Centre for Internet and Society

Workshop on Democratic Accountability in the Digital Age (Delhi, November 14-15)

sumandro — 2016-12-15T09:27:22Z

IT for Change, along with Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), Digital Empowerment Foundation (DEF), Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) and National Campaign for People’s Right to Information (NCPRI), is organising a two day workshop on ‘Democratic Accountability in the Digital Age’. The workshop will focus on evolving a comprehensive policy approach to data based governance and digital democracy, grounded in a rights and social justice framework. It will be held at the United Service Institution of India, Delhi, during November 14-15, 2016. The CIS team to participate in the workshop includes Sumandro Chattapadhyay (speaker), Amber Sinha (speaker), Vanya Rakesh (participant), and Himadri Chatterjee (participant).

The workshop aims to:

Discuss the institutional norms, rules and practices appropriate to the rise of ‘governance by networks’ and ‘rule by data’ that can guarantee democratic accountability and citizen participation, and
Articulate the steps to claim the civic-public value of digital technologies so that data and the new possibilities for networking are harnessed for a vibrant grassroots democracy.

We hope the workshop can create a civil society coalition that can build effective strategies for legal and policy reform to further participatory democracy in the digital age. On the first day, the workshop will set the context through knowledge sharing and thematic presentations and discussions. On the second day, we aim to concretize strategies for collective action to further democratic accountability in the digital age.

Workshop Agenda (PDF)

Background Note (ODT)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/events/workshop-on-democratic-accountability-in-the-digital-age-delhi-november-14-15

Why Presumption of Renewal is Unsuitable for the Current Registry Market Structure

Padma Venkataraman — 2017-10-31T02:53:26Z

With the recent and much protested renewal of the .net legacy Top-Level-Domain (TLD), the question of the appropriate method of renewal has again come to the forefront. While this seems relatively uncontroversial to most, Padma Venkataraman, a law student and intern at CIS looks at presumptive renewal through a critical lens.

With the recent renewal of the .net legacy Top-Level-Domain (TLD), the question of the appropriate method of renewal is worth reconsidering. When we talk about presumption of renewal for registry agreements, it means that the agreement has a reasonable renewal expectancy at the end of its contractual term. According to the current base registry agreement, it shall be renewed for 10-year periods, upon expiry of the initial (and successive) term, unless the operator commits a fundamental and material breach of the operator’s covenants or breach of its payment obligations to ICANN.

Download the entire blog post here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/why-presumption-of-renewal-is-unsuitable-for-the-current-registry-market-structure

Where Does ICANN’s Money Come From? We Asked; They Don’t Know

geetha — 2015-03-05T07:43:45Z

Just how transparent is ICANN? How responsive are they to requests for information? At CIS, we sent ICANN ten questions seeking information about, inter alia, their revenues, commitment to the NETmundial Principles, Globalisation Advisory Groups and organisational structure. Geetha Hariharan wonders at ICANN's reluctance to respond.

Why Is ICANN Here?

The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is responsible for critical backbones of the Internet. It manages the root server system, the global allocation of IP addresses, protocol registries and the domain name system (management of gTLDs, ccTLDs, as well as the newly rolled-out “new gTLDs”).

ICANN was incorporated in California in 1998, and was intended as the technical coordination body for the backbone of the Internet. That is, it was to administer the Internet’s domain names and IP addresses, and also manage the Internet root servers.

As a result of an agreement with the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) in the US Department of Commerce, ICANN is the IANA functions operator. It carries out the IANA functions, which include making changes to the root zone file (the backbone of the domain name system), allocation of IP address blocks to the five Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), and maintaining protocol parameter registries in collaboration with the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). The RIRs are responsible for allocating IP addresses (IPv4 and IPv6) to national and local Internet registries. The IETF develops Internet standards and protocols, such as those within the TCP/IP suite. To be clear, ICANN does not make policy for the IP address or Internet standards/protocols; those are the domains of RIRs and the IETF, respectively.

ICANN, Domain Names and All That Buried Treasure

ICANN is the de facto policy-making body for domain names. Through ICANN’s community Supporting Organisations and Advisory Committees (SOACs) – largely a multi-stakeholder community – ICANN determines policies for dispute resolution (see, for instance, the UDRP for domain name disputes), maintaining the WHOIS database, etc. for domain names.

Under its contracts with Top Level Domain (TLD) Registries, ICANN receives payment for all registrations and/or renewals of domain names. For instance, under the .bharti Registry Agreement, ICANN receives a fixed annual registry free of US $6250. If there are more than 50,000 registrations or renewals of domain names under a TLD (say, .bharti) in a quarter, then ICANN also receives an amount equal to (No. of registrations or renewals X US $0.25). TLD Registries “own” TLDs like .com, and they maintain a list of all the domain names registered under that TLD. There are around 816 such Registry Agreements, and in FY14, ICANN received over US $47 million in Registry fees [see page 7].

Similar agreements exist between ICANN and domain name Registrars accredited by it, too. Domain name Registrars are entities like Go Daddy and Big Rock, from whom people like you and me (or companies) can register domain names. Only Registrars accredited by ICANN can register domain names that will be included in the ICANN DNS, the most frequently used DNS on the Web. Each Registrar pays a yearly accreditation fee of US $4000 to ICANN (see Clause 3.9). Each Registrar also pays to ICANN fees for every domain name registration or renewal. There are over 500 ICANN-accredited Registrars, and in FY14, ICANN received over US $34.5 million in Registrar fees [see page 7].

Now, apart from this, in its IANA operator role, ICANN is responsible for the global allocation of IP addresses (IPv4 and IPv6). From the global pool of IP addresses, ICANN allocates to the five Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), which then allocate to National Internet Registries like the National Internet Exchange of India (NIXI as IRINN), local Internet registries or ISPs. For this, ICANN receives a combined contribution of US $823,000 each year as revenue from RIRs [see, ex.: FY09 Financial Statements, page 3].

And this isn’t all of it! With its new gTLD program, ICANN is sitting on a large treasure trove. Each gTLD application cost US $185,000, and there were 1930 applications in the first round (that’s US $357 million). Where there arose disagreements as to the same or similar strings, ICANN initiated an auction process. Some new gTLDs were auctioned for as high as US $6 million.

So ICANN is sitting on a great deal of treasure (US $355 million in revenues in FY14 and growing). It accumulates revenue from a variety of quarters; the sources identified above are by no means the only revenue-sources. But ICANN is unaware of, or unwilling to disclose, all its sources of revenue.

ICANN's Troubling Scope-creep and Does Transparency Matter?

At CIS, we are concerned by ICANN’s unchecked influence and growing role in the Internet governance institutional space. For instance, under its CEO Fadi Chehade, ICANN was heavily involved backstage for NETmundial, and has set aside over US $200,000 for Mr. Chehade’s brainchild, the NETmundial Initiative. Coupled with its lack of transparency and vocal interests in furthering status quo (for instance, both the names and numbers communities’ proposals for IANA transition want ICANN to remain the IANA functions operator, without stringent safeguards), this makes for a dangerous combination.

The clearest indication lies in the money, one might say. As we have written before, ICANN budgets for less than US $10 million for providing core Internet functions out of a US $160 million strong budget (Budget FY15, page 17). It has budgeted, in comparison, US $13 million for travel and meetings alone, and spent over US $18 million on travel in FY14 (Budget FY15, page 11).

To its credit, ICANN makes public its financial statements (current and historic), and community discussions are generally open. However, given the understandably complex contractual arrangements that give ICANN its revenues, even ploughing through the financials does not give one a clear picture of where ICANN’s money comes from.

So one is left with questions such as the following: Which entities (and how many of them) pay ICANN for domain names? What are the vendor payments received by ICANN and who pays? Who all have paid ICANN under the new gTLD program, and for what purposes? Apart from application fees and auctions, what other heads of payment exist? How much does each RIR pay ICANN and what for, if IP addresses are not property to be sold? For how many persons (and whom all) does ICANN provide pay for, to travel to meetings and other events?

You may well ask why these questions matter, and whether we need greater transparency. To put it baldly: ICANN’s transparency is crucial. ICANN is today something of a monopoly; it manages the IANA functions, makes policy for domain names and is increasingly active in Internet governance. It is without greater (effective) accountability than a mere review by the NTIA, and some teething internal mechanisms like the Documentary Information Disclosure Policy (DIDP), Ombudsman, Reconsideration and Independent Review and the Accountability and Transparency Review (ATRT). I could elaborate on why these mechanisms are inadequate, but this post is already too long. Suffice it to say that by carefully defining these mechanisms and setting out their scope, ICANN has stifled their effectiveness. For instance, a Reconsideration Request can be filed if one is aggrieved by an action of ICANN’s Board or staff. Under ICANN’s By-laws (Article IV, Section 2), it is the Board Governance Committee, comprising ICANN Board members, that adjudicates Reconsideration Requests. This simply violates the principles of natural justice, wherein one may not be a judge in one’s own cause (nemo debet esse judex in propria causa).

Moreover, ICANN serves corporate interests, for it exists on account of contractual arrangements with Registries, Registrars, the NTIA and other sundry entities. ICANN has also troublingly reached into Internet governance domains to which it was previously closed, such as the NETmundial Initiative, the NETmundial, the IGF and its Support Association. It is unclear that ICANN was ever intended to overreach so, a point admitted by Mr. Chehade himself at the ICANN Open Forum in Istanbul (IGF 2014).

Finally, despite its professed adherence to multi-stakeholderism, there is evidence that ICANN’s policy-making and functioning revolve around small, cohesive groups with multiple professional inter-linkages with other I-Star organisations. For instance, a revolving door study by CIS of the IANA Coordination Group (ICG) found that 20 out of 30 ICG members had close and longterm ties with I-Star organisations. This surely creates concern as to the impartiality and fairness of the ICG’s decision-making. It may, for instance, make a pro-ICANN outcome inevitable – and that is definitely a serious worry.

But ICANN is intended to serve the public interest, to ensure smooth, stable and resilient running of the Internet. Transparency is crucial to this, and especially so during the IANA transition phase. As advisor Jan Scholte asked at ICANN52, what accountability will ICANN exercise after the transition, and to whom will it be accountable? What, indeed, does accountability mean? The CCWG-Accountability is still asking that question. But meanwhile, one among our cohorts at CIS has advocated transparency as a check-and-balance for power.

The DIDP process at ICANN may prove useful in the long run, but does it suffice as a transparency mechanism?

ICANN's Responses to CIS' DIDP Requests

Over December ’14 and January ’15, CIS sent 10 DIDP requests to ICANN. Our aim was to test and encourage transparency from ICANN, a process crucial given the CCWG-Accountability’s deliberations on ways to enhance ICANN’s accountability. We have received responses for 9 of our requests. We summarise ICANN’s responses in a table: please go here.

A glance at the table above will show that ICANN’s responses are largely negative. In 7 requests out of 9, ICANN provides very little new information. Though the responses are detailed, the majority of information they provide is already identified in CIS’ requests. For instance, in the response to the NETmundial Request, ICANN links us to blogposts written by CEO Fadi Chehade, where he notes the importance of translating the NETmundial Principles into action. They also link us to the Final Report of the Panel on Global Internet Cooperation and Governance Mechanism, and ICANN’s involvement in the NETmundial Initiative.

However, to the query on ICANN’s own measures of implementing the NETmundial Principles – principles that it has lauded and upheld for the entire Internet governance community – ICANN’s response is surprisingly evasive. Defending lack of action, they note that “ICANN is not the home for implementation of the NETmundial Principles”. But ICANN also responds that they already implement the NETmundial Principles: “Many of the NETmundial Principles are high-level statements that permeate through the work of any entity – particularly a multistakeholder entity like ICANN – that is interested in the upholding of the inclusive, multistakeholder process within the Internet governance framework” (emphasis provided). One wonders, then, at the insistence on creating documents involving such high-level principles; why create them if they’re already implemented?

Responses to other requests indicate that the DIDP is, in its current form, unable to provide the transparency necessary for ICANN’s functioning. For instance, in the response to the Ombudsman Request, ICANN cites confidentiality as a reason to decline providing information. Making Ombudsman Requests public would violate ICANN Bylaws, and topple the independence and integrity of the Ombudsman.

These are, perhaps, valid reasons to decline a DIDP request. But it is also important to investigate these reasons. ICANN’s Ombudsman is appointed by the ICANN Board for 2 year terms, under Clause V of ICANN’s Bylaws. The Ombudsman’s principal function is to “provide an independent internal evaluation of complaints by members of the ICANN community who believe that the ICANN staff, Board or an ICANN constituent body has treated them unfairly”. The Ombudsman reports only to the ICANN Board, and all matters before it are kept confidential, including the names of parties and the nature of complaints. The Ombudsman reports on the categories of complaints he receives, and statistics regarding decisions in his Annual Reports; no details are forthcoming for stated reasons of confidentiality and privacy.

This creates a closed circle in which the Ombudsman operates. The ICANN Board appoints the Ombudsman. He/she listens to complaints about unfair treatment by the ICANN Board, Staff or constituency. He/she reports to the ICANN Board alone. However, neither the names of parties, the nature of complaints, nor the decisions of the Ombudsman are publicly available. Such a lack of transparency throws doubt on the functioning of the Ombudsman himself – and on his independence, neutrality and the extent of ICANN’s influence on him/her. An amendment of ICANN’s Bylaws would then be imperative to rectify this problem; this matter is squarely within the CCWG-Accountability’s mandate and should be addressed.

As is clear from the above examples, ICANN’s DIDP is an inadequate tool to ensure transparency functioning. The Policy was crafted without community input, and requires substantial amendments to make it a sufficient transparency mechanism. CIS’ suggestions in this regard shall be available in our next post.

CIS' Annual Reports are here. Our audit is ongoing, and the Annual Report for 2013-14 will be up shortly. Pranav Bidare (3rd year) of the National Law School, Bangalore assisted with research for this post, and created the table of CIS' DIDP requests and responses.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/where-does-icann2019s-money-come-from-we-asked-they-don2019t-know

Summary Report Internet Governance Forum 2015

jyoti — 2015-11-30T10:47:13Z

Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), India participated in the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) held at Poeta Ronaldo Cunha Lima Conference Center, Joao Pessoa in Brazil from 10 November 2015 to 13 November 2015. The theme of IGF 2015 was ‘Evolution of Internet Governance: Empowering Sustainable Development’. Sunil Abraham, Pranesh Prakash & Jyoti Panday from CIS actively engaged and made substantive contributions to several key issues affecting internet governance at the IGF 2015. The issue-wise detail of their engagement is set out below.

