Centre for Internet and Society

Pratap Vikram Singh - Why Aadhaar is Baseless?

praskrishna — 2016-04-02T05:31:30Z

This article by Pratap Vikram Singh, Governance Now, discusses the problems emerging out of the UIDAI project due to its lack of mechanisms for informed and granular consent, and for seeking recourse in the case of denial of service. The article quotes Sumandro Chattapadhyay and mentions Hans Varghese Mathew's work on the biometric basis of UIDAI. It was written before the Aadhaar bill was passed in Lok Sabha.

Cross-posted from Governance Now.

It was no less than a roller-coaster ride for Aadhaar, a programme formulated by the UPA government to assign a 12-digit unique number to every Indian resident. From the time it came into being in 2009, Aadhaar drew a volley of criticism, thanks to the misgivings and apprehensions that various critics and civil society organisations had. It was criticised for lack of a clear purpose, degree of effectiveness and absence of a privacy law and was virtually thrown into the bin by a parliamentary panel headed by BJP’s Yashwant Sinha in December 2011.

When the finance minister Arun Jaitley, in his budget speech, announced that the government would introduce the Aadhaar bill during the budget session, expectations were already set high. The bill, giving statutory backing to the unique identification authority of India (UIDAI), the implementing authority, was passed by the Lok Sabha on March 11. While the privacy and voluntary versus mandatory provisions are under the consideration of the supreme court, the bill makes way for linking Aadhaar with all government subsidies, benefits and services. The law on Aadhaar, former UIIDAI chairman Nandan Nilekani wrote in the Indian Express, will help the government in going paperless, presence-less and cashless. The legislation, however, fails to deliver on several counts.

However, prior to evaluating the bill (yet to be passed by the Rajya Sabha at the time of this writing though it is a money bill), let us take a look at its major aspects. For those, who always wondered whether Aadhaar is mandatory or voluntary, the bill 2016 makes it mandatory to avail subsidy, benefit or a service from the government.

The bill has provisions related to information security and confidentiality (section 28) which not only extend to employees of the UIDAI but also consultants and external agencies working with the authority.

The proposed law restricts information sharing. It bars UIDAI from sharing core biometric information – the bill defines it as fingerprints and iris scan – with “anyone for any reason whatsoever” or “used for any purpose other than generation of Aadhaar numbers and authentication under this Act”. The section 32 of the bill entitles Aadhaar number holders to access her or his authentication record. It also bars the authority from collecting, keeping or maintaining information about the purpose of authentication.

Odd Drives the Bill

While the intent is clear and is aimed at streamlining welfare schemes to ensure it reaches the bottom of the pyramid, cutting through the long chain of pilferage and subversion, the bill, however, has several shortcomings. To begin with, the government should not have taken the money bill route to pass the legislation – tactfully avoiding any conclusive discussion and debate in the Rajya Sabha, where it is in minority.

The bill assumes that the technology and the biometric system used by the UIDAI are flawless and it doesn’t provide any recourse in case of denial of a service. “If your fingerprint is not matching and you lose out on service, then what is the alternative mechanism you have,” asks Sumandro Chattapadhyay, research director, centre for internet and society (CIS). The bill doesn’t provide for recourse. “What if the scanning machine fails? What if the identifiers of two people match?”

Based on experiments conducted in the initial days of the Aadhaar programme, Hans Verghese Mathews, another CIS researcher, did a study on the probability of matching of identifiers of two persons. “For the current population of 1.2 billion the expected proportion of duplicands (users whose identifiers match) is 1/121, a ratio which is far too high,” Mathews wrote in the Economic and Political Weekly in February.

“It is like putting the technology in a black box – which can’t be reviewed,” says Chattapadhyay. The bill doesn’t talk about setting up an independent body to review the logs and keep an eye on wrong and duplicate matches.

Who Defines National Security?

According to public policy experts, it is an attempt to seek “minimal legitimacy” from parliament and further adds to the unbridled power of the executive.

Although the bill restricts information sharing in section 29, sections 33 and 48 provide exemption in cases of national security and public emergency, respectively. The legislation, nevertheless, doesn’t elaborate on what constitutes national security and public emergency, leaving it to the executives. The section 33 reads: “Nothing contained in… shall apply in respect of any disclosure of information, including identity information or authentication records, made in the interest of national security….”

Similarly, section 48 states that if, at any time, the central government is of the opinion that a public emergency exists, “the central government may, by notification, supersede the Authority for such period, not exceeding six months, as may be specified in the notification and appoint a person or persons as the president may direct to exercise powers and discharge functions under this Act”.

Says Jayati Ghosh, professor, centre for economic studies and planning, Jawaharlal Nehru University, “National security is a very opaque term. Who decides what national security is? Today, the whole JNU is being projected as a threat to national security.” Swagato Sarkar, associate professor and executive director, Jindal school of government and public policy, OP Jindal Global University, says, “The bill has provisions for oversight on the use of Aadhaar, but then it suspends those provisions in case of emergency in the later sections, giving the state the power to use biometric information for whatever it deems fit.”

Sarkar adds, “It seems the bill is simply an instrument for seeking minimum legitimacy from parliament. The bill tries to address the concern of privacy minimally and it hardly serves any purpose.” He believes that there is a need to define the broader contours of democratic control of the state and reassess the changing state-citizen relationship, instead of rejecting the whole idea on the basis of surveillance and privacy. In other words, there is a need for strong parliamentary oversight, and that the Aadhaar related matters shouldn’t be completely delegated to the executive.

In its recommendations on formulating Privacy Act, the justice AP Shah committee in 2012 provided for establishing the office of privacy commissioner at the regional and central levels, defining the role of self-regulating organisations and co-regulation, and creating a system of complaints and redressal for aggrieved individuals. Since the country still doesn’t have any legislation on privacy, people are left on their own in case of an infringement or violation of privacy. Moreover, section 47 states, “No court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act, save on a complaint made by the Authority or any officer or person authorised by it.”

In its report, the parliamentary committee headed by Yashwant Sinha notes that “enactment of national data protection law… is a prerequisite for any law that deals with large scale collection of information from individuals and its linkages across separate databases”. The committee notes that in absence of data protection legislation, it would be difficult to deal with issues of access, misuse of personal information, surveillance, profiling, linking and matching of databases and securing confidentiality of information.

Subsidy-Aadhaar Linkage

The Sinha committee also takes a cautious view of the role of Aadhaar in curbing leakages in subsidy distribution, as beneficiary identification is done by states. It notes, “Even if the Aadhaar number links entitlements to targeted beneficiaries, it may not even ensure that beneficiaries have been correctly identified. Thus, the present problem of proper identification would persist.”

According to Ghosh, the biggest danger in using Aadhaar for social welfare programmes is that the fingerprints of the rural working class is not always in good shape and hence Aadhaar will not be the best way of identification. “If I am misidentified, I can go to so many places for recourse. But what if a labourer in a remote Jharkhand village is misidentified? Where and whether he would go?” the economist asks. Besides, the bill doesn’t limit the use of Aadhaar and defines areas where it can be used. Section 57 says that the law will not prevent the use of Aadhaar number for establishing the identity of an individual for any purpose, “whether by the state or anybody corporate or person, pursuant to any law, for the time being in force or any contract to this effect.”

According to a PRS Legislative review, since the bill also allows private persons to use Aadhaar as a proof of identity for any purpose, the provision will open a floodgate and enable private entities such as airlines, telecom, insurance and real estate companies to mandate Aadhaar as a proof of identity for availing their services.

Since the bill doesn’t restrict its application, people will not have a choice to identify themselves other than using Aadhaar when corporate organisations make it mandatory, says Chattapadhyay of the CIS. Adds Sarkar, “The bill should clearly mention sectors or services where Aadhaar will be potentially used (or made mandatory). Every time a new sector or service is added to the list, it is done after parliamentary approval.”

So far, 98 crore people have been assigned Aadhaar number. So far the project has costed Rs 8,000 crore.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/gov-now-pratap-vikram-singh-17032016-why-aadhaar-is-baseless

Power over privacy: New Personal Data Protection Bill fails to really protect the citizen’s right to privacy

Nikhil Pahwa — 2019-12-15T05:57:31Z

Nikhil Pahwa throws light on the new personal data protection bill.

The article by Nikhil Pahwa was published in the Times of India on December 12, 2019. CIS report was mentioned.

Earlier this year, in April, a data breach in the Election Commission of Philippines led to the leakage of personal information of over 55 million eligible voters on a searchable website: including names, addresses and date of birth. This was not the first data breach from the Election Commission. After the first, which took place in March 2016, where 340 GB of voter data was published online by a group of hackers called LulzSec Pilipinas, the National Privacy Commission of Philippines found that the Election Commission had violated the Data Privacy Act of 2012, and recommended criminal prosecution of its chairman, finding him liable when the agency failed to dispense its duty as a “personal information controller”.

It’s 2019, and that recommendation has still not been acted upon, because the National Privacy Commission of Philippines only has recommendatory powers for criminal prosecution. Meanwhile, data breaches continue at the Election Commission of Philippines.

