Centre for Internet and Society

Good Intentions, Recalcitrant Text - I: Why India’s Proposal at the ITU is Troubling for Internet Freedoms

geetha — 2014-11-02T15:13:45Z

The UN's International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is hosting its Plenipotentiary Conference (PP-14) this year in South Korea. At PP-14, India introduced a new draft resolution on ITU's Role in Realising Secure Information Society. The Draft Resolution has grave implications for human rights and Internet governance. Geetha Hariharan explores.

At the 2014 Plenipotentiary Conference (‘PP-14’ or ‘Plenipot’) of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), India has tabled a draft proposal on “ITU’s Role in Realising Secure Information Society” [Document 98, dated 20 October 2014] (“Draft Resolution”). India’s proposal has incited a great deal of concern and discussion among Plenipot attendees, governments and civil society alike. Before offering my concerns and comments on the Draft Resolution, let us understand the proposal.

Our Draft Resolution identifies 3 security concerns with exchange of information and resource allocation on the Internet:

First, it is troubling for India that present network architecture has “security weaknesses” such as “camouflaging the identity of the originator of the communication”;[1] random IP address distribution also makes “tracing of communication difficult”;[2]
Second, India is concerned that under the present allocation system of naming, numbering and addressing resources on the Internet, it is impossible or at the very least, cumbersome to identify the countries to which IP address are allocated;[3]
Third, India finds it insecure from the point of view of national security that traffic originating and terminating in the same country (domestic traffic) often routes through networks overseas;[4] similarly, local address resolution also routes through IP addresses outside the country or region, which India finds troubling.[5]

In an effort to address these concerns, the Draft Resolution seeks to instruct the ITU Secretary General:

First, to develop and recommend a ‘traffic routing plan’ that can “effectively ensure the traceability of communication”;[6]
Second, to collaborate with relevant international and intergovernmental organisations to develop an “IP address plan” which facilitates identification of locations/countries to which IP addresses are allocated and coordinates allocation accordingly;[7]
Third, to develop and recommend “a public telecom network architecture” that localizes both routing[8] as well as address resolution[9] for local/domestic traffic to “within the country”.

Admittedly, our Draft Resolution is intended to pave a way for “systematic, fair and equitable allocation” of, inter alia, naming, numbering and addressing resources,[10] keeping in mind security and human rights concerns.[11] In an informal conversation, members of the Indian delegation echoed these sentiments. Our resolution does not, I was told, raise issues about the “concentration of control over Internet resources”, though “certain governments” have historically exercised more control. It also does not, he clarified, wish to make privacy or human rights a matter for discussion at the ITU. All that the Draft Resolution seeks to do is to equip the ITU with the mandate to prepare and recommend a “roadmap for the systematization” of allocation of naming, numbering and addressing resources, and for local routing of domestic traffic and address resolution. The framework for such mandate is that of security, given the ITU’s role in ‘building confidence and security in the use of ICTs’ under Action Line C5 of the Geneva Plan of Action, 2003.

Unfortunately, the text of our Draft Resolution, by dint of imprecision or lack of clarity, undermines India’s intentions. On three issues of utmost importance to the Internet, the Draft Resolution has unintended or unanticipated impacts. First, its text on tracing communication and identity of originators, and systematic allocation of identifiable IP address blocks to particular countries, has impacts on privacy and freedom of expression. Given Edward Snowden’s NSA files and the absence of adequate protections against government incursions or excesses into privacy,[12] either in international human rights law or domestic law, such text is troublesome. Second, it has the potential to undermine multi-stakeholder approaches to Internet governance by proposing text that refers almost exclusively to sovereign monopolies over Internet resource allocation, and finally, displays a certain disregard for network architecture and efficiency, and to principles of a free, open and unified Internet, when it seeks to develop global architecture that facilitates (domestic) localization of traffic-routing, address resolution and allocation of naming, numbering and addressing.

In this post, I will address the first concern of human rights implications of our Draft Resolution.

Unintended Implications for Privacy and Freedom of Expression:

India’s Draft Resolution has implications for individual privacy. At two different parts of the preamble, India expresses concerns with the impossibility of locating the user at the end of an IP address:

Pream. §(e): “recognizing… that the modern day packet networks, which at present have many security weaknesses, inter alia, camouflaging the identity of originator of the communication”;
Pream. §(h): “recognizing… that IP addresses are distributed randomly, that makes the tracing of communication difficult”.

The concerns here surround difficulties in tracking IP addresses due to the widespread use of NATs, as also the existence of IP anonymisers like Tor. Anonymisers like Tor permit individuals to cover their online tracks; they conceal user location and Internet activity from persons or governments conducting network surveillance or traffic analysis. For this reason, Tor has caused much discomfort to governments. Snowden used Tor while communicating with Laura Poitras. Bradley (now Chelsea) Manning of Wikileaks fame is reported to have used Tor (page 24). Crypto is increasingly the safest – perhaps the only safe – avenue for political dissidents across the world; even Internet companies were coerced into governmental compliance. No wonder, then, that governments are doing all they can to dismantle IP anonymisers: the NSA and GCHQ have tried to break Tor; the Russian government has offered a reward to anyone who can.

Far be it from me to defend Tor blindly. There are reports suggesting that Tor is being used by offenders, and not merely those of the Snowden variety. But governments must recognize the very obvious trust deficit they face, especially after Snowden’s revelations, and consider the implications of seeking traceability and identity/geolocation for every IP address, in a systematic manner. The implications are for privacy, a right guaranteed by Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Privacy has been recognized by the UN General Assembly as applicable in cases of surveillance, interception and data collection, in Pream. §4 of its resolution The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age. But many states do not have robust privacy protections for individuals and data. And while governments may state the necessity to create international policy to further effective criminal investigations, such an aim cannot be used to nullify or destroy the rights of privacy and free speech guaranteed to individuals. Article 5(1), ICCPR, codifies this principle, when it states that States, groups or persons may not “engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein…”.

Erosion of privacy has a chilling effect on free speech [New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254], so free speech suffers too. Particularly with regard to Tor and identification of IP address location and users, anonymity in Internet communications is at issue. At the moment, most states already have anonymity-restrictions, in the form of identification and registration for cybercafés, SIM cards and broadband connections. For instance, Rule 4 of India’s Information Technology (Guidelines for Cyber Cafe) Rules, 2011, mandates that we cannot not use computers in a cybercafé without establishing our identities. But our ITU Draft Resolution seeks to dismantle the ability of Internet users to operate anonymously, be they political dissidents, criminals or those merely acting on their expectations of privacy. Such dismantling would be both violative of international human rights law, as well as dangerous for freedom of expression and privacy in principle. Anonymity is integral to democratic discourse, held the US Supreme Court in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission [514 U.S. 334 (1995)].[13] Restrictions on Internet anonymity facilitate communications surveillance and have a chilling effect on the free expression of opinions and ideas, wrote Mr. Frank La Rue, Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression (¶¶ 48-49).

So a law or international policy for blanket identification and traceability of IP addresses has grave consequences for and prima facie violates privacy, anonymity and freedom of speech. But these rights are not absolute, and can be validly restricted. And because these human rights are implicated, the ITU with its lack of expertise in the area may not be the adequate forum for discussion or study.

To be valid and justified interference, any law, policy or order interfering with privacy and free speech must meet the standards of reasonableness and proportionality, even if national security were the government’s legitimate aim, laid down in Articles 19(3) and 17 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) [Toonen v. Australia, Communication No. 488/1992, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994), ¶6.4]. And as the European Court of Human Rights found in Weber & Saravia v. Germany [Application no. 54934/00, 29 June 2006 (ECHR), ¶95], law or executive procedure that enables surveillance without sufficient safeguards is prima facie unreasonable and disproportionate. Re: anonymity, in Delfi AS v. Estonia [Application no. 64569/09, 17 February 2014, ¶83], while considering the liability of an Internet portal for offensive anonymous comments, the ECHR has emphasized the importance of balancing freedom of expression and privacy. It relied on certain principles such as “contribution to a debate of general interest, subject of the report, the content, form and consequences of the publication” to test the validity of government’s restrictions.

