must be made transparent to consumers both individual and institutional, the general public and to the regulator. Further, such services should be available to the user only upon request, and not without their active choice, with the requirement that the service cannot be reasonably provided with ‘best efforts’ delivery guarantee that is available over the Internet, and hence requires discriminatory treatment, or that the discriminatory treatment does not unduly harm the provision of the rest of the Internet to other customers.
On incentives for telecom operators, CIS believes that the government should consider different models such as waiving contribution to the Universal Service Obligation Fund for prepaid consumers, and freeing up additional spectrum for telecom use without royalty using a shared spectrum paradigm, as well as freeing up more spectrum for use without a licence.
On reasonable network management CIS still does not have a common institutional position.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-position-on-net-neutrality

A Question of Digital Humanities

sneha-pp — 2016-06-30T05:06:46Z

An extended survey of digital initiatives in arts and humanities practices in India was undertaken during the last year. Provocatively called 'mapping digital humanities in India', this enquiry began with the term 'digital humanities' itself, as a 'found' name for which one needs to excavate some meaning, context, and location in India at the present moment. Instead of importing this term to describe practices taking place in this country - especially when the term itself is relatively unstable and undefined even in the Anglo-American context - what I chose to do was to take a few steps back, and outline a few questions/conflicts that the digital practitioners in arts and humanities disciplines are grappling with. The final report of this study will be published serially. This is the second among seven sections.

Sections

01. Digital Humanities in India?

02. A Question of Digital Humanities

03. Reading from a Distance – Data as Text

04. The Infrastructure Turn in the Humanities

05. Living in the Archival Moment

06. New Modes and Sites of Humanities Practice

07. Digital Humanities in India – Concluding Thoughts

The 'digital turn' has been one of the significant changes in interdisciplinary research and scholarship in the last couple of decades. The advent of new digital technologies and growth of networked environments have led to a rethinking of the traditional processes of knowledge gathering and production, across an array of fields and disciplinary areas. DH has emerged as yet another manifestation of what in essence is this changing relationship between technologies and the human being or subject. The nature and processes of information, scholarship and learning, now produced or mediated by digital tools, methods or spaces have formed the crux of the DH discourse as it has emerged in different parts of the world so far. It has been variously called a phenomenon, field, discipline and a set of convergent practices – all of which are located at and/or try to understand the interaction between digital technologies and humanities practice and scholarship. DH in the Anglo-American context has seen several changes – from an early phase of vast archival initiatives and digitisation projects, to now exploring the role of big data and cultural analytics in literary criticism. Some of the early scholarship in the field illustrate the problems with defining and locating it within specific disciplinary formations, as the research objects, methods and locations of DH work cut across everything from the archive to the laboratory and social networking platforms. Largely interpreted as a way to explore the intersection of information technology and humanities, DH is grown to become an interdisciplinary field of research and practice today. However, DH is also clearly being posited as a site of contestation – what is perceived as doing away with or reinventing certain norms of traditional humanities research and scholarship. As a result it has largely been framed within the existing narrative of a crisis in the humanities, highlighting the more prominent role of technology which is now expected to resolve in some way questions of relevance and authority that seem to have become central to the continued existence and practice of the humanities in its conventional forms.

The Problem of Definition

The question of what is DH has been asked many times, and in different ways. Most scholars have differentiated between two waves or types of DH – the first is that of using computational tools to do traditional humanities research, while the second looks at the 'digital' itself as integral to humanistic enquiry [1]. However as is apparent in the existing discourse, the problem of definition still persists. As a field, method or practice, is it a found term that has now been appropriated in various forms and by various disciplines, or is it helping us reconfigure questions of the humanities by making available, through advancements in technology, a new digital object or a domain of enquiry that previously was unavailable to us? These and others will continue to remain questions for the digital humanities, but it would be important to first examine what would be the question/s of digital humanities. Dave Parry summarises to some extent these different contentions to a definition of the field when he suggests that "what is at stake here is not the object of study or even epistemology, but rather ontology. The digital changes what it means to be human, and by extension what it means to study the humanities." (Parry 2012)

Some speculation on the larger premise of the field, with specific reference to its emergence in India is what I hope to chart out in this report. This is not in itself an attempt at a definition, but sketching out a domain of enquiry by mapping the field with respect to work being done in the Indian context. In doing so these propositions will assume one or the other (if not all three) of these following suggested threads or modes of thought, which will also inform larger concerns of the DH work at CIS:

The first is the inherited separation of technology and the humanities and therefore the existing tenuous relationship between the two fields. As is apparent in the nomenclature itself, there seems to be a bringing together of what seem to have been essentially two separate domains of knowledge. However, the humanities and technology have a rather chequered history together, which one could locate with the beginning of print culture. As Adrian Johns points out in the Nature of the book, "any printed book is, as a matter of fact, both the product of one complex set of social and technological processes and the beginning of another" (Johns 1998:3). The larger imagination of humanities as text-based disciplines can be located in a sense in the rise of printing, literacy and textual scholarship. While the book itself seems to have made a comfortable transition into the digital realm, the process of this transition, the channels of circulation and distribution of information as objects of study have been relegated to certain disciplinary concerns, thus obfuscating and making invisible this 'technologised history' of the humanities. Can DH therefore be an attempt to uncover such a history and bridge these knowledge gaps would be a question here?
The distance between the practice and the subject. How does one identify with DH practice? While many people engage with what seem to be core DH concerns, they are not all 'digital humanists' or do not identify themselves by the term. While at one level the problem is still that of definition and taxonomy – what is or is not DH – at another level it is also about the nature of subjectivity produced in such practice – whether it has one of its own or is still entrenched in other disciplinary formations, as is the case with most DH research today. This is apparent in the emphasis on processes and tools in DH– where the practice or method seems to have emerged before the theoretical or epistemological framework. One may also connect this to the larger discourse on the emergence of the techno-social subject [2] as an identity meditated by digital and new media technologies, wherein technology is central to the practices that engender this subjectivity.
Tying back to the first question is also the notion of a conflict between the humanities and DH. This comes with the perception of DH being a version 2.0 of the traditional humanities, a result of the existing narrative of crisis and the need for the humanities disciplines to reinvent themselves to remain relevant in the present context, and one way to do this is by becoming amenable to the use of computing tools. DH has emerged as one way to mediate between the humanities and the changes that are imminent with digital technologies, but it may not or even need not take up the task of trying to establish a teleological connection between the two. The theoretical pursuits of both may be different but deeply related, and this is one manner of approaching DH as a field or domain of enquiry; the point of intersection or conflict would be where new questions emerge. This narrative is also located within a larger framing of DH in terms of addressing the concerns of the labour market, and the fear of the humanities being displaced or replaced as a result. Parry’s objective of studying DH works with and tries to address this particular formulation of the field.

Locating these concerns in India, where the field of DH is still at an incipient stage comes with a multitude of questions. For one the digital divide still persists to a large extent in India, and is at different levels due to the complexity of linguistic and social conditions of technological advancement. It is difficult locate a field that is so premised on technology in such a varied context. Secondly, the existing discourse on DH still draws upon, to a large extent, the given history of the term which renders it inaccessible to certain groups or classes of people in the global South. Another issue which is not specifically Indian but can be seen more explicitly in this context is the somewhat uncritical way in which technology itself is imagined. In most spaces, technology is still understood as either ‘facilitating’ something, either a specific kind of research enquiry or as a tool - a means to an end, and as being value or culture neutral. However, if we are to imagine the digital as a condition of being as Parry says, then technology too cannot be relegated to being a means to an end. Bruno Latour indicates the same when he says "Technology is everywhere, since the term applies to a regime of enunciation, or, to put it another way, to a mode of existence, a particular form of exploring existence, a particular form of the exploration of being – in the midst of many others." (Latour 2002)

DH then in some sense takes us back to the notion of technology or more specifically the digital realm as being a discursive space, and a technosocial or cultural paradigm that generates new objects and methods of study. This has been the impetus of cyber culture and digital culture studies, but what separates DH from these fields is another way to arrive at some understanding of its ontological status. At a cursory glance, the shift from content to process, from information to data seems to be the key transition here, and the blurring of the boundaries between such absolute categories. More importantly however, does this point towards an epistemic shift; a rupture in the given understanding of certain knowledge formations or systems is also a pertinent question of DH. There are several questions therefore for DH - in terms of what it means and what it could do for our understanding of the humanities and technology. However the questions of DH still need to be made explicit. This mapping exercise will attempt to explore some of the above thoughts a little further. Through discussions with scholars and practitioners across diverse fields, we will attempt to map and generate different meanings of the ‘digital’ and DH. While one can expect this to definitely produce more questions, we also hope the process of thinking though these questions will lead to an understanding of the larger field as well.

The Problem of the Discipline

Much has been said and written about DH as an emergent field or domain of enquiry; the plethora of departments being set up all across the world, well mostly the developed world is testimony to the claimed innovative and generative potential of the field. However as outlined in the introduction the problem of definition still persists and poses much difficulty in any attempts to engage with the field. While the predominant narrative seems to be in terms of defining what DH or to take it a step back, what the ‘digital’ allows you to do, with respect to enabling or facilitating certain kinds of research and pedagogy, a pertinent question still is that of what it allows you to ‘be’. DH has been alternatively called a method, practice and field of enquiry, but scholars and practitioners in many instances have stopped short of fully embracing it as a discipline. This is an interesting development given the rapid pace of its institutionalisation - from being located in existing Humanities or Computational Sciences and Media Studies departments it has now claimed functional institutional spaces of its own, with not just interdisciplinary research and teaching but also other creative and innovative knowledge-making practices. The field is slowly gaining credence in India as well, with several institutions pursuing research around core questions within the fold of DH.

So is the disciplinary lens inadequate to understand this phenomenon, or is it too early for a field still considered in some ways rather incipient. The growth of the academic discipline itself is something of a fraught endeavour; as debates around the scientific revolution and Enlightenment thought have established. To put it in a very simple manner, the story of academic disciplines is that of training in reason [3]. Andrew Cutrofello says "In academia, a discipline is defined by its methodological rigor and the clear boundaries of its field of inquiry. Methods or fields are criticized as being 'fuzzy' when they are suspected of lacking a discipline. In a more straightforwardly Foucauldian sense, the disciplinary power of academic disciplines can be located in their methods for producing docile bodies of different sorts" (Cutrofello 1994). The problem with defining DH may lie in it not conforming to precisely this notion of the academic discipline, and changing ideas of the function of critique when mediated by the digital, which is of primary concern for the humanities. DH has in many spaces also emerged as a manifestation of increasing interdisciplinarity and the blurring of boundaries between traditional disciplinary concerns.

However a prevalent mode of understanding DH has been in terms of the disciplinary concerns it raises for the humanities themselves; this works with the assumption that it is in fact a newer, improved version or extension of the humanities. The present mapping exercise too began with the disciplinary lens, but instead of enquiring about what DH is, it tried to explore what the ‘digital’ has brought to, changed or appropriated in terms of existing disciplinary concerns within the humanities and more broadly spaces and process of knowledge-making and dissemination. This thought stems from the premise that if we have to posit the digital itself as a state of being or existence, then we need to understand this new techno-social paradigm much better. Prof. Amlan Dasgupta, at the School of Cultural Texts and Records at Jadavpur University in Kolkata sees this as useful way of going about the problem of trying to arrive at a definition of the field – one is to understand the history of the term, from its inherited definition in the Anglo-American context, and distinguish it from what he calls the current state of ‘digitality’ – where all cultural objects are being now being conceived of as ‘digital’ objects. In the Indian context, the question of digitality also becomes important from the perspective of technological obsolescence - where there is a great resistance to discontinuing or phasing out the use of certain kinds of technology; either for lack of access to better ones or simply because one finds other uses for it. Prof. Dasgupta interestingly terms this a ‘culture of reuse’, one example of this being the typewriter which for all practical purposes has been displaced by the computer, but still finds favour with several people in their everyday lives. The question of livelihood is still connected to some of these technologies, so much so that they are very much a part of channels of cultural production and circulation, and even when they cease to become useful they have value as cultural artefacts. We therefore inhabit at the same time, different worlds, that of the analogue and digital, or as he calls it 'a multi-layered technological sphere'. The notion of the 'digital' is also multi-layered, with some objects being 'weakly digital', and others being so in a more pronounced manner. The variedness of this space, and the complexities or ‘degrees of use’ of certain technologies or technological objects is what further determines the nature of this space and makes it all the more difficult to define. DH itself has seen several phases in the West, but has seen no such movement or gradual evolution in India, where these phases exist simultaneously.

This is also true of most technology in underdeveloped world. This further complicates the questions of access to technology or the 'digital divide' which have been and still are some of the primary approaches concerning the pervasiveness of technology, particularly in the Global South. The need of the hour therefore is to be able to distinguish between this current state of digitality that we are in, and what is meant by the ‘Digital Humanities’. It may after all be a set of methodologies rather than a subject or discipline in itself– the question is how it would help us understand the ‘digital’ itself much better, and more critically, and the new kinds of enquiries it may then facilitate about this space we now inhabit. This, Prof. Dasgupta feels would go a long way in arriving at some definition of the field.

One of the important points of departure, from the traditional humanities and later humanities computing as mentioned earlier, has been the blurring of boundaries between content, method and object/s of enquiry. The ‘process’ has become important, as illustrated by the iterative nature of most DH projects and the discourse itself which emphasises the 'making' and 'doing' aspects of the research as much as the content itself. Tool-building as a critical activity rather than as mere facilitation is an important part of the knowledge-making process in the field (Ramsay 2010). In conjunction with this, Dr. Moinak Biswas, at the Department of Film Studies at Jadavpur University, thinks that the biggest changes have been in terms of the collaborative nature of knowledge production, based on voluntarily sharing or creating new content through digital platforms and archives, and crucially the possibility of now imagining creative and analytical work as not separate practices, but located within a single space and time. He cites an example from film, where now with digital platforms and processes ‘image’ making and critical practice can both be combined on one platform, like the online archive Indiancine.ma [4] or the Vectors journal [5] for example, to produce new layers of meaning around existing texts. The aspect of critique is important here, given that the consistent criticism about the field has been the ambiguity of its social undertaking; its critical or political standpoint or challenge to existing theoretical paradigms. Most of the interest around the term has been in very instrumental terms, as a facilitator or enabler of certain kinds of digital practice. While the move away from computational analysis as a technique to facilitate humanities research is apparent, the disciplinary concerns here still seem to be latched onto those of the traditional humanities. Questions about the epistemological concerns of DH itself therefore remain unanswered.

While reiterating some of these core questions within DH, Dr. Souvik Mukherjee at the Department of English, Presidency University and Dr. Padmini Ray Murray, at the Centre for Public History, Srishti School of Art, Design and Technology, speak of the problem of locating the field in India, where work is presently only being done in a few small pockets. The lack of a precise definition, or location within an established disciplinary context are some reasons why a lot of work that could come within the ambit of DH is not being acknowledged as such; conversely it also leads to the problem of projects on digitisation or studies of digital cultures/cyber cultures being easily conflated with DH . Related to this is the absence of self-claimed ‘digital humanists’, which makes it all the more difficult to identify the boundaries of their research and practice. More importantly, the lack of an indigenous framework to theorise around questions of the digital is also an obstacle to understanding what the field entails and the many possibilities it may offer in the Indian context. This they feel is a problem not just of DH, but in general for modes of knowledge production in the social sciences and humanities that have adopted Western theoretical constructs. One could also locate in some sense the present crisis in disciplines within this problem. Sundar Sarukkai and Gopal Guru explicate this issue when they talk about the absence of 'experience as an important category of the act of theorising' because of the privileging of ideas in Western constructs of experience (Guru and Sarukkai 2012). This is also reflective of the bifurcation between theory and praxis in traditional social sciences or humanities epistemological frameworks which borrow heavily from the West. DH while still to arrive at a core disciplinary concern seems to point towards the problem of this very demarcation by addressing the aspect of practice as a very focal point of its discourse.

