Centre for Internet and Society

The Competition Law Case Against Whatsapp’s 2021 Privacy Policy Alteration

Aman Nair and Arindrajit Basu — 2021-03-24T16:12:09Z

Having examined the privacy implications of Whatsapp's changes to its privacy policy in 2021, this issue brief is the second output in our series examining the effects of those changes. This brief examines the changes in the context of data sharing between Whatsapp and Facebook as being an anticompetitive action in violation of the Indian Competition Act, 2002.

Executive Summary

On January 4, 2021, Whatsapp announced a revised privacy policy through an in-app notification. It highlighted that the new policy would impact user interactions with business accounts, including those which may be using Facebook's hosting services. The updated policy presented users with the option of either accepting greater data sharing between Whatsapp and Facebook or being unable to use the platform post 15th May, 2021. The updated policy resulted in temporarily slowed growth for Whatsapp and increased growth for other messaging apps like Signal and Telegram. While Whatsapp has chosen to delay the implementation of this policy due to consumer outrage, it is important for us to unpack and understand what this (and similar policies) mean for the digital economy, and its associated competition law concerns. Competition law is one of the sharpest tools available to policy-makers to fairly regulate and constrain the unbridled power of large technology companies.

While it is evident the Indian competition landscape will benefit from revisiting the existing law and policy framework to reign in Big technology companies, we argue that the change in Whatsapp’s privacy policy in 2021 can be held anti-competitive using legal provisions as they presently stand. Therefore, in this issue brief, we largely limit ourselves to evaluating the legality of Whatsapp’s privacy policy within the confines of the present legal system.

First, we dive into an articulation of the present abuse of dominance framework in Indian Competition Law. Second, we analyze whether there was abuse of dominance-bearing in mind an economic analysis of Whatsapp’s role in the relevant market by using tests laid out in previous rulings of the CCI

The framework for determining abuse of dominance as per The Competition Act is based on three factors:

1. Determination of relevant market

2. Determination of dominant position

3. Abuse of the dominant position

In two previous orders in 2016 and 2020, CCI has held that Whatsapp is dominant in its relevant market based on several factors which we explore. These include:

Advantage in user base, usage and reach,
Barriers to entry for other competitors
Power of acquisition over competitors.

However, in both orders, CCI held that Whatsapp did not abuse its dominance by arguing that the practices in question allowed for user choice. We critique these judgments for not reflecting the market structures and exploitative practices of large technology companies. We also argue that even if we use the test of user choice laid down by the CCI in its previous orders concerning Whatsapp and Facebook, the changes made to the privacy policy in 2021 did abuse dominance,and should be held guilty of violating competition law standards.

Our analysis revolves around examining the explicit and implicit standards of user choice laid out by the CCI in its 2016 and 2020 judgements as the standard for evaluating fairness in an Abuse of Dominance claim.We demonstrate how the 2021 changes failed to meet these standards.

Finally, we conclude by noting that the present case offers a crucial opportunity for India to take a giant step forward in its regulation of big tech companies and harmonise its rulings with regulatory developments around the world.

The full issue brief can be found here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-competition-law-case-against-whatsapp2019s-2021-privacy-policy-alteration

Standard Essential Patents on Low-Cost Mobile Phones in India: A Case to Strengthen Competition Regulation?

nehaa — 2016-04-24T04:42:52Z

The realization of the promise of the sub hundred dollar mobile device as a facilitator of access to knowledge is contingent inter alia on its availability in the market place. In turn, the market availability of the sub hundred dollar mobile device is influenced by the existence of an enabling environment for producers to produce, and consumers to consume. From a regulatory perspective, the enabling environment itself is a function of existing laws and policies, and the ‘developmental effects’ of certain laws and policies (Saraswati, 2012).

This article seeks to examine one such legal and policy lever and the role of a regulator in the development of an enabling environment for access to sub hundred dollar mobile devices. This paper is founded on four assumptions: first, that access to sub hundred dollar mobile devices is influenced by their price; second, that the question of access necessitates conversation between the intellectual property regime and several other actors, sites and tools; third, that one of the fundamental goals of regulatory reform is the creation of a ‘stable, open and future- proof environment’ (Guermazi and Satola, 2005) that encourages access to these devices; and fourth, that there exist public law implications of intellectual property that justify the involvement of State actors and regulators in matters that may arise out of private transactions.

This article will examine whether there is a role to be played by competition law in this narrative of innovation, intellectual property and access to sub hundred dollar mobile devices. In light of increasing litigation around standard essential patents, and the inability of FRAND and International Standard Setting Organizations to find a comprehensive solution, this paper will question the efficacy of competition law as an ex post solution to a problem that might be better addressed by ex ante regulation from a specialized body.

In an attempt to address these questions, this article will examine the role of the Competition Commission of India and the Indian Judiciary. Orders of the Competition Commission will be studied from its inception till March, 2015, in order to draw conclusions about the role that the Commission identifies for itself and the nature of disputes it adjudicates. This article will also examine the role of similarly placed institutions in the United States of America as well as some member states of the European Union.

It will be argued that while Competition Law might address some of the issues arising out of litigation around standard essential patents, and might be a tool to increase access to sub hundred dollar mobile devices, its efficacy as a long term solution in light of its nature as an ex post solution, is questionable. Consequently, it might be prudent to have a conversation leaning towards exante regulation of the market place by a specialized regulator.

The paper was published by Socio Legal Review (National Law School of India University). Download the PDF here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/the-socio-legal-review-nehaa-chaudhari-standard-essential-patent-on-low-cost-mobile-phones-in-india

Revisiting Per Se vs Rule of Reason in Light of the Intel Conditional Rebate Case

Shruthi Anand — 2017-10-04T13:45:51Z

Recent developments in the European Union (EU) regarding the antitrust case against Intel have brought back into focus two rules of competition law analysis- the per se rule and the rule of reason. In light of the decision by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the matter, this Note examines the application of the two rules to the case in detail. Additionally, it analyzes the statutory and judicial basis for the rules in the context of the EU and Indian competition law regimes, and concludes by identifying some areas in which these concepts would be relevant.

Click on the link below to read the full article:

Revisiting Per Se vs Rule of Reason in Light of the Intel Conditional Rebate Case

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/revisiting-per-se-vs-rule-of-reason-in-light-of-the-intel-conditional-rebate-case

IJLT-CIS Law Essay Competition

pranesh — 2011-08-04T04:35:20Z

The Indian Journal of Law and Technology and CIS are conducting a legal essay competition to encourage law students across India to think critically about the techno-legal issues facing us today. Students can write on any of the four themes, with the top prize being Rs. 7500 and an internship at CIS.

The Indian Journal of Law and Technology (IJLT) is an annual law journal published by the Law and Technology Committee of the National Law School of India University, Bangalore. IJLT aims to provide a platform for promoting discussion on issues relating to the interface between law and technology, particularly from the perspective of the developing world.

The Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) is a leading research organisation that engages with issues of digital pluralism, public accountability and pedagogic practices, in relation to the field of Internet and Society, with special emphasis towards South-South dialogue and exchange. IJLT and CIS are proud to announce the 1st IJLT-CIS Annual Law Essay Competition 2009, which is a competition open to undergraduate law students across India. The competition seeks to encourage creative thinking and promote research and writing about crucial legal issues in the field of Information Technology and the Internet.

Themes

Criminality and Second Life: Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde
Trademark and the Internet: Cybersquatting and the Google Adwords-Consim Controversy -- Reasonable Limits to Trademark Protection
3G Services and Spectrum Allocation: Fair Competition, Welfare and Freedom of Speech and Commerce on the Airwaves
Easier to Be Criminals: Judicial and Legislative Responses to Cyber Crime in India.

Judging

The winning law essays shall be determined through a blind review by a panel of eminent academicians in the field of law and technology.

Prizes

Ist Prize: Rs. 7500 and an internship at CIS

2nd Prize: Rs. 5000

3rd Prize: Rs. 4000

Please note that the terms of the above internship shall be decided by CIS on its own initiative, and as such shall not be negotiable. The winning law essay shall be considered for publication in the next issue of IJLT in accordance with the Editorial Policy of IJLT.

Eligibility

The competition is open to all undergraduate law students in any college/law school in India.

Submission Guidelines

The entries must be between 5000-7500 words inclusive of all footnotes. The entries that fall short of or exceed the above word limit shall be penalised.
Substantive footnoting is not permitted and shall be penalised. The use of endnotes or other citation methods is not permitted.
The entries should be accompanied by a 150-word abstract. The abstract is not counted towards the word limit.
All entries should be in Times New Roman, size 12, 1.5 line spacing. The footnotes used should be in Times New Roman, size 10, single line spacing.
The footnotes used should follow a uniform and complete system of citation. However, the use of the Harvard Blue Book (18th edition) system of citation is encouraged.
The entries must be submitted in the Microsoft Word format and with all identifying information removed from the text of the entries and the file properties. The covering e-mail should contain the name, e-mail address, postal address, institution, course and year of study of the author.
The entries must be submitted via e-mail to essay@ijlt.in.
The deadline for entries is 11:59 P.M., 23rd January, 2010.

For any clarifications, please send an e-mail to editorialboard@ijlt.in.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/ijlt-cis-law-essay

Does the Social Web need a Googopoly?

rebecca — 2011-08-18T05:06:37Z

While the utility of the new social tool Buzz is still under question, the bold move into social space taken last week by the Google Buzz team has Gmail users questioning privacy implications of the new feature. In this post, I posit that Buzz highlights two privacy challenges of the social web. First, the application has sidestepped the consensual and contextual qualities desirable of social spaces. Secondly, Google’s move highlights the increasingly competitive and convergent nature of the social media landscape.

Last week, and for many a surprise, Google launched its new social networking platform, Buzz. The new service is Google’s effort to amplify the “social nature” of their services by integrating them under one platform, and adding some extra social utility. The social application runs from the Gmail interface, but also links other Google accounts a user may have, including albums on Picasa, and Google Reader. The service also allows for the sharing from external sources, such as photos on Flickr, and videos from YouTube. The service also allows users to post, like, or dislike the status updates of others which may be publicly searchable if the user opts. Before a Gmail user may fully participate in Google Buzz service, a unique Google Personal Profile must be created.

User Consent

Much of the buzz surrounding the new social networking service last week wasn’t paying much lip service to the new application. Instead, an uproar of privacy concerns continued to dominate the Buzz scene, with many critics quickly labeling Buzz a “privacy nightmare”. A formal complaint has been already filed with the US Federal Trade Commission in response to Google’s new privacy violating service. A second-year Harvard Law student has also filed a class-action suit against the company for its privacy malpractices.