The implications of the suggested text of India’s Draft Resolution should then be carefully thought out. And this is a good thing. For one must wonder why governments need perfect traceability, geolocation and user identification for all IP addresses. Is such a demand really different from mass or blanket surveillance, in scale and government tracking ability? Would this not tilt the balance of power strongly in favour of governments against individuals (citizens or non-citizens)? This fear must especially arise in the absence of domestic legal protections, both in human rights, and criminal law and procedure. For instance, India’s Information Technology Act, 2000 (amended in 2008) has Section 66A, which criminalizes offensive speech, as well as speech that causes annoyance or inconvenience. Arguably, arrests under Section 66A have been arbitrary, and traceability may give rise to a host of new worries.

In any event, IP addresses and users can be discerned under existing domestic law frameworks. Regional Internet Registries (RIR) such as APNIC allocate blocks of IP addresses to either National Internet Registries (NIR – such as IRINN for India) or to ISPs directly. The ISPs then allocate IP addresses dynamically to users like you and me. Identifying information for these ISPs is maintained in the form of WHOIS records and registries with RIRs or NIRs, and this information is public. ISPs of most countries require identifying information from users before Internet connection is given, i.e., IP addresses allocated (mostly by dynamic allocation, for that is more efficient). ISPs of some states are also regulated; in India, for instance, ISPs require a licence to operate and offer services.

If any government wished, on the basis of some reasonable cause, to identify a particular IP address or its user, then the government could first utilize WHOIS to obtain information about the ISP. Then ISPs may be ordered to release specific IP address locations and user information under executive or judicial order. There are also technical solutions, such as traceroute or IP look-up that assist in tracing or identifying IP addresses. Coders, governments and law enforcement must surely be aware of better technology than I.

If we take into account this possibility of geolocation of IP addresses, then the Draft Resolution’s motivation to ‘systematize’ IP address allocations on the basis of states is unclear. I will discuss the implication of this proposal, and that of traffic and address localization, in my next post.

[1] Pream. §(e), Draft Resolution: “recognizing… that the modern day packet networks, which at present have many security weaknesses, inter alia, camouflaging the identity of originator of the communication”.

[2] Pream. §(h), Draft Resolution: “recognizing… that IP addresses are distributed randomly, that makes the tracing of communication difficult”.

[3] Op. §1, Draft Resolution: “instructs the Secretary General… to collaborate with all stakeholders including International and intergovernmental organizations, involved in IP addresses management to develop an IP address plan from which IP addresses of different countries are easily discernible and coordinate to ensure distribution of IP addresses accordingly”.

[4] Pream. §(g), Draft Resolution: “recognizing… that communication traffic originating and terminating in a country also many times flows outside the boundary of a country making such communication costly and to some extent insecure from national security point of view”.

[5] Pream. §(f), Draft Resolution: “recognizing… that even for local address resolution at times, system has to use resources outside the country which makes such address resolution costly and to some extent insecure from national security perspective”.

[6] Op. §6, Draft Resolution: “instructs the Secretary General… to develop and recommend a routing plan of traffic for optimizing the network resources that could effectively ensure the traceability of communication”.

[7] Op. §1, Draft Resolution; see note 3.

[8] Op. §5, Draft Resolution: “instructs the Secretary General… to develop and recommend public telecom network architecture which ensures that effectively the traffic meant for the country, traffic originating and terminating in the country remains within the country”.

[9] Op. §4, Draft Resolution: “instructs the Secretary General… to develop and recommend public telecom network architecture which ensures effectively that address resolution for the traffic meant for the country, traffic originating and terminating in the country/region takes place within the country”.

[10] Context Note to Draft Resolution, ¶3: “Planning and distribution of numbering and naming resources in a systematic, equitable, fair and just manner amongst the Member States…”

[11] Context Note to Draft Resolution, ¶2: “…there are certain areas that require critical attention to move in the direction of building the necessary “Trust Framework” for the safe “Information Society”, where privacy, safety are ensured”.

[12] See, for instance, Report of the Office of the High Commission for Human Rights (“OHCHR”), Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, A/HRC/27/37 (30 June 2014), ¶34-35, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session27/Documents/A.HRC.27.37_en.pdf. See esp. note 30 of the Report, ¶35.

[13] Many thorny political differences exist between the US and many states (including India and Kenya, who I am told has expressed preliminary support for the Draft Resolution) with regard to Internet governance. Irrespective of this, the US Constitution’s First Amendment and judicial protections to freedom of expression remain a yardstick for many states, including India. India, for instance, has positively referred to the US Supreme Court’s free speech protections in many of its decisions; ex. see Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1963 Cri. L.J. 329; R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1995 SC 264.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/good-intentions-going-awry-i-why-india2019s-proposal-at-the-itu-is-troubling-for-internet-freedoms

GNI Assessment Finds ICT Companies Protect User Privacy and Freedom of Expression

elonnai — 2014-01-20T06:17:46Z

Elonnai Hickok analyses a public report recently published by GNI on the independent assessment process for Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo. The report finds Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo to be in compliance with the GNI principles on privacy and freedom of expression.

Introduction

In January 2014, the Global Network Initiative (GNI) published the Public Report on the Independent Assessment Process for Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo. GNI is an industry consortium that was started in 2008 with the objective of protecting user’s right to privacy and freedom of expression globally. The main objectives of GNI are to provide a framework for companies that is based on international standards, ensure accountability of ICT companies through independent assessments, create opportunities for policy engagement, and create opportunities for stakeholders from multiple jurisdictions to engage in dialogue with each other. The Centre for Internet and Society, Bangalore, is a member of GNI. Companies based in India have yet to join as members to the GNI network.

Overview of the Public Report

The Public Report provides an overview of assessments completed on the practices and policies of Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft from 2011 - 2013 to measure company compliance with the GNI principles on freedom of expression and privacy. The principles lay out broad guidelines that member companies should seek to incorporate in their internal and external practices and speak to freedom of expression, privacy, responsible company decision making, multi – stakeholder collaboration, and organizational governance, accountability, and transparency. The GNI principles have also been developed with Implementation Guidelines to provide companies with a framework for companies to respond to government requests. The assessment carried out by GNI reviewed cases in each company pertaining to governmental: blocking and filtering, takedown requests, criminalization of speech, intermediary liability, selective enforcement, content surveillance, and requests for user information.

Importantly, the assessment undertaken by GNI finds Yahoo, Microsoft, and Google to be in compliance with the GNI principles on freedom of expression and privacy. The Report highlights practices by the companies that work to protect freedom of expression and privacy such as conducting human rights impact assessments, issuing transparency reports, and notifying affected users when content is removed, have been, adopted by these companies. For example, Google conducts Human Rights Impact Assessments to assess potential threats to freedom of expression and privacy. Google also has in place internal processes to review governmental requests impacting freedom of expression and privacy, and the legal team at Google prepares a “global removal report” to provide a bird’s eye view of trends emerging from content removal requests. If Google has the email address of a user who’s posted content is removed, Google will often notify the user and directs the user to the Chilling Effects website. Google has also published a transparency report since 2010. Like Google, Microsoft conducts Human Rights Impact Assessments before making decisions on whether to incorporate certain features into its platforms when operating in high risk markets. Microsoft has also issued two global law enforcement requests reports in 2013. Yahoo has established a Business and Human Rights Program to ensure responsible actions are taken by the company with regards to freedom of expression and privacy, and now issues transparency reports about government requests. Yahoo’s Public Policy team also engages in dialogue with governments on an international level about existing and proposed legislation impacting and implicating privacy and freedom of expression.

The Report highlights challenges to compliance with the GNI principles that companies face – namely legal restraints and mandates that they are faced with. On the issue of transparency, the assessment found that companies do not disclose information when there are legal prohibitions on such disclosure, when users privacy would be implicated, when companies choose to assert attorney client privilege, and when trade secrets are involved. Despite this, the assessment found that companies do deny and push back on governmental requests impacting freedom of expression and privacy for reasons such as the request needed clarification and modification, or that the request needed to follow established procedure.

A number of findings came out of the assessments undertaken for the Report including:

As demonstrated by the lack of ability to access information about secret national security requests, and the lack of ability for companies to disclose information on this topic there is a dire need for governments to reform surveillance policy and law impacting freedom of expression and privacy.
The implementation of the GNI Principles is challenging when a company is undergoing an acquisition. In this scenario, contractual provisions limiting third party disclosure are critical in ensuring protection of privacy and free expression rights.
Companies need to pro-actively and on an ongoing basis internally review governmental restrictions on content to determine if it is in compliance with the commitment made by that company to the GNI Principles.