Dr. Indira Chowdhury, oral historian and director of the Centre for Public History, who is also a faculty member at the Srishti School of Art, Design and Technology, Bangalore sees this as a favourable way of understanding how the field as such has emerged and what its various possibilities could be in terms of different disciplinary perspectives. She is uncertain that of its emergence as a response to a ‘crisis’ in the humanities as such. She recalls an instance of one of her students who went on to work on hypertext in Canada, several years ago, which for her seemed to be the first instance of something close to DH. The IT revolution in the early 2000s was a significant change, and there were several things that it enabled people to do, in terms of concordance, cross-referencing and getting around texts in certain ways. However, whether key questions in the humanities really changed, whether they were taken any further, is something yet to be explored because it is still such a new field, and one can only be speculative about it, she feels. It perhaps pushes for a new level of interdisciplinarity, and a different kind of collaborative space that the digital enables. What is significant and exciting for her as a historian, however, is that if history has to survive as a discipline, in schools but in terms of public spaces and discourse, it should actively engage with the digital. This not only presents significant challenges, in terms how to represent the past in the digital space, (in short problems with method) but also opens up new possibilities, for example with oral history and the advent of digital sound. The definition of the field will also evolve, as people define it from different spaces of practice and research, which Dr. Chowdhury feels is crucial to keeping it open and accessible by all.

Even from diverse disciplinary perspectives, at present the understanding of DH is that it facilitates new modes of humanistic enquiry, or enables one to ask questions that could not be asked earlier. As Prof. Dasgupta reiterates, it is no longer possible to imagine humanities scholarship outside of the ‘digital’ as such, as that is the world we inhabit. However, while some of the key conceptual questions for the humanities may remain the same, it is the mode of questioning that has undergone a change – we need to re-learn questioning or question-making within this new digital sphere, which is in some sense also a critical and disciplinary challenge. While this does not resolve the problem of definition, it does provide a useful route into thinking of what would be questions of DH, particularly in the Indian context.

Notes

[1] For a more detailed overview of the different phases of DH, see Patrik Svensson in 'Landscape of Digital Humanities,' Digital Humanities Quarterly, Volume 4 Number 1, 2010, http://digitalhumanities.org/dhq/vol/4/1/000080/000080.html.

[2] For more on the nature of the technosocial subject, see Nishant Shah, The Technosocial Subject: Cities, Cyborgs and Cyberspace, Manipal University, 2013. Indian ETD Repository @ INFLIBNET, http://hdl.handle.net/10603/8558.

[3] This is rather simple abstraction of ideas about discipline and reason as they have stemmed from Enlightenment thought. For a more elaborate understanding see Conflict of the Faculties (1798) by Immanuel Kant and Discipline and Punish (1975) by Michel Foucault.

[4] See: http://indiancine.ma/.

[5] See: http://vectors.usc.edu/journal/index.php.

References

Cutrofello, Andrew, Discipline and Critique: Kant, Poststructuralism and the Problem of Resistance, State University of New York Press, 1994.

Guru, Gopal, and Sundar Sarukkai, The Cracked Mirror: An Indian Debate on Experience and Theory, New Delhi: Oxford University Press India, 2012.

Johns, Adrian, The Nature of the Book: Print and Knowledge in the Making, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998.

Latour, Bruno, 'Morality and Technology: The End of the Means,' Trans. Couze Venn, Theory Culture Society, 247-260, 2002.

Parry, Dave, 'The Digital Humanities or a Digital Humanism', Debates in the Digital Humanities, ed. Mathew K. Gold, University of Minnesota Press, 2012, http://dhdebates.gc.cuny.edu/debates/text/24.

Ramsay, Stephen, 'On Building,' 2010, http://lenz.unl.edu/papers/2011/01/11/on-building.html.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/a-question-of-digital-humanities

Digital Humanities in India?

sneha-pp — 2016-06-30T05:05:29Z

Sections

01. Digital Humanities in India?

02. A Question of Digital Humanities

03. Reading from a Distance – Data as Text

04. The Infrastructure Turn in the Humanities

05. Living in the Archival Moment

06. New Modes and Sites of Humanities Practice

07. Digital Humanities in India – Concluding Thoughts

Background

It has only been a couple of years since I began hearing the term Digital Humanities (henceforth, DH) being uttered quite prominently, though mostly in academic circles. For the uninitiated, it almost sounds like an oxymoron. After all, for most practical purposes the digital and humanities have always been seen almost as contradictory terms, existing in distinct silos. A couple of workshops and conferences, one national-level consultation, three new centres, and two academic courses later the term still needs a definition in India, if not also in other parts of the world. But what was by then, and even now, is interesting is the emergence of pockets of work in India either claiming to be DH or even remotely related to it, and the interest in the term, either as one full of a seemingly diverse, innovative, and generative potential for interdisciplinary work in academia and practice, or as something that is just a reinvention of old questions that have been the focus of humanistic enquiry for several decades now.

The enquiry for this mapping began with the term itself, as a 'found' name for which I needed to excavate some meaning, context and location in India at the present moment. A consultation on Digital Humanities for Indian Higher Education organised in Bangalore in July 2013 [1] and a proposed short course in ‘Digital Humanities and Cultural Informatics’ [2] at Jadavpur University, Kolkata, were some of the early prominent instances of the use of the term. I later learnt from one of the people interviewed for this study that DH was already discussed in academic workshops as early as 2010 [3]. The general interest in the term has steadily picked up in the last couple of years however, albeit in specific pockets of the country, and it would be safe to say that it has been approached in markedly different ways by several institutions.

The source of the term itself is the history and body of literature around humanities computing in the UK and US, which essentially explores the use of computational methods in humanities research and practice. Roberto A. Busa (2010) describes it as “… precisely the automation of every possible analysis of human expression (therefore, it is exquisitely a "humanistic" activity), in the widest sense of the word, from music to the theater, from design and painting to phonetics, but whose nucleus remains the discourse of written texts”. However, locating such a history in India seems not only to be a difficult project, but largely a futile one. It seemed irrelevant to import a concept or discourse that in itself was (and still is to some extent) relatively unstable and undefined even in the Anglo-American context, and then try to locate it here. Instead, what I chose to do was to take a few steps back - firstly to outline a couple of questions/conflicts that seemed to be troubling about this concept to begin with:

Are ‘digital’ and ‘humanities’ really two contradictory terms that are being bridged together? Is this a reiteration of the ‘two cultures’ (Snow 1990) debate?
What are the changes in the object(s) of enquiry in humanities disciplines due to the advent of the internet and digital technologies?
What methods are to be used to study and work with digital objects? How are these affecting the traditional methods of the humanities?
Is DH a fringe academic phenomena, and can it be related to academic disciplines only? With several groups of practitioners engaging with questions and methods akin to DH outside universities, how do we define its institutional boundaries?
What are the new skills and tools emerging with, and in turn defining, DH practices in India?

Context

An immediate context for the growth of DH has been the steady debate around a ‘crisis’ of the disciplines, the humanities in particular, and how DH in a strange paradox, seemed to be both the phenomenon posing this question and offering an answer to it. Particularly in the Anglo-American context, while there has been a sustained decline in funding for the arts, especially post the global recession in the late 1990s, the Science, Technology, Engineering and Math (STEM) and other disciplines in natural sciences still seem to be on a steady footing. The ‘crisis’ here exists here at several levels - budgetary cuts across universities for liberal arts and humanities programmes, a steep fall in gainful employment for graduates (whose numbers are much more than the jobs available in the market, the adjunct system that has become popular in the US, which has resulted in reduced full-time employment and poor compensation for faculty, and in general a lack of opportunities and resources for research in the arts and humanities. The problem however, of which these are only the symptoms, lies much deeper, at the heart of what is seen as the lack of interest due to the diminishing practical value of the humanities, which further makes them seem most dispensable in a moment of economic crisis. Martha Nussbaum calls this a ‘silent crisis’, spurred by the growth of a profit-driven model of education, which has led to an increased focus on science and technology programmes, and emphasized the fostering of certain specific skills in these domains much to the detriment of arts and humanities programmes at every level of formal education, thus also doing away with “cultivated capacities of critical thinking and reflection, which are crucial in keeping democracies alive and wide awake.”

Gary Gutting on the other hand sees this definition of crisis in terms of numbers itself as misleading, but proposes that this decline also as a result of a cultural and economic system that is inhospitable to the humanities in general, and the ‘cultural middle class’ in particular. He writes:

Our economic system works well for those who find meaning in economic competition and the material rewards it brings. To a lesser but still significant extent, our system provides meaningful work in service professions (like health and social work) for those fulfilled by helping people in great need. But for those with humanistic and artistic life interests, our economic system has almost nothing to offer. Or rather, it has a great deal to offer but only for a privileged elite (the cultural parallel to our economic upper class) who have had the ability and luck to reach the highest levels of humanistic achievement. If you have (in Pierre Bourdieu’s useful term) the “cultural capital” to gain a tenured professorship at a university, play regularly in a major symphony orchestra or write mega bestsellers, you can earn an excellent living doing what you love. Short of that, you must pursue your passion on the side. (Gutting 2013)

Paul Jay and Gerald Graff locate the problem within the notion of the humanities as being inherently averse to a market-driven, utilitarian form of education, which emphasises only credentials, thus rendering the field esoteric and lacking when it comes to solving problems in the ‘real world’. Instead they favour the approach of humanities students developing diverse skill sets, in addition to traditional skills of their disciplines, and being open to engage with opportunities in the larger marketplace outside of academy as well. As the essay states:

We believe it is time to stop the ritualized lamentation over the crisis in the humanities and get on with the task of making them relevant in the 21st century. Such lamentation only reveals the inability of many humanists to break free of a 19th-century vision of education that sees the humanities as an escape from the world of business and science. As Cathy Davidson has forcefully argued in her new book, Now You See It, this outmoded way of thinking about the humanities as a realm of high-minded cultivation and pleasure in which students contemplate the meaning of life is a relic of the industrial revolution with its crude dualism of lofty spiritual art vs. mechanized smoking factories, a way of thinking that will serve students poorly in meeting the challenges of the 21st century. (Jay and Duff 2002)

While many of the traditional humanities scholars may still look at this as the result of a certain techno capitalistic impulse - wherein a new research regime based on knowledge creation to fulfil corporate interests emerges – it is prudent to examine how and why fields like the digital humanities have now emerged around the time of such a crisis, as they seemingly fit well within this nebulous space, and what are their implications for the humanities, education and research at large.

In the India, the context is a rather chequered one – with most conversations around the internet and digital technologies located within the domain of the development of Information and Communication technologies for Development (ICT4D), in sectors ranging from education to governance. The introduction to the digital has been in multifarious ways for countries in the global south, largely through rhetoric about its potential to address and even resolve social and economic problems, so much so that, as several of the people interviewed in this study also mentioned, now anything digital automatically translates to ‘good’ and ‘beneficial’. Addressing the digital divide has been a mandate of all stakeholders, whether the state and policy-makers, private organisations, NGOs or academia. With around 300 million internet users and counting, India has the second largest internet user base in the world. However, the conditions and quality of access to the internet and other digital technologies, and who is using these and for what purposes continue to remain a bone of contention. The ambitious Digital India initiative of the current government is the latest in a slew of measures undertaken to address some of these concerns in the last several years, and it proposes to do so by tackling three key areas – digital infrastructure, governance and services on demand, and empowerment of citizens through increased digital literacy [4]. As such it seeks to resolve some of the challenges of last mile connectivity that have forever been an issue with many ICT4D initiatives, particularly with countries in the Global South. The advent of a techno-democracy or a model of governance that successfully integrates technology within a framework of rights and social development seems to be larger vision of these proposed initiatives.

The ICT-fication of education has been a major objective and challenge within this larger vision, specifically with respect to the problem of access, and more importantly quality of access which stands out as pertinent, again a problem attributed to the lack of last mile connectivity. In 2009, the MHRD launched the ambitious National Mission in Education and Information and Communication Technologies (NMEICT) programme [5], which along with the National Commission for Higher Education and Research (NCHER) Bill [6] and the recommendations of the Yashpal Committee report [7], was expected to address some long-standing concerns in making higher education more accessible and hospitable to students, particularly those from underprivileged backgrounds. Ashish Rajadhyaksha (2011) argues that the last-mile problem is a more of a conceptual or cultural problem than merely a technological one. This is illustrated in the manner of implementation of several projects under the NMEICT, particularly in the imagination, as Rajadhyaksha says, of technology as neutral and therefore capable of addressing issues of democratisation within higher education.

Following the NMEICT, several initiatives such as the National Programme on Technology Enhanced Learning (NPTEL) [8] programme, and the use of low-cost devices such as the Aakash tablets [9] were also field tested to get a better understanding of how digital technologies could be integrated seamlessly into classroom instruction. The Indira Gandhi National Open University (IGNOU) [10] and Information and Library Network (INFLIBNET) [11], and more recently the National Knowledge Network (NKN) [12] are some of the more established efforts in distance education and open courseware. Digitisation initiatives were also launched on a large scale in the last decade, some notable ones being National Mission for Manuscripts [13], Digital Library of India [14], and National Library of India [15], among many others. There is also a growing number of closed/commercial archives, some examples being the South Asia Archive [16] and Asia Art Archive [17]. Digitisation, while being taken up in the interest of preservation and record, also brought with it a number of challenges, particularly with respect to the manner in which the projects were implemented. Whether with regard to preservation of the original material, problems with copyright or defining metadata standards, digitisation has never been an easy process. The Google Books library project is an example of this, where many books were damaged and had to be discarded in the process of digitisation, and the project itself came under criticism for several copyright violations, errors produced due to conversion of scanned texts using Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software and incorrect or unavailable metadata.

The move towards digitisation also provided the much needed impetus for archival practice to make a transition to the digital space, this has been an inevitable but rather fraught endeavour to begin with, as some of the observations made in the later chapters will illustrate. The emergence of independent, private online archives, often seen as a fallout of the hegemony of state-funded archives is an important development of this time. An influx of funding from government and private donors, has led to a lot of work in media and communication technologies getting concentrated in so-called ‘alternative’ spaces outside the university. The growth of these in between spaces has been an interesting phenomenon, particularly with respect to the possibilities offered for different kinds of research and other creative practices that are often unable to find a space within the confines of a university or other large, established knowledge institutions.

In the last decade or so, DH seems to have become one of the most highly funded areas in humanities research and practice. While this has seemingly helped to either save and/or reinvent some the humanities programmes, a lot of traditional humanists also view the field and the term with scepticism – as a threat to more traditional forms of humanities pedagogy and practice. Whether such a context exists in India and is still a matter of question, and hinges largely on how we understand the digital itself - as an object, concept or space. For that seems to be where the questions about the field, its emergence and its epistemological concerns lie.

This report, therefore, takes a slightly broader look, somewhat like a scoping exercise to see what some present concerns are and what could be the possibilities of DH in India. The areas of focus are few – the notion of crisis, and disciplines, the archive and so forth which form the crux of the debate in India. It also looks at changes that have come about, and are imminent with the ‘digital turn’, from the perspective of selected disciplines, and practices of knowledge-making. More importantly, it tries to extrapolate, from the common issues and conflicts traced across several conversations, larger questions of a conflict of authority that disciplines in the humanities have come to undergo, and whether the digital has amplified of tried to resolve the same. The conflict is tied to questions of ownership/authorship and authenticity that emerge with new collaborative modes of knowledge production, and the politics of circulation. It is reflected in the shift from more traditional spaces of knowledge-making to newer methods, objects, figures and processes in the online world, which seem to at one level replace older ones. This perceived threat of irrelevance or obsolescence is one of the manifestations of this conflict of authority. The Wikipedia is one example of this conflict, wherein the authenticity and authority of its content and recognition as scholarship has been intensely debated owing to, among other things, the fact that it cannot be attributed to any single author. In the ways in which the digital now mediates such activities, what has become the space and understanding of the digital in our lives, in the ways we consume and produce information and knowledge, and increasingly become uneven stakeholders in a dynamic knowledge economy, are some of the questions explored therein.