Between 2017 and 2018, Aadhaar related personally identifiable data of several Indian citizens, including names, addresses, bank account numbers, in some cases pregnancy information and even religion and caste information of individuals, was published online by Indian government departments. The Centre for Internet and Society, in a report, estimated that personally identifiable data for 130-135 million Indian citizens had been leaked, thus putting them at risk. 210 government websites had made Aadhaar related data public, UIDAI confirmed in response to an RTI in 2017.

No one was held liable. There was no data protection law, no data protection authority, no criminal prosecution was recommended. Around that time, the Indian government was instead arguing in the Supreme Court that privacy isn’t a fundamental right under the Indian Constitution.

What we can learn from these two instances is that for the enforcement of a citizen’s right to privacy, and ensuring that no one takes the protection of data lightly, there needs to be a strong privacy law that holds even the government responsible, and above all, a strong data protection authority that is independent and has powers to penalise even government officials. On some of these counts, the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019, disappoints.

First, members of the Data Protection Authority will no longer be appointed by independent entities from diverse backgrounds: where they were previously going to be appointed by a committee comprising the Chief Justice of India or a Supreme Court judge, the Cabinet secretary, and an independent expert, the power to appoint members to DPA now rests solely with government officials, including the appointment of adjudicating officers. In addition, the central government, in the interest of “national security, sovereignty, international relations and public order, can issue directions to DPA, which DPA will be bound by. Powers of DPA have also been reduced: while in the previous version of the bill, DPA had the sole power to categorise data as sensitive personal data, in the current version, the power rests with the central government, albeit in consultation with DPA. The central government will also notify any social media company as a significant data fiduciary, and not DPA. Only the central government can determine what critical personal data is, and not DPA.

This dependence on the government for appointments, functions and definitions, will invariably impact the independence of DPA, and even though the 2019 version of the bill gives it the authority to fine the state a maximum of Rs 5-15 crore, depending on the offence, i’d be surprised if this ever happens.

The bill does create significant exceptions for the state to acquire and process data, and an opportunity to create a base for surveillance reform in the country has been lost. The previous version of the bill had brought some sense of safety against mass surveillance, when it included the condition that processing of data by the government must be “necessary and proportionate”, drawing from Supreme Court’s historic right to privacy judgment. This is particularly important given that the bill also gives power to the government to exempt any agency from the provisions of the bill for processing of personal data, which includes acquiring data from any public or private entity.

Effectively, this means that government agencies may be exempt from any scrutiny by DPA, and can even collect data from third parties (for example, fin-tech companies, health-tech startups) without the user even knowing. Forget recommending criminal prosecution for mass surveillance, India’s DPA won’t even be able to fine a government agency for such a violation of the fundamental right to privacy. The government also has vast exceptions for data processing: “for the performance of any function of the state authorised by law”.

This aside, one of the more curious clauses in the bill is around non-personal data. The government, a few months ago, constituted a committee led by Infosys co-founder Kris Gopalakrishnan to look into the governance of non-personal data. Non-personal data, as the term suggests, is any data that is not related to an individual. In the bill, the government has given itself the right to acquire this data, which is essentially a company’s intellectual property, to “promote framing of policies for digital economy”. Why non-personal data finds a mention in a Personal Data Protection Bill is beyond comprehension, and this move will not inspire much confidence in businesses operating in India, when the state claims eminent domain over intellectual property.

It’s unfortunate minister Ravi Shankar Prasad is sending the bill to a select committee, given the fact that such significant changes to the bill should have led to another public consultation.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-times-of-india-december-12-2019-power-over-privacy

Porn: Law, Video, Technology

praskrishna — 2011-09-27T11:25:57Z

Namita’s legal inquiry into the relationship between technologies and the law finds a new point of entry into existing debates by looking at the legal construction of pleasure through different technologies of mass consumption in order to revisit the arguments around pornography and obscenity effect in recent times. She produces a comprehensive overview of different debates, both in the West and in India, to concentrate on how the visual aesthetics of pornography, the new circuits of pornographic consumption and the privilege of affect over regulation lead to possibilities of interaction and negotiation with heteronormative power structures in the country.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/histories-of-the-internet/porn-law-video

Porn: Law, Video, Technology

praskrishna — 2011-09-28T09:30:40Z

Namita Malhotra focuses on pornography, pleasure and law, where she finds a new point of entry into existing debates by looking at legal construction of pleasure through different technologies of mass consumption. She revisits the arguments around pornography, obscenity and affect in recent times. Malhotra produces a comprehensive over-view of different debates, both in the West and in India, to concentrate on how the visual aesthetics of pornography, the new circuits of pornographic consumption, the privilege of affect over regulation lead to possibilities of interaction and negotiation with heternormative power structures in the country. The monograph demonstrates how the grey zones of pornography and the law’s inability to deal with it, offer new conceptual tools of understanding the spaces of digital interaction and identity.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/histories-of-the-internet/porn-law.pdf

Poor Guarantee of Online Freedom in India

praskrishna — 2012-06-17T04:18:26Z

The debate over the "Intermediaries Guidelines" as part of the Information Technology Act, 2000 in Parliament brought focus to the issue of censorship and lack of accountability of governing bodies vis-à-vis the internet in the country. This cannot be divorced from the larger questions related to the threats to freedom of expression from both the state and various societal actors today.

This article by Geeta Seshu was published in the Economic & Political Weekly, Vol XLVII No. 24, June 2012.

An annulment motion against the Information Technology (Inter-mediaries Guidelines) Rules, 2011 moved by Member of Parliament (MP) P Rajeev of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) in the Rajya Sabha, was the first serious attempt by internet freedom activists to get the Information Technology (IT) Act, 2000 discussed and reviewed by the country’s lawmakers.

Not unexpectedly, the motion, specifically against the rules governing intermediaries – clause (zg) of subsection (2) of Section 87 read with subsection (2) of Section 79 of the >IT Act, 2000 – was not carried. However, the discussion that preceded it at least demonstrated the concerns of parliamentarians about what internet freedom activists have termed the “draconian” provisions of the IT Act.

It is about time, really, that parliamentarians sit down to review what they very quickly acquiesced to in December 2009. It is also about time that the debate over the provisions of the IT Act be conducted in the public domain, instead of in closed-door meetings with expert groups and committees comprising a narrow set of stakeholders favoured by the government or its various wings.

The discussion in the Rajya Sabha largely centred around the vague and sweeping terminology of the range of content that anyone could take objection to. P Rajeev said that while he supported the regulation of the internet, he was not in favour of its control. The rules were ultra vires the IT Act, he said. Echoing his concern, leader of the opposition Arun Jaitley of the Bharatiya Janata Party, D Raja of the Communist Party of India and N K Singh of the Janata Dal (United) – to name just a few – also said that the internet was different from other media and censoring it was untenable.

Finally, union minister for information technology, Kapil Sibal, was forced to give an assurance to the house that he would call a meeting of MPs, industry and all stakeholders and implement whatever consensus emerges after a discussion on the specific words members had objections to.

There was no mention from the minister on a host of other problem areas in the rules as they are currently framed, including the very sweeping definition of an “intermediary” itself (any entity which on behalf of another receives, stores or transmits any electronic record – which means internet service providers, web hosting providers, search engines, online payment sites, cybercafes and bloggers too). No mention either of the rules for intermediaries to takedown notices within 36 hours of receiving a complaint, irrespective of whether these are fair and reasonable. No mention of whether the rules need to provide procedures for hearing and adjudicating complaints before any content is taken down.

The IT Guidelines

In several ways, the rules have gone way beyond what was laid down in the IT Act, but they also add considerably to the original reasonable restrictions laid down under Article 19 (2) of the Constitution of India. Some of the terms that can invite objections under the guidelines are:

(a) Belongs to another person and to which the user does not have any right to; (b) grossly harmful, harassing, blasphemous, defamatory, obscene, pornographic, paedophiliac, libellous, invasive of another’s privacy, hateful, or racially, ethnically objectionable, disparaging, relating or encouraging money laundering or gambling, or otherwise unlawful in any manner whatever; (c) harm minors in any way; (d) infringes any patent, trademark, copyright or other proprietary rights; (e) violates any law for the time being in force; (f) deceives or misleads the addressee about the origin of such messages or communicates any information which is grossly offensive or menacing in nature; (g) impersonate another person; (h) contains software viruses or any other computer code, files or programmes designed to interrupt, destroy or limit the functionality of any computer resource; (i) threatens the unity, integrity, defence, security or sovereignty of India, friendly relations with foreign states, or public order or causes incitement to the commission of any cognisable offence or prevents investigation of any offence or is insulting any other nation.

With this wide-ranging and entirely arbitrary set of potential violations, the possibility of misuse is also immense. In its comments submitted in response to the draft rules, Privacy India and the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) pointed out that Sections 79(1) and (2) of the amended IT Act itself did provide for exemptions for third party liabilities of intermediaries, something that the rules have now virtually set aside.[1]

Other comments submitted by these organisations about security and privacy of cybercafe users deal with minors and with the general architecture of cybercafes. In the first instance, the organisations expressed concern that undue restrictions on the use of the internet by minors (photo identity cards, accompanied by adults, etc) would hamper their access to the internet and would actually discourage poorer children from using the internet.