INTERNET GOVERNANCE

I. The Multi-stakeholder Advisory Group to the IGF organised a discussion on Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and Internet Economy at the Main Meeting Hall from 9:00 am to 12:30 pm on 11 November, 2015. The discussions at this session focused on the importance of Internet Economy enabling policies and eco-system for the fulfilment of different SDGs. Several concerns relating to internet entrepreneurship, effective ICT capacity building, protection of intellectual property within and across borders were availability of local applications and content were addressed. The panel also discussed the need to identify SDGs where internet based technologies could make the most effective contribution. Sunil Abraham contributed to the panel discussions by addressing the issue of development and promotion of local content and applications. List of speakers included:

Lenni Montiel, Assistant-Secretary-General for Development, United Nations
Helani Galpaya, CEO LIRNEasia
Sergio Quiroga da Cunha, Head of Latin America, Ericsson
Raúl L. Katz, Adjunct Professor, Division of Finance and Economics, Columbia Institute of Tele-information
Jimson Olufuye, Chairman, Africa ICT Alliance (AfICTA)
Lydia Brito, Director of the Office in Montevideo, UNESCO
H.E. Rudiantara, Minister of Communication & Information Technology, Indonesia
Daniel Sepulveda, Deputy Assistant Secretary, U.S. Coordinator for International and Communications Policy at the U.S. Department of State
Deputy Minister Department of Telecommunications and Postal Services for the republic of South Africa
Sunil Abraham, Executive Director, Centre for Internet and Society, India
H.E. Junaid Ahmed Palak, Information and Communication Technology Minister of Bangladesh
Jari Arkko, Chairman, IETF
Silvia Rabello, President, Rio Film Trade Association
Gary Fowlie, Head of Member State Relations & Intergovernmental Organizations, ITU

Detailed description of the workshop is available here http ://www .intgovforum .org /cms /igf 2015-main -sessions

Transcript of the workshop is available here http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2327-2015-11-11-internet-economy-and-sustainable-development-main-meeting-room

Video link Internet economy and Sustainable Development here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D6obkLehVE8

II. Public Knowledge organised a workshop on The Benefits and Challenges of the Free Flow of Data at Workshop Room 5 from 11:00 am to 12:00 pm on 12 November, 2015. The discussions in the workshop focused on the benefits and challenges of the free flow of data and also the concerns relating to data flow restrictions including ways to address them. Sunil Abraham contributed to the panel discussions by addressing the issue of jurisdiction of data on the internet. The panel for the workshop included the following.

Vint Cerf, Google
Lawrence Strickling, U.S. Department of Commerce, NTIA
Richard Leaning, European Cyber Crime Centre (EC3), Europol
Marietje Schaake, European Parliament
Nasser Kettani, Microsoft
Sunil Abraham, CIS India

Detailed description of the workshop is available here http ://www .intgovforum .org /cms /workshops /list -of -published -workshop -proposals

Transcript of the workshop is available here http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2467-2015-11-12-ws65-the-benefits-and-challenges-of-the-free-flow-of-data-workshop-room-5

Video link https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KtjnHkOn7EQ

III. Article 19 and Privacy International organised a workshop on Encryption and Anonymity: Rights and Risks at Workshop Room 1 from 11:00 am to 12:30 pm on 12 November, 2015. The workshop fostered a discussion about the latest challenges to protection of anonymity and encryption and ways in which law enforcement demands could be met while ensuring that individuals still enjoyed strong encryption and unfettered access to anonymity tools. Pranesh Prakash contributed to the panel discussions by addressing concerns about existing south Asian regulatory framework on encryption and anonymity and emphasizing the need for pervasive encryption. The panel for this workshop included the following.

David Kaye, UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression
Juan Diego Castañeda, Fundación Karisma, Colombia
Edison Lanza, Organisation of American States Special Rapporteur
Pranesh Prakash, CIS India
Ted Hardie, Google
Elvana Thaci, Council of Europe
Professor Chris Marsden, Oxford Internet Institute
Alexandrine Pirlot de Corbion, Privacy International

Detailed description of the workshop is available here http ://www .intgovforum .org /cms /worksh o ps /list -of -published -workshop -proposals

Transcript of the workshop is available here http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2407-2015-11-12-ws-155-encryption-and-anonymity-rights-and-risks-workshop-room-1

Video link available here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hUrBP4PsfJo

IV. Chalmers & Associates organised a session on A Dialogue on Zero Rating and Network Neutrality at the Main Meeting Hall from 2:00 pm to 4:00 pm on 12 November, 2015. The Dialogue provided access to expert insight on zero-rating and a full spectrum of diverse views on this issue. The Dialogue also explored alternative approaches to zero rating such as use of community networks. Pranesh Prakash provided a detailed explanation of harms and benefits related to different approaches to zero-rating. The panellists for this session were the following.

Jochai Ben-Avie, Senior Global Policy Manager, Mozilla, USA
Igor Vilas Boas de Freitas, Commissioner, ANATEL, Brazil
Dušan Caf, Chairman, Electronic Communications Council, Republic of Slovenia
Silvia Elaluf-Calderwood, Research Fellow, London School of Economics, UK/Peru
Belinda Exelby, Director, Institutional Relations, GSMA, UK
Helani Galpaya, CEO, LIRNEasia, Sri Lanka
Anka Kovacs, Director, Internet Democracy Project, India
Kevin Martin, VP, Mobile and Global Access Policy, Facebook, USA
Pranesh Prakash, Policy Director, CIS India
Steve Song, Founder, Village Telco, South Africa/Canada
Dhanaraj Thakur, Research Manager, Alliance for Affordable Internet, USA/West Indies
Christopher Yoo, Professor of Law, Communication, and Computer & Information Science, University of Pennsylvania, USA

Detailed description of the workshop is available here http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf2015-main-sessions

Transcript of the workshop is available here http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2457-2015-11-12-a-dialogue-on-zero-rating-and-network-neutrality-main-meeting-hall-2

V. The Internet & Jurisdiction Project organised a workshop on Transnational Due Process: A Case Study in MS Cooperation at Workshop Room 4 from 11:00 am to 12:00 pm on 13 November, 2015. The workshop discussion focused on the challenges in developing an enforcement framework for the internet that guarantees transnational due process and legal interoperability. The discussion also focused on innovative approaches to multi-stakeholder cooperation such as issue-based networks, inter-sessional work methods and transnational policy standards. The panellists for this discussion were the following.

Anne Carblanc Head of Division, Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry, OECD
Eileen Donahoe Director Global Affairs, Human Rights Watch
Byron Holland President and CEO, CIRA (Canadian ccTLD)
Christopher Painter Coordinator for Cyber Issues, US Department of State
Sunil Abraham Executive Director, CIS India
Alice Munyua Lead dotAfrica Initiative and GAC representative, African Union Commission
Will Hudsen Senior Advisor for International Policy, Google
Dunja Mijatovic Representative on Freedom of the Media, OSCE
Thomas Fitschen Director for the United Nations, for International Cooperation against Terrorism and for Cyber Foreign Policy, German Federal Foreign Office
Hartmut Glaser Executive Secretary, Brazilian Internet Steering Committee
Matt Perault, Head of Policy Development Facebook

Detailed description of the workshop is available here http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals

Transcript of the workshop is available here http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2475-2015-11-13-ws-132-transnational-due-process-a-case-study-in-ms-cooperation-workshop-room-4

Video link Transnational Due Process: A Case Study in MS Cooperation available here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M9jVovhQhd0

VI. The Internet Governance Project organised a meeting of the Dynamic Coalition on Accountability of Internet Governance Venues at Workshop Room 2 from 14:00 – 15:30 on 12 November, 2015. The coalition brought together panelists to highlight the challenges in developing an accountability framework for internet governance venues that include setting up standards and developing a set of concrete criteria. Jyoti Panday provided the perspective of civil society on why acountability is necessary in internet governance processes and organizations. The panelists for this workshop included the following.

Robin Gross, IP Justice
Jeanette Hofmann, Director Alexander von Humboldt Institute for Internet and Society
Farzaneh Badiei, Internet Governance Project
Erika Mann, Managing Director Public PolicyPolicy Facebook and Board of Directors ICANN
Paul Wilson, APNIC
Izumi Okutani, Japan Network Information Center (JPNIC)
Keith Drazek , Verisign
Jyoti Panday, CIS
Jorge Cancio, GAC representative

Detailed description of the workshop is available here http://igf2015.sched.org/event/4c23/dynamic-coalition-on-accountability-of-internet-governance-venues?iframe=no&w=&sidebar=yes&bg=no

Video link https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UIxyGhnch7w

VII. Digital Infrastructure Netherlands Foundation organized an open forum at Workshop Room 3 from 11:00 – 12:00 on 10 November, 2015. The open forum discussed the increase in government engagement with “the internet” to protect their citizens against crime and abuse and to protect economic interests and critical infrastructures. It brought together panelists topresent ideas about an agenda for the international protection of ‘the public core of the internet’ and to collect and discuss ideas for the formulation of norms and principles and for the identification of practical steps towards that goal. Pranesh Prakash participated in the e open forum. Other speakers included

Bastiaan Goslings AMS-IX, NL
Pranesh Prakash CIS, India
Marilia Maciel (FGV, Brasil
Dennis Broeders (NL Scientific Council for Government Policy)

Detailed description of the open forum is available here http://schd.ws/hosted_files/igf2015/3d/DINL_IGF_Open%20Forum_The_public_core_of_the_internet.pdf

Video link available here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=joPQaMQasDQ

VIII. UNESCO, Council of Europe, Oxford University, Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, Google, Internet Society organised a workshop on hate speech and youth radicalisation at Room 9 on Thursday, November 12. UNESCO shared the initial outcome from its commissioned research on online hate speech including practical recommendations on combating against online hate speech through understanding the challenges, mobilizing civil society, lobbying private sectors and intermediaries and educating individuals with media and information literacy. The workshop also discussed how to help empower youth to address online radicalization and extremism, and realize their aspirations to contribute to a more peaceful and sustainable world. Sunil Abraham provided his inputs. Other speakers include

1. Chaired by Ms Lidia Brito, Director for UNESCO Office in Montevideo

2.Frank La Rue, Former Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression

3. Lillian Nalwoga, President ISOC Uganda and rep CIPESA, Technical community

4. Bridget O’Loughlin, CoE, IGO

5. Gabrielle Guillemin, Article 19

6. Iyad Kallas, Radio Souriali

7. Sunil Abraham executive director of Center for Internet and Society, Bangalore, India

8. Eve Salomon, global Chairman of the Regulatory Board of RICS

9. Javier Lesaca Esquiroz, University of Navarra

10. Representative GNI

11. Remote Moderator: Xianhong Hu, UNESCO

12. Rapporteur: Guilherme Canela De Souza Godoi, UNESCO

Detailed description of the workshop is available here http://igf2015.sched.org/event/4c1X/ws-128-mitigate-online-hate-speech-and-youth-radicalisation?iframe=no&w=&sidebar=yes&bg=no

Video link to the panel is available here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eIO1z4EjRG0

INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY

IX. Electronic Frontier Foundation, Centre for Internet Society India, Open Net Korea and Article 19 collaborated to organize a workshop on the Manila Principles on Intermediary Liability at Workshop Room 9 from 11:00 am to 12:00 pm on 13 November 2015. The workshop elaborated on the Manila Principles, a high level principle framework of best practices and safeguards for content restriction practices and addressing liability for intermediaries for third party content. The workshop saw particpants engaged in over lapping projects considering restriction practices coming togetehr to give feedback and highlight recent developments across liability regimes. Jyoti Panday laid down the key details of the Manila Principles framework in this session. The panelists for this workshop included the following.

Kelly Kim Open Net Korea,
Jyoti Panday, CIS India,
Gabrielle Guillemin, Article 19,
Rebecca McKinnon on behalf of UNESCO
Giancarlo Frosio, Center for Internet and Society, Stanford Law School
Nicolo Zingales, Tilburg University
Will Hudson, Google

Detailed description of the workshop is available here http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals

Transcript of the workshop is available here http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2423-2015-11-13-ws-242-the-manila-principles-on-intermediary-liability-workshop-room-9

Video link available here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kFLmzxXodjs

ACCESSIBILITY

X. Dynamic Coalition on Accessibility and Disability and Global Initiative for Inclusive ICTs organised a workshop on Empowering the Next Billion by Improving Accessibility at Workshop Room 6 from 9:00 am to 10:30 am on 13 November, 2015. The discussion focused on the need and ways to remove accessibility barriers which prevent over one billion potential users to benefit from the Internet, including for essential services. Sunil Abraham specifically spoke about the lack of compliance of existing ICT infrastructure with well established accessibility standards specifically relating to accessibility barriers in the disaster management process. He discussed the barriers faced by persons with physical or psychosocial disabilities. The panelists for this discussion were the following.

Francesca Cesa Bianchi, G3ICT
Cid Torquato, Government of Brazil
Carlos Lauria, Microsoft Brazil
Sunil Abraham, CIS India
Derrick L. Cogburn, Institute on Disability and Public Policy (IDPP) for the ASEAN(Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Region
Fernando H. F. Botelho, F123 Consulting
Gunela Astbrink, GSA InfoComm

Detailed description of the workshop is available here http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals

Transcript of the workshop is available here http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2438-2015-11-13-ws-253-empowering-the-next-billion-by-improving-accessibility-workshop-room-3

Video Link Empowering the next billion by improving accessibility https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7RZlWvJAXxs

OPENNESS

XI. A workshop on FOSS & a Free, Open Internet: Synergies for Development was organized at Workshop Room 7 from 2:00 pm to 3:30 pm on 13 November, 2015. The discussion was focused on the increasing risk to openness of the internet and the ability of present & future generations to use technology to improve their lives. The panel shred different perspectives about the future co-development of FOSS and a free, open Internet; the threats that are emerging; and ways for communities to surmount these. Sunil Abraham emphasised the importance of free software, open standards, open access and access to knowledge and the lack of this mandate in the draft outcome document for upcoming WSIS+10 review and called for inclusion of the same. Pranesh Prakash further contributed to the discussion by emphasizing the need for free open source software with end‑to‑end encryption and traffic level encryption based on open standards which are decentralized and work through federated networks. The panellists for this discussion were the following.

Satish Babu, Technical Community, Chair, ISOC-TRV, Kerala, India
Judy Okite, Civil Society, FOSS Foundation for Africa
Mishi Choudhary, Private Sector, Software Freedom Law Centre, New York
Fernando Botelho, Private Sector, heads F123 Systems, Brazil
Sunil Abraham, CIS India
Pranesh Prakash, CIS India
Nnenna Nwakanma- WWW.Foundation
Yves MIEZAN EZO, Open Source strategy consultant
Corinto Meffe, Advisor to the President and Directors, SERPRO, Brazil
Frank Coelho de Alcantara, Professor, Universidade Positivo, Brazil
Caroline Burle, Institutional and International Relations, W3C Brazil Office and Center of Studies on Web Technologies

Detailed description of the workshop is available here http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals

Transcript of the workshop is available here http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2468-2015-11-13-ws10-foss-and-a-free-open-internet-synergies-for-development-workshop-room-7

Video link available here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lwUq0LTLnDs

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/summary-report-internet-governance-forum-2015

Report of the Global Accessibility Awareness Day 2017

nirmita — 2017-06-19T15:07:28Z

Aditya Tejas attended the Global Accessibility Awareness Day event organized at NIMHANS Convention Centre in Bengaluru. The event had multiple panels and presentations, including a talk on coding for accessibility, a panel on why accessibility is necessary and how India is lagging behind in implementing it, and a presentation on how accessibility principles are integrated into the product life cycle at Cisco.

