Centre for Internet and Society

Phone Spreadsheet

jdine — 2012-10-30T05:51:04Z

A documentation of the basic components and features of the mobile devices in a spreadsheet.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/phone-spreadsheet.xlsx

Pervasive Technologies: Working Document Series – Updated Research Methodology – Applying the Actor Network Theory to Competition Law and Standard Essential Patent Litigation in India

nehaa — 2015-10-04T04:20:13Z

This document lays out the updated research methodology for the paper on competition law issues around standard essential patent litigation in India.

Read the earlier posts:

In New Delhi, as in Fascist Milan or Nazi Berlin, the individual is lost; the scale is not human but super human; not national, but super-national: it is, in a word, Imperial.[1]

Twenty plus years later, written after he was awe-struck by the grandeur of the Rashtrapati Bhawan in New Delhi, Dalrymple’s delightful choice of words on the similarities between Lutyen’s Delhi and Speer’s Nuremberg[2] rather aptly describe today’s globalized narrative of intellectual property (“IP”) rights determination and ownership. The process of determination of standards applied in mobile devices, claims of IP ownership in these standards and the subsequent enforcement (globally) of these IP claims are all instances of this narrative.

The increasingly global nature of both – innovation and intellectual property has been well documented by researchers over the years and needs no further exploration in this article. This article will seek to examine how this narrative influences (either overtly or covertly) the application of competition law to the regulation of standard essential patents (SEPs) in India. More specifically, this article seeks to study the role of various human and non-human actors involved were competition law to be considered as a potential solution to the matter of SEP litigation in India.

This article examines four research questions. First, how does the globalized narrative of intellectual property influence the determination of standards around mobile devices, their IP protection, licensing and enforcement? Second, what are the important competition law issues in SEP litigation in the United States of America (“USA”) and the European Union (“EU”), and how have regulators (the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the European Commission (“EC”) respectively) and courts in these jurisdictions addressed these issues? Third, what are the critical issues in SEP litigation and competition law in India and how do they compare with similar questions in other jurisdictions? Fourth, could solutions and methodology from the FTC and the EC be applied to SEP competition law matters in India?

In this effort, this article will employ Bruno Latour’s Actor-Network Theory[3] (“ANT”) as the primary research methodology, supplemented where needed by others including comparative research and case studies. A detailed approach into discussing the (above) research questions has been discussed below.

Question one - how does the globalized narrative of intellectual property influence the determination of standards around mobile devices, their IP protection, licensing and enforcement?

This question primarily seeks to explain the determination SEPs on standards through International Standard Setting Organizations (“SSOs”) and the subsequent obligation on members of the SSOs to licence these SEPs on a Fair, Reasonable and Non Discriminatory (“FRAND”) basis.

Applying the ANT, this question will identify both human and non-human actors and that play a role internationally, in the determination of SEPs and their licensing. Illustratively, these actors include the SSOs, multinational corporations that are members of the SSOs, the FRAND licences and the contracts/terms of reference between the SSOs and their member corporations. In order to address this question, the author will refer to academic writing and other literature explaining the role of various actors and the international nature of the standard setting process. Networks that these actors share with each other and the possible influences to the determination of international standards will be studied. This question will explore the international IP environment, and the power of various actors that have an influence on IP norm setting, and attempt to locate the power of these various actors in their network setting.

Question two - what are the important competition law issues in SEP litigation in the USA and the EU, and how have regulators (the FTC and the EC respectively) and courts in these jurisdictions addressed these issues?

This question will study the competition law issues arising from the international determination of standards and the cross-border assertion and enforcement of intellectual property rights discussed in the previous question. This question will also study how (first, whether) courts and regulators have attempted to address some of the competition law issues.

Also applying the ANT, this question will identify various actors involved in competition law litigation around SEPs before the FTC, EC and the courts in the USA and the EU. Illustratively, these include the parties to the litigation, the regulator (whether the FTC or the EC), the court and the legal principles employed. Further applying the ANT, this question will also study how the various actors relate to one another, as a result of their connections within this network, i.e., the litigation, and other connections in other networks (for instance, the position of the parties in certain markets).

Under this research question, select a case study method will be employed to select cases from each jurisdiction. The most important cases pertaining to competition law questions will be studied. These are yet to be identified.

Question three - what are the critical issues in SEP litigation and competition law in India and how do they compare with similar questions in other jurisdictions?

This research question will seek to map the global context around SEP litigation (discussed above) to specific cases in India. In doing so, the author will study the two SEP disputes in India with competition law implications – the Ericsson and Micromax dispute and the Ericsson and Intex dispute; based on information available in the public domain. While there are other pending disputes around SEPs in India, they do not involve the Competition Commission of India (India’s market regulator), and hence are outside the scope of this article. Through a study of these cases, questions of competition law will be identified. Such questions may be either those as a result of the direct application of the Competition Act, 2000 or certain actions taken by the courts with competition law implications (for instance, granting ex-parte interim injunctions).

Having identified competition law issues in SEP litigation in India, the author will then employ the comparative research methodology to trace similar issues in international SEP litigation, discussed under the previous research question. What the author is most interested in locating is the position of the actors in domestic as well as international SEP litigation. Specifically, it is submitted that characters in the domestic litigation also trace back to the context of global IP norm setting; some of them more directly than others. For instance, multinational corporations are directly involved in IP norm setting and are a party to domestic disputes. Further, domestic regulators may seek to draw inferences or apply commonly understood international legal principles, thus invoking more international actors. This phase will attempt to distill the uniqueness of India in the narrative of global IP ownership around SEP litigation.

Question four- what are the challenges for competition regulation of SEPs in India; do principles and methodology from the FTC/ EU and courts present solutions to these challenges?

In this question, the author deliberates the challenge of competition regulation for SEPs in India and whether the approach of international regulators and courts could serve as a roadmap to address these issues.

In answering this question, the author will trace India’s specific location in global competition. The tensions between differently situated actors and the networks that they form will be examined. Some comparisons will be made to illustrate how the relationship of international jurisdictions (mainly the USA and the EU) with international multinational corporations that are a party to litigation differs from that of India. Legal traditions and institutions in India will be used to understand what legal possibilities are available for using competition regulation to regulate SEPs. This includes specifically the levers in competition law such as abuse of dominance as well as the nature of the competition regulator and the role that it identifies for itself. One might also consider the relative ‘youth’ of the competition regulator as a factor in laying down legal principles, the constraints it imposes on itself as well as a tension between the market regulator and the courts. This phase will also attempt to make a case for IP regulation within India’s existing culture of engaging with the public interest in intellectual property regulation.

Having examined global IP norm setting in SEPs, international and domestic issues around SEP litigation and the network of actors involved in these proceedings, in concluding this article, the author seeks to illustrate how actors and networks in the SEP-competition set-up derive power from each other; and how the location of an actor within a network is likely to influence law and regulation. Tracing this location will then in turn be useful in determining what solutions would best address the matter of competition regulation for SEPs in India.

[1]William Dalrymple, The City of Djinns – A Year in Delhi (rep. 2014, Penguin, India) at 83.

[2]Id at 82.

[3]Bruno Latour, Networks, Societies, Spheres: Reflections of an Actor – Network Theorist, International Journal of Communication 5 (2011), 796- 810, http://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/viewArticle/1094 (accessed 31 August, 2015).

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/pervasive-technologies-working-document-series-2013-updated-research-methodology-2013-applying-the-actor-network-theory-to-competition-law-and-standard-essential-patent-litigation-in-india

Pervasive Technologies: Working Document Series - Research Questions and a Literature Review on the Actor-Network Theory

nehaa — 2015-09-05T04:56:03Z

This document is divided into two parts - the first part lays out a series of research questions, potentially seeking to apply actor-network theory as a research methodology. The second part seeks to map literature around the Actor-Network Theory ("ANT") as a research methodology.

Part 1: Research Questions

The aim of this exercise is to delineate the contours of the paper, and provide some insight into the demarcation of the various sections.

The overall context to this paper will be determined by a globalized form of intellectual property ownership, and the various instances in which this narrative finds a place (either overtly or covertly) in the regulation of standard essential patents in India. In our paper, the globalized form of IP ownership is probably most clearly indicated in the standard setting process, where participants are International Standard Setting Organizations determining, in a manner of speaking - the rules of the game - that is - licensing on Fair Reasonable and Non Discriminatory Basis. The other important player to our understanding of global ownership would be multilateral organizations such as Ericsson, involved in many of the disputes before the Delhi High Court and the Competition Commission of India ("CCI"). Perhaps international actors/actants would also be international legal principles as well as international regulators such as the FTC or the ECC themselves. This phase of the paper will also trace India's specific location in global competition. In doing so, not only will the market positions of some of the players be examined, but also some comparisons will be made to illustrate how the relationship of international jurisdictions (mainly the USA and the EU) with international multinational corporations that are a party to litigation differs from that of India. This phase of the chapter will most likely apply the doctrinal method of research, study academic texts as sources as well as study some decisions by international regulators and courts to understand the tools and sites available for regulation as well as the nature of the regulatory process itself.

The second phase of this chapter will seek to map the overall context to specific cases - that is, pending legal processes in India. This includes both, ongoing litigation on patent infringement at the Delhi High Court as well as ongoing disputes before the CCI as well. The characters in this litigation also trace back to the broader context; some of them more directly than others. The multinational corporations are directly involved in both contexts, whereas the domestic regulators may seek to draw inferences or apply commonly understood international legal principles, thus invoking more international actants.

This phase of the chapter will study three key litigations in India - Ericsson and Micromax, Ericsson and Intex, and a third that is yet to be defined. Legal traditions and institutions in India will be used to understand what legal possibilities are available for using competition regulation to regulate SEPs. This includes specifically the levers in competition law such as abuse of dominance as well as the nature of the competition regulator and the role that it identifies for itself. One might also consider the relative 'youth' of the competition regulator as a factor in laying down legal principles, the constraints it imposes on itself as well as a tension between the market regulator and the courts. Perhaps this might also be an actant, in the context of the actor network theory. This phase of the chapter will most likely apply the doctrinal method of research, study academic texts as sources as well as study legal instruments and judicial decisions as sources.

The third phase of this chapter will now ask the question of standard essential patent (SEP) regulation, located within this broader matrix of intellectual property ownership and fluidity of actants. The specific question to be asked will be what is the competition regulation challenge for SEPs in India? This phase will attempt to distill the uniqueness of India in the narrative of global IP ownership around SEP litigation. It will be observed that the nature of the players in international litigation as well as in India is rather different. This phase will also attempt to make a case for IP regulation within India's existing culture of engaging with the public interest in intellectual property regulation.

It is in this phase that one must also examine the usefulness of the actor-network theory as a research methodology to study SEP regulation in India. It must be noted that while SEP regulation so used is used to refer to competition regulation specifically, and not to other levers, such as mechanisms within intellectual property law itself. The focus of this exercise will be competition regulation, with an engagement with other areas of the law and the judicial process only in as much as it informs our understanding of competition regulation of SEPs or impedes it. If one were to apply the actor network theory to this phase of the exercise, one would view courts, parties involved in the litigation, the CCI, international legal principles, international market regulators, international SSOs, competition law as well as issues raised in the litigation as 'actants', both human and non human, who are to be treated on par with each other, with a study of the networks that these actants create, or are a part of.

Part 2: Literature Review on the Actor-Network Theory

The aim of this exercise is to first, understand the ANT as a research methodology; second, to study its components and third, to ascertain its suitability as a research method for exploring the challenge of regulating SEP litigation through completion law mechanisms in India.

What is the Actor-Network Theory?

David Banks, in a 2011 blog post, contextualized in trying to trace a relationship between our offline and online behavior presents an overview of the ANT.[1] Banks describes ANT as an ongoing project that seeks to radically transform how social scientists talk about society's relationship to technology and other non human actors ; and identifies Bruno Latour, John Law and Michael Callon as the major authors in this space. (It is observed that there might have been additions or deletions to this core list of thinkers - not to self for further reading).

In his paper[2] reflecting on the ANT, Bruno Latour refers to himself as a 'fellow traveler' of the various network 'revolutions', and says that in the network, he has found a powerful way of rephrasing basic issues of social theory, epistemology and philosophy. Latour says that in its simplest and deepest sense, the notion of the network is of use whenever action has to be redistributed.[3] In a different paper, Latour argues that the purpose of the ANT is not to provide explanations for the behaviour and reasons of actors, but only to map procedures which enable actors to relate to each other and each others' world building capacity. My discomfort with this reading is trying to locate what these procedures would be in an SEP regulation environment.

Identifying the components of the ANT

Latour presents an actant - or an actor - as something that acts, or to which some sort of activity is assigned by others. [4] There is no special motivation of humans or human actors. "An actant," says Latour, "can literally be anything provided it is granted to be the source of the action."[5] The conception of an actant, Latour further articulates, should be not as fixed entities, but as fluid, circulating objects, whose stability and continuity depends on other actions. [6]

So what is on its agenda? The attribution of human, unhuman, nonhuman, inhuman, characteristics; the distribution of properties among these entities; the connections established between them; the circulation entailed by these attributions, distributions and connections; the transformation of those attributions, distributions and connections, of the many elements that circulates and of the few ways through which they are sent.[7]

Banks[8] identifies actants to be of two types - human and non human, further explaining that 'actors' is typically used to refer to humans. These actants have equal amounts of agency within the actor-network. Banks proceeds to demonstrate this applicability of equal agency with an illustration of getting wi-fi connectivity in Albany. In his narrative [9] (and as he notes later himself), Banks uses the same language (read as according agency to the inanimate) to describe both, the human and non human actants. Says Banks, that the actants are merely nodes that facilitate a larger functioning. It is submitted that the 'larger functioning' being referred to is probably something that would be determined on a case to case basis - depending on what was being studied.

In a 1999 paper On Recalling ANT[10], Latour articulates a problem with the usage of the word 'network' as a result of its usage having changed over time - from using it to refer to a series of transformations incapable of being captured by prevalent social theory at the time, to an unmediated access to every piece of information (to my understanding within the context of the World Wide Web). Latour explains that his new understanding is exactly the opposite of what they meant and that it ought not to be used to mean the transformations they were initially articulating.

Another of Latour's papers is helpful in arriving at an understanding of the 'network', where he argues that it would be fallacious to consider it in a technical sense, as one would a sewage, a train or a telephone network.[11] Unlike a technical network, Latour argues, an actor-network may have no compulsory paths, no nodes and might be quite local in nature. Latour further argues that thinking in terms of a network helps us overcome the tyranny of distance, citing a range of examples including standing one metre away from somebody in a telephone booth and yet being more closely connected to his mother, thousands of miles away, among others[12]. In each of his illustrations, however, Latour articulates closeness or distance in terms of geography or presence in a physical sense, which might not be entirely applicable to the research question we're seeking to study. What might be more useful perhaps, is the articulation of the network where he argues that instead of tracing an individual to the collective or the agency, one could only at the number of connections an element has and gauge the importance of the element in light of these connections . The greater the number of connections, the more important an element and vice versa. [13]

ANT Criticism and Applicability of the ANT to our research question?

Before delving into specifics of the ANT that lend themselves to a critique, I submit a broader reservation with the application of the ANT to studying legal and regulatory processes. From my reading and understanding of the ANT so far, a cornerstone appears to be the exclusion normative ideologies, with a focus on studying processes and networks as is, without formulating a value-judgment on their larger place in the society being studied. In so far as defending this claim, Latour and other supporters of this theory have relied on scientific examples (for instance, the reference to the Colombia Shuttle - NASA and its complex organizational structure)[14] or illustrations from the social sciences or social phenomena. I'm still attempting to locate a paper that utilizes the ANT to study law or regulation. Prima facie, the challenge being posed is to study inherently normative structures and processes with clear power structures.

Banks[15] describes the efficacy of the ANT in describing the processes by which inventions and technological systems come into being, or fail to do so. Perhaps in studying the legal regulation of SEP litigation in India, the efficacy of the ANT would like in describing the processes by which legal regulation and legal systems in India (specifically to regulate SEPs) come into being, or fail to do so. By extension, for our research question, non human actants as identified by Banks[16] would probably be legal institutions and the parties to the litigation themselves. What is unclear at the moment is whether policy and legal instruments or levers themselves would be actors.

Banks, in his article also articulates criticisms[17] to the ANT propounded by Sandra Harding, David Bloor and Sal Restivo, on the grounds of being blind towards other social factors such as race or patriarchy. If one were to extend this to the research question at hand, an argument could be made that the ANT seeks to equate dissimilarly situated institutions. Corollaries to race and patriarchy might be found in the market power of parties (an Ericsson v. a Micromax), or even within regulatory set up itself, where, based on the facts so far, an argument could be made out that different regulators are situated differently, where the Delhi High Court could pass an order restraining another regulator - the Competition Commission of India, from passing its own order.

A reference to the 'agency' critique of the ANT is made by Latour himself, in his 1999 paper. Latour goes on to acknowledges the critiques of the ANT, but says that most have (mistakenly) centered either around the actor or around the network; and that the idea was to never occupy a position in the agency/structure debate.[18] Later in the paper, Latour further clarifies that actants are not to be perceived as playing the role of agency, and network is not to be seen as playing the role of the structure. Instead, says he, they represent two sides of the same phenomenon. Latour further explains that the ANT merely tried to learn from the actors (what was sought to be learnt was difficult to grasp), without attempting to be an explanation of societal pressures (and the reasons for such pressures) on actors. The difficulty in reading this paper for me was that it was rather dense in many respects, with various concepts - including, for instance, the idea of the 'social', which he refers to constantly, not being clearly articulated. Further, what is uncertain to me is how this question of agency will play out if applied to a legal or regulatory context. If, for instance, a legal principle was to be a non human actant, how would this have an agency independent of the human actor (the judge) that would be the one applying the legal principle in the first place? Can we truly exclude the question of agency from the ANT if the very exclusion of agency means a recognition of the existence of agency in the first place? How does one exclude the question of agency in seemingly unequally situated actors with an inherent power dynamic? Is the ANT, then even a useful research methodology? In his 1999 paper, Latour argues that the aim of the ANT is to study actors without the imposition of an a priori definition of their world building capacities.[19] The question now arises for me, is how to divest regulators of their 'world building capacities'.

Explaining the rationale[20] for the ANT (in social science research), Latour articulates a dissatisfaction that social scientists have with both, micro (local sites) and macro levels (more abstract ideas like culture, patriarchy etc.) of research. This dissatisfaction, he argues, results in a back and forth between these sites ad infinitum. The ANT, argues Latour, is a way of tracing these dissatisfactions, not for the purposes of finding a solution, but to follow them elsewhere and explore the very conditions that make these two disappointments possible. Latour further clarifies that one must not understand 'network' in ANT to mean a larger society that would help make sense of local interactions or as an anonymous field of forces. Instead, he says, it refers to summing up various interactions through various devices, inscriptions, forms and formulae into a very local, very practical, very tiny locus. My key takeaway from this articulation was that ANT could be used to study various interactions between various key stakeholders, with a very specific research question. Given that the locus could also be tiny, perhaps if the research question was narrowed further, the key stakeholders, or the 'network' and the 'actants' would reduce as well.

Latour has also argued that the ANT makes no assumptions about how an actor should behave and assumes infinite pliability and absolute freedom of actors. [21] In itself AT is not a theory of action no more than cartography is a theory on the shape of coasts lines and deep sea ridges; it just qualify what the observer should suppose in order for the coast lines to be recorded in their fine fractal patterns. Any shape is possible provided it is obsessively coded as longitude and latitude. Similarly any association is possible provided it is obsessively coded as heterogeneous associations through translations.

there is no difficulty in seeing that AT is not about traced networks by about a network-tracing activity. As I said above there is not a net and an actor laying down the net, but there is an actor whose definition of the world outlines, traces, delineate, limn, describe, shadow forth, inscroll, file, list, record, mark, or tag a trajectory that is called a network. No net exists independently of the very act of tracing it, and no tracing is done by an actor exterior to the net. A network is not a thing but the recorded movement of a thing. The questions AT addresses have now changed. It is not longer whether a net is representation or a thing, a part of society or a part of discourse or a part of nature, but what moves and how this movement is recorded. [22]

A useful articulation of the application of ANT emerges out of Jonathan Murdoch's 1997 paper.[23]He submits that the human gaze is being increasingly considered as an unreliable source of knowledge, being in a constant state of flux. Citing the example of the environment/biosphere to demonstrate the futility of the separations we make between nature and society, Murdoch argues that any solution to the environmental crisis will involve a profound re-thinking of how we link these two domains.[24]Extending this argument to our research question, one might ponder for instance that any solution to the SEP litigation and regulation conundrum will involve a profound re-thinking of how we link the courts and the CCI. What is unclear is what method we will use to arrive at this re-thinking, or what the re-thought out version would look like.