In the second instance, the detailed restrictions on the layout of the cybercafés – the height of cabins and the directions of the screens, etc, would, they felt, be intrusive and violate the privacy of internet users in cybercafes. Besides, vulnerable sections like sexual minorities or HIV positive patients may even be open to identity theft, they feared.

The discussion on the rules unfortunately did not come close to addressing these fears. While the lawmakers generally accepted the importance of regulation of the internet and electronic communication, there is still very little clarity on exactly how this must be done, the extent to which regulation must take place and the agency that will be entrusted with this task.

The IT Act, 2000 was first passed in an era when the country was transitioning to an electronic age. E-commerce was uppermost in the minds of policymakers, their eyes firmly fixed on the new economy. But soon enough, it was clear that technology was developing rapidly and an expert committee was constituted to revise the act and suggest amendments that would incorporate technological changes.

Lack of Accountability

In the wake of the 26 November 2008 attack in Mumbai, national security and intelligence were powerful emotional catchwords and few questioned some of the sweeping provisions laid down by the rules under the IT Act. While the annulment motion focuses on the pernicious nature of the guidelines for intermediaries, this is only one amongst a series of rules that seek to change the very manner in which Indians can access and use the internet. Other rules relate to decrypting, monitoring and blocking of communication, data security and privacy (Section 69: interception, monitoring and decryption of information, Section 69 A: blocking, Section 69 B: monitoring of traffic data or information) and of course, the complete absence of checks and balances for the powers given to authorities like Computer Emergency Response Team India (CERT-In).

In fact, there has been little or no review of the responsibility vested in an agency like CERT-In, which describes itself as the nodal agency to oversee the security of the nation. Conflating security concerns with content that may be objectionable to some is one thing but also providing this agency with the powers to block sites without even the creators of these sites getting to know about it is another.

Most of our attention today is on the censorship rampant on the internet in India. Most recently, there have been several instances of internet sites being blocked and takedown notices sent to bloggers. In the last few months, we have had the arbitrary blocking of the website cartoonsagainstcorruption.com which was run by Kanpur-based cartoonist Aseem Trivedi, the arrest of Jadavpur University professor Ambikesh Mohapatra and the controversial move last year by the Indian government to get internet service providers to remove so-called objectionable content on Facebook, Orkut and Youtube, apart from other sites. A complaint against these sites by journalist Vinay Rai followed soon after, though it strangely did not invoke provisions of the IT Act, preferring to cite alleged violations under the Indian Penal Code.

Trivedi did not even know that his site was blocked till some friends called him to tell him that they could not access his site. After an exchange of emails with his webhost, the portal “Big Rock”, he was informed that the site was suspended because it contained cartoons that showed disrespect to national emblems. A complaint had been received by Mumbai’s cybercrime cell by a Mumbai-based advocate, R P Pandey. The Kanpur resident also learnt later from newspaper reports that another case, this time under charges of sedition, were lodged against him in Beed district of Maharashtra.

While this method of embroiling someone in cases in far-flung geographical areas is not new (the complaint by the Indian Institute of Planning and Management against New Delhi-based Caravan magazine in Silchar, Assam is a good case in point), Trivedi quickly moved the content on his site onto another blogging platform, also got together friends and supporters to launch “Saveyourvoice”, an online and offline campaign, with a cheeky celebration of All Fool’s Day on 1 April 2012 with a greeting to the minister Kapil Sibal “for his foolish attempts to try censoring internet” and another campaign – “Freedom in a cage” – at Jantar Mantar, Delhi, in April 2012.

Other internet freedom activists have got together to secure information on censorship. Last year, a right-to-information (RTI) application by the CIS revealed that 11 websites were blocked on orders from the department of information technology. A writ petition against the IT Act has been filed in the Kerala High Court and the Software Freedom Law Centre, which was instrumental in campaigning for the annulment motion in the Rajya Sabha, has launched an online petition against the IT Act rules that refers to government authority to censor facebook posts, monitor emails and skype conversations, access private information and mine sensitive personal data.[2]

Governments the world over are exercised about the need to impose restrictions on online freedom and a good indication is the bi-annual Google Transparency Report that monitors the number and categories of requests sent by different governments to take down content. In the last report for the period January to June 2011, the report recorded requests to remove 358 items and 68 content removal requests, 58% of which were fully or partially complied with. In addition, there were government requests to remove Youtube videos that were protests against local leaders or used offensive language against religious leaders, besides 236 communities and profiles from Orkut which were critical of a local politician.

Interestingly, while content removal requests for the Orkut profiles remained as Google maintained it did not fit its own community standards or local law, Google chose to “locally” restrict the videos that may incite enmity between communities. With minor variations, this is a stance adopted by other online companies, like Facebook and Twitter, with the latter coming out with a policy earlier this year that it would remove content that appeared to violate local laws.

In the struggle to keep the internet free and protect communication from surveillance and blocking by governments, it would be naive to expect commercially-driven internet companies to put up much of a stand. Most of these stakeholders have agreed with lawmakers that the internet does need regulation. On their part, the Indian government, which has flexed its desire to regulate the internet, has also been sensitive to criticism of its role in censoring online freedom. Other stakeholders – the vast community of users of the internet, bloggers, website hosts, creators and producers of online videos, file-sharers, software developers, etc, are only engaged in a race to protect their content and shift it to more amenable sites every time they run into trouble.

Threats to Freedom of Expression

However, it must be noted that the censorship of online media is but a reflection of the curbs on freedom of expression in general. The attacks on freedom of expression in “offline” media, the attacks on journalists and the deaths of eight journalists since 2010,[3] the alarming regularity with which we are witnessing a ban on books and cinema, art or theatre, the increasing intolerance of dissenting or differing opinions in society, the abject fear of free and independent debate and discussion and the role of the government in actively furthering this intolerance are suggestive of a dangerous trend.

Almost all these instances are marked by the clear absence of any due procedure in addressing the content that becomes objectionable to someone or some sections of society, instead arbitrarily and speedily removing this content from the public domain. Whether it is the withdrawal of Rohinton Mistry’s book Such a Long Journey, a prescribed textbook by Bombay University, midway through the academic year, or that of recent issue of the National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT) textbook on the Constitution of India, institutional redressal mechanisms were simply not given a chance.

The woeful absence of similar redressal mechanisms for so-called objectionable content under the rules of the amended IT Act only exacerbates this situation further.

Notes

[1].http://privacyindia.org/2011/03/10/comments-on-the-information-technology-guidelines-for-cyber-cafe-rules-2011/
[2].www.softwarefreedom.org
[3].The Free Speech Hub, which has been tracking violations of freedom of expression as part of a project from the media-watch site, The Hoot (www.thehoot.org), has this list: Hemchandra Pandey (July 2010), Bimala Prasad Talukdar (September 2010), Sushil Pathak (December 2010), Umesh Rajput (January 2011), J Dey (June 2011), Ramesh Singhla (October 2011), Chandrioka (February 2012) and Rajesh Mishra (March 2012).

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/poor-guarantee-of-online-freedom-in-india

Policy Recommendations for Surveillance Law in India and an Analysis of Legal Provisions on Surveillance in India and the Necessary & Proportionate Principles

maria — 2015-03-14T03:08:04Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/policy-recommendations-for-surveillance-law-in-india-and-analysis-of-legal-provisions-on-surveillance-in-india-and-the-necessary-and-proportionate-principles.pdf

Policy Paper on Surveillance in India

vipul — 2015-08-03T15:27:41Z

This policy brief analyses the different laws regulating surveillance at the State and Central level in India and calls out ways in which the provisions are unharmonized. The brief then provides recommendations for the harmonization of surveillance law in India.

Introduction

The current legal framework for surveillance in India is a legacy of the colonial era laws that had been drafted by the British. Surveillance activities by the police are an everyday phenomenon and are included as part of their duties in the various police manuals of the different states. It will become clear from an analysis of the laws and regulations below, that whilst the police manuals cover the aspect of physical surveillance in some detail, they do not discuss the issue of interception of telephone or internet traffic. These issues are dealt with separately under the Telecom Act and the Information Technology Act and the Rules made thereunder, which are applicable to all security agencies and not just the police. Since the Indian laws deal with different aspects of surveillance under different legislations, the regulations dealing with this issue do not have any uniform standards. This paper therefore argues that the need of the hour is to have a single legislation which deals with all aspects of surveillance and interception in one place so that there is uniformity in the laws and practices of surveillance in the entire country.

Legal Regime

India does not have one integrated policy on surveillance and law enforcement and security agencies have to rely upon a number of different sectoral legislations to carry out their surveillance activities. These include:

1. Police Surveillance under Police Acts and Model Police Manual

Article 246(3) of the Constitution of India, read with Entry 2, List II, of the VIIth Schedule, empowers the States to legislate in matters relating to the police. This means that the police force is under the control of the state government rather than the Central government. Consequently, States have their own Police Acts to govern the conduct of the police force. Under the authority of these individual State Police Acts, rules are formulated for day-to-day running of the police. These rules are generally found in the Police Manuals of the individual states. Since a discussion of the Police Manual of each State with its small deviations is beyond the scope of this study, we will discuss the Model Police Manual issued by the Bureau of Police Research and Development.