Logo of Shuttleworth Foundation below:

Global Accessibility Awareness Day is celebrated across the world on May 3 every year. The objective of the event is to get everyone talking, thinking and learning about digital access/inclusion and people with different disabilities.

This year the Global Accessibility Awareness Day 2017 (GAAD 2017) organized by Prakat Solutions and co-hosted by CIS and Mitra Jyoti, was held on May 18 at NIMHANS Convention Centre in Bengaluru. The event was designed to raise awareness around digital accessibility issues for persons with disabilities. The Shuttleworth Foundation also supported this event. Approximately 250 people were in attendance. The URL for the event is here. A detailed agenda can be found here. Video recordings of the event will be made available shortly.

The event ran from 2:30-7:30 PM and featured various discussions and events, including dance ceremonies, skits, and talks by various figures.

The first event was an extended presentation on coding for accessibility by Nawaz Khan of PayPal, in which he discussed how developers can integrate accessibility principles into their software from the design phase, and how persons with disabilities can productively make their issues known to developers. He encouraged developers to adopt international standards such as WAI-ARIA, and also encouraged developers to use accessible open source libraries and testing tools. He took questions about standards for other types of disabilities beyond visual impairment, joining the global conversation around accessibility standards, and accessibility design for mobile platforms.

The main event was a panel on the awareness of accessibility issues in India and how they could be improved, both in the public and private spheres. In attendance were Abhik Biswas of Prakat Solutions, Pranay Gadodia of Deutsche Bank HR, Shalini Subramaniam of PayPal, Balachandra Shetty of Intuit, Sandeep Sabat of ZingUp Life, Kameshwari from Wipro, Mahabala Shetty from NIC, and Srinivasu from Informatica. The panel was moderated by Giri Prakash of Hindu Business Line. They discussed issues including how to promote a stronger government response to accessibility issues, initiatives that can be taken from the private or civil society sector in order to address accessibility issues, the lack of awareness around accessibility in the Indian context, and the responsibilities that developers have to make accessible apps and products. Shalini from PayPal talked about the potential for government initiatives such as Make in India could be used to further the availability of accessible consumer products and services in India.

The second speaker, Kameshwari Visarapu from Wipro, talked about how persons with disabilities need to make their voices heard in society. She stressed that, while the laws are already in place, people do not demand their rights. Without this, the government and any community, even those with the necessary power, would not be able to make the changes. Mahabala Shetty from NIC pointed out that NIC is responsible for developing and updating various government websites. He said he understood that the inaccessibility of government websites and services is a serious problem, and pledged to make sure that all websites would be made accessible in the coming months.

The fifth speaker was Sandeep Sabat of ZingUp Life, also a health tech company, which seeks to help people with issues not just around physical health, but also emotional, mental and spiritual health. He drew a comparison with the beginning of the mobile revolution, when people would say that web on mobile is a small, niche space, which eventually gave way to the idea of mobile-first design. Extending this analogy, he said that design must now be accessibility-first, in order to ensure that it becomes part of the culture of product development.

The sixth speaker at the event was Balachandra Shetty from Intuit. He pointed out that design principles needed to make a product accessible and making that product easy to use for the general public are the same, and that improving the user experience for 20% of the population effectively improves it for everyone.

The seventh speaker was Pranay Gadodia from Deutsche Bank HR, who argued that accessibility was important not just for persons with disabilities, but for everyone. He gave the example of ramps on public entrances, which make access easier for everyone. He demonstrated the use of a screen reader and tried to order food through Swiggy. When he found that the app was inaccessible, he pointed out that they had just lost a customer.

The eighth speaker, Srinivasu from Informatica, talked about his work in the accessibility space for various NGOs and companies. He argued that inaccessibility was never built into a product by design, and that any problems were the result of ignorance. He also said that accessibility work was the only career with two major benefits – that of creating an immediate impact among the community and being the kind of work that not only takes advantage of a business opportunity but also directly benefits consumers.

The ninth speaker, Abhik Biswas, said that he believes that accessibility is a nonissue, because if everyone wrote good code and followed best practices, all products would be accessible anyway. He said this was not always the case with software tools. He gave the example of work that Prakat did with a provider of legal software. In large corporate lawsuits, parties would usually share terabytes of data with each other, and legal e-discovery software is used to discover patterns for evidence. An inaccessible document would be useless to such software so, of course accessibility isn’t an issue only for a certain set of people. If you’re in the innovation space and trying to solve problems, he stressed, then accessibility is an issue.

The moderator then raised the issue of the lack of progress for persons with disabilities in the past five years. He asked what progress has been made in the legal area, and whether there are any solutions that users can come up with themselves rather than waiting for government action. Shalini pointed out the inaccessibility of the Swiggy app, and added that there are automated accessibility checkers for apps, both Apple and Android. She demonstrated this for the audience.

Kameshwari said that part of the problem is that a single person may not be able or willing to make much noise. There are a lot of communities that have been formed on a corporate/state/national level, but collectively making noise is important for major changes. One process that her own company tried was creating a repository of pre-tested accessible components, which has two advantages; the developer can pick the component from a standardized repository, and the component would have been pre-tested for accessibility and responsiveness. This is another possible solution – which people collectively come up with standardized repositories of accessible components.

She then gave the example of an accessible garden in Kerala, where persons with disabilities could visit and touch different types of plants in a guided experience to help them identify and understand them. When talking about inclusivity, she asked, why create a separate garden? Integrate these features into all gardens instead, she suggested.

The third speaker said that the government drains enthusiasm from people, and insisted that it could only play the role of a facilitator. The need is to inspire the necessary passion in people to carry forward the issues themselves.

Sandeep said that the intent is already there, but the government was not capable of doing it alone. The social fabric of the country needs to change, along with the attitude of the society. To that end, they suggested making accessibility a non-issue, and looking for opportunities to integrate it into society at large. Instead of thinking of it through a usability standpoint, consider how to improve the overall user experience of a product through the lens of a user with disabilities.

Balachandra pointed out that while love is a strong emotion, fear too is very powerful. The laws in the Commonwealth are much stricter than those in the US, he pointed out, and yet apps built in those countries are far more accessible than those in Indonesia, India etc. So, he suggested that if a product proved to be inaccessible to a certain segment of the population, the employees responsible could face down the CEO, and fear would drive them to make their products accessible. In addition, he called for stricter laws and a possible amendment of the IT Act, drawing upon laws in the Commonwealth and France. Disability discrimination in the US carries a high penalty, and suggested that similar laws would enforce accessibility in local products.

The moderator asked Pranay: is it possible for app developers or mobile platform providers to make accessibility mandatory for apps that are publicly released? He answered that as a tech developer he might not be the right person to answer that, however, he know that the iOS framework is much more stringent than Android in this regard. He called on users with disabilities to call out inaccessible design wherever they saw it, in order to inform developers and to create a healthy competition to make companies disability-inclusive. He also pointed out that many corporations hold events or draft policy for persons with disabilities without involving them in the decision-making process, and that this needed to change.

Srinivasu stressed that the job of making government services accessible fell on the developers within the government, who are in-house, or the vendors, who work for NIC. There are two things the government can do, he said; when asking for a vendor, they could refuse those who make inaccessible products, thus making accessibility a requirement for procurement.

The second is to raise accessibility issues at the level of education. He gave the example of several apps like TaxiForSure and Cleartrip, all of which responded to accessibility issues raised by their users. He stressed that any user could give feedback, and not just those with disabilities, and that raising awareness is a duty for everyone. He asked the audience to share the event on WhatsApp, and to type with their non-dominant hand, as a simple way of understanding disability. The other exercise he called on the audience to do is to write a post about the event on Facebook or their blogs using only the keyboard, without touching their mouse. In this way, he drew attention to thinking about accessibility whenever one uses a website or software.

Abhik took the opportunity to add one more dimension, an area of concern for app developers in India in particular – that of linguistic accessibility. Most apps, he pointed out, are being developed in English only, and most government apps have the additional burden of considering vernacular languages, while NVDA only supports 10-12. The government can’t solve this problem by making multilingual websites, as developers also need to contribute to projects like NVDA in order to build support for other languages. Accessibility, he stressed, wasn’t anyone’s problem, but everyone’s problem.

After this, Shekhar Naik, former captain of the Indian blind cricket team, talked about his life story. He mentioned that there are over 5c0k blind cricketers in the country. He talked about his passion for cricket, how it brought him to where he was today, and thanked the government for its increased recognition and felicitation of persons with disabilities.

After that, the owner of Pothole Raja, Pratap Bhimasena Rao, spoke about the importance of the accessibility of built environments such as roads. He pointed out that 25% of vehicular accidents cause a disability, and stressed the need to address these issues to promote not just accessibility, but prevent disability.

After this, Amit Balakrishna Joshi from the state government gave a brief overview of the Karnataka government’s accessibility and e-governance initiatives. He spoke about the Karnataka Mobile One app, an initiative to consolidate and digitize several state government services. As the world’s largest Mobile One platform, it would integrate about 40 departments, with the objective of bringing equality in service delivery across socioeconomic, linguistic and literacy divides.

At 7:00, Sean Murphy from Cisco gave a talk on universal design principles. He discussed how universal design is important to maximize market access, ensuring that a company reaches 100% of its market. In Cisco, accessibility is integrated into the product lifecycle right from the design phase to testing to rollout.

He also discussed regulatory standards such as Section 508 in the US, which he stressed were critical to securing industry-wide accessibility. The event ended at 7:30 p.m.

Images:

Participants light the lamp to commemorate the start of GAAD 2017.

Prakat Solutions co-founder Abhik Biswas speaks at GAAD 2017.

Panelists discuss accessibility challenges in India.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/accessibility/blog/report-gaad-2017

Reading the Fine Script: Service Providers, Terms and Conditions and Consumer Rights

jyoti — 2014-07-04T06:31:37Z

This year, an increasing number of incidents, related to consumer rights and service providers, have come to light. This blog illustrates the facts of the cases, and discusses the main issues at stake, namely, the role and responsibilities of providers of platforms for user-created content with regard to consumer rights.

On 1st July, 2014 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) filed a complaint against T-Mobile USA,[1] accusing the service provider of 'cramming' customers bills, with millions of dollars of unauthorized charges. Recently, another service provider, received flak from regulators and users worldwide, after it published a paper, 'Experimental evidence of massive-scale emotional contagion through social networks'.[2] The paper described Facebook's experiment on more than 600,000 users, to determine whether manipulating user-generated content, would affect the emotions of its users.

In both incidents the terms that should ensure the protection of their user's legal rights, were used to gain consent for actions on behalf of the service providers, that were not anticipated at the time of agreeing to the terms and conditions (T&Cs) by the consumer. More precisely, both cases point to the underlying issue of how users are bound by T&Cs, and in a mediated online landscape—highlight, the need to pay attention to the regulations that govern the online engagement of users.

I have read and agree to the terms

In his statement, Chief Executive Officer, John Legere might have referred to T-Mobile as "the most pro-consumer company in the industry",[3] however the FTC investigation revelations, that many customers never authorized the charges, suggest otherwise. The FTC investigation also found that, T-Mobile received 35-40 per cent of the amount charged for subscriptions, that were made largely through innocuous services, that customers had been signed up to, without their knowledge or consent. Last month news broke, that just under 700,000 users 'unknowingly' participated in the Facebook study, and while the legality and ethics of the experiment are being debated, what is clear is that Facebook violated consumer rights by not providing the choice to opt in or out, or even the knowledge of such social or psychological experiments to its users.

Both incidents boil down to the sensitive question of consent. While binding agreements around the world work on the condition of consent, how do we define it and what are the implications of agreeing to the terms?

Terms of Service: Conditions are subject to change

A legal necessity, the existing terms of service (TOS)—as they are also known—as an acceptance mechanism are deeply broken. The policies of online service providers are often, too long, and with no shorter or multilingual versions, require substantial effort on part of the user to go through in detail. A 2008 Carnegie Mellon study estimated it would take an average user 244 hours every year to go through the policies they agree to online.[4] Based on the study, Atlantic's Alexis C. Madrigal derived that reading all of the privacy policies an average Internet user encounters in a year, would take 76 working days.[5]

The costs of time are multiplied by the fact that terms of services change with technology, making it very hard for a user to keep track of all of the changes over time. Moreover, many services providers do not even commit to the obligation of notifying the users of any changes in the TOS. Microsoft, Skype, Amazon, YouTube are examples of some of the service providers that have not committed to any obligations of notification of changes and often, there are no mechanisms in place to ensure that service providers are keeping users updated.

Facebook has said that the recent social experiment is perfectly legal under its TOS,[6] the question of fairness of the conditions of users consent remain debatable. Facebook has a broad copyright license that goes beyond its operating requirements, such as the right to 'sublicense'. The copyright also does not end when users stop using the service, unless the content has been deleted by everyone else.

More importantly, since 2007, Facebook has brought major changes to their lengthy TOS about every year.[7] And while many point that Facebook is transparent, as it solicits feedback preceding changes to their terms, the accountability remains questionable, as the results are not binding unless 30% of the actual users vote. Facebook can and does, track users and shares their data across websites, and has no obligation or mechanism to inform users of the takedown requests.

Courts in different jurisdictions under different laws may come to different conclusions regarding these practices, especially about whether changing terms without notifying users is acceptable or not. Living in a society more protective of consumer rights is however, no safeguard, as TOS often include a clause of choice of law which allow companies to select jurisdictions whose laws govern the terms.

The recent experiment bypassed the need for informed user consent due to Facebook's Data Use Policy[8], which states that once an account has been created, user data can be used for 'internal operations, including troubleshooting, data analysis, testing, research and service improvement.' While the users worldwide may be outraged, legally, Facebook acted within its rights as the decision fell within the scope of T&Cs that users consented to. The incident's most positive impact might be in taking the questions of Facebook responsibilities towards protecting users, including informing them of the usage of their data and changes in data privacy terms, to a worldwide audience.

My right is bigger than yours

Most TOS agreements, written by lawyers to protect the interests of the companies add to the complexities of privacy, in an increasingly user-generated digital world. Often, intentionally complicated agreements, conflict with existing data and user rights across jurisdictions and chip away at rights like ownership, privacy and even the ability to sue. With conditions that that allow for change in terms at anytime, existing users do not have ownership or control over their data.