The assessment resulted in GNI defining a number of actionable (non-binding) recommendations for companies such as:

Improving the integration of human rights considerations in the due diligence process with respect to the acquiring and selling companies.
Consider the impact of hardware on freedom of expression and privacy.
Improve external and internal reporting.
Review employee access to user data to ensure that employee access rights are restricted by both policy and technical measures on a ‘need to know’ basis across global operations.
Review executive management training.
Improve stakeholder engagement.
Improve communication with users.
Increase sharing of best practices.
The GNI principles are focused on freedom of expression and privacy and are based on internationally recognized laws and standards for human rights.

NSA leaks, global push for governmental surveillance reform, and the Public Report

With special attention given to the various companies responses to the NSA leaks, the Report notes that in response to the NSA leaks the assessed companies have issued public statements and filed legal challenges with the US government and filed suit with the FISA Court seeking the right to disclose data relating to the number of FISA requests received with the public. All three companies have also supported legislation and policy that would allow for such transparency. Furthermore in December 2014, the companies , along with other internet companies, developed and issued the five Principles on Global Government Surveillance Reform. Similar to other efforts to end mass and disproportionate surveillance, such as the Necessary and Proportionate principles, the Principles on Global Government Surveillance Reform address: Limiting Governments’ Authority to Collect Users’ Information, Oversight and Accountability, Transparency about Government Demands, Respecting the Free Flow of Information, Avoiding Conflicts Among Governments. Other companies that signed these principles include AOL, Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter.

Along these lines, on January 14^th, GNI released the statement “Surveillance Reforms to Protect Rights and Restore Trust”, urging the U.S Government to review and enact surveillance legislation that incorporate a ‘rights based’ approach to issues involving national security. In the statement, GNI specifically recommends the Government to action and: end mass collection of communications metadata, protect and uphold the rights of non-Americans, continue to increase transparency of surveillance practices, support the use of strong encryption standards.

Conclusion and way forward

Looking ahead, GNI is planning on developing and implementing a mechanism to address effectively address consumer engagement and complaints issued by individuals who feel that GNI member companies have not acted consistently with the commitments made as a GNI member. GNI is also looking to expand work around public policy and surveillance.

The Public Report on the Independent Assessment Process for Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo is an important step towards ensuring ICT sector companies are accountable to the public in their practices impacting freedom of expression and privacy. The assessment comes at a time when ICT companies often find themselves stuck between a rock and a hard place – with Governments issuing surveillance and censorship demands with mandates for non-disclosure, and the public demanding transparency, company resistance to such demands from the Government, and a strong commitment to users freedom of expression and privacy. Hopefully, the GNI assessment is and will evolve into a middle ground for ICT companies – where they can be accountable to the public and their customers and compliant with Governmental mandates in all jurisdictions that they operate in. It will be interesting to see if in the future Indian companies join GNI as members and being to adopt the GNI principles and undergo GNI assessments.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/gni-assessment-finds-ict-companies-protect-user-privacy-and-freedom-of-expression

GNI Annual Report

praskrishna — 2013-04-25T07:14:33Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/gni-annual-report.pdf

Global Partners Meeting @ London

praskrishna — 2013-03-20T06:37:48Z

Privacy International is organizing the Global Partners Meeting in London from March 22 to 25, 2013. The workshop will be held at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Sunil Abraham and Malavika Jayaram will be participating in this event.

Click to read the full details published by Privacy International here.

The meeting is an opportunity to connect global partners with each other and with researchers, human rights advocates, and privacy and technology experts from over 20 countries. This will provide an opportunity for discussion and debate, that will enrich global research and advocacy agenda for the next two years.

Workshop Overview

The purpose of the three day workshop is as follows:

To understand the privacy discourse and identify the challenges faced in advancing the right to privacy across the globe.
To consolidate our network and look for opportunities for collaboration and cross-pollination for research and advocacy initiatives.
To share experiences about research, dissemination and advocacy strategies that influence policy change.

We envisage this workshop as a launching pad for the work that Privacy International and our global partners will conduct over the next two years under the ambit of the Surveillance and Freedom: Global Understandings and Rights Development (SAFEGUARD) project, funded by the International Development

Research Centre. The focus of the SAFEGUARD project is to understand what are the threats, challenges and obstacles to, and opportunities for, the protection of privacy in developing countries.

Background to the SAFEGUARD project

Nowhere are the challenges to, and opportunities for, privacy protections as dynamic and complex as in the developing world. As these countries seek new measures to develop their economies, build social and technological infrastructures, sustain their social systems, and ensure security they need to consider what are the modern policy frameworks they require to ensure a just society. The windows around these policy frameworks are key opportunities for reflection about rights and democratic values, and in the case of this project, the protection of privacy.

The vast scope and relevance of the right to privacy in this age of technology gives rise to a myriad of challenges and issues, many of which have relevance across, as well as within, borders. This is particularly the case in the developing world, where South-South collaboration is gaining increasing currency in the development sector, and donor countries continue to contribute to and influence policy in recipient countries, particularly with respect to the adoption of new technologies. Many of the trends in developing countries – communications surveillance, biometrics and DNA databases, and identity cards – mirror those being adopted in the global North. Policy laundering and modelling, such as that witnessed with respect to counter-terrorism policies in the aftermath of 9/11 is taking hold in the context of communications surveillance laws and national ID databases. Such phenomena raise concerns not only as to the spread of practices that threaten to undermine privacy, but also with respect to the stifling of national policy discourses and legislative processes.

Conceptual framework

This projects sets out to isolate and understand the challenges to privacy in the developing world. In order to ensure that the research developed is sufficiently targeted to influence policy debates, we have identified a set of themes that cover the range of privacy-related issues and that together will give a comprehensive picture of the difficult relationship between privacy and technology. This set of themes has been developed in collaboration with our partners, who have identified those discussions around which there is perfect storm of advancing surveillance policies and technologies, poor legal and technical safeguards, and a scarcity of research and understanding. We have designed our conceptual framework accordingly.

Research questions

The legal and constitutional landscape: What laws and constitutional provisions exist to protect privacy, how are they implemented and monitored, and where are the legal and policy gaps?

Data protection: What is the state of data protection in partner countries, and what are the local and regional regulatory standards and good practices?

Communications surveillance: What communications surveillance regimes are in place, how are they designed in law and how do they operate in practice?

Adoption of surveillance technologies: Where are governments buying surveillance technologies, and how are they using them? What legal regimes are in place to establish safeguards over the use of advanced surveillance technologies? What is the state of the art in legal protections?

Political intelligence oversight: What is the nature and operation of local intelligence services, what oversight mechanisms are in place, and how can these mechanisms be implemented or enforced?

Politics, Identity, sexual and reproductive health and social sorting: To what the extent do governments misuse personal information to pursue social sorting practices?

Delivery of public services: What is the state of privacy protections in public service delivery, particularly those related to e-health systems and social protection programmes, and how can protections be improved?

ID, DNA and biometrics: What privacy risks are associated with the collection and use of personal information for ID and biometric systems?