Murdoch does, however, articulate concerns with the 'non dualistic' framework (which the ANT positions itself as) and argues, relying on others before him, that such an adoption could have far reaching consequences; that the very basis of the development of social science is such a binary division. Murdoch argues that the nature-society divide has enabled social scientists to break the hegemony of the natural scientists. Murdoch further submits his reading of Latour, where he states that the power of laboratories arises as a result of their ability to tie together actors that are beyond the lab into networks that are then used to disseminate scientific facts.[25] Murdoch's paper largely focuses on blurring the distance between 'natural' and 'social' actors, and identifies the difficulties in attempting to compare the two. Murdoch questions if natural actors whose identity emerge from nature itself are malleable as social actors, who are by definition, a product of society. What is unclear, however, is how malleable are two dissimilarly situated social actors; and whether 'social actors' is broad enough to encompass all institutions born out of or with a human/societal interaction component. Specifically, for our paper, would courts and the CCI both qualify as social actors? Would legal principles? Would the decision making process by the courts itself? Latour's very example for proposing the ANT was that of pasteurization in France. Murdoch also questions whether it's possible to in fact treat various actants as each other. In order to address another critique of ANT, that where we exclude notions of power, Mudoch says Law's articulation - of focusing on 'victims' instead of 'heroes' might prove to be useful. This has not been discussed in detail, leaving the reader to make their own inferences.

In other words, can ANT, with its seamless webs, forever crisscrossing the human-nonhuman divide, provide a secure platform for critique, for the expression of a profound dissatisfaction with the activities of powerful social actors and the attribution of responsibility to those actors? Can it, in other words, ever do anything more than describe, in a prosaic fashion, the dangerous imbroglios that enmesh us?
Does this emphasis on description necessarily represent "an insuperable obstacle to effective and convincing social criticism

[1] David Banks, A Brief Summary of Actor Network Theory, available at http://thesocietypages.org/cyborgology/2011/12/02/a-brief-summary-of-actor-network-theory/ (last accessed 29 August, 2015).

[2] Bruno Latour - Networks, Societies, Spheres : Reflections of an Actor - Network Theorist, International Journal of Communication 5 (2011), 796- 810, available at http://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/viewArticle/1094 (last accessed 31 August, 2015).

[3] Id at 797.

[4] Bruno Latour - complications paper - at internal page 7.

[5] Id.

[6] Id at internal page 8.

[7] Id at internal page 7.

[8] Id.

[9] Id.

[10] Bruno Latour, On Recalling ANT, available at http://www.bruno-latour.fr/sites/default/files/P-77-RECALLING-ANT-GBpdf.pdf (last accessed 28 August, 2015).

[11] Bruno Latour, On actor-network theory. A few clarifications plus more than a few complications, available at http://www.bruno-latour.fr/sites/default/files/P-67%20ACTOR-NETWORK.pdf (last accessed 30 August, 2015) at internal page 2.

[12] Id at internal page 4

[13] Id at internal page 6.i

[14] Latour, the networks, societies, spheres paper

[15] Id.

[16] Id.

[17] Id.

[18] Latour, recalling the ANT paper.

[19] Recalling ANT paper, page 20

[20] Bruno Latour, On Recalling ANT, available at http://www.bruno-latour.fr/sites/default/files/P-77-RECALLING-ANT-GBpdf.pdf (last accessed 28 August, 2015).

[21] Latour, the complications paper, page 9.

[22] Id at 14.

[23] Jonathan Murdoch, Inhuman/nonhuman/: actor-network theory and the prospects for a nondualistic and symmetrical perspective on nature and society, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 1997, Volume 15, 731-576

[24] Murdoch at page 732.

[25] Murdoch at page 737.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/pervasive-technologies-working-document-series-research-questions-and-a-literature-review-on-actor-network-theory

Pervasive Technologies: Patent Pools

nehaa — 2013-07-03T06:57:59Z

In this research paper, Nehaa Chaudhari gives an analysis of patent pools. She discusses the working of a patent pool, study patent pool in other areas of technology, and patenting in telecom and related technology.

Click to download the full research paper here (PDF, 475 Kb)

Introduction

The network landscape over the past few years has been characterized by several battles of supremacy between two or more rival technologies. [1] These battles have included, inter alia, the constant efforts at besting rivals in the arena of patenting innovations in technology, often as a result characterised by the imposition of high royalties on rivals, for the use of one’s patents. However, having realised that such efforts at besting the other could prove detrimental for all parties concerned in the long run, and stall technological advancements which would in turn translate into lower business revenue, mechanisms were devised to ensure a relatively equitable utilization of patents in the market place. One such mechanism that has been developed is that of patent pools.

Patent pools have been developed around most areas of high end technology and research and development. Over the course of this paper, the author has confined herself to a study on patent pools in the area of telecommunications, and the issues to be addressed therein. Specifically, the author will be dealing with patent pools around 3G, 4G, LTE, TD-SCDMA and TD-LTE technologies. Within this framework, the author seeks to examine what are patent pools, whether and what kind of patent pools exist, their associated costs, their licensing arrangements and the structure of the payment of royalty, and the feasibility of these patent pools.

Understanding Patent Pools

Patent pools are agreements among patent owners through which patent owners combine their patents, waiving their exclusive rights to the patent to enable others, or themselves, to obtain rights to license the pooled patents.[2] Therefore, such pools may be focussed either on cross licensing, that is companies mutually making their patents available to each other, or on out licensing, that is, a group of companies making a collection of patents available to companies that do not or might not have patents of their own to contribute to the pool.[3] Typically, modern patent pools combine patents of various companies and are around inventions that are required to implement an established industry standard, are licensed as a whole (on an all or nothing basis) and not as individual licenses for patents owned by various companies within that pool, and are available to any non member for licensing.[4] Such licensing is done under a standard agreement and royalty rates, on a non discriminatory basis. The exception to this rule is that if certain members have contributed patents to the pool, they may receive more favourable terms, in recognition of their cross licensing relationship to the pool.[5] When viewed from a law and economics perspective, patent pools are seen to be an efficient institutional solution to various problems that arise when companies have complementary intellectual property rights, and these rights are essential to new technologies being used and employed. [6] However, this perspective also warns about the antitrust risks that may arise when competitors or potential competitors are involved in the coordination of their intellectual property. For instance, such pools may be used to allocate markets or otherwise chill competition. [7]

The Working of a Patent Pool

Generally, a patent pool may be administered in one of two ways- it may either have an administrative entity, or may also just be a system of cross licensing between two firms.[8] In case of the former, the licensing agency may be one of the patent holders, [9] or may be an independent licensing company (e.g. MPEG).[10]

The ownership of patents within the pool is retained by the owners, who then license them to the operator/administrator on a non exclusive basis, with sub licensing rights. This means that the owners are free to continue to license their patents on an individual basis, and the administrator also has the right to further license the patents to any party who is interested in licensing from the patent pool.[11] The responsibility of managing licensing and licenses is vested in the operator/administrator of the patent pool. Licensees are required to report sales and pay royalties to the pool administrator, who in turn would enforce the conditions of the license.[12] The distribution of royalties between the members of the pool is on the basis of a formula which may, or may not be transparent to non member licensees, with the pool operator retaining a management fee.[13] Typically, pool licenses are also structured in a manner so as to render difficult early termination by the licensee. The nature of the contract, once signed by a licensee, is typically binding in nature. Therefore, this would mean that the administrator of the patent pool could sue the licensee for non performance of the contract.[14] However, unless a pool operator is a member of the pool itself, it cannot sue for the infringement of patents. [15] Therefore, in the event that a patented technology were to be utilised without having taken a license, one or more of the individual patent owners would be required to take legal action. The involvement of the pool operator would be limited to being a part of any settlement discussions, if they were to occur, since one of the options for the alleged infringer could be to obtain a license for the patent pool.[16]

Drawing Parallels with Other Patent Pools

In this section of the paper, the author seeks to study patent pools in other areas of technology in order to better understand the structure and pricing of patent pools.

The ‘3C DVD’ Patent Pool
Established in 1998, the 3C DVD Patent Pool was the brainchild of Philips, Sony and Pioneer, and L.G. was subsequently inducted as a member. Philips acts as a licensing administrator for patents held by all the companies, which are over two hundred in number. These patents include those for the manufacture of the DVD players, and for the manufacture of the DVD disks themselves. [17] The player license per unit royalty was set as 3.5% of the net selling price of each player sold. This was subject to a minimum fee of $7 per unit, which after January 1, 2000 became $5 per unit. The disc license royalty was set as $0.05 per disc sold.[18]

The ‘DVD- 6C’ Patent Pool
Established in June 1999, the members of this pool at the time of its inception were Hitachi, Matsushita, Mitsubishi, Time Warner, Toshiba, and JVC. This pool was also for the DVD-ROM and the DVD- Video formats, with Toshiba acting as the administrator. [19] The royalties were set at $.075 per DVD Disc and 4% of the net sales price of DVD players and DVD decoders, with a minimum royalty of $4.00 per player or decoder, which saw a substantial reduction in 2003.[20] Subsequently, there were various changes that were made to this group, including the inclusion of newer standards, the joining and subsequent departure of IBM and other organizations as a member etc. Hitachi and Panasonic also act as regional agents in certain regions of the world.

The MPEG LA pool
The MPEG-2 is a standard for describing the coding of data inter alia, on DVD discs. For MPEG-2, a patent pool has been established, where the administrator is an independent, external organization known as the MPEG Licensing Authority, that set itself the aim to develop a patent pool for this standard. [21] The MPEG LA invited parties that thought they owned patents essential to this standard to join the program, which took off in 1997. At present, the pool has over a hundred patents and thousands of licensees.[22]

Patenting in Telecom and Related Technology

In this section of the paper, the author examines the working of patenting and patent pools in the telecommunications sector and in areas of related technology.

Early Developments and the Emergence of GSM
Patent pools are slowly developing into a key component of the telecommunications and the technological industry. The technology industry has been said to be an ecosystem, wherein there is a complex correlation between those who develop the technology and those who implement it in the creation and development of products.[23] In the telecommunications industry for instance, each handset manufacturer has declared only a small percentage of the various types of intellectual property assets that are necessary to implement a 3G compatible cellular phone. Therefore, the working in such a context is that various companies develop different technologies, and the same is shared by various manufacturers that seek to make use of this technology.[24]

The revival of patenting in the sector of telecommunications, post a period of decline in the decades of the 19540s to the 1980s, is attributed to the advent of the GSM standard for mobile communications in Europe.[25] In 1988, the main European operators invited equipment suppliers and developed a procedure wherein manufacturers would have to give up their intellectual property rights and to provide free world wide licenses for essential patents.[26] After opposition from the manufacturers, the approach was modified to one wherein the operators required the suppliers to sign a declaration agreeing to serve all of the GSM community on fair, reasonable and non discriminatory conditions.[27] In the early 1990s, Motorola by refusing to grant non discriminatory licenses for its substantial portfolio of essential patents and only agreeing to enter into cross license agreements further intensified the debate over IPRs in telecommunications. The company only lifted these restrictions after various countries across the world expressed a preference for this standard. The experience in this standard has demonstrated that it would not be accurate to expect that all parties holding essential patents would be willing to license them to all interested parties.[28] Companies were only willing to relax their licensing conditions once revenue generating opportunities increased.

The 3G3P and the UMTS
In July 2000 the 3G Patent Platform Partnership (3G3P) and its 18 partners notified various agreements to the end of establishing a worldwide patent platform. The purpose behind this was disclosed to be that of providing a voluntary and cost effective mechanism to evaluate, verify and license patents that were essential for third generation (3G) mobile communication systems.[29] It was also claimed that the said agreements would have pro competitive effects and that the purpose behind this Platform was the facilitation of access to technology and consequent entry into the markets.[30] On the intellectual property front, the purpose was to reduce cost uncertainties and the delays that were accompaniments of licensing numerous essential patents for complex technologies.

While it has often been considered to be a patent pool, this arrangement has been said to be only similar to a patent pool.[31] The 3G3P itself has argued that since it was a mere facilitator of transactions between patent holders and licensees, and that membership was open to both licensors and licensees as opposed to only licensors as in the case of patent pools, it would be fallacious to classify the Platform as a patent pool. Further, it has also been argued that licensing by members is not restricted to the Platform and that there was no bundling or real pooling of the patents per se and those licensees have the opportunity to pick and choose between patents with the licensing being carried out on a bilateral basis. Additionally, unlike in a patent pool, there is no single license between the patent holders as a collective and the licensee, and the parties have a choice between the Standard License of the Platform, and a negotiable individual license.[32] A Standard License provides for Standard Royalty Rate, a Maximum Cumulative Royalty Rate and a Cumulative Royalty Rate.[33] Bilateral transactions on the other hand, are negotiated between the parties where the consideration is to be determined on fair and equitable terms.[34] This Platform also provides for a price cap, which, instead of being absolute and set at a pre-determined royalty rate, is a default five percent maximum (not minimum) cumulative royalty rate for potential licensees per product category.[35] The royalty rate for each individual patent will differ for each of the licensees and this depends on the patent portfolio under each product category that the licensee has chosen.[36]

The concerns and challenges of the GSM experience were well perceived during the determination of the course of action for UMTS. European actors were especially wary of Qualcomm and expected the firm to demand high license fees, with some even fearing them to be in excess of 10%.[37] Subsequently, various attempts at developing licensing schemes failed, until 2004 and the establishment of the W-CDMA Patent Licensing Programme for UMTS FDD patents.[38] At the outset, seven licensors offered their patents as a bundle to prospective licensors, a number which decreased over time.[39]

The Development of LTE Patent Pools
The next stage in the process of innovation in the realm of telecommunications was the development of the Long Term Evolution (LTE) Standard, which while being essential to 4G technology has also seen application in the realm of 3G. Consequently, patent pools or similar structures have been developed in these areas. LTE patents are being viewed as among the most valuable intellectual property resource in the mobile telecommunications industry, with most operators around the world building LTE networks.[40]

As per in a study conducted in 2011, 23% of the patents about this technology were owned by L.G. Electronics, with Qualcomm coming in second with 21%. Motorola Mobility, InterDigital, Nokia and Samsung each owned 9%, China’s ZTE owned about 6%[41] and Nortel owned 4%, which were later sold to a consortium of Apple, EMC, Ericsson, Microsoft, Research in Motion (RIM) and Sony, after Nortel filed for bankruptcy in 2009.[42] Ericsson also independently owns 2% of the patent pool and RIM owns 1%.[43] However, another analysis[44] of IP databases conducted by ZTE in 2011 revealed differing results. As per this analysis, InterDigital was the leader, with its Patent Holdings arm controlling 13% and the Technology arm controlling 11% of LTE essential patents. Qualcomm controlled 13%, Nokia and Samsung 9% each, Ericsson controlled 8%, as did Huawei, ZTE controlled 7%, L.G. controlled 6% and NTT DoCoMo brought up the rear with 5%. The remaining 11% was held by various other firms.[45] It is to be realized that these studies have often come under criticism from different companies, with each of them eager to portray themselves as the market leader.[46] Setting aside criticism driven by corporate egos, the principle of it, that is, the difficulty in assessing and valuing patents cannot be disputed. Valuing patents is far from merely counting the number of patents owned by a company. The complications are especially evident when it comes to determining which of these patents are essential and which of them aren’t. Additionally, the worth of these patents varies depending on the existence or the absence of certain conditions, including transfer restrictions, cross licensing arrangements, ownership and market conditions.[47]

The aforesaid discussion reveals the complexity and the fragmentation of the LTE environment, which further underscored the need to have patent pools in this field. Although the need for a patent pool was realized in 2009-2010, given that the WCDMA patent pool had been met with very limited success,[48] industry watchers were reluctant to be optimistic. This was in part fuelled by the understanding of the attitude of dominant players, wherein they continued to believe that they could derive more monetary, cross licensing and litigation defence value if they did not pool their patents.[49]

The development of LTE patent pools can be traced back to 2009, and the response of Via Licensing¸ Sisvel and MPEG LA to a Request for Information on forming such a patent pool by the Next Generation Mobile Network Alliance (NGMN).[50] Sisvel’s proposal, which it subsequently made at a public conference in 2010 sought to demonstrate that patent pools could prevent excessive costs from royalty stacking.[51] Among various other examples, Roberto Dini, the founder of Sisvel suggested that if patents were to be licensed individually, for instance, 85 patents for MPEG video at 50 cents apiece would cost $42.50. As opposed to this, the patent pool charged $2.50.[52] In 2011, the NGMN reiterated its recommendation to all stakeholders in the mobile industry that were interested in developing patent pools to hasten their development process to avoid further delays in LTE licensing.[53] The NGMN also went on to state that it would be ideal if all the parties were to agree on a single patent pool that promoted reasonable royalties, offered certainty on the availability of the licenses for patents and created a framework for evaluation of their essentiality, where the value of the patents essential to the pool would be established by the industry.[54] These recommendations were not without their fair share of criticism, both, from industry watchers[55] and from vendors.[56] Notwithstanding these reservations, both, Sisvel[57] and Via Licensing have gone on to issue calls for patents for the purposes of creating patent pools in the LTE marketplace.

The Sisvel LTE Patent Pool materialized in late 2012, wherein licenses were offered under a portfolio of patents essential to LTE.[58] The pool includes patents owned by Cassidian, the China Academy of Telecommunication Technology, the Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute, France Telecom, TDF, and KPN, in addition to some patents that had been originally filed by Nokia but were acquired by Sisvel in 2011.[59] The pool is also open to other organizations that have patents essential to LTE. At present, the current portfolio of these patents is available under standard terms and conditions. The running royalty rate is 0.99 Euros per device.[60]

Having promised a launch within a few months in June, 2012[61] Via Licensing has also developed its own LTE Patent Pool, with the initial companies in this pool being AT&T, Clearwire Corporation, DTVG Licensing, HP, KDDI Corporation, MTT DoCoMo, SK Telecom, Telecom Italia, Telefónica and ZTE.[62] Like Sisvel’s Patent Pool, this pool is also open to other organizations that believe they possess essential LTE patents, and they are encouraged to submit the same for evaluation.[63] The patent pool floated by Via leans heavily towards service providers, but some of the big players in the industry including Nokia, Ericsson, Huawei Technologies and Samsung Electronics are conspicuous by their absence.[64] This absence is felt even in Sisvel’s patent pool, with the reasoning being proposed[65] that these key patent holders may prefer private licensing and subsequent litigation over pooled resources in patent pools.[66] Understandably, the launch of the LTE Patent Pools has been met with approval by the NGMN[67] but given the nascent stages in which both of these pools find themselves, it would be premature to comment (without first observing for a few months) the likelihood of their success or failure and how they would play out against each other.

The TD-SCDMA and the TD-LTE
Reportedly, China has spent several billion dollars on the import of analog and GSM technology,[68] and the country’s mobile communications industry continues to be dominated by foreign players.[69] Therefore, in continuation of a purportedly growing trend[70] in the area of telecommunications as well, domestically developed systems are being preferred and developed over standardized technologies that enjoy strong patent protection outside China.[71] Besides the avoidance of paying royalties to foreigners, the idea is also to use China’s strong market presence and have more participants in China’s home grown technology.[72]

Time Divisional- Synchronous Code Division Multiple Access (TD-SCDMA), developed by the China Academy of Telecommunications Technology (CATT), in collaboration with Datang and Siemens[73] is a Chinese indigenously developed 3G technology standard developed by China to reduce its dependence on western standards.[74] Interestingly however, it has been reported that the Chinese hold core patent technology only about 7% whereas most of the rest of it is taken by other foreign organizations.[75] In 2000, an industry consortium, the TD-SCDMA forum was established. The participants were China Mobile, China Telecom, China Unicom, Huawei, Motorola, Nortel, and Siemens, with the objective of developing and supporting this technology. Government support was received in 2002, following which the TD-SCDMA Industry Alliance was founded by well known market players including Datang, SOUTEC, Holley, Huawei, LENOVO, ZTE, CEC and China Putian. There has also been the creation of various joint ventures with international giants such as Alcatel, Ericsson, Nokia, (erstwhile) Nortel, Philips, Samsung and Siemens have also been created.[76]

Information about the existence of patent pools in this technology has been hard to come by. One of the few to write about patent pools in his 2008 paper,[77] Dazheng Wang proposes patent pools as a solution to the problem of commercialization of TD-SCDMA. He suggests that the framework of this patent pool should be on the industry principles of fair, reasonable and non discriminatory licensing terms for essential patents, with the end result being one of increased innovation and competition and an overall increase in market presence. Interestingly, a few articles[78] on blog posts on the internet speak about the existence of patent pools and their apparent misuse[79] as well.

It is submitted that these inconsistencies regarding the division of patents between various patent holders, where the percentage of patents held by each company have been pegged differently,[80] and about the existence of a patent pool or not raise pressing concerns about the payment of royalties and how licensing works in such a situation. On a very basic level, in order to be able to pay royalties and enter into licensing agreements, the existence of an identified, non disputed patent holder would be the sine qua non, which seems to be missing in the case of patents for TD-SCDMA. This problem is only further compounded by the lack of clarity on the very existence of patent pools. Had there been specified patent pools, the issues of determination of essential patents and the setting of royalties and licensing fees would have been standardized, a situation that cannot be invoked, without dispute, in the present Chinese context.