In April New York Times, reported of updates to the legal policy of General Mills (GM), the multibillion-dollar food company.[9] The update broadly asserted that consumers interacting with the company in a variety of ways and venues no longer can sue GM, but must instead, submit any complaint to “informal negotiation” or arbitration. Since then, GM has backtracked and clarified that “online communities” mentioned in the policy referred only to those online communities hosted by the company on its own websites.[10] Clarification aside, as Julia Duncan, Director of Federal programs at American Association for Justice points out, the update in the terms were so broad, that they were open to wide interpretation and anything that consumers purchase from the company could have been held to this clause. [11]

Data and whose rights?

Following Snowden revelations, data privacy has become a contentious issue in the EU, and TOS, that allow the service providers to unilaterally alter terms of the contract, will face many challenges in the future. In March Edward Snowden sent his testimony to the European Parliament calling for greater accountability and highlighted that in "a global, interconnected world where, when national laws fail like this, our international laws provide for another level of accountability."[12] Following the testimony came the European Parliament's vote in favor of new safeguards on the personal data of EU citizens, when it’s transferred to non-EU.[13] The new regulations seek to give users more control over their personal data including the right to ask for data from companies that control it and seek to place the burden of proof on the service providers.

The regulation places responsibility on companies, including third-parties involved in data collection, transfer and storing and greater transparency on concerned requests for information. The amendment reinforces data subject right to seek erasure of data and obliges concerned parties to communicate data rectification. Also, earlier this year, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled in favor of the 'right to be forgotten'[14]. The ECJ ruling recognised data subject's rights override the interest of internet users, however, with exceptions pertaining to nature of information, its sensitivity for the data subject's private life and the role of the data subject in public life.

In May, the Norwegian Consumer Council filed a complaint with the Norwegian Consumer Ombudsman, “… based on the discrepancies between Norwegian Law and the standard terms and conditions applicable to the Apple iCloud service...”, and, “...in breach of the law regarding control of marketing and standard agreements.”[15] The council based its complaint on the results of a study, published earlier this year, that found terms were hazy and varied across services including iCloud, Drop Box, Google Drive, Jotta Cloud, and Microsoft OneDrive. The Norwegian Council study found that Google TOS, allow for users content to be used for other purposes than storage, including by partners and that it has rights of usage even after the service is cancelled. None of the providers provide a guarantee that data is safe from loss, while many, have the ability to terminate an account without notice. All of the service providers can change the terms of service but only Google and Microsoft give an advance notice.

The study also found service providers lacking with respect to European privacy standards, with many allowing for browsing of user content. Tellingly, Google had received a fine in January by the French Data Protection Authority, that stated regarding Google's TOS, "permits itself to combine all the data it collects about its users across all of its services without any legal basis."

To blame or not to blame

Facebook is facing a probe by the UK Information Commissioner's Office, to assess if the experiment conducted in 2012 was a violation of data privacy laws.[16] The FTC asked the court to order T-Mobile USA, to stop mobile cramming, provide refunds and give up any revenues from the practice. The existing mechanisms of online consent, do not simplify the task of agreeing to multiple documents and services at once, a complexity which manifolds, with the involvement of third parties.

Unsurprisingly, T-Mobile's Legere termed the FTC lawsuit misdirected and blamed the companies providing the text services for the cramming.[17] He felt those providers should be held accountable, despite allegations that T-Mobile's billing practices made it difficult for consumers to detect that they were being charged for unauthorized services and having shared revenues with third-party providers. Interestingly, this is the first action against a wireless carrier for cramming and the FTC has a precedent of going after smaller companies that provide the services.

The FTC charged T-Mobile USA with deceptive billing practices in putting the crammed charges under a total for 'use charges' and 'premium services' and failure to highlight that portion of the charge was towards third-party charges. Further, the company urged customers to take complaints to vendors and was not forthcoming with refunds. For now, T-Mobile may be able to share the blame, the incident brings to question its accountability, especially as going forward it has entered a pact along with other carriers in USA including Verizon and AT&T, agreeing to stop billing customers for third-party services. Even when practices such as cramming are deemed illegal, it does not necessarily mean that harm has been prevented. Often users bear the burden of claiming refunds and litigation comes at a cost while even after being fined companies could have succeeded in profiting from their actions.

Conclusion

Unfair terms and conditions may arise when service providers include terms that are difficult to understand or vague in their scope. TOS that prevent users from taking legal action, negate liability for service providers actions despite the companies actions that may have a direct bearing on users, are also considered unfair. More importantly, any term that is hidden till after signing the contract, or a term giving the provider the right to change the contract to their benefit including wider rights for service provider wide in comparison to users such as a term that that makes it very difficult for users to end a contract create an imbalance. These issues get further complicated when the companies control and profiting from data are doing so with user generated data provided free to the platform.

In the knowledge economy, web companies play a decisive role as even though they work for profit, the profit is derived out of the knowledge held by individuals and groups. In their function of aggregating human knowledge, they collect and provide opportunities for feedback of the outcomes of individual choices. The significance of consent becomes a critical part of the equation when harnessing individual information. In France, consent is part of the four conditions necessary to be forming a valid contract (article 1108 of the Code Civil).

The cases highlight the complexities that are inherent in the existing mechanisms of online consent. The question of consent has many underlying layers such as reasonable notice and contractual obligations related to consent such as those explored in the case in Canada, which looked at whether clauses of TOS were communicated reasonably to the user, a topic for another blog. For now, we must remember that by creating and organising social knowledge that further human activity, service providers, serve a powerful function. And as the saying goes, with great power comes great responsibility.

[1] 'FTC Alleges T-Mobile Crammed Bogus Charges onto Customers’ Phone Bills', published 1 July, 2014. See: http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/07/ftc-alleges-t-mobile-crammed-bogus-charges-customers-phone-bills

[2] 'Experimental evidence of massive-scale emotional contagion through social networks', Adam D. I. Kramera,1, Jamie E. Guilloryb, and Jeffrey T. Hancock, published March 25, 2014. See:http://www.pnas.org/content/111/24/8788.full.pdf+html?sid=2610b655-db67-453d-bcb6-da4efeebf534

[3] 'U.S. sues T-Mobile USA, alleges bogus charges on phone bills, Reuters published 1st July, 2014 See: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/01/us-tmobile-ftc-idUSKBN0F656E20140701

[4] 'The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies', Aleecia M. McDonald and Lorrie Faith Cranor, published I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society 2008 Privacy Year in Review issue. See: http://lorrie.cranor.org/pubs/readingPolicyCost-authorDraft.pdf

[5] 'Reading the Privacy Policies You Encounter in a Year Would Take 76 Work Days', Alexis C. Madrigal, published The Atlantic, March 2012 See: http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/reading-the-privacy-policies-you-encounter-in-a-year-would-take-76-work-days/253851/

[6] Facebook Legal Terms. See: https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms

[7] 'Facebook's Eroding Privacy Policy: A Timeline', Kurt Opsahl, Published Electronic Frontier Foundation , April 28, 2010 See:https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/04/facebook-timeline

[8] Facebook Data Use Policy. See: https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/

[9] 'When ‘Liking’ a Brand Online Voids the Right to Sue', Stephanie Strom, published in New York Times on April 16, 2014 See: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/17/business/when-liking-a-brand-online-voids-the-right-to-sue.html?ref=business

[10] Explaining our website privacy policy and legal terms, published April 17, 2014 See:http://www.blog.generalmills.com/2014/04/explaining-our-website-privacy-policy-and-legal-terms/#sthash.B5URM3et.dpufhttp://www.blog.generalmills.com/2014/04/explaining-our-website-privacy-policy-and-legal-terms/

[11] General Mills Amends New Legal Policies, Stephanie Strom, published in New York Times on 1http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/18/business/general-mills-amends-new-legal-policies.html?_r=0

[12] Edward Snowden Statement to European Parliament published March 7, 2014. See: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201403/20140307ATT80674/20140307ATT80674EN.pdf

[13] Progress on EU data protection reform now irreversible following European Parliament vote, published 12 March 201 See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-186_en.htm

[14] European Court of Justice rules Internet Search Engine Operator responsible for Processing Personal Data Published by Third Parties, Jyoti Panday, published on CIS blog on May 14, 2014. See: http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/ecj-rules-internet-search-engine-operator-responsible-for-processing-personal-data-published-by-third-parties

[15] Complaint regarding Apple iCloud’s terms and conditions , published on 13 May 2014 See:http://www.forbrukerradet.no/_attachment/1175090/binary/29927

[16] 'Facebook faces UK probe over emotion study' See: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-28102550

[17] Our Reaction to the FTC Lawsuit See: http://newsroom.t-mobile.com/news/our-reaction-to-the-ftc-lawsuit.htm

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/reading-between-the-lines-service-providers-terms-and-conditions-and-consumer-rights

National IPR Policy Series: RTI Requests by CIS to DIPP + DIPP Responses

nehaa — 2015-04-26T08:47:00Z

In earlier blog posts, we have discussed the development of India’s National IPR Policy (“the Policy”); comments by the Centre for Internet and Society (“CIS”) to the IPR Think Tank before the release of the first draft of the Policy and CIS’ comments to the IPR Think Tank in response to the first draft of the Policy. Continuing our National IPR Policy Series, this article documents our requests to the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (“DIPP” / “the Department”) under the Right to Information (“RTI”) Act, 2005 and the responses of the Department.

View the PDF here.

Details of RTI Requests Filed by CIS

In February, 2015, CIS had filed three RTI requests with the DIPP. The first request was four-pronged, seeking information related to first, the process followed by the Department in the creation of the IPR Think Tank; second, details and documents of a meeting held to constitute the Think Tank; third, details and documents of all/multiple meetings held to constitute the Think Tank; fourth, details of a directive/directives received from any other Government Ministry/authority directing the constitution of the Think Tank and fifth, the process of shortlisting the members of the Think Tank by the DIPP.

In our second RTI request, first, we requested details of the process followed by the Think Tank in the formulation of the Policy; second, we requested all documents relating to a meeting held for the formulation of the Policy; third, we requested all documents held for multiple meetings for the creation of the Policy and fourth, we requisitioned all suggestions and comments received by the Think Tank from stakeholders before the release of the Policy, that is, those suggestions/comments received in November, 2014.

In our third RTI request, also filed on also filed in February, 2015, we had asked the DIPP to indicate all suggestions and comments received by the IPR Think Tank from different stakeholders in response to the first draft of the National IPR Policy (to have been submitted on or before January 30, 2015 as per DIPP’s Public Notice).

Responses by DIPP to CIS' RTI Requests

The DIPP replied to our three RTI requests in multiple stages. At first, in a letter dated 12 February, 2015, we were directed to resubmit our application , seemingly because we hadn’t addressed the Postal Money Order to the correct authority, and were directed to do the same. Funnily enough, we received three other responses – one for each of our RTI requests (the first of these is not dated; the second one is dated 19 February, 2015 and then revised to 26 February, 2015; and the third is also dated 26 February, 2015).

The First Response: On the Constitution of the Think Tank

In the first of their responses to these requests, the Department has grouped our queries into five questions and provided a point-wise response to these questions, as under:

Please indicate in detail the process followed by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion for the constitution for an IPR Think Tank to draft the National Intellectual Property Rights Policy under Public Notice No. 10 (22)/2013 –IPR-III dated November 13, 2014 (sic).

In its response the Department notes that it convened an interactive meeting on IPR issues which was chaired by the Minister for Commerce and Industry (Independent Charge), i.e., Ms. Nirmala Sitharaman. As per the Department’s response, this meeting was held on 22 September, 2014 (“the Meeting”) and was aimed at discussing issues related to IPRs, including finalization of the Terms of Reference for IPR Think-Tank proposed to be established (sic.) The Department also notes that representatives from various Ministries/Departments, Member of various Expert Committees constituted by the Department, besides IP experts and other Legal Practitioners (sic) were invited to the meeting. The Department then states that the composition of the Think Tank was decided on the basis of the discussions held in the department after the said interactive Meeting (sic).

If there was a meeting held to decide on the same, please include all necessary documents including the minutes of the meeting, records, documents, memos, e-mails, opinion, advices, press releases, circulars, orders etc in which the constitution of the aforesaid mentioned IPR Think Tank was decided (sic).

The Department has attached the Minutes of the Meeting held on 22 September, 2014 (“the Minutes”) and states that there were no documents or papers that were circulated at this meeting and that the participants were asked to present their views on various IP issues at this meeting.

Excerpts from the Minutes

The Secretary of the Department (Shri Amitabh Kant) refers to a (then) recent announcement made by the Minister of State for Commerce and Industry (“the Minister”) on the formulation of the National IPR Policy and the establishment of an IPR Think Tank and states that the meeting had been convened to discuss on various IPR issues with IP experts and legal practitioners so that it would provide essential inputs to the policy needs of the department (sic). The Minutes report that Mr. Kant further stated that the objective of the department was to have a world class IP system and that this included a comprehensive National IPR Policy and which takes care of various issues like IP creation, protection, administration and capacity building (sic). He is also reported to have said that such a stakeholder interaction was important for the government to seek inputs.

The Minister is reported to have said that the purpose of the meeting was to constitute an IP Think Tank that would regularly provide inputs to all IP policy needs of this department as well as advice government in disparate legal aspects (sic). The Minutes also report her to have said that the department would finalize an IP policy within ninety days of the Meeting, based on the inputs of the participants.

According to the Minutes, various issues emerged from the discussion. Inter alia, these include first, that the proposal to constitute the Think Tank was a welcome measure, along the lines of similar initiatives taken by Australia, South Kora, the United Kingdom and the United States of America; second, that in order to remove misconceptions held by foreign stakeholders about IP enforcement in India, there was a need to highlight judgments of Indian courts that were favorable to foreign stakeholders and MNCs; third, that the national policies on telecom, manufacturing and IP ought to be integrated; fourth, that the focus of the Policy should be increase in creation of IP including commercialization of IP and strengthening human capital and IP management and fifth, that empirical studies should be conducted to examine the feasibility of Utility Models protection, that there was a need to revise the law on Geographical Indications and that the Policy should include protection for traditional knowledge and guidelines for publicly funded research.

The Minister is then said to have identified six major areas during the discussion, including IP institution, legislation, implementation, public awareness, international aspects and barriers in IP growth as areas to be covered under the Policy.

Who attended the Meeting?

Attached with the Minutes was also a list of participants who attended the Meeting. Out of the thirty six attendees, I have not been able to locate a single individual or organization representing civil society. Participants include representatives from various government departments and ministries, including inter alia, the DIPP, the Department of Commerce, the Ministry of External Affairs, the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, the Copyright Division from the Department of Higher Education of the Ministry of Human Resources Development, the Office of the Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks and the Ministry of Culture. The Meeting was also attended by representatives of corporations and industry associations, including FICCI, CII and Cadila Pharmaceuticals; in addition to representatives from law firms including Luthra and Luthra, K&S Partners and Inventure IP and academics including, inter alia, faculty from the Asian School of Business, Trivandrum, Indian Law Institute, Delhi, Tezpur University, Assam, National Law University, Delhi, NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad, the Indian Institute of Technology, Madras and the National Law School of India University, Bangalore.