Methodology

With few 'digital humanists' (a term many DH scholars in India have consciously chosen to stay away from) and DH centres around, and the discourse being far from stable in India, the best way to explore this supposedly new phenomenon then seemed to be to understand some of the immediate problems and questions with the notion of the ‘digital’ itself. This approach was not just the result of constraints of the immediate context, but also turned out to be a productive methodological gesture, as it widened the scope of this mapping exercise to include several proto/perhaps-DH initiatives that have come up around the same time, or been in existence for a while and have been trying to work around similar questions. The mapping did not begin with an assumption of a field called DH as being extant in India, and therefore as an examination of its challenges and possibilities, but rather to understand how DH-like practices have evolved and converged at the moment under what appears to be like a place-holder term, and the implications of this for research and learning. Being located in India, it also provided a good vantage point to reflect on some of the literature and discourse around the term being produced in the Anglo-American context. The consultation on Digital Humanities for Indian Higher Education held in July 2013 was helpful in bringing together a number of people and key questions of what was then understood as something of a field. It is largely from the discussions at this consultation that this report approaches the term and what it may offer for humanities and related interdisciplinary research in India; somewhere it also hopes to serve as a point of departure. A major concern then was the lack of a proper definition of the field, and its instability, which continued to be a recurrent topic in my discussions with people as part of this exercise. However, the merits of embarking upon an exercise to ‘define DH in India’ were highly contentious, so the mapping took a more descriptive route, and did a discursive analysis of work in DH and allied fields and what people were saying about it in India. What I found were a range of views, some informed by practice and scholarship, others based on conjecture and some purely non-committal. As one of the people interviewed for this mapping pointed out, there is something provisional about which, if I may add, also inhibits us from saying anything definitive about it, just yet.

Given that the lack of a definition of the field remained one of the main issues, I went into conducting the mapping with a working definition/assumption that DH ‘is an interdisciplinary area of research, practice and pedagogy that looks at the interaction of digital tools, methods and spaces with core concerns of humanistic enquiry’. This definition was developed based on a review of existing literature in the Anglo-American context on DH, and deliberately made expansive enough to include within its fold, the different kinds of practices that had already chosen to adopt the term, and others which seemed to be inclined towards similar theoretical and practical concerns. Another useful definition, from the Digital Humanities Quarterly useful was the following:

Digital humanities is a diverse and still emerging field that encompasses the practice of humanities research in and through information technology, and the exploration of how the humanities may evolve through their engagement with technology, media, and computational methods. (Digital Humanities Quarterly 2010)

Deliberating on the interaction between humanities and technology, Susan Schreibman, in one the earliest books on DH describes the 'field' as follows:

The digital humanities, then, and their interdisciplinary core found in the field of humanities computing, have a long and dynamic history best illustrated by examination of the locations at which specific disciplinary practices intersect with computation. (Schreibman et al 2004)

One of the popular and most quoted definitions, however, is an early one that appeared in the Digital Humanities Manifesto 2.0 (Institute for the Future of the Book 2009). This describes DH as an array of convergent practices, and is also reproduced in the book Digital Humanities (Burdick et al 2012):

Digital Humanities refers to new modes of scholarship and institutional units for collaborative, transdisciplinary, and computationally engaged research, teaching, and publication. Digital Humanities is less a unified field than an array of convergent practices that explore a universe in which print is no longer the primary medium in which knowledge is produced and disseminated. (Ibid., 122)

The notion that DH is a “less a unified field than an array of convergent practices” seems to be the most useful way to describe the observations and more so the conditions that led to this mapping exercise, which also seeks to outline some kind of a trajectory of practices that converge at this contemporary moment to engender new meanings of and around the digital, rather than produce a conceptual history of the term in the Indian context or even imagine an extant field of some sort. This notion of a convergence, as stated in the last definition, although not apparent or expressed by anyone in India, seems to be the best possible way to describe the manner in which certain practices and a discourse has grown around the intersection of humanities and digital technologies in India. This rather organic growth of DH projects, practices and coursework in the absence of a meta-theory that would drive its epistemological concerns is an important conceptual question for the field itself, and a challenge for the study. Thus while the broader conversation around DH spans everything from instructional technology, new media and art practices, integrated science education to cultural analytics, the core concerns often remain the same, that of the intersection of previously separate domains of knowledge that are now coming together, and the crucial role played by the internet and digital technologies in bringing them together.

Further, three immediate experiences in engaging with digital technologies and questions of knowledge production in India shaped the intellectual concerns of this study. The first of these is the series of monographs produced as part of the ‘Histories of Internets in India’ project at the Researchers at Work (RAW) programme in CIS, during 2008-2011. A key point foregrounded in these monographs was the critical need to approach the internet, as a plural technology, available in and actualised through different forms, practices, and experiences. The second one was the collaborative project on the quality of access to higher education in undergraduate educational institutions at the Higher Education Innovation and Research Applications programme at the Centre for the Study of Culture and Society, Bangalore.The project was conducted in nine undergraduate institutions across three states in India, and included interaction with students and teachers through workshops and campus projects.The experience of working with students – who ranged from those who could barely use a computer to students proficient with the latest software, multimedia tools and internet applications – led to many insightful learnings about the teaching-learning environment, and prevalence of digital technologies and the internet in these spaces. The third one, of course, is the consultation on DH held in Bangalore, which provided an immediate set of questions and a network of people to begin the mapping with.

In this study, the fieldwork consisted of in-depth and semi-structured interviews with key people involved in the DH-like initiatives in India, and allied areas such as media, archives, art, and higher education. The sample size being small, the conversations were by no means exhaustive, but they were insightful in terms of the present nature of practice and the questions that they further pointed towards. The interviews were largely open-ended conversations focussing on, where possible, questions about DH: its emergence, theory, practice and pedagogy, but emphasising the notion of the ‘digital’ and is diverse perception and formulations. With respondents who were not from an academic space or not involved with DH directly, the questions were more related to the nature of changes that the digital has brought about in their practice, specifically the shifts in content and method. The crisis of disciplines and the move away from more traditional concerns of humanistic enquiry were also discussed. Issues of access, exclusivity and the move towards collaborative spaces of knowledge production and the democratic potential of the internet and digital technologies also came up quite prominently as points of discussion.

The fieldwork tried to cover not just a range of people from different disciplines and areas of practice, but also institutions: Prof. Amlan Dasgupta, Prof. Sukanta Chaudhuri and Purbasha Auddy, (School of Cultural Texts and Records and Dept. of English), Dr. Moinak Biswas and Dr. Madhuja Mukherjee (Media lab and Dept. of Film Studies); Dr. Abhijit Roy (School of Communication and Culture) at Jadavpur University, Kolkata; Dr. Souvik Mukherjee (Dept. of English) and Dr. Milinda Banerjee (Dept. of History) at Presidency University, Kolkata; Abhijit Bhattacharya (Media Archives) at Centre for the Studies in Social Sciences, Kolkata; Dr. Ravi Sundaram (the Sarai Programme) at Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, New Delhi; Dr. Indira Chowdhury and Dr. Padmini Ray-Murray (Centre for Public History) at Srishti School of Art, Design and Technology, Bangalore; Dr. C. S Lakshmi at the Sound and Picture Archives for Research on Women, Mumbai; Shaina Anand, Namita Malhotra, Lawrence Liang, Jan Gerber, Sebastian Lutgert and Ashish Rajadhyaksha, who have all worked with CAMP, Mumbai and are part of the team behind Indiancine.ma and Pad.ma; Vikram Vincent at the Indian Institute of Technology, Mumbai and S.V. Srinivas, Azim Premji University, who was previously associated with the Centre for the Study of Culture and Society. The individuals and institutions mentioned here have been engaged with these concerns within their respective fields of research and practice. Three institutions - Jadavpur University, Presidency University and the Centre for Public History – have actively adopted the term DH for some of the work they have been doing, whereas the remaining have been working with digital technologies as part of research, pedagogy, and practice. The report presents some part of these conversations and in doing so provides a snapshot of the operational context of the term ‘DH’ in India as well. The attempt was to understand the nature of existing and possible institutional investment in the term, as well as digital technologies (beyond tools, platforms and processes) and their stake in taking these questions further.

Notes

[1] This one-day event was organized by the Higher Education Innovation and Research Applications (HEIRA) programme at the Centre for the Study of Culture and Society, in collaboration with the Access to Knowledge (A2K) Programme at the Centre for Internet and Society, and other institutions. See: http://cis-india.org/digital-natives/digital-humanities-for-indian-higher-education.

[2] See: https://sctrdhci.wordpress.com/

[3] See: http://www.tezu.ernet.in/notices/ResearchMethodology.pdf.

[4] See: http://www.digitalindia.gov.in/.

[5] See: http://www.nmeict.ac.in/.

[6] See http://www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/Higher%20education/Legislative%20Brief%20-%20Higher%20Education%20and%20Research%20Bill.pdf.

[7] See: http://mhrd.gov.in/sites/upload_files/mhrd/files/document-reports/YPC-Report.pdf

[8] See: http://nptel.ac.in/

[9] See: http://gadgets.ndtv.com/tablets/news/government-for-providing-aakash-tablet-at-rs-1500-329578.

[10] See: http://www.ignou.ac.in/.

[11] See: http://www.inflibnet.ac.in/.

[12] See: http://nkn.in/.

[13] See: http://www.namami.org/.

[14] See: http://www.dli.ernet.in/.

[15] See: http://www.nationallibrary.gov.in/.

[16] See: http://www.southasiaarchive.com/.

[17] See: http://www.aaa.org.hk/.

References

Burdick, Anne, Johanna Drucker, Peter Lunefeld, Todd Presner, and Jeffrey Schnapp, Digital_Humanities, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2012, https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/digitalhumanities.

Digital Humanities Quarterly, "About DHQ," 2010, http://www.digitalhumanities.org/dhq/about/about.html

Gutting, Gary. "The Real Humanities Crisis," The New York Times, November 30, 2013, accessed July 14, 2015. http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/11/30/the-real-humanities-crisis/.

Institute for the Future of the Book, "The Digital Humanities Manifesto 2.0," 2009, http://manifesto.humanities.ucla.edu/2009/05/29/the-digital-humanities-manifesto-20/

Jay, Paul, and Gerald Duff, "The Fear of Being Useful," Inside Higher Ed. January 5. 2012. Accessed September 22, 2015. https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2012/01/05/essay-new-approach-defend-value-humanities.

Schreibman, Susan, Ray Siemens, and John Unsworth, "The Digital Humanities and Humanities Computing: An Introduction," A Companion to Digital Humanities, Oxford: Blackwell, 2004, http://www.digitalhumanities.org/companion/.

Snow, C.P. "The Two Cultures," Leonardo, Vol. 23, No. 2/3, New Foundations: Classroom Lessons in Art/Science/Technology for the 1990s. 1990. Pp. 169-173.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/digital-humanities-in-india

Crowdsourcing Incidents of Communication Privacy Violation in India

sumandro — 2015-10-16T10:49:17Z

In the context of several ongoing threads of debates and policy discussions, we are initiating this effort to crowdsource incidents of violation of digital/online/telephonic privacy of persons and organisations in India. The full list of submitted incidents is publicly shared, under Creative Commons Attributions-ShareAlike 4.0 International license. Please contribute and share with your friends and colleagues.

Report an incident: http://goo.gl/forms/8Xcf0zcWZW

Collected incidents: http://bit.ly/privacy-violation-india (CC BY-SA 4.0)

You are welcome to cross-post this to your website or other online forum. Please provide attribution, and link back to this page. For any clarification, write to Sumandro Chattapadhyay, Research Director, CIS, at sumandro[at]cis-india[dot]org.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/crowdsourcing-incidents-of-communication-privacy-violation-in-india

Internet Researchers' Conference (IRC) 2016 - Studying Internet in India: Call for Sessions (Extended to Nov 22)

sumandro — 2015-11-15T07:48:17Z

With great excitement, we are announcing the beginning of an annual conference series titled Internet Researchers' Conference (IRC), the first edition of which is to take place in Delhi during February 25-27, 2016 (yet to be confirmed). This first conference will focus on the theme of 'Studying Internet in India.' The word 'study' here is a shorthand for a range of tasks, from documentation and theory-building, to measurement and representation. We invite you to propose sessions for the conference by Sunday, November 22, 2015. Final sessions will be selected during December and announced by December 31, 2015. Below are the details about the conference series, as well instructions for proposing a session for the conference.

Call for Sessions document: Download (PDF)

Call for Sessions poster: Download (PNG)

Internet Researchers’ Conference

The last decades have seen a growing entanglement of our daily lives with the internet, not only as modes of communication but also as shared socio-politico-cultural spaces, and as objects of study. The emergence of new artifacts, conditions, and sites of power/knowledge with the prevalence of digital modes of communication, consumptions, production, distribution, and appropriation have expectedly attracted academic and non-academic explorers across disciplines, professions, and interests. Researchers across the domains of arts, humanities, and social sciences have attempted to understand life on the internet, or life after the internet, and the way digital technologies mediate various aspects of our being today. These attempts have in turn raised new questions around understanding of digital objects, online lives, and virtual networks, and have contributed to complicating disciplinary assumptions, methods, and boundaries.

The Researchers at Work (RAW) programme at the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) is very excited to invite you to take part in the first of a series of annual conferences for researchers (academic or otherwise) studying internet in India. These conferences will be called the Internet Researchers' Conference (IRC), with the abbreviation reminding us of an early protocol for text-based communication over internet. The first edition will be organised around the theme of ‘studying internet in India.’ The word study here is a shorthand for a range of tasks, from documentation and theory-building, to measurement and representation.

This conference series is founded on the following interests:

Creating discussion spaces for researchers studying internet in India and in other comparable regions.
Foregrounding the multiplicity, hierarchies, tensions, and urgencies of the digital sites and users in India.
Accounting for the various layers, conceptual and material, of experiences and usages of internet and networked digital media in India.
Exploring and practicing new modes of research and documentation necessitated by new (digital) forms of objects of power/knowledge.

Studying Internet in India

The inaugural conference will be held in Delhi (to be confirmed) on February 25-27, 2015. It will comprise of discussion and workshop sessions taking place during the first two days, and a writing sprint and a final round table taking place during the third day.

The conference will specifically focus on the following questions:

How do we conceptualise, as an intellectual and political task, the mediation and transformation of social, cultural, political, and economic processes, forces, and sites through internet and digital media technologies in contemporary India?
How do we frame and explore the experiences and usages of internet and digital media technologies in India within its specific historical-material contexts shaped by traditional hierarchies of knowledge, colonial systems of communication, post-independence initiatives in nation-wide technologies of governance, a rapidly growing telecommunication market, and informal circuits of media production and consumption, among others?
What tools and methods are made available by arts, humanities, social science, and technical disciplines to study internet in India; how and where do they fail to meet the purpose; what revisions and fresh tool building are becoming necessary; and how should the usage of such tools and methods be taught?
Given the global techno-economic contours of the internet, and the starkly hierarchical and segmented experiences and usages of the same in India, how do we begin to use the internet as a space for academic and creative practice and intervention?

Sessions

The conference will not be organised around papers but sessions. Each session will be one and half hour long. Potential participants may propose sessions that largely engage with one of the questions listed above.

Each proposed session must have at least two, and preferably three, co-leaders, who will drive the session, and prepare a session document after the conference. The proposed session can either involve a discussion, or a workshop.

In a discussion session, the co-leaders may present their works (not necessarily of the academic kind), or invite others to present their works, on a specific theme, which will be followed by a discussion, as structured by the co-leaders.

In a workshop session, the co-leaders will engage the participants to undertake individual or collaborative work in response to a series of questions, challenges, or provocations offered by the co-leaders at the beginning of the session. The proposed work may involve writing, searching, copying, building, etc., but not speaking.

Both the kinds of sessions are open to presentations and collaborations in the textual format or in other formats, including but not limited to code-based works and multimedia installations.

Writing Sprint

At the writing sprint, on the third day morning, all the participants will collaboratively put together the first draft of a handbook on tools and methods of studying Internet in India. It will be created as an online, open access, multilingual, and editable (wiki-like) book, and will be meant for extensive usage and augmentation by students, researchers, and others.

Final Round Table

This will take place after the lunch on the third day to wrap-up the conversations (and propose new initiatives, hopefully) emerging during the previous days of the conference, to make plans for follow-up works (including the first IRC Reader), and to speculate about the shape of the next year’s conference.

IRC Reader

The IRC Reader will be produced as documentation of the conversations and activities at the conference. The Reader, obviously, will have the same theme as the conference, and will largely comprise of the session documentation (not necessarily textual) prepared by the co-leaders of the session concerned. Once all the session documentation is shared by the co-leaders and is temporarily published online, all the participants will be invited to share their comments, which will all be part of the final Reader of the conference.