It is further submitted that despite China being the world’s largest market for mobile communications, and its progress from a mere importer to a developer of some parts of technology,[81] the Chinese experiment with TD-SCDMA seems to have met with limited success, in comparison to what was envisaged. For instance, while an agency had forecast that the number of TD-SCDMA subscribers in 2010 would be 34 million, by April, 2010 there were only 8 million or (even lower) subscribers.[82] One of the reasons for preferring other standards, for instance, the W-CDMA is the number of handsets compatible with the same and the consequent variety that is available to the consumer. To illustrate, one could look at the figures from June, 2010. At this point of time China Unicom had 94 models for W-CDMA from twenty four manufacturers including nine foreign ones, whereas China Mobile had only twenty eight models that were compatible with TD-SCDMA.[83] Interestingly, if one were to measure popularity in terms of sheer numbers, TD-SCDMA would emerge the winner over W-CDMA by a couple of million subscribers, but if the growth rate were to be considered, W-CDMA would come out on top. While TD-SCDMA grew only by 24%, W-CDMA has grown at 32% monthly since the start of its service is October, 2009.[84]

China’s experiments with creating its home grown telecommunication standards have not stopped with the development of the TD-SCDMA, with the country being on track in the development of the TD-LTE. Reports suggest that although the systems are in ‘trial’ mode officially, the 4G spectrum situation remains uncertain.[85] It is submitted that although this is in the nascent stages as compared to the TD-SCDMA, the concerns expressed earlier about TD-SCDMA and the suggestions made therein for the technology to realise its full potential would be equally applicable in this scenario as well.

Therefore, in light of this discussion it would not be fallacious to conclude that while the TD-SCDMA, and now more recently the TD-LTE standard might still be in its nascent stages, on a fundamental level it seems to have not fulfilled the objectives with which it was developed, especially given that a sizeable portion of its patents continue to be owned by foreign corporations. In addition to the challenges of attracting subscribers, it would also need to streamline its system of patents, royalties and licensing, if it wants to have a truly global or even national presence. To this end perhaps patent pools structured along the lines of those being developed or in place for other mobile communication technologies might provide a viable solution meriting consideration.

Concluding Observations

One of the fundamental concerns that plague most downstream organizations in the mobile communications sector is the prevalence of high licensing fees that need to be paid on essential patents, the cost of which often trickles down to the customers. A study on the licensing arrangements prevalent at the moment[86] reveals that as of the moment, the result of royalty rate caps is that they save money for downstream manufacturers, but this is at the expense of upstream licensors. The most significant savers are the ones downstream with no IP to trade, and vertically integrated companies while losing some revenue, are able to save significantly more in reduced expenses.[87]

Therefore, it comes as no surprise that efforts at limiting aggregate licensing fees have been at the forefront over the past couple of years. It is in this scenario that patent pools have developed, with operators such as Via Licensing and Sisvel even promoting themselves as being able to put together patent pools that would greatly limit licensing fees.[88] However, some owners of intellectual property continue to find bilateral licensing and cross licensing to be more profitable as opposed to patent pools.

One of the key concerns when it comes to fore when dealing with how patent pools are structured is about the distribution of income received from royalties within the members of the pool, which ties in with the bigger question of classifying patents as essential and non essential. More often than not, patent pools also have to grapple with the problem of members having conflicting interests. For instance, manufacturers have the incentive to cap aggregate royalties of certain essential patents that they would use in manufacturing, in order to reduce their licensing costs. However, these manufacturers could have also brought their own essential patents to the pool, perhaps of a new way of doing things, and would certainly be averse of having caps imposed on these royalties.

One of the key other considerations that patent pools need to take into account include the royalty rates affixed. In an interview some time ago, the founder of Sisvel, went on to state that while affixing these royalty rates, there could be no discrimination against licensees, since that would be a sure fire way of ensuring the collapse of the patent pool.[89] Additionally, patent pools also need to account for the difference in regulatory mechanism and their execution that exists across jurisdictions. For instance, customs officials in France pay a lot more attention to counterfeit goods than they would to patent infringing products, whereas those in Germany would have a keen eye on the latter.[90]

Various other concerns have also been identified with regard to patent pools over time. One of these is that they could potentially eliminate competition that comes from outside of patent pools.[91]

Additionally, patent pools are not all inclusive, since participation is entirely voluntary. Therefore, patent pools would not even be reasonably expected to cover all essential patents required to make a standardised product. This problem is rendered even more complex as a result of the presence of multiple patent pools around the same technology, as in the case of DVDs and more recently, LTE technology.

In sum, while portfolio cross licenses and patent pools can be helpful in resolving issues created by patent thickets by reducing transaction costs for licensees, while preserving to a definitive extent financial incentives for inventors to commercialize their existing inventions and undertake new research, the significant shortcomings of these pools also need to be taken into account before they can be heralded as the solution to problems presented by complex patent landscapes. While voluntary patent pools might have proved to be beneficial in some respects, the imposition of patent pools would be a fallacious approach to undertake.

[1]. Hui Yan, The 3G Standard Setting Strategy and Indigenous Innovation Policy in China: Is TD-SCDMA a Flagship?, DRUID Working Paper No 07-01, available at http://www2.druid.dk/conferences/viewpaper.php?id=1454&cf=9 (last accessed 07 12 2012)

[2]. Josh Lerner and Jean Tirole, Efficient Patent Pools, 4 Am. Econ. Rev. 691, 691 (2004)

[3]. Patent Pools- Some Not So Frequently Answered Questions, available at http://blog.patentology.com.au/2012/11/patent-pools-some-not-so-frequently.html (last accessed 10 December, 2012)

[4]. Id.

[5]. Id.

[6]. Philip B. Nelson, Patent Pools: An Economic Assessment of Current Law and Policy, Rutgers Law Journal, Volume 38:539, 559 (2007)

[7].

[8]. Roger B. Andewelt, Analysis of Patent Pools Under the Antitrust Laws, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 611, 611 (1984).

[9]. Philips has been known to have been the licensing agency for patent pools where it was a member

[10]. Supra note 3

[11]. Supra note 3

[12]. Supra note 3

[13]. Supra note 3

[14]. Supra note 3

[15]. Supra note 3

[16]. Supra note 3

[17]. Rudi Bekkers et. al., Patent Pools and Non Assertion Agreements: Coordination Mechanisms for Multi Party IPR Holders in Standardization, available at http://www-i4.informatik.rwth-aachen.de/Interest/EASST_Bekkers_Iversen_Blind.pdf 22 (last accessed 09 December, 2012)

[18]. Id.

[19]. Id.

[20]. Id.

[21]. Supra note 17 at 23.

[22]. Supra note 17 at 23.

[23]. Keith Mallinson, Fixing IP Prices with Royalty Rate Caps and Patent Pools, available at http://ipfinance.blogspot.in/2011/07/fixing-ip-prices-with-royalty-rate-caps.html (last accessed 10 December, 2012)

[24]. Id. See Appendix 1 for a graphical representation of declared intellectual property assets in 2009.

[25]. Supra note 17 at 25

[26]. Supra note 17 at 27

[27]. Supra note 17 at 27

[28]. Supra note 17 at 28

[29]. Dessy Choumelova, Competition Law Analysis of Patent Licensing Agreements- the Particular Case of 3G3P, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/2003_1_41.pdf- 41 (last accessed 10 December, 2012)

[30]. Id.

[31]. Id.

[32]. Id.

[33]. Id at 42.

[34]. Id at 42.

[35]. Id at 42-43.

[36]. Id at 43.

[37]. Supra note 17 at 29.

[38]. Supra note 17 at 39.

[39]. Supra note 17 at 39.

[40]. Elizabeth Woyke, Identifying the Tech Leaders in LTE Wireless Patents, available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/elizabethwoyke/2011/09/21/identifying-the-tech-leaders-in-lte-wireless-patents/ (last accessed 08 December, 2012)

[41]. Id.

[42]. Id.

[43]. Id.

[44]. Caroline Gabriel, ZTE Claims 7% of LTE Essential Patents, available at http://www.rethink-wireless.com/2011/01/11/zte-claims-7-lte-essential-patents.htm (last accessed 09 December, 2012)

[45]. Id.

[46]. Id.

[47]. Supra note 40.

[48]. Keith Mallinson, Mallinson: Uncertain Futures in LTE Patent Pool Licensing, available at http://www.fiercewireless.com/europe/story/mallinson-uncertain-outlook-patent-pool-licensing/2010-08-25 (last accessed 10 December, 2012)

[49]. Id.

[50]. Id.

[51]. Id.

[52]. Id.

[53]. NGMN Board Recommendation on LTE Patent Pool, available at http://4g-portal.com/ngmn-board-recommendation-on-lte-patent-pool (last accessed 10 December, 2012)

[54]. Id.

[55]. Caroline Gabriel, NGMN’s Calls for an LTE Patent Pool Will be Futile in the Current IPR Climate, available at http://www.4gtrends.com/articles/53511/ngmns-calls-for-an-lte-patent-pool-will-be-futile-/ (last accessed 11 December, 2012)

[56]. Michelle Donegan, Vendors Balk at LTE Patent Pool Proposal, available at http://www.lightreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=212362 (last accessed 11 December, 2012).

[57]. SISVEL: Patent Pool for 3G Long Term Evolution (LTE), available at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/SISVEL%3A+Patent+Pool+for+3G+Long+Term+Evolution+(LTE).-a0199544458 (last accessed 08 December, 2012)

[58]. LTE Patent Pool from Sisvel, available at http://4g-portal.com/lte-patent-pool-from-sisvel (last accessed 09 December, 2012)

[59]. Id.

[60]. Id.

[61]. Mike Dano, Via Promises LTE Patent Pool Launch Within Months, available at http://www.fiercewireless.com/story/licensing-promises-lte-patent-pool-launch-within-months/2012-06-15 (last accessed 07 December, 2012)

[62]. LTE Patent Pool Available Through Via’s Licensing Program, available at http://4g-portal.com/lte-patent-pool-available-through-vias-licensing-program (last accessed 10 December, 2012).

[63]. Id.

[64]. Stephen Lawson, Lte Patent Pool Brings Together Technologies From At&T, Zte, Hp And Others, available at http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9232043/LTE_patent_pool_brings_together_technologies_from_AT_amp_T_ZTE_HP_and_others (last accessed 09 December, 2012)

[65]. Peter White, Sisvel LTE Patent Pool Emerges After All- Majors Still Hold Back from Committing, available at http://www.rethink-wireless.com/2012/11/05/sisvel-lte-patent-pool-emerges-all-majors-hold-committing.htm (last accessed 09 December, 2012)

[66]. Shankar Pandiath, Sisvel Launches Patent Pool for 3G Long Term Evolution (LTE), available at http://next-generation-communications.tmcnet.com/topics/nextgen-voice/articles/314957-sisvel-launches-patent-pool-3g-long-term-evolution.htm (last accessed 09 December, 2012).

[67].NGMN Board Welcomes Launch of LTE Patent Pool, available at http://4g-portal.com/ngmn-board-welcomes-launch-of-lte-patent-pool (last accessed 09 December, 2012).

[68]. ELSPETH THOMSON AND JON SIGURDSON (EDS.), CHINA’S SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SECTOR AND THE FORCES OF GLOBALIZATION 17 (2008, World Scientific Publishing Company, Singapore).

[69]. Cong Cao, Challenges for Technological Development in China’s Industry, available at http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/924 (last accessed 11 December, 2012)

[70]. Peter Zura, China Launches TD-SCDMA Telecom Standard¸ available at http://271patent.blogspot.in/2006/01/china-launches-td-scdma-telecom.html (last accessed 10 December, 2012)

[71]. Id.

[72]. Id.

[73]. TD-SCDMA (time division synchronous code division multiple access), available at http://searchmobilecomputing.techtarget.com/definition/TD-SCDMA (last accessed 07 December, 2012).

[74]. SHAHD AKHTAR AND PATRICIA ARINTO (EDS.), DIGITAL REVIEW OF ASIA PACIFIC : 2009-2010 8 (2010, Sage Publications, New Delhi).

[75]. Supra note 1 at 2. See Appendix 2 for the breakup of patent holding. However, see details on Infra note 78 for a contradictory view, wherein China claims to own 30% of all TD-SCDMA patents.

[76]. Pierre Vialle, On the relevance of Indigenous Standard Setting Policy: the Case of TD-SCDMA in China, 2^nd International Conference on Economics, Trade and Development, (2012) 36 IPEDR 184-185 (IACSIT Press, Singapore).

[77]. Dazheng Wang, Patent Pool: A Solution to the Problem of TD-SCDMA’s Commercialization, http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/login.jsp?tp=&arnumber=5076744&url=http%3A%2F%2Fieeexplore.ieee.org%2Fiel5%2F5076660%2F5076661%2F05076744.pdf%3Farnumber%3D5076744 (last accessed 11 December, 2012).

[78]. China Owns 30% of TD-SCDMA Related Patents, available at http://www.cn-c114.net/582/a310685.html (last accessed 11 December, 2012).

[79]. The Legal Regulation on Patent Pool Misuse, available at http://www.socpaper.com/the-legal-regulation-on-patent-pool-misuse.html (last accessed 11 December, 2012).

[80]. Supra notes 75 and 78.

[81]. Tomoo Marukawa, Chinese Innovations in Mobile Telecommunications: Third Generation vs. “Guerrilla Handsets”, Paper presented at the IGCC Conference: Chinese Approaches to National Innovation, La Jolla, California, June 28-29, 2010 at 1.

[82]. Id at 8.

[83]. Id at 9.

[84]. Id at 9.

[85]. China to Speed Up TD-LTE Process, available at http://www.tdscdma-forum.org/en/news/see.asp?id=11998&uptime=2012-11-29 (last accessed 08 December, 2012)

[86]. Supra note 23.

[87]. Id.

[88]. Supra note 23.

[89]. Sisvel’s Patent Strategy, available at http://www.managingip.com/Article/2400452/Sisvels-patent-strategy.html (last accessed 12 December, 2012).

[90]. Id.

[91]. Supra note 23.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/patent-pools

Pervasive Technologies: Access to Knowledge in the Marketplace — CIS’s Upcoming A2K Research Initiative

Jadine Lannon — 2012-10-30T06:23:53Z

Pervasive technologies have flooded the Indian market and are changing the ways in which the average Indian accesses knowledge but very little is understood about these technologies, particularly when it comes to their legality. The Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) plans to begin a research project that aims to understand how pervasive technologies interact with Intellectual Property laws and what can be done to protect these technologies from being labelled “illegal” and eradicated from the Asian market.

Between 2000 and 2012, mobile phone subscriptions in India increased from 3.578 million to 893.86 million — an increase of almost 250 per cent.[1] In fact, mobile device sales were expected to reach 231 million units in 2012, an 8.5 per cent increase from 2011[2] and an incredible leap from the 21 million units sold in India in 2004.[3] While mobile phone penetration has been rising steadily in India,[4] the cost of mobile phones has plummeted, meaning that the ability to purchase and use mobile phones in India is becoming more and more widespread, especially in the marginalized classes. Mobiles are not the only technology that has experienced this phenomenon; indeed, many different types of pervasive technologies (mass-market networked communication technologies) have become increasingly more accessible across the board in Indian society.

When I use the term pervasive, I am referring to those technologies that are the most accessible to and used by the typical Indian. These technologies are characterized by their ability to provide access to media without significant cost to the user through both their low cost and their features. Mobile phones, netbooks and media players, as well as hardware, software and associated content are all considered to be pervasive technologies. For research purposes, CIS will only consider those technologies that cost under USD 100 or about INR 5,400. Considering that in 2011 it was estimated that about 75 per cent of the mobile devices sold in India cost below USD 75,[5] this is not a restrictive figure.

Although these technologies have become near ubiquitous in India and similar developing markets, very little is actually understood about how they interact with Intellectual Property (IP) laws. The pervasive technology industry exists somewhere between formal and informal and legal and illegal (as Carolyn Nordstrom would put it, these technologies would be il slash legal, or il/legal),[6] and can shift in and out of the legal/formal and illegal/informal realm depending on the stage of production; this is why they are often referred to as “gray market” technologies (though in some cases, it may even be appropriate to call them extra-legal). This lack of compliance with IP laws have made technologies both quite cheap to purchase and a popular platform for software, hardware and content innovation. The result is that these technologies often contain the newest and most interesting features and they provide the most “bang-for-your-buck” for content and value-added services. Thus, a consumer can buy a grey market technology that will have a wide array of features and services for a much lower price than would be paid to one of the larger manufacturers for an equal or even lesser product.

It is the low cost but highly sophisticated state of these pervasive technologies that is changing the way that people across the world access information and media, particularly those individuals and groups that routinely face barriers to mainstream structures of access. For those that were left on the wrong side of the infamous “digital divide”, pervasive technologies have been arguably the most effective means of providing real access to knowledge to the masses within India and across Asia, even more so than directed development initiatives. Indeed, pervasive technologies are not the future solution for access to knowledge; they are the current reality.

Although pervasive technologies are plausibly the most effective tools of access for knowledge in the marketplace in emerging economies like China, Indonesia and India, very little scholarly research has been done on pervasive technologies in the developing world, especially research that acknowledges the significant role that pervasive technologies have had in bridging the digital divide. This absence of appreciation for the significance of pervasive technologies in developing economies, coupled with a lack of understanding around their complex interaction with national and international IP regimes, may lead to a policy vacuum within which the existence of pervasive technologies could be jeopardized. Accordingly, CIS will begin a new access to knowledge research initiative that aims to understand the relationship between pervasive technologies and Intellectual Property. Pervasive Technologies: Access to Knowledge in the Marketplace will span over two-and-a-half calendar years (30 calendar months) and will recruit researchers from China, India, and other parts of Asia. Interaction will also be established with members of like-minded projects in Africa and Latin America. This research will begin as soon as it is approved by the Ministry of Home Affairs. The current project proposal is available for download as a PDF document (299 Kb).

The immediate aim of the research is to understand the legal environment, in which pervasive technologies exist, but simply generating comprehension is not enough; pervasive technologies must be allowed a more formal space in the Indian market. As part of the research project, CIS plans to carry out both an advocacy phase and dissemination phase in order to use the research outputs to create a more widespread understanding of the importance of pervasive technologies as access to knowledge tools. We hope that the research will encourage the formation of IP reforms and norms that recognize the role that pervasive technologies play in providing access to knowledge and enable their continued participation in the Indian market and society.

As the formal research project has yet to commence, I will be working on a small section of the Pervasive Technologies: Access to Knowledge in the Marketplace research on pervasive mobile phone technologies. CIS currently possesses 12 mobile phones that fall into the definition of pervasive technologies, though we will hopefully add to our collection as the research continues. The aim of this research is to document as much information about the life-cycles, hardware, software and content of each phone as possible in order to generate a better understanding of how these phones exist and interact with IP regimes and norms. The blog series on this research should begin in the next couple of weeks.

[1]. Data available on the International Telecommunications Union Data Explorer at http://bit.ly/MIfEYO
[2].Gartner Inc. Gartner Says Indian Mobile Handset Sales to Reach 231 Million Units in 2012, http://bit.ly/tKe7nU(November 22, 2011).
[3].Gartner Inc., ‘Forecast: Mobile Terminals, Worldwide, 2000-2009 report’ (July, 2005), but cited information can be retrieved from http://bit.ly/PTAOFC
[4].International Telecommunications Union, 'The World in 2009: ICT Facts and Figures' available at http://bit.ly/qtwGU
[5].Gartner Inc. Gartner Says Indian Mobile Handset Sales to Reach 231 Million Units in 2012, http://bit.ly/qtwGU (November 22, 2011).
[6].Nordstrom, C. Global Outlaws: Crime, Money, and Power in the Contemporary World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 256.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/pervasive-technologies-access-to-knowledge-in-the-market-place

Pervasive Technologies: Access to Knowledge in the Market Place — A Presentation by Sunil Abraham

sunil — 2013-02-13T07:05:15Z

The 2012 Global Congress on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest was organized in Rio de Janeiro from December 15 to 17, 2012. The Centre for Internet & Society partnered FGV, Washington College of Law, the American Embassy, African Information Research and Training and International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development in this event. Sunil Abraham made a presentation on Pervasive Technologies on the opening day, December 15, 2012.

Sunil Abraham presented on 13 different smartphones from the Indian market such as: The Classroom in a Box, The Supercharger, The Networker, The Linguist, TV on the Go, The Spy, The Semi-Smartphone, The Trendy, The Boombox, 3D, The Mighty Mini, The Pianist, and the Indian Experience.

Most of the above devices are manufactured in China and imported into India through local companies for domestic consumption and made available for its 900 million mobile subscribers.

Download the presentation [PDF, 4.61 Mb]

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/access-to-knowledge-in-market-place

Pervasive Technologies Project Working Document Series: Literature Review on IPR in Mobile app development

sinha — 2015-08-31T13:48:02Z

This post is literature survey of material exploring and analysing the role of Application Platforms in the Mobile Applications Development ecosystem, albeit from an intellectual property perspective. The document is a work in progress.

1. What are the decisions developers are making within their practice in terms of location of their enterprise and clients, scale of audience, funding, business models and mobile apps marketplace (app stores)? Who is the primary actor in the mobile applications development cycle in India?

1.1. Is the mobile apps marketplace organically developing into a Bazaar model, or a Cathedral model?

1.2. What are the contractual terms between the enterprise and the employee? What is the typical nature of agreements in the mobile apps development industry between enterprise- employee and enterprise- client?

The role of Mobile application developers (“developers”) is critical in the app market, especially when such markets are regarded as the key entry and dissemination point for mobile content. Developers are seen as innovation engines and the fastest route to innovation, so understanding factors that attract and retain third party mobile application developers is of importance to mobile platform providers in order to survive.