If there were multiple meetings held for the same please provide all necessary documents including the minutes of all such meetings, records, documents, memos, e-mails, opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, orders etc. for all such meetings held (sic).

The Department answered, “No”; which I’m taking to mean that there weren’t other meetings held for the formulation of the Think Tank or the Policy. This is interesting, because the Minutes (referred to earlier) speak of another inter-ministerial meeting including IP experts and legal practitioners slated to be held around the 10^th of October, 2014, to discuss the framework of the Policy.

If a directive or directives were received by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion from any other government body to constitute such a think tank, please provide a copy of such a directive received by the DIPP from any Government authority, to constitute such a Think Tank (sic).

The Department answered, “No”; which I’m taking to mean that there was no communication received by the Department to constitute this Think Tank.

Please indicate in detail the process of shortlisting the members of the IPR Think Tank by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion or any other body that was responsible for the same (sic).

The Department replied that the answer to this was the same as that to the first question.

The Second Response: The Drafting of the Policy

The second of the Department's responses to our requests came in the form of separate responses to each of our four questions, as under:

Please indicate in detail the process followed by the IPR Think Tank constituted by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion via Public Notice No. 10 (22)/2013-IPR-III dated November 13, 2014 while framing the first draft of the National IPR Policy dated Dec. 19, 2014 (sic).

The Department stated that the IPR Think Tank conducted its meetings independently without any interference from the Department. The Department then stated that the Think Tank had received comments from stakeholders via a dedicated email id and conducted the interactive meeting with stakeholders while framing the draft on the National IPR Policy.

If there was a meeting held to decide on the same, please include all necessary documents including the minutes of the meeting, records, documents, memos, e-mails, opinion, advices, press releases, circulars, orders, suggestions etc. related to drafting of such National IPR Policy Think Tank chaired by Justice Prabha Sridevan (sic).

The Department replied that since the IPR Think Tank had decided its process by themselves (sic), the Department do not have the minutes of the meeting etc. conducted by the IPR Think Tank (sic). It attached with its reply a copy of the press releases announcing the composition of the Think Tank and asking stakeholders to submit comments to the first draft of the Policy.

If there were multiple meetings held for the same, please provide all necessary documents including the minutes of all such meetings, records, documents, memos, e-mails, opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, order suggestions etc. for all such meetings held (sic).

The Department replied that the response to this was the same as that to the earlier question above.

Please provide all the suggestions and comments received by the IPR Think Tank from stakeholders after the DIPP issued Public Notice No. 10/22/2013-IPR-III dated 13.11.2014 asking for suggestions and comments on or before November 30, 2014 (sic).

The Department replied that the comments and suggestions were received by the Think Tank directly and that therefore, the Department was not in a position to provide the same.

The Third Response: Stakeholder Comments

In its third and final response to our requests, the DIPP replied to our query as under:

Please indicate all the suggestions and comments received by the IPR Think Tank by different stakeholders on or before January 30, 2015 on its first draft of the National Intellectual Property Policy submitted by the IPR Think Tank on December 19, 2014.

The Department said that the suggestions and comments on the draft on National IPR Policy have been received by the IPR Think Tank directly. As such this Department is not in a position to provide the same (sic.).

Observation on the DIPP's Responses

Prima facie, the responses by the Department are rather curious, leading to a range of oddities and unanswered questions.

Who Will Watch the IPR Think Tank

In its response to our first RTI request, the Department quite clearly stated that it decided the composition of the IPR Think Tank based on discussions in a meeting that it convened, which was also chaired by the Minister of State for Commerce and Industry, the parent ministry of the DIPP. In the same response, the Department also stated that it had not received any directive from any other ministry/government department directing the constitution of the IPR Think Tank, leading to the conclusion that this decision was taken by the DIPP/the Ministry of Commerce and Industry itself. Subsequently however, the Department justified its refusal to furnish us with documents leading to the development of the first draft of the National IPR Policy (contained in our second RTI request) by stating that the IPR Think Tank conducted its business without any interference from the Department, and that the Department did not have access to any of the submissions made to the IPR Think Tank or any of the internal minutes of the meetings etc. that were a part of the process of drafting the IPR Policy.

Various press releases by the DIPP have stated that it has constituted the IPR Think Tank, and that the purpose of the IPR Think Tank would be to advise the Department on IPR issues. Visibly, the Department intends for the IPR Think Tank to play an active role in shaping India’s IP law and policy, including suggesting amendments to laws wherever necessary. It is concerning therefore that on the question of accountability of the IPR Think Tank, the DIPP remains silent. It may be argued perhaps, that the IPR Think Tank constitutes a ‘public authority’ under Section 2(h)(d) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (“RTI Act”). In that case, the IPR Think Tank would have to fulfill, inter alia, all of the obligations under Section 4 of the RTI Act as well as designate a Public Information Officer. Alternatively, given that the IPR Think Tank has been constituted by the DIPP and performs functions for the DIPP, the Public Information Officer of the DIPP would have to furnish all relevant information under the RTI Act (including the information that we sought in our requests, which was not provided to us).

Who are the Stakeholders

Even a preliminary look at the list of participants at the Meeting (based on which the Department constituted the IPR Think Tank) reveals that not all stakeholders have been adequately represented. I haven’t been able to spot any representation from civil society and other organizations that might be interested in a more balanced intellectual property framework that is not rights-heavy. The following chart (based on a total sample size of 36 participants, as stated in the list of participants provided to us by the DIPP) will help put things in perspective.

What Could've Been Done?

Setting aside arguments on its necessity, let us for the moment assume that this drafting of the National IPR Policy is an exercise that needed to have been undertaken. We must now examine what might possibly be the best way to go about this.

In 2014, the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) (based on whose approach the Policy seems to have been based- at least in part), produced a detailed Methodology for the Development of National Intellectual Property Strategies, outlining a detailed eight step process before a National IP Policy was implemented in a Member State. While this approach is one to be followed by the WIPO and might not be entirely suited to India’s drafting exercise, specific sections on the national consultation process as well as the drafting and implementation of national intellectual property strategies might prove to be a decent starting point.

(More on this in an upcoming article).d

Where Do We Go From Here?

The DIPP’s responses have left me with more questions, probably the subject of more RTI requests. Is the IPR Think Tank a public authority for the purposes of the Right to Information Act, 2005? To whom should questions of informational accountability of the IPR Think Tank be addressed, if there is no information available on the IPR Think Tank, and the DIPP claims to have no access to it? Do we need to re-examine the draft National IPR Policy given that there has been inadequate representation of all stakeholders? What were the suggestions made by different stakeholders, and (how) have these been reflected in the first draft of the Policy? Was there an evaluation exercise conducted before the first draft of the Policy was released in order to better inform the formulation of the Policy?

We will be looking at these and other questions as they arise, and sending some of these to the DIPP in the form of RTI requests. (Watch the blog for more).

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/national-ipr-policy-series-rti-requests-by-cis-to-dipp-dipp-responses

ICANN’s Problems with Accountability and the .WEB Controversy

Padma Venkataraman — 2017-10-28T15:49:38Z

The Post-Transition IANA promised enhanced transparency and accountability to the global multistakeholder community. The series of events surrounding the .WEB auction earlier this year has stirred up issues relating to the lack of transparency and accountability of ICANN. This post examines the .WEB auction as a case study to better understand exact gaps in accountability.

Chronological Background of the .WEB Auction

In June 2012, ICANN launched a new phase for the creation and operation of Generic Top-Level Domains (gTLDs). After confirming the eligibility of seven applicants for the rights of the .WEB domain name, ICANN placed them in a string contention set (a group of applications with similar or identical applied for gTLDs).^[1]

[Quick Note: ICANN procedure encourages the resolving of this contention set by voluntary settlement amongst the contending applicants (also referred to as a private auction), wherein individual participation fees of US $185,000 go to ICANN and the auction proceeds are distributed among the bidders. If a private auction fails, the provision for a last resort auction conducted by ICANN is invoked - here the total auction proceeds go to ICANN along with the participation fees.^[2]]

In June 2016, NuDotCo LLC, a bidder that had previously participated in nine private auctions without any objection, withdrew its consent to the voluntary settlement. Ruby Glen LLC, another bidder, contacted NDC to ask if it would reconsider its withdrawal, and was made aware of changes in NDC’s Board membership, financial position, management and a potential change in ownership, by NDC’s Chief Financial Officer.^[3] Concerned about the transparency of the auction process, Ruby Glen requested ICANN to postpone the auction on June 22, in order to investigate the discrepancies between NDC’s official application and its representation to Ruby Glen.^[4] The Vice President of ICANN’s gTLD Operations and the independent ICANN Ombudsman led separate investigations, both of which were limited to few e-mails seeking NDC’s confirmation of status quo. On the basis of NDC’s denial of any material changes, ICANN announced that the auction would proceed as planned, as no grounds had been found for its postponement.^[5]

On July 27, NDC’s winning bid – USD 135 million – beat the previous record by $90 million, doubling ICANN’s total net proceeds from the past fifteen auctions it had conducted.^[6] Soon after NDC’s win, Verisign, Inc., the market giant that owns the .com and .net domain names, issued a public statement that it had used NDC as a front for the auction, and that it had been involved in its funding from the very beginning. Verisign agreed to transfer USD 130 million to NDC, allowing the latter to retain a $5 million stake in .WEB.^[7]

Ruby Glen LLC filed for an injunction against the transfer of .WEB rights to NDC, and sought expedited discovery^[8] against ICANN and NDC in order to gather evidentiary support for the temporary restraining order.^[9] Donuts Inc., the parent company of Ruby Glen, simultaneously filed for recovery of economic loss due to negligence, fraud and breach of bylaws among other grounds, and Affilias, the second highest bidder, demanded that the .WEB rights be handed over by ICANN.^[10] Furthermore, at ICANN57, Affilias publicly brought up the issue in front of ICANN’s Board, and Verisign followed with a rebuttal. However, ICANN’s Board refused to comment on the issue at that point as the matter was still engaged in ongoing litigation.^[11]

Issues Regarding ICANN’s Assurance of Accountability

The Post-Transition IANA promised enhanced transparency and accountability to the global multistakeholder community. The series of events surrounding the .WEB auction has stirred up issues relating to the lack of transparency and accountability of ICANN. ICANN’s arbitrary enforcement of policies that should have been mandatory, with regard to internal accountability mechanisms, fiduciary responsibilities and the promotion of competition, has violated Bylaws that obligate it to operate ‘consistently, neutrally, objectively, and fairly, without singling out any particular party for discriminatory treatment’.^[12]

Though the US court ruled in favour of ICANN, the discrepancies that were made visible with regard to ICANN’s differing emphasis on procedural and substantive compliance with its rules and regulations, have forced the community to acknowledge that corporate strategies, latent interests and financial advantages undermine ICANN’s commitment to accountability. The approval of NDC’s ridiculously high bid with minimal investigation or hesitation, even after Verisign’s takeover, signifies pressing concerns that stand in the way of a convincing commitment to accountability, such as:

The Lack of Substantive Fairness and Accountability at ICANN (A Superficial Investigation)
ICANN’s Sketchy Tryst with Legal Conformity
The Financial Accountability of ICANN’s Auction Proceeds

The Lack of Substantive Fairness and Accountability in its Screening Processes:

Ruby Glen’s claim that ICANN conducted a cursory investigation of NDC’s misleading and unethical behaviour brought to light the ease and arbitrariness with which applications are deemed valid and eligible.

Disclosure of Significant Details Unique to Applicant Profiles: In the initial stage, applications for the gTLD auctions require disclosure of background information such as proof of legal establishment, financial statements, primary and secondary contacts to represent the company, officers, directors, partners, major shareholders, etc. At this stage, TAS User Registration IDs, which require VAT/tax/business IDs, principal business address, phone, fax, etc. of the applicants, are created to build unique profiles for different parties in an auction.^[13] Any important change in an applicant’s details would thus significantly alter the unique profile, leading to uncertainty regarding the parties involved and the validity of transactions undertaken. NDC’s application clearly didn’t meet the requirements here, as its financial statements, secondary contact, board members and ownership all changed at some point before the auction took place (either prior to or post submission of the application).^[14]

Mandatory Declaration of Third Party Funding: Applications presupposing a future joint venture or any organisational unpredictability are not deemed eligible by ICANN, and if any third party is involved in the funding of the applicant, the latter is to provide evidence of such commitment to funding at the time of submission of its financial documents.^[15] Verisign’s public announcement that it was involved in NDC’s funding from the very beginning (well before the auction) and its management later, proves that NDC’s failure to notify ICANN made its application ineligible, or irregular at the very least.^[16]

Vague Consequences of Failure to Notify ICANN of Changes: If in any situation, certain material changes occur in the composition of the management, ownership or financial position of the applicant, ICANN is liable to be notified of the changes by the submission of updated documents. Here, however, the applicant may be subjected to re-evaluation if a material change is concerned, at ICANN’s will (there is no mention of what a material change might be). In the event of failure to notify ICANN of changes that would lead the previous information submitted to be false or misleading, ICANN may reject or deny the application concerned.^[17] NDC’s absolute and repeated denial of any changes, during the extremely brief e-mail ‘investigation’ conducted by ICANN and the Ombudsman, show that at no point was NDC planning on revealing its intimacy with Verisign. No extended evaluation was conducted by ICANN at any point.^[18] Note: The arbitrary power allowed here and the vague use of the term ‘material’ obstruct any real accountability on ICANN’s part to ensure that checks are carried out to discourage dishonest behaviour, at all stages.

Arbitrary Enforcement of Background Checks: In order to confirm the eligibility of all applicants, ICANN conducts background screening during its initial evaluation process to verify the information disclosed, at the individual and entity levels.^[19] The applicants may be asked to produce any and all documents/evidence to help ICANN complete this successfully, and any relevant information received from ‘any source’ may be taken into account here. However, this screening is conducted only with regard to two criteria: general business diligence and criminal history, and any record of cybersquatting behaviour.^[20] In this case, ICANN’s background screening was clearly not thorough, in light of Verisign’s confirmed involvement since the beginning, and at no point was NDC asked to submit any extra documents (apart from the exchange of e-mails between NDC and ICANN and its Ombudsman) to enable ICANN’s inquiry into its business diligence.^[21] Further, ICANN also said that it was not required to conduct background checks or a screening process, as the provisions only mention that ICANN is allowed to do so, when it feels the need.^[22] This ludicrous loophole hinders transparency efforts by giving ICANN the authority to ignore any questionable details in applications it desires to deem eligible, based on its own strategic leanings, advantageous circumstances or any other beneficial interests.