Proposing a Session

To propose a session, each team of two/three co-leaders will have to submit the following documents:

The name of the session: It should be created as a hashtag, as in #BlackLivesMatter, or #RefugeesWelcome.
A plan of the proposed session that should clarify its context, the key questions/challenges/provocations for the session, and how they connect to any one of the four questions listed above. Write no more than one page.
If it is a discussion session: Mention what will be presented at the session, and who will present it. Share the abstracts of the papers to be presented (if any). Each abstract should not be longer than 300 words.
If it is a workshop session: Mention what you expect the participants to do during the session, and how the co-leaders will support them through the work. Write no more than one page.
Three readings, or objects, or software that you expect the participants to know about before taking part in the session.
CVs of all the co-leaders of the session.

We understand that finding co-leaders for a session you have in mind might be difficult in certain cases. One possible way for you to find co-leaders is by sharing your session idea on the researchers@cis-india.org mailing list. Alternatively, you may keep an eye on the list to see what potential topics are being discussed. If you are facing any difficulty subscribing to the mailing list, please write to raw@cis-india.org.

All session proposals must be submitted by Sunday, November 22 (extended), 2015, via email sent to raw@cis-india.org.

Selection of Sessions

All proposed sessions, along with related documents, will be published online by November 30. All co-leaders of proposed sessions will be invited to vote for 8 sessions before December 15. The sessions with maximum votes will be selected for the conference, and the list of such sessions will be published on December 31, 2015.

Venue, Accommodation, and Travel

The conference is most likely to take place in Delhi on February 25-27, 2016. The place, dates, and venue will be confirmed by December 31, 2015.

The conference organiser(s) will cover all costs related to accommodation and hospitality during the conference.

Unfortunately, we are not sure if we will be able to pay for travel expenses of the participants. We will confirm this by December 31, 2015.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/irc16-call

Comments on the DoT Panel Report via MyGov

pranesh — 2015-09-26T10:16:44Z

On behalf of the Centre for Internet and Society, I must commend the Department of Telecom Panel on its report. Overall, it displays a far better understanding of the underlying issues than the TRAI consultation paper did, and is overall a good effort at balancing the different sides. However, some of its most important recommendations are completely off-mark and would be disastrous if accepted by the government.

It is praiseworthy that the panel emphasizes the separation in regulatory terms between the network layer and the service layer. This also means that telecom carriers should be regulated differently from OTT services.

Licensing of Communication OTT Services

The proposal by the DoT panel of a licensing regime for communication OTT services is a terrible idea. It would presumptively hold all licence non-holders to be unlawful, and that should not be the case; as the panel itself notes, apps that lower the cost of communication are a welcome development and should be encouraged by the government and not made presumptively unlawful.

While it is in India's national interest to want to hold VoIP services to account if they do not follow legitimate regulations, it is far better to do this through ex-post regulations rather than an ex-ante licensing scheme.

A licensing scheme would benefit Indian VoIP companies (including services like Hike, which Airtel has invested in) over foreign companies like Viber, or free/open source technologies like WebRTC. The Universal Licence is designed for a world where all the licencees have an operational presence in India. This is not true of communications OTT services. Therefore a licensing regime would unjustly favour some services over others.

Further, VoIP services need not be provided by a company: a person can choose to run XMPP, SIP, or Mumble — all of which are protocol that support VoIP — on their own computers. Will a licensing regime force such individuals' many of whom may not be Indian nationals — to become licence-holders if they facilitate domestic communications within India? The DoT panel report doesn't say. This would also result in a licensing regime unjustly favouring some services over others.

The report also doesn't say how one would distinguish between OTT communication services and OTT application services, when many apps such as personal assistance apps like HelpChat, are centred around communications. It also does not mention what regulatory distinction exists between text communication services and video/voice communication services, or between purely domestic and international video/voice communications. Stating that certain telecom companies are currently earning most of their revenue from domestic voice traffic will not suffice as a regulatory, just as it did not suffice to say that VSNL's international telephony monopoly earned it a lot of money. Regulatory fairness is the important issue and not protecting specific business models. Thus, there is no rational distinction to be drawn. Even if the panel has some regulatory distinction that it has not stated, this is an impossibility to enforce. Much domestic IP traffic is 'round-tripped', with traffic leaving India and coming back in. How would the regulator propose to regulate that?

Will there be a revenue-sharing mechanism, as is currently the case under the Unified Licence? If so, how will it be calculated in case of services like WhatsApp? These questions too find no answer in the report.

Given these numerous objections and unanswered questions, the government would be well-advised not seek to license OTT communications services. Instead, it would be useful for the government to hold public consultations about:

1. What Universal Licence conditions makes sense in the world of IP-based services, and international services?
2. How can we frame ex-post regulations that address legitimate concerns? Is there overlap with provisions of the IT Act such as s.69, s.69B, s.79, and others?
3. How can we ensure that the regulatory burden for telecom players with respect to their being able to provide IP-based services that are equivalent to OTT communication services?

Net neutrality

While the DoT panel reiterates a number of times that the core principles of Net neutrality should be adhered to, it nowhere defines what these core tenets are. We suggest the following definition:

net neutrality is the principle that we should regulate gatekeepers to ensure they do not use their power to unjustly discriminate between similarly situated persons, content or traffic.

The above definition applies to the way the ISPs treat consumers, treat interconnecting networks, as well as the way they treat traffic internally.
We agree with the panel that in that while Net neutrality should find place in a new law, for the time being Net neutrality principles can be enforced through the licence agreement between the DoT and telecom providers.

Traffic Management

It is unclear what precisely the DoT panel means by "application-agnostic" and "application-specific" network management. Different scholars on this issue — such as Barbara van Schewick and Christopher Yoo — mean different things when they use the word "application". Without a definition, it is difficult to say whether the panel's recommendation on that front are sound.
Instead, we suggest the following tests:
Discrimination between classes of traffic for the sake of network management should only be permissible if:

there is an intelligible differentia between the classes which are to be treated differently, and
there is a rational nexus between the differential treatment and the aim of such differentiation, and
the aim sought to be furthered is legitimate, and is related to the security, stability, or efficient functioning of the network, or is a technical limitation outside the control of the ISP, and
the network management practice is the least harmful manner in which to achieve the aim.

As for the provision of enterprise and managed services, which we more broadly term "specialized services", we would recommend:

Provision of specialized services is permitted if and only if it is shown that
The service is available to the user only upon request, and not without their active choice, and
The service cannot be reasonably provided with "best efforts" delivery guarantee that is available over the Internet, and hence requires discriminatory treatment, or
The discriminatory treatment does not unduly harm the provision of the rest of the Internet to other customers.

Lastly, we would recommend that the above regulatory guidlines only be applied against ISPs, and not against public providers of Internet connectivity, such as a library, a school, an airport, a hotel, etc.

Zero-rating

On the contentious issue of zero-rating, a process that involves both ex-ante and ex-post regulation is envisaged to prevent harmful zero-rating, while allowing beneficial zero-rating. Further, the report notes that the supposed altruistic or "public interest" motives of the zero-rating scheme do not matter if they result in harm to competition, distort consumer markets, violate the core tenets of Net neutrality, or unduly benefit an Internet "gatekeeper".

Much of the discussion around zero-rating has been happening around an assumption of common understanding of the phrase. Unfortunately, that is not true. There is no consensus as to whether a "special Facebok pack of 200MB for Rs.20" offered by a telecom company constitutes zero-rating or not. Without a working definition of zero-rating, not much progress can be made.

We propose the following as a definition:

Zero-rating is the practice of not counting (aka "zero-rating") certain traffic towards a subscriber's regular Internet usage.

The zero-rated traffic could be zero-priced or fixed-price; capped or uncapped; subscriber-paid, Internet service-paid, paid for by both, or unpaid; content- or source/destination-based, or agnostic to content or source/destination; automatically provided by the ISP or chosen by the customer.

We believe that zero-rating can be non-discriminatory in nature, and such zero-rating should not be prohibited. Having a system with both ex-ante and ex-post checks is rather heavy-handed regulation, but since the issue is very contentious in India, we believe it might be merited.

We thank you for giving us this opportunity to comment.
Pranesh Prakash, Policy Director at the Centre for Internet and Society

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/telecom/blog/comments-on-dot-panel-report-via-mygov

Open Letter to PM Modi on Intellectual Property Rights issues on His Visit to the United States of America in September, 2015

Pranesh Prakash and Nehaa Chaudhari — 2015-09-25T06:43:12Z

This is an open letter by CIS to the Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi in light of his impending visit to the USA. This letter asks the Prime Minister to urge the USA to ratify the Marrakesh Treaty; and asks that India not be a party to TPP negotiations, in light of recent reports on a study encouraging India to join the TPP.

Shri Narendra Damodardas Modi
Hon’ble Prime Minister of India
152, South Block, Raisina Hill
New Delhi-110011

22 September, 2015

Dear Sir,

We write on behalf of the Centre for Internet and Society, India [1], a Bangalore and New Delhi based not-for-profit organization engaging in research on among others, accessibility for persons with disabilities, intellectual property rights, openness and access to knowledge. Over the past fifteen months, we have welcomed and support certain initiatives of our government as being in line with some of our research interests, specifically, the "Make in India" and "Digital India" initiatives, and your vision of a digitally empowered India, as we have noted in an earlier open letter to you. [2]

This letter is in light of your visit to the United States of America (“USA”) this month, to articulate a two-fold request: first, that during the course of your visit you request the government of the USA to ratify the Marrakesh Treaty for visually impaired persons (“Marrakesh Treaty”); [3] and second, that the Indian government not enter into any negotiations around the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement (“the TPP”).

On the Marrakesh Treaty

According to figures by the World Blind Union, approximately 90% of all published material is not accessible to blind or print disabled people. [4] The severity of the ‘book famine’ experienced by the world’s estimated 300 million blind or otherwise print or visually disabled people (of which an estimated 63 million are in India) was highlighted by India in its Closing Statement at the Diplomatic Conference convened to conclude the Marrakesh Treaty. [5] India has historically been a strong advocate of the spirit of the Marrakesh Treaty, becoming the first country to ratify it in June, 2014. [6] Amendments in 2012 to India’s copyright law predated the signature to the Marrakesh Treaty. These amendments created disability and works neutral exceptions to our copyright law, well beyond the mandate of the Marrakesh Treaty.

The true realization of the promise of the Marrakesh Treaty however will remain a distant dream until the treaty comes into effect (three months) after 20 Member States have ratified it or acceded to it. [7] According to information available from the World Intellectual Property Organization [8], this number is currently only 9, and the USA is not one of the countries to have done so. The USA is home [9] to some of the largest publishers of both academic and other/leisure material including Penguin Random House, Harper Collins, John Wiley & Sons, the RELX Group, McGraw-Hill Education, Scholastic and Cengage Learning to name a few. It accounts for a large volume of the world’s book and other print material export. The active participation of the USA through the ratification of the Marrakesh treaty is critical if the treaty is to be truly effective.

During your visit, we urge you request the government of the United States of America to ratify the Marrakesh Treaty at the earliest. This will bring us one important step closer to eradicating the book famine.

On the TPP

We are concerned after reports [10] of a recent study authored by C Fred Bergsten that encourages India to join the TPP. On this front, we are in complete agreement with the reported statement of the Hon’ble Ambassador Shri Arun K. Singh, where he disagrees with some of the findings and analysis of this recent report. [11]

The TPP has come into severe criticism [12] over the years [13] from a vast multitude [14] of sources [15] (including a group of 30 law professors in 2012) [16] across the various countries that are a party to the negotiations. Among others and most relevant to us as an organization is the criticism around the secrecy of negotiations [17] as well as the content of the chapter on intellectual property in the TPP. It is our belief that eventually, India stands to lose as a result of the TPP [18] with its possible adverse impact on our economy. [19]

The rigid intellectual property protections (including criminal penalties for unintentional copying) [20] sought to be enforced through the TPP would benefit only US pharmaceutical and entertainment industries. [21] These provisions (among others) mandate the inclusion of TRIPS plus provisions in national laws, envisage possible extensions in term of protection on patents, restrict copyright exceptions and limitations, extend copyright protection terms and impose a higher liability on intermediaries; [22]all of which would be disastrous for an emerging economy such as India’s, which is a heavy user of intellectual property and not a heavy producer of the same.

Historically, India has been a supporter of a transparent, multilateral decision making process, a commitment to which was also reiterated recently by the Hon’ble Minister of State for Commerce and Industry, Smt. Nirmala Sitharaman. [23]India has also raised many of its concerns (on the secrecy of the negotiations as well as substantive provisions themselves) around the TPP and its close cousin, the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (“ACTA”) in 2011 [24] and 2012 [25] at the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) TRIPS Council and on the ACTA in 2010, also at the WTO Trips Council. [26]

In light of the above, we strongly urge the Indian government to not engage in negotiations on the TPP. At a minimum, we would request that any engagement in TPP negotiations be preceded by national consultations on the same, soliciting input from various stakeholders with diverging interests, including academia, civil society, industry associations, large Indian corporations, small and medium enterprises and multi- national corporations, rights holders associations and other interest groups.

We thank you for the opportunity to present these views to you. We do hope that you will consider these suggestions favourably, in the interests of India’s economic and social development. We welcome any opportunity to assist you with any queries you may have with regard to these submissions.

Thank you.

Yours truly

(For the Centre for Internet and Society, India)

Pranesh Prakash, Policy Director
Nehaa Chaudhari, Programme Officer

Copies to:

Smt. Smriti Zubin Irani, Minister for Human Resource Development, Government of India.
Prof. (Dr.) Ram Shankar Katheria, Minister of State for Human Resource Development (Higher Education), Government of India.
Smt. Nirmala Sitharaman, Minister of State for Commerce and Industry, Government of India.
Shri Vinay Sheel Oberoi, Secretary (Department of Higher Education), Ministry of Human Resources Development, Government of India, Government of India.
Shri Amitabh Kant, Secretary (Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion), Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India.

(Edit - 25 September, 2015) - The following people have reached out to us in support of this letter and have expressed a desire to have their signatures placed on record as support. We wish to acknowledge the same.

Prof. Dinesh Abrol - Convenor, National Working Group on Patent Laws and WTO
Dr. B. Ekbal - President, Democratic Alliance for Knowledge Freedom, Kerala
T.C. James - President, NIPO
Dr. Suman Sahai - Chairperson, Gene Campaign
Dr. Biswajit Dhar - Professor, Centre for Economic Studies and Planning, School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University

[1]See generally http://cis-india.org/ (last accessed 22 September, 2015).

[2]Rohini Lakshane, Open Letter to Prime Minister Modi, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/open-letter-to-prime-minister-modi (last accessed 22 September, 2015); Centre for Internet and Society/Rohini Lakshane, Digital India & Make in India : Form a patent pool of critical mobile technologies – CIS India, available at http://www.medianama.com/2015/03/223-digital-india-make-in-india-form-a-patent-pool-of-critical-mobile-technologies-cis-india/ (last accessed 22 September, 2015).

[3]The Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works by Visually Impaired Persons and Persons with Print Disabilities adopted on June 27, 2013. Treaty text and other official documentation available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/marrakesh/ (last accessed 22 September, 2015).

[4]World Blind Union, Marrakesh Treaty – Right to Read Campaign, available at http://www.worldblindunion.org/English/our-work/our-priorities/Pages/right-2-read-campaign.aspx (last accessed 22 September, 2015).

[5]Pranesh Prakash, India’s Closing Statement at Marrakesh on the Treaty for the Blind, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/india-closing-statement-marrakesh-treaty-for-the-blind (last accessed 22 September, 2015).

[6]Nehaa Chaudhari, India’s Ratification of the Marrakesh Treaty Celebrated; Accessible Books Consortium Launched, available at http://cis-india.org/accessibility/blog/indias-ratification-of-marrakesh-treaty-celebrated (last accessed 22 September, 2015).

[7]Article 18 of the Marrakesh Treaty.

[8]World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO Administered Treaties: Contracting Parties > Marrakesh VIP Treaty (Treaty not yet in force), available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=843 (last accessed 22 September, 2015).

[9]Publishers Weekly, The World’s 57 Largest Book Publishers, 2015, available at http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/international/international-book-news/article/67224-the-world-s-57-largest-book-publishers-2015.html (last accessed 22 September, 2015).