Who are the primary actors in the mobile applications development cycle in India?

This chapter of the Pervasive Technologies Project (“Project”) aims to study developers who are key contributors to the mobile applications space within India; and the problems, those being faced by them as they attempt to navigate an emerging and ambiguous ecosystem. The results of our qualitative research give us insight into the characteristics of this new tribe. A majority of the developers do not own the products they innovate and instead assign ownership of their IP over to their clients. Innovating for the purpose of creating and retaining ownership is a key motivation and is reflected in the tendency of developers to move away from the services sector to develop their own products.[1]

As one developer puts it, “unless you're a 1000 man enterprise, there's no economic benefit in services; as competition has driven pricing so low, everyone's struggling to deliver $12-14 per hour.”

Every startup in mobile development, especially, is doing services to stay afloat and would like to move toward a product model.

Further, IAMAI conducted a survey[2] in 2013 and the report presents an analysis in four sections:

a) Who? The App Developer in India

b) What? The Preference of Users and Developers in India

c) Why? The Business of Apps in India

d) How? The Future of Apps in India

The Report states:

“The vast majority of app developers in India are male. In their survey of 454 developers, only 35 respondents were female reflecting the gender bias. On the demand side 80 percent of smartphone users in India are male reinforcing the male dominance. Geographically the respondents were all based in India except one developer of Indian origin residing in Malaysia. The well known and established IT cities in India are attractive for app developers because they provide with easy access to infrastructure, skill and a ready market for products. The survey shows the concentration of app developers in the cities of Bangalore, Mumbai, Delhi NCR, Hyderabad and Ahmedabad. A larger percentage of developers in such IT cities make apps on a full-time basis as compared to developers in other cities. The survey data also shows that Bangalore, Mumbai and NCR have the maximum number of companies (organized business operations) engaged in app development. Cities like Ahmedabad, Hyderabad and Chennai host many small teams of app developersas well as self-employed app professionals. In most of the other cities such as Bhubaneshwar, Cochin, Coimbatore, Gandhinagar and Kota, app development is done primarily on a part-time basis and is not the primary source of income. This could be the result of limited monetization options that make app development an unsustainable livelihood for many.

The popularity of international apps was evident in the survey data. The average download of ‘Indian’ apps was very low. Only 14 of the 454 developers has crossed the hundred thousand download mark, of which only 5 surpassed the one million milestone. These numbers do not pertain to a single app, but to the cumulative number of downloads across all the apps created by each developer, supporting the thesis of low visibility of apps developed domestically.

In their sample of 454 developers, entertainment apps including gaming and social networking are the dominant categories reflecting demand side preference. Utilities, health and education are the other important categories. The survey also below provided the number of apps developed under each category. The list does not include lifestyle and enterprise apps which are exceptions. One forceful result of their survey is the focus of app developers on foreign app demand in preference to producing locally-relevant content - as the latter is less profitable. Each respondent in their sample had developed an average of 38 apps. Of these 13 have developed 100 or more apps and these are the larger professional app companies. After excluding extreme values, the average number of apps developed by each respondent fell to 17.

Skewed revenue sharing models biased against content providers was one of the main reasons why Indian app developers focus on international app stores such as Apple App Store or Google PlayStore that offer a flat 70 percent of the total revenue to developers. This adversely affected development of India-specific apps and even popular apps such as Saavn and Zomato have expanded abroad because of this very reason.

Survey results indicated an Android dominated future for the app economy in India for two apparent reasons. One, Android devices are more affordable and two, the Android ecosystem is open allowing OEMs such as Samsung and HTC to manufacture mobile devices that use the Android OS. The drawback turns out to be the resulting fragmentation in screen sizes, resolution limits and hardware traits. Because of this, “developing apps that work across the whole range of Android devices can be extremely challenging and time-consuming.” Moreover, Indian app developers need to recognise the existence of an active market for used phones and thus the appeal of ‘backward compatibility’ i.e. an app that can work across old devices as well as new ones and also function across both old and new versions of operating systems will stand a better chance of success.

On the whole, app development was not considered to be a remunerative business opportunity. 17 percent of respondents who answered the question on choice of revenue model indicated that they did not have a specific revenue generation plan. While some developers are engaged in contractual development, there are few developers who self finance their project and do not actively market or promote their app. The business of app development in India seems to be at a stage in which it could be characterised as one based on a ‘hit and trial’ philosophy. Self financing is common in the industry. Only 7 and 13 developers approached banks or venture capitalists for financing. Funding an app developer was not an investor’s primary choice. Recognising the market failure and the utility of apps, the Department of Electronics and IT and Department of Telecommunication have both instituted funds to encourage mobile technology ventures

and app development in India.[3] One can argue on the efficacy of the use of limited public resources for app development, but not the fact that app development in India needs a boost. The industry is still very young and ‘unorganized’ and is largely dependent on own and informal sources for financing. The study presents presents the source of financing for app developers.”

Understanding of IP

There is a lack of understanding of IP amongst the developers. During the course of interviews, IP was often thought of as mere content or code. There was also confusion between the terms IP and IPR. The few developers who understood the nuances of IP better, voiced a need for the developer community to deepen their understanding of what parts of their work are IP. Samuel Mani, Founding Partner of Mani Chengappa & Mathur, stressed that developers should recognize the value within not just the product or software itself, but the background business processes. According to Mani, the execution of the idea is the true source of innovation; how one accesses the market, and maybe who the market is as well.[4]

The IAMAI report[5] had some observations on the impact of IP on the apps industry. According to the report, “since the industry thrived on innovation, protection of intellectual property was important to developers. The balance between protection and sharing of innovation was part of a larger and often tendentious debate on open source versus proprietary software development.[6] The survey did not attempt to deconstruct that debate; merely reported that 70 percent of respondents were of the view that intellectual property protection was a concern for app developers. However, not all had taken steps to protect intellectual property. The lack of seriousness could be associated with poor revenue potential from apps. Among those who had, some obtained copyrights/patents, while others worked with individual checks on in-app piracy using code morphing, copy protection, server–based checks, or both etc (The study provides data on different IP protection measures).”

Nature of their clients

Out-sourced 'mobile app services' is marginal as a business model here in India.[7]

Ownership of their product/service:

Often, the lack in understanding can be traced to the developers working in isolation from the legalities involved in assigning the product to the client. Majority of those interviewed developed mobile app products for clients, and in turn assigned ownership of their products to their clients. As previously mentioned, they commonly shared an interest in leaving the services sector to create products of their own, with some of them already having made the transition within their business model.[8]

Contractual clauses most important to mobile app developers: Delving deeper into the aspect of assigning ownership to clients, the most common practice is for developers to enter into a work-for-hire agreement with the client. Typically, a work-for-hire agreement mandates that if a worker is paid to carry out a particular project, whatever is created within the project belongs to the client.[9]

For startups where team players are small in number, it is likely that all will have access to any contract agreements entered into with clients. For larger corporate software developer firms, there may be a specialized department for legal-related matters. In such cases, the mobile app developers themselves would seldom lay eyes on the legalese of contracts, for the primary reason being that it doesn't concern them. Instead, the terms of agreement more familiar to them would be those that they obliged to upon working for their employer. The interviews revealed that the importance of contract agreements was actually underestimated in the country.[10]

Within a work-for-hire agreement, it is commonplace for developers to enter into restrictive agreements that obstruct the freedoms of what they can do with the code created for the client. Problematic areas proved to be those related to the time periods in which the developer was not allowed to take up future work for competing clients (i.e. the non-compete clause), or could not talk about their work for the client at all (the “quiet period”).[11]

Developers are unable to license their work to other interested clients when one client retains ownership. “Clients typically do not want a perpetual license, but complete ownership”, says a website developer. He further explains that, “this means they could make a derivative work or use it for another project. Depending on how bad we want the project, we'll work out some middle ground.” But it does not seem to be so easy for he and his SME to do so: “The thing about contracts is it’s all about a sort of differential bargaining power that the two parties have... you’ll have very little control about what happens once you’ve got paid.”[12]

To have any sort of bargaining power within a work-for-hire arrangement requires a lot of time for negotiating, and the space for communication to begin with. In many cases, contracts may not even be introduced into a work agreement, leaving a lot of intricacies to the unknown.

The problems are further compounded by contract illiteracy, more so in second tier cities.[13]

2. What is the nature of innovation emerging from the mobile app industry? What is the awareness of the "mobile applications developer and its enterprise on rules concerning code, content and design? How does re-use and sharing of code, content and design occur in the mobile application developer ecosystem ? What is the perceived impact of the Indian IPR regime on the aforementioned aspects? Finally, do the emerging trends in re-use and sharing of code run afoul of Indian IP law?

There is a marked shift towards using open source software amongst developers. According to a Gartner study, most software makers will have some open source applications or code in their portfolio by 2016. The study also reaches the conclusion that 99% of Forbes’ Global 2000 companies will be using some form of open source software.[14]

Awareness

The interviews revealed different personal understandings of the meaning of IP. The most common responses were the following[15]:

A : When questioned about IP to developers, they did not know what it meant, because it didn’t have anything to do with what they were doing.

B : Developers often did not know what part of their app was IP... there is was gap in understanding with respect to IP.

For the most part, it seems, IP was considered to refer to content or code across interviews, and was even confused at one point with IPR (IP Rights) within a response referring to an SME's trademark and pending application.

For those who appeared to be better versed in matters related to IP, they emphasised on the need for developers to be better acquainted with what parts of their work are IP. One interviewee stressed on the importance of developers to recognize the value of background business processes, apart from software and the product itself. [16]

In certain cases, it took $1 million in sales for a medium-sized software development enterprise to start paying attention to IP. The enterprise tried to obtain patent protection for their application, but the effort turned out to be futile.[17]

Protection of work (Speaks to awareness also)

When asked, those interviewed responded with a variance in answers. Some simply stated that their work is not protected, while a few mentioned that they acquired trademark or intend to apply for trademark protection. One interviewee had a patent pending in India and the US, as well. In many conversations, developers mentioned that their code for their apps is under open source licenses, and a couple others entailed sharing that the content is under creative commons licenses, “individual licenses,” or joint copyright. Additionally, within one interview, one mentioned the use of encryption tools as a technical means of protection for their work.[18]

“The concept of securing IP is relatively new within the Indian context... it becomes a question of priority between innovation and protection" — Aravind Krishnaswamy, Levitum.

Of the developers interviewed, many exhibited some sort of confusion or misunderstanding related to the protection of their works by means of intellectual property rights (IPR). Those interviewed seemed to either express an interest to acquire IPR in the future for their products in the forms of patent or trademark protection, or expressed their appreciation for openness source licensing—or both! Beneath these immediate responses, however, many repeated patterns, as well as contradictions, are revealed. Conversations that followed within these interviewed entailed the opportunity to hear from personal experiences and opinions on different areas within their practice intersecting IPR.[19]

Across interviews conducted, one particular observation entailed the tendency for developers to have worked in the past for corporate employers that have dealt with cases of infringement or have acquired IP protection. Almost half of those interviewed shared the fact that they worked for a corporate employer and became better familiar with different notions of intellectual property through that experience. It may not be too far-fetched to suggest, then, that for the developer the idea of acquiring IPR protection is one that may be reinforced from previous employers or other successful development companies with IPR of their own.[20]

Impact of law & reasons for IPR Protection

One would assume that if a startup was bootstrapped with minimal cash flow, then it would place a low priority on getting IP protection for its products. Aravind Krishnaswamy of startup, Levitum, also stated that “the concept of securing IP was relatively new within the Indian context.” [21]

Yet, many developers who were interviewed did express an interest in IPR. The main concerns developers believed IP protection would address, were proving ownership over their work or preventing problems in the future. One developer's commented on how the mobile app market is a “new and potentially volatile area for software development.” For this reason, it was imperative that he and his team attempted to avoid trouble in the future, and ensure that they going about mobile app development the right and moral way.[22]

Within another interview, developer, John Paul of mobile app SME, Plackal, explained his motives for seeking to acquire patent protection, the application for which back then was pending in India and the US: "For us, applying for a patent is primarily defensive. And if it does get infringed upon, it would give us a good opportunity to generate revenue from it." For the company's trademark, they sought to be able to enforce their ownership over their product's brand: “As a precautionary, we've trademarked the app so that should there be a situation where the app is pirated, we can claim ownership for that app.”[23]

Do the emerging trends run afoul of Indian law?

Yes. This was evident from the legal practices of mobile app developers and the resulting cases of infringement.

Some instances of infringement (limited to Mobile app content (i.e. logos, pictures, etc.)) are[24]:

• Pirated apps in app stores

• “Dummy apps” or imitations of another's app

• Breaching app stores user agreement

• Violation of License agreements of code created by another

• Violation of Open source licenses

• Breaching of terms of agreement for by commissioning clients

• Breaching of terms of agreement for by those hired

Some of the developers indicated that they weren't a fish big enough to be pursued for infringement. “The big companies do not go after small developers; it depends on how much money they're making.” said a developer. He added,“Patent lawsuits can cost something like millions of dollars, so unless they're going to get more back, they wouldn't go through the trouble of doing so... but that is true even in the US.”

Some added that others who may have been apparently copying you, may have been working on the same content independently. Corporate players are in non-compliance knowingly than not, whereas more SMEs infringe upon others without being aware that they are. Just as well, the degree to which infringement takes place may differ between the two types of industry players: “At the corporate level, where they know they are not in compliance, the degree of non-compliance might be very small or specific, but it still exists.” On the other hand, for startup developers, a substantial amount of their code may not comply with the licenses and agreements they are obliged to—something that could pose problems for them later down the road if left unfixed. [25]

3. The apps marketplace is extremely important since they are the gatekeepers enabling access to apps. What is the nature of the apps marketplace? What are the limitations associated with it ? How do the existing regulatory models intersect with this relatively new marketplace? What is the enforcement carried out by these app stores in terms of IP?

“The app platform is a gatekeeper which provides the consumer and developer a virtual space to buy and sell products (mobile apps). What is the nature of the app platform? What are the limitations associated with it?

An app dealing in pirated content or infringing intellectual property faces the risk of getting barred by the app platform. What is the enforcement carried out by app platforms to protect intellectual property?”

Firstly, what is an app platform?

Iansteti and Levien[26] state that at the core of each innovation network is a focal organization known as platform owner (or keystone) that provides the platform to facilitate contribution by other members in the network.

Hagiu[27] defines a platform as a product, service or technology that provides a foundation for other parties to develop complementary products.

Specifically, I Kouris[28] defines an app platform as a special kind of electronic market which enable software developers to distribute their software applications(apps) among users of mobile devices like smartphones or tablets. An app platform owner dictates the entire infrastructure(like user interface, server space, etc.) and determines the rules for the interaction between the developers and users. They usually provide information about apps and developers and serve as a trusted third party by controlling app quality. Fransman M[29] characterised the app platform as an 'innovation ecosystem incorporating app developers effectively.'

Innovation can happen within the enterprise, or can take a more open route and benefit from external innovation. In order to gain the benefit of external innovation, platform owners must open their platforms up beyond their internal base of developers and provide resources to third party developers.[30]

What is the platform concept in software?

Broadly, Noori[31], discusses the issues about the platform concept in software and attempts to address the subject of platform strategy. Tsai, Phal & Robert[32] further the discussion by stating principles for an effective platform strategy.

In mobile ecosystems building a developer community is one of the niches to attract the developers to join the ecosystem. However, health can mean differing things for different ecosystem members. In order to stimulate innovation[33] the keystone company is often forced to relinquish much of their control over the platform to the development community. This involves a careful balancing act in relinquishing enough control to create a healthy environment for developers, and not stifling innovation while retaining a necessary and desired degree of control.[34]

Baskin[35] examines the problems concerning software patent under the mobile applications platform environment. The scope of the analysis is limited to two mobile applications platforms: Apple's iOS and Google's Android. The analysis throws light on the problems of innovation in software systems like iOS and Android. The note also proposes several changes to both antitrust and patent laws that will make it more difficult for established market players to prevent new competitors from entering high tech markets, thereby promoting greater openness and innovation. The part on software patents discusses the effects of enforcement of patent rights on open and closed systems. The note observes that the US Federal Circuit's decisions (Fonar Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., io7 F.3d 1543, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1997)) have severely curtailed both the enablement and best mode requirements for successful software patents., thereby limiting the disclosure and preventing many of the invention's useful elements from reaching the public domain. Patentability issues have affected open systems such as Android more than Apple, owing to a greater dependency on third parties to run android systems, leading to more patent infringement issues. It recommends, that, intellectual property law should promote open systems above patent protection in high tech fields, allow reverse engineering of software and introduce an 'independent invention' defence in the law for innovators.

A certain paper addresses rejection of apps in the AppStore on three grounds: rejection on content grounds (including some competition-driven restrictions), rejection on development grounds, and the regulation of transactions.

Apple's and Google's foray into building a mobile development platform

Coming from the music and personal computer industry, Apple disrupted the mobile industry by making its mobile development platform available to third party developers and eliminating the barriers between those developers and customers. The main goal of Apple in the mobile world is to increase the cross-sales of its high-margin products by providing a continuous experience roaming (iPhone, iPad, Mac, and Apple TV) using complements such as mobile applications, content, services, and accessories.[36] Google, on the other hand, is an online advertising company which provides an open source mobile operating system, in the shape of Android, on which mobile handset manufacturers can develop smartphones without paying software licensing fees. By commoditizing mobile device production under its unique governance structure and building a large developer community, Google secured a means of reducing the barriers to new users accessing their advertising through smartphones. Microsoft through its Windows Phone is the most recent addition to the leading mobile platform providers. Its motivations lie in trying to protect its core business of software licensing which has been disrupted by falling PC sales linked to the emergence of mobile technology and free cloud technology services provided by companies such as Google which have impacted respectively on its licensing fees for Windows OS and Microsoft Office[37].

Luis H Hestres[38] analyzes Apple’s guidelines and approval process on the App Store, discusses content-based rejections of apps, and outlines the consequences of this process for developers’ and consumers’ freedom of expression. It outlines a set of principles to ensure “app-neutrality” whilie ensuring device quality and safety. The article illustrates challenges faced by app developers working on the iOS platform. Criticisms have come forth about Apple's arbitrary and opaque review process. Apple has a rejection rate of 30% of the 26,000 apps submitted to the app store each week[39]. Van Grove[40] comments that the ambiguity, opaqueness, and susceptibility to outside pressures that seems to characterize Apple’s approval process do a disservice to a democratic online culture. With more than 400 million iOS devices sold worldwide since 2007[41], Apple’s devices and app store have become important online intermediaries for Internet users. The article proposes a few basic guidelines, anchored on widely accepted international laws and treaties, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Statistics

A Report[42] presents us with some important insights into the growth of Google Play. Following are the highlights of the report: There are now well over 1 million apps available on Google Play App downloads and revenue from Google Play increased dramatically over the past year; Markets such as Brazil, Russia, Mexico, Turkey and Indonesia are driving growth in app downloads from Google Play; Google Play is experiencing rapid expansion of monetization in established markets such as Japan, the United States and South Korea; Games played a major role in the acceleration of Google Play revenue growth, but almost all app categories experienced expansion and accounted for almost 90% of revenue in Q1 2014; The freemium business model advanced its domination of Google Play app revenue, and represents a growing proportion of downloads; Asian markets lead the way in generating freemium revenue. Another report8 reiterates the explosion of gaming apps.

4. How does Indian copyright law and patent law apply to the mobile applications development ecosystem, in respect of the various business models operating in the industry?

4.1. The patent regime is grounded on a laboratory model of innovation. What does the niche mobile applications development industry (working on a micro-creativity model of innovation) require differently from the patent regime to foster growth?

4.2. Similarly, copyright law has a distinct design for digital objects. Examine the design and its suitability to regulate a mobile application.

A. The interviews reveal a dichotomy existing in the mobile app developer space. While some developers argued for strong IPR protections, several of app developers opposed strict IPR protection (patents, especially) and advocated use of open source software.[43]

Open source for future protection (Applicable as literature to Research question 2)

Sometimes developers license for community values primarily, however, the assumption is that dominant reason is to retain the ability to use their own work across clients. A designer from a services enterprise gave a different reason for doing so: to guarantee their ability to use their work again. “Since we use a bunch of templates and things like that, those we license using a non-exclusive license, because we reuse those elements on different bits of code in different projects,” he explains, “so there are bits of it which is used over multiple projects and there are stuff that is built exclusively for the client.”[44]

Here one can gather some insight, that perhaps developers do not necessarily license for community values primarily, but for the ability to use their own work across clients. That being said, we begin to wonder what the possibility that open source code may serve as a loophole for work-for-hire contracts, which require the developer to assign all written intellectual property to whoever is commissioning the project. If the code happened to “already be available by open source,” a developer may still be honouring any restrictive agreements with clients, and ensuring their ability to use their code in this future again.[45]

As a developer suggests, that startups should first and foremost protect themselves by making wiser choices related to code in order to prevent being litigated against by others—such as using an open source equivalent to a piece of code that one does not have the rights to, or instead putting the extra time in to develop it from scratch.[46]

Of those who expressed an interest in the open source movement, not all had said that their products were to be open licensed as well. One developer explicitly stated: “I like the idea of open source, and building upon others' work...but our app is not open source, it's proprietary.” It may be a given, then, that all or most developers within our interview sample rely on open source code within their practice, but not all may contribute their resulting product's source code back.[47]

Vivek Durai, from Humble Paper said that despite the fact that “open source has really taken route... on the smaller levels, people will come to a point when philosophies begin to change the moment you start seeing commercial.”[48]

B. A certain paper[49] examines from various angles the complex relationship between intellectual-property rights and technological innovation. Following are the conclusions:

1) Intellectual property rights are most likely to foster innovation when the following conditions converge in a particular industry: (a) high research-and-development costs; (b) a high degree of uncertainty concerning whether specific lines of research will prove fruitful; (c) the content of technological advances can be ascertained easily by competitors through “reverse engineering”; and (d) technological advances can be mimicked by competitors rapidly and inexpensively.