ICANN’s deliberate avoidance of discussing or investigating the ‘allegations’ against NDC (that were eventually proved true), as well as a visible compromise in fairness and equity of the application process point to the conclusion it desired.

ICANN’s Sketchy Tryst with Legal Conformity:

ICANN’s lack of substantive compliance, with California’s laws and its own rules and regulations, leave us with the realisation that efforts towards transparency, enforcement and compliance (even with emphasis on the IANA Stewardship and Accountability Process) barely meet the procedural minimum.

Rejection of Request for Postponement of Auction: ICANN’s intent to ‘initiate the Auction process once the composition of the set is stabilised’ implies that there must be no pending accountability mechanisms with regard to any applicant.^[23] When ICANN itself determines the opening and closing of investigations or reviews concerning applicants, arbitrariness on ICANN’s part in deciding on which date the mechanisms are to be deemed as pending, may affect an applicant’s claim about procedural irregularity. In this case, ICANN had already scheduled the auction for July 27, 2016, before Ruby Glen sent in a request for postponement of the auction and inquiry into NDC’s eligibility on June 22, 2016.^[24] Even though the ongoing accountability mechanisms had begun after initiation of the auction process, ICANN confirmed the continuance of the process without assurance about the stability of the contention set as required by procedure. Ruby Glen’s claim about this violation in auction rules was dismissed by ICANN on the basis that there must be no pending accountability mechanisms at the time of scheduling of the auction.^[25] This means that if any objection is raised or any dispute resolution or accountability mechanism is initiated with regard to an applicant, at any point after fixing the date of the auction, the auction process continues even though the contention set may not be stabilised. This line of defence made by ICANN is not in conformity with the purpose behind the wording of its auction procedure as discussed above.

Lack of Adequate Participation in the Discovery Planning Process: In order to gather evidentiary support and start the discovery process for the passing of the injunction, ICANN was required to engage with Ruby Glen in a conference, under Federal law. However, due to a disagreement as to the extent of participation required from both parties involved in the process, ICANN recorded only a single appearance at court, after which it refused to engage with Ruby Glen.^[26] ICANN should have conducted a thorough investigation, based on both NDC’s and Verisign’s public statements, and engaged more cooperatively in the conference, to comply substantively with its internal procedure as well jurisdictional obligations. Under ICANN’s Bylaws, it is to ensure that an applicant does not assign its rights or obligations in connection with the application to another party, as NDC did, in order to promote a competitive market and ensure certainty in transactions.^[27] However, due to its lack of substantive compliance with due procedure, such bylaws have been rendered weak.

Demand to Dismiss Ruby Glen’s Complaint: ICANN demanded the dismissal of Ruby Glen’s complaint on the basis that the complaint was vague and unsubstantiated.^[28] After the auction, Ruby Glen’s allegations and suspicions about NDC’s dishonest behaviour were confirmed publicly by Verisign, making the above demand for dismissal of the complaint ridiculous.

Inapplicability of ICANN’s Bylaws to its Contractual Relationships: ICANN maintained that its bylaws are not part of application documents or contracts with applicants (as it is a not-for-profit public benefit corporation), and that ICANN’s liability, with respect to a breach of ICANN’s foundational documents, extends only to officers, directors, members, etc.^[29] In addition, it said that Ruby Glen had not included any facts that suggested a duty of care arose from the contractual relationship with Ruby Glen and Donuts Inc.^[30] Its dismissal of and considerable disregard for fiduciary obligations like duty of care and duty of inquiry in contractual relationships, prove the contravention of promised commitments and core values (integral to its entire accountability process), which are to ‘apply in the broadest possible range of circumstances’.^[31]

ICANN’s Legal Waiver and Public Policy: Ruby Glen had submitted that, under the California Civil Code 1668, a covenant not to sue was against policy, and that the legal waiver all applicants were made to sign in the application was unenforceable.^[32] This waiver releases ICANN from ‘any claims arising out of, or related to, any action or failure to act’, and the complaint claimed that such an agreement ‘not to challenge ICANN in court, irrevocably waiving the right to sue on basis of any legal claim’ was unconscionable.^[33] However, ICANN defended the enforceability of the legal waiver, saying that only a covenant not to sue that is specifically designed to avoid responsibility for own fraud or willful injury is invalidated under the provisions of the California Civil Code.^[34] A waiver, incorporating the availability of accountability mechanisms ‘within ICANN’s bylaws to challenge any final decision of ICANN’s with respect to an application’, was argued as completely valid under California’s laws. It must be kept in mind that challenges to ICANN’s final decisions can make headway only through its own accountability mechanisms (including the Reconsideration Requests Process, the Independent Review Panel and the Ombudsman), which are mostly conducted by, accountable to and applicable at the discretion of the Board.^[35] This means that the only recourse for dissatisfied applicants is through processes managed by ICANN, leaving no scope for independence and impartiality in the review or inquiry concerned, as the .WEB case has shown.

Note: ICANN has also previously argued that its waivers are not restricted by S. 1668 because the parties involved are sophisticated - without an element of oppression, and that these transactions don’t involve public interest as ICANN doesn’t provide necessary services such as health, transportation, etc.^[36] Such line of argument shows its continuous refusal to acknowledge responsibility for ensuring access to an essential good, in a diverse community, justifying concerns about ICANN’s commitment to accessibility and human rights.

Required to remain accountable to the stakeholders of the community through mechanisms listed in its Bylaws, ICANN’s repeated difficulty in ensuring these mechanisms adhere to the purpose behind jurisdictional regulations confirm hindrances to impartiality, independence and effectiveness.

The Financial Accountability of ICANN’s Auction Proceeds:

The use and distribution of significant auction proceeds accruing to ICANN have been identified by the internet community as issues central to financial transparency, especially in a future of increasing instances of contention sets.

Private Inurement Prohibition and Legal Requirements of Tax-Exempted Organisations: Subject to California’s state laws as well as federal laws, tax exemptions and tax-deductible charitable donations (available to not-for-profit public benefit corporations) are dependent on the fulfillment of jurisdictional obligations by ICANN, including avoiding contracts that may result in excessive economic benefit to a party involved, or lead to any deviation from purely charitable and scientific purposes.^[37] ICANN’s Articles require that it ‘shall pursue the charitable and public purposes of lessening the burdens of government and promoting the global public interest in the operational stability of the Internet’.^[38] Due to this, ICANN’s accumulation of around USD 60 million (the total net proceeds from over 14 contention sets) since 2014 has been treated with unease, making it impossible to ignore the exponential increase in the same after the .WEB controversy.^[39] With its dedication to a bottom-up, multi-stakeholder policy development process, the use of a single and ambiguous footnote, in ICANN’s Guidebook, to tackle the complications involving significant funds that accrue from last resort auctions (without even mentioning the arbiters of their ‘appropriate’ use) is grossly insufficient.^[40]

Need for Careful and Inclusive Deliberation Over the Use of Auction Proceeds: At the end of the fiscal year 2016, ICANN’s balance sheet showed a total of USD 399.6 million. However, the .WEB sale amount was not included in this figure, as the auction happened after the last date (June 30, 2016).^[41] Around seven times the average winning bid, a USD 135 million hike in ICANN’s accounts shows the need for greater scrutiny on ICANN’s process of allocation and distribution of these auction proceeds.^[42] While finding an ‘appropriate purpose’ for these funds, it is important that ICANN’s legal nature under US jurisdiction as well as its vision, mission and commitments be adhered to, in order to help increase public confidence and financial transparency.

The CCWG Charter on New gTLD Auction Proceeds: ICANN has always maintained that it recognised the concern of ‘significant funds accruing as a result of several auctions’ at the outset.^[43] In March 2015, the GNSO brought up issues relating to the distribution of auction proceeds at ICANN52, to address growing concerns of the community.^[44] A Charter was then drafted, proposing the formation of a Cross-Community Working Group on New gTLD Auction Proceeds, to help ICANN’s Board in allocating these funds.^[45] After being discussed in detail at ICANN56, the draft charter was forwarded to the various supporting organisations for comments.^[46] The Charter received no objections from 2 organisations and was adopted by the ALAC, ASO, ccNSO and GNSO, following which members and co-chairs were identified from the organisations to constitute the CCWG.^[47] It was decided that while ICANN’s Board will have final responsibility in disbursement of the proceeds, the CCWG will be responsible for the submission of proposals regarding the mechanism for the allocation of funds, keeping ICANN’s fiduciary and legal obligations in mind.^[48] While creating proposals, the CCWG must recommend how to avoid possible conflicts of interest, maintain ICANN’s tax-exempt status, and ensure diversity and inclusivity in the entire process.^[49] It is important to note that the CCWG cannot make recommendations ‘regarding which organisations are to be funded or not’, but is to merely submit a proposal for the process by which allocation is undertaken.^[50] ICANN’s Guidebook mentions possible uses for proceeds, such as ‘grants to support new gTLD applications or registry operators from communities’, the creation of a fund for ‘specific projects for the benefit of the Internet community’, the ‘establishment of a security fund to expand use of secure protocols’, among others, to be decided by the Board.^[51]

A Slow Process and the Need for More Official Updates: The lack of sufficient communication/updates about any allocation or the process behind such, in light of ICANN’s current total net auction proceeds of USD 233,455,563, speaks of an urgent need for a decision by the Board (based on a recommendation by CCWG), regarding a timeframe for the allocation of such proceeds.^[52] However, the entire process has been very slow, with the first CCWG meeting on auction proceeds scheduled for 26 January 2016, and the lists of members and observers being made public only recently.^[53] Here, even parties interested in applying for the same funds at a later stage are allowed to participate in meetings, as long as they include such information in a Statement of Interest and Declaration of Intention, to satisfy CCWG’s efforts towards transparency and accountability.^[54]

The worrying consequences of ICANN’s lack of financial as well as legal accountability (especially in light of its controversies), reminds us of the need for constant reassessment of its commitment to substantive transparency, enforcement and compliance with its rules and regulations. Its current obsessive courtship with only procedural regularity must not be mistaken for a greater commitment to accountability, as assured by the post-transition IANA.

^[1] DECLARATION OF CHRISTINE WILLETT IN SUPPORT OF ICANN’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, 2. (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.p df)

^[2] 4.3, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 4-19. (https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb)

^[3] NOTICE OF AND EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF, 15. (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf)

^[4] NOTICE OF AND EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF, 15. (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf)

^[5] DECLARATION OF CHRISTINE WILLETT IN SUPPORT OF ICANN’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, 4-7. (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.pdf)

^[6] PLAINTIFF RUBY GLEN, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO TAKE THIRD PARTY DISCOVERY OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR THE COURT TO ISSUE A SCHEDULING ORDER, 3.

(https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-motion-court-issue-scheduling-order-26oct16-en.pdf)

^[7](https://www.verisign.com/en_US/internet-technology-news/verisign-press-releases/articles/index.xhtml?artLink=aHR0cDovL3ZlcmlzaWduLm5ld3NocS5idXNpbmVzc3dpcmUuY29tL3ByZXNzLXJlbGVhc2UvdmVyaXNpZ24tc3RhdGVtZW50LXJlZ2FyZGluZy13ZWItYXVjdGlvbi1yZXN1bHRz)

^[8] An expedited discovery request can provide the required evidentiary support needed to meet the Plaintiff’s burden to obtain a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. (http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/businesstorts/articles/winter2014-0227-using-expedited-discovery-with-preliminary-injunction-motions.html)

^[9] NOTICE OF AND EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF, 2. (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf)

^[10] (http://domainincite.com/20789-donuts-files-10-million-lawsuit-to-stop-web-auction); (https://www.thedomains.com/2016/08/15/afilias-asks-icann-to-disqualify-nu-dot-cos-135-million-winning-bid-for-web/)

^[11] (http://www.domainmondo.com/2016/11/news-review-icann57-hyderabad-india.html)

^[12] Art III, Bylaws of Public Technical Identifiers, ICANN. (https://pti.icann.org/bylaws)

^[13] 1.4.1.1, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 1-39.(https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb)

^[14] NOTICE OF AND EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF, 15. (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf)

^[15] 1.2.1; 1.2.2, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 1-21. (https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb)

^[16](https://www.verisign.com/en_US/internet-technology-news/verisign-press-releases/articles/index.xhtml?artLink=aHR0cDovL3ZlcmlzaWduLm5ld3NocS5idXNpbmVzc3dpcmUuY29tL3ByZXNzLXJlbGVhc2UvdmVyaXNpZ24tc3RhdGVtZW50LXJlZ2FyZGluZy13ZWItYXVjdGlvbi1yZXN1bHRz)

^[17] 1.2.7, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 1-30. (https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb)

^[18] DECLARATION OF CHRISTINE WILLETT IN SUPPORT OF ICANN’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, 4. (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.pdf)

^[19] 1.1.2.5, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 1-8. (https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb)

^[20] 1.2.1, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 1-21. (https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb)

^[21] DECLARATION OF CHRISTINE WILLETT IN SUPPORT OF ICANN’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, 7. (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.pdf)

^[22] 6.8; 6.11, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 6-5 (https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb);

DEFENDANT INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, 10. (http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf)

^[23] 1.1.2.10, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN. (https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb)

^[24] NOTICE OF AND EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF, 15. (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf)

^[25] DEFENDANT INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, 8. (http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf)

^[26] 26(f); 65, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (https://www.federalrulesofcivilprocedure.org/frcp/title-viii-provisional-and-final-remedies/rule-65-injunctions-and-restraining-orders/); (https://www.federalrulesofcivilprocedure.org/frcp/title-v-disclosures-and-discovery/rule-26-duty-to-disclose-general-provisions-governing-discovery/)

^[27] 6.10, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 6-6. (https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb); (https://www.icann.org/resources/reviews/specific-reviews/cct)

^[28] 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; DEFENDANT INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, 6. (http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf)

^[29] DEFENDANT INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, 8. (http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf)

^[30] PLAINTIFF RUBY GLEN, LLC’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES, 12.