[10]S Rajagopalan, US Report Pushes India to Join the Trans-Pacific Partnership, available at http://www.dailypioneer.com/world/us-report-pushes-india-to-join-trans-pacific-partnership.html (last accessed 22 September, 2015); Indo-Asian News Service on NDTV, India Can Boost Exports by $500 Billion with Trade Liberalization: Study, available at http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/india-can-boost-exports-by-500-billion-with-trade-liberalization-study-1218887 (last accessed 22 September, 2015); Raghavendra M., India can boost exports by $500 billion with trade liberalization: study, available at http://www.americanbazaaronline.com/2015/09/18/india-can-boost-exports-by-500-billion-with-trade-liberalization-study/ (last accessed 22 September, 2015); Press Trust of India in the Business Standard, India can boost exports by USD 500 bn by joining the TPP: report, available at http://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/india-can-boost-exports-by-usd-500-bn-by-joining-tpp-report-115091701149_1.html (last accessed 22 September, 2015); Seema Sirohi, India must expand its trade before it gets left behind in the race, available at http://blogs.economictimes.indiatimes.com/letterfromwashington/india-must-expand-its-trade-before-it-gets-left-behind-in-the-race/ (last accessed 22 September, 2015).

[11]S Rajagopalan, US Report Pushes India to Join the Trans-Pacific Partnership, available at http://www.dailypioneer.com/world/us-report-pushes-india-to-join-trans-pacific-partnership.html (last accessed 22 September, 2015)

[12]Natasha Lennard, Noam Chomsky: Trans-Pacific Partnership is a “neoliberal assault”, available at http://www.salon.com/2014/01/13/chomsky_tpp_is_a_neoliberal_assault/ (last accessed 22 September, 2015); Zach Carter and Ryan Grim, Noam Chomsky: Obama Trade Deal a ‘Neoliberal Assault’ to ‘Further Corporate Domination’, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/13/noam-chomsky-obama-trans-pacific-partnership_n_4577495.html?ir=India&adsSiteOverride=in (last accessed 22 September, 2015); Sean Flynn;, Margot E Kaminski, Brook K Baker and Jimmy H Koo., "Public Interest Analysis of the US TPP Proposal for an IP Chapter" (2011). PIJIP Research Paper Series. Paper 21. http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/research/21 (last accessed 22 September, 2015).

[13]BBC News, TPP: What is it and why does it matter?, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/business-21782080 (last accessed 22 September, 2015);

[14]For a compilation on writing on the TPP see James Love, Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP also known as the TPPA), available at http://keionline.org/tpp (last accessed 22 September, 2015); see also American University Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property, Trans-Pacific Partnership, available at http://infojustice.org/tpp (last accessed 22 September, 2015).

[15]Zach Carter, Alan Grayson on Trans-Pacific Partnership: Obama Secrecy Hides ‘Assault on Democratic Government’, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/18/alan-grayson-trans-pacific-partnership_n_3456167.html?ir=India&adsSiteOverride=in (last accessed 22 September, 2015); James Love, KEI analysis of Wikileaks leak of TPP IPR text, from August 30, 2013, available at http://keionline.org/node/1825 (last accessed 22 September, 2015); Ian Verrender, The TPP has the potential for real harm, available at http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-03-16/verrender-the-tpp-has-the-potential-for-real-harm/6321538 (last accessed 22 September, 2015).

[16]Sean Flynn, Law Professors Call for Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Transparency, available at http://infojustice.org/archives/21137 (last accessed 22 September, 2015).

[17]Sachie Mizohata, "The Trans-Pacific Partnership and Its Critics: An introduction and a petition," The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 11, Issue 36, No. 3, available at http://japanfocus.org/-Sachie-MIZOHATA/3996/article.html (last accessed 22 September, 2015).

[18]Vijay Rajamohan, Trans-Pacific Partnership – Should India Join this Mega Trade Deal?, available at http://swarajyamag.com/world/trans-pacific-partnership-should-india-join-this-mega-trade-deal/ (last accessed 22 September, 2015).

[19]Sylvia Mishra, How will the Trans-Pacific Partnership affect India?, available at http://www.observerindia.com/cms/sites/orfonline/modules/analysis/AnalysisDetail.html?cmaid=85684&mmacmaid=85685 (last accessed 22 September, 2015).

[20]Gabrielle Chan, Trans-Pacific Partnership: a guide to the most contentious issues, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/10/trans-pacific-partnership-a-guide-to-the-most-contentious-issues (last accessed 22 September, 2015).

[21]James Love, New leak of TPP consolidated text on intellectual property provides details of pandering to drug companies and publishers, available at http://www.keionline.org/node/2108 (last accessed 22 September, 2015); Vijay Rajamohan, Trans-Pacific Partnership – Should India Join this Mega Trade Deal?, available at http://swarajyamag.com/world/trans-pacific-partnership-should-india-join-this-mega-trade-deal/ (last accessed 22 September, 2015) referencing Paul Krugman.

[22]William New, Leaked TPP Draft Reveals Extreme Rights Holder Position Of US, Japan, Outraged Observers Say, available at http://www.ip-watch.org/2014/10/17/leaked-tpp-draft-reveals-extreme-rights-holder-position-of-us-japan-outraged-observers-say/ (last accessed 22 September, 2015).

[23]Lalit K Jha, India not being left out of global trade pacts: Minister, available at http://www.thestatesman.com/news/business/india-not-being-left-out-of-global-trade-pacts-minister/91679.html (last accessed 22 September, 2015).

[24]Thirukumaran Balasubramaniam, WTO TRIPS Council: India raises concerns on ACTA and TPPA on discussion of “Trends in the Enforcement of IPRs”, available at https://donttradeourlivesaway.wordpress.com/2011/10/29/wto-trips-council-india-raises-concerns-on-acta-and-tppa-on-discussion-of-trends-in-the-enforcement-of-iprs/ (last accessed 22 September, 2015).

[25]Thirukumaran Balasubramaniam, 28 Feb 2012: Intervention delivered by India at WTO TRIPS Council on IP Enforcement Trends noting concerns with ACTA and TPPA, available at http://keionline.org/node/1376 (last accessed 22 September, 2015).

[26]Kanaga Raja, ACTA comes in for criticism at the TRIPS council, available at http://www.twn.my/title2/wto.info/2010/twninfo100606.htm (last accessed 22 September, 2015).

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/open-letter-on-intellectual-property-rights-issues-during-your-visit-to-the-united-states-of-america-in-september-2015

International Open Data Charter: Comments by CIS

sumandro — 2015-09-08T11:01:01Z

The second meeting of Stewards of the International Open Data Charter is in progress in Santiago, Chile, where the revisions made to the Charter based on the comments received during the public consultation period that ended on July 31, 2015, are being re-discussed and finalised by the Stewards. Here we are sharing the comments submitted by us on the first public draft of the Charter published during the International Open Data Conference in Ottawa, Canada, in May 2015. The comments include those submitted by Sumandro and Sharath Chandra Ram.

The draft International Open Data Charter and all the submitted comments can be accessed here: http://opendatacharter.net/charter/

Comments on the Public Draft

Note: The text below contains excerpts from the public draft of the Charter, followed by submitted comments in bold.

1) The world is witnessing the growth of a global movement facilitated by technology and digital media and fuelled by information – one that contains enormous potential to create more accountable, efficient, responsive, and effective governments and businesses, and to spur economic growth.

The word ‘movement’ can perhaps be replaced by ‘transformation.’ ‘Movement’ tends to suggest some kind of unity of purpose or objective, which is not perhaps what is meant here. Also, is it possible to add ‘transparent’ to ‘accountable, efficient, responsive, and effective’?

Open data sit at the heart of this global movement.

Perhaps ‘transformation’ and not ‘movement’.

2) Building a more democratic, just, and prosperous society requires transparent, accountable governments that engage regularly and meaningfully with citizens. Accordingly, there is an ongoing effort to enable collaboration around key social challenges, to provide effective oversight of government activities, to support economic development through innovation, and to develop effective, efficient public policies and programmes.

Perhaps insert ‘sustainable’ before ‘economic development’. In the second sentence, none of the action phrases (‘enable collaboration’ and ‘effective oversight’ and ‘innovation’ and ‘develop effective, efficient’) are speaking about either democracy or justice. The focus seems to be completely on effectiveness. Phrases like ‘transparent’, ‘accountable’, and ‘participatory’ should be introduced here.

Open data is essential to meeting these challenges.

The above point clarifies why ‘data is essential’ but not why ‘open data is essential’. The connection between democracy and justice on one hand, and open data on the other is not yet articulated clearly.

3) Effective access to data allows individuals and organisations to develop new insights and innovations that can generate social and economic benefits to improve the lives of people around the world, and help to improve the flow of information within and between countries. While governments collect a wide range of data, they do not always share these data in ways that are easily discoverable, useable, or understandable by the public.

Along with allowing ‘insights’ and ‘innovations’ to develop, can it also be highlighted that open data make decisions and processes transparent?

This is a missed opportunity.

I agree with above comments that it is perhaps better to articulate this not as ‘missed opportunity’ but to highlight this as the very ‘opportunity’ that the open data agenda is interested in capturing.

4) Today, many people expect to be able to access high quality information and services, including government data, when and how they want. Others see the opportunity presented by government data as one which can provide innovative policy solutions and support economic and social benefits for all members of society. We have arrived at a point at which people can use open data to generate value, insights, ideas, and services to create a better world for all.

This point may also mention that some people are interested in using government data to open up government decisions and processes and make them transparent, which is a necessary condition for making the government accountable.

6) Providing access to government data can drive sustainable and inclusive growth by empowering citizens, the media, civil society, and the private sector to identify gaps, and work toward better outcomes for public services in areas such as health, education, public safety, environmental protection, and governance. Open data can do this by:

Perhaps ‘democratic participation’ can be added after ‘sustainable and inclusive growth’. That is: ‘Providing access to government data can drive sustainable and inclusive growth, and democratic participation, by empowering citizens…’

7) Open government data can be used in innovative ways to create useful tools and products that help to navigate modern life more easily. Used in this way, open data are a catalyst for innovation in the private sector, supporting the creation of new markets, businesses, and jobs. These benefits can multiply as more private sector and civil society organisations adopt open data practices modelled by government and share their own data with the public.

The incentive for private sector and CSOs to open up data is not clear. Overall benefit may rise with them opening up data, but how does a private company / CSO benefit by opening up its data?

8) We, the adherents to the International Open Data Charter, agree that open data are an under-used resource with huge potential to encourage the building of stronger, more interconnected societies that better meet the needs of our citizens and allow innovation and prosperity to flourish.

Along with ‘stronger’ and ‘more interconnected’, please mention ‘more transparent’ and ‘more democratic’. Also it is not clear what is meant by ‘stronger’. ‘[B]etter meet the needs of our citizens’ does not necessarily suggest a more democratic or just society, but a more effective welfare distribution system. Please add ‘… and empower the citizens to ensure accountability of the government.’

9) We therefore agree to follow a set of principles that will be the foundation for access to, and the release and use of, open government data. These principles are:

Open Data by Default;
Quality and Quantity;
Accessible and Useable by All;
Engagement and Empowerment of Citizens;
Collaboration for Development and Innovation

Does it makes sense to remove the ‘Quantity and Quality’ point and merging it with ‘Accessible and Usable by All’? Data quantity and quality issues, along with those related to publication of data, can all logically follow under the topic of data access and use. For example, highly aggregated data published once a year without documentation is not really usable data.

10) We will develop an action plan in support of the implementation of the Charter and its Technical Annexes, and will update and renew the action plan at a minimum of every two years. We agree to commit the necessary resources to work within our political and legal frameworks to implement these principles in accordance with the technical best practices and timeframes set out in our action plan.

We (at CIS) strongly feel that the Charter should also prescribe that along with the national Action Plan, Open Data Citizen’s Charters are created for various levels and verticals of the government. This will clarify data publication responsibilities and targets at ministerial and sub-national (including city) governmental levels, and will allow for much more effective monitoring (national and international) of the Action Plan implementation process.

‘[A]t a minimum of every two years’ reads a bit unclear. Does it mean that the Action Plan should be renewed only after two years and not before, or that the Action Plan should be renewed every two years or before that?

11) We recognise that free access to, and the subsequent use of, government data are of significant value to society and the economy, and that government data should, therefore, be open by default.

Along with clarifying the scope of ‘government data,’ the idea of ‘open’ in the context of data needs a clear definition as an independent point. The document is getting into ‘open by default’ without clarifying what is ‘open’, including both necessary and sufficient conditions.

12) We acknowledge the need to promote the global development and adoption of tools and policies for the creation, use, and exchange of open data and information.

I agree with Mike Linksvayer. This is a great opportunity for the Charter to connect the open data agenda with the wider open agendas, especially that of free and open source softwares. It is very important that this point promotes ‘global development of free and open source tools’.

Extending the comment by Jose Subero, along with ‘tools’ and ‘policies’, it will be great to have a mention of ‘standards’ here, which is critical for ensuring ‘interoperability’ and thus ‘harmonisation’.

13) We recognise that the term ‘government data’ is meant in the widest sense possible. This could apply to data held by national, federal, and local governments, international government bodies, and other types of institutions in the wider public sector. This could also apply to data created for governments by external organisations, and data of significant benefit to the public which is held by external organisations and related to government programmes and services (e.g. data on extractives entities, data on transportation infrastructure, etc).

It is wonderful that the point promotes a wide understanding of ‘government data’ but at the same time it should also define a necessary core understanding of data, just to ensure that governments do not interpret this point too narrowly.

Further, a focus only on data created by public agencies can perhaps be too narrow (for the necessary/core understanding of ‘government data’). With public services delivered increasingly by private agencies and public-private-partnerships, it is crucial that ‘government data’ should explicitly include any data coming out of a process funded by public money (the process may be carried out by a public agency or not). This is an extremely important point from a developing country perspective.

14) We recognise that there is domestic and international legislation, in particular pertaining to security, privacy, confidentiality, intellectual property, and personally-identifiable and other sensitive information, which must be observed and/or updated where necessary.

From a developing country perspective, it is very important that the Charter does not keep this critical point dependent on domestic and international legislations. International legislation may not be very developed for all of the mentioned topics, and many countries may not have existing domestic legislations on these topics either. The Charter should mention an internationally acceptable list of concerns / criteria for not opening up data. The list may include the topics mentioned here, like privacy and national security. This need not be a list of sufficient criteria, but of necessary ones.

15) We will:

develop and adopt policies and practices to ensure that all government data is made open by default, as outlined in this Charter, while recognising that there are legitimate reasons why some data cannot be released;

'Administrative reforms’ are most often crucial to make government data ‘open by default, and the same should be mentioned along with ‘policies’ and ‘practices’.

provide clear justifications as to why certain data cannot be released;

This is a great point. Perhaps it can be added that all government agencies should produce a list of all data assets maintained by them, point out the ones that cannot be made open, and provide clear justification as to why those cannot be released. This comment pre-empts 19.1. Perhaps this point about providing justification for not releasing data can be merged with 19.1.

develop the leadership, management, oversight, and internal communication policies necessary to enable this transition to a culture of openness.

Along with ‘leadership, management, oversight, and internal communication’, is it possible to add ‘incentives’? This is often overlooked in implementing open data policies.

16) We recognise that governments and other public sector organisations hold vast amounts of information that may be of interest to citizens, and that it may take time to identify data for release or publication.

17) We also recognise the importance of consulting with citizens, other governments, non-governmental organisations, and other open data users, to identify which data to prioritise for release and/or improvement.

18) We agree, however, that governments’ primary responsibility should be to release data in a timely manner, without undue delay.

Points 16-18 seem to suggest that the ‘quantity and quality’ issue is mostly one of prioritisation. This can be misleading. This is perhaps the ‘quantity’ issue, but not at all the ‘quality’ issue.

19) We will:

...
release high-quality open data that are timely, comprehensive, and accurate in accordance with prioritisation that is informed by public requests. To the extent possible, data will be released in their original, unmodified form and at the finest level of granularity available, and will also be linked to any visualisations or analyses created based on the data, as well as any relevant guidance or documentation;

Please add ‘human- and machine-readable’ along with ‘timely, comprehensive, and accurate’.

Put ‘, and’ between ‘, and accurate’ and ‘in accordance’.