Partners

Africa	Latin America	Asia
Zimbabwe Human Rights Forum, Zimbabwe Kenyan Ethical and Legal Issues Network, Kenya Media Institute of Southern Africa, Namibia Jonction, Senegal Centre for Social Sciences Research, University of Cape Town African Platform for Social Protection, Kenya	Dejusticia, Columbia Asociacion por los Derechos Civiles, Argentina Autonomous University of Mexico State, Mexico Centro de Tecnologia y Sociedad, Universidad San Andres, Argentina, in collaboration with the Centro de Tecnologica da Escola de Direito da Fundacao Getulio Vargas, Brasil Instituto NUPEF, Brazil Derechos Digitales, Chile	VOICE, Bangladesh University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Centre for Internet and Society, India Thai Netizen Network, Thailand Thai Media Policy Center, Thailand Bytes For All, Pakistan Centre for Cyber Law Studies, Indonesia Foundation for Media Alternatives, Philippines

Africa

Latin America

Asia

Zimbabwe Human Rights Forum, Zimbabwe

Kenyan Ethical and Legal Issues Network, Kenya

Media Institute of Southern Africa, Namibia

Jonction, Senegal

Centre for Social Sciences Research, University of Cape Town

African Platform for Social Protection, Kenya

Dejusticia, Columbia

Asociacion por los Derechos Civiles, Argentina

Autonomous University of Mexico State, Mexico

Centro de Tecnologia y Sociedad, Universidad San Andres, Argentina, in collaboration with the Centro de Tecnologica da Escola de Direito da Fundacao Getulio Vargas, Brasil

Instituto NUPEF, Brazil

Derechos Digitales, Chile

VOICE, Bangladesh
University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Centre for Internet and Society, India
Thai Netizen Network, Thailand
Thai Media Policy Center, Thailand
Bytes For All, Pakistan
Centre for Cyber Law Studies, Indonesia
Foundation for Media Alternatives, Philippines

Participants

Ababacar Diop
Allan Maleche
Anna Fielder
Anthony Jackson
Arthit Suriyawongkul
Arthur Gwagwa
Ben Hayes
Ben Wagner
Benjamin Barretto
Carly Nyst
Carolin Moeller
Charles Dhewa
Claudio Ruiz
Clement Chen
Danilo Doneda
Eric King
Farjana Akter
Fieke Jansen
Graciela Sulamein
Gus Hosein
Helen Wallace
Juan Camilo Rivera
Karelle Dagon
Katitza Rodriguez
Kevin Donovan
Levinson Kabwato
Malavika Jayaram
Mathias Vermeulen
Michael Rispoli
Nelson Arteaga Botello
Pablo Palazzi
Pirongrong Ramasoota
Ramiro Alvarez Ugarte
Richie Tynan
Sam Smith
Sinta Dewi Rosadi
Shahzad Ahmed
Sinta Dewi Rosadi
Sunil Abraham
Stephanie Perrin
Tavengwa Nhongo
Vera Franz
Vicky Nida
Vivian Newman Pont

Agenda

Friday, March 22, 2013: Reception

Meet with Privacy International staff members and advisors, and workshop participants from more than 20 countries in Latin America, Asia, Africa, Europe and Central Asia. Food and drinks will be provided.

Time: 6.00 p.m.
Location: 2nd Floor, 46 Bedford Row, London WC1R 4LR
Contact: 0207 242 2836
Getting there: Our office is a short walk 10 minute from your hotel. See Map 1 below for directions.

Saturday, March 23, 2013: Day 1 (Objectives and Reviewing the Landscape)

10:00 a.m. - Welcome Breakfast: Setting The Scene
Location: Mercure London Bloomsbury restaurant

Welcome and introduction

Overview of PI’s work in developing countries

Participant introductions

Setting the agenda

12:30 p.m. - Session 1: Reviewing The Landscape
Location: Old Building, Room 3.21, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE

Mapping privacy in constitutions

Masterclass 1: communications surveillance laws around the world

Break-out groups on assigned topics, and reporting back

2:30 p.m. - Afternoon tea

Privacy quiz

Masterclass 2: SIM card registration

Building a network: how can PI facilitate your work?

Masterclass 3: Oversight of intelligence agencies

6:00 p.m. - Drinks

7:00 p.m. - Dinner

Location: Tohbang, 164 Clerkenwell Road
http://www.tohbang.com/sub_eng/main.php

Sunday, March 24: Day 2 (Research Topics and Strategies)

Location: Old Building, Room 3.21, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE

10:00 a.m. - Recap of day one

Masterclass 4 - The UN Universal Periodic Review

Open-space - research and policy priorities

1:00 p.m. - Lunch
Location: Ship Tavern, Holborn

2:30 p.m. - Reconvene

Open space - research, dissemination and communication strategies

Wrapping up and going forward

6:00 p.m. - Dinner
Location: Wahaca, Charlotte St, http://www.wahaca.co.uk/

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/global-partners-meeting-london

Global Partners Meeting - Agenda and Info

praskrishna — 2013-03-20T06:25:09Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/global-partners-meeting-london.pdf

Global Networks, Individual Freedoms: A Peer Forum on Internet Freedom and Human Rights

praskrishna — 2012-06-28T09:12:28Z

In Connection with the 2012 Internet Freedom Fellows Program, the United States Mission to the United Nations in Geneva is pleased to invite Pranesh Prakash to a peer forum at the United States Mission to the United Nations on Thursday, June 21, 2012, from 9 a.m. to 3 p.m.

Join the Internet Freedom Fellows, diplomats, UN representatives, civil society, technologists and social media experts, Geneva media and other professionals engaged in the intersection of human rights, internet freedom and technology.

This peer forum is part of the Internet Freedom Fellows program, which brings human rights activists from across the globe to Geneva, Washington, and Silicon Valley to meet with fellow activists, U.S. and international government leaders, and members of civil society and the private sector engaged in technology and human rights.

This year’s Internet Freedom Fellows, all human rights activists and active practitioners of digital media, are from Syria, India, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Venezuela and Azerbaijan.

For additional information on the program, please visit Internet Freedom Fellows.

Program

9:00 a.m.	Welcome and introduction David Kennedy / John Horniblow
9:15 - 10:15	Freedom to Connect and Freedom from Fear: The problem of surveillance in a networked world. Rebecca MacKinnon – Co Founder Global Voices Online, Author “Consent of the Networked”, Boards of Directors of the Committee to Protect Journalists and the Global Network Initiative
10:15 - 10:45	Developing Networked Voices and Promoting the protection of Human Rights Andreas Harsono, blogger and human rights activist (Indonesia), and Rosebell Kagumire, multimedia journalist working on peace and conflict issues in the Eastern Africa region (Uganda) 2011 Internet Freedom Fellows and journalists (via Skype)
10:45 - 11:00	Coffee break
11:00 - 12:00	Moderated Panel Discussion – How Do we Protect Human Rights in a world of global networks? How do the needs of the grassroots, civil society and business inform the process of upholding the UDHR and IHL in networks and technologies? Dr. Robert Whelan (ICRC), Pranesh Prakash, Salil Trepathi (IHRB), Nicolas Seidler (ISOC), Emin Milli Moderated Panel Discussion followed by Q &A
12:00 - 13:00	Buffet Luncheon
13:00 - 13:30	The Open Internet - Empowering Digital Humanitarianism Paul Conneally - Head of Communications for ITU and a former Red Cross delegate (in various positions, locations and with IFRC plus ICRC and the Irish Red Cross).
13:40 - 14:10	Global Network Initiative and the multistakeholder approach ensuring an Open Internet David Sullivan -Policy and Communications Director Global Network Initiative
14.15 - 14.40	The Silicon Valley Standard and implications for technology companies in the protection of Human Rights and other freedoms Brett Solomon -Exec Director Access Now (via Skype)
15:00	Twiplomacy Matthias Luefkins Managing Director, Digital, EMEA– Burson Marstellar

Participation is limited. Please RSVP by noon on Friday, June 15 to iff@usmission.ch. When responding, please indicate whether you will also join us for the luncheon buffet.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/peer-forum-on-internet-freedom-and-human-rights

Global Censorship Conference

praskrishna — 2012-03-30T11:34:07Z

The Abrams Institute for Freedom of Expression at Yale Law School is holding a conference on global censorship from March 30 to April 1, 2012, at Yale Law School. The programme is sponsored by the Information Society Project at Yale Law School and Thomson Reuters.

"This conference is the first major event for the Abrams Institute for Freedom of Expression, and it brings together an exciting group of thinkers from law, political science, computer science, business and the non-profit sector to discuss the lessons of the past few years,” explained Yale Law Professor Jack Balkin, director of the Abrams Institute and the Information Society Project. “We think the study of free expression in the digital age should be international and interdisciplinary."[1]

Rishabh Dara, Google Policy Fellow who worked at CIS office in Bangalore on freedom of expression and internet-related policy issues is participating in the event as a speaker in the panel on Case Studies of Censorship. The panel will explore recent instances of censorship in the United States, Egypt, Syria, Brazil, and India and the common themes and important differences that emerged.

This conference will consider how censorship has changed in a networked world, exploring how networks have altered the practices of both governments and their citizens. Panels will include discussions of how governments can and do censor and how speakers can command technical and legal tools to preserve their ability to speak. The conference will conclude with a discussion of new controversies in censorship, including laws designed to prevent online bullying and intellectual property infringement.