(https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-opposition-motion-dismiss-first-amended-complaint-07nov16-en.pdf)

^[31] (https://archive.icann.org/en/accountability/frameworks-principles/legal-corporate.htm); Art. 1(c), Bylaws for ICANN. (https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylaws-en)

^[32] (http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=CIV&sectionNum=1668); NOTICE OF AND EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER: MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF, 24. (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf)

^[33] 6.6, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 6-4. (https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb)

^[34] DEFENDANT INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, 18. (http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf)

^[35] (https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/mechanisms-2014-03-20-en)

^[36] AMENDED REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ICANN’S MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, 4. (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-dca-reply-memo-support-icann-motion-dismiss-first-amended-complaint-14apr16-en.pdf)

^[37] 501(c)(3), Internal Revenue Code, USA. (https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-organizations/exemption-requirements-section-501-c-3-organizations)

^[38] Art. II, Public Technical Identifiers, Articles of Incorporation, ICANN. (https://pti.icann.org/articles-of-incorporation)

^[39](https://community.icann.org/display/alacpolicydev/At-Large+New+gTLD+Auction+Proceeds+Discussion+Paper+Workspace)

^[40] (https://www.icann.org/policy); 4.3, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 4-19. (https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb)

^[41]5, Internet Corporation for ASsigned Names and Numbers, Fiscal Statements As of and for the Years Ended June 30, 2016 and 2015. (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/financial-report-fye-30jun16-en.pdf);

(http://domainincite.com/21204-icann-has-400m-in-the-bank?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+DomainIncite+%28DomainIncite.com%29)

^[42] (http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/07/28/someone_paid_135m_for_dot_web)

^[43](https://community.icann.org/display/CWGONGAP/Cross-Community+Working+Group+on+new+gTLD+Auction+Proceeds+Home)

^[44] (https://www.icann.org/public-comments/new-gtld-auction-proceeds-2015-09-08-en)

^[45] (https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en)

^[46] (https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en)

^[47](https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en);

(https://community.icann.org/display/CWGONGAP/Cross-Community+Working+Group+on+new+gTLD+Auction+Proceeds+Home)

^[48] (https://ccnso.icann.org/workinggroups/ccwg-charter-07nov16-en.pdf); (https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en)

^[49] (https://www.icann.org/public-comments/new-gtld-auction-proceeds-2015-09-08-en)

^[50] (https://community.icann.org/display/CWGONGAP/CCWG+Charter)

^[51] 4.3, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 4-19. (https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb)

^[52] (https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/auctions/proceeds)

^[53] (https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=63150102)

^[54] (https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann2019s-problems-with-accountability-and-the-web-controversy

ICANN’s Documentary Information Disclosure Policy – I: DIDP Basics

Vinayak Mithal — 2014-07-01T13:01:34Z

In a series of blogposts, Vinayak Mithal analyses ICANN's reactive transparency mechanism, comparing it with freedom of information best practices. In this post, he describes the DIDP and its relevance for the Internet community.

The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”) is a non-profit corporation incorporated in the state of California and vested with the responsibility of managing the DNS root, generic and country-code Top Level Domain name system, allocation of IP addresses and assignment of protocol identifiers. As an internationally organized corporation with its own multi-stakeholder community of Advisory Groups and Supporting Organisations, ICANN is a large and intricately woven governance structure. Necessarily, ICANN undertakes through its Bye-laws that “in performing its functions ICANN shall remain accountable to the Internet community through mechanisms that enhance ICANN’s effectiveness”. While many of its documents, such as its Annual Reports, financial statements and minutes of Board meetings, are public, ICANN has instituted the Documentary Information Disclosure Policy (“DIDP”), which like the RTI in India, is a mechanism through which public is granted access to documents with ICANN which are not otherwise available publicly. It is this policy – the DIDP – that I propose to study.

In a series of blogposts, I propose to introduce the DIDP to unfamiliar ears, and to analyse it against certain freedom of information best practices. Further, I will analyse ICANN’s responsiveness to DIDP requests to test the effectiveness of the policy. However, before I undertake such analysis, it is first good to know what the DIDP is, and how it is crucial to ICANN’s present and future accountability.

What is the DIDP?

One of the core values of the organization as enshrined under Article I Section 4.10 of the Bye-laws note that “in performing its functions ICANN shall remain accountable to the Internet community through mechanisms that enhance ICANN’s effectiveness”. Further, Article III of the ICANN Bye-laws, which sets out the transparency standard required to be maintained by the organization in the preliminary, states - “ICANN and its constituent bodies shall operate to the maximum extent feasible in an open and transparent manner and consistent with procedures designed to ensure fairness”.

Accordingly, ICANN is under an obligation to maintain a publicly accessible website with information relating to its Board meetings, pending policy matters, agendas, budget, annual audit report and other related matters. It is also required to maintain on its website, information about the availability of accountability mechanisms, including reconsideration, independent review, and Ombudsman activities, as well as information about the outcome of specific requests and complaints invoking these mechanisms.

Pursuant to Article III of the ICANN Bye-laws for Transparency, ICANN also adopted the DIDP for disclosure of publicly unavailable documents and publish them over the Internet. This becomes essential in order to safeguard the effectiveness of its international multi-stakeholder operating model and its accountability towards the Internet community. Thereby, upon request made by members of the public, ICANN undertakes to furnish documents that are in possession, custody or control of ICANN and which are not otherwise publicly available, provided it does not fall under any of the defined conditions for non-disclosure. Such information can be requested via an email to didp@icann.org.

Procedure

Upon the receipt of a DIDP request, it is reviewed by the ICANN staff.
Relevant documents are identified and interview of the appropriate staff members is conducted.
The documents so identified are then assessed whether they come under the ambit of the conditions for non-disclosure.
- Yes - A review is conducted as to whether, under the particular circumstances, the public interest in disclosing the documentary information outweighs the harm that may be caused by such disclosure.
- Documents which are considered as responsive and appropriate for public disclosure are posted on the ICANN website.
- In case of request of documents whose publication is appropriate but premature at the time of response then the same is indicated in the response and upon publication thereafter, is notified to the requester.

Time Period and Publication

The response to the DIDP request is prepared by the staff and is made available to the requestor within a period of 30 days of receipt of request via email. The Request and the Response is also posted on the DIDP page http://www.icann.org/en/about/transparency in accordance with the posting guidelines set forth at http://www.icann.org/en/about/transparency/didp.

Conditions for Non-Disclosure

There are certain circumstances under which ICANN may refuse to provide the documents requested by the public. The conditions so identified by ICANN have been categorized under 12 heads and includes internal information, third-party contracts, non-disclosure agreements, drafts of all reports, documents, etc., confidential business information, trade secrets, information protected under attorney-client privilege or any other such privilege, information which relates to the security and stability of the internet, etc.

Moreover, ICANN may refuse to provide information which is not designated under the specified conditions for non-disclosure if in its opinion the harm in disclosing the information outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information. Further, requests for information already available publicly and to create or compile summaries of any documented information may be declined by ICANN.

Grievance Redressal Mechanism

In certain circumstances the requestor might be aggrieved by the response received and so he has a right to appeal any decision of denial of information by ICANN through the Reconsideration Request procedure or the Independent Review procedure established under Section 2 and 3 of Article IV of the ICANN Bye-laws respectively. The application for review is made to the Board which has designated a Board Governance Committee for such reconsideration. The Independent Review is done by an independent third-party of Board actions, which are allegedly inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bye-laws of ICANN.

Why does the DIDP matter?

The breadth of ICANN’s work and its intimate relationship to the continued functioning of the Internet must be appreciated before our analysis of the DIDP can be of help. ICANN manages registration and operations of generic and country-code Top Level Domains (TLD) in the world. This is a TLD:

(Source: here)

Operation of many gTLDs, such as .com, .biz or .info, is under contract with ICANN and an entity to which such operation is delegated. For instance, Verisign operates the .com Registry. Any organization that wishes to allow others to register new domain names under a gTLD (sub-domains such as ‘benefithealth’ in the above example) must apply to ICANN to be an ICANN-accredited Registrar. GoDaddy, for instance, is one such ICANN-accredited Registrar. Someone like you or me, who wants to get our own website – say, vinayak.com – buys from GoDaddy, which has a contract with ICANN under which it pays periodic sums for registration and renewal of individual domain names. When I buy from an ICANN-accredited Registrar, the Registrar informs the Registry Operator (say, Verisign), who then adds the new domain name (vinayak.com) to its registry list, and then it can be accessed on the Internet.

ICANN’s reach doesn’t stop here, technically. To add a new gTLD, an entity has to apply to ICANN, after which the gTLD has to be added to the root file of the Internet. The root file, which has the list of all TLDs (or all ‘legitimate’ TLDs, some would say), is amended by Verisign under its tripartite contract with the US Government and ICANN, after which Verisign updates the file in its ‘A’ root server. The other 12 root servers use the same root file as the Verisign root server. Effectively, this means that only ICANN-approved TLDs (and all sub-domains such as ‘benefithealth’ or ‘vinayak’) are available across the Internet, on a global scale. Or at least, ICANN-approved TLDs have the most and widest reach. ICANN similarly manages country-code TLDs, such as .in for India, .pk for Pakistan or .uk for the United Kingdom.

All of this leads us to wonder whether the extent of ICANN’s voluntary and reactive transparency is sufficient for an organization of such scale and impact on the Internet, perhaps as much impact as the governments do. In the next post, I will analyse the DIDP’s conditions for non-disclosure of information with certain freedom of information best practices.

Vinayak Mithal is a final year student at the Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab. His interests lie in Internet governance and other aspects of tech law, which he hopes to explore during his internship at CIS and beyond. He may be reached at vinayakmithal@gmail.com.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann2019s-documentary-information-disclosure-policy-2013-i-didp-basics

ICANN Workstream 2 Recommendations on Accountability

akriti — 2018-11-23T14:56:20Z

One of the most significant initiatives to improve the accountability of the Internet Corporation of Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) commenced in 2014, when the Cross Community Working Group on Accountability was created. Its role was to develop a set of proposed enhancements to ICANN’s accountability to the global Internet community. This resulted in the first Work Stream (WS1) recommendations, which were eventually approved and incorporated into the bylaws of ICANN in 2016. These included a provision expressing the need for a second WS since the first one, done on a tight deadline,did not cover all the requisite issues. Instead WS1 only focused on issues that were needed to complete the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority(IANA) transition.

At the ICANN meeting in March of 2017 in Finland, the second Work Stream (WS2) was launched. The Cross Community Working Group submitted their final report at the end of June 2018 and the purpose of this blog is to look at the main recommendations given and the steps ahead to its implementation.

The new Workstream was structured into the following 8 independent sub groups as per the topics laid down in the WS1 final report, each headed by a Rapporteur:

1. Diversity

2. Guidelines for Standards of Conduct Presumed to be in Good Faith Associated with Exercising Removal of Individual ICANN Board Directors. (Guidelines for Good Faith)

3. Human Rights Framework of Interpretation (HR-FOI)

4. Jurisdiction

5. Office of the Ombuds

6. Supporting Organization/ Advisory Committee Accountability

7. Staff Accountability

8. ICANN Transparency

1. DIVERSITY Recommendations

The sub-group on Diversity suggested ways by which ICANN can define, measure, report, support and promote diversity. They proposed 7 key factors to guide all diversity considerations: Language, Gender, Age, Physical Disability, Diverse skills, Geographical representation and stakeholder group. Each charting organization within ICANN is asked to undertake an exercise whereby they publish their diversity obligations on their website, for each level of employment including leadership either under their own charter or ICANN Bylaws. This should be followed by a diversity assessment of their existing structures and consequently used to formulate their diversity objectives/criteria and steps on how to achieve the same along with the timeline to do so. These diversity assessments should be conducted annually and at the very least, every 3 years. ICANN staff has been tasked with developing a mechanism for dealing with complaints arising out of diversity and related issues. Eventually, it is envisioned that ICANN will create a Diversity section on their website where an Annual Diversity Report will be published. All information regarding Diversity should also be published in their Annual Report.

The recommendations leave much upto the organization without establishing specific recruitment policies for equal opportunities. In their 7 parameters, race was left out as a criteria for diversity. The criteria of ‘diverse skills’ is also ambiguous; and within stakeholder group, it would have been more useful to highlight the priority for diversity of opinions within the same stakeholder group. So for example, to have two civil society organizations (CSOs) advocating for contrasting stances as opposed to having many CSO’s supporting one stance. However, these steps should be a good starting point to improve the diversity of an organization which in our earlier research we have found to be neither global nor multistakeholder. In fact, our recent diversity analysis has shown concerns such as the vast number of the end users participating and as an extension, influencing ICANN work are male. The mailing list where the majority of discussions take place are dominated by individuals from industry bodies. This coupled with the relative minority presence of the other stakeholders, especially geographically (14.7% participation from Asian countries), creates an environment where concerns emanating from other sections of the society could be overshadowed. Moreover, when we have questioned ICANN’s existing diversity of employees based on their race and citizenship, they did not give us the figures citing either lack of information or confidentiality.

2. HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK OF INTERPRETATION (HR-FOI)

A Framework of Interpretation was developed by the WS2 for ICANN Bylaws relating to Human Rights which clarified that Human Rights are not a Commitment for the organization but is a Core Value. The former being an obligation while the latter are “not necessarily intended to apply consistently and comprehensively to ICANN’s activities”.

To summarize the FOI, if the applicable law i.e. the law practiced in the jurisdiction where ICANN is operating, does not mandate certain human rights then they do not raise issues under the core value. As such, there can be no enforcement of human rights obligations by ICANN or any other party against any other party. Thus, contingent on the seat of the operations the law can vary though by in large ICANN recognizes and can be guided by significant internationally respected human rights such as those enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The United Nations Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights was recognized as useful in the process of applying the core value in operations since it discusses corporate responsibility to respect human rights. Building on this, Human Right Impact Assessments (HRIA) with respect to ICANN policy development processes are currently being formulated by the Cross Community Working Group on Human Rights. Complementing this, ICANN is also undertaking an internal HRIA of the organization’s operations. It is important to remember that the international human rights instruments that are relevant here are those required by the applicable law.

Apart from its legal responsibility to uphold the HR laws of an area, the framework is worded negatively in that it says ICANN should in general avoid violating human rights. It is also said that they should take into account HR when making policies but these fall short from saying that HR considerations should be given prominent weightage and since there are many core values, at any point one of the others can be used to sidestep human rights. One core value in particular says that ICANN should duly consider the public policy advice of governments and other authorities when arriving at a decision. Thus, if governments want to promote a decision to further national interests at the expense of citizen’s human rights then that would be very much possible within this FOI.

3. JURISDICTION

A highly contentious issue in WS2 was that of Jurisdiction, and the recommendations formed to tackle it were quite disappointing. Despite initial discussion by the group on ICANN’s location, they did not address the elephant in the room in their report. Even after the transition, ICANN’s new by-laws state that it is subject to California Law since it was incorporated there. This is partly the fault of the first Workstream because when enumerating the issues for WS2 with respect to jurisdiction, they left it ambiguous by stating: :

“At this point in the CCWG Accountability’s work, the main issues that need within Work Stream 2 relate to the influence that ICANN ́s existing jurisdiction may have on the actual operation of policies and accountability mechanisms. This refers primarily to the process for the settlement of disputes within ICANN, involving the choice of jurisdiction and of the applicable laws, but not necessarily the location where ICANN is incorporated.”