‘Relevant guidance or documentation’ should be mentioned before, and not after, ‘visualisations or analyses’.

ensure that accompanying documentation is written in clear, plain language, so that it can be easily understood by all;

Add that the documentation should be ‘comprehensive’, along with being written in plain language.

make sure that data are fully described, and that data users have sufficient information to understand their source, strengths, weaknesses, and any analytical limitations;

Regarding ‘Full description of data’ — Aggregate data must be accompanied by low level raw data along with details of analytical methods used to arrive at figures. This allows for verification as well as alternate views and detection of statistical anomalies.

ensure that open datasets include consistent core metadata, and are made available in human- and machine-readable formats under an open and unrestrictive licence;

Is this the necessary definition of ‘open data’? If so, it should be much higher up.

allow users to provide feedback, and continue to make revisions to ensure the quality of the data is improved as needed; and

This point should clarify if it is talking about making revisions of the data itself (its content), or how it is being published (its form), or both?

apply consistent information lifecycle management practices, and ensure historical copies of datasets are preserved, archived, and kept accessible as long as they retain value.

The ‘as long as they retain value’ part seems vague. Who is going to take this decision about value? Is it possible to rephrase this as ‘as long as they are demanded by data users’?

21) We recognise that open data should be made available free of charge in order to encourage their widest possible use.

Maybe ‘government data’ and not ‘open data’ (open data already means it is available gratis). Also, along with ‘free of charge’ maybe add ‘under open license’, as that is a critical requirement for ‘widest possible use.’

22) We recognise that when open data are released, they should be made available without bureaucratic or administrative barriers, such as mandatory user registration, which can deter people from accessing the data.

I strongly believe that this point should be removed. Registration of the data user can also be very useful for the government agencies to track demand and actual usage of their datasets. Instead of the government agencies doing such kind of tracking as a background process, it is much better if the data usage monitoring of all users is done transparently. Along with perhaps a public dashboard of data usages of the users of an open data portal. As long as the registration barrier does not involve an approval process by the government agency, it can be allowed.

A more general point should be added as part of this principle, regarding no-discrimination (or approval process) among data users interested in accessing and using of open government data.

23) We will:

release data in open formats and free of charge to ensure that the data are available to the widest range of users to find, access, and use them. In many cases, this will include providing data in multiple formats, so that they can be processed by computers and used by people; and

Please add ‘open license’ along with ‘open formats’ and ‘free of charge’.

24) We recognise that the release of open data strengthens our public and democratic institutions, encourages better development, implementation, and assessment of policies to meet the needs of our citizens, and enables more meaningful, better informed engagement between governments and citizens.

Perhaps add ‘, and makes them transparent’ after ‘strengthens our public and democratic institutions’. Please also add ‘monitoring’ along with ‘development, implementation, and assessment’.

25) We will:

implement oversight and review processes to report regularly on the progress and impact of our open data initiatives;

The functioning of these ‘oversight and review processes’ must be open and transparent themselves. The reporting should be public.

engage with community and civil society representatives working in the domain of transparency and accountability to determine what data they need to effectively hold governments to account; encourage the use of open data to develop innovative, evidence-based policy solutions that benefit all members of society, as well as empower marginalised groups; and

This must also include a point regarding the government proactively seeking data demands from citizens, CSOs, academics, and the private sector.

‘as well as empower marginalised groups’ is too vague. Perhaps it can be made into a separate point, and qualified with what kinds of empowerment is needed – from demanding data, to accessing and using data, to be aware of the data collected from such groups by the government agencies.

be transparent about our own data collection, standards, and publishing processes, by documenting all of these related processes online.

This should be part of point 19.

26) We recognise the importance of diversity in stimulating creativity and innovation. The more citizens, governments, civil society, and the private sector use open data, the greater the social and economic benefits that will be generated. This is true for government, commercial, and non-commercial uses.

The diversity point is almost already made with points 20-21 – widest possible users lead to widest possible use.

28) We will:

...
engage with civil society, the private sector, and academic representatives to determine what data they need to generate social and economic value;

This is also covered under the Principle 3.

provide training programs, tools, and guidelines designed to ensure government employees are capable of using open data effectively in policy development processes;

This should be part of Principle 1.

encourage non-governmental organisations to open up data created and collected by them in order to move toward a richer open data ecosystem with multiple sources of open data;

I agree with ABS. Why not ‘non-governmental organisations and the private sector’?

Also the document shifts back and forth between ‘civil society organisations’ and ‘non-governmental organisations’. If both mean the same in this document, then it should use only one.

General Comments on the Charter

1. Why not merge the Principle 4 and 5 so as to describe an overall situation of engagement and collaboration. The ends can be commercial acts or towards democratic practices, but the existing principles do not make much a difference between the two types of acts.

2. Further, can a new principle be added at the end that would address the implementation process of the Action Plan? Specifically, it should clarify how the implementation itself be an open process, with not only the Action Plan but annual reports regarding the status of implementation. This principle may connect to the work being done by the Implementation WG.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/international-open-data-charter-comments-by-cis

Workshop on Open Data for Human Development - Sessions Report

sumandro — 2015-08-28T08:16:09Z

CIS facilitated a workshop on open data policy and tools for government officials from Sikkim, Meghalaya, and Tripura, and those from Bhutan and Maldives, in June 2015. The workshop was co-facilitated with Akvo, DataMeet, and Mapbox, and was supported by International Centre for Human Development of UNDP India. Here we share the workshop report and other related documents. The report is written by Sumandro, along with Amitangshu Acharya of Akvo.

Day 01, June 03, 2015

The first day of the workshop began with Mr. Prem Das Rai, Honourable MP, Loksabha, Sikkim, briefly addressing the participants. He contextualised the workshop against the background of technological changes and emerging opportunities of governance through effective usages of data. Dr. A.K. Shiva Kumar, Director of the International Centre for Human Development (IC4HD), UNDP India, welcomed the participants and initiated a panel discussion on data, ICTs and governance. The panel had three speakers: Mr. Srivatsa Krishna, IAS and Secretary, Department of Information Technology, Biotechnology, and Science and Technology, Government of Karnataka; Dr. B. Gangaiah, Additional Director General, Centre for Good Governance, Hyderabad; and Sunil Abraham, Executive Director, the Centre for Internet and Society, Bengaluru and Delhi.

Mr. Krishna spoke about the strategies adopted in setting up IT and ITES clusters in Cyberabad, Andhra Pradesh and in Bengaluru, Karnataka. He noted that tax cuts and accelerated land allocation are key to incentivising the private sector to set up IT and ITES units. Another major concern is that of ensuring supply of good quality IT workers. He also emphasised on the need for governments to build effective public facing electronic services - either in the form of Nemmadi Kendras, where people can physically go to access various government services, or in the form of mobile applications that bring different civic services into one digital interface, like Bangalore One and Karnataka Mobile One.

Dr. Gangaiah gave an extensive overview of the idea and applications of open data in the contexts of governance and development. He noted that government data (in India) often suffers from criticisms related to quality, as well as the lack of availability of the same in public domain. The key problems, he identified, for opening up government data in India are that most often the data is collected by a government agency for a very specific purpose, and the steps required to ensure wider circulation and use of the same is not taken (such as lack of documentation and interoperability of data); and that the government agencies most often consider the collected data as a source of power, and hence as something to be retained and not disclosed in full details. The slides from Dr. Gangaiah’s presentation can be accessed here.

Mr. Abraham’s presentation highlighted several areas of concern when deploying data-driven techniques and solutions for human development challenges. He described how the current phase of open data discussions by central and state governments in India represent the third phase of ‘openness’ in governance in India. While the first phase focused on usage of Free/Libre Open Source Softwares in building electronic governance applications and information systems, the second phase involved embracing of open software standards and formats across government information systems and IT solutions. It is very important to note that with the third phase of openness focusing on opening up of data and information, both of these earlier foci of free and open source softwares, and open standards and interoperability are returning as complementary components to ensure seamless publication of open government data. However, he argued, when deploying data-driven techniques and solutions for human development challenges, it is imperative to remember three things: 1) collection of data is a time- and effort-consuming task, and hence must be optimised so as to not to take away time and effort from actual developmental interventions, 2) bad quality of development data is a structural problem, often emanating from the data being not useful to the person actually collecting it, and 3) availability of data does not automatically change or open up the process of decision-making.

The second session of the day started with a detailed presentation by Mr. T. Samdup, Joint Director, Department of Information Technology, Government of Sikkim, on the context, the making, and the salient features of the Sikkim Open Data Acquisition and Accessibility Policy (SODAAP), 2014. He explained that the Policy mandates setting up of an online state data portal that will host all data sets generated by various agencies of the Government of Sikkim, and making such data available, subject to concerns of privacy and security, across all state government agencies and the citizens in general. The key needs driving this Policy have been that for availability of accurate and timely data on various aspects of human development in the state, as well as for reducing expenses and confusions due to duplication of data collection efforts. The slides from Mr. Samdup’s presentation can be accessed here.

The presentation by Mr. Samdup was followed by one by Mr. Sumandro Chattapadhyay of the Centre for Internet and Society on an initial set of questions and concerns that should be addressed by the implementation plan of the SODAAP. He took a detailed look at the four objectives mentioned in the Policy document, and discussed what tasks, decisions, and deliberations are needed to achieve each of those. In conclusion, he listed a set of core components of the implementation process that must also be discussed in the implementation plan document, namely: 1) governance and oversight structure for implementation, 2) incentivising government personnel for opening up data across departments, including financial support for the same, 3) metadata, documentation of data collection process, and implementing unique identifiers, and 4) developing processes of sharing of data between the Union and the state government, especially in reference to national Management Information Systems. The slides from Mr. Chattapadhyay’s presentation can be accessed here.

These presentations were followed by a general discussion on various aspects of the SODAAP and the challenges to be overcome during its implementation. This session provided a general introduction to the SODAAP, especially for workshop participants who are not from Sikkim, and also set up the key questions to be discussed and answered while preparing the first draft of the SODAAP implementation plan.

After the second session ended, the participants were asked to individually write down the key challenges they identify for the implementation process of SODAAP. These responses were compiled by Sumandro and made available as a reference document for the implementation plan. The chart below summarises these responses.

In the third session of the day, Joy Ghosh and Amitangshu Acharya of Akvo talked about the challenges of collecting structured born-digital data from the grassroots level, and how using mobile-based applications, like Akvo FLOW, can address such challenges. Akvo FLOW runs on all Android-based smartphones, and allows ground level development workers to directly feed data into the phone, as well as collect related materials like GPS location and photographs, based upon a form that is centrally designed and downloaded into their phones by the development workers. The data is then kept in the phone till it is sent back to the main server, where data coming from all different surveyors using the same form is shown on a map-based interface for easy navigation of the data across space and time. In this session, Mr. Acharya first introduced the participants to the issues around digital data collection, touching upon issues of ethics, capacity, prioritisation of data collection process along with tools. Mr. Ghosh then took over to describe the functioning of the tool, and then distributed several smartphones, pre-loaded with Akvo FLOW, among the participants for an applied data collection exercise where the participants walked around the NIAS campus and collected data using the FLOW interface. They returned to see their data mapped and analysed on the online dashboard. Their presentation can be accessed here.

Day 02, June 04, 2015

The second day started with two consecutive presentations by Mr. Thejesh GN of DataMeet, and Mr. Sivaram Ramachandran of Mapbox on the tools and techniques for working with statistical data and with geospatial data, respectively. The former presentation took the participants through the stages of working with statistical data: from collecting and finding data, to cleaning and validating, and finally analysing the data. Various free and open source tools for each of these stages were also discussed in brief, such as PDF Tables and Tabula for converting PDF tables to spreadsheets, Open Refine for cleaning data, and RAW and DataWrapper for generating web-based dynamic charts. The latter presentation explored the various ways in which geospatial data can be used to inform and support decision-making, and the tools that can be used to render and present geospatial data in forms that are accessible for decision-makers within government and also for individual users. Mr. Ramachandran presented the various free and open source tools available for working with geospatial data, such as Mapbox Studio, Quantum GIS, and Leaflet JS. He also gave a brief introduction to OpenStreetMap, the wiki-like user-contributed global map data platform. Both the presentations can be accessed here and here, respectively. After this session, the participants were divided into two groups. One group engaged further with tools and techniques of working with statistical and geospatial data. The second group took part in a series of exercises to identify and document the current data flows and bottlenecks thereof across several key departments of Government of Sikkim.

The group engaging in applications of various software tools for working with statistical and geospatial data was facilitated by Mr. Thejesh and Mr. Ramachandran. This group worked with a sample statistical data set, taking it across the stages of finding, cleaning, analysing, and visualising as discussed earlier. The participants used the online version of Tableau to create dynamic charts. Afterwards, they were introduced to various methods of contributing and downloading data from the OpenStreetMap, including directly adding data points through the online editor named iD. The participants went out in the NIAS campus to collect geospatial data about various natural and human-made features of the campus, such as trees, pathways, etc.

The second group working on documenting data flows and identifying bottlenecks was facilitated by Mr. Chattapadhyay, Mr. Acharya, and Ms. Rajashi Mukherjee from Akvo. The group was further divided into department-wise teams, one each for the Department of Health, the Department of Economic Statistics, Monitoring, and Evaluation (DESME), the Human Resource Development Department (HRDD), and representatives from Gram Panchayat Units. The exercise began with each of the teams discussing and drawing the flow of data for one of the major data set maintained by the agency concerned. The data flows were drawn by identifying key moments of its processing (such as primary collection, verification, digitisation, analysis, storage, reporting, etc.), the actors involved in that moment, the tools and data formats relevant for each moment, and which agency finally stores and uses the data. Once these processes were described on paper, the next part of the exercise focused on identifying which challenges exist at which part of these data flows. This was followed up by a ranking of all these challenges, in terms of how critically they affect the ability of the agency concerned to use and share the final data. All the teams worked separately, and conversed with the facilitators as needed, to develop the data flow diagrams and identify the key challenges.

The major common challenges noted by these teams were: 1) delays in collection, verification, and digitisation of data, 2) inability of state government agencies to access data collected as part of centrally-funded welfare schemes, and 3) parallel systems of data collection employed by different departments leading to duplication of efforts and data.

Several interesting insights came through in this exercise. For example, data related to education is collected both by the HRDD, and the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyaan (SSA). However, SSA data is not shared with the HRDD. Also, the HRDD publishes all its data, including the name of students, on their website, making it publicly available. One of the data challenges identified by the HRDD was their difficulty in tracking if scholarship money is reaching the suitable students. When a student moves from one school to another, the records do not get updated easily. This leads to different schools continuing to receive funds for the same scholarship. Aligning school records is important to prevent such leakages.

After these two grouped exercises, all the participants gathered back so that the data flows diagrams and identification of key challenges documented by departmental teams could be presented to the entire group. Each team presented their data flow diagram, and discussed challenges and opportunities. This created a context for different departments to discuss what kind of data they often needed from each other, and how there was neither a platform for inter-departmental discussion on such issues, nor systems that facilitate the same. There was an agreement that an open data platform could address this issue to a great extent. The discussion also highlighted that the most significant data collecting government agency in Sikkim is DESME, however, it does not publish any data in machine-readable formats, and does not even have a website.

This data flow and bottleneck exercise made it very clear that there are several data production and collection processes in place in Sikkim, and also systems that are digesting, processing, and reporting data. Hence, implementing the open data policy will need to negotiate with such complexity.

In the final session of the day, Dr. Shiban Ganju made a presentation on applications of open data in healthcare. His talk focused on how converting medical information about a patient being stored at various locations to a combined and shareable Electronic Health Record can save the patient as well as the medical practitioners from duplication of medical tests, easier mobility from one medical institute to another, and a clearer macro-level understanding of key public health indicators. Dr. Ganju discussed the open health data initiatives in the United States, in the United Kingdom, and in Sweden, before discussing the challenges faced in implementing interoperable standards for open health data in India. The slides from Dr. Ganju’s presentation can be accessed here.

Day 03, June 05, 2015

The final day started with a set of presentations from Mr. Garab Dorji, Deputy Chief IT Officer, Office of the Prime Minister, Thimphu, Bhutan of the Government of Bhutan, Mr. Birendra Tiwari, Senior Informatic Officer, Department of Information Technology, Government of Meghalaya, and Mr. Milan Chhetri of Melli Dara Paiyong Gram Panchayat Unit, Sikkim, on various technological solutions being explored, implemented, and practiced by the respective governments and administrative units.