Agenda

Friday March 30, 2012

2:00	Begin Registration
3:15 – 4:45	The Means of Change, Familiar and New (co-sponsored by Sponsored by the Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center for International Human Rights) In the popular story of the political upheavals in the Middle East and North Africa, information technology stands out as the new factor that was critical to rapid mass mobilization for demanding change. The media have been credited with making popular demands for change contagious. Enthusiasts for the potential of technology to foster progressive change have labeled these apparently sudden developments a Facebook revolution. Governments responded by seeking to curtail the use of mobile phones and the Internet. What role has technology played in igniting, sustaining and shaping recent political changes in the Arab world? Anupam Chander, Professor of Law, University of California, Davis and Director, California International Law Center Rebecca MacKinnon, Bernard L. Schwartz Senior Fellow, New America Foundation John Pollock, journalist
5:00– 6:30	Keynote Lecture (co-sponsored by Sponsored by the Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center for International Human Rights) Irwin Cotler, Canadian Parliament, former Attorney General of Canada
6:30– 9:00	Reception for Panelists of the Global Censorship Conference

Saturday March 31, 2012

9:00 – 10:00	Registration and Breakfast
10:00– 11:30	Panel One: Old and New Forms of Censorship Years ago, activists met in person to plan protests and quietly shared subversive texts. Now, events can be planned over social networking sites, and arguments for change are posted online. How have governments responded to these changes? How have activist practices and governments’ reactions changed the way we conceptualize censorship? Jack Balkin, Yale Law School Yochai Benkler, Harvard Law School Navid Hassanpour, Yale Political Science Deptartment Rebecca MacKinnon, Bernard L. Schwartz Senior Fellow, New America Foundation
11:45 – 1:15	Panel Two: Technical Architectures of Censorship There are a number of choke points across the Internet and a number of different censorship mechanisms that can be deployed at various points across the network. Censorship can be executed at the router level, the Internet Service Provider (ISP) level, the Internet Content Provider (ICP) level, or the device level. Additionally, countries can employ a number of different technologies at each level. This panel will explore the many technical options for censorship and the strategic value of different choices. Laura DeNardis, Associate Professor of Communication at American University, and Affiliated Fellow, Information Society Project at Yale Law School Nagla Rizk, American University in Cairo Hal Roberts, Fellow at Berkman Center for Internet & Technology Ashkan Soltani, Independent Researcher and Consultant on Privacy and Security
1:15 – 2:15	Lunch
2:15 – 3:45	Panel Three: Case Studies of Censorship In the wake of censorship both domestically and abroad, many questions emerged about how the censorship was executed, what effects it had, if and how activists were able to route around the it, and how, if it all, it was eventually stopped. This panel will explore recent instances of censorship in the United States, Egypt, Syria, Brazil, and India and the common themes and important differences that emerged. Sherwin Siy, Deputy Legal Director and the Kahle/Austin Promise Fellow at Public Knowledge Lina Attalah, Journalist, Managing Editor of Al-Masry Al-Youm Anas Qtiesh, Blogger, Editor of Global Voices Carlos Affonso Pereira de Souza, Vice-Coordinator of the Center for Technology & Society (CTS) at the Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) Law School Rishabh Dara, Researcher at Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad
4:00 – 5:30	Panel Four: Technical Methods of Circumventing Censorship New technology may provide governments with new tools to censor, but it also creates opportunities for speakers and “hactivists” everywhere. How can individuals evade identification online and access blocked content? Can activists circumvent attempts to shut down the internet during periods of political unrest? What new methods are being developed to preserve free speech online? Roger Dingledine, The Tor Project Peter Fein, Telecomix Alex Halderman, University of Michigan, Dept. of Computer Science Sascha Meinrath, Open Technology Initiative Director, New America Foundation Wendy Seltzer, Senior Fellow, Information Society Project at Yale Law School
6:00 – 9:00	Dinner for Speakers

Sunday, April 1, 2012

9:00 – 9:30	Breakfast
9:30 – 11:00	Panel Five: Legal Solutions to Censorship Given the way censorship technologies have slowly crept into acceptable use because of concerns like piracy, child pornography, or national security, there is much debate about the role and capacity of law in combatting these new, digital forms of government censorship, domestically and internationally. This panel will discuss if and how legal solutions to censorship can be deployed most effectively. Derek Bambauer, Brooklyn Law School Jim Dempsey, Vice President of Public Policy at the Center for Democracy and Technology Molly Land, New York Law School Linda Lye, ACLU Northern California Jillian York, Director for International Freedom of Expression at the Electronic Frontier Foundation
11:15 – 12:45	Panel Six: New Controversies in Censorship Does new technology change the appropriate scope of free expression rights? Can policing intellectual property infringement burden free speech interests? Does surveillance ever have a censoring effect? This panel will wrestle with whether a variety of government activities constitutes inappropriate censorship or necessary actions to protect the public interest. Rebecca Bolin, Fellow at Information Society Project, Yale Law School Mark MacCarthy, Vice President for Public Policy, Software and Information Industry Association; Adjunct Professor, Communication, Culture and Technology Program, Georgetown University Preston Padden, Senior Fellow at the Silicon Flatirons Center and an Adjunct Professor at the University Of Colorado's Law School and Interdisciplinary Telecommunications Program David Post, Temple University, Beasley School of Law Christopher Soghoian, Graduate Fellow, Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research, Indiana University
12:45	Bagged Lunch Available

[1].Global Censorship Conference to be Held March 30-April 1 at Yale Law School | Yale Law School, last accessed on March 30, 2012, http://www.law.yale.edu/news/15140.htm

Read the original posted in Yale Law School website

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/global-censorship-conference

Getting the (Digital) Indo-Pacific Economic Framework Right

arindrajit — 2022-10-03T14:56:22Z

On the eve of the Tokyo Quad Summit in May 2022, President Biden unveiled the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), visualising cooperation across the Indo-Pacific based on four pillars: trade; supply chains; clean energy, decarbonisation and infrastructure; and tax and anti-corruption. Galvanised by the US, the other 13 founding members of the IPEF are Australia, Brunei Darussalam, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. The first official in-person Ministerial meeting was held in Los Angeles on 9 September 2022.

The article was originally published in Directions on 16 September 2022.

It is still early days. Given the broad and noncommittal scope of the economic arrangement, it is unlikely that the IPEF will lead to a trade deal among members in the short run. Instead, experts believe that this new arrangement is designed to serve as a ‘framework or starting point’ for members to cooperate on geo-economic issues relevant to the Indo-Pacific, buoyed in no small part by the United States’ desire to make up lost ground and counter Chinese economic influence in the region.

United States Trade Representative (USTR) Katherine Tai has underscored the relevance of the Indo-Pacific digital economy to the US agenda with the IPEF. She has emphasized the importance of collaboratively addressing key connectivity and technology challenges, including standards on cross-border data flows, data localisation and online privacy, as well as the discriminatory and unethical use of artificial intelligence. This is an ambitious agenda given the divergence among members in terms of technological advancement, domestic policy preferences and international negotiating stances at digital trade forums. There is a significant risk that imposing external standards or values on this evolving and politically-contested digital economy landscape will not work, and may even undermine the core potential of the IPEF in the Indo-Pacific. This post evaluates the domestic policy preferences and strategic interests of the Framework’s member states, and how the IPEF can navigate key points of divergence in order to achieve meaningful outcomes.

State of domestic digital policy among IPEF members

Data localisation is a core point of divergence in global digital policymaking. It continues to dominate discourse and trigger dissent at all international trade forums, including the World Trade Organization. IPEF members have a range of domestic mandates restricting cross-border flows, which vary in scope, format and rigidity (see table below). Most countries only have a conditional data localisation requirement, meaning data can only be transferred to countries where it is accorded an equivalent level of protection – unless the individual whose data is being transferred consents to said transfer. Australia and the United States have sectoral localisation requirements for health and defence data respectively. India presently has multiple sectoral data localisation requirements. In particular, a 2018 Reserve Bank of India (RBI) directive imposed strict local storage requirements along with a 24-hour window for foreign processing of payments data generated in India. The RBI imposed a moratorium on the issuance of new cards by several US-based card companies until compliance issues with the data localisation directive were resolved. Furthermore, several iterations of India’s recently withdrawn Personal Data Protection Bill contained localisation requirements for some categories of personal data.