Jurisdiction can often play a significant role in the laws that ICANN will have to abide by in terms of financial reporting, consumer protection, competition and labour laws, legal challenges to ICANN’s actions and finally, in resolving contractual disputes. In its present state, the operations of ICANN could, if such a situation arises, see interference from US authorities by way of legislature, tribunals, enforcement agencies and regulatory bodies.

CIS has, in the past, discussed the concept of “jurisdictional resilience”, which calls for:

Legal immunity for core technical operators of Internet functions (as opposed to policymaking venues) from legal sanctions or orders from the state in which they are legally situated.
Division of core Internet operators among multiple jurisdictions
Jurisdictional division of policymaking functions from technical implementation functions

Proposing to change ICANN’s seat of headquarters or at the very least, suggest ways for ICANN to gain partial immunity for its policy development processes under the US law would have gone a long way in making ICANN truly a global body. It would have also ensured that as an organization, ICANN would have been equally accountable to all its stakeholders as opposed to now, where by virtue of its incorporation, it has higher legal and possible political, obligations to the United States. This was (initially?) expressed by Brazil who dissented from the majority conclusions of the sub-group and drafted their own minority report, which was supported by countries like Russia. They were unhappy that all countries are still not at an equal footing in the participation of management of Internet resources, which goes against the fundamentals of the multi-stakeholder system approach.

Recommendations:

The recommendations passed were in two categories:

Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC)

OFAC is an office of the US Treasury administering and enforcing economic and trade sanctions based on the American foreign policy and national security objectives. It is pertinent because, for ICANN to enter into a Registration Accreditation Agreement (RAA) with an applicant from a sanctioned country, it will need an OFAC license. What happens right now is that ICANN is under no obligation to request for this license and in either case, OFAC can refuse to provide it. The sub group recommended that the terms of the RAA be modified so that ICANN is required to apply for and put their best efforts in securing the license if the applicant is qualified to be a registrar and not individually subject to sanctions. While the licensing process is underway they should also be helpful and transparent, and maintain on-going communication with the applicant. The same recommendation was made for applicants to the new gTLD program, from sanctioned countries. Other general licenses are needed from OFAC for certain ICANN transactions and hence it was proposed that ICANN pursue the same.

2. Choice of law and Choice of Venue Provisions in ICANN Agreements

In ICANN’S Registry Agreements (RA) and Registration Accreditation Agreement (RAA) the absence of a choice of law provision means that the governing law of these contracts is undetermined until later decided by a judge or arbitrator or an agreement between the parties. It was collectively seen that increased freedom of choice for the parties in the agreement could help in customizing the agreements and make it easier for registries and such to contractually engage with ICANN. Out of various options, the group decided that a Menu approach would be best whereby a host of options(decided by ICANN) can be provided and the party in case choose the most appropriate from them such as the jurisdiction of their incorporation.In RAs, the choice of venue was pre determined as Los Angeles, California but the group recommended that instead of imposing this choice on the party it would be better to offer a list of possible venues for arbitration. The registry can then choose amongst these options when entering into the contract. There were other issues discussed which did not reach fruition due to lack of unanimity such as discussions on immunity of ICANN from US jurisdiction.

4. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDS

Subsequent to the external evaluation of the ICANN Office of the Ombuds (IOO), there were a couple of recommendations to strengthen the office. They were divided into procedural aspects that the office should carry out to improve their complaint mechanism such as differentiating between categories of complaints and explaining how each type would be handled with. The issues that would not invoke actions from the IOO should also be established clearly and if and where these could be transferred to any other channel. The response from all the relevant parties of ICANN to a formal request or report from the IOO should take place within 90 days, and 120 at the maximum if an explanation for the same can be provided. An internal timeline will be defined by the office for handling of complaints and document a report on these every quarter or annually. A recommendation for the IOO to be formally trained in mediation and have such experience within its ranks was further given. Reiterating the importance of diversity, even this sub group emphasized on the IOO bearing a diverse group in terms of gender and other parameters. This ensures that a complainant has a choice in who to approach in the office making them more comfortable. To enhance the independence of the Ombuds, their employment contract should have a 5 year fixed term which only allows for one extension of maximum 3 years. An Ombuds Advisory Panel is to be constituted by ICANN comprising five members to act as advisers, supporters and counsel for the IOO with at least 2 members having Ombudsman experience and the remaining possessing extensive ICANN experience. They would be responsible for selecting the new Ombuds and conducting the IOO’s evaluation every 5 years amongst others. Lastly, the IOO should proactively document their work by publishing reports on activity, collecting and publicizing statistics, user satisfaction information a well any improvements to the process.

These proposals still do not address the opacity of how the Office of the Ombuds resolve these cases since it does not call for; a) a compilation of all the cases that have been decided by the office in the history of the organization b) the details of the parties that are involved if the parties have allowed that to be revealed and if not at the very least, the non sensitive data such as their nationality and stakeholder affiliation and c) a description of the proceedings of the case and who won in each of them. When CIS asked for the above in 2015, the information was denied on ground of confidentiality. Yet, it is vital to know these details since the Ombuds hear complaints against the Board, Staff and other constituent bodies and by not reporting on this, ICANN is rendering the process much less accountable and transparent. This conflict resolution process and its efficacy is even more essential in a multi-stakeholder environment so as to give parties the faith to engage in the process, knowing that the redressal mechanisms are strong. It is also problematic that sexual harassments complaints are dealt by the Ombuds and that ICANN does not have a specific Anti-Sexual Harassment Committee. The committee should be neutral and approachable and while it is useful for the Office of the Ombuds to be trained in sexual harassment cases, it is by no means a comprehensive and ideal approach to deal with complaints of this nature. Despite ICANN facing a sexual harassment claim in 2016, the recommendations do not specifically address the approach the Ombuds should take in tackling sexual harassment.

5. SUPPORTING ORGANIZATION/ ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACCOUNTABILITY

The sub group presented the outcomes under the main heads of Accountability, Transparency, Participation, Outreach and Updates to policies and procedures. They suggested these as good practices that can be followed by the organizations and did not recommend that implementation of the same be required. The accountability aspect had suggestions of better documentation of procedures and decision-making. Proposals of listing members of such organizations publicly, making their meetings open to public observation including minutes and transcripts along with disclosing their correspondence with ICANN were aimed at making these entities more transparent. In the same vein, rules of membership and eligibility criteria, the process of application and a process of appeal should be well defined. Newsletters should be published by the SO/AC to help non-members understand the benefit and the process of becoming a member. Policies were asked to be reviewed at regular intervals and these internal reviews should not extend beyond a year.

6. STAFF ACCOUNTABILITY

Improving the ICANN staff’s Accountability was the job of a different group who assessed it at the service delivery, departmental or organizational level not at an individual or personnel level. They did this by analysing the roles and responsibilities of the Board, staff and community members and the nexus between them. Their observations culminated in the understanding that ICANN needs to take steps such as make visible their performance management system and process, their vision for the departmental goals and how they tie in to the organization’s strategic goals and objectives. They note that several new mechanisms have already been established yet have not been used enough to ascertain their efficacy and thus, propose a regular information acquisition mechanism. Most importantly, they have asked ICANN to standardize and publish guidelines for suitable timeframes for acknowledging and responding to requests from the community.

7. ICANN TRANSPARENCY

The last group of the WS2 was one specifically looking at the transparency of the organization.

a. The Documentary Information Disclosure Policy (DIDP)

Currently the DIDP process only applies to ICANN’s “operational activities”, it was recommended to delete this caveat to cover a wider breadth of the organization’s activities. As CIS has experienced, request for information is often met with an answer that such information is not documented and to remedy the same, a documentation policy was proposed where if significant elements of a decision making process are taking place orally then the participants will be required to document the substance of the conversation. Many a times DIDP requests are refused because one aspect of the information sought is subject to confidentiality. hus one of the changes is to introduce a severability clause so that in such cases, information can still be disclosed with the sensitive aspect redacted or severed. In scenarios of redaction, the rationale should be provided citing one of the given DIDP exceptions along with the process for appeal. ICANN’s contracts should be under the purview of the DIDP except when subject to a non-disclosure agreement and further, the burden is on the other party to convince ICANN that it has a legitimate commercial reason for requested the NDA. No longer would any information pertaining to the security and stability of the Internet be outside the ambit of the DIDP but only if it is harmful to the security and stability. Finally, ICANN should review the DIDP every five years to see how it can be improved.

b. Documenting and Reporting on ICANN’s Interactions with the Government

In a prominent step towards being more transparent with their expenditure and lobbying, the group recommended that ICANN begins disclosing publicly on at least an annual basis, sums of $20,000 per year devoted to “political activities” both in the US and abroad. All expenditures should be done on an itemized basis by ICANN for both outside contractors and internal personnel along with the identities of the persons engaging in such activities and the type of engagement used for such activities amongst others.

cc. Transparency of Board Deliberations

The bylaws were recommended to be revised so that material may be removed from the minutes of the Board if subject to a DIDP exception. The exception for deliberative processes should not apply to any factual information, technical report or reports on the performance or effectiveness of a particular body or strategy. When any information is removed from the minutes of the Board meeting, they should be disclosed after a particular period of time as and when the window of harm has passed.

d. ICANN’s Anonymous Hotline (Whistle-blower Protection)

To begin with, ICANN was recommended to devise a way such that when anyone searches their website for the term “whistle-blower”, it should redirect to their Hotline policy since people are unlikely to be aware that in ICANN parlance it is referred to as the Hotline policy. Instead of only “serious crimes” that are currently reported, all issues and concerns that violate local laws should be. Complaints should not be classified as ‘urgent’ and ‘non-urgent’ but all reports should be a priority and receive a formal acknowledgment within 48 hours at the maximum. ICANN should make it clear that any retaliation against the reporter will be taken and investigated as seriously as the original alleged wrongdoing. Employees should be provided with data about the use of the Hotline, including the types of incidents reported. Few member of this group came out with a Minority Statement expressing their disapproval with one particular aspect of the recommendations that they felt was not developed enough, the one pertaining to ICANN’s attorney-client privilege. The recommendation did not delve into specifics but merely stated that ICANN should expand transparency in their legal processes including clarifying how attorney-client privilege is invoked. The dissidents thought ICANN should go farther and enumerate principles where the privilege would be waived in the interests of transparency and account for voluntary disclosure as well.

The transparency recommendations did not focus on the financial reporting aspects of ICANN which we have found ambiguities with before. Some examples are; the Registries and Registrars are the main sources of revenue though there is ambiguity as to the classifications provided by ICANN such as the difference between RYG and RYN. The mode of contribution of sponsors isn’t clear either so we do not know if this was done through travel, money, media partnerships etc. Several entities have been listed from different places in different years, sometimes depending on the role they have played such as whether they are a sponsor or registry. Moreover, the Regional Internet Registries are clubbed under one heading and as a consequence it is not possible to determine individual RIR contribution like how much did APNIC pay for the Asia and Pacific region. Thus, there is a lot more scope for ICANN to be transparent which goes beyond the proposals in the report.

It is worth noting that whereas the mandate of the WS1 included the implementation of the recommendations, this is not the case for WS2 and thus, by creating a report itself the mission of the group is concluded. This difference can be attributed to the fact that during the first WS, there was a need to see it through since the IANA transition would not happen otherwise. The change in circumstances and the corresponding lack of urgency render the process less powerful, the second time round. The final recommendations are now being discussed in the relevant charting organizations within ICANN such as the Government Advisory Council (GAC) and subsequent to their approval,, it will be sent to the Board who will decide to adopt them or not. If adopted, ICANN and its sub organizations will have to see how they can implement these recommendations. The co-chairs of the group will be the point of reference for the chartering organizations and an implementation oversight team has been formed, consisting of the Rapporteurs of the sub teams and the co-chairs. A Feasibility Assessment Report will be made public in due time which will describe the resources that would take to implement the recommendations. Since it would be a huge undertaking for ICANN to implement the above, the compliance process is expected to take a few years. .

The link to report can be found here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann-work-stream-2-recommendations-on-accountability

ICANN reveals hitherto undisclosed details of domain names revenues

geetha — 2014-12-12T05:08:02Z

Following requests from CIS, ICANN has shared a detailed list of its revenues from domain names for the fiscal year ending June 2014. Such level of detail has, until now, been unavailable. Historical data is still to be made available.

Five days ago, CIS received a detailed list of ICANN’s revenues from domain name sales and renewals for the fiscal year ending June 2014. The document, sent to us by ICANN’s India head Mr. Samiran Gupta, lists payments received by ICANN from registrars, registries, sponsors and other entities such as the NRO and Country Code TLD administrators. Such granular information is not available at the moment on ICANN’s website as part of its financial transparency disclosures. A summary has also been provided by ICANN.

This revenue disclosure from ICANN comes on the heels of public and email correspondence between CIS and ICANN staff. At the Asia Pacific Regional IGF (August 3-6, 2014), CIS’ Sunil Abraham sought granular data – both current and historical – on ICANN’s revenues from the domain name industry.

Again, at the ICANN Open Forum at IGF (4 September 2014), Sunil sought “details of a list of legal entities that give money to ICANN and how much money they give to ICANN every year”. In emails to Kuek Yu-Chuang (ICANN’s Asia Pacific head) and Xavier Calvez (ICANN CFO), CIS had asked for historical data as well.

The global domain name industry is a multi-billion dollar industry, and ICANN sits at the centre of the web. ICANN is responsible for the policy-making and introduction of new Top Level Domains (TLDs), and it also performs technical coordination and maintenance of the Internet’s unique identifiers (domain names and IP addresses). For each domain name that is registered or renewed, ICANN receives payment through a complex contractual network of registries and registrars. The domain name industry is ICANN’s single largest revenue source.

Given the impending IANA transition and accountability debates at ICANN, and the rapid growth of the global domain name industry, one would imagine that ICANN is held up to the same standard of accountability as laid down in the right to information mechanisms of many countries. At the ICANN Open Forum (IGF Istanbul), Sunil raised this very point. Had a Public Information Officer in India failed to respond to a request for information for a month (as ICANN had to CIS’ request for granular revenue data), the officer would have been fined and reprimanded. Since there are no sufficiently effective accountability or reactive transparency measures at ICANN, such penalties are not in place.

In any event, CIS received the list of ICANN’s current domain name revenues after continual email exchanges with ICANN staff. This is undoubtedly heartening, as ICANN has shown itself responsive to repeated requests for transparency. But it remains that ICANN has shared revenue data only for the fiscal year ending June 2014, and historical revenue data is still not publicly available. Neither is a detailed list (current and historical) of ICANN’s expenditures publicly available. Perhaps ICANN could provide the necessary information during its regular Quarterly Stakeholder Reports, as well as on its website. This would go a long way in ascertaining and improving ICANN’s accountability and transparency.

The documents:

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-receives-information-on-icanns-revenues-from-domain-names-fy-2014