2) The likelihood that intellectual-property rights will impede more than stimulate innovation increases as more and more of the following factors obtain in a particular field: (a) trade-secret protection or lead-time advantages reduce the ability of competitors to take advantage of technological advances; (b) innovation in the field tends to be highly cumulative; (c) researchers in the field are motivated primarily by non-monetary incentives; (d) the field is characterized by strong network externalities. The last three of these circumstances were all present during the development of the technical infrastructure of the Internet; it is thus not surprising that that development proceeded rapidly and effectively with little reliance upon intellectual-property systems.

3) The following techniques may be employed to mitigate the economic side-effects of intellectual-property systems: (a) compulsory licenses; (b) facilitation of price discrimination; (c) strict enforcement of the “utility” requirement; (d) encouragement of appropriate cross-licensing agreements (provided that cartel behavior can be simultaneously discouraged); (e) narrow interpretations of “similarity”; (f) strict enforcement of “enablement” and “best-mode” requirements; and (g) the affirmative defenses of patent and copyright misuse.

4) In contexts in which reliance upon these mitigating devices is not feasible, the following alternative ways of solving the public-goods problem may be superior to intellectual-property rights as ways of stimulating innovation:government research; government funding for private research; or post-hoc government rewards for private technological advances.

C. In a paper[50], the authors study the determinants of patent quality and volume of patent applications when inventors care about perceived patent quality. They analyze the effects of various policy reforms, specifically, a proposal to establish a two‐tiered patent system. In the two‐tiered system, applicants can choose between a regular patent and a more costly, possibly more thoroughly examined, ‘gold‐plate’ patent. Introducing a second patent‐tier can reduce patent applications, reduce the incidence of bad patents, and sometimes increase social welfare. The gold‐plate tier attracts inventors with high ex‐ante probability of validity, but not necessarily applicants with innovations of high economic value.

D. Copyrights related to apps are still being hashed out in the courts. Oracle, for example, sued Google[51] for copyright infringement regarding the structure of Java APIs in its Android operating system[52], and the case was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court.

E. Policy Levers in Patent Law[53]

The paper argues that some industries should be the subject of patent tailoring – which can make them illustrative of certain policy levers. Use of obviousness and disclosure doctrines to modulate the scope and frequency of patents, as might be necessary where anti-commons to patent thicket theories are applicable.

Nature of software vis-a-vis biological/chemical inventions

Software inventions tend to have a quick, cheap, and fairly straightforward post- invention development cycle. Most of the work in software development occurs in the initial coding, not in development or production. The lead time to market in the software industry tends to be short. Because innovation is less uncertain in software than in industries like biotechnology, Merges’ economic framework suggests that the non-obviousness bar should be rather high.

Implementing a rational software policy obviously requires some significant changes to existing case law. A number of policy levers might be brought to bear on this problem. First, obviousness doctrine needs to be reformed, preferably by way of a more informed application of the level of skill in the art or alternatively by application of new secondary considerations of non-obviousness.

Poor handling of software patents by the Federal Circuit

The paper argued that broad software patents were indeed what the existing Federal Circuit jurisprudence will likely produce. By relaxing the enablement requirement and permitting software inventions defined in broad terms, supported by very little in the way of detailed disclosure, the Federal Circuit has encouraged software patents to be drafted broadly and to be applied to allegedly infringing devices that are far removed from the original patented invention.

By implication, the Federal Circuit’s standard also seems to suggest that many narrower software patents on low- level incremental improvements will be invalid for obviousness in view of earlier, more general disclosures. They may also be invalidated under the on- sale bar, because the Supreme Court’s view that a software invention is “ready for patenting” when it is the subject of a commercial order and when the inventor has described its broad functions, even if it is not clear how the code will be written or that it will work for its intended purpose, means that any patentee who waits until the code is written to file a patent application risks being time-barred for not filing earlier. Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit’s current standard seems to be precisely backwards. Software is an industry characterized by at least to a limited extent by competition theory and to a greater extent by cumulative innovation. Cumulative innovation theory suggests that patent protection for incremental software inventions should be relatively easy to acquire in order to reward incremental improvements, implying a somewhat lower obviousness threshold. It also suggests that the resulting patents should be narrow and, in particular, that they should not generally extend across several product generations for fear of stifling subsequent incremental improvements. This suggests that software patents should be limited in scope.

Second, a higher disclosure requirement and restrictions on the doctrine of equivalents will help reduce patent scope. Additionally, the authors think software patents are the ideal candidate for a new policy lever: reverse engineering. Many commentators have explained the importance of permitting competitors to reverse engineer a product in order to see how it works and to figure out ways to design around it. In the case of copyright, courts have adapted the doctrine of fair use, together sometimes with copyright misuse, to allow competitors to engage in reverse engineering of computer software. Patent law includes no express provision allowing reverse engineering, nor is there any judicially developed exception akin to copyright’s fair use doctrine that might permit it. Indeed, patent law generally lacks provisions akin to fair use or other exceptions that might readily be pressed into the service of reverse engineering, although commentators have suggested that patent law may need such exceptions for precisely this reason.

This does not mean that reverse engineering a patented product is necessarily illegal patent law. Some inventions, such as the paper clip, are readily apparent once embodied in a product. Improvers do not need to reverse engineer the paper clip and figure out how it works in order to improve it; they just need to look at it. Additionally, in many cases, the patentee has done all the work necessary for reverse engineering patented inventions by virtue of disclosing how to make and use the claimed invention in the patent specification. In theory, an express provision authorizing reverse engineering would be superfluous if the enabling disclosures required to secure a patent were sufficiently strong – someone who wanted to learn how a patented device worked would only need to read the patent specification. Patentable inventions in software, however, generally do not have these characteristics. Software devices typically cannot be readily understood by casual inspection, and particularly not without access to human-readable source code or other documentation. Examination of the patent itself is unlikely to yield information equivalent to a reverse engineered inspection because the Federal Circuit does not require would-be patentees of software inventions to disclose the implementing source code or, for that matter, very much at all about their inventions. Accordingly, software patents present unique obstacles to consummation of the patent law’s traditional rights-for-disclosure bargain with the public. The specific reverse engineering techniques commonly used for software, in turn, may raise some infringement problems that are unique to software. The definition of infringement in the patent statute is extremely broad, encompassing anyone who “makes, uses, offers to sell, ... sells..., or imports” a patented product. Reverse engineering a patented computer program by decompiling it likely fits within this broad category of prohibited conduct, at least where the program itself is claimed as an apparatus. Reverse engineering clearly constitutes a “use” of the patented software, though owners of a particular copy of the program surely have the right to use it. More significantly, decompilation may also constitute “making” the patented program by generating a temporary yet functional copy of it in RAM memory and, in certain instances, a longer-term (though still “intermediate”) copy in more permanent memory. Those copies probably constitute patent infringement unless protected by some defense. The result of all of this is that the nominally neutral patent law rule – no defense for reverse engineering – affects software more than other industries.

The need for a reverse engineering exception in patent law militates in favor of adapting the existing doctrines of exhaustion or experimental use to that end. Patent misuse might also be adapted, as it has been in the copyright arena, to prevent patent holders from deterring or prohibiting reverse engineering related to their inventions. The exception might even be created out of whole cloth by reinterpreting the infringement provisions of section 271(a). The resulting patent doctrine would constitute a macro policy lever. As Cohen and Lemley observe, in most industries there is either no need to reverse engineer an invention or reverse engineering can be done without infringing the patent.

The paper concludes by stating, “Only in software is there a need for a particular doctrine to protect the right to reverse engineer —and therefore the ability of improvers to innovate. Thus, a judicially created reverse engineering defense would make sense across the board in software cases but not in other patent cases.”

[1]Samantha Cassar, "App Developers Series: Products-Services Dichotomy & IP (Part I)”, last accessed July 21, 2015

[2]IAMAI, “An inquiry into the impact of India's App economy”, 2015

[3]DoT has set up a 1000 crore app development centre called Application Development Infrastructure and 700 crores under the National E-Governance Plan have been allocated for mobile technology ventures

[4]Supra note 1

[5]Supra note 2

[6]Hippel, Eric von, and Georg von Krogh. "Open source software and the “private-collective” innovation model: Issues for organization science." Organization science 14.2 (2003): 209-223.

[7]Supra note 1

[8]Ibid

[9] Samantha Cassar, “Mobile App Developer Series: Terms of Agreement – Part IV”, last accessed July 21

[10]Ibid

[11]Ibid

[12]Ibid

[13]Ibid

[14]Gartner Data

[15]Supra note 1

[16]Ibid

[17]Samantha Cassar, “Interviews with App Developers: [dis]regard towards IPR vs. Patent Hype – Part II”, last accesed July 21, 2015

[18]Ibid

[19]Ibid

[20]Ibid

[21]Ibid

[22]Ibid

[23]Ibid

[24]Samantha Cassar, “Interviews with App Developers: Name of the Game (Part IV)”, last accessed July 21, 2015

[25]Ibid

[26]"Strategy as Ecology," Harvard Business Review, Vol. 82, No. 3, March 2004.

[27] Evans, D. S., A. Hagiu and R. Schmalensee, 2006, Invisible Engines: How Software Platforms

Drive Innovation and Transform Industries, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

[28]Kouris, Iana and Kleer, Rob, "BUSINESS MODELS IN TWO-SIDED MARKETS: AN ASSESSMENT OF STRATEGIES FOR APP PLATFORMS" (2012). 2012 International Conference on Mobile Business. Paper 22.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/icmb2012/22

[29]Fransman, M. (2014) Models of Innovation in Global ICT Firms: The Emerging Global Innovation Ecosystems. JRC Scientific and Policy Reports –EUR 26774 EN. Seville: JRC-IPTS

[30] Deniz and Kehoe, Factors that attract and retain third party developers in mobile ecosystems, June 2013

[31]Nadea Saad Noori (2009) Managing External Innovation: The case of platform extension, available at http://www3.carleton.ca/tim/theses/2009/Noori2009.pdf

[32]Tsai, Phal & Robert, Industry Platform Construction and Development in a changing environment: Evidence from the ICT Industry, available at http://druid8.sit.aau.dk/acc_papers/6s5aqckmne7ggybu0vfxryrynuog.pdf

[33] Supra note 9

[34] Ibid.

[35]John Baskin, Competitive Regulation of Mobile Software Systems: Promoting Innovation Through Reform of Antitrust and Patent Laws (2013)

[36] Constantinou, 2012b

[37]Ibid.

[38]Luis H Hestres (2013) App Neutrality: Apple’s App Store and Freedom of Expression Online , American University , International Journal of Communication 7 (2013), 1265–1280

[39]Supra note 9

[40]Ibid.

[41] Supra note 9

[42]App Annie Data

[43]Supra note 1

[44]Samantha Cassar, “Interviews with App Developers: Open Source, Community, and Contradictions – Part III”, last accessed July 21

[45]Ibid

[46]Ibid

[47]Ibid

[48]Ibid

[49] William Fisher, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INNOVATION: THEORETICAL, EMPIRICAL, AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

[50]Patent Quality and a Two‐Tiered Patent System (Vidya Atal and Talia Brar, 2014)

[51]http://copyrightalliance.org/2014/05/federal_circuit_releases_decision_oracle_v_google

[52]http://copyrightalliance.org/2014/05/federal_circuit_releases_decision_oracle_v_google#.VYf0i9Z5MxB

[53]http://escholarship.org/uc/item/4qr081sg

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/pervasive-technologies-project-working-document-series-literature-review-on-ipr-in-mobile-app-development

Pervasive Technologies Project Working Document Series: Document 2 Literature Review on Competition Law + IPR + Access to < $100 Mobile Devices

Amulya Purushothama and Nehaa Chaudhari — 2015-09-03T02:02:51Z

This note is the second document in the series of Working Documents that I will be creating for my research under the Pervasive Technologies: Access to Knowledge in the Marketplace (“PT Project”).

View the first document here. Note: The research was for this blog post was done by Amulya Purushothama which wasn't acknowledged earlier.

Preliminary

This note will serve as the literature review for my research paper under this project. This note- to be revised periodically- maps the existing literature around questions of competition law intersecting with intellectual property law on the specific issue of enabling access to sub hundred dollar mobile devices; which might be impaired as a result of intellectual property protections, particularly standard essential patents.

This note will explore the literature around the relationship between intellectual property and competition law; with a specific focus on the antitrust/competition concerns that arise around the licensing of standard essential patents. This note will study the approach adopted in other jurisdictions in the employment of existing mechanisms in competition law as possible solutions to issues with the licensing of standard essential patents.

Literature Review

Smartphones and Access to knowledge.

The Avendus Capital report[1] on mobile data usage in India provides important information about mobile internet users in India. Particularly the striking fact that more than half of the internet users in India use it on their low cost mobile phone and that access to these phones therefore becomes a step toward access to the internet. John Harmen Valk and others [2] have through their report demonstrated how mobile phones with internet access have been used to further educational outcomes in India and Asia and underscores the idea that access to such technology is important.

Competition Law and Intellectual Property

Academic writing around the nexus between intellectual property law and competition law presents varied perspectives; particularly on the question of whether they each acted as incentives for innovation, or whether competition law hindered innovation that intellectual property (seemingly) promoted. This narrative does not question a more fundamental concept; of whether intellectual property protections necessarily incentivized innovation; but takes that as the underlying assumption that they do.

Gitanjali Shankar and Nitika Gupta have noted that antitrust law and intellectual property have in the past seen to diverse and work against each other with different approaches to monopoly and that the two have also been viewed as related to each other in so far as intellectual property has been viewed as one of the tools to regulate competition in the market place. they propose that if the latter approach is taken and the two branches of law are seen to converge, two guidelines must be followed in to balance the various interests and ensure clarity, first that IP laws must only be extended by legislation and not through judicial interpretation, the second that when two interpretations are available during the enforcement of any intellectual property, that interpretation must be chosen which is in line with encourages the free market and promotes fair competition.

They have argued that both antitrust law and intellectual property have separate operational areas and their functions must be kept independent of each other. They argue that the domain of intellectual property concerns the assignment and defense of intellectual property rights and the domain of antitrust deals with the use and exercise of such rights within the market. They argue that competition law does not call into question that basis of IPRs that it doesn't question the exclusivity of legal rights, merely their abuse which results in unfair trade practices. They argue that the distance between economic and legal monopolies should be maintained and these fall within the domains of antitrust law and intellectual property respectively. They further argue that antitrust law exists to ensure that the IPR owner does not abuse his rights and thus bolsters intellectual property rights. [3]

Robert Pitofsky while reviewing a work of Prof. Mark Lemley explains that while anti-trust laws and intellectual property laws have the same long term goals of incentivizing innovation and investment in innovation, they are bound to conflict with each other in the short term as anti-trust law seeks to achieve this goal via limiting the possibilities of a monopoly and further ensuring that monopolies do not abuse the power they enjoy in the market place. Antitrust policies assume that the free market will fairly allocate resources and thereby encourage innovation efficiently. Pitofsky goes on to state that intellectual property on the other hand believes in rewarding innovation and thereby incentivizing investing in innovation, intellectual property is basically a grant of limited monopolies to ensure that costs of innovation are recovered and product quality is maintained. He argues that it is critical to ensure that patents are granted after thorough analysis to ensure a balance between anti-trust policies and intellectual property rights and to ensure that the larger goals of incentivizing innovation are achieved.[4]

Katrina Perehudoff and Sophie Bloemen have argued that anti-competitive strategies such as defensive patenting (the creation of weak and frivolous patents around their main patent) and vexatious litigation (the use of litigation as a threat to smaller and medium enterprises who cannot afford costs of litigation) have ensured that the bestselling originators medicine dominates the market for artificially long periods of time ensuring that the company therefore profits at the expense of public interest and obstructs widespread access, it is argued that such practices go against the aims of the patent system which were to ensure that the innovator could recoup costs of invention and in fact hamper incentives to invent. [5] It is submitted that while in this instance the discussion of defensive patenting as well as holding out is in the context of healthcare, similar trends have been witnessed in the space of technological patents as well. With standard essential patents for instance, there exists a very real danger of frivolous litigation and hold-outs ensuring market dominance by larger players, forcing out smaller and medium sized enterprises.

While acknowledging that intellectual property law and competition law might both seek to achieve a common goal of incentivizing innovation, Daniel Ravicher and Shani Dilloff have argued that the scrutiny of intellectual property exploitation from an antitrust perspective lacks economic and political merit. They argue that governments and courts have time and again preferred to enforce antitrust policy at the expense of enforcing intellectual property rights as evidenced by the cases of International Salt Co. v. United States[6], United States v. Lowe's Inc. [7], and Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc.[8] among others. They argue that the law depends on the flawed assumption that intellectual property confers upon the rights holder some kind of market power through creation of monopolies as evidenced by Jefforson Parish Hospital District No.2 v. Hyde[9] and the U.S. Department of Justice Guidelines on licensing of intellectual property[10] and is therefore in the wrong.

They argue that no such power is conferred on the rights holder because intellectual property rights do not confer monopolies so much as they ensure that a certain standard of uniqueness is assured, and that this standard of uniqueness falls short of the uniqueness required to obtain monopoly power within a market. They argue that IPRs do not grant the ability to raise prices above the competitive level and do not grant the right to exclude a rival or to exclude new entrants in the field, they only grant a right to prohibit others from exploiting their creation in an unfair manner and provide for sufficient limitations and exceptions to ensure that fair exploitation of their works is still allowed. And therefore while sound economic theory that ensures free marketplace through government regulation underlies most of antitrust policy, scrutiny of intellectual property through an antitrust point of view is economically flawed.

In a departure from other perspectives, the authors in this paper also argue that the factors affecting the employment of antitrust policies are not entirely legal; and that this preference is often a reflection of non-meritorious factors such as arguable predictions for the future, difference in financial stability of the competing parties, the political persuasion of the decision maker or the posturing of the parties and the courts being simply hostile to intellectual property rights and is unfair to intellectual property owners. They further argue that this preference is politically indefensible as it undermines the intent of the legislature. They argue that because of these things the case law so far that deals with this conflict is unreliable, unpredictable and not credible. They lastly argue that the solution out this conflict is to ensure economic efficiency by exempting intellectual property rights from scrutiny based on antitrust policies.[11]

Robert Anderson argues that IPRs do not inherently confer market power on rights holders and that in many cases restrictions on licensing could encourage competitive behavior and economic efficiency while not losing sight of the fact that IPRs can result in anti-competitive behavior in certain circumstances, particularly in context of network industries and that competition law must respond to these issues. This paper also makes a reference to the Trade Related Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS Agreement"), and the provision that it makes that allow member countries to curb anticompetitive practices through Article 8.2 and Article 40 and thus catering to the interests of developing nations. The paper also notes that the TRIPS Agreement does not set out a specific list of practices that should be treated as abuses. Further, this paper goes on to analyse intellectual property regimes in the US, Canada, Japan and the EU and concludes that the US has maintained a liberal environment for granting of intellectual property rights while being cautious of abuse of IPRs for anticompetitive purposes, that Canada on the other hand has been suspicious of legislative efforts to curb the proper use of IPRs that the EU has adopted a far stricter approach to the issue to achieve market integration, and that Japan has chosen a somewhat middle path by providing for a case by case evaluation of practices. It is argued that certain restraints on international trade such as the restriction on parallel importation due to IPRs segment markets and is harmful to trade and collective innovation and some mechanism for exhausting of these rights must be considered. [12] This cross jurisdictional analysis is particularly useful, and will be examined in detail in my research paper.

Elieen Mc Dermott, in a discussion on FTC public hearings in December 2008 to discuss the overlap between intellectual property laws and antitrust and competition laws, identifies that Innovation Alliance, an organization that represents technology patent owning companies put forward three principles to govern antitrust policies, the first to define antitrust policy to promote consumer welfare and to limit its role to conduct that has "a demonstrable anticompetitive effect", second to bring on board the diverse range of interests and business models involved and third to ensure that principles behind patent law have evolved before allowing antitrust enforcement agency involvement in patent cases.[13] This submission by Innovation Alliance will now be studied in greater detail while attempting a submission on India's stance on competition law issues in the licensing of standard essential patents.