Much of the privacy talk thus far has focused on issues of consent, or lack thereof, in this case. Upon Buzz’s launch, Gmail users were automatically subscribed as “opting in” for the service. Google has used the private address books of millions of Gmail accounts to build social networks from the contacts users email and chat with most. To entice users into using the service, Gmail users were set to auto-follow all of their contacts, and in turn, to be followed by them, too. Furthermore, all new Buzz users had been set to automatically share all public Picasa albums and Google Reader items with their new social graph. It is argued that social network services should be opt-in, rather than opt-out, and that Buzz has violated the consensual nature of the social web.

Illuminating the complications of building a social graph from ones inbox is the story of an Australian women, who remains anonymous. As she claims, most of the emails currently received through her Gmail account, are those from her abusive ex-boyfriend. Due to Google’s assumption that Gmail users would like to be “auto-followed” by their Gmail contacts (mirroring Twitters friendship protocol), items shared between herself and new boyfriend through her Google reader account had become public to her broader social graph, including her ex-boyfriend and his harassing friends.

In a blog response directed to Google’s Buzz team, the woman scornfully wrote- “F*ck you, Google. My privacy concerns are not trite. They are linked to my actual physical safety, and I will now have to spend the next few days maintaining that safety by continually knocking down followers as they pop up. A few days is how long I expect it will take before you either knock this shit off, or I delete every Google account I have ever had and use Bing out of f*cking spite”. As this case demonstrates, the people we mail most often may not be our closest friends. As email has replaced the telephone for many as the dominate mode of communication--some contacts may be friends, however, many others may not be.

In response to the uproar, tweaks to Buzz’s privacy features have since been made. Todd Jackson, Buzz’s product manager, has also posted a public apology to the official Gmail Blog late last week for not “getting everything quite right”. The service will now assume the more user-centric “auto-suggest” model, allowing users to selectively choose the contacts they wish to follow, and will also no longer auto-link Picasa and Reader content. However, as the EPIC’s complaint notes, many are still unsatisfied with the opt-out nature of the service, arguing that users should be able to opt-into the service if they so choose, rather than having to delist themselves for a service they didn’t necessarily sign up. Ethical quandaries also still loom over Google’s misuse of the users’ private contact lists to jumpstart their new service.

Contextual Integrity

The attacks on personal privacy resulting from Google’s model are vast. As the case of the Australian woman illuminates, the concept of the “online friend” has completely taken out of context with Buzz’s initial auto-follow model. Many of the contacts we make on a daily basis need not be made public through the Google profile. For most, this Buzz’s privacy breach may be benign or annoying at most. However, those who are engaged in sensitive social or political relationships via their Gmail chat or email accounts, the revelation of common contact could have been potentially damaging for many. A reporter from CNET has cleverly labeled Buzz’ as a “socially awkward networking”, as bringing diverse contacts under one umbrella doesn’t exactly make the most social sense. In response, Gmail users are required to sort through and filter their Buzz followers according, or choose to disable the service all together.

Besides questions of who is stalking whom, the assumptive and public nature of Google’s new move has cast a shadow of doubt among Gmail users regarding the ability of Google to maintain the privacy and contextual integrity of the Gmail account. Should one account be the place to socialize, and “do business”? Gmail is, and should remain, an email service. However, Buzz takes the email experience into new and questionable grounds. Do Gmail users feel entirely comfortable having their personal email, social graph, and chat functions all coming under the auspices of one platform? Many users felt they had been lured into using a social networking service that they didn’t sign up for in the first place.

Social Media Competition

In addition to Google’s attempt to integrate their various service offerings, Buzz is seen as an obvious attempt to bolster competitiveness in the social media market. In 2004, Google released Orkut. While the service has become big in countries such as Brazil and India, it has been overshadowed by sites such as Facebook in other jurisdictions, and has not been able to prove itself as a mainstream space for networking. In the past year, Google had also launched Google Wave, a tool that mixes e-mail, with instant messaging and the ability for several people to collaborate on documents. However, the application failed to completely win over audiences, and was considered one of the top failures of 2009.

With Google unable to effectively saturate the social media ecosystem, Buzz is an attempt to compete with the searchable and real time experiences provided by social media giants, Facebook and Twitter. Increased competition within the social media market could be a positive development for privacy, as social media companies could arguably be compete on their ability to provide users with preferable privacy architectures. To the contrary, however, such competition has thus far had negative ramifications for user privacy, as the recent Buzz and Facebook moves illustrates. Facebook’s loosened privacy settings were a competitive knee-jerk to Twitters searchable and real time experience. Through a Twitter search, individuals can come to know what people are saying about a certain topic, event, or product, and as a result, the service has received a great deal attention from users, and non-users such as advertisers, alike.

In an attempt to one-up, their competition, the “Twitterization” of Facebook followed in two distinct stages. First was with the implementation of the Facebook News Feed, which gave users a real time account of actions their friends on the site. Many argued that this feature invaded user privacy. However, it was argued by Facebook that they only were making available information that was already accessible through individual profile pages. The News Feed, as it happens, effectively took user information and actions on the site out of original context by streaming this information live for others easy viewing. Information users once had to rummage for had become accessible in real time on the homepage of the service.

Secondly, Facebooks’ recent privacy scandal was a step towards making profile information more searchable and accessible to third parties, as is most often the case with the more public feeds on Twitter. As one commentator notes, “Facebook used to be very private but private is not great for search, to have great search you need all of the data to be publicly available as it mostly is on Twitter. Facebook have not quite nailed real time search yet but they are getting there and it will soon be a great way of examining sentiment across different demographics”. As a result, information on Facebook, such as name, profile picture, friends list, location and fan pages have become open access information. In addition, users on Facebook have been subjected to new privacy regime without notice, leaving their profile pages generally more open, and searchable through Google.

Converging the Online Self

The impact Buzz alone can make on the social media landscape remains questionable (Gmail heralds only 140 million accounts, which is a deficient cry from Facebooks’ 400+ million dedicated users). However, despite Googles’ in/ability to become claim hegemony over the social web landscape, the abuse of private information to launch a new service has raised serious debate over the privacy and the future of social networking. The Buzz service marks more than yet another new social networking service that brushes aside the privacy of users. As user control and privacy becomes an increasingly peripheral concern, Google’s shift toward privacy decontrol also signifies a worrisome supply-side shift towards the “convergence” of online identity.

Within this new dominant paradigm, privacy concerns are often interpreted as antithetical to competitiveness in the social media marketplace. Instead of an imagined ecosystem based on user control and privacy preference, it can now be inferred that the competiveness of social networking services will continue to disrupt the delicate balance between the public and private online. Regardless that greater visibility and searchability of the social profile may not be in the public interest, Google’s recent move works to reinforcement of the new status quo of “openness”. Furthermore, it is questionable as to how concentrated and integrated a user may want their online activities to become. A critical discourse of online privacy must, therefore, take into account the ways in which the social web has renders the user increasingly transparent through networks of networking services.

Google’s Buzz illustrates this point quite well. Initially, Gmail was a straightforward email service. Next, the AdWords advertising service and Gmail chat had become integrated into the Gmail experience. Because Google was using the confidential emails of its Gmail users, privacy concerns began to mount upon the launch of the the AdWords service. However, turmoil surrounding AdWords died down, notably as Google continues to reassert that is is bots, not humans, that are scanning the emails in order to provide the AdWords service. Next, there gradually occurred a convergence of Google services under the single social profile, or “email address”. A single Gmail account potentially includes use of with Google reader, calendar, chat, groups and an Orkut account. In terms of behavioral targeted advertising, Google has recently announced that they will be providing personalized search results even to users who have not signed up for Google services. This will be done through the placement a cookie on all machines to provide targeted advertising seamlessly through each Google search and browsing session.

While many argue that the collection of non-personally identifiable information poses no privacy harm, this assumption needs reassessment. As Google comes to offer us more, they also come to learn more, and Buzz signifies this trend towards a Googopolized social web. To add another layer of complexity to Googles hegemony, users of the Buzz service are also required to create a “Google Profile”, which is searchable online and displays real time status updates, comments, and connections from other social network services, such as Facebook and Twitter. As Google recently launched the beta version of the new Social Search, Buzz was just the service required to increase the relevance to the new service by encouraging Gmail users to publish even more personal information. The creation of a personal Google profile, which is indexed and searchable, raises many concerns about privacy and identity, and doubts are continually raised over how much Google should come to know about us.

While Google’s services have arguably made the online social experience more seamless and tailored, it is questionable as to how relevant, or even desirable, such a shift may be. At present, it may appear that Google is wearing far too many hats, and users should be wary of placing all eggs into one basket. As the launch of Buzz has shown us, user consent and the contextual integrity of private personal information can be compromised when a diverse number of online services are integrated and given a social spin. When competition among social web providers drives users to lose control of the private information which is inherently theirs, critical questions surrounding competition, convergence and privacy require critical exploration.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/blog-old/does-the-social-web-need-a-googopoly

Comments on Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion Discussion Paper on Standard Essential Patents and their Availability on Frand Terms

Anubha Sinha, Nehaa Chaudhari and Rohini Lakshane — 2016-05-03T02:30:15Z

The Centre for Internet & Society gave its comments to the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion. The comments were prepared by Anubha Sinha, Nehaa Chaudhari and Rohini Lakshané.

Download the PDF To access other submissions to the DIPP Discussion Paper on SEP and FRAND, please click here

Authors

I. PRELIMINARY

1. This submission presents comments by the Centre for Internet and Society, India ("CIS") on the Discussion Paper on Standard Essential Patents and their Availability on FRAND Terms (dated 01 March, 2016), released by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion ("the DIPP"), Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India (" the discussion paper/ discussion paper").

2. CIS commends the DIPP for its efforts at seeking inputs from various stakeholders on this important and timely issue. CIS is thankful for the opportunity to put forth its views.

3. This submission is divided into three main parts. The first part, 'Preliminary', introduces the document; the second part, 'About CIS', is an overview of the organization; and, the third part, 'Submissions on the Issues', answers the questions raised in the discussion paper. A list of annexures and their URLs is included at the end of the document.

II. ABOUT CIS

4. CIS is a non-profit organisation that undertakes interdisciplinary research on internet and digital technologies from policy and academic perspectives. The areas of focus include digital accessibility for persons with diverse abilities, access to knowledge, intellectual property rights, openness (including open data, free and open source software, open standards, open access, open educational resources, and open video), internet governance, telecommunication reform, freedom of speech and expression, intermediary liability, digital privacy, and cyber-security.