Mr. Milan Chhetri’s presentation was on the operationalisation of Cyber Villages in Sikkim, which had been initiated in 2013 with support from the Honourable Chief Minister of Sikkim, Pawan Kumar Chamling. Cyber Villages aim to address digital divide, by empowering local village units with handheld data devices to collect data from every household and connect the same to a real time dashboard. All village related data is expected to be available in one place. At the same time as part of e-governance initiative, SMS based updates on Government programmes and services will be sent to all villagers. Mr. Chhetri ended his presentation with a short promotional video of the concept, which is embedded below.

The second session of the day started with a presentation from Mr. D. P. Misra, National Data Sharing and Accessibility Policy - Programme Management Unit (NDSAP-PMU), National Informatics Centre, Government of India. The presentation focused on the process of implementation of the National Data Sharing and Accessibility Policy approved by the Government of India in 2012. Mr. Misra has played a key role in the NDSAP-PMU that was trusted with development of the national open government data platform of India and in setting up the procedures and standards for publication of government data by various central and state government agencies through that Platform. His talk described the technical solutions designed by the NDSAP-PMU to make data accessible for the end-users in various file formats, to make visualisation of available data easy, and to make it possible for users to comment upon existing data and to request for data that is unavailable at the moment. Further, he emphasised the need for outreach initiatives by the government so as to build awareness and activities around the available open government data. The slides from Mr. Misra’s presentation can be accessed here.

The presentation by Mr. Misra was followed by a group exercise where various teams, self-selected by the participants, worked on different sections of the SODAAP implementation plan to put together ideas and plans for the first draft of the document. Five groups were formed and each of them worked on a separate section of the implementation plan: 1) Governance Framework and Budgetary Support, 2) Data Inventory and Negative List, 3) Data Acquisition and Open Standards, 4) Data Publication Process, Licenses, and Timeframes, and 5) Awareness, Capacity, and Demand of Data. The initial section titled ‘Introduction to the Policy and its Principles’ was put together by Vashistha Iyer on the basis of the SODAAP document. The technical section on the ‘Sikkim Open Data Portal’ was left out of this drafting exercise, as it was decided that the representatives of the Department of Information Technology will prepare this section on the basis of their interactions with the NDSAP-PMU later in June.

The drafting session was followed by presentations by each team working on a separate section, and quick feedbacks from all the participants. These drafts, along with the feedbacks, have been compiled together by Mr. Chattapadhyay, and is shared with the officials from the Government of Sikkim for their further discussion and eventual finalisation of the SODAAP implementation plan document.

The workshop ended with a round of final words and sharing of learning by the participants, and a vote of thanks on the behalf of the organisers.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/workshop-on-open-data-for-human-development-2015-06-report

Security: Privacy, Transparency and Technology

sunil — 2015-09-15T10:53:52Z

The Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) has been involved in privacy and data protection research for the last five years. It has participated as a member of the Justice A.P. Shah Committee, which has influenced the draft Privacy Bill being authored by the Department of Personnel and Training. It has organised 11 multistakeholder roundtables across India over the last two years to discuss a shadow Privacy Bill drafted by CIS with the participation of privacy commissioners and data protection authorities from Europe and Canada.

The article was co-authored by Sunil Abraham, Elonnai Hickok and Tarun Krishnakumar. It was published by Observer Research Foundation, Digital Debates 2015: CyFy Journal Volume 2.

Our centre’s work on privacy was considered incomplete by some stakeholders because of a lack of focus in the area of cyber security and therefore we have initiated research on it from this year onwards. In this article, we have undertaken a preliminary examination of the theoretical relationships between the national security imperative and privacy, transparency and technology.

Security and Privacy

Daniel J. Solove has identified the tension between security and privacy as a false dichotomy: "Security and privacy often clash, but there need not be a zero-sum tradeoff." [1] Further unpacking this false dichotomy, Bruce Schneier says, "There is no security without privacy. And liberty requires both security and privacy." [2] Effectively, it could be said that privacy is a precondition for security, just as security is a precondition for privacy. A secure information system cannot be designed without guaranteeing the privacy of its authentication factors, and it is not possible to guarantee privacy of authentication factors without having confidence in the security of the system. Often policymakers talk about a balance between the privacy and security imperatives—in other words a zero-sum game. Balancing these imperatives is a foolhardy approach, as it simultaneously undermines both imperatives. Balancing privacy and security should instead be framed as an optimisation problem. Indeed, during a time when oversight mechanisms have failed even in so-called democratic states, the regulatory power of technology [3] should be seen as an increasingly key ingredient to the solution of that optimisation problem.

Data retention is required in most jurisdictions for law enforcement, intelligence and military purposes. Here are three examples of how security and privacy can be optimised when it comes to Internet Service Provider (ISP) or telecom operator logs:

Data Retention: We propose that the office of the Privacy Commissioner generate a cryptographic key pair for each internet user and give one key to the ISP / telecom operator. This key would be used to encrypt logs, thereby preventing unauthorised access. Once there is executive or judicial authorisation, the Privacy Commissioner could hand over the second key to the authorised agency. There could even be an emergency procedure and the keys could be automatically collected by concerned agencies from the Privacy Commissioner. This will need to be accompanied by a policy that criminalises the possession of unencrypted logs by ISP and telecom operators.
Privacy-Protective Surveillance: Ann Cavoukian and Khaled El Emam [4] have proposed combining intelligent agents, homomorphic encryption and probabilistic graphical models to provide “a positive-sum, ‘win–win’ alternative to current counter-terrorism surveillance systems.” They propose limiting collection of data to “significant” transactions or events that could be associated with terrorist-related activities, limiting analysis to wholly encrypted data, which then does not just result in “discovering more patterns and relationships without an understanding of their context” but rather “intelligent information—information selectively gathered and placed into an appropriate context to produce actual knowledge.” Since fully homomorphic encryption may be unfeasible in real-world systems, they have proposed use of partially homomorphic encryption. But experts such as Prof. John Mallery from MIT are also working on solutions based on fully homomorphic encryption.
Fishing Expedition Design: Madan Oberoi, Pramod Jagtap, Anupam Joshi, Tim Finin and Lalana Kagal have proposed a standard [5] that could be adopted by authorised agencies, telecom operators and ISPs. Instead of giving authorised agencies complete access to logs, they propose a format for database queries, which could be sent to the telecom operator or ISP by authorised agencies. The telecom operator or ISP would then process the query, and anonymise/obfuscate the result-set in an automated fashion based on applicable privacypolicies/regulation. Authorised agencies would then hone in on a subset of the result-set that they would like with personal identifiers intact; this smaller result set would then be shared with the authorised agencies.

An optimisation approach to resolving the false dichotomy between privacy and security will not allow for a total surveillance regime as pursued by the US administration. Total surveillance brings with it the ‘honey pot’ problem: If all the meta-data and payload data of citizens is being harvested and stored, then the data store will become a single point of failure and will become another target for attack. The next Snowden may not have honourable intentions and might decamp with this ‘honey pot’ itself, which would have disastrous consequences.

If total surveillance will completely undermine the national security imperative, what then should be the optimal level of surveillance in a population? The answer depends upon the existing security situation. If this is represented on a graph with security on the y-axis and the proportion of the population under surveillance on the x-axis, the benefits of surveillance could be represented by an inverted hockey-stick curve. To begin with, there would already be some degree of security. As a small subset of the population is brought under surveillance, security would increase till an optimum level is reached, after which, enhancing the number of people under surveillance would not result in any security pay-off. Instead, unnecessary surveillance would diminish security as it would introduce all sorts of new vulnerabilities. Depending on the existing security situation, the head of the hockey-stick curve might be bigger or smaller. To use a gastronomic analogy, optimal surveillance is like salt in cooking—necessary in small quantities but counter-productive even if slightly in excess.

In India the designers of surveillance projects have fortunately rejected the total surveillance paradigm. For example, the objective of the National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) is to streamline and automate targeted surveillance; it is introducing technological safeguards that will allow express combinations of result-sets from 22 databases to be made available to 12 authorised agencies. This is not to say that the design of the NATGRID cannot be improved.

Security and Transparency

There are two views on security and transparency: One, security via obscurity as advocated by vendors of proprietary software, and two, security via transparency as advocated by free/open source software (FOSS) advocates and entrepreneurs. Over the last two decades, public and industry opinion has swung towards security via transparency. This is based on the Linus rule that “given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow.” But does this mean that transparency is a necessary and sufficient condition? Unfortunately not, and therefore it is not necessarily true that FOSS and open standards will be more secure than proprietary software and proprietary standards.

Optimal surveillance is like salt in cooking—necessary in small quantities but counter-productive even if slightly in excess.

The recent detection of the Heartbleed [6] security bug in Open SSL, [7] causing situations where more data can be read than should be allowed, and Snowden’s revelations about the compromise of some open cryptographic standards (which depend on elliptic curves), developed by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology, are stark examples. [8]

At the same time, however, open standards and FOSS are crucial to maintaining the balance of power in information societies, as civil society and the general public are able to resist the powers of authoritarian governments and rogue corporations using cryptographic technology. These technologies allow for anonymous speech, pseudonymous speech, private communication, online anonymity and circumvention of surveillance and censorship. For the media, these technologies enable anonymity of sources and the protection of whistle-blowers—all phenomena that are critical to the functioning of a robust and open democratic society. But these very same technologies are also required by states and by the private sector for a variety of purposes—national security, e-commerce, e-banking, protection of all forms of intellectual property, and services that depend on confidentiality, such as legal or medical services.

In order words, all governments, with the exception of the US government, have common cause with civil society, media and the general public when it comes to increasing the security of open standards and FOSS. Unfortunately, this can be quite an expensive task because the re-securing of open cryptographic standards depends on mathematicians. Of late, mathematical research outputs that can be militarised are no longer available in the public domain because the biggest employers of mathematicians worldwide today are the US military and intelligence agencies. If other governments invest a few billion dollars through mechanisms like Knowledge Ecology International’s proposed World Trade Organization agreement on the supply of knowledge as a public good, we would be able to internationalise participation in standard-setting organisations and provide market incentives for greater scrutiny of cryptographic standards and patching of vulnerabilities of FOSS. This would go a long way in addressing the trust deficit that exists on the internet today.

Security and Technology

A techno-utopian understanding of security assumes that more technology, more recent technology and more complex technology will necessarily lead to better security outcomes.

This is because the security discourse is dominated by vendors with sales targets who do not present a balanced or accurate picture of the technologies that they are selling. This has resulted in state agencies and the general public having an exaggerated understanding of the capabilities of surveillance technologies that is more aligned with Hollywood movies than everyday reality.

More Technology

Increasing the number of x-ray machines or full-body scanners at airports by a factor of ten or hundred will make the airport less secure unless human oversight is similarly increased. Even with increased human oversight, all that has been accomplished is an increase in the potential locations that can be compromised. The process of hardening a server usually involves stopping non-essential services and removing non-essential software. This reduces the software that should be subject to audit, continuously monitored for vulnerabilities and patched as soon as possible. Audits, ongoing monitoring and patching all cost time and money and therefore, for governments with limited budgets, any additional unnecessary technology should be seen as a drain on the security budget. Like with the airport example, even when it comes to a single server on the internet, it is clear that, from a security perspective, more technology without a proper functionality and security justification is counter-productive. To reiterate, throwing increasingly more technology at a problem does not make things more secure; rather, it results in a proliferation of vulnerabilities.

Latest Technology

Reports that a number of state security agencies are contemplating returning to typewriters for sensitive communications in the wake of Snowden’s revelations makes it clear that some older technologies are harder to compromise in comparison to modern technology. [9] Between iris- and fingerprint-based biometric authentication, logically, it would be easier for a criminal to harvest images of irises or authentication factors in bulk fashion using a high resolution camera fitted with a zoom lens in a public location, in comparison to mass lifting of fingerprints.

Complex Technology

Fifteen years ago, Bruce Schneier said, "The worst enemy of security is complexity. This has been true since the beginning of computers, and it’s likely to be true for the foreseeable future." [10] This is because complexity increases fragility; every feature is also a potential source of vulnerabilities and failures. The simpler Indian electronic machines used until the 2014 elections are far more secure than the Diebold voting machines used in the 2004 US presidential elections. Similarly when it comes to authentication, a pin number is harder to beat without user-conscious cooperation in comparison to iris- or fingerprint-based biometric authentication.

In the following section of the paper we have identified five threat scenarios [11] relevant to India and identified solutions based on our theoretical framing above.

Threat Scenarios and Possible Solutions

Hacking the NIC Certifying Authority
One of the critical functions served by the National Informatics Centre (NIC) is as a Certifying Authority (CA). [12] In this capacity, the NIC issues digital certificates that authenticate web services and allow for the secure exchange of information online. [13] Operating systems and browsers maintain lists of trusted CA root certificates as a means of easily verifying authentic certificates. India’s Controller of Certifying Authority’s certificates issued are included in the Microsoft Root list and recognised by the majority of programmes running on Windows, including Internet Explorer and Chrome. [14] In 2014, the NIC CA’s infrastructure was compromised, and digital certificates were issued in NIC’s name without its knowledge. [15] Reports indicate that NIC did not "have an appropriate monitoring and tracking system in place to detect such intrusions immediately." [16] The implication is that websites could masquerade as another domain using the fake certificates. Personal data of users can be intercepted or accessed by third parties by the masquerading website. The breach also rendered web servers and websites of government bodies vulnerable to attack, and end users were no longer sure that data on these websites was accurate and had not been tampered with. [17] The NIC CA was forced to revoke all 250,000 SSL Server Certificates issued until that date [18] and is no longer issuing digital certificates for the time being. [19]Public key pinning is a means through which websites can specify which certifying authorities have issued certificates for that site. Public key pinning can prevent man-in-the-middle attacks due to fake digital certificates. [20] Certificate Transparency allows anyone to check whether a certificate has been properly issued, seeing as certifying authorities must publicly publish information about the digital certificates that they have issued. Though this approach does not prevent fake digital certificates from being issued, it can allow for quick detection of misuse. [21]

‘Logic Bomb’ against Airports
Passenger operations in New Delhi’s Indira Gandhi International Airport depend on a centralised operating system known as the Common User Passenger Processing System (CUPPS). The system integrates numerous critical functions such as the arrival and departure times of flights, and manages the reservation system and check-in schedules. [22] In 2011, a logic bomb attack was remotely launched against the system to introduce malicious code into the CUPPS software. The attack disabled the CUPPS operating system, forcing a number of check-in counters to shut down completely, while others reverted to manual check-in, resulting in over 50 delayed flights. Investigations revealed that the attack was launched by three disgruntled employees who had assisted in the installation of the CUPPS system at the New Delhi Airport. [23] Although in this case the impact of the attack was limited to flight delay, experts speculate that the attack was meant to take down the entire system. The disruption and damage resulting from the shutdown of an entire airport would be extensive.

Adoption of open hardware and FOSS is one strategy to avoid and mitigate the risk of such vulnerabilities. The use of devices that embrace the concept of open hardware and software specifications must be encouraged, as this helps the FOSS community to be vigilant in detecting and reporting design deviations and investigate into probable vulnerabilities.

Attack on Critical Infrastructure
The Nuclear Power Corporation of India encounters and prevents numerous cyber attacks every day. [24] The best known example of a successful nuclear plant hack is the Stuxnet worm that thwarted the operation of an Iranian nuclear enrichment complex and set back the country’s nuclear programme. [25]

The worm had the ability to spread over the network and would activate when a specific configuration of systems was encountered [26] and connected to one or more Siemens programmable logic controllers. [27] The worm was suspected to have been initially introduced through an infected USB drive into one of the controller computers by an insider, thus crossing the air gap. [28] The worm used information that it gathered to take control of normal industrial processes (to discreetly speed up centrifuges, in the present case), leaving the operators of the plant unaware that they were being attacked. This incident demonstrates how an attack vector introduced into the general internet can be used to target specific system configurations. When the target of a successful attack is a sector as critical and secured as a nuclear complex, the implications for a country’s security and infrastructure are potentially grave.

Security audits and other transparency measures to identify vulnerabilities are critical in sensitive sectors. Incentive schemes such as prizes, contracts and grants may be evolved for the private sector and academia to identify vulnerabilities in the infrastructure of critical resources to enable/promote security auditing of infrastructure.