Herbert Hovenkamp has argued that for most of history, antitrust law and intellectual property law have undermined their own purpose of encouraging innovation by protecting too much, whether it is the shielding of inefficient business from competition or the shielding of IPRs beyond what is necessary to incentivize innovation, in both cases the consumer is harmed and the costs of innovation increases. He argues that while it is good that we have lately come to view patents as a kind of property as opposed to a kind of monopoly, since there is no real proof that patents lead to market power, we haven't extended to patents the same kind of conditions we extend to other kinds of property, like the obligation to define the boundaries of ownership another being the obligation to ensure that notice of the claim to property is rendered in time, neither of these obligations, he says, are imposed upon patent holders. He states that this leads to over protection and wastage of state resources.

He goes on to offer a few principles for antitrust in innovation intensive markets that involve exercise of patent rights; the first being that the purpose of antitrust must not be to fix defects in other regimes, but only to correct private markets, second that any antitrust or intellectual property intervention is justified only when congress or a tribunal has a reason for thinking that such an intervention is necessary to ensure more competition or more innovation, third is that many IP practices do not conflict with antitrust laws and antitrust policies shouldn't intervene in such cases, fourth that innovation provides society with more gains than simple production and trading under constant technology and therefore, when we have to choose between innovation and competition, we must choose innovation, fifth that innovation is more than what is simply defined under intellectual property law and at times, when practices seem clearly anti-competitive and IP statutes do not provide us with answers, we should consider antitrust policies as guidelines, sixth that IP protections can at times protect competition more efficiently than antitrust legislation, seventh that IP law must constantly examine its roots as antitrust legislation has and ensure that any expansion of IPR is well thought out.[14]

John Barton examines antitrust treatment of oligopolies that use IPRs defensively to block new entrants into the market. These oligopolists each have substantial patent portfolios that are infringed by its competitors but never a matter of litigation as there is the fear of counter litigation. Therefore there is an implied licensing of patent portfolios among the oligopolists. It is further argued that under systems like this, while there is an incentive for firms to acquire more patents to build defensive portfolios, there is no incentive to actually carry out new research therefore firms will obtain patents on existing research base and therefore this stunts innovation. Further oligopolists holding cross-infringing patents may put up entry barriers for new entrants and thereby dis-incentivize innovation. Due to all of these reasons, the paper argues for patent law reform and appropriate application of antitrust analysis to ensure that the IP system encourages innovation.[15]

Essential Facilities Doctrine

This section of the note looks at the literature surrounding the Essential Facilities Doctrine- an aspect of antitrust law that is employed in order to adjudge behavior as anticompetitive or the lack thereof.

Essential facilities doctrine is an aspect of antitrust law that imposes a duty upon firms that have patents/ copyrights or trade secrets with regard to an essential facility to ensure that they do not put in place a monopoly and make the facility available to their rivals. In the context of IPRs, an essential facilities doctrine functions in a way that is equivalent to compulsory licensing regimes. Different jurisdictions adopt different standards and approaches to the employment of this doctrine. By tracking the literature around this doctrine, these different approaches across jurisdictions will be studied, including landmark cases, and submissions made in the research paper on whether this doctrine may be employed in India - specifically to adjudge whether there was a case to be made out for anti -competitive behavior in the smartphone wars on standard essential patents.

MCI Communications Corporation v. AT&T[16] is the landmark case with regard to the essential facilities doctrine, in this case MCI argued that AT&T's switching equipment was an essential facility and access to such an essential facility was necessary to conduct telemarketing business. The court in this case laid down the necessary elements to establish a claim to essential facilities:

a) Control of an essential facility by a monopolist

b) Competitors inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility

c) The denial of the use of the facility to a competitor and

d) The feasibility of providing the facility.[17]

Richard Gilbert and Carl Shapiro have argued that a unilateral refusal to deal (which is often one of the conditions that needs to be met before the essential facilities doctrine is employed) can be justified in the context of profit-maximizing firms in certain cases such as: cases where the owner of the facility wants to ensure a certain level of service quality with his facility, cases where the owner wants to prevent free riding, prevent new entrants into the market, cases where the owner wants to promote price discrimination in the sale of the final product, and cases where the owner is not adequately compensated for licensing out his essential facility. These justifications it is argued increase economic efficiency in the market, ensure quality of services rendered, increase incentives for investment and innovation etc. It is further argued that in the long run, it is more economically efficient for companies to refuse to deal rather than to set higher prices, simply because in a system where one cannot refuse to deal, the incentive for firms to misrepresent their actual costs to obtain licenses etc., and further that an obligation to license can have negative effects on economic welfare, it can reduce welfare in the short run by forcing inefficient licensing, it can also reduce welfare in the long run by reducing incentives for innovation and investment and creation of intellectual property.[18]

Robert Pitofsky, Donna Patterson and Jonathan Hooks on the other hand have argued in support of the essential facilities doctrine and supported the use of this doctrine in cases concerning intellectual property rights, the authors here argued that the harshness of the anticompetitive effects of denial of access take precedence over business justifications, especially when specific animus to injure a rival has been proven. The authors argued that while it was important to ensure that the doctrine was not expanded to include a vague and amorphous set of rights, it was important to ensure that the monopolists arguments against the doctrine should not succeed regardless of the nature of the essential facility, whether it is intellectual property or even if the case did not involve vertically related markets.[19]

Paul Maquardt and Mark Leddy in their response to Pitofsky, Patterson and Hooks argued that it is not anticompetitive behavior if the normal enforcement of an intellectual property right results in market power is getting skewed in favor of the rights holder, and the intellectual property rights should not be limited by compulsory licensing. They have argued that the essential facilities doctrine should only apply in cases where the rights holder attempts to leverage his exclusionary rights from the market in which the innovation competes into a related market or in cases of abuse of those rights because in cases where the rival is competing directly with the facility incorporating the intellectual property protection, the rights holder would not be damaging incentives to innovate as he would in cases of abuse or in cases of leveraging the protection to attain profits in a related field. They argue that to force compulsory licensing in other cases where the rival is in direct competition to the right holder would harm incentives to innovate and create intellectual property, a goal that both intellectual property rights and anti-trust laws are supposed to achieve. [20]

Martin Cave and Peter Crowther have argued that the European Commission seems to have embraced the essential facilities doctrine quite well despite not properly codifying the criteria used to determine whether a facility is essential and access to this facility should be mandatory. They have found that in the U.S., a) the courts have decided the question of whether or not a facility is "essential" on the basis of whether new entrants to the field would be able to duplicate the facility as evidenced by the cases of MCI Communications Corporation v. AT&T[21] and Hecht v. Pro Football Inc It is as yet undecided at what point a refusal to deal in a facility will render the rival without an alternative option. In Camco Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg.[22]it was decided that a facility was essential insofar as alternatives were inferior. There is no requirement of a duplication of the facility to be impossible as evidenced from Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States[23] . They have also found that as per Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. [24], there is no general duty to deal on the monopolists. They have also found that liability under the essential facilities doctrine can be found in the presence of the following conditions: a) control of an essential facility by a monopolist, b) a competitor's inability to duplicate the facility, c) the denial of the use of the facility to the rival, and d) the feasibility of providing the facility

Under analysis of the law in Australia, they found that section 46 of the Trade Practices Act, 1974 proscribes taking advantage of a substantial degree of market power for the purpose of a) eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor, b) preventing the entry of a person into a market or c) deterring or preventing a person from engaging in competitive conduct in a market. They found two important cases in Australian law, Queensland Wire, the first Australian case to consider adopting the US essential facilities doctrine which ruled that the monopolistic firm couldn't refuse to sell facilities to the smaller firm if had been subject to competition in the supply of that product while not actually mentioning the essential facilities doctrine, the second case of importance would be Pont Data litigation where Pont Data wanted to supply stock exchange information which the Australian Stock Exchange had a monopoly on, the court on appeal held that ASX should be ordered to supply information but "on terms designed to obtain a broad and substantial justice between parties"

They have further argued that there is even less certainty in respect of the price at which access to an essential facility should be made available. This is evidenced by their study of the laws in New Zealand. They found that in New Zealand the landmark judgment to study would be the Privy Council judgment in Clear Telecommunications Ltd v. Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd. This case arose out of a dispute between the state owned telecom which monopolized the public telecommunication system and Clear a new entrant into the market after Telecomwas privatized. The dispute mainly concerned about the price which Clear should pay Telecom for providing access to the Telecom network, while Clear argued that it should only be required to pay Telecom for the direct costs of providing access, Telecom held that Clear should pay the equivalent of profits which telecom would lose by granting access- the opportunity costs. The Privy Council agreed with Telecom in that insofar as Clear had not proved that it would be forced to pay monopoly prices because it was paying opportunity costs, it had not been proved that there were any entry barriers to the market.

In their analysis of the European Union, these authors found that Article 86 prohibits the abuse of the dominant position within a common market by under takings that consist in particular of a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or unfair trading conditions, b) limiting production markets… to the prejudice of consumers, c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions. The European Court of Justice has already decided that dominance can be assessed by a reference to the dependence of the consumer on the supplier inCommercial Solvents v. Commission. [25] And in Hugin v. Commission[26] The court first mentioned essential facilities in the United Brands case[27] where the ECJ held that the charging of discriminatory prices against and the refusal to supply a longstanding customer and distributor who had taken part in a sales campaign on behalf of a competitor had infringe article 86. Therefore if a firm acts in such a way that it could possibly affect rivals by precluding access to an essential facility, it would be an abuse of intellectual property.[28]

Albertina Albors-Llorens has reported on the recent judgment of the ECJ in Oscar Bronner CmbH and Co. KG v.Mediaprint Zeitungs -und Zeitschriftenverlag CmbH & Co. KG and others[29], the ECJ in this case has defined "essential facilities" as a "facility or infrastructure without access to which competitors cannot provide services to their customers"[30] under the doctrine, any dominant undertaking that owns or controls an essential facility and refuses without an objective justification [31] to make the facility available to its competitors or makes it available under discriminatory terms abuses its position of dominance. The court here distinguished the case from earlier case law including the case of Commercial Solvents and from the Magill case[32] where the court held that copyright holders who published guides of television programmes for their channels refused to license an independent company which wanted to publish a comprehensive television program guide had based their position of dominance and prevented a the emergence of a new beneficial product to the consumer and therefore it was not objectively justified and that it was otherwise impossible for Magill to obtain the information that was essential to carry on its business. She reports that the court in Bronner held that this case was distinguished from the precedent as there were less advantageous methods of distribution available and it wasn't impossible forBronner to set up their own home delivery system.[33]

Gregory Gundlach and Paul Bloom have analyzed the history of the essential facilities doctrine and cases refusals to deal , they have noted the refusal by Microsoft to deal with firms seeking to provide compatible software products and share its knowledge of its key operating systems for IBM compatible computers and its investigation by the Federal Trace Comission (FTC). They trace back the essential facilities doctrine from the case of United States v. Grinnel Corporation[34] which held that monopolization necessarily had to include the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and the acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of superior product, business acumen or historic accident. Preventing a rival from accessing an essential facility was held to be evidence suggestive of intent to monopolize and a challenge to the Sherman Act. They argue that this doctrine presents a challenge to marketers as they now have to ensure that they don't compete themselves into antitrust challenges, ensure that rivals don't attempt to free ride on their research and investment, they argue that while forcing firms to enable their rivals to access their essential facilities is at odds with the idea of competitive behavior, prudent application of this doctrine may ensure that welfare is substantially enhance and innovation is encouraged. They propose that the duty to deal be imposed only when commercial viability of the rival is at stake as a measure of protecting the rights of the firms. They also propose that new modes of competition such as strategic alliances, long term partnership be kept in mind before when forming future policy development in the area. [35]

Spencer Weber Waller and William Tasch have compared the law in the US with the law in the European Union and several other countries, and argue that there is a growing international consensus that it is sometimes appropriate to require a regime of nondiscriminatory access to infrastructure and related facilities. They have pointed out that common law countries and civil law countries have responded to the issue in different ways, for example, Germany has dealt with the issue by passing the German Act Against Restraints that contains provisions regarding abuse of dominant position in refusal to allow other undertakings access to essential facilities without proper justification. South Africa, they note has adopted a two pronged approach to unilateral refusal to deals, one through the South African Competition act that prohibits refusals to deal and another through the same legislation that prohibits refusal to supply scarce goods to a competitor when supplying those goods is economically feasible. They argue that since the essential facilities doctrine has become an accepted law in most competition jurisdictions, the US must work to harmonize their laws with the rest of the world to ensure better trade practices. [36]

Daniel E Troy has argued that post the Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc. case, jurisprudence in competition law shifted from intent to the actions of the monopolists. He argues that there are no clear rules regarding when the essential facilities doctrine should be invoked or a consensus as to what the doctrine requires once invoked. He proposes that the resulting confusion be resolved by ensuring that the essential facilities doctrine cover all arbitrary refusals to deal when such a refusal threatens the commercial viability of the rival party, or when access to the facility is necessary for entry into the market or when duplication of the facility exceeds the standard cost of entry.[37]

Howard Shelanski has argued that unilateral refusal to deal must be susceptible to antitrust scrutiny, he argues that neither economics not IP policy considerations provide a sound basis for exempting refusals to supply IP from antitrust laws on unilateral refusals to deal. He argues that while there may be a case for treating IPRs different on some occasion that should be based on logical links between IP and the considerations that weigh against antitrust mandates to deal in any property: deterrence of innovation, investment or precompetitive conduct.[38]

Royalty Stacking in Smartphone Industry

Ann Armstrong, Joseph J Mueller and Timothy D Syrett[39] have collected and analysed data on the royalty burdens to be faced by a standard smartphone supplier and the adverse effects royalty stacking might have on competition in the smart phone industry. It is an article rich in detail and carefully explains the costs of each of the components that make up a smartphone, in doing so they also trace the mobile phone Standard Essential Patents (SEP) litigation occurring in United States of America (USA). They conclude that royalties demands on a smartphone could exceed the cost of the devices components, and that due to royalty stacking, costs of patent royalties act as an entry barrier for many suppliers thereby limiting competition in the market. They have argued that in calculating the royalty for a component, licensees, advocates and courts should base their conclusions on the price of the component and not on percentage of sales price of the entire smartphone which is the current practice. They have argued that this valuation is even more important for standardized technologies because patent holders usually only have a small slice of the declared patents for a particular standard and where that standard is just one of the many supported by the device. They present data to prove that when royalties are so vigorously calculated, they turn out to be a fraction of what patent-holders claim. This article was used mostly for background information on how royalty stacks work and how FRAND prices must ideally be calculated, and as a source of information on litigation surrounding royalty stacking in USA.

Damien Geradin in his articles[40] on pricing abuses by SEP holders in SSOs in EU and USA documents the evolution of competition law in these courts and the work of the Federal Trade Commission in this regard. He examines the role of the FTC in quite some detail, and this article provided important background information on the question of the potential role of the CCI.

Bouthenia Guermazi and David Satola[41] have argued that in creating a right enabling environment for the ICT, one of the goals of regulation is to create a stable, open and future-proof environment that encourages access and doesn't limit it.

Tracing Mobile Phone SEP Litifation:Treatment by European Commission and Federal Trade Commission

Damien Geradin and Miguel Rato[42] have inquired into the question of whether SSOs provide for an environment of exploitation and abuse due to royalty stacking, weak enforcement of FRAND terms, and hold-ups. They have identified three criteria for the establishment/adoption of an industry standard - first, that it is a set of technical specifications; second, that these technical specifications provide a common design; and third, that the common design provided may be for a product or a process. These criteria have been used in the paper.

Michael A Carrier in his article[43] focuses on the smartphone industry and the ongoing patent and FRAND licensing litigation wars. He traces court rulings on holdups and injunctions granted on SEPs and discusses EC investigations into Motorola and Samsung in detail. This article was useful in that it provided for a good resource on recent judgments surrounding FRAND Licensing and SEP litigations focusing on the smartphone industry.

Mark A Lemley and Carl Shapiro[44] in their article demonstrate that even a threat to obtain a permanent injunction enhances the patent holders negotiating power, leading to royalty rates that exceed a natural benchmark based on the value of the patented technology and the strength of the patent. They argue that such overcharging occurs more noticeably in the case of weak patents covering a minor feature of the product with a sizeable price/cost margin. They present data to show that these holdup problems are reduced if courts regularly grant stays to permanent injunctions. , that they are magnified in the presence of royalty stacking, and that royalty stacking can become a huge problem especially in a standard setting context. This article was useful in understanding the holdup issues with regard to SEPs and the effect of royalty stacking.

Lemley and Shapiro in another article[45] have argued that one method of efficiently settling FRAND disputes would be to impose an obligation on the SEP owner to entire into a binding final offer decided in arbitration with any willing licensee to determine the royalty rate. This article provided important insights into the holdup problem and possible solutions that could be considered.

Phillipe Baechtold in his presentation[46] makes the argument that the central problem with the approach to solving the issue of ensuring Standard Setting organisations achieve interoperability and allow for licensing on FRAND terms is that a problem with patent laws is being solved in a manner that focuses other legal systems such as competition law, health law etc. He argues that there is a need to address these issues within the patent system itself. This article has been used to understand different solutions to the issue that have been proposed so far.

Richard Schmalensee[47] in his article argues that competition policy should not favour patent holders who would use their patents to stop innovation and that SSOs should determine standards based on lower post-standard royalty rates. The claim of interest in his article is that in the absence of a deceptive act, it would be difficult to prove in a case that a differing standard could have been adopted had there been a full disclosure of patent.

Gertjan Kuipers[48] has provided a useful resource on the Apple v Samsung cases in Netherlands and this has been useful to understand non-disclosure of patents as an anti-competitive practice within SSOs. Leon Greenfields article that surveys non-US decisions on SEP disputes also makes for a useful resource in the same regard. [49]

In their article, Damien Neven and Miguel de la Mano[50] discuss the activities of the Directorate General for Competition at the European Commission during the course of one year and discuss cases and policy developments during that time. It served as a useful resource on cases relating to violation of FRAND Commitments and in understanding the functioning of SSOs.

Bjorn Lundgvist[51] has analysed EU and US antitrust/competition law, and argued that Orange Book Standard case where it was held that abuse of dominant position is a valid claim if a patentee refuses to conclude a license agreement on non discriminatory and non-restrictive terms, is problematic as the potential licensee only has the option of paying the customary royalty rate or accepting the rate that the patentee offers by applying "reasonable excercised discretion" and that this doesn't give much leeway for licensees to question the validity of the rate.

James Abell[52] documents cases in the US federal courts regarding standards development organisations, antitrust law and fraud his analysis of the Broadcom Corp v. Qualcomm Inc., was particularly well done and proved to be useful in tracing SEP litigation in the US. Koren W Wong Ervin [53] in her important article traces SEP litigation across the world in various countries. This makes for an important resource on the subject as it serves as a primer on SEP litigation in many jurisdictions including China, Japan, India, EU and the US among others.

Mobile Phone SEP Litigation in India

Ravikant Bharadwaj in his article[54] provides a broad overview of standard setting in India and the competition and IPR issues associated with it. He makes the important argument that once an industry standard has been set, and since the goal is to ensure inter-operability, denial of access to these standards on FRAND terms could become barriers to trade.

Anubha Sinha[55] in her report on Spicy IP traces the Ericsson- Micromax dispute at the Competition Commission of India (CCI), this has been used as a background document to trace the timeline in the dispute while tracing mobile phone SEP litigation in India.

Prashanth Reddy in his article [56] argues against interim injunctions stating that these injunctions should be used as an exception and not as a matter of a rule. He argues that in many cases courts either don't provide reasoning or provide insufficient reasoning behind orders granting injunctions. He argues that protection of IPRs cannot be a convincing reason on its own in this context particularly because patent infringement cases are complicated and can only be decided after a full trial and appreciation of evidence. In this context, he argues that issuing interim injunctions as a matter of course is a harmful practice that must be done away with.Vaibav Choukse makes a very similar argument in his article as well.[57]

John E Matheson in his article[58] seeks to understand how standards must be developed and what best practices can be followed by India in forming its IPR policy. He specifically argues that the litigation costs that invariably occur during hold ups and reverse hold ups ensure that smaller companies and newer start-ups ultimately give in to patentees who enjoy more market power and can bear the litigation costs for as long as it takes.

Pankaj Soni and Satyoki Koundinya in their article[59] outline the questions at the heart of the mobile phone FRAND disputes and focus on the disputes in India including Ericsson-Micromax, Intex, Vringo and Asus and ZTE disputes providing a fairly comprehensive timelines of the same. They argue that the threat of injunctions often bring licensees to the discussion table which otherwise would not have happened and that disallowing this would disincentivise patentees from disclosing their patents. This article makes important arguments in terms of what would incentivize pro-competitive behavior and how policy surrounding holdups could influence anti-competitive behavior.

Abuse of Dominance and Competition Law and Policy in India

The Competition Commission of India Guide to Abuse of Dominance[60] lays out in clear simple terms what constitutes abuse of dominance under competition law in India, while it does not refer to case law on the matter, it does make for a great source for interpreting and understanding Indian competition law and was used for the same purposes.

Samir Gandhi[61] in his article analyses trends in enforcement of competition law in India. He provides data to prove that the CCIs decisions seem to want to establish a greater familiarity with complex tools of assessments like including economic measures etc. He argues that the CCI is eager to make up for lost time and therefore doesn't shy away from issuing judgments quickly and imposing severe penalties. This is useful in understanding whether or not the CCI is the appropriate and competent authority to deal with cases that are likely to come up involving the smartphone industry.