5. CIS values the fundamental principles of justice, equality, freedom and economic development. This submission is consistent with CIS' commitment to these values, the safeguarding of general public interest and the protection of India's national interest at the international level. Accordingly, the comments in this submission aim to further these principles. In addition, the comments are in line with the aims of the Make in India and Digital India initiatives of the Government of India.

III. SUBMISSION ON THE ISSUES FOR RESOLUTION

6. The following sections provide CIS' views and recommendations on the issues enumerated in section 11 of the discussion paper:

a) Whether the existing provisions in the various IPR-related legislations, especially the Patents Act, 1970 and antitrust legislations, are adequate to address the issues related to SEPs and their availability on FRAND terms? If not, then can these issues be addressed through appropriate amendments to such IPR-related legislations? If so, what changes should be affected?

A.1. The issues related to Standard Essential Patents ("SEPs") and their licensing on a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory ("FRAND") basis lie at the intersection of intellectual property ("IP") law and competition law . As such, in India, the Patents Act, 1970 ("the Patents Act") and, the Competition Act, 2002 ("the Competition Act") are the relevant legislations to be studied. These have been recently discussed, most recently, by Justice Bakhru in his comprehensive order inTelefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (Publ) v. Competition Commission of India and Another.

A.2. It is our submission that at the moment, amendments to the Patents Act and the Competition Act may not be preferred. As Justice Bakhru has noted in the aforesaid decision, there is no conflict between the remedies in the Patents Act and in the Competition Act, and, the pursuit of rights and remedies under one of these legislations does not bar a party from pursuing rights and remedies in the other. Further, under both legislations, there are scenarios for the respective authorities - the Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks ("the Controller") and the Competition Commission of India (" the CCI") for the Patents Act and for the Competition Act respectively - to seek inputs from each other.

A.3. We also note that the CCI is a fairly nascent regulator; one whose jurisdiction is not yet a settled matter of law. While the judgment in the Ericsson-CCI case is indeed a good beginning, we do not believe that the matter has been conclusively decided. Accordingly, given the complex legal questions involved, over not just the interpretation of the Patents Act and the Competition Act, but also constitutional issues around the jurisdiction of regulators and the power of judicial review of the courts, we believe that it would be prudent to examine the ruling of the courts on these issues in some detail, before considering amendments.

A.4. In addition, we are of the opinion that our IP law, and, our competition law, fully honor our international commitments, including the requirements under the TRIPS Agreement. As such, we would urge the Government of India to not enter into free trade agreements including, inter alia, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, that threaten our use of TRIPS flexibilities, and, impose 'TRIPS-plus' obligations.

A.5. We also urge the Government of India to adopt a balanced National IPR Policy, and, a National Competition Policy, both of which has been in abeyance for a considerable amount of time. We believe that these policies are crucial to realize the objectives of the Make in India and Digital India initiatives. At the same time, we submit that these policies be balanced, taking into account the interests of all stakeholders, developed through an extensive consultative process, and, suitably modified based on feedback.

b) What should be the IPR policy of Indian Standard Setting Organizations in developing Standards for Telecommunication sector and other sectors in India where Standard Essential Patents are used?

B.1. The discussion paper identifies four Standard Setting Organizations ("SSOs") in India, namely, the Telecom Standards Development Society of India ("TSDSI"), the Telecommunication Engineering Center ("TEC"), the Bureau of Indian Standards (" BIS"), the Global ICT Standardization Forum for India ("GISFI"), and, the Development Organization of Standards for Telecommunications in India ("DOSTI"). Comments on each of their policies have been made in the following paragraphs.

B.2. The BIS does not have an intellectual property rights ("IPR") policy of its own. The BIS Act, 2016 does not include one either. As the discussion paper notes, the BIS refers to the IPR policies of the relevant international SSO in the context of technology implemented in India, that is the same or equivalent to the ones developed or maintained by the respective SSOs.We recommend that BIS adopt an IPR policy at the earliest, factoring in India specific requirements differences: a large and exponentially growing mobile device market makes it possible for manufacturers, patent owners and implementers alike to achieve financial gains even with a low margin ("India specific requirements"). In addition, our comments on the IPR policy of the TSDSI in paragraph B.4. of this submission (below), may also be considered for the content of the BIS' future policy on IPR.

B.3 . According to the discussion paper, the TEC considers the IPR policies of the International Telecommunication Union. We recommend that like the BIS, the TEC also adopt its own IPR policy, factoring in the India specific requirements detailed above. In addition, our comments on the IPR policy of the TSDSI in paragraph B.4. of this submission (below), may also be considered for the content of the BIS' future policy on IPR.

B.4. The TSDSI, a relatively new standards body, has defined an IPR policy . In respect of this policy, the following observations are presented. First, this policy notes that IPR owners should be adequately and fairly rewarded.Second, it requires members to disclose essential IPRs in a "timely fashion." Third, as per its policy, the TSDSI can request the owner of an essential IPR to undertake, within three months, to license it irrevocably on FRAND terms. At the same time, the policy also states that the (aforesaid) ask may be subject to the condition that licensees agree to reciprocate. Should such an undertaking not be forthcoming, the TSDSI may suspend work on the standard or technical specification in question, or, adopt another course of action. Fourth, the policy identifies two scenarios for the non availability of licences prior to publication, based on the existence, or, the lack thereof, of alternative technologies. In the event of a lack of alternative technology, the policy requires a member to disclose in writing its reasons for not licensing its patents. Following this, it is submitted that there is no clarity on the concrete steps that the TSDSI would adopt in case the efforts to convince a member to license their essential IPRs, fail. The policy only states that "the TSDSI shall take further action as deemed fit." The same is also true where the IPR owner is not a member of the TSDSI. Fifth, the policy also envisages a scenario of non-availability post publication. The procedure for dealing with this is akin to the one detailed above, with the TSDSI asking for a written explanation, considering further action, including the possible withdrawal of the standard or technical specification in question. Sixth, it is observed that the policy does not require a commitment from its members to refrain from seeking injunctive relief. Seventh, it is accordingly recommended that the policy be suitably modified (a) to include India specific requirements discussed above; (b) to require a commitment from its members, that they refrain from seeking injunctive relief; (c) to delete the condition where FRAND negotiations may be subject to a condition of reciprocity; (d) to identify in detail the procedure to be followed in case of patent 'hold-ups' and patent 'hold-outs'; (e) to identify in detail the procedure to be followed in case of refusal to license by TSDSI members, and, non-members, both; and, (f) to include a detailed process on the declassification of a standard or technical specification.

B.5. The IPR policy of GISFI, is substantially similar to the IPR policy of the TSDSI, discussed in paragraph B.4. of this submission (above). Inter alia, GISFI's IPR policy also does not indicate the specific steps to be taken in case an IPR owner refuses to license essential IPRs for which no alternative technology is available. This is true in the cases both, where the refusal is by a member, and, by a non-member. Our recommendations on the IPR policy of the TSDSI in paragraph B.4. of this submission (above), may also be considered for the GISFI's IPR policy.

B.6. According to the discussion paper, the IPR policy of the DOSTI resembles that of the GIFSI. It is submitted that these policies are similar in the context of refusal to license by a member or non-member, and, like the TSDSI and the GISFI, the DOSTI also requires the patent holder to license its IPR irrevocably on FRAND terms. Accordingly, we reiterate our comments on the IPR policy of the TSDSI in paragraph B.4. of this submission (above). The aforesaid recommendations may also be considered to be relevant for the DOSTI's IPR policy.

B.7. We are also of the opinion that it would be useful for Indian SSOs to consider recommending the use of royalty-free licenses for IPRs. Illustratively, the World Wide Web Consortium ("W3C") and the Open Mobile Alliance ("OMA") encourage royalty-free licensing.

c) Whether there is a need for prescribing guidelines on working and operation of Standard Setting Organizations by Government of India? If so, what all areas of working of SSOs should they cover?

C.1. In our opinion, in a milieu where instances of SEP litigation are becoming increasingly complex, and, there is a tangible threat of the abuse of the FRAND process, it might be useful for the Government of India to make suggestions on the working of Indian SSOs.

C.2. It is suggested that the Government of India develop Model Guidelines that may be adopted by Indian SSOs, taking into account India specific requirements, including the ones detailed in paragraph B.2. of this submission (above). We believe that this measure will also enable the fulfilment of the objectives of the Make in India and Digital India initiatives.

C.3. We recommend that various stakeholders, including IP holders, potential licensees and users of IP, civil society organizations, academics, and, government bodies, including the the Indian Patent Office ("IPO"), the Department of Telecommunications, the DIPP, TRAI, and, the CCI be consulted in the creation of these Model Guidelines.

C.4. In our opinion, the Model Guidelines may cover (a) the composition of the SSO; (b) the process of admitting members; (c) the process of the determination of a standard or technical specification; (d) the process of declassification of a standard or technical specification; (e) the IPR Policy; (f) resolution of disputes; (g) applicable law.

d) Whether there is a need for prescribing guidelines on setting or fixing the royalties in respect of Standard Essential Patents and defining FRAND terms by Government of India? If not, which would be appropriate authority to issue the guidelines and what could be the possible FRAND terms?

D.1. In light of the inadequacies in the IPR policies (discussed above) of various SSOs in India, as well the the spate of ongoing patent infringement lawsuits around mobile technologies, we recommend that the Government of India intervene in the setting of royalties and FRAND terms.

D.2. We propose that the Government of India initiate the formation of a patent pool of critical mobile technologies and apply a compulsory license with a five per cent royalty. Further details of this proposal have been enumerated in answer to question 'f' of the discussion paper (below).

D.3. Our motivations for this proposal are many-fold. In our opinion, it is near-impossible for potential licensees to avoid inadvertent patent infringement. As a part of our ongoing research on technical standards applicable to mobile phones sold in India, we have found nearly 300 standards so far . It is submitted that carrying out patent searches for all the standards would be extremely expensive for potential licensees. Further, even if such searches were to be carried out, different patent owners, SSOs and potential licensees disagree on valuation, essentiality, enforceability, validity, and coverage of patents. In addition, some patent owners are non-practising entities ("NPEs") and may not be members of SSOs. The patents held by them are not likely to be disclosed. More importantly, home-grown manufacturers that have no patents to leverage and may be new entrants in the market would be especially disadvantaged by such a scenario. Budget phone manufacturers, standing to incur losses either as a result of heavy licensing fees, or, potential litigation, may close down. Alternatively, they may pass on their losses to consumers, driving the now-affordable phones out of their financial reach. With the objectives of Make in India and Digital India in sight, it is essential that Indian consumers continue to have access to devices within their purchasing power.

e) On what basis should the royalty rates in SEPs be decided? Should it be based on Smallest Saleable Patent Practicing Component (SSPPC), or on the net price of the Downstream Product, or some other criterion?