Indonesia and Vietnam have diluted the scopes of their data localisation mandates to apply, respectively, only to companies providing public services and to companies not complying with other local laws. These dilutions may have occurred in response to concerted pushback from foreign technology companies operating in these countries. In addition to sectoral restrictions on the transfer of geospatial data, South Korea retains several procedural checks on cross-border flows, including formalities regarding providing notice to individual users.

Moving onto another issue flagged by USTR Tai, while all IPEF members recognise the right to information privacy at an overarching or constitutional level, the legal and policy contours of data protection are at different stages of evolution in different countries. Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand have data protection frameworks in place. Data protection frameworks in India and Brunei are under consultation. Notably, the US does not have a comprehensive federal framework on data privacy, although there are patchworks of data privacy regulations at both the federal and state levels.

Regulation and strategic thinking on artificial intelligence (AI) are also at varying levels of development among IPEF members. India has produced a slew of policy papers on Responsible Artificial Intelligence. The most recent policy paper published by NITI AAYOG (the Indian government’s think tank) refers to constitutional values and endorses a risk-based approach to AI regulation, much like that adopted by the EU. The US National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI), chaired by Google CEO Eric Schmidt, expressed concerns about the US ceding AI leadership ground to China. The NSCAI’s final report emphasised the need for US leadership of a ‘coalition of democracies’ as an alternative to China’s autocratic and control-oriented model. Singapore has also made key strides on trusted AI, launching A.I. verify – the world’s first AI Governance Testing Framework for companies that wish to demonstrate their use of responsible AI through a minimum verifiable product.

IPEF and pipe dreams of digital trade

Some members of the IPEF are signatories to other regional trade agreements. With the exception of Fiji, India and the US, all the IPEF countries are members of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which also includes China. Five IPEF member countries are also members of the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) that President Trump backed out of in 2017. Several IPEF members also have bilateral or trilateral trading agreements among themselves, an example being the Digital Economic Partnership Agreement (DEPA) between Singapore, New Zealand and Chile.

All these ‘mega-regional’ trading agreements contain provisions on data flows, including prohibitions on domestic legal provisions that mandate local computing facilities or restrict cross-border data transfers. Notably, these agreements also incorporate exceptions to these rules. The CPTPP includes within its ambit an exception on the grounds of ‘legitimate public policy objectives’ of the member, while the RCEP incorporates an additional exception for ‘essential security interests’.

IPEF members are also spearheading multilateral efforts related to the digital economy: Australia, Japan and Singapore are working as convenors of the plurilateral Joint Statement Initiative (JSI) at the World Trade Organization (WTO), which counts 86 WTO members as parties. India (along with South Africa) vehemently opposes this plurilateral push on the grounds that the WTO is a multilateral forum functioning on consensus and a plurilateral trade agreement should not be negotiated within the aegis of the WTO. They fear, rightly, that such gambits close out the domestic policy space, especially for evolving digital economy regimes where keen debate and contestation exist among domestic stakeholders. While wary of the implications of the JSI, other IPEF members, such as Indonesia, have cautiously joined the initiative to ensure that they have a voice at the table.

It is unlikely that the IPEF will lead to a digital trade arrangement in the short run. Policymaking on issues as complex as the digital economy that must respond to specific social, economic and (geo)political realities cannot be steamrolled through external trade agreements. For instance, after the Los Angeles Ministerial India opted out of the IPEF trade pillar citing both India’s evolving domestic legislative framework on data and privacy as well as a broader lack of consensus among IPEF members on several issues, including digital trade. Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal explained that India would wait for the “final contours” of the digital trade track to emerge before making any commitments.

Besides, brokering a trade agreement through the IPEF runs a risk of redundancy. Already, there exists a ‘spaghetti bowl’ of regional trading agreements that IPEF members can choose from, in addition to forming bilateral trade ties with each other.

This is why Washington has been clear about calling the IPEF an ‘economic arrangement’ and not a trade agreement. Membership does not imply any legal obligations. Rather than duplicating ongoing efforts or setting unrealistic targets, the IPEF is an opportunity for all players to shape conversations, share best practices and reach compromises, which could feed back into ongoing efforts to negotiate trade deals. For example, several members of RCEP have domestic data localisation mandates that do not violate trade deals because the agreement carves out exceptions that legitimise domestic policy decisions. Exchanges on how these exceptions work in future trade agreements could be a part of the IPEF arrangement and nudge states towards framing digital trade negotiations through other channels, including at the WTO. Furthermore, states like Singapore that have launched AI self-governance mechanisms could share best practices on how these mechanisms were developed as well as evaluations of how they have helped policy goals be met. And these exchanges shouldn’t be limited to existing IPEF members. If the forum works well, countries that share strategic interests in the region with IPEF members, including, most notably, the European Union, may also want to get involved and further develop partnerships in the region.

Countering China

Talking shop on digital trade should certainly not be the only objective of the IPEF. The US has made it clear that they want the message emanating from the IPEF ‘to be heard in Beijing’. Indeed, the IPEF offers an opportunity for the reassertion of US economic interests in a region where President Trump’s withdrawal from the CPTPP has left a vacuum for China to fill. Accordingly, it is no surprise that the IPEF has representation from several regions of the Indo-Pacific: South Asia, Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

This should be an urgent policy priority for all IPEF members. Since its initial announcement in 2015, the Digital Silk Road (DSR), the digital arm of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, has spearheaded massive investments by the Chinese private sector (allegedly under close control of the Chinese state) in e-commerce, fintech, smart cities, data centres, fibre optic cables and telecom networks. This expansion has also happened in the Indo-Pacific, unhampered by China’s aggressive geopolitical posturing in the region through maritime land grabs in the South China Sea. With the exception of Vietnam, which remains wary of China’s economic expansionism, countries in Southeast Asia welcome Chinese investments, extolling their developmental benefits. Several IPEF members – including Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore – have associations with Chinese private sector companies, predominantly Huawei and ZTE. A study evaluating Indonesia’s response to such investments indicates that while they are aware of the risks posed by Chinese infrastructure, their calculus remains unaltered: development and capacity building remain their primary focuses. Furthermore, on the specific question of surveillance, given evidence of other countries such as the US and Australia also using digital infrastructure for surveillance, the threat from China is not perceived as a unique risk.

Setting expectations and approaches

Still, the risks of excessive dependence on one country for the development of digital infrastructure are well known. While the IPEF cannot realistically expect to displace the DSR, it can be utilised to provide countries with alternatives. This can only be done by issuing carrots rather than sticks. A US narrative extolling ‘digital democracy’ is unlikely to gain traction in a region characterised by a diversity of political systems that is focused on economic and development needs. At the same time, an excessive focus on thorny domestic policy issues – such as data localisation and the pipe dream of yet another mega-regional trade deal – could risk derailing the geo-economic benefits of the IPEF.

Instead, the IPEF must focus on capacity building, training and private sector investment in infrastructure across the Indo-Pacific. The US must position itself as a geopolitically reliable ally, interested in the overall stability of the digital Indo-Pacific, beyond its own economic or policy preferences. This applies equally to other external actors, like the EU, who may be interested in engaging with or shaping the digital economic landscape in the Indo-Pacific.

Countering Chinese economic influence and complementing security agendas set through other fora – such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue – should be the primary objective of the IPEF. It is crucial that unrealistic ambitions seeking convergence on values or domestic policy do not undermine strategic interests and dilute the immense potential of the IPEF in catalysing a more competitive and secure digital Indo-Pacific.

Table: Domestic policy positions on data localisation and data protection

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/directions-cyber-digital-europe-arindrajit-basu-september-16-2022-getting-the-digital-indo-pacific-economic-framework-right

Getting Strategic about Openness and Privacy

praskrishna — 2014-11-09T09:19:23Z

This blog post by Tim Davies, Open Data Research Lead at Web Foundation was published in Open Up? on November 3, 2014.

Click to read the original post here. Sunil Abraham gave his inputs.

Information is powerful. And in a world where the amount of information generated, captured and stored has grown exponentially in recent decades, getting hold of the information you need, when you need it, relies upon having access to the data that describes it. That makes the control of data especially powerful.