Pratibha Jain and others[62] conduct a fascinating study of how competition law is enforced in the country, in a fairly comprehensive report with individual case studies. They demonstrate quite clearly that the CCI refrains from laying down broad principles and restricts its rulings to the facts of a particular case. It also provides important data on how many cases are dismissed and in how many cases the CCI has found anti-competitive behavior. This data helps understand how effective or otherwise the CCI has been.

Archana Shanker and Shraddha Singh[63] in their article have argued that competition law and IP must both be used in a harmonious manner. In doing so they have analyzed relevant legislation and important cases such as Micromax and Intex, They have analysed how capable the CCI or courts in India are when it comes to determining FRAND terms in the context of SSOs and SEPs. They argue that the CCI has shown a lack of understanding of the IP aspects in these cases and have focused on competition law to their exclusion. While this is a well written and informative article on mobile phone SEP litigation in India, it is important to point out that the article does not deal with how courts in India have failed to appreciate concerns regarding hold-ups while issuing stays or ex-parte orders.

Kanika Chaudhary[64] has written about jurisdictional issues that the CCI might face due to the wording of the Competition Act that states that the act is applicable to anti-competitive behavior notwithstanding other laws and yet another section stating that competition law must be harmonized with existing laws. She argues that there is a need to restructure competition law in this regard to avoid conflicts.

The CUTS International report on the CCI[65] provides for an important resource on comments about the CCI and its judgments and media reactions to the CCI. The report submits that while the CCI is generally seen to be doing well in the media, several academics have argued that the CCI is riddled by legal lacunae, that it lacks teeth and that because most of its orders have been appealed in courts, and it lacks autonomy due to rules of procedure, it is not an effective or efficient forum and needs to be improved by further legislation. The same has been corroborated by a report in the Indian Express that speaks of new bills that were in the offing in 2012 that were aimed at giving the CCI more teeth. [66]

Peter Alexiadis[67] in his outlines general principles of ex post and ex ante intervention and how the two disciplines come into tension with each other when competition law is involved in a dispute along with any other legal regime such as IPR laws. He explores ways in which these two disciplines must be balanced. This article was used to understand how the ex-post decisions involving competition law inevitably are backward looking and adopt a narrow view of the product, looking largely at its demand side-substitutability. This helps explore the argument that a sector specific regulatory body could better address complex technical and economic questions specific to the industry, as opposed to litigation merely being played out in the courts.

George Cary and Mark W Nelson[68] have delved into the question of the role of antitrust in policing abuse by patent holders with royalty stacks in standard setting organisations. They have argued that it is important for a legal tool to police this abuse because while other areas of law may prove capable of addressing these issues, these disputes are, at their core antitrust disputes. And only antitrust law can ensure that private parties and government enforcement authorities can seek redress where there is harm to competition.

Suzanne Michael in her article[69] argues that SEP holders who have their patent incorporated as a standard stand to gain by increasing royalty rates beyond RAND terms and beyond their actual economic value as they hold a monopoly simply because they own the standard. She argues that this will harm consumer interest and slow innovation. She further argues that an ex-ante approach should therefore be taken in ordering remedies in these cases to protect consumer interest. She also looks into the question of holdups and injunctions in cases involving RAND commitment. But her argument about ex ante remedies in RAND cases is an interesting point relevant to the paper.

Anne Layne-Farrar, A Jorge Padilla and Richard Schmalensee[70] in their article delve into the question of what exactly would constitute FRAND terms in the context of licensing terms for essential IP in a standards setting organization. They have also analyzed the Georgia-Pacific guidelines and extending it to a standard setting organization and the numeric proportionality method proposed by courts in EU. They conclude that the Georgia-Pacific guidelines might work in FRAND disputes, that while this would leave FRAND basically undefined, it would be made an enforceable promise with an SSO and that these guidelines would provide sufficient direction and predictability in litigation. This article has been used to understand what kind of guidelines a regulatory body could be expected to codify for patent remedies in India.

Rahul Singh in his article[71] analyses how due to its nature, the CCI is not sector specific and is supposed to look at "anti-competitive behavior" in all sectors most of whom already have their own sector specific regulator. He argues that unlike sector specific regulators, the CCI can privately enforce orders and pursue claims for damages and that this makes the CCI better situated to deal with consumer welfare areas. He further argues that to reduce transaction costs, enhance legal certainty and predictability, enforcement of such disputes must be left in the hands of the CCI. This argument has been extended to argue that courts enforcing IPRs would be less suited to handle these matters and more likely to cause inefficiencies and unpredictability and a re-imagined, empowered CCI would be the best suited judge of these issues.

K.D.Raju in his article[72] analyses broadly the connection between IP laws and competition law in India. He argues that while the jurisprudence behind IPR and competition law has traditionally been viewed as incompatible with each other, in effect, they seek to further the same goals. He argues that the competition laws as they exist in India currently cannot effectively deal with the nexus with IPR and suggests that the CCI come out with IPR specific guidelines to deal with upcoming litigation in the area.

Apoorva and Shreeja Sen[73] in their report trace the stay orders in courts across India holding up CCI investigations and how this is symptomatic of the fact that courts do not understand concerns regarding hold-ups and reverse hold-ups in IP related cases where time is of the essence.

Karthik Jayakumar[74] has written about the Bhatia International case regarding arbitration, we use this to merely draw parallels with IPR laws in that just as in Bhatia the court held that arbitrations having their seat outside India were still within the jurisdiction of Indian courts and this was overruled in the BALCO case , the role of the CCI also has to be made clear through legislative reform or judicial pronouncement for the regulator to address questions of competition law across different sectors without a threat of stay orders from courts.

Nick Robinson in his article[75] speaks of good governance courts, and of how courts in India have used good governance and right to life to become essentially second governments regulating everything from encouraging the use of natural gas to regulated encroachment on preservation of public forests to guidelines for school safety at the expense of government and independent regulators. While Nick Robinson makes a larger argument about good governance courts, it is used only for the limited purpose of supporting the argument made in the paper about judicial interventions allowing for anti-competitive behavior.

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[7] 371 U.S. 38 (1962)

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[9] 466 U.S. 2 (1984).

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[17] Id.

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[22] 436 U.S. 585 (1985)

[23] 194, F. 2d, 484,487 (1st Cir), cert. denied, 344, U.S. 817 (1952

[24] 326 U.S. 1 (1945).

[25] 472, U.S. 585.

[26] Ref. Case 6 and 7/1973, Commercial Solvents v. Commission 1974 ECR 223.

[27] Case 22/1978 (1979), ECR, 1869.

[28] Ref. C. 27/1976, United Brands v. Commission (1978) , ECR 207.

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[31] B&I Line plc. V. Sealink harbors Ltd, a Commission of 11 June 1992, (1992), C.M.L.R 255 at paragraph 4.

[32] Objective justifications such as shortage of the product were accepted in Case77/77 Benezine en Petroleum Handlesmaatschappij BV v. British Petroleum (1978) ECR 1513

[33] Case T-69/89 Radio Telefis Eireaan v. Commission (1991) ECR II-485 on appeal Cases C-241P and 242/91P RTE and ITP v. Commission (1995) ECR I-743.

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[35] 1966, p. 570-71

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[57] Vaibhav Choukse, The Debate on Essentials, BUSINESS LINE, (March 29, 2015).

[58] John E Matheson, Patents and Standards, FRAND Challenges for India's ICT Sector, SpicyIP Discussion paper series, Paper no. 201401, 2014, available at: http://spicyip.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/FRAND-Challenges-for-Indias-ICT-Sector.pdf (last accessed 21 May, 2015) at 7

[59] Pankaj Soni and Satyoki Koundinya, Taking the FRANDLY Approach, a First Look at FRAND Battles in India, Remfry and Sagar, available at http://www.iam-media.com/Intelligence/IAM-Yearbook/2015/Country-by-country/Taking-the-FRAND-ly-approach-a-first-look-at-FRAND-battles-in-India (last accessed 21 May, 2015).

[60] Competition Commission of India, Guide to Abuse of Dominance, available at http://www.cci.gov.in/images/media/Advocacy/Awareness/Abuse_Dominance.pdf (last accessed 21 May, 2015).

[61] Samir Gandhi et al., Enforcement Trends in India under Competition Act 2002, Practical Law, 1 June 2013, available at http://uk.practicallaw.com/2-532-3777?q=&qp=&qo=&qe=#a456237 (last accessed 11 May, 2015).

[62] Pratibha Jain et.al., Competition Law in India, A Report on Jurisprudential Trends, Nishit Desai and Associates, available at http://www.nishithdesai.com/fileadmin/user_upload/pdfs/Research%20Papers/Competition_Law_in_India.pdf

[63] Archana Shanker and Shraddha Singh Chauhan, How to use Patent and Competition Law Effectively in Tandem, 1 September 2014, Managingip, available at http://www.managingip.com/Article/3382427/How-to-use-patent-and-competition-law-effectively-in-tandem.html (last accessed 20 May, 2015).

[64] Kanika Chaudhary Nayar, India: Jurisdiction of the CCI: Navigating Through Muddy Waters, 28 April 2015, Mondaq, Available at: http://www.mondaq.com/india/x/392738/Antitrust+Competition/Jurisdiction+Of+The+CCI+Navigating+Through+Muddy+Waters

[65] CUTS International, Competition Commission of India Through the Eyes of the Media: Doing Well!, 17 September 2012, available at http://www.cuts-ccier.org/pdf/Competition_Commission_of_India_through_the_eyes_of_the_media-Doing_well.pdf (last accessed 13 May, 2015) at 13.

[66] Bureau, Bill Aimed at Giving CCI More Teeth Tabled, Indian Express, 11 December 2012, Available at: http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/bill-aimed-at-giving-cci-more-teeth-tabled/1043320/

[67] Peter Alexiadis, Balancing the application of ex post and ex ante disciplines under community law in electronic communications markets: square pegs in round holes? RIGHTS AND REMEDIES IN A LIBERALISED AND COMPETITIVE INTERNAL MARKET (2012).

[68] George S Cary, Mark W Nelson et al, the case for Antitrust law to police the patent holdup problem in standard setting, 77(3) ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 913-945 (2011).

[69] Suzanne Michel, Bargaining for RAND Royalties in the Shadow of Patent Remedies Law, 77(3) ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 889-911 (2011).

[70] Anne Layne-Farrar, A Jorge Padilla and Richard Schmalensee, Pricing Patents for Licensing in Standard-Setting Organisations: Making Sense of FRAND Commitments, 74(3) ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 671-706 (2007).

[71] Rahul Singh, The Teeter Totter of Regulation and Competition: Balancing the Indian Competition Commission with Sectoral Regulators, Washungton University Global Studies Law Review, Vol.8, Issue 1, January 2009 at 97-102.

[72] K D Raju, The Inevitable Connection Between Intellectual Property and Competition Law: Emerging Jurisprudence and Lessons for India, Journal of Intellectual Property Rights, Vol.18, No.2, 2013, at 111-122.

[73] Apoorva, Shreeja Sen, Multiple Court Stays Hold UP CCI Investigations, Livemint, 28 November 2014, available at http://www.livemint.com/Politics/5Lm7tjIuogbBsm6qRb4exH/Multiple-court-stays-hold-up-CCI-investigations.html (last accessed 23 May, 2015).

[74] Karthik Jayakumar, Bhatia v. Balco, Who Should Stand?, 18 August 2013, available at http://blog.athirtyeight.com/2013/08/bhatia-v-balco-who-should-stand.html (last accessed 22 May, 2015).

[75] Nick Robinson, Expanding Judiciaries: India and the Rise of the Good Governance Court, Washington University Global Studies Law Review, Vol.8, Issue 1, January 2009 at 21.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/pervasive-technologies-project-working-document-series-document-2-literature-review-on-competition-law-ipr-access-to-100-mobile-devices-1

PERVASIVE TECHNOLOGIES PROJECT WORKING DOCUMENT SERIES: DOCUMENT 1 - RESEARCH METHODOLOGY FOR A PAPER ON COMPETITION LAW + IPR + ACCESS TO < $100 MOBILE DEVICES

nehaa — 2015-10-04T02:51:06Z

This blog post is the research methodology for my research paper under the Pervasive Technologies Project. This is a work in progress and is likely to be modified from time to time.

See a subsequent version titled Pervasive Technologies: Working Document Series - Research Questions and a Literature Review on the Actor-Network Theory

Preliminary

The realization of the promise of the sub hundred dollar mobile device as a facilitator of access to knowledge is contingent inter alia on its availability in the market place. In turn, the market availability of the sub hundred dollar mobile device is influenced by the existence of an enabling environment for producers to produce, and consumers to consume. From a regulatory perspective, the enabling environment itself is a function of existing laws and policies, and the 'developmental effects' of certain laws and policies (Saraswati, 2012).

This research paper under the Pervasive Technologies: Access to Knowledge in the Market Place Project ("PT Project") examines one such legal and policy lever and the role of a regulator in the development of an enabling environment for access to sub hundred dollar mobile devices. This paper is founded on four assumptions: first, that access to sub hundred dollar mobile devices is influenced by their price; second, that the question of access necessitates conversation between the intellectual property regime and several other actors, sites and tools; third, that one of the fundamental goals of regulatory reform is the creation of a 'stable, open and future- proof environment' (Guermazi and Satola, 2005) that encourages access to these devices; and fourth, that there exist public law implications of intellectual property that justify the involvement of State actors and regulators in matters that may arise out of private transactions.

Research Questions

This research paper will examine whether there is a role to be played by one regulator, that is, the Competition Commission of India (“CCI”), in this narrative of innovation, intellectual property and access to sub hundred dollar mobile devices. Specifically, the following research questions will be addressed:

First, what is the relationship between intellectual property and competition law? Second, what are the competition law/antitrust concerns that arise around the licensing of intellectual property (standard essential patents)? Third, can existing mechanisms in competition law address concerns around the licensing of standard essential patents on sub hundred dollar devices, and is competition law a viable solution to address this issue? If so, which ones? Fourth, given the frequency of these litigations, is there a role to be played by an ex-post regulator, such as the CCI, or is there a need for ex-ante regulation?

Research Objects

In an attempt to address these research questions, this paper will examine the role of the Competition Commission of India and the Indian Judiciary. This paper will also examine the role of similarly placed institutions in the United States of America as well as some member states of the European Union.

This research paper will also examine select tools and sites sought to be used to create an enabling environment to facilitate access to these sub hundred dollar mobile devices: first, principles, legal frameworks and provisions of competition law/antitrust law; second, all relevant judicial decisions.

Research Method

First , this research paper will begin with establishing the case for the intervention of the regulator and/or the judiciary in the sub hundred dollar mobile device market by undertaking a review of primary and secondary literature [1]("literature"). Second, also through a literature review, the research will be contextualized to India in terms of the market, the actors involved and the legal framework. Third, a cross jurisdictional comparative legal search will be undertaken to understand the potential areas of intervention for the judiciary and the Competition Commission of India based on existing legal disputes in other jurisdictions; and the possible challenges that might ensue. Fourth, in a scenario building exercise, an attempt will be made to outline the role that the judiciary and the regulator might play in India, in order to ensure access to sub hundred dollar mobile devices is not impeded by litigation around standard essential patents.

Generally, in the writing of this paper, inputs will be sought from experts including MHRD Chair Professors, legal practitioners in India, academics in India and abroad and members of relevant departments of the Indian Government.

Research Communication

This research will be communicated through a series of blog posts- one every month from December, 2014 to December, 2015. A preliminary draft of a research paper will be produced by December, 2015, tentatively to be presented at the 4th Global Congress on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest, New Delhi. The final output will be a research paper.

References

Bouthenia Guermazi and David Satola, Creating the "Right" Enabling Environment for ICT, in Robert Schware (ed.), E-development: From Excitement to Effectiveness (2005, World Bank Publications).
Jyoti Saraswati, Dot. Compradors- Power and Policy in the Development of the Indian Software Industry (2012, Pluto Press)

[1] Unless otherwise specified, for the purposes of this document, primary and secondary literature includes academic articles and books, newspaper articles and opinion pieces, blog posts, case law and other legal provisions.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/methodology-sub-hundred-dollar-mobile-devices-and-competition-law

Pervasive Technologies Project Presentations at the 4th Global Congress, 2015

nehaa — 2016-01-21T16:33:41Z

These are the presentations made by the members of the PT Project team at the 4th Global Congress on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest, 2015 at National Law University, New Delhi.

Nehaa Chaudhari: The Curious Case of the CCI: Competition Law and SEP Regulation in India
Amba Uttara Kak and Maggie Huang: Rethinking Music Copyright Management in the Age of Digital Distribution: Business Models, Licensing Practices and Copyright Institutions in India
Rohini Lakshané: Patent Landscaping in the sub-$100 Mobile Device Market in India
Anubha Sinha: IP in Mobile Applications Development in India

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/pervasive-technologies-project-presentations-at-the-4th-global-congress-2015

Pervasive Technologies Project in Hong Kong

praskrishna — 2017-03-20T16:09:22Z

Digital Asia Hub and the United Nations University Institute on Computing and Society (UNU-CS) held a new networking initiative. Digital Asia Hub and the United Nations University Institute on Computing and Society co-hosted a series of events aimed at fostering engagement and knowledge sharing at the intersection of technology, society, law, policy and international development.

CIS shared its insights on the Pervasive Technologies project.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/news/pervasive-technologies-project-in-hong-kong

Pervasive Mobile Technologies: Meet Our Mobile Devices!

jdine — 2012-12-21T07:48:40Z

As a part of the Pervasive Technologies: Access to Knowledge in the Marketplace research project, the Centre for Internet & Society (CIS) is researching 12 mobile phone devices to generate a better understanding of the intellectual property (IP) implications of pervasive mobile technologies available in the Indian market. This post is an introduction to our 12 mobile phones.

As detailed in my introductory blog on Pervasive Technologies: Access to Knowledge in the Marketplace Research Initiative, CIS will be conducting research on mobile technologies as a small off-shoot of the overall project. Pervasive technologies that can be purchased for less than USD 100 play an integral role in bringing access to knowledge to those that routinely face barriers to the consumption of information. However, their legality, particularly in terms of their use of IP, is unclear. In order to better understand the legal environment in which these technologies exist, CIS purchased 12 mobile phones to study the patent implications of their hardware, software and content.

Through examination, research, interviews and consultancies, we hope to create an in-depth documentation of each device, an extensive database or account of the patents implicated, and a number of narrower research avenues on topics related to IP, patents, and mobile technologies.

This blog post will serve as a brief introduction to our mobile devices. The information that I have compiled was discovered through shallow interaction with the phones — turning a device on and exploring the interface and content — which is why the documentation is not particularly extensive at this point. I have had difficulty identifying certain features of some of the phones, like which media formats they support or whether or not they are EDGE[2] — enable, but I am confident that I will be able to ascertain these specifications in the near future; however, certain features, like what OS (operating system) they run on and what chip set they are using, will require collaboration with experts to identify. The exploration is on-going, and more information will be posted as it is discovered.

Aside from all of the usual functions of a mobile phone (making calls, receiving calls, saving numbers, etc.), each of our mobiles devices possess what I have termed the "basics": dual GSM SIM capabilities with dual standby, the ability to connect to 2G networks, GPRS, a WAP browser (except device 011), bluetooth capabilities, a microSD slot, a dual camera (a camera that takes still photos and records video), an FM radio receiver and the ability to play .mp3 audio files and .mp4 video files, record audio and view .jpg images. Each phone also has a handful of various "utilities" and "extras" applications (such as an alarm, a calculator, a calendar, etc.) as well as at least one game. The full specifications of each phone will be provided in the near future, along with further pictures of each device.

As much of the research in this project pertains to the IP implications of the devices, we have decided to withhold the make and model of each device to shield the producers from any negative repercussions that could be the result of our research inquiries. They have been assigned the numeric code names 001 to 012.

Without further ado, I'd like to introduce you to our mobile phones:

001 - The Classroom in a Box

Price: Rs. 6,300.00 / $113.00

KEY FEATURES

Pico-Projector
Analog TV Receiver
MS Office Document Viewer


This bar-design feature phone has all of the basics with a few added bonuses: an analog TV receiver, viewer, and a built-in pico-projector that projects the mobile's screen onto any surface. Though this phone does not technically fall into our definition of pervasive technologies because of its price, it was the first mobile phone with a built-in pico-projector as well as an analog TV receiver available on the Indian market for less than Rs. 10,000 when it was purchased more than a year ago. Since then, other sub-USD100 pico-projector mobile devices have made an appearance on the Indian market, but each of those devices appear to have been discontinued and 001 continues to be the cheapest pico-projector mobile phone available for purchase.

002 - The Supercharger

Price: Rs. 2,499.00 / $45.00

KEY FEATURES

Solar Panel
Hindi Keyboard

	002 is a sleek candybar feature phone with a particularly interesting innovation. While it uses a standard lithium-ion battery that can be recharged via connection to a wall socket or electrical device (such as a laptop), it also has a built-in solar panel that can generate some charge as well. The solar panel technology is not yet very efficient—the panel would have to be placed in direct sunlight for multiple hours to fully charge the battery—but it represents an important step towards untethering mobile phones and mobile phone users from costly electricity infrastructure, a development that would have significant implications for rural populations who have unreliable access to electricity.