E.1. It is our submission that royalty rates for SEPs should be based on the smallest saleable patent practising component ("SSPPC"). Most modern telecommunication and IT devices are complex with numerous technologies working in tandem. Different studies indicate that the number of patents in the US applicable to smartphones is between 200,000 and 250,000. A comprehensive patent landscape of mobile device technologies conducted by CIS reveals that nearly 4,000 patents are applicable to mobile phones sold in India. It is thus extremely difficult to quantify the exact extent of interaction and interdependence between technologies in any device, in such a way that the exact contribution of the patented technology to the entire device can be determined.

E.2. The net cost of the device is almost always several times that of the chipset that implements the patented technology. Armstrong et al have found that the cost of a 4G baseband chip costs up to $20 including royalties in a hypothetical $400 phone sold in the US. One of the litigating parties in the ongoing patent infringement lawsuits in India has stated that one of the reasons for preferring to leverage its patents as downstream as possible in the value chain is that it will earn the company more royalties . In instances where patent exhaustion occurs much earlier in the value chain, such as in the case of the company's cross-licenses with Qualcomm (another company that owns patents to chip technologies), the company does not try to obtain royalties from the selling prices of devices for the cross-licensed technologies. It is submitted that such market practices could be detrimental to the government's objectives such as providing a mobile handset to every Indian by 2020 as a part of the Digital India programme . It is also worth noting in this context that the mobile device is the first and only medium of access to the Internet and telecom services for a large number of Indians, and, consequently, the only gateway to access to knowledge, information and critical services, including banking.

E.3. The discussion paper notes that J. Gregory Sidak, having studied the proceedings before the Delhi High Court, approved of the manner in which the court determined royalties. In his paper, Sidak(2015) notes that in determining royalties, the court relied, inter alia, on the decision of CSIRO v.Cisco ("the CSIRO case"), a 2015 decision of the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 2015. We humbly disagree with the opinion of the Delhi High Court on the manner of determining royalties, and, with Sidak's approval of the same.

E.4. It is our submission that the CSIRO case relied on a previous judgment, which we disagree with. The decision, a 2014 district court judgment, analogises the determination of royalties on SEPs to the determination of royalties on a copyrighted book. The court notes, "[b]asing a royalty solely on chip price is like valuing a copyrighted book based only on the costs of the binding, paper, and ink needed to actually produce the physical product. While such a calculation captures the cost of the physical product, it provides no indication of its actual value." In our opinion, this analogy is flawed. While a book is a distinct product as a whole, a mobile phone is a sum-total of its parts. If at all, a mobile phone could be compared with a book with several authors, as multiple technologies belonging to several patent holders are implemented in it. This judgement bases valuation for one set of technologies on the whole device, thus awarding compensation to the licensor even for those technologies implemented in the device that are not related to the licensed technologies. In our opinion, charging royalty on the net selling price of a device for one technology or one set of technologies is thus more like a referral scheme and less like actual compensation for the value added. Accordingly, royalties must be charged on the SSPPC principle.

f) Whether total payment of royalty in case of various SEPs used in one product should be capped? If so, then should this limit be fixed by Government of India or some other statutory body or left to be decided among the parties?

F.1. CIS has proposed a compulsory licensing fee of five per cent on a patent pool of critical mobile technologies. The rationale for this figure is the royalty cap imposed by India in the early 1990s.

F.2. As part of regulating foreign technology agreements, the (former) Department of Industrial Development (later merged with the DIPP) capped royalty rates in the early 1990s. Payment of royalties was capped at either a lump sum payment of $2 million, or, 5 percent on the royalty rates charged for domestic sale, and, 8 percent for export of goods pertaining to "high priority industries". Royalties higher than 5 percent or 8 percent, as the case may be, required securing approval from the government.

F.3. While the early 1990s (specifically, 1991) was too early for the mobile device manufacturing industry to be listed among high priority industries, the public announcement by the government covered computer software, consumer electronics, and electrical and electronic appliances for home use. The cap on royalty rates was lifted by the DIPP in 2009.

F.4. It is submitted in the case of mobile device technology, we are witnessing a situation similar to that of the 1990s. In this sphere, most of the patent holders are multinational corporations which results in large royalty amounts leaving India. At the same time, in our opinion, litigation over patent infringement in India has limited the manufacture and sale of mobile devices of homegrown brands.

F.5. We believe that the aforementioned developments are detrimental to the Make in India and Digital India initiatives of the Government of India, and, the government's aim of encouraging local manufacturing, facilitating indigenous innovation, as well as strengthening India's intellectual property regime. It is our submission, therefore, that the payment of royalties on SEPs be capped.

F.6. We submit that such a measure is particularly important, given the nature of SEP litigation in India. While SEP litigation in India is indeed comparable to international SEP litigation on broader issues raised, specifically competition law concerns, but differs crucially where the parties are concerned. International SEP litigation is largely between multinational corporations with substantial patent portfolios, capable of engaging in long drawn out litigations, or engaging in other strategies including setting off against each other's patent portfolios. Dynamics in the Indian market differ - with a larger SEP holder litigating against smaller manufacturers, many of whom are indigenous, home-grown.

F.7. In June, 2013, we had recommended to the erstwhile Hon'ble Minister for Human Resource Development that a patent pool of essential technologies be established, with the compulsory licensing mechanism. Subsequently, in February, 2015, we reiterated this request to the Hon'ble Prime Minister. We propose that the Government of India initiate the formation of a patent pool of critical mobile technologies and mandate a five percent compulsory license. As we have stated in our request to the Hon'ble Prime Minister, we believe that such a pool would "possibly avert patent disputes by ensuring that the owners' rights are not infringed on, that budget manufacturers are not put out of business owing to patent feuds, and that consumers continue to get access to inexpensive mobile devices. Several countries including the United States issue compulsory licenses on patents in the pharmaceutical, medical, defence, software, and engineering domains for reasons of public policy, or to thwart or correct anti-competitive practices."

F.8. We believe that such a measure is not in breach of our international obligations under the TRIPS Agreement.

g) Whether the practice of Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDA) leads to misuse of dominant position and is against the FRAND terms?

G.1. The issue of Non Disclosure Agreements ("NDAs") in SEP/FRAND litigation is a contentious one. Patent holders argue that they are essential to the license negotiation process to protect confidential information, whereas potential licensees submit that NDAs result in the imposition of onerous conditions.

G.2. In India's SEP litigation, the use of NDAs has been raised as an issue in at least two cases - separately by Intex and by iBall , in their cases against Ericsson. Intex and iBall have both claimed that the NDAs that Ericsson asked them to sign were onerous, and favoured Ericsson.

G.3. According to Intex, the NDA in question would result in high legal costs for Intex, and, would render it unable to disclose crucial information to its vendors (who had agreed to supply to Intex on the condition that Intex was not infringing on any patents).

G.4. According to iBall, the parties had agreed to enter a global patent license agreement ("GPLA") but Ericsson insisted on an NDA. Upon receiving the terms of the NDA, iBall claimed before the CCI that Ericsson's refusal to identify the allegedly infringed SEPs; the threat of patent infringement proceedings; the attempt to coax iBall to enter into a "one-sided and onerous NDA"; the tying and bundling patents irrelevant to iBall's products by way of a GPLA; demanding unreasonably high royalties by way of a certain percentage value of handset as opposed to the cost of actual patented technology used all constituted abuse of Ericsson's dominant position under Section 4 of the Competition Act.

G.5. In India, the law on misuse (abuse) of dominant position by an 'enterprise' is found primarily in Section 4 of the Competition Act (read with Section 2(h) of the Competition Act, which defines 'enterprise'). In its recent decision in the Ericsson-CCI case , the Delhi High Court has found Ericsson to be an 'enterprise' for the purposes of the Competition Act, and hence subject to an inquiry under Section 4 of the same legislation. In the same decision, the court has also recognised the jurisdiction of the CCI to examine Ericsson's conduct for abuse of behaviour, based on complaints by Micromax and Intex. The use of NDAs is one of the grounds on which the parties have complained to the CCI.

G.6. Pending a final determination by the CCI (and subsequent appeals), it would be premature to make an absolute claim on whether the use of NDAs results in an abuse of dominant position in all instances. However, the following submissions are made: First, the determination of misuse/abuse of dominant position is influenced by a number of factors , i.e., such a determination should be made on a case to case basis. Second, the market regulator, the CCI, is best situated to determine (a) abuse of dominance, and (b) whether the use of NDAs by an enterprise constitutes an abuse of its dominance. Third, the question of whether the use of NDAs constitutes misuse of dominance needs to be addressed in two parts - (a) whether the use of the NDA itself is abusive, irrespective of its terms and, (b) whether the use of certain specific terms renders the NDA abusive. Fourth, NDAs could potentially lead to the patent owner abusing its dominant position in the market, as well as result in an invalidation of FRAND commitments and terms. NDAs make it impossible to determine if a patent holder is engaging in discriminatory licensing practices. Fifth, NDAs are especially harmful in the case of NPEs-- companies that hold patents and monetise them but don't build or manufacture the components or devices that implement the technology associated with the patents.

h) What should be the appropriate mode and remedy for settlement of disputes in matters related to SEPs, especially while deciding FRAND terms? Whether Injunctions are a suitable remedy in cases pertaining to SEPs and their availability on FRAND terms?

H.1. The licensing of SEPs on FRAND terms requires the parties to negotiate "reasonable" royalty rates in good faith, and apply the terms uniformly to all willing licensees. It is our submission that if the parties cannot agree to FRAND terms, they may enter into binding arbitration. Further, if all efforts fail, there exist remedies under the Patents Act and the Competition Act, 2002 to address the issues.

H.2. Section 115 of the Patents Act empowers the court to appoint an independent scientific adviser " to assist the court or to inquire and report upon any such question of fact or of opinion (not involving a question of interpretation of law) as it may formulate for the purpose. " Such an independent adviser may inform the court on the technical nuances of the matter.