Modern transparency initiatives, promoting the idea of open data, have been seeking to break the data-monopoly of privileged actors within the state — unlocking key datasets and making them available for public scrutiny and reducing the information inequalities that undermine open public discourse. Opening up government data is *one* way in which citizens can reclaim some power and reestablish the principle that “they work for us”. Open government data gives us power to know how the government is spending money, what companies are getting public sector contracts and licenses, who owns these companies, what profits they make and what royalties and taxes they pay. Yet, progress has been slow, and we have faced substantial challenges in securing reliable and standardised flows of public data that can be joined-up to give a true picture of how public resources are being used, and key decisions made. Although millions of public datasets have been placed online, the most politically salient are often lacking. The 2013 Open Data Barometer found fewer than 1 in 10 accountability datasets were truly open.

At the same time, advocates of building a more open government need to grapple with three other trends that are shaping discussions of data, power and the state:

Firstly, and most important, the revelations brought to our attention by whistleblower Edward Snowden have confirmed the extent of the secret state and the profound imbalance of power between citizens and their state created through mass surveillance. Whilst projects to disclose even basic data on the state like public spending are underfunded and ad hoc, billions of dollars are poured into tools and technologies that violate basic human rights and that threaten trust and security on the Web. Fundamentally the problem with secret mass surveillance is that it destroys the checks and balances that are meant to limit the power of the state over citizens.
Secondly, and in part due to the discussion spared by Snowden, public awareness of the data, and consequently power, held by corporations has grown. The Web has become increasingly centralised, and large companies now harvest large amounts of data on any individual technology user. In parallel, in some countries such as the UK, governments have sought to use open data agendas as cover for increased proprietary sharing of public data with private firms, seeking to go around established principles of consent to share publicly held health, tax or student records with profit-making firms. Such data-sharing is not inherently wrong if there are public benefits, but building citizen trust in the state’s stewardship of personal data, and ensuring safeguards are in place to warrant that trust, is a major challenge.
Thirdly, concerns have been raised that some of the data released through open data initiatives may also affect the privacy of citizens. Some aggregated and anonymised datasets can be combined with other data to reverse engineer identifiable information. Although early calls for “raw data now” were clear that they were not calling for open personal information, in practice the divide between personal and public can be a narrow one.

So, do these trends mean we should be more cautious about opening up? Should the balance swing back towards a focus on protecting privacy? Ultimately, a simple opposition of privacy and openness is a false dichotomy. The question is not should we focus on openness, or should we protect privacy: but is Who should be open? And how? And whose privacy should be protected, and how?

Sunil Abraham, of the Centre for Internet and Society in Bangalore, has offered a key solution in the idea that:

“Transparency should be proportional to power, privacy inversely so.”

It is on this basis that organisations working for a fairer future, with more vibrant public discourse, greater freedom, and better governments, can campaign for both privacy and openness together. Those who occupy public office, own companies, or tender for public contracts must accept that there is a legitimate public interest in information about their activities in these roles, whilst independent citizens must be afforded space to form views and live lives without constant state surveillance. Companies should not be considered to have a right to privacy: their interests are already protected by other laws and provisions.

To deliver effective openness through open data, the Web Foundation is working to understand how data gets used on the ground in different settings across the world, and, with Omidyar support, is working on the creation of inclusive open data standards for public contracting data. Standards like the Open Contracting Data Standard are part of building a new infrastructure of open governance, making it possible to join-up data from different places, helping tilt the balance of power towards citizens when it comes to scrutinising governments and corporations. Through the Open Data Barometer we keep track of the availability of key datasets that can be used for accountability, and we’re co-chairing the Open Government Partnership Open Data Working Group, seeking to set high standards for relevant and usable data disclosures by governments.

By focussing on the civic use of data, we can better identify those datasets that must be in the public domain. And by thinking about relative power when considering privacy we can address genuine privacy concerns, whilst not allowing corporations claiming privacy rights, or public figures trying to hide their financial interests, from diminishing the power of data to enable accountability.

At the same time, the Web Foundation leads the Web We Want campaign, challenging mass surveillance and seeking to secure a Web where individuals have the right to privacy, and the tools to secure it. And increasingly transparency of what the state and companies do with personal data can help increase the capacity of citizens to respond to threats to their autonomy, and can increase oversight and safeguards on state or corporate capacity.

Ultimately, our ongoing efforts to open up, and to protect individual freedoms, have to be strategic. And keeping an analysis of power, and Sunil’s maxim, in mind, provides a good starting point to guide the strategy.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/open-up-tim-davies-november-3-2014-getting-strategic-about-openness-and-privacy

Geo-economic impacts of the coronavirus: Global Supply Chains (Part I)

Nikhil Dave — 2020-06-16T08:17:44Z

This two part blog post looks at the geo-economic impacts of the coronavirus by examining crucial impacts of developments in China. Part I looks at the impact of China's shutdown on global supply chains and part two, considers the implications for the future of 5G technology.

Introduction

The outbreak and swift spread of COVID-19, though comparable to previous incidents such as the SARS-CoV virus outbreak in 2003, has had a far more severe impact for a number of reasons which inter alia, include China’s enhanced role in the world economy and global supply chains. Back in 2003, China produced a mere 5% of the Global GDP, which has since increased nearly four times to 16%, with similar rises in Chinese imports, exports, services sector and tourism. Emerging as a public health emergency and global pandemic over the past few months, there have been 7 million confirmed cases of COVID-19 and nearly 4,00,000 deaths worldwide. The resultant economic impact has also been devastating for most affected countries. In most instances, it can be traced back to China’s integral role as the “world’s factory.”

As the situation worsened in January, the response from China was drastic, with complete lockdowns of cities and provinces giving free reign to the surveillance state to control the lives of its citizens. The province of Hubei with a population of 58 million people was completely isolated from the rest of the country and millions of businesses worldwide, as it was placed in strict lockdown for months.

The adverse impact of a viral outbreak in a city was compounded greatly by the rate at which it can spread due to the efficiency of modern transport systems. The Chinese aviation sector being one of the largest in the world led to the rapid spread of COVID-19 across a number of countries. Beyond the impact on human lives, it has also exposed the pitfalls of placing complete reliance on one manufacturing hub.

Through this two part blog post, two broad impacts will be addressed– in part one, the impact of China’s shutdown on global supply chains and economy and in part two, the implications for the future of 5G technology. The latter would also include how China has strategically leveraged its near monopoly status in certain sectors, its earlier recovery, and the vulnerable economic position of states as effective tools to further its lead in the all-important 5G tech race.

BLOG POST 1 : Global Supply Chains

Disruption of Global Supply Chains

Internationally, the manufacturing industry is structured within the intertwined nature of global supply chains. This implies that a break in the flow of production and distribution of one part of the chain would have a compound effect on the interconnected global economy. It would prevent the manufacture of finished products in several other countries which are dependent on a specific region for components. However, these highly interdependent supply chains have only developed over the last three decades, with China’s extensive expansion and a massive push towards globalisation from the 1990s. China emerged as an industrial hub for several reasons which inter alia include: a low-cost workforce, extremely efficient manufacturing capabilities, lower tax rates, and streamlined logistics – placing it miles ahead of competing developing economies. This would provide companies with two particular benefits – extremely low production cost and a significant increase in profit margins. For businesses in the West, it became nearly impossible to compete with another that was manufacturing in China because they had significantly larger margins to undercut them on cost. Thus, businesses globally gravitated towards China as a manufacturer and provider of essential components with no readily available alternatives.

The resultant global supply chains tend to be rather opaque in their functioning, due to the prohibitively high investment of time and resources required in supply network mapping (the process of figuring out where each component of a product is sourced from). As a direct consequence, most companies tend to not have sufficient clarity on when disruptions are likely and no conceivable back-up plans. This has been witnessed in previous disasters such as the 2011 tsunami and earthquake in Japan when several automobile companies were oblivious to the supply chain disruptions for several weeks and production was halted globally. Yet, the troubles caused by placing reliance on a single supplier has not led to companies across sectors taking major steps to remedy the situation.

The lack of prior estimation of such an incident and creation of response plans despite a similar, albeit much smaller coronavirus outbreak (SARS-CoV in 2003) recently, has halted production across sectors US, Germany, France and others. The global supply chains have broken down in sectors ranging from machinery, aviation, pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, apparel, automobiles, and technology. This is majorly due to the limited inventories and paucity of substitutable source for components.