As per the Model Police Manual, “surveillance and checking of bad characters” is considered to be one of the duties of the police force mentioned in the “Inventory of Police Duties, Functions and Jobs”.[1] Surveillance is also one of the main methods utilized by the police for preventing law and order situations and crimes.[2] As per the Manual the nature and degree of surveillance depends on the circumstances and persons on whom surveillance is mounted and it is only in very rare cases and on rare occasions that round the clock surveillance becomes necessary for a few days or weeks.[3]

Surveillance of History Sheeted Persons: Beat Police Officers should be fully conversant with the movements or changes of residence of all persons for whom history sheets of any category are maintained. They are required to promptly report the exact information to the Station House Officer (SHO), who make entries in the relevant registers. The SHO on the basis of this information reports, by the quickest means, to the SHO in whose jurisdiction the concerned person/persons are going to reside or pass through. When a history-sheeted person is likely to travel by the Railway, intimation of his movements should also be given to the nearest Railway Police Station.[4] It must be noted that the term “history sheet” or “history sheeter” is not defined either in the Indian Penal Code, 1860, most of the State Police Acts or the Model Police Manual, but it is generally understood and defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as persons with a criminal record.

Surveillance of “Bad Characters”: Keeping tabs on and getting information regarding “bad characters” is part of the duties of a beat constable. In the case of a “bad character” who is known to have gone to another State, the SHO of the station in the other state is informed using the quickest means possible followed by sending of a BC Roll 'A' directly to the SHO.[5] When a “bad character” absents himself or goes out of view, whether wanted in a case or not, the information is required to be disseminated to the police stations having jurisdiction over the places likely to be visited by him and also to the neighbouring stations, whether within the State or outside. If such person is traced and intimation is received of his arrest or otherwise, arrangements to get a complete and true picture of his activities are required to be made and the concerned record updated.[6]

The Police Manual clarifies the term “bad characters” to mean “offenders, criminals, or members of organised crime gangs or syndicates or those who foment or incite caste, communal violence, for which history sheets are maintained and require surveillance.”[7] A fascinating glimpse into the history of persons who were considered to be “bad characters” is contained in the article by Surjan Das & Basudeb Chattopadhyay in EPW[8] wherein they bring out the fact that in colonial times a number of the stereotypes propagated by the British crept into their police work as well. It appears that one did not have to be convicted to be a bad character, but people with a dark complexion, strong built, broad chins, deep-set eyes, broad forehead, short hair, scanty or goatee beard, marks on face, moustache, blunt nose, white teeth and monkey-face would normally fit the description of “bad characters”.

Surveillance of Suspicious Strangers: When a stranger of suspicious conduct or demeanour is found within the limits of a police station, the SHO is required to forward a BC Roll to the Police Station in whose jurisdiction the stranger claims to have resided. The receipt of such a roll is required to be immediately acknowledged and replied. If the suspicious stranger states that he resides in another State, a BC Roll is sent directly to the SHO of the station in the other State.[9] The manual however, does not define who a “suspicious stranger” is and how to identify one.

Release of Foreign Prisoners: Before a foreign prisoner (whose finger prints are taken for record) is released the Superintendent of Police of the district where the case was registered is required to send a report to the Director, I.B. through the Criminal Investigation Department informing the route and conveyance by which such person is likely to leave the country.[10]

Shadowing of convicts and dangerous persons: The Police Manual contains the following rules for shadowing the convicts on their release from jails:

(a) Dangerous convicts who are not likely to return to their native places are required to be shadowed. The fact, when a convict is to be shadowed is entered in the DCRB in the FP register and communicated to the Superintendent of Jails.

(b) The Police Officer deputed for shadowing an ex-convict is required to enter the fact in the notebook. The Police Officers area furnished with a challan indicating the particulars of the ex-convict marked for shadowing. This form is returned by the SHO of the area where the ex-convict takes up his residence or passes out of view to the DCRB / OCRS where the jail is situated, where it is put on record for further reference and action if any. Even though the subjects being shadowed are kept in view, no restraint is to put upon their movements on any account.[11]

Apart from the provisions discussed above, there are also provisions in the Police Manual regarding surveillance of convicts who have been released on medical grounds as well as surveillance of ex-convicts who are required to report their movements to the police as per the provisions of section 356 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.[12]

As noted above, the various police manuals are issued under the State Police Acts and they govern the police force of the specific states. The fact that each state has its own individual police manual itself leads to non-uniformity regarding standards and practices of surveillance. But it is not only the legislations at the State levels which lead to this problem, even legislation at the Central level, which are applicable to the country as a whole also have differing standards regarding different aspects of surveillance. In order to explore this further, we shall now discuss the central legislations dealing with surveillance.

2. The Indian Telegraph Act, 1885

Section 5 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, empowers the Central Government and State Governments of India to order the interception of messages in two circumstances: (1) in the occurrence of any public emergency or in the interest of public safety, and (2) if it is considered necessary or expedient to do so in the interest of:[13]

the sovereignty and integrity of India; or
the security of the State; or
friendly relations with foreign states; or
public order; or
for preventing incitement to the commission of an offence.

The Supreme Court of India has specified the terms 'public emergency' and 'public safety', based on the following[14]:

"Public emergency would mean the prevailing of a sudden condition or state of affairs affecting the people at large calling for immediate action. The expression 'public safety' means the state or condition of freedom from danger or risk for the people at large. When either of these two conditions are not in existence, the Central Government or a State Government or the authorised officer cannot resort to telephone tapping even though there is satisfaction that it is necessary or expedient so to do in the interests of it sovereignty and integrity of India etc. In other words, even if the Central Government is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do in the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of India or the security of the State or friendly relations with sovereign States or in public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of an offence, it cannot intercept the message, or resort to telephone tapping unless a public emergency has occurred or the interest of public safety or the existence of the interest of public safety requires. Neither the occurrence of public emergency nor the interest of public safety are secretive conditions or situations. Either of the situations would be apparent to a reasonable person."

In 2007, Rule 419A was added to the Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951 framed under the Indian Telegraph Act which provided that orders on the interception of communications should only be issued by the Secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs. However, it provided that in unavoidable circumstances an order could also be issued by an officer, not below the rank of a Joint Secretary to the Government of India, who has been authorised by the Union Home Secretary or the State Home Secretary.[15]

According to Rule 419A, the interception of any message or class of messages is to be carried out with the prior approval of the Head or the second senior most officer of the authorised security agency at the Central Level and at the State Level with the approval of officers authorised in this behalf not below the rank of Inspector General of Police, in the belowmentioned emergent cases:

in remote areas, where obtaining of prior directions for interception of messages or class of messages is not feasible; or
for operational reasons, where obtaining of prior directions for interception of message or class of messages is not feasible;

however, the concerned competent authority is required to be informed of such interceptions by the approving authority within three working days and such interceptions are to be confirmed by the competent authority within a period of seven working days. If the confirmation from the competent authority is not received within the stipulated seven days, such interception should cease and the same message or class of messages should not be intercepted thereafter without the prior approval of the Union Home Secretary or the State Home Secretary.[16]

Rule 419A also tries to incorporate certain safeguards to curb the risk of unrestricted surveillance by the law enforcement authorities which include the following:

Any order for interception issued by the competent authority should contain reasons for such direction and a copy of such an order should be forwarded to the Review Committee within a period of seven working days;[17]
Directions for interception should be issued only when it is not possible to acquire the information by any other reasonable means;[18]
The directed interception should include the interception of any message or class of messages that are sent to or from any person n or class of persons or relating to any particular subject whether such message or class of messages are received with one or more addresses, specified in the order being an address or addresses likely to be used for the transmission of communications from or to one particular person specified or described in the order or one particular set of premises specified or described in the order;[19]
The interception directions should specify the name and designation of the officer or the authority to whom the intercepted message or class of messages is to be disclosed to;[20]
The directions for interception would remain in force for sixty days, unless revoked earlier, and may be renewed but the same should not remain in force beyond a total period of one hundred and eighty days;[21]
The directions for interception should be conveyed to the designated officers of the licensee(s) in writing by an officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police or Additional Superintendent of Police or the officer of the equivalent rank;[22]
The officer authorized to intercept any message or class of messages should maintain proper records mentioning therein, the intercepted message or class of messages, the particulars of persons whose message has been intercepted, the name and other particulars of the officer or the authority to whom the intercepted message or class of messages has been disclosed, etc.;[23]
All the requisitioning security agencies should designate one or more nodal officers not below the rank of Superintendent of Police or the officer of the equivalent rank to authenticate and send the requisitions for interception to the designated officers of the concerned service providers to be delivered by an officer not below the rank of Sub-Inspector of Police;[24]
Records pertaining to directions for interception and of intercepted messages should be destroyed by the competent authority and the authorized security and Law Enforcement Agencies every six months unless these are, or likely to be, required for functional requirements;[25]

According to Rule 419A, service providers \are required by law enforcement to intercept communications are required to comply with the following[26]:

Service providers should designate two senior executives of the company in every licensed service area/State/Union Territory as the nodal officers to receive and handle such requisitions for interception;[27]
The designated nodal officers of the service providers should issue acknowledgment letters to the concerned security and Law Enforcement Agency within two hours on receipt of intimations for interception;[28]
The system of designated nodal officers for communicating and receiving the requisitions for interceptions should also be followed in emergent cases/unavoidable cases where prior approval of the competent authority has not been obtained;[29]
The designated nodal officers of the service providers should forward every fifteen days a list of interception authorizations received by them during the preceding fortnight to the nodal officers of the security and Law Enforcement Agencies for confirmation of the authenticity of such authorizations;[30]
Service providers are required to put in place adequate and effective internal checks to ensure that unauthorized interception of messages does not take place, that extreme secrecy is maintained and that utmost care and precaution is taken with regards to the interception of messages;[31]

Service providers are held responsible for the actions of their employees. In the case of an established violation of license conditions pertaining to the maintenance of secrecy and confidentiality of information and unauthorized interception of communication, action shall be taken against service providers as per the provisions of the Indian Telegraph Act, and this shall not only include a fine, but also suspension or revocation of their license;[32]

Service providers should destroy records pertaining to directions for the interception of messages within two months of discontinuance of the interception of such messages and in doing so they should maintain extreme secrecy.[33]

Review Committee

Rule 419A of the Indian Telegraph Rules requires the establishment of a Review Committee by the Central Government and the State Government, as the case may be, for the interception of communications, as per the following conditions:[34]

(1) The Review Committee to be constituted by the Central Government shall consist of the following members, namely:

(a) Cabinet Secretary - Chairman

(b) Secretary to the Government of India in charge, Legal Affairs - Member

(2) The Review Committee to be constituted by a State Government shall consist of the following members, namely:

(a) Chief Secretary – Chairman

(b) Secretary Law/Legal Remembrancer in charge, Legal Affairs – Member

(3) The Review Committee meets at least once in two months and records its findings on whether the issued interception directions are in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the Indian Telegraph Act. When the Review Committee is of the opinion that the directions are not in accordance with the provisions referred to above it may set aside the directions and order for destruction of the copies of the intercepted message or class of messages;[35]

It must be noted that the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, (which is currently used against most acts of urban terrorism) also allows for the interception of communications but the procedures and safeguards are supposed to be the same as under the Indian Telegraph Act and the Information Technology Act.[36]

3. Telecom Licenses

The telecom sector in India has seen immense activity in the last two decades ever since it was opened up to private competition. These last twenty years have seen a lot of turmoil and have offered a tremendous learning opportunity for the private players as well as the governmental bodies regulating the sector. Currently any entity wishing to get a telecom license is offered a UL (Unified License) which contains terms and conditions for all the services that a licensee may choose to offer. However there were a large number of other licenses before the current regime, and since the licenses have a long phase out, we have tried to cover what we believe are the four most important licenses issued to telecom operators starting with the CMTS License:

Cellular Mobile Telephony Services (CMTS) License

In terms of National Telecom Policy (NTP)-1994, the first phase of liberalization in mobile telephone service started with issue of 8 licenses for Cellular Mobile Telephony Services (CMTS) in the 4 metro cities of Delhi, Mumbai, Calcutta and Chennai to 8 private companies in November 1994. Subsequently, 34 licenses for 18 Territorial Telecom Circles were also issued to 14 private companies during 1995 to 1998. During this period a maximum of two licenses were granted for CMTS in each service area and these licensees were called 1st & 2nd cellular licensees.[37] Consequent upon announcement of guidelines for Unified Access (Basic & Cellular) Services licenses on 11.11.2003, some of the CMTS operators were permitted to migrate from CMTS License to Unified Access Service License (UASL) but currently no new CMTS and Basic service licenses are being awarded after issuing the guidelines for Unified Access Service Licence (UASL).

The important provisions regarding surveillance in the CMTS License are listed below:

Facilities for Interception: The CMTS License requires the Licensee to provide necessary facilities to the designated authorities for interception of the messages passing through its network.[38]

Monitoring of Telecom Traffic: The designated person of the Central/State Government as conveyed to the Licensor from time to time in addition to the Licensor or its nominee have the right to monitor the telecommunication traffic in every MSC or any other technically feasible point in the network set up by the licensee. The Licensee is required to make arrangement for monitoring simultaneous calls by Government security agencies. The hardware at licensee’s end and software required for monitoring of calls shall be engineered, provided/installed and maintained by the Licensee at licensee’s cost. In case the security agencies intend to locate the equipment at licensee’s premises for facilitating monitoring, the licensee is required to extend all support in this regard including space and entry of the authorised security personnel. The interface requirements as well as features and facilities as defined by the Licensor are to be implemented by the licensee for both data and speech. The Licensee is also required to ensure suitable redundancy in the complete chain of Monitoring equipment for trouble free operations of monitoring of at least 210 simultaneous calls.[39]

Monitoring Records to be maintained: Along with the monitored call following records are to be made available:

Called/calling party mobile/PSTN numbers.
Time/date and duration of interception.
Location of target subscribers. Cell ID should be provided for location of the target subscriber. However, Licensor may issue directions from time to time on the precision of location, based on technological developments and integration of Global Positioning System (GPS) which shall be binding on the LICENSEE.
Telephone numbers if any call-forwarding feature has been invoked by target subscriber.
Data records for even failed call attempts.
CDR (Call Data Record) of Roaming Subscriber.

The Licensee is required to provide the call data records of all the specified calls handled by the system at specified periodicity, as and when required by the security agencies.[40]

Protection of Privacy: It is the responsibility of the Licensee to ensure the protection of privacy of communication and ensure unathorised interception of messages does not take place.[41]

License Agreement for Provision of Internet Services (ISP License)

Internet services were launched in India on 15th August, 1995 by Videsh Sanchar Nigam Limited. In November, 1998, the Government opened up the sector for providing Internet services by private operators. The major provisions dealing with surveillance contained in the ISP License are given below:

Authorization for monitoring: Monitoring shall only be by the authorization of the Union Home Secretary or Home Secretaries of the States/Union Territories.[42]

Access to subscriber list by authorized intelligence agencies and licensor: The complete and up to date list of subscribers will be made available by the ISP on a password protected website – accessible to authorized intelligence agencies.[43] Information such as customer name, IP address, bandwidth provided, address of installation, data of installation, contact number and email of leased line customers shall be included in the website.[44] The licensor or its representatives will also have access to the Database relating to the subscribers of the ISP which is to be available at any instant.[45]

Right to monitor by the central/state government: The designated person of the central/state government or the licensor or nominee will have the right to monitor telecommunications traffic in every node or any other technically feasible point in the network. To facilitate this, the ISP must make arrangements for the monitoring of simultaneous calls by the Government or its security agencies.[46]

Right of DoT to monitor: DoT will have the ability to monitor customers who generate high traffic value and verify specified user identities on a monthly basis.[47]

Provision of mirror images: Mirror images of the remote access information should be made available online for monitoring purposes.[48] A safeguard provided for in the license is that remote access to networks is only allowed in areas approved by the DOT in consultation with the Security Agencies.[49]

Provision of information stored on dedicated transmission link: The ISP will provide the login password to DOT and authorized Government agencies on a monthly basis for access to information stored on any dedicated transmission link from ISP node to subscriber premises.[50]

Provision of subscriber identity and geographic location: The ISP must provide the traceable identity and geographic location of their subscribers, and if the subscriber is roaming – the ISP should try to find traceable identities of roaming subscribers from foreign companies.[51]

Facilities for monitoring: The ISP must provide the necessary facilities for continuous monitoring of the system as required by the licensor or its authorized representatives.[52]

Facilities for tracing: The ISP will also provide facilities for the tracing of nuisance, obnoxious or malicious calls, messages, or communications. These facilities are to be provided specifically to authorized officers of the Government of India (police, customs, excise, intelligence department) when the information is required for investigations or detection of crimes and in the interest of national security.[53]

Facilities and equipment to be specified by government: The types of interception equipment to be used will be specified by the government of India.[54] This includes the installation of necessary infrastructure in the service area with respect to Internet Telephony Services offered by the ISP including the processing, routing, directing, managing, authenticating the internet calls including the generation of Call Details Record, IP address, called numbers, date, duration, time, and charge of the internet telephony calls.[55]

Facilities for surveillance of mobile terminal activity: The ISP must also provide the government facilities to carry out surveillance of Mobile Terminal activity within a specified area whenever requested.[56]

Facilities for monitoring international gateway: As per the requirements of security agencies, every international gateway location having a capacity of 2 Mbps or more will be equipped will have a monitoring center capable of monitoring internet telephony traffic.[57]

Facilities for monitoring in the premise of the ISP: Every office must be at least 10x10 with adequate power, air conditioning, and accessible only to the monitoring agencies. One local exclusive telephone line must be provided, and a central monitoring center must be provided if the ISP has multiple nodal points.[58]

Protection of privacy: There is a responsibility on the ISP to protect the privacy of its communications transferred over its network. This includes securing the information and protecting against unauthorized interception, unauthorized disclosure, ensure the confidentiality of information, and protect against over disclosure of information- except when consent has been given.[59]

Log of users: Each ISP must maintain an up to date log of all users connected and the service that they are using (mail, telnet, http, etc). The ISPs must also log every outward login or telnet through their computers. These logs as well as copies of all the packets must be made available in real time to the Telecom Authority.[60]

Log of internet leased line customers: A record of each internet leased line customer should be kept along with details of connectivity, and reasons for taking the link should be kept and made readily available for inspection.[61]