Micro Level: Chip Attacks
Semiconductor devices are ubiquitous in electronic devices. The US, Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, Korea and China are the primary countries hosting manufacturing hubs of these devices. India currently does not produce semiconductors, and depends on imported chips. This dependence on foreign semiconductor technology can result in the import and use of compromised or fraudulent chips by critical sectors in India. For example, hardware Trojans, which may be used to access personal information and content on a device, may be inserted into the chip. Such breaches/transgressions can render equipment in critical sectors vulnerable to attack and threaten national security. [29]

Indigenous production of critical technologies and the development of manpower and infrastructure to support these activities are needed. The Government of India has taken a number of steps towards this. For example, in 2013, the Government of India approved the building of two Semiconductor Wafer Fabrication (FAB) manufacturing facilities [30] and as of January 2014, India was seeking to establish its first semiconductor characterisation lab in Bangalore. [31]

Macro Level: Telecom and Network Switches

The possibility of foreign equipment containing vulnerabilities and backdoors that are built into its software and hardware gives rise to concerns that India’s telecom and network infrastructure is vulnerable to being hacked and accessed by foreign governments (or non-state actors) through the use of spyware and malware that exploit such vulnerabilities. In 2013, some firms, including ZTE and Huawei, were barred by the Indian government from participating in a bid to supply technology for the development of its National Optic Network project due to security concerns. [32] Similar concerns have resulted in the Indian government holding back the conferment of ‘domestic manufacturer’ status on both these firms. [33]

Following reports that Chinese firms were responsible for transnational cyber attacks designed to steal confidential data from overseas targets, there have been moves to establish laboratories to test imported telecom equipment in India. [34] Despite these steps, in a February 2014 incident the state-owned telecommunication company Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd’s network was hacked, allegedly by Huawei. [35]

Security practitioners and policymakers need to avoid the zero-sum framing prevalent in popular discourse regarding security VIS-A-VIS privacy, transparency and technology.

A successful hack of the telecom infrastructure could result in massive disruption in internet and telecommunications services. Large-scale surveillance and espionage by foreign actors would also become possible, placing, among others, both governmental secrets and individuals personal information at risk.

While India cannot afford to impose a general ban on the import of foreign telecommunications equipment, a number of steps can be taken to address the risk of inbuilt security vulnerabilities. Common International Criteria for security audits could be evolved by states to ensure compliance of products with international norms and practices. While India has already established common criteria evaluation centres, [36] the government monopoly over the testing function has resulted in only three products being tested so far. A Code Escrow Regime could be set up where manufacturers would be asked to deposit source code with the Government of India for security audits and verification. The source code could be compared with the shipped software to detect inbuilt vulnerabilities.

Conclusion

Cyber security cannot be enhanced without a proper understanding of the relationship between security and other national imperatives such as privacy, transparency and technology. This paper has provided an initial sketch of those relationships, but sustained theoretical and empirical research is required in India so that security practitioners and policymakers avoid the zero-sum framing prevalent in popular discourse and take on the hard task of solving the optimisation problem by shifting policy, market and technological levers simultaneously. These solutions must then be applied in multiple contexts or scenarios to determine how they should be customised to provide maximum security bang for the buck.

[1]. Daniel J. Solove, Chapter 1 in Nothing to Hide: The False Tradeoff between Privacy and Security (Yale University Press: 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1827982.

[2]. Bruce Schneier, “What our Top Spy doesn’t get: Security and Privacy aren’t Opposites,” Wired, January 24, 2008, http://archive.wired.com/politics/security commentary/security matters/2008/01/securitymatters_0124 and Bruce Schneier, “Security vs. Privacy,” Schneier on Security, January 29, 2008, https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/01/security_vs_pri.html.

[3]. There are four sources of power in internet governance: Market power exerted by private sector organisations; regulatory power exerted by states; technical power exerted by anyone who has access to certain categories of technology, such as cryptography; and finally, the power of public pressure sporadically mobilised by civil society. A technically sound encryption standard, if employed by an ordinary citizen, cannot be compromised using the power of the market or the regulatory power of states or public pressure by civil society. In that sense, technology can be used to regulate state and market behaviour.

[4]. Ann Cavoukian and Khaled El Emam, “Introducing Privacy-Protective Surveillance: Achieving Privacy and Effective Counter-Terrorism,” Information & Privacy Commisioner, September 2013, Ontario, Canada, http://www.privacybydesign.ca/content/uploads/2013/12/pps.pdf.

[5]. Madan Oberoi, Pramod Jagtap, Anupam Joshi, Tim Finin and Lalana Kagal, “Information Integration and Analysis: A Semantic Approach to Privacy”(presented at the third IEEE International Conference on Information Privacy, Security, Risk and Trust, Boston, USA, October 2011), ebiquity.umbc.edu/_file_directory_/papers/578.pdf.

[6]. Bruce Byfield, “Does Heartbleed disprove ‘Open Source is Safer’?,” Datamation, April 14, 2014, http://www.datamation.com/open-source/does-heartbleed-disprove-open-source-is-safer-1.html.

[7]. “Cybersecurity Program should be more transparent, protect privacy,” Centre for Democracy and Technology Insights, March 20, 2009, https://cdt.org/insight/cybersecurity-program-should-be-more-transparent-protect-privacy/#1.

[8]. “Cracked Credibility,” The Economist, September 14, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/international/21586296-be-safe-internet-needs-reliable-encryption-standards-software-and.

[9]. Miriam Elder, “Russian guard service reverts to typewriters after NSA leaks,” The Guardian, July 11, 2013, www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/russia-reverts-paper-nsa-leaks and Philip Oltermann, “Germany ‘may revert to typewriters’ to counter hi-tech espionage,” The Guardian, July 15, 2014, www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/15/germany-typewriters-espionage-nsa-spying-surveillance.

[10]. Bruce Schneier, “A Plea for Simplicity,” Schneier on Security, November 19, 1999, https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/1999/11/a_plea_for_simplicit.html.

[11]. With inputs from Pranesh Prakash of the Centre for Internet and Society and Sharathchandra Ramakrishnan of Srishti School of Art, Technology and Design.

[12]. “Frequently Asked Questions,” Controller of Certifying Authorities, Department of Electronics and Information Technology, Government of India, http://cca.gov.in/cca/index.php?q=faq-page#n41.

[13]. National Informatics Centre Homepage, Government of India, http://www.nic.in/node/41.

[14]. Adam Langley, “Maintaining Digital Certificate Security,” Google Security Blog, July 8, 2014, http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.in/2014/07/maintaining-digital-certificate-security.html.

[15]. This is similar to the kind of attack carried out against DigiNotar, a Dutch certificate authority. See: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1246&context=jss.

[16]. R. Ramachandran, “Digital Disaster,” Frontline, August 22, 2014, http://www.frontline.in/the-nation/digital-disaster/article6275366.ece.

[17]. Ibid.

[18]. “NIC’s digital certification unit hacked,” Deccan Herald, July 16, 2014, http://www.deccanherald.com/content/420148/archives.php.

[19]. National Informatics Centre Certifying Authority Homepage, Government of India, http://nicca.nic.in//.

[20]. Mozilla Wiki, “Public Key Pinning,” https://wiki.mozilla.org/SecurityEngineering/Public_Key_Pinning.

[21]. “Certificate Transparency - The quick detection of fraudulent digital certificates,” Ascertia, August 11, 2014, http://www.ascertiaIndira.com/blogs/pki/2014/08/11/certificate-transparency-the-quick-detection-of-fraudulent-digital-certificates.

[22]. “Indira Gandhi International Airport (DEL/VIDP) Terminal 3, India,” Airport Technology.com, http://www.airport-technology.com/projects/indira-gandhi-international-airport-terminal -3/.

[23]. “How techies used logic bomb to cripple Delhi Airport,” Rediff, November 21, 2011, http://www.rediff.com/news/report/how-techies-used-logic-bomb-to-cripple-delhi-airport/20111121 htm.

[24]. Manu Kaushik and Pierre Mario Fitter, “Beware of the bugs,” Business Today, February 17, 2013, http://businesstoday.intoday.in/story/india-cyber-security-at-risk/1/191786.html.

[25]. “Stuxnet ‘hit’ Iran nuclear plants,” BBC, November 22, 2010, http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-11809827.

[26]. In this case, systems using Microsoft Windows and running Siemens Step7 software were targeted.

[27]. Jonathan Fildes, “Stuxnet worm ‘targeted high-value Iranian assets’,” BBC, September 23, 2010, http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-11388018.

[28]. Farhad Manjoo, “Don’t Stick it in: The dangers of USB drives,” Slate, October 5, 2010, http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2010/10/dont_stick_it_in.html.

[29]. Ibid.

[30]. “IBM invests in new $5bn chip fab in India, so is chip sale off?,” ElectronicsWeekly, February 14, 2014, http://www.electronicsweekly.com/news/business/ibm-invests-new-5bn-chip-fab-india-chip-sale-2014-02/.

[31]. NT Balanarayan, “Cabinet Approves Creation of Two Semiconductor Fabrication Units,” Medianama, February 17, 2014, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-02-04/news/47004737_1_indian-electronics-special-incentive-package-scheme-semiconductor-association.

[32]. Jamie Yap, “India bars foreign vendors from national broadband initiative,” ZD Net, January 21, 2013, http://www.zdnet.com/in/india-bars-foreign-vendors-from-national-broadband-initiative-7000010055/.

[33]. Kevin Kwang, “India holds back domestic-maker status for Huawei, ZTE,” ZD Net, February 6, 2013, http://www.zdnet.com/in/india-holds-back-domestic-maker-status-for-huawei-zte-70 00010887/. Also see “Huawei, ZTE await domestic-maker tag,” The Hindu, February 5, 2013, http://www.thehindu.com/business/companies/huawei-zte-await-domesticmaker-tag/article4382888.ece.

[34]. Ellyne Phneah, “Huawei, ZTE under probe by Indian government,” ZD Net, May 10, 2013, http://www.zdnet.com/in/huawei-zte-under-probe-by-indian-government-7000015185/.

[35]. Devidutta Tripathy, “India investigates report of Huawei hacking state carrier network,” Reuters, February 6, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/06/us-india-huawei-hacking-idUSBREA150QK20140206.

[36]. “Products Certified,” Common Criteria Portal of India, http://www.commoncriteria-india.gov.in/Pages/ProductsCertified.aspx.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/security-privacy-transparency-and-technology

Digital Activism in Asia Reader

sumandro — 2015-10-24T14:36:44Z

The digital turn might as well be marked as an Asian turn. From flash-mobs in Taiwan to feminist mobilisations in India, from hybrid media strategies of Syrian activists to cultural protests in Thailand, we see the emergence of political acts that transform the citizen from being a beneficiary of change to becoming an agent of change. In co-shaping these changes, what the digital shall be used for, and what its consequences will be, are both up for speculation and negotiation. Digital Activism in Asia marks a particular shift where these questions are no longer being refracted through the ICT4D logic, or the West’s attempts to save Asia from itself, but shaped by multiplicity, unevenness, and urgencies of digital sites and users in Asia. It is our great pleasure to present the Digital Activism in Asia Reader.

The Book

The Reader took shape over two workshops with a diverse range of participants, including activists, change-makers, and scholars, organised by the Researchers at Work (RAW) programme in June 2014 and March 2015. During the first workshop, the participants identified the authors, topics, and writings that should be included/featured in the reader, based upon their relevance in the grounded practices of the participants, who came from various Asian countries. The second workshop involved open discussions regarding how the selected readings should be annotated, from key further questions to strategies of introducing them, followed by development of the annotations by the participants of the workshop. The full list of contributors, annotators, and editors is mentioned at the end of the book.

We are grateful to the Meson Press for its generous and patience support throughout the development process of the book.

Please download, read, and share this open-access book from the Meson Press website.

The Reader has been edited by Nishant Shah, P.P. Sneha, and Sumandro Chattapadhyay, with support from Anirudh Sridhar, Denisse Albornoz, and Verena Getahun.

Excerpt from the Foreword

Compiling this Reader on Digital Activism in Asia is fraught with compelling challenges, because each of the key terms in the formulation of the title is sub-ject to multiple interpretations and fierce contestations. The construction of ‘Asia’ as a region, has its historical roots in processes of colonial technologies of cartography and navigation. Asia was both, a measured entity, mapped for resources to be exploited, and also a measure of the world, promising anorientation to the Western World’s own turbulent encounters. As Chen Kuan-Hsing points out in his definitive history of the region, Asia gets re-imagined as a ‘method’ in cold-war conflicts, becoming the territory to be assimilated through exports of different ideologies and cultural purports. Asia does not have its own sense of being aregion. The transactions, interactions, flows and exchanges between different countries and regions in Asia have been so entirely mediated by powers of colonisation that the region remains divided and reticent in its imagination of itself. However, by the turn of the 21st century, Asia has seen a new awakening. It finds a regional identity, which, surprisingly did not emerge from its consolidating presence in global economics or in globalised structures of trade and commerce. Instead, it finds a presence, for itself, through a series of crises of governance, of social order, of political rights, and of cultural productions, that binds it together in unprecedented ways.

The digital turn might as well be marked as an Asian turn, because with the new networks of connectivity, with Asian countries marking themselves as informatics hubs, working through a circulated logic of migrant labour and dis-tributed resources, there came a sense of immediacy, proximity, and urgencythat continues to shape the Asian imagination in a new way. In the last decade or so, the rapid changes that have emerged, creating multiple registers of modernity, identity, and community in different parts of Asia, accelerated by a seamless exchange of ideas, commodities, cultures, and people have created a new sense of the region as emerging through co-presence rather than competition and conflict. Simultaneously, the emergence of global capitals of information, labour and cultural export, have created new reference points by which the region creates its identities and networks that are no longer subject to the tyranny of Western hegemony...

While the digital remains crucial to this shaping of contemporary Asia, both in sustaining the developmental agenda that most of the countries espouse, and in opening up an inward looking gaze of statecraft and social organisation, the digital itself remains an ineffable concept. Largely because the digital is like a blackbox that conflates multiple registers of meaning and layers of life, it becomes important to unengineer it and see what it enables and hides. The economic presence of the digital is perhaps the most visible in telling the story of Asia in the now. Beginning with the dramatic development of Singapore as the centre of informatics governance and the emergence of a range of cities from Shanghai to Manilla and Bangalore to Tehran, there has been an accelerated narrative of economic growth and accumulation of capital that is often the global face of the Asian turn. However, this economic reordering is not a practice in isolation. It brings with it, a range of social stirrings that seek to overthrow traditional structures of oppression, corruption, control, and injustice that have often remained hidden in the closed borders of Asian countries. However, the digital marks a particular shift where these questions are no longer being excavated by the ICT4D logic, of the West’s attempts to save Asia from itself. These are questions that emerge from the ground, as more people interact with progressive and liberal politics and aspire not only for higher purchase powers but a better quality of rights. The digital turn has opened up a range of social and political rights based discourses, practices, and movements, where populations are holding their governments and countries responsible, accountable, and culpable in the face of personal and collective loss and injustice...

In the face of this multiplicity of digital sites and usages that are reconfiguring Asia, it is obvious then, that the very nature of what constitutes activism is changing as well. Organised civil society presence in Asia has often had a strong role in shaping modern nation states, but more often than not these processes were defined in the same vocabulary as that of the powers that they were fighting against. Marked by a strong sense of developmentalism and often working in complement to the state rather than keeping a check on the state’s activities, traditional activism in Asia has often suffered from the incapacity to scale and the inability to find alternatives to the state-defined scripts of development, growth and progress. In countries where literacy rates have been low, these movements also suffer from being conceived in philosophical and linguistic sophistry that escapes the common citizen and remains the playground of the few who have privileges afforded to them by class and region. Digital Activism, however, seems to have broken this language barrier, both internally and externally, allowing for new visualities enabled by ubiquitous computing to bring various stakeholders into the fray... At the same time, the digital itself has introduced new problems and concerns that are often glossed over, in the enthralling tale of progress. Concerns around digital divide, invasive practices of personal data gathering, the nexus of markets and governments that install the citizen/consumer in precarious conditions, and the re-emergence of organised conservative politics are also a part of the digital turn. Activism has had to focus not only on digital as a tool, but digital also as a site of protest and resistance...

The Reader does not offer an index of the momentous emergence with the growth of the digital or a chronological account of how digital activism in Asia has grown and shaped the region. Instead, the Reader attempts a crowd-sourced compilation that presents critical tools, organisations, theoretical concepts, political analyses, illustrative case-studies and annotations, that an emerging network of changemakers in Asia have identified as important in their own practices within their own contexts.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/digital-activism-in-asia-reader