H.3. Further, under the Patents Act, pending the decision of infringement proceedings the Court may provide interim relief, if the plaintiff proves first, a prima facie case of infringement; second, that the balance of convenience tilts in plaintiff's favour; and, third, that if an injunction is not granted the plaintiff shall suffer irreparable damage. H.4. However, it is our suggestion that courts adopt a more cautious stance towards granting injunctions in the field of SEP litigation. First, in our opinion, injunctions may prove to be a deterrent to arrive at a FRAND commitment, in particular, egregiously harming the willing licensee. Second, especially in the Indian scenario, where litigating parties operate in vastly different price segments (thereby targeting consumers with different purchasing power), it is difficult to establish that "irreparable damage" has been caused to the patent owner on account of infringement. Third, we note the approach of the European Court of Justice, which prohibited the patent holder from enforcing an injunction provided a willing licensee makes an offer for the price it wishes to pay to use a patent under the condition that it deposited an amount in the bank as a security for the patent holder. Fourth, we also note the approach of the Federal Trade Commission in the USA, which only authorizes patent holders to seek injunctive relief against potential licensees who have either stated that they will not license a patent on any terms, or refuse to enter into a license agreement on terms that have been set in the final ruling of a court or arbitrator. Further, as Contreras (2015) observes, that the precise boundaries of what constitutes as an unwilling licensee remains to be seen. We observe a similar ambiguity in Indian jurisprudence, and accordingly submit that courts should carefully examine the conduct of the licensee to injunct them from the alleged infringement.

i) What steps can be taken to make the practice of Cross-Licensing transparent so that royalty rates are fair & reasonable?

I.1. The Patents Act requires patentees and licensees to submit a statement on commercial working of the invention to the Controller every year. Form 27 under section 146(2) of the Act lists the details necessary to be disclosed for compliance of the requirement of "working". A jurisprudential analysis reveals the rationale and objective behind this mandatory requirement. Undeniably, the scheme of the Indian patent regime makes it amply clear that "working" is a very important requirement, and the public as well as competitors have a right to access this information in a timely manner, without undue hurdles. Indeed, as the decision in Natco Pharma v. Bayer Corporation reveals, the disclosures in Form 27 were crucial to determining the imposition of a compulsory license on the patentee. Thus, broadly, Form 27 disclosures can critically enable willing licensees to access patent "working" information in a timely manner.

I.2. However, there has been little compliance of this requirement by the patentees, despite the IPO reiterating the importance of compliance through the issuance of multiple public notices (suo motu and in response to a public interest litigation filed in 2011 ), and, reminding the patentees that non-compliance is punishable with a heavy fine. Findings of research submitted by one of the parties in the writ of the 2011 public interest litigationShamnad Basheer v. Union of India and others reveal as follows. First, a large number of Form 27s are unavailable for download from the website of the IPO. This possibly indicates that the forms have either not been filed by the patentees with the IPO, or have not been uploaded (yet) by the IPO. Second, a large number of filings in the telecom sector remain incomplete.

I.3. In 2015, CIS queried the IPO website for Form 27s of nearly 4,400 patents. CIS' preliminary research (ongoing and unpublished) echoes findings similar to the ones disclosed in the case discussed in paragraph I.2. of this submission (above).

I.4. In view of the submissions above, CIS makes the following recommendations to make the practice of cross-licensing transparent so that royalty rates are fair & reasonable: first, that there be a strict enforcement of the submission of Form 27s on a regular and timely basis by the patentees; and, second, that guidelines may be drawn up on whether it was discriminatory to charge no royalties (whether on the SSPPU or on the whole device) for a patent holder in a cross-licensing arrangement with another, when it charges royalty on the selling price of the device from a non-cross-licensor.

j) What steps can be taken to make the practice of Patent Pooling transparent so that royalty rates are fair & reasonable?

J.1. Patent pools can be understood as an agreement between two or more patent owners to license one or more of their patents to one another or to third parties. Thus, the creation of a patent pool makes use of the legal instrument of licensing, similar to the practice of cross-licensing. Insofar, we reiterate our recommendations made in paragraph I.3. of this submission (above), which apply to the answer to the instant question.

J.2. In furtherance of the recommendation above, we also propose the alteration of the Form 27 template to include more disclosures. Presently, patentees are required to to declare number of licensees and sub-licensees. We specifically propose that the format of Form 27 filings be modified to include patent pool licenses, with an explicit declaration of the names of the licensees and not just the number.

J.3. It is also our submission that patent pools be required to offer FRAND licenses on the same terms to both members and non-members of the pool.

k) How should it be determined whether a patent declared as SEP is actually an Essential Patent, particularly when bouquets of patents are used in one device?

K.1. We submit that several studies on the essentiality of SEPs indicate that only a small percentage of SEPs are actually essential. A study conducted byGoodman and Myers (2004) showed that only 21% of SEPs pertaining to the 3G standard in the US were deemed to be actually essential. Another study conducted by the same authors in 2009 for WCDMA patents showed that 28% SEPs were essential.

K.2. In our opinion, first, the methodology adopted by Goodman and Myers could be replicated to determine the "essential" nature of an SEP. Second, while adopting their methodology, it would be useful to address some of the issues over which these studies were critiqued. Accordingly, we suggest that (a) laboratory tests may be conducted by an outside expert or by a commercial testing laboratory, and not at an in-house facility owned by either parties, so as to eliminate in the lab results; and, (b) expert opinions may be considered in order to determine essentiality.

l) Whether there is a need of setting up of an independent expert body to determine FRAND terms for SEPs and devising methodology for such purpose?

L.1. In our opinion, there is no need for an independent expert body to determine FRAND terms for SEPs and devising the methodology for such a purpose. The existing legal and regulatory framework is reasonably equipped to determine FRAND terms. A more detailed submission on the existing framework and suggested changes has been made in our answer to question 'a' of the discussion paper (above).

L.2. However, we observe that Indian courts, tribunals and the CCI are yet to endorse a methodology for making FRAND determinations. The judgments of the Delhi High Court do not provide a conclusive rationale or methodology for the imposition of royalty rates in the respective matters.

L.3. We submit that in the absence of definitive Indian jurisprudence for determination of FRAND terms, American jurisprudence provides certain guidance. Contreras (2015) informs us about the various case law American courts and regulators have developed and adhered to whilst making such determinations.The dominant analytical framework for determining "reasonable royalty" patent damages in the United States today was set out in 1970 by the District Court for the Southern District of New York in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp . While this may be used as a guiding framework, the question of methodology remains far from settled.

m) If certain Standards can be met without infringing any particular SEP, for instance by use of some alternative technology or because the patent is no longer in force, what should be the process to declassify such a SEP?

M.1. In our opinion, if a standard can be met without infringing a patent declared to be "essential" to it, then the patent is not actually "essential". In this instance, the methods suggested in response to question 'k' of the discussion paper (above) could be used to declassify the SEP.

M.2. We further submit that if a patent is no longer in force, that is, if it has expired, then it ceases to be patent, and therefore an SEP. The process to declassify such an SEP could be simply to declare it an expired patent.

M.3. In addition, if it is possible to implement a certain standard by using an alternative technology, then the SEP for such a standard is not actually an SEP. However, the scale of operations and that of mass manufacturing and compatibility requirements in devices and infrastructure mean that it is unlikely to have different methods of implementing the same standard.

M.4. In general, it is our submission that an Indian SSO could maintain a publicly accessible database of SEPs found to be invalid or non-essential in India.

7. We reiterate our gratitude to the DIPP for the opportunity to make these submissions. In addition to our comments above, we have shared some of our research on this issue, in the 'Annexures', below.

8. It would be our pleasure and privilege to discuss these comments with the DIPP; and, supplement these with further submissions if necessary. We also offer our assistance on other matters aimed at developing a suitable policy framework for SEPs and FRAND in India, and, working towards the sustained innovation, manufacture and availability of mobile technologies in India.

On behalf of the Centre for Internet and Society, 22 April, 2016

Anubha Sinha - anubha@cis-india.org | Nehaa Chaudhari - nehaa@cis-india.org

Rohini Lakshané - rohini@cis-india.org

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ANNEXURES

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● Anubha Sinha, Fuelling the Affordable Smartphone Revolution in India, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/digital-asia-hub-the-good-life-in-asias-21-st-century-anubha-sinha-fueling-the-affordable-smartphone-revolution-in-india (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

● Nehaa Chaudhari, Standard Essential Patents on Low-Cost Mobile Phones in India: A Case to Strengthen Competition Regulation?, available at http://www.manupatra.co.in/newsline/articles/Upload/08483340-C1B9-4BA4-B6A9-D6B6494391B8.pdf (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

● Nehaa Chaudhari, Pervasive Technologies:Patent Pools, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/patent-pools (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

● Nehaa Chaudhari, The Curious Case of the CCI:Competition Law and SEP Regulation in India, presented at the 4th Global Congress on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/the-curious-case-of-the-cci-competition-law-and-sep-regulation-in-indi a (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

● Nehaa Chaudhari, Letter for Establishment of Patent Pool for Low Cost Access Devices through Compulsory Licences, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/letter-for-establishment-of-patent-pool-for-low-cost-access-devices (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

● Prof Jorge L. Contreras and Rohini Lakshané, Patents and Mobile Devices in India: An Empirical Survey, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2756486 (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

● Rohini Lakshané, CIS, List of technical standards and IP types (Working document), available at https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B8SgjShAjhbtaml5eW50bS01d2s/view?usp=sharing (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

● Rohini Lakshané, Open Letter to Prime Minister Modi, February 2015, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/open-letter-to-prime-minister-modi (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

● Rohini Lakshané, FAQ: CIS' proposal to form a patent pool of critical mobile technology, September 2015, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/faq-cis-proposal-for-compulsory-licensing-of-critical-mobile-technologies (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

● Rohini Lakshané, Joining the dots in India's big-ticket mobile phone patent litigation, May 2015, last updated October 2015, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/joining-the-dots-in-indias-big-ticket-mobile-phone-patent-litigation (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

● Rohini Lakshané, Compilation of Mobile Phone Patent Litigation Cases in India, March 2015, last updated April 2016, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/compilation-of-mobile-phone-patent-litigation-cases-in-india , (last accessed April 22, 2016).

● Rohini Lakshané, Patent landscaping in the Indian Mobile Device Marketplace, presented at the 4th Global Congress on Intellectual Property and Public Interest, December 2015, available at https://drive.google.com/open?id=0B8SgjShAjhbtME45N245SmowOGs (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

● Vikrant Narayan Vasudeva, Patent Valuation and Licence Fee Determination in the Context of Patent Pools, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/patent-valuation-and-license-fee-determination-in-context-of-patent-pools (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

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This submission has been authored by (alphabetically) Anubha Sinha, Nehaa Chaudhari and Rohini Lakshané, on behalf of the Centre for Internet and Society, India.

See The Centre for Internet and Society, available at http://cis-india.org (last accessed 22 April, 2016) for details of the organization, and, our work.

Make in India, available at http://www.makeinindia.com/home (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Digital India, available at http://www.digitalindia.gov.in/ (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

See Nehaa Chaudhari, The Curious Case of the CCI:Competition Law and SEP Regulation in India, presented at the 4th Global Congress on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/the-curious-case-of-the-cci-competition-law-and-sep-regulation-in-india (last accessed 21 April, 2016) for further details on relevant provisions.