Log of remote access activities: The ISP will also maintain a complete audit trail of the remote access activities that pertain to the network for at least six months. This information must be available on request for any agency authorized by the licensor.[62]

Monitoring requirements: The ISP must make arrangements for the monitoring of the telecommunication traffic in every MSC exchange or any other technically feasible point, of at least 210 calls simultaneously.[63]

Records to be made available:

CDRS: When required by security agencies, the ISP must make available records of i) called/calling party mobile/PSTN numbers ii) time/date and duration of calls iii) location of target subscribers and from time to time precise location iv) telephone numbers – and if any call forwarding feature has been evoked – records thereof v) data records for failed call attempts vi) CDR of roaming subscriber.[64]
Bulk connections: On a monthly basis, and from time to time, information with respect to bulk connections shall be forwarded to DoT, the licensor, and security agencies.[65]
Record of calls beyond specified threshold: Calls should be checked, analyzed, and a record maintained of all outgoing calls made by customers both during the day and night that exceed a set threshold of minutes. A list of suspected subscribers should be created by the ISP and should be informed to DoT and any officer authorized by the licensor at any point of time.[66]
Record of subscribers with calling line identification restrictions: Furthermore, a list of calling line identification restriction subscribers with their complete address and details should be created on a password protected website that is available to authorized government agencies.[67]

Unified Access Services (UAS) License

Unified Access Services operators provide services of collection, carriage, transmission and delivery of voice and/or non-voice messages within their area of operation, over the Licensee’s network by deploying circuit and/or packet switched equipment. They may also provide Voice Mail, Audiotex services, Video Conferencing, Videotex, E-Mail, Closed User Group (CUG) as Value Added Services over its network to the subscribers falling within its service area on a non-discriminatory basis.

The terms of providing the services are regulated under the Unified Access Service License (UASL) which also contains provisions regarding surveillance/interception. These provisions are regularly used by the state agencies to intercept telephonic and data traffic of subscribers. The relevant terms of the UASL dealing with surveillance and interception are discussed below:

Confidentiality of Information: The Licensee cannot employ bulk encryption equipment in its network. Any encryption equipment connected to the Licensee’s network for specific requirements has to have prior evaluation and approval of the Licensor or officer specially designated for the purpose. However, any encryption equipment connected to the Licensee’s network for specific requirements has to have prior evaluation and approval of the Licensor or officer specially designated for the purpose. However, the Licensee has the responsibility to ensure protection of privacy of communication and to ensure that unauthorised interception of messages does not take place.[68] The Licensee shall take necessary steps to ensure that the Licensee and any person(s) acting on its behalf observe confidentiality of customer information.[69]

Responsibility of the Licensee: The Licensee has to take all necessary steps to safeguard the privacy and confidentiality of any information about a third party and its business to whom it provides the service and from whom it has acquired such information by virtue of the service provided and shall use its best endeavors to secure that :

No person acting on behalf of the Licensee or the Licensee divulges or uses any such information except as may be necessary in the course of providing such service to the third party; and
No such person seeks such information other than is necessary for the purpose of providing service to the third party.[70]

Provision of monitoring facilities: Requisite monitoring facilities /equipment for each type of system used, shall be provided by the service provider at its own cost for monitoring as and when required by the licensor.[71] The license also requires the Licensee to provide necessary facilities to the designated authorities for interception of the messages passing through its network.[72] The licensor in this case is the President of India, as the head of the State, therefore all references to the term licensor can be assumed to be to the government of India (which usually acts through the department of telecom (DOT). For monitoring traffic, the licensee company has to provide access of their network and other facilities as well as to books of accounts to the security agencies.[73]

Monitoring by Designated Person: The designated person of the Central/ State Government as conveyed to the Licensor from time to time in addition to the Licensor or its nominee has the right to monitor the telecommunication traffic in every MSC/Exchange/MGC/MG or any other technically feasible point in the network set up by the Licensee. The Licensee is required to make arrangement for monitoring simultaneous calls by Government security agencies. The hardware at Licensee’s end and software required for monitoring of calls shall be engineered, provided/installed and maintained by the Licensee at Licensee’s cost. However, the respective Government instrumentality bears the cost of user end hardware and leased line circuits from the MSC/ Exchange/MGC/MG to the monitoring centres to be located as per their choice in their premises or in the premises of the Licensee. In case the security agencies intend to locate the equipment at Licensee’s premises for facilitating monitoring, the Licensee should extend all support in this regard including space and entry of the authorized security personnel. The Licensee is required to implement the interface requirements as well as features and facilities as defined by the Licensor for both data and speech. The Licensee is to ensure suitable redundancy in the complete chain of Monitoring equipment for trouble free operations of monitoring of at least 210 simultaneous calls for seven security agencies.[74]

Monitoring Records to be maintained: Along with the monitored call following records are to be made available:

Called/calling party mobile/PSTN numbers.
Time/date and duration of interception.
Location of target subscribers. Cell ID should be provided for location of the target subscriber. However, Licensor may issue directions from time to time on the precision of location, based on technological developments and integration of Global Positioning System (GPS) which shall be binding on the LICENSEE.
Telephone numbers if any call-forwarding feature has been invoked by target subscriber.
Data records for even failed call attempts.
CDR (Call Data Record) of Roaming Subscriber.

The Licensee is required to provide the call data records of all the specified calls handled by the system at specified periodicity, as and when required by the security agencies.[75]

List of Subscribers: The complete list of subscribers shall be made available by the Licensee on their website (having password controlled access), so that authorized Intelligence Agencies are able to obtain the subscriber list at any time, as per their convenience with the help of the password.[76] The Licensor or its representative(s) have an access to the Database relating to the subscribers of the Licensee. The Licensee shall also update the list of his subscribers and make available the same to the Licensor at regular intervals. The Licensee shall make available, at any prescribed instant, to the Licensor or its authorized representative details of the subscribers using the service.[77] The Licensee must provide traceable identity of their subscribers,[78] and should be able to provide the geographical location (BTS location) of any subscriber at a given point of time, upon request by the Licensor or any other agency authorized by it.[79]

CDRs for Large Number of Outgoing Calls: The call detail records for outgoing calls made by subscribers making large number of outgoing calls day and night and to the various telephone numbers should be analyzed. Normally, no incoming call is observed in such cases. This can be done by running special programs for this purpose.[80] Although this provision itself does not say that it is limited to bulk subscribers (subscribers with more than 10 lines), it is contained as a sub-clause of section 41.19 which talks about specific measures for bulk subscribers, therefore it is possible that this provision is limited only to bulk subscribers and not to all subscribers.

No Remote Access to Suppliers: Suppliers/manufacturers and affiliate(s) are not allowed any remote access to the be enabled to access Lawful Interception System(LIS), Lawful Interception Monitoring(LIM), Call contents of the traffic and any such sensitive sector/data, which the licensor may notify from time to time, under any circumstances.[81] The Licensee is also not allowed to use remote access facility for monitoring of content.[82] Further, suitable technical device is required to be made available at Indian end to the designated security agency/licensor in which a mirror image of the remote access information is available on line for monitoring purposes.[83]

Monitoring as per the Rules under Telegraph Act: In order to maintain the privacy of voice and data, monitoring shall be in accordance with rules in this regard under Indian Telegraph Act, 1885.[84] It interesting to note that the monitoring under the UASL license is required to be as per the Rules prescribed under the Telegraph Act, but no mention is made of the Rules under the Information Technology Act.

Monitoring from Centralised Location: The Licensee has to ensure that necessary provision (hardware/ software) is available in its equipment for doing lawful interception and monitoring from a centralized location.[85]

Unified License (UL)

The National Telecom Policy - 2012 recognized the fact that the evolution from analog to digital technology has facilitated the conversion of voice, data and video to the digital form which are increasingly being rendered through single networks bringing about a convergence in networks, services and devices. It was therefore felt imperative to move towards convergence between various services, networks, platforms, technologies and overcome the incumbent segregation of licensing, registration and regulatory mechanisms in these areas. It was for this reason that the Government of India decided to move to the Unified License regime under which service providers could opt for all or any one or more of a number of different services.[86]

Provision of interception facilities by Licensee: The UL requires that the requisite monitoring/ interception facilities /equipment for each type of service, should be provided by the Licensee at its own cost for monitoring as per the requirement specified by the Licensor from time to time.[87] The Licensee is required to provide necessary facilities to the designated authorities of Central/State Government as conveyed by the Licensor from time to time for interception of the messages passing through its network, as per the provisions of the Indian Telegraph Act.[88]

Bulk encryption and unauthorized interception: The UL prohibits the Licensee from employing bulk encryption equipment in its network. Licensor or officers specially designated for the purpose are allowed to evaluate any encryption equipment connected to the Licensee’s network. However, it is the responsibility of the Licensee to ensure protection of privacy of communication and to ensure that unauthorized interception of messages does not take place.[89] The use of encryption by the subscriber shall be governed by the Government Policy/rules made under the Information Technology Act, 2000.[90]

Safeguarding of Privacy and Confidentiality: The Licensee shall take necessary steps to ensure that the Licensee and any person(s) acting on its behalf observe confidentiality of customer information.[91] Subject to terms and conditions of the license, the Licensee is required to take all necessary steps to safeguard the privacy and confidentiality of any information about a third party and its business to whom it provides services and from whom it has acquired such information by virtue of the service provided and shall use its best endeavors to secure that: a) No person acting on behalf of the Licensee or the Licensee divulges or uses any such information except as may be necessary in the course of providing such service; and b) No such person seeks such information other than is necessary for the purpose of providing service to the third party.