003 - The Networker

Price: Rs. 1,250.00 / $22.00

KEY FEATURES

Wi-Fi
Optical Trackpad
Secondary Forward-facing Camera
Support for 8 Languages


With a boxy, QWERTY-keyboard design and relatively small screen, 003 does not appear, at first glance, to be anymore than an average feature phone — but appearances can be deceiving. With a highly responsive optical trackpad, an analog TV receiver, BlackBerry-esque interface and WiFi capabilities, this mobile device packs some sophisticated technologies and features. Further, it is the only phone in our collection that can connect to the internet using WLAN networks. Considering that some of the other devices are much more complex — and expensive — than 003, the wide-spread exclusion of WiFi capabilities in our collection is intriguing. Is the choice to include or exclude mobile technology a matter of economics? Are cellular WiFi components expensive, and producers are choosing to exclude WiFi as a method of cutting costs? Is it simply a response to patterns of consumer demand? The WiFi questions will be explored in more depth in up-coming blog posts.

004 - The Linguist

Price: Rs. 2,250.00 / $40.00

KEY FEATURES

Android-like OS
Support for 14 Languages
Secondary Forward-facing Camera
Large Number of Pre-loaded Apps


Though it may be hard to believe at first glance, this mobile device was purchased for less than Rs. 2500. With its large internal memory, support for 14 different languages (including Tamil, Bengali and Hindi), and its large array of pre-loaded games and social media applications already set it apart from the less sophisticated mobiles in our collection, 004 also runs on a mysterious Android-like operating system similar to the popular MIUI Android ROM developed by the Chinese-based company Xiaomi Tech. This give it a very sophisticated interface with the look and feel of a smartphone, though the device itself lacks many of the capabilities that are often considered as smartphone criteria (GPS, high-speed internet access, push/pull email, Wi-Fi, an app store, etc.). Because this device, and others like it in our collection, have more sophisticated hardware, software and content than a generic feature phone, but are not as capable as a smartphone, I have taken to calling these devices "semi-smart".

005 - TV on the Go

Price: Rs. 1,450.00 / $26.00

KEY FEATURES

Analog TV receiver
Arabic Keyboard
Secondary Forward-facing Camera


Though it doesn't have any particular innovation that sets it apart from the other devices, 005 is a hardy QWERTY-design feature phone with all of the basics as well as a good collection of social media applications and an analog TV receiver. Though its keyboard can be programmed to write in English, Tamil, Arabic and Hindi script, the buttons have the Arabic abjad on them, which brings up the question of which market this mobile was originally designed for.

006 - The Spy

Price: Rs. 1,680.00 / $30.00

KEY FEATURES:

Secondary “Spy” Camera
Ability to behave as a modem via USB connection

	006 is an interesting candy bar feature phone. On initial examination, this mobile appears to be a completely generic feature phones with all of the basics, but nothing auxiliary. However, a more careful inspection will reveal a secondary camera with an unusual placement — instead of being place at the top of the screen like all of the other secondary cameras found on our devices, this camera is situated on the right hand side of the phone.

The manufacturer of this device actually refers to this secondary camera as a "spy" camera, and it is truly an appropriate name; from a distance, it looks more like a headphone jack than a camera, and its placement allows for photo and video to be taken without any suspicious movement or positioning by the user. The secondary camera has 1.3 megapixels and can take relatively high resolution photos and videos.

007 - The Semi-Smartphone

Price: Rs. 2,150.00 / $39.00

KEY FEATURES

Android-like OS (maybe MIUI)
USB Tethering
Push Email


Device 007 is a semi-smart touchscreen phone, and by far the most sophisticated device in our collection. We believe that it uses MIUI OS, which gives it a very similar look to Android and a functionality that is reminiscent of iOSx. While it doesn't have an app store, 007 is jam-packed with pre-loaded applications and can support a wide variety of file formats. Further, while the phone cannot connect to WLAN networks on its own; it can connect to WiFi by tethering to a networked device via USB connection.

008 - The Trendy

Price: Rs. 2,350.00 / $42.00

KEY FEATURES

Android-like OS
Support for 9 languages


Another mainstream look-alike, 008 runs the same unidentified OS as device 004 and has similar capabilities. Its plastic casing is a bit flimsy, but its "back", "home" and "list" buttons are touch sensitive. Its sophisticated OS and pre-loaded applications make it a semi-smart device.

009 - The Boombox

Price: Rs. 1,420.00 / $26.00

KEY FEATURES

Huge built-in speaker
Android-like OS

	Though it is less recognizable than some of the other devices, this mobile may have one of the significant smartphone qualifiers that our other devices lack: an app store — or what appears to be an app store. The app store icon itself is actually the icon for the Android app store, but the interface is completely different, and the only thing available for download is a handful of games. Interestingly enough, many of these games also make appearances on some of the other mobile devices (like fishing joy and tear clothes). Further, I would not call this phone semi-smart, as its interface is not particularly any more sophisticated than some of the other feature phones in our collection.

009 also features a large built-in speaker, the Opera Mini mobile browser and an Android-like OS, though this OS is less sophisticated than that of 004 and 008.

010 - 3D

Price: Rs. 1,440.00 / $26.00

KEY FEATURES

Android-like OS
Pre-loaded Stereoscopic (3D) videos
Support for 13 languages


This semi-smart touchscreen phone also has an Android-like operating system. Though it lacks an app store and push-email, it comes pre-loaded with a veritable smorgasbord of games and social media applications and supports 13 different languages. It also comes with a pair of 3D glasses and two short, very basic pre-loaded stereoscopic videos.

011 - The Mighty Mini

Price: Rs. 750.00 / $14.00

KEY FEATURES

Dual GSM SIM support
Best bang-for-your-buck for a basic mobile phone


At Rs. 750, this little feature phone was the least expensive phone we could find that still had almost all of the basics. Even without any extra features, it is still almost Rs. 200 cheaper than the majority of the most basic GSM dual SIM mobiles available on the formal Indian market[3]— and, in most cases, 011 has more capabilities than most of those devices. With .mp3 and .mp4 file playback, a dual camera, colour display, a WAP browser, MMS messaging support, two charging ports and Urdu and Hindi language support, this mobile phone personifies affordable accessibility to knowledge and media.

012 - The Pianist

Price: Rs. 1,550.00 / $28.00

KEY FEATURES

Touch piano
Two charging ports
Support for a multitude of audio, video and image formats

	012 is a basic candy bar feature phone with a particularly novel innovation: a touch piano. It is quite sensitive to touch and has a one octave range.

013 - The Indian Experience

Price: Rs. 2,100.00 / $38.00

KEY FEATURES

India specific content
Proprietary App Store

	This little touchscreen mobile is chockfull of “Indian-specific” content, including an application that links directly to an online portal where consumers can download “Hungama” videos, music and movies onto the phone—for a price. Many of the games also charge a monthly user fee, though interestingly enough, Angry Birds and Talking Tom Cat are pre-loaded and free to play. This phone also has a proprietary app store with a limited amount of mBounce4] applications and games available for purchase. I am not yet sure if this app store can be remotely updated with new apps, but the device can receive data vis USB connection, so it is possible that new applications can be added through direct file transfer. It also has keyboard support for English, Hindi and Tamil, but the interface cannot be set it appear in anything other than English.

[2]. Enhanced Data rates for GSM Evolution, also known as Enchanced GPRS (EGPRS) is a mobile phone technology that also improved data transmission on GSM networks. It is considered a pre-3G radio technology. Read more about it here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enhanced_Data_Rates_for_GSM_Evolution
[3]. Information retrieved from www.flipkart.com. The prices shown here have been verified as being the same or very similar (though never more expensive) to the prices offered by each brand's official distributors. See Flipkart search links:

Mircomax: http://bit.ly/UW3q0U

Spice Mobility: http://bit.ly/V0DK9i

Karbonn: http://bit.ly/10DKKbz

Lava: http://bit.ly/TSxUzQ

[4] mBounce Ltd is a Hong Kong-based company that performs a variety of mobile phone application support services like proprietary in-house billing infrastructure for app stores, the pre-loading of applications and app stores, and application creation. They are MediaTek-nominated key partner in providing MRE (Maui Runtime Environment) App Store Solutions, but mBounce applications and software can also be placed on other mobile operating systems. You can read more about mBounce here: http://www.mbounce.com/?lang=eng&module=ltrbox&menu=m1&content=home and here: http://developer.mediatek.com/mre/en/partner/335

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/pervasive-mobile-technologies-meet-our-grey-market-devices

Patterns of Gender Aggression and Harassment in Open Tech and Open Culture Communities Online

rohini — 2015-06-01T02:13:14Z

Report on the talk delivered by me at Adacamp held in Montreal, Canada on April 13-14, 2015.

Link to the original blog post published on Wikimedia blog can be accessed here.

I received a grant from the Wikimedia Foundation to participate in Adacamp. While the talk was pegged on my experience of working on Wikipedia's Gender gap in India, the content is equally relevant for other, open online projects, especially those that value the anonymity of its users. The talk ended with a discussion on how to identify and combat these patterns. It was a collaborative talk delivered along with Gretchen McCulloch who spoke on Wikipedia's Gender gap and Fandom. Credits to session rapporteur and participant Maja Frydrychowicz.

Gender disparity among Wikipedia's editors is well-known and well-documented.[1] [2] A survey conducted by the Wikimedia Foundation in 2011 pegged the number of female contributors to the English-language Wikipedia at 9%.[3] Several outreach, advocacy, and capacity-building efforts have been made to bridge Wikipedia's glaring gender imbalance. In the openness domain, other projects and initiatives have been making similar efforts to bring more women into the fold. To cite an example, the Outreach Program for Women endeavours to recruit more female coders in the world of open source software.

While the narrative of few women being online has changed, more in some parts of the world than in others, the next barriers of making them stay online and establishing an active presence, remain. Wikipedia, like many other open communities, has a high drop-out rate of female contributors. Many female contributors maintain identities that do not give away their gender or practise self-censorship in order to continue to be a part of the community. Several studies conducted in the past few years have attributed the gender gap to numerous reasons -- women have less time left after fulfilling their tasks at home and work; antagonistic exchanges are emotionally draining; in households where there is only one Internet-enabled device, women have access to it for a shorter time; and so on. A blog post by Sue Gardner former executive director of the Wikimedia Foundation, pithily lays out why women don't edit Wikipedia.

One of the ways that outreach and advocacy can work towards retaining more contributors and enabling them to participate more fruitfully is by identifying patterns of aggression and harassment that are directed, subtly or otherwise, at them owing to their gender or sexual orientation.

What are some of the significant patterns that cause a contributor to censor themselves or leave, even if they have just joined?

Hostile environment, antagonistic exchanges: These word clouds[4][5] display name-calling experienced by female users on Wikipedia. Wikipedia's editorial model stands on building consensus and collaboration but the spirit of debate often gives way to slings and arrows, many of which would violate Wikipedia's policy of being civil to other contributors (WP:Civil) and one of the five pillars of the crowdsourced encyclopedia. Facing hostility can be emotionally draining, especially for a new contributor, and reason enough for them to avoid contributing to certain topics, to censor themselves, or to leave the platform. Verbal violence and use of language considered unacceptable as per the community rules, is one form of harassment/ violence that is relatively easy to spot and call out, and is not uncommon.
Mansplaining: is more insidious than outright hostile behaviour. The intent is not constructive criticism but to humiliate the recipient, make them feel that do not belong in the space, or drive them underground. It involves the use of what Wikipedia terms "weasel words", and dismissive and condescending speech. It is difficult to address because it is less perceptible, difficult to differentiate from advise or feedback given in good faith (WP: AssumeGoodFaith), and does not violate the guideline of not attacking newbies but explaining the matter to them (WP:DontBiteTheNewbies).
Deletionism: is the practice of reverting edits or deleting/ nominating for deletion entire pages, projects, or other content out of relatively strict adherence to policies. Deletionism is often difficult to tell apart from very strict adherence to standards. Policies are open to interpretation, and deletionists justify their position by applying certain policies and contexts that favour their stance. In the context of issues pertaining to gender or sexuality, a pattern to look out for is the same user, IP address, or an apparent sockpuppet reverting edits, making edits, and defending them in a way that makes the article less gender-sensitive and disproportionately skewed away or towards a certain gender or orientation.
Subtle Powerplay/ Microaggressions: find their way into discussion boards, mailing lists and other areas of debate and discussion. A study done by the Internet Democracy Project in India documents some of the remarks that leave women feeling they are unwelcome, that do not belong in the space, or that they are an 'imposter'. "People will not be outright abusive towards you, which is a lot I face in my job. When someone does not want you to be a part of their community, they will not abuse you because they get banned for it. They will goad and nudge you in ways to tell and make sure that you are not welcome. So they will ask you, 'Oh, so when did you learn JavaScript?' knowing that you don’t know JavaScript. Just to make you feel that only those who have learnt JavaScript have the right to be there [in the forum].”

One of the factors that inadvertently aids some of these patterns is the kind of sources that are considered reliable on Wikipedia (WP:RS). Newspapers, magazines, websites, books, and journals are considered acceptable references. These sources tend to reflect existing gender biases and structures of power. Studies conducted on the content published by newspapers, for example, have shown that news coverage about men is much higher than that about women.

As most of the attendees of the talk were not very well-acquainted with the intricacies of Wikipedia's Gender gap, I went on to explain some topics that were not explicitly related to the subject of the talk.

Initiatives to improve diversity and encourage new contributors on Wikipedia

Beginner-friendly groups such as The Tea House and the Welcoming Committee
Special Interest Groups (SIGs)
The Gender gap project
Edit-a-thons geared towards increasing gender-sensitive content on Wikipedia and correcting content with gender bias
Wikipedia tries to foster positive feedback through barnstars, Wikilove, and marking a good edit with a “thank you” or a heart icon.

How existing editors can work towards increasing diversity and encouraging new editors

Help get more women mentioned in references or citations in Wikipedia articles.
Add information about women in biographies (e.g. add the mother's name or female spouse's name in a biography article.)
One of the traits of communities that do have many women on them is that a lot of positive interaction happens in response to contributions.
Teachers can obtain support for getting students to edit Wikipedia as part of a class project.

Strategies to recruit more women editors (individuals who self-identify as women, transwomen, genderqueer, genderfluid)

Aim outreach efforts towards women who blog, or already have a presence online.
Persuade existing editors to encourage women in their family and social groups to start contributing. In the case of existing male editors, it works as the two-pronged strategy of sensitising men while empowering women.
Organise outreach events where the organisers and participants are all women/ individuals who largely self-identify as women.
Organise outreach events with gender-sensitive male editors.

Questions-Answers

What is needed to meet Wikipedia's notability criterion?

A: There are different requirements depending on the subject of the article: a book, a work of art, a public figure, an artist, a writer, and so on. There are stricter requirements for biography articles, especially those of living people. Being famous does not necessarily mean being notable in the Wikipedia context. Notability requirements end up being gendered; Wikipedia replicates the biases that are present in the offline world due to its reference structure (WP:RS)

There were several general questions from the attendees about editing Wikipedia, and about Wikipedia policies and best practices. These were answered by McCulloch and me in the last 15 to 20 minutes of the talk.

References

[1]. Define Gender Gap? Look Up Wikipedia's Contributor List, Naom Cohen, January 30, 2011.

[2]. WP:Clubhouse? An Exploration of Wikipedia's Gender Imbalance, Shyong (Tony) K. Lam, Anuradha Uduwage, Zhenhua Dong, Shilad Sen, David R.Musicant, Loren Terveen, John Riedl, 2011

[3]. Women and Wikimedia survey, 2011

[4]. Research: Communicating on Wikipedia while female

[5]. Women and Wikimedia survey, 2011, Name-calling on English Wikipedia

[6]. Women and Online Abuse, Internet Democracy Project, 2013

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/blog-old/patterns-of-gender-aggression-and-harassment-in-open-tech-and-open-culture-communities-online

Patents and Mobile Devices in India: An Empirical Survey

rohini — 2017-03-29T04:03:03Z

Though India has the second-largest wireless subscriber base in the world, with more than 150 mobile device vendors, it has, until recently, remained relatively unaffected by the global smartphone wars. Over the past three years, however, a growing number of patent enforcement actions have been brought by multinational firms against domestic Indian producers. These actions, which have largely resulted in judgments favoring foreign patent holders, have given rise to a variety of proposals for addressing this situation.

In order to assess the potential impact of patents on the mobile device market in India, and to assist policy makers in formulating and implementing regulations affecting this market, we have conducted a comprehensive patent landscape analysis of the mobile device sector in India using public data relating to Indian patent ownership by technology type, nationality, and industry classification. Our results illuminate a number of important features of the Indian mobile device market, including the overwhelming prevalence of foreign patent holders, the rate at which foreign and domestic firms are obtaining patents, and how these patent holdings are likely to shape industrial dynamics in the Indian market for mobile devices, as well as the availability of low-cost mobile devices that can significantly enhance public health, agriculture, safety and economic development throughout India.

Download the full paper here

This paper was published by the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law on February 9, 2017.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/patents-and-mobile-devices-in-india-an-empirical-survey

Patented Games

sunil — 2012-03-08T12:14:22Z

Some prefer Steve Jobs, patron saint of perfection, others prefer Nicholas Negroponte, messiah of the masses. While Mr Jobs may be guilty of contributing to the digital divide, Mr Negroponte may have contributed to bridging it with his innovation: the One Laptop Per Child, also known as the $100 laptop or XO. Sunil Abraham's column was published in the Economic Times on 8 March 2012.

Much ink has been spilt celebrating the contributions of both, but if we were to judge them by utilising evidence from the market, their technologies are used by a rather thin section of the pyramid.

For this writer, however, the real heroes are entrepreneurs from China and Taiwan who make technology that is used by millions of Indians and other consumers across the globe. Sometimes it comes with domestic branding and with all the right peripherals - for example, in India, the Popkorn, which costs only Rs 6,699. It features support for two SIM cards, a receiver for analogue terrestrial television, a receiver for FM radio, a 3.2-megapixel camera, boom-box style internal speakers and, most impressively, a pica projector. It ships with a tripod stand, external speakers, a torch and a laser pointer. It is a classroom in a box. At other times, it comes as a Shanzhai clone of a branded product - for example, the Blackcherry, at one-sixth the price-point with twice the number of cameras as the Blackberry. Some Shanzhai phones support four SIM cards and ship with a spare battery.

Dual- and quad-SIM support is critical in developing countries, especially Africa, where regulation has failed to rationalise interconnection costs. Most of the global south is yet to harvest the digital dividend, so TV reception is very useful indeed. And the additional battery is invaluable for rural entrepreneurs who are not sure whether their next halt will sync with the local load-shedding schedule.

The same with the focus on audio capabilities, reflecting the communal usage patterns. Unlike many expensive big-brand phones that require purchase of additional software, these phones often have in-built support for a wide variety of proprietary and open file formats.

These products are unavailable in the US and Europe because they would be sued out of the market by rights-holders or snuffed out by enforcement activities. David Drummond, Google's chief legal officer, says "smartphones might involve as many as 2,50,000 (largely questionable) patent claims". But there are three important differences for the Indian consumer. One, many of these patents are registered in the US, Europe and Japan and, therefore, prevent others from securing those patents in other jurisdictions. But it does not prevent Indian or Chinese entrepreneurs from using the patents. Two, unlike the US patent law, the Indian Patent Act does not consider "mathematical or a business method or computer program per se or algorithms" as inventions. And three, Indian courts, unlike their US and European counterparts, are less likely to grant injunctions preventing sale or use of any device.

Patent pools are a century-old policy tool for reducing royalties and uncertainty for manufacturers and consumers. In 1917, the US government forced aircraft patent-holders, including the famous Wright Brothers, into a patent pool that allowed 60 firms to produce planes at reduced royalty costs without worrying about litigation. Since then, the US government has issued thousands of compulsory licences in many different domains. Patent pools do exist in some areas of mobile technologies such as GSM and video file formats, but more patent pools are needed.

The Chinese government has used standards policy in the past to reduce outgoing royalties on information and communication technologies. They promoted or mandated indigenous standards either as a negotiating tactic with rights-holders or to benefit from cross-licensing of domestic IP. Some standards include TD-SCDMA, as an alternative to Qualcomm's CDMA, EVD as an alternative to the DVD standard, and CBHD as an alternative to Sony's Blu-ray. The potential savings were quite significant. In the words of Ma Jun, Deutsche Bank's chief China economist, "There is almost no profit for Chinese DVD makers as they have to pay about $7 in licensing fees to foreign patent holders per DVD player, which are sold at around $20 only - both at home and abroad."

In addition to patent and standards policy, royalty caps have been used to ensure access to innovative technologies. Till the end of 2009, the Indian government had imposed a royalty cap of 5% on domestic sales and 8% on exports. If a company wanted to pay higher royalties, permission had to be secured from an inter-ministerial Project Approval Board. Between 1991 and 2009, only 8,062 approvals were granted, indicating our government was keen to reduce outgoing royalties. Policymakers could reconsider reintroducing such royalty caps for devices that cost less than $200.

(The author is with the Centre for Internet and Society)

Read the original published in the Economic Times

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/patented-games