In the High Court of Delhi, W.P.(C) 464/2014 & CM Nos. 911/2014 & 915/2014, judgment delivered on 30 March, 2016. Hereafter referred to as the Ericsson-CCI judgment.

Id.

Under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, and, under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, for the High Courts and the Supreme Court, respectively.

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

KEI Staff, 2015 October 15 version: RCEP IP Chapter, available at http://keionline.org/node/2472 (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

BIS Act, 2016, available at http://www.bis.org.in/bs/bsindex.asp (last accessed 21 April, 2016).

TSDSI, Intellectual Property Rights Policy, available at http://www.tsdsi.org/media/Help/2014-12-17/TSDSI-PLD-40-V1.0.0-20141217.pdf (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Id at Clause 3.1.

Id at Clause 5.1.

Id at Clause 5.2.

Id at Clause 5.5.

Id at Clauses 7.1. and 7.2.

Id at Clause 7.2.1.a (iii).

Id at Clause 7.2.1.b(iii).

Id at Clause 7.3.

GISFI, Intellectual Property Rights Policy, available at http://www.gisfi.org/ipr_policy/gisfi_intellectual_property_righ.htm (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Id at Clauses 6.2.1.a(iii) and 6.2.1.b(iii).

See W3C, Patent Policy, available at https://www.w3.org/Consortium/Patent-Policy-20040205/ (last accessed 22 April, 2016) for more details on their royalty-free licences.

See OMA, Use Agreement, available at http://openmobilealliance.org/about-oma/policies-and-terms-of-use/use-agreement/ (last accessed 22 April, 2016) for more details on their royalty-free licences.

See Rohini Lakshané, Open Letter to PM Modi, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/open-letter-to-prime-minister-modi (last accessed 22 April, 2016) for further details of CIS' proposal.

Rohini Lakshané, CIS, List of Technical Standards and IP Types (Working document), available at https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B8SgjShAjhbtaml5eW50bS01d2s/view?usp=sharing (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 Tex. L. Rev. at 2015; See also, for e.g., RPX Corporation, Amendment No. 3 to Form S-l, 11 Apr. 2011, at 59, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1509432/000119312511101007/ds1a.htm (last accessed 22 April, 2016), quoting - "Based on our research, we believe there are more than 250,000 active patents relevant to today's smartphones…".; See further Steve Lohr, Apple- Samsung Case Shows Smartphone as Legal Magnet, New York Times, 25 Aug. 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/26/technology/apple-samsung-case-shows-smartphone-as-lawsuit-magnet.html (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Jorge L. Contreras and Rohini Lakshané, Patents and Mobile Devices in India: An Empirical Survey, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2756486 (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Ann Armstrong, Joseph J. Mueller and Timothy D. Syrett, The Smartphone- Royalty Stack:Surveying Royalty Demands for the Components Within Modern Smartphones, available at https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/Publications/Documents/The-Smartphone-Royalty-Stack-Armstrong-Mueller-Syrett.pdf (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Florian Mueller, Ericsson Explained Publicly why it Collects Patent Royalties from Device (Not Chipset) Makers, available at http://www.fosspatents.com/2014/01/ericsson-explained-publicly-why-its.html (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Romit Guha and Anandita Singh Masinkotia, PM Modi's Digital India Project:Government to Ensure that Every Indian has a Smartphone by 2019, available at http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-08-25/news/53205445_1_digital-india-india-today-financial-services (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Nehaa Chaudhari, Standard Essential Patents on Low-Cost Mobile Phones in India: A Case to Strengthen Competition Regulation?, available at http://www.manupatra.co.in/newsline/articles/Upload/08483340-C1B9-4BA4-B6A9-D6B6494391B8.pdf (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

See part 10.2.2. of the Discussion Paper, at page 25.

J.Gregory Sidak, FRAND in India:The Delhi High Court's Emerging Jurisprudence on Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, available at http://jiplp.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2015/06/11/jiplp.jpv096.full (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas in No. 6:11-cv-00343-LED, decided on 03 December, 2015, available at. http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/15-1066.Opinion.12-1-2015.1.PDF (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Id.

Kumkum Sen, News on Royalty Payments Brings Cheer in New Year, available at http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/news-on-royalty-payment-brings-cheer-in-new-year-110010400044_1.html (last accessed 21 April, 2016).

See Sanjana Govil, Putting a Lid on Royalty Outflows- How the RBI Can Help Reduce India's IP Costs, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/lid-on-royalty-outflows (last accessed 21 April, 2016), for a discussion on the introduction of royalty caps in the early 1990s, and its success in reducing the flow of money out of India.

Supra note 33.

Nehaa Chaudhari, Letter for Establishment of Patent Pool for Low-cost Access Devices through Compulsory Licenses, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/letter-for-establishment-of-patent-pool-for-low-cost-access-devices (last accessed 21 April, 2016).

Supra note 26.

Rohini Lakshané, FAQ: CIS' proposal to form a patent pool of critical mobile technology, September 2015, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/faq-cis-proposal-for-compulsory-licensing-of-critical-mobile-technologies (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Id.

See the Ericsson-CCI case, supra note 6, for Intex's submissions as discussed by Justice Bakhru.

Id.

Rohini Lakshané, Compilation of Mobile Phone Patent Litigation Cases in India, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/compilation-of-mobile-phone-patent-litigation-cases-in-india (last accessed 21 April, 2016).

See the Ericsson-CCI case, supra note 6, at paragraph 19.2.

Supra note 47.

See the Ericsson-CCI judgment, supra note 6, at paragraphs 88-105.

Section 19(4) of the Competition Act. See also Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India and Another, (2010) 10 SCC 744.

Section 115 of the Patents Act, 1970.

Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v. ZTE Corp. and ZTE Deutschland, Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 16 July 2015 in GmbH C-170/13.

Third Party United States Fed. Trade Commission's Statement on the Public Interest, In re Certain Wireless Communication Devices, Portable Music and Data Processing Devices, Computers and Components Thereof, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, Inv. No. 337-TA-745 (Jun. 6, 2012).

Jorge L. Contreras, A Brief History of FRAND: Analyzing Current Debates in Standard Setting and Antitrust Through a Historical Lens, 80 Antitrust Law Journal 39 (2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2374983 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2374983 (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Section 146(2) of the Patents Act, 1970..

Sai Vinod, Patent Office Finally Takes Form 27s Seriously, available at http://spicyip.com/2013/02/patent-office-finally-takes-form-27s.html (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Order No. 45/2013 (Intellectual Property Appellate Board, Chennai), available at http://www.ipab.tn.nic.in/045-2013.htm (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Intellectual Property India, Public Notice, available at http://www.ipindia.nic.in/iponew/publicNotice_Form27_12Feb2013.pdf (last accessed 22 April, 2016) and Intellectual Property India, Public Notice, available at http://ipindia.nic.in/iponew/publicNotice_24December2009.pdf (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Supra note 57.

Id.

See research findings available at http://spicyip.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/FORM-27-WP-1R-copy.pdf (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

In the High Court of Delhi, W.P.(C) 5590/2015. This litigation is currently ongoing. See, illustratively, Mathews P. George, Patent Working in India: Delhi HC issues notice in Shamnad Basheer v. Union of India & Ors. - I, available at http://spicyip.com/2015/09/patent-working-in-india-delhi-hc-issues-notice-in-shamnad-basheer-v-union-of-india-ors-i.html (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

In response to an RTI request made to the IPO in Mumbai for forms unavailable on the website, CIS received a reply stating, "As thousand [sic] of Form -27 are filed in this office, it is very difficult to segregate Form-27 for the patent numbers enlisted in your RTI application as it needs diversion of huge official staff/ manpower and it will affect day to day [sic] work of this office." This research is ongoing and unpublished. Please contact us for a copy of the RTI application and the response received.

WIPO Secretariat, Patent Pools and Antitrust - A Comparative Analysis, available at https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.wipo.int%2Fexport%2Fsites%2Fwww%2Fip-competition%2Fen%2Fstudies%2Fpatent_pools_report.pdf (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Form 27, The Patents Act, available at http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/manual/HTML%20AND%20PDF/Manual%20of%20Patent%20Office%20Practice%20and%20Procedure%20-%20html/Forms/Form-27.pdf (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

David J. Goodman and Robert A. Myers, 3G Cellular Standards and Patents, available at http://patentlyo.com/media/docs/2009/03/wirelesscom2005.pdf (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Darien CT, Review of Patents Declared as Essential to WCDMA through December, 2008, available at http://www.frlicense.com/wcdma1.pdf (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Supra note 67.

Donald L. Martin and Carl De Meyer, Patent Counting, a Misleading Index of Patent Value: A Critique of Goodman & Myers and its Uses, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=949439 (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Rohini Lakshané, Joining the Dots in India's Big-Ticket Mobile Phone Patent Litigation, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/joining-the-dots-in-indias-big-ticket-mobile-phone-patent-litigation (last accessed 22 April, 2016). See also supra note 47 for more details.

Supra note 55.

318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified and aff'd, 446 F. 2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971).

2015

They filed it in 2011

The 2011 filing only includes pharma, BTW: http://spicyip.com/docs/Form%2027s.pdf. Also, this writ is from May 2015: http://spicyip.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/FORM-27-WP-1R-copy.pdf Anyway, I'll leave it as it is.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/comments-on-department-of-industrial-policy-and-promotion-discussion-paper-on-standard-essential-patents-and-their-availability-on-frand-terms

Combinations and Competition: Why the draft DCB must account for digital mergers and acquisitions

Abhineet Nayyar and Isha Suri — 2024-08-08T07:47:01Z

Authored by Abhineet Nayyar and Isha Suri, reviewed by Nishant

“It is better to buy than to compete”

Mark Zuckerberg (Meta CEO, 2008)[1]

Mergers and Acquisitions (collectively, M&As or Combinations) have been a common practice in industry consolidation for many years now. In fact, as Zuckerberg’s infamous quote suggests, it might be one of the central pillars of today’s internet economy. The recently announced $1.5 billion merger between Reliance Industries and Disney, which, among other things, aims to combine their streaming services – Jio Platforms and Hotstar, respectively – is just another instance of this growing trend.[2] Data on market activity suggests that far from being an outlier, M&As are becoming commonplace in the Indian technology ecosystem as well - a trend likely to continue and increase unless market regulators intervene.