Provided the above para does not apply where: a) The information relates to a specific party and that party has consented in writing to such information being divulged or used, and such information is divulged or used in accordance with the terms of that consent; or b) The information is already open to the public and otherwise known.[92]

No Remote Access to Suppliers: Suppliers/manufacturers and affiliate(s) are not allowed any remote access to the be enabled to access Lawful Interception System(LIS), Lawful Interception Monitoring(LIM), Call contents of the traffic and any such sensitive sector/data, which the licensor may notify from time to time, under any circumstances.[93] The Licensee is also not allowed to use remote access facility for monitoring of content.[94] Further, suitable technical device is required to be made available at Indian end to the designated security agency/licensor in which a mirror image of the remote access information is available on line for monitoring purposes.[95]

Monitoring as per the Rules under Telegraph Act: In order to maintain the privacy of voice and data, monitoring shall be in accordance with rules in this regard under Indian Telegraph Act, 1885.[96] Just as in the UASL, the monitoring under the UL license is required to be as per the Rules prescribed under the Telegraph Act, but no mention is made of the Rules under the Information Technology Act.

Terms specific to various services

Since the UL License intends to cover all services under a single license, in addition to the general terms and conditions for interception, it also has terms for each specific service. We shall now discuss the terms for interception specific to each service offered under the Unified License.

Access Service: The designated person of the Central/ State Government, in addition to the Licensor or its nominee, shall have the right to monitor the telecommunication traffic in every MSC/ Exchange/ MGC/ MG/ Routers or any other technically feasible point in the network set up by the Licensee. The Licensee is required to make arrangement for monitoring simultaneous calls by Government security agencies. For establishing connectivity to Centralized Monitoring System, the Licensee at its own cost shall provide appropriately dimensioned hardware and bandwidth/dark fibre upto a designated point as required by Licensor from time to time. In case the security agencies intend to locate the equipment at Licensee’s premises for facilitating monitoring, the Licensee should extend all support in this regard including space and entry of the authorized security personnel.

The Interface requirements as well as features and facilities as defined by the Licensor should be implemented by the Licensee for both data and speech. The Licensee should ensure suitable redundancy in the complete chain of Lawful Interception and Monitoring equipment for trouble free operations of monitoring of at least 480 simultaneous calls as per requirement with at least 30 simultaneous calls for each of the designated security/ law enforcement agencies. Each MSC of the Licensee in the service area shall have the capacity for provisioning of at least 3000 numbers for monitoring. Presently there are ten (10) designated security/ law enforcement agencies. The above capacity provisions and no. of designated security/ law enforcement agencies may be amended by the Licensor separately by issuing instructions at any time.

Along with the monitored call following records are to be made available:

Called/calling party mobile/PSTN numbers.
Time/date and duration of interception.
Location of target subscribers. Cell ID should be provided for location of the target subscriber. However, Licensor may issue directions from time to time on the precision of location, based on technological developments and integration of Global Positioning System (GPS) which shall be binding on the LICENSEE.
Telephone numbers if any call-forwarding feature has been invoked by target subscriber.
Data records for even failed call attempts.
CDR (Call Data Record) of Roaming Subscriber.

The Licensee is required to provide the call data records of all the specified calls handled by the system at specified periodicity, as and when required by the security agencies.[97]

The call detail records for outgoing calls made by those subscribers making large number of outgoing calls day and night to the various telephone numbers with normally no incoming calls, is required to be analyzed by the Licensee. The service provider is required to run special programme, devise appropriate fraud management and prevention programme and fix threshold levels of average per day usage in minutes of the telephone connection; all telephone connections crossing the threshold of usage are required to be checked for bona fide use. A record of check must be maintained which may be verified by Licensor any time. The list/details of suspected subscribers should be informed to the respective TERM Cell of DoT and any other officer authorized by Licensor from time to time.[98]

The Licensee shall provide location details of mobile customers as per the accuracy and time frame mentioned in the Unified License. It shall be a part of CDR in the form of longitude and latitude, besides the co-ordinate of the BTS, which is already one of the mandated fields of CDR. To start with, these details will be provided for specified mobile numbers. However, within a period of 3 years from effective date of the Unified License, location details shall be part of CDR for all mobile calls.[99]

Internet Service: The Licensee is required to maintain CDR/IPDR for Internet including Internet Telephony Service for a minimum period of one year. The Licensee is also required to maintain log-in/log-out details of all subscribers for services provided such as internet access, e-mail, Internet Telephony, IPTV etc. These logs are to be maintained for a minimum period of one year. For the purpose of interception and monitoring of traffic, the copies of all the packets originating from / terminating into the Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) shall be made available to the Licensor/Security Agencies. Further, the list of Internet Lease Line (ILL) customers is to be placed on a password protected website in the format prescribed in the Unified License.[100]

Lawful Interception and Monitoring (LIM) systems of requisite capacities are to be set up by the Licensees for Internet traffic including Internet telephony traffic through their Internet gateways and /or Internet nodes at their own cost, as per the requirement of the security agencies/Licensor prescribed from time to time. The cost of maintenance of the monitoring equipment and infrastructure at the monitoring centre located at the premises of the licensee shall be borne by the Licensee. In case the Licensee obtains Access spectrum for providing Internet Service / Broadband Wireless Access using the Access Spectrum, the Licensee shall install the required Lawful Interception and Monitoring systems of requisite capacities prior to commencement of service. The Licensee, while providing downstream Internet bandwidth to an Internet Service provider is also required to ensure that all the traffic of downstream ISP passing through the Licensee’s network can be monitored in the network of the Licensee. However, for nodes of Licensee having upstream bandwidth from multiple service providers, the Licensee may be mandated to install LIM/LIS at these nodes, as per the requirement of security agencies. In such cases, upstream service providers may not be required to monitor this bandwidth.[101]

In case the Licensee has multiple nodes/points of presence and has capability to monitor the traffic in all the Routers/switches from a central location, the Licensor may accept to monitor the traffic from the said central monitoring location, provided that the Licensee is able to demonstrate to the Licensor/Security Agencies that all routers / switches are accessible from the central monitoring location. Moreover, the Licensee would have to inform the Licensor of every change that takes place in their topology /configuration, and ensure that such change does not make any routers/switches inaccessible from the central monitoring location. Further, Office space of 10 feet x 10 feet with adequate and uninterrupted power supply and air-conditioning which is physically secured and accessible only to the monitoring agencies shall be provided by the Licensee at each Internet Gateway location at its cost.[102]

National Long Distance (NLD) Service: The requisite monitoring facilities are required to be provided by the Licensee as per requirement of Licensor. The details of leased circuit provided by the Licensee is to be provided monthly to security agencies & DDG (TERM) of the Licensed Service Area where the licensee has its registered office.[103]

International Long Distance (ILD) Service: Office space of 20’x20’ with adequate and uninterrupted power supply and air-conditioning which is physically secured and accessible only to the personnel authorized by the Licensor is required to be provided by the Licensee at each Gateway location free of cost.[104] The cost of monitoring equipment is to be borne by the Licensee. The installation of the monitoring equipment at the ILD Gateway Station is to be done by the Licensee. After installation of the monitoring equipment, the Licensee shall get the same inspected by monitoring /security agencies. The permission to operate/commission the gateway will be given only after this.[105]

The designated person of the Central/ State Government, in addition to the Licensor or its nominee, has the right to monitor the telecommunication traffic in every ILD Gateway / Routers or any other technically feasible point in the network set up by the Licensee. The Licensee is required to make arrangement for monitoring simultaneous calls by Government security agencies. For establishing connectivity to Centralized Monitoring System, the Licensee, at its own cost, is required to provide appropriately dimensioned hardware and bandwidth/dark fibre upto a designated point as required by Licensor from time to time. In case the security agencies intend to locate the equipment at Licensee’s premises for facilitating monitoring, the Licensee should extend all support in this regard including Space and Entry of the authorized security personnel. The Interface requirements as well as features and facilities as defined by the Licensor should be implemented by the Licensee for both data and speech. The Licensee should ensure suitable redundancy in the complete chain of Monitoring equipment for trouble free operations of monitoring of at least 480 simultaneous calls as per requirement with at least 30 simultaneous calls for each of the designated security/ law enforcement agencies. Each ILD Gateway of the Licensee shall have the capacity for provisioning of at least 5000 numbers for monitoring. Presently there are ten (10) designated security/ law enforcement agencies. The above capacity provisions and number of designated security/ law enforcement agencies may be amended by the Licensor separately by issuing instructions at any time.[106]

The Licensee is required to provide the call data records of all the specified calls handled by the system at specified periodicity, as and when required by the security agencies in the format prescribed from time to time.[107]

Global Mobile Personal Communication by Satellite (GMPCS) Service: The designated Authority of the Central/State Government shall have the right to monitor the telecommunication traffic in every Gateway set up in India. The Licensee shall make arrangement for monitoring of calls as specified in the Unified License.[108]