As per reports of a survey conducted by the Institute for Supply Management, nearly 75% of companies have faced supply chain disruptions due to China’s lockdown measures and transportation restrictions – showing the level of unpreparedness that most businesses are at within the current global crisis. A second study conducted by Dun & Bradstreet found that nearly 51,000 companies had direct suppliers in Wuhan itself – and the province has facilities which are Tier-2 suppliers for nearly 5 million companies in the world. Both multinationals and small businesses depend on China for either finished products or essential components – this enhances the economic impact with production being disrupted across all levels. So when China’s factories are closed, half the world’s factories across diverse sectors cannot continue production beyond the inventory they possess.

Excessive dependence?

The Sino-American Trade war had already stressed supply chains sufficiently over the past two years and China’s shutdown ended up being the last straw. Two key areas that have been impacted – critical medical equipment production (given the public health emergency) and the technology industry. The two have also been strategically linked by China to extract important geo-political benefits.

The response to the pandemic exposed the world’s over-dependence on China for key medical equipment including PPE, ventilators, and N95 masks which became highly valued as infection numbers rose. China produced nearly half of the world’s N95 respirators before the pandemic and with production in overdrive, it accounts for 85% . With China looking to use it as a bargaining chip, it had soured US-China relations further.

China’s integral role in the global electronics and technology industry produced a definitive impact on production for US companies and the rest of the world. Even the smartphone market which has witnessed consistent growth over the past decade has seen a decline in the first quarter of 2020. Apple was one of the first tech companies to acknowledge the impact on revenues and smartphone sales world over. Thus, the shutdown of China’s factory floors had created a supply side problem which soon evolved into a demand crunch due to lockdowns being imposed in all major economies.

The smartphone market demand crunch is indicative of a larger pattern of a sharp fall in demand across industries in the West. South Korea, one of the top exporters, has witnessed a 46.3% fall in exports as per its May numbers. Even in early March, a UNCTAD report estimated that global value chains had already suffered a loss of $50 billion, due to COVID-19 related shutdowns, of which the major impact has been on the US, EU, Japan and South Korea. Just two months later, the estimated losses to the global economy stand at $5.8-8.8 trillion, as per a report by the Asian Development Bank. China’s production shutdown along with the continued spread of COVID-19 has caused a catastrophic domino effect for the global economy which cannot be overstated.

Path ahead for Global Supply Chains & China’s Role

China has been slowly trying to get production back up with increased safety measures in place and stood at around 80% of earlier levels in April. Nonetheless the devastating impact of the pandemic has caused several states to re-evaluate their strategies of complete reliance on China for essential components. The sole dependence on China for essential components must be cut down despite the lower margins it provides simply because of the possibly incalculable damage caused by such an event.

An overarching trend among countries largely dependent on China has been their government’s push to decouple from China’s supply chains by setting-up of manufacturing facilities in South-East Asia. A number of businesses had been considering a transfer of part of their production centres to other Asian countries including India and other South-East Asian nations. These include the US tech giants – Apple, Microsoft and Google as well as Samsung, Intel, Nike and Adidas, that are considering a shift in partial production to Vietnam and Thailand. As a reactionary measure, governments in the United States and the EU have announced economic stimulus packages with figures in trillions. Within these stimulus packages some countries such as Japan have offered incentives in billions of dollars to firms for shifting production out of China.

Even though the US had signed phase one of a “historic” trade deal with China in January 2020, signalling a short truce after the trade wars, Trump has pushed the pedal back on sanctions in May. These include sanctions targeting Huawei to cover up loopholes which allowed American companies with facilities abroad to continue supplying components to China - including the all important semiconductor chips used in most Huawei devices and 5G base-stations. China has stated that they will retaliate with all necessary measures suggesting the trade wars are only likely to heighten once again. There have also been reports that China, taking a leaf out of the US’s ‘lawfare’ strategy, intends to launch innumerable investigations into US tech companies in retaliation. The sanctions could include investigations into companies such as Apple, Cisco, and Qualcomm that are heavily reliant on Chinese suppliers along with a prospective ban on Boeing aircrafts being purchased in China.

In light of the fresh sanctions and pressure on Johnson from his own party, even the UK has announced its intentions of forming a 5G alliance of democratic nations - the D10 - independent of Chinese reliance. (US sanctions on Huawei and the 5G alliance will be addressed in further detail in Part Two). China’s economic sanctions against Australia as retaliation for official investigations demands on the origin of the virus has caused Australia to consider reducing complete reliance on China as the primary market for its goods but stopping short of decoupling due to their mutual dependence.

Another strong indicator of a prominent economy looking to limit China’s impact in its economy and supply chains has been India’s move to block the automatic FDI route for neighbours given the “volatile business climate” in the COVID-19 hit economy. India’s clear intention is to prevent hostile takeover of businesses in India by Chinese firms and their rising commercial influence in India’s markets. All of these moves certainly suggest that several major economies are looking to reduce their economic reliance on China and diversify their supply chains.

With several countries looking to decouple their supply chains from China, geo-economic relations could be starkly different from the standards of normalcy. However, shifting production away from China and reducing their dependency presents several complex obstacles. China’s infrastructure and supply of highly-skilled workers in the technology and electronics industry are difficult to replicate elsewhere. Creation of adequate replacement for component manufacturing particularly is likely to take several years to develop capacity and infrastructure as well. Even if manufacturing processes are shifted outside China, companies may still have to rely on China for component sourcing, one of the major causes for the current breakdown of supply chains. Nintendo had partially transferred production of Switch consoles to Vietnam in 2019. In the wake of China’s shutdown, the console has been unavailable in stores since component supply dried up from China.

Even if a large swathe of countries is miraculously successful in reducing their economic reliance on China – the pattern of continued dependence displayed by companies like Nintendo in the technology sector point towards China’s continued importance. Its domination in 5G network infrastructure is also likely to continue - as will be mentioned in the subsequent blog post- this further entrenches the world’s reliance on China in the manufacture and deployment of technology. China is already slated to lead the global economic recovery since it is well ahead of other states and one of the only major economies likely to grow this year.

China has also displayed a willingness to take action to kickstart the process of global economic recovery by engaging and providing aid through several multilateral fora - including the ASEAN, the Central and Eastern European States under its controversial 17=1 Mechanism, the ten Pacific Island states, and the Arab League. The US, under Trump, has been adopting a policy of ‘America First’ which led to a lack of crucial international cooperation during the pandemic with other countries adopting export controls on essential products too. Furthermore, the US decision to cut funding from the WHO in the midst of a pandemic only brought further harms to their soft power and position as an international leader. The key advantages held and actions taken by China, in contrast to the US’s apathy could ensure their emergence as a winner in the emerging global economic order of the post-pandemic world. The control of global supply chains entrenched in Chinese domination seems unlikely to witness a radical shift because of the very over-dependence on China. This factor coupled with its earlier economic recovery from the pandemic highlight the importance it will continue to play in global economic affairs.

(Nikhil Dave is a student at the West Bengal University of National Juridical Sciences and a researcher at CIS. This post was edited and reviewed by Arindrajit Basu and Aman Nair)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/geo-economic-impacts-of-the-coronavirus-global-supply-chains-part-i

General Comments on Data Protection Bill

Pallavi Bedi and Shweta Mohandas — 2022-02-14T15:55:10Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/general-comments-data-protection-bill.pdf

Gender, Health, & Surveillance in India - Panel - Agenda

sumandro — 2020-12-23T13:56:07Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/gender-health-surveillance-in-india-panel-agenda

Gender, Health, & Surveillance in India - A Panel Discussion

Aayush Rathi and Ambika Tandon — 2020-12-23T14:03:13Z

Women and LGBTHIAQ-identifying persons face intensive and varied forms of surveillance as they access reproductive health systems. Increasingly, these systems are also undergoing rapid digitisation. The panel was set-up to discuss the discursive, experiential and policy implications of these data-intensive developments on access to public health and welfare systems by women and LGBTHIAQ-identifying persons in India. The panelists presented studies undertaken as part of two projects at CIS, one of which is supported by Privacy International, UK, and the other by Big Data for Development network established by International Development Research Centre, Canada.

Event note and agenda: Read (PDF)

Recording of the discussion: Watch (YouTube)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/gender-health-surveillance-in-india-panel-discussion

Gen Comments to PDP Bill

akash — 2020-02-12T11:50:32Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/gen-comments-to-pdp-bill

Gen Comments PDP Bill 2019

pallavi — 2020-02-21T10:00:16Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/accessibility/blog/gen-comments-pdp-bill-2019