Built on direct and indirect network effects, digital markets are susceptible to concentration in the hands of a few dominant platforms. In addition to potentially anti-competitive practices that these platforms are likely to engage in such as deep discounting, they often use ‘strategic investments and partnerships’ with their competitors or other firms in their supply chains to further consolidate their position in the market. Examples include but are not limited to Facebook’s 2012 acquisition of Instagram for $1 billion, its 2014 acquisition of WhatsApp for $19 billion, or even its 2020 investment of $5.7 billion in Reliance Industries’ Jio – a partnership that positions itself at “bringing together JioMart, Jio’s small-business initiative, with WhatsApp”.[3][4][5][6] Through similar transactions, dominant players are in a position to foreclose competition and further entrench their position as market leaders.

In 2022, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on “Anti-Competitive Practices by BigTech Companies” also highlighted ‘killer acquisitions’ in India’s digital markets as one of the many concerning anti-competitive practices.[7] As per the Standing Committee, in the choice between ‘Build versus Buy’, “large platforms tend to pick the latter, thereby disallowing smaller firms to grow beyond a certain limit.” [8] However, the Committee on Digital Competition Law (CDCL), specifically formed to look into competition-related concerns in digital markets, chose to exclude this particular anti-competitive practice from the ambit of its proposed Digital Competition Bill (Draft DCB). Moreover, the CDCL explains this choice by pointing to the Competition [Amendment] Act, 2023, which theoretically allows the Competition Commission of India (CCI) to review more M&As.

But this justification is only partial.[9] While the 2023 Amendment tries to answer the question “Are the right digital M&As being regulated by CCI?”, it ignores the more pertinent “Are the right principles being deployed to review digital M&As?”.

In this context, the first section of this article provides an overview of conventional M&A regulation in India and underlines prominent trends in the process. This is followed by an inquiry into the evolution of digital combinations in India, and their treatment by CCI. We conclude the piece by recommending CCI incorporate more accurate and relevant theories of harm for digital mergers – a practice that competition authorities have incorporated in other jurisdictions such as the EU’s Digital Markets Act, the UK’s Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill and the 2022 guidelines released by Singapore’s Competition and Consumer Commission.[10]

Reviewing Combinations for Anti-competitiveness

M&As, including digital mergers, are governed through Sections 5 and 6 of the Competition Act, 2002 [Act] and the Combination Regulations, 2011. The Act lays out many key elements in this respect, including defining ‘Combinations’ - referred to a sub-group of M&As that qualify certain threshold values and are required to notify CCI about their existence.[11] In addition, the Act also empowers the CCI to evaluate and adjudicate on these combinations.[12]

Typically, a qualified combination – including a merger, an acquisition, or an investment that meets the threshold criteria – must notify the CCI of the relevant transaction.[13] Following this notification, as per the rules, the Commission conducts a thorough review of the anti-competitive effects of the proposed combinations. Once complete, the CCI is empowered to either approve or reject the transaction. Overall, the CCI primarily assesses the combination based on its effect on the competition structure of the relevant market. In cases where the CCI is satisfied that such adverse effects can be eliminated by suitable modification, it may approve the combination with modifications. Conversely, the Commission might also pursue an investigation against a combination that has failed to notify it of the relevant transaction.

It is important to note that not every M&A requires notification and approval from the Commission and depends on whether that particular transaction qualifies the threshold values set under Section 5 of the Act.[14] With massive digitisation underway across all sectors of the Indian economy, concerns about how these threshold values affect scrutiny of digital mergers – which usually didn’t qualify – have drawn focus in recent years.[15] Deals such as Facebook’s 2014 acquisition of WhatsApp, which evaded the regulator’s scrutiny since it failed to meet the qualifying thresholds, have also uncovered the need for newer ‘theories of harm’ that can be used to govern such combinations adequately [more on this later].[16]

Digital M&As and Limitations of the Status Quo

According to data released by CCI in its annual reports, the Commission reviewed 99 combination notices in 2022-23, an increase from 90 during the previous year.[17] Out of these 99, the Commission approved 92 such combinations in 2022-23, up from 89 in 2021-22.[18] However, it is pertinent to note that none of these combination notices were rejected by the Commission. In fact, CCI has not rejected any of the 400+ combination notices filed with it in the last five years.[19]

Furthermore, research undertaken by Deloitte suggests that there were more than 160 mergers or acquisitions in India in 2022-23.[20] This disparity between CCI’s figures and market estimates can largely be attributed to the threshold requirements under the 2002 Act. Taking into account that over 36% of these 160+ M&A deals are estimated to be in the ‘Technology, Media and Telecommunications’ industry, it is reasonable to assume that ‘asset-light’ digital combinations continue to escape the Commission’s scrutiny.[21] This is a risk because despite failing to meet the threshold values set under the 2002 Act, many deals are still significant in their scale. For example, Reliance Industries group, which also owns the telecom giant Jio, single-handedly accounted for eight (8) digital acquisitions in 2019.[22]

The Commission’s high approval rate, coupled with its inability to appropriately scrutinise such digital M&As, led to the government seeking modifications to India’s competition law.[23] In 2023, following the recommendations of the 2019 Competition Law Review Committee, the Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023 [or ‘the 2023 Amendment’] was passed.[24] Among other changes, the 2023 Amendment included “value of transaction” as one of the threshold measures for triggering the notifying clause.[25] This meant that even if a merger did not satisfy the ‘asset’ or ‘turnover’ threshold values, it could still be deemed a combination if the value of the transaction exceeded ₹2000 cr.[26] However, the impact of the 2023 Amendment on CCI’s future rulings is yet to be seen.

Thereafter in 2023, the Government of India constituted the CDCL “to examine the need for a separate law on competition in digital markets”, including a framework similar to the EU’s Digital Markets Act.[27][28] However, unlike the US, the EU, the UK, or Singapore – jurisdictions that the CDCL referred to during its deliberations – it explicitly excluded ‘mergers and acquisitions’ from the draft bill’s scope, instead relying solely on the 2023 Amendment.[29] But the intended objectives of the 2023 Amendment and the proposed DCB are entirely different. While deal value thresholds aim to address the ‘threshold value’ problem to include more deals under merger review, they provide no guidance that can help adapt the merger review process to the context of digital markets.

Adopting Accurate and Relevant Theories of Harm

Established theories of harm lie at the core of any merger review process, with the competition regulator relying on them to assess potential damage to competition. Traditionally, if merging parties are neither competitors (horizontal) nor trading relationships (vertical), their combinations are usually not subject to strict enforcement under the conventional merger review regime.[30][31] As a result, traditional theories of harm focus on the risk that the post-merger firm will ‘bundle’ or ‘tie’ the pre-merger firms’ products together. In contrast, many inherent characteristics of digital markets – such as network effects and low marginal costs – have been found to exacerbate the gaps in these outdated theories of harm.[32][33] While network effects allow first movers to access a positive feedback loop and become dominant in digital markets, they also incentivise mergers between competitors because an increase in the network of users is likely to generate further returns.[34]

Take the case of ‘platform envelopment’, for example, where a platform dominant in one market i.e., ‘the origin market’, enters another platform market i.e., ‘the target market’ – through a merger or an acquisition – and bundles its original functionality with that of its newly acquired platform in the target market.[35] As a prominent example of this theory, Google entered mobile operating systems by bundling Android with Google Search – two separate markets – to leverage the data generated by users of both. Such data was effectively monetized through Google’s online advertising platforms, thereby enabling the firm to fund its entry in a way that could not be replicated by other competitors and contributed to its eventual dominance of the mobile operating system market.[36] However, recognising envelopment and using other such theories of harm requires an understanding of platform characteristics, the impact of direct and indirect network effects, and the role of data in enabling platform monopolisation – all of which the draft DCB seeks to do.[37]

As highlighted earlier, many other jurisdictions have also updated or are in the process of updating their merger guidelines to incorporate these newer theories of harm. For instance, the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) amended its merger guidelines in 2019 to address the competitive concerns of conglomerate mergers, especially in digital markets. This allows the JFTC to consider factors such as network effects, the value of data, and the importance of marginal costs while reviewing digital combinations.[38]

With M&A activity in India’s digital sector also bound to witness an upward trend, we reiterate that merger review for digital markets should account for many of these characteristics that are likely to amplify the shortcomings of traditional theories of harm. This requires the CDCL to modify the draft DCB accordingly or, at the very least, for the CCI to publish detailed guidelines on reviewing digital M&As, accounting for more evolved theories of harm.

[1]FTC v. Facebook, Inc, FTC Amended Complaint, 2021, p. 1, available here

[2]Reliance and Disney team up to crush Netflix and Prime Video in India, Rest of World, March 2024, available here

[3]The Inside Story of How Facebook Acquired Instagram, OneZero, August 2020, available here

[4]India seeks to tighten rules on M&A antitrust scrutiny, Reuters, 2022, available here

[5]CCI approves acquisition of approximately 9.99% of Jio Platforms by Facebook, AZB and Partners, 2020, available here

[6]Facebook Invests $5.7 Billion in Indian Internet Giant Jio, The New York Times, April 2020, available here

[7]Parliamentary Standing Committee on Anti-Competitive Practices by BigTech Companies, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, p. 8, available here

[8]Parliamentary Standing Committee on Anti-Competitive Practices by BigTech Companies, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, p. 8, available here

[9]Comments to the Draft Digital Competition Bill, 2024, Nayyar, A., Suri, I., and Bedi, P., Centre for Internet and Society, May 2024, p. 20-22, available here

[10]Singapore: Competition law fact sheet, Norton Rose Fulbright, April 2024, available here

[11]The Competition Act, 2002, Government of India, p. 8, available here

[12]The Competition Act, 2002, Government of India, p. 12, available here

[13]Combination FAQs, Competition Commission of India, available here

[14]The Competition Act, 2002, Government of India, p. 8, available here

[15]Big Data Mergers: Bridging the Gap for an Effective Merger Control Framework, Tyagi, K., May 2021, p. 34, available here

[16]India seeks to tighten rules on M&A antitrust scrutiny, Reuters, 2022, available here

[17]Annual Reports, Competition Commission of India, available here

[18]Annual Reports, Competition Commission of India, available here

[19]Annual Reports, Competition Commission of India, available here

[20]India’s M&A Trends 2023, Deloitte, 2023, available here

[21]India’s M&A Trends 2023, Deloitte, 2023, available here

[22]2019 In Review: Top 10 High-Profile Startup Acquisitions In India, Inc42, 2019, available here

[23]India seeks to tighten rules on M&A antitrust scrutiny, Reuters, 2022, available here

[24]The Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023, Government of India, available here

[25]The Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023, Government of India, available here

[26]The Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023, Government of India, available here

[27]Unstarred question No. 81, Government of India, Lok Sabha, December 2023, available here

[28]The Digital Markets Act Proposal of the European Commission: Ex-ante Regulation, Infused with Competition Principles, European Papers, 2021, available here

[29]Report of the Committee on Digital Competition Law, Government of India, 2024, p. 151 onwards, available here

[30]A note on conglomerate mergers: The Google/Fitbit case, Nakagawa, K. and Matsushima, N., Japan and the World Economy, Volume 67, 2023, 101203, ISSN 0922-1425, available here

[31]Executive Summary of the Roundtable on Conglomerate effects of mergers, OECD, June 2020, available here

[32]Executive Summary of the Roundtable on Conglomerate effects of mergers, OECD, June 2020, available here

[33]Tying and bundling in the digital era, Holzweber, S., European Competition Journal, October 2018, available here

[34]Horizontal mergers, cost savings, and network effects, Cosnita-Langlias, A. and Rasch, A., Bulletin of Economic Research, April 2018, available here

[35]Harnessing Platform Envelopment in the Digital World, Condorelli, Daniele; Padilla, Jorge, Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 00(00), 1-45, 2020, available here

[36] Harnessing Platform Envelopment in the Digital World, Condorelli, Daniele; Padilla, Jorge, Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 00(00), 1-45, 2020, available here

[37]Summary of Discussion of the roundtable on Conglomerate Effects of Mergers, OECD, Feb 2021, available here

[38]Conglomerate effects of mergers – Note by Japan, OECD, May 2020, available here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/combinations-and-competion

A Study of J. Sai Deepak's Comments on Competition Law in India

Aarushi Bansal — 2015-11-21T06:18:42Z

In his blog, 'The Demanding Mistress', J. Sai Deepak has commented on the competition law in India, using provisions of different acts, case judgments and amendments to these acts. He has also included a comment on India’s patent law. This review studies his comments to the Competition Act, 2002 (“Competition Act”) and the Patents Act, 1970 (“Patents Act”).

Read J. Sai Deepak - The Demanding Mistress[1]. Nehaa Chaudhari provided inputs and edited this blog post.

The Nexus Between the Competition Act and the Patents Act

Sai Deepak explains the nexus between the Competition Act and the Patents Act[2] using two positions. Firstly, by using two situations to explain which of these two acts will apply under different circumstances. Secondly, by explaining the overlap that is apparent in cases of abuse of power.

Under the first issue, the two situations are thus. In a case where a patentee's patent over a technology allows him to acquire a position of dominance, Competition Act will be applied if he abuses this dominance. In case a patentee imposes a high license fee on his product, many players cannot afford it and get ejected from the market. Here, both the acts would apply, thereby indicating an overlap.

Under the second issue, it is stated that abuse of power could also happen if a patentee sets an "unfair price". Therefore, Sai Deepak argues that for ensuring fair or affordable price, there should be harmony between Competition Act and Patents Act. He has derived harmonized interpretations of "unfair price" under the Competition Act and "reasonably affordable price" under the Patents Act. He explains that the price under each law is measured according to the price for the licensee and not the price demanded or the value of the licensed technology. He further, argues that such a harmonization is possible since "price" under these two acts is essentially used in the same context. It is necessary to harmonize the two acts since the overriding effect of Section 60 of the Competition Act can be effective only when an inconsistency is proved with the other provisions or laws.

Patents and Competition "Arrangements"

An arrangement[3] or collusion may exist between two market players if their activities can be foreseeably linked, even if there is no express act or formal arrangement between these parties. This has been explained through an example.

A sells a patented drug in the market. B sells another patented drug which is similar to the drug sold by A. A also has some share in B's company. When C introduces a similar drug at a much cheaper price, B is forced to reduce his the price of his drug. A follows suit.

It may be noted that since there were similarities between the drugs being sold by A and B, and, therefore the patent, it may have been possible for B to challenge A’s patent on prior art and eject A from the market, thereby reducing competition.

Since he did not challenge A's patent which was closest to that of B in terms of prior art, there may be an arrangement between A and B. This shows that A and B decided to divide the market and not encroach upon each other's trading space. In addition to this, the fact that A was a shareholder in B's company, points in the direction of a collusive activity.

Legality of Pay-for-Delay Settlement Payments

This post, as written by Amshula Prakash, refers to J. Sai Deepak's comments on the topic. She has described a Pay-For-Delay settlement [4] as a patent settlement wherein the patentee pharmaceutical company pays the generic manufacturer to remain ejected from the market for a certain period of time.

She justifies these agreements by relying on the case of Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis [5],which upheld that such agreements are lawful as long as their anti-competitive activities are covered under the exclusive patent granted to them. She opines that entering late into the market is better than not entering at all, and such a deal would anyway not go beyond the life of the patent. She concludes by reiterating J. Sai Deepak's statement that the exact impact of the agreement cannot be ascertained, as no such cases of Pay-For-Delay agreements have arisen in the Indian market yet.

Collective Bargaining

J Sai Deepak has addressed two issues under this post. Firstly, the relation between collective bargaining and cartel-like conduct. Secondly, whether any defense under S.3(3) [6] of the Competition Act is available against cartel-like conduct.

In first issue, [7] J. Sai Deepak suggests that collective bargaining is a joint venture as it increases efficiency of entities in providing services. Similarly, an agreement to reduce such efficiency is also a joint venture, since it may ensure competitiveness in the market and control over prices. He specifies grounds to determine the purpose of a collective act which helps ascertain whether it will be covered under "collective bargaining". These include the nature of business, parity between parties, past negotiations etc. He has relied on foreign sources to justify cartel-like behavior of smaller entities, like Australia's Dawson Committee and Taiwan's efforts to integrate smaller enterprises into the mainstream market to increase efficiency and competitiveness. Hence he suggests that an amendment should be made in law to permit small businesses to make an exception to cartel-like conduct and collective bargaining.

Under the second issue, [9] he opines that a strict assumption of the presence of any anticompetitive nature or agreement is counter productive to the intention of the law. The available defenses under S.3(3) for parties accused of cartel-like conduct can be justified using the proviso[10] under this section. He explains that collective bargaining may be seen as a "joint venture" under the proviso of S.3 if it is not anti-competitive. He has further supported this argument by relying on FICCI - Multiplex Association of India v. United Producers/ Distributors Forum, [11] where "collective bargaining" was accepted as a valid defense to cartel-like behavior.

Power of Competition Commission with Respect to Abuse of Powers

J. Sai Deepak has explained the powers of the Competition Commission of India (CCI),[12] firstly, with respect to abuse of powers and secondly, in terms of imposing liability.

With Respect to Abuse of Powers

With respect to abuse of powers, he refers to Section 4 of the Competition Act. It refers to a situation wherein a dominant player in the market sets a discriminatory (including predatory price) or unfair price in the sale of his good. Predatory pricing is explained in this section and not discriminatory or unfair price. J. Sai Deepak argues that since they are capable of having different meanings, there might be different forms of abuse which a dominant entity can exercise.

He relies on a test laid down in a case on unfair price, namely United Brands Company v. Commission of the European Communities.[13] A question arising under this test was whether the regulator is expected to fix prices if they are found to be unfair. To show that the CCI has the power to fix prices, S.27 and 28 of the Act have been compared. Section 27(d) empowers the CCI to direct that agreements which are in contravention of Section. Furthermore, Section 27 (g) allows the CCI to pass orders 'it may deem fit'. Section 28(2)(a) empowers the CCI to vest property rights, which creates licenses for third parties. The CCI can set future commercial terms in agreements remove complexities of the market in the interest of equity and justice. This shows the abundant powers the Competition Commission of India has to set prices.

In Terms of Imposing Liability

To answer whether these decisions of the CCI are in rem [14], he explains that the CCI can regulate market transactions and the finding of an abusive practice would be applied to other enterprises with similar practices. This shows that CCI lays down rules prescribing acceptable practices in the market.

Review of the Competition Amendment Bill, 2012

This post discusses the proposed amendments in the Bill [15] regarding three issues. Firstly, in regards to joint dominance, i.e. position of dominance enjoyed by one or more enterprises, J. Sai Deepak argues that the Bill recognizes an oligopolistic market's collusive activities, thereby providing a legal method of identifying it. He argues that it is not yet time to introduce it into the Indian industrial arena, since S.3 which regards anti-competitive agreements, is too rigorous to harmonize the concept of joint dominance with it.

Secondly, another proposed change is to render the decision taken under S.21[16] appeal-able under S.53A of the Act. He criticizes this by saying that an appeal on S.21 while adjudicating on S.53A may lead to a multiplicity of legislations and jurisdiction issues.

Lastly, the amendment of S.5A, empowers the government to specify the values of any assets or turnovers based on the class of enterprises. The government may consult the CCI, but the consultation is not binding or of mandatory assent, which shows that the CCI might turn into a tool which furthers the powers of the executive.

Conclusion

On reading J. Sai Deepak's comments on the competition law in India, I have concluded that several provisions under legislations regulating competition in Indian markets might still not be comprehensive. This may be because many scenarios for which these provisions have been made have not yet arisen in India. Hence a few outcomes of these legislations remain to be mere speculations and as several developments in the market are still underway, laws like the Competition Act should adopt to these if and when they arise.

[1]. http://thedemandingmistress.blogspot.in/

[2]. http://thedemandingmistress.blogspot.in/2013/09/the-overlap-between-patents-and.html#links

[3]. http://thedemandingmistress.blogspot.in/2011/10/patents-and-competition-need-for.html#links

[4]. http://thedemandingmistress.blogspot.in/2013/06/legality-of-pay-for-delay-settlement.html#links

[5]. 570 U. S. ____ (2013)

[6]. Defines the type of agreements which would qualify as anti-competitive

[7]. http://thedemandingmistress.blogspot.in/2012/01/collective-bargaining-and-cartel-like.html#links

[8]. Committee of Inquiry for the Review of the Trade Practices Act of the Australian Parliament

[9]. http://thedemandingmistress.blogspot.in/2012/01/competition-act-is-collective.html#links

[10]. Refers to “any agreement entered into by way of joint ventures”.

[11]. Case No. 01 Of 2009

[12]. http://thedemandingmistress.blogspot.in/2015_01_01_archive.html

[13]. C-27/76 [1978]

[14]. http://thedemandingmistress.blogspot.in/2014/07/are-decisions-of-competition-commission.html#links

[15]. http://thedemandingmistress.blogspot.in/2015/03/a-review-of-competition-amendment-bill.html#links

[16]. Reference by Commission to statutory authority in case of contravention with the Act

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/a-study-of-j-sai-deepaks-comments-on-competition-law-in-india