The hardware/software required for monitoring of calls shall be engineered, provided/installed and maintained by the Licensee at the ICC (Intercept Control Centre) to be established at the GMPCS Gateway(s) as also in the premises of security agencies at Licensee’s cost. The Interface requirements as well as features and facilities shall be worked out and implemented by the Licensee for both data and speech. The Licensee should ensure suitable redundancy in the complete chain of Monitoring equipment for trouble free operations. The Licensee shall provide suitable training to the designated representatives of the Licensor regarding operation and maintenance of Monitoring equipment (ICC & MC). Interception of target subscribers using messaging services should also be provided even if retrieval is carried out using PSTN links. For establishing connectivity to Centralized Monitoring System, the Licensee at its own cost shall provide appropriately dimensioned hardware and bandwidth/dark fibre upto a designated point as required by Licensor from time to time.[109] The License also has specific obligations to extend monitored calls to designated security agencies as provided in the UL.[110] Further, the Licensee is required to provide the call data records of all the calls handled by the system at specified periodicity, if and as and when required by the security agencies.[111] It is the responsibility of the service provider for Global Mobile Personal Communication by Satellite (GMPCS) to provide facility to carry out surveillance of User Terminal activity.[112]

The Licensee has to make available adequate monitoring facility at the GMPCS Gateway in India to monitor all traffic (traffic originating/terminating in India) passing through the applicable system. For this purpose, the Licensee shall set up at his cost, the requisite interfaces, as well as features and facilities for monitoring of calls by designated agencies as directed by the Licensor from time to time. In addition to the Target Intercept List (TIL), it should also be possible to carry out specific geographic location based interception, if so desired by the designated security agencies. Monitoring of calls should not be perceptible to mobile users either during direct monitoring or when call has been grounded for monitoring. The Licensee shall not prefer any charges for grounding a call for monitoring purposes. The intercepted data is to be pushed to designated Security Agencies’ server on fire and forget basis. No records shall be maintained by the Licensee regarding monitoring activities and air-time used beyond prescribed time limit.

The Licensee has to ensure that any User Terminal (UT) registered in the gateway of another country shall re-register with Indian Gateway when operating from Indian Territory. Any UT registered outside India, when attempting to make/receive calls from within India, without due authority, shall be automatically denied service by the system and occurrence of such attempts along with information about UT identity as well as location shall be reported to the designated authority immediately.

The Licensee is required to have provision to scan operation of subscribers specified by security/ law enforcement agencies through certain sensitive areas within the Indian territory and shall provide their identity and positional location (latitude and longitude) to Licensor on as and when required basis.

Public Mobile Radio Trunking Service (PMRTS): Suitable monitoring equipment prescribed by the Licensor for each type of System used has to be provided by the Licensee at his own cost for monitoring, as and when required.[113]

Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) Closed User Group (CUG) Service: Requisite monitoring facilities/ equipment for each type of system used have to be provided by the Licensee at its own cost for monitoring as and when required by the Licensor.[114] The Licensee shall provide at its own cost technical facilities for accessing any port of the switching equipment at the HUB for interception of the messages by the designated authorities at a location to be determined by the Licensor.[115]

Surveillance of MSS-R Service: The Licensee has to provide at its own cost technical facilities for accessing any port of the switching equipment at the HUB for interception of the messages by the designated authorities at a location as and when required.[116] It is the responsibility of the service provider of INSAT- Mobile Satellite System Reporting (MSS-R) service to provide facility to carry out surveillance of User Terminal activity within a specified area.[117]

Resale of International Private Leased Circuit (IPLC) Service: The Licensee has to take IPLC from the licensed ILDOs. The interception and monitoring of Resellers circuits will take place at the Gateway of the ILDO from whom the IPLC has been taken by the Licensee. The provisioning for Lawful Interception & Monitoring of the Resellers’ IPLC shall be done by the ILD Operator and the concerned ILDO shall be responsible for Lawful Interception and Monitoring of the traffic passing through the IPLC. The Resellers shall extend all cooperation in respect of interception and monitoring of its IPLC and shall be responsible for the interception results. The Licensee shall be responsible to interact, correspond and liaise with the licensor and security agencies with regard to security monitoring of the traffic. The Licensee shall, before providing an IPLC to the customer, get the details of services/equipment to be connected on both ends of IPLC, including type of terminals, data rate, actual use of circuit, protocols/interface to be used etc. The Resellers shall permit only such type of service/protocol on the IPLC for which the concerned ILDO has capability of interception and monitoring. The Licensee has to pass on any direct request placed by security agencies on him for interception of the traffic on their IPLC to the concerned ILDOs within two hours for necessary actions.[118]

4. The Information Technology Act, 2000

The Information Technology Act, 2000, was amended in a major way in 2008 and is the primary legislation which regulates the interception, monitoring, decryption and collection of traffic information of digital communications in India.

More specifically, section 69 of the Information Technology Act empowers the central Government and the state governments to issue directions for the monitoring, interception or decryption of any information transmitted, received or stored through a computer resource. Section 69 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 expands the grounds upon which interception can take place as compared to the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885. As such, the interception of communications under Section 69 is carried out in the interest of[119]:

The sovereignty or integrity of India

Defence of India

Security of the State
Friendly relations with foreign States
Public order
Preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offense relating to the above
For the investigation of any offense

While the grounds for interception are similar to the Indian Telegraph Act (except for the condition of prevention of incitement of only cognizable offences and the addition of investigation of any offence) the Information Technology Act does not have the overarching condition that interception can only occur in the case of public emergency or in the interest of public safety.

Additionally, section 69 of the Act mandates that any person or intermediary who fails to assist the specified agency with the interception, monitoring, decryption or provision of information stored in a computer resource shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and shall be liable for a fine.[120]

Section 69B of the Information Technology Act empowers the Central Government to authorise the monitoring and collection of information and traffic data generated, transmitted, received or stored through any computer resource for the purpose of cyber security. According to this section, any intermediary who intentionally or knowingly fails to provide technical assistance to the authorised agency which is required to monitor and collection information and traffic data shall be punished with an imprisonment which may extend to three years and will also be liable to a fine.[121]

The main difference between Section 69 and Section 69B is that the first requires the interception, monitoring and decryption of all information generated, transmitted, received or stored through a computer resource when it is deemed “necessary or expedient” to do so, whereas Section 69B specifically provides a mechanism for all metadata of all communications through a computer resource for the purpose of combating threats to “cyber security”. Directions under Section 69 can be issued by the Secretary to the Ministry of Home Affairs, whereas directions under Section 69B can only be issued by the Secretary of the Department of Information Technology under the Union Ministry of Communications and Information Technology.

Overlap with the Telegraph Act

Thus while the Telegraph Act only allows for interception of messages or class of messages transmitted by a telegraph, the Information Technology Act enables interception of any information being transmitted or stored in a computer resource. Since a “computer resource” is defined to include a communication device (such as cellphones and PDAs) there is a overlap between the provisions of the Information Technology Act and the Telegraph Act concerning the provisions of interception of information sent through mobile phones. This is further complicated by the fact that the UAS License specifically states that it is governed by the provisions of the Indian Telegraph Act, the Indian Wireless Telegraphy Act and the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, but does not mention the Information Technology Act.[122] This does not mean that the Licensees under the Telecom Licenses are not bound by any other laws of India (including the Information Technology Act) but it is just an invitation to unnecessary complexities and confusions with regard to a very serious issue such as interception. This situation has thankfully been remedied by the Unified License (UL) which, although issued under section of 4 of the Telegraph Act, also references the Information Technology Act thus providing essential clarity with respect to the applicability of the Information Technology Act to the License Agreement.

Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009

The interception of internet communications is mainly covered by the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009under the Information Technology Act (the “IT Interception Rules”). In particular, the rules framed under Section 69 and 69B include safeguards stipulating to who may issue directions of interception and monitoring, how such directions are to be executed, the duration they remain in operation, to whom data may be disclosed, confidentiality obligations of intermediaries, periodic oversight of interception directions by a Review Committee under the Indian Telegraph Act, the retention of records of interception by intermediaries and to the mandatory destruction of information in appropriate cases.

According to the IT Interception Rules, only the competent authority can issue an order for the interception, monitoring or decryption of any information generated, transmitted, received or stored in any computer resource under sub-section (2) of section 69 of the Information Technology Act.[123] At the State and Union Territory level, the State Secretaries respectively in charge of the Home Departments are designated as “competent authorities” to issue interception directions.[124]In unavoidable circumstances the Joint Secretary to the Government of India, when so authorised by the Competent Authority, may issue an order. Interception may also be carried out with the prior approval of the Head or the second senior most officer of the authorised security agency at the Central Level and at the State Level with the approval of officers authorised in this behalf not below the rank of Inspector General of Police, in the belowmentioned emergent cases:

(1) in remote areas, where obtaining of prior directions for interception or monitoring or decryption of information is not feasible; or

(2) for operational reasons, where obtaining of prior directions for interception or monitoring or decryption of any information generation, transmitted, received or stored in any computer resource is not feasible,

however, in the above circumstances the officer would have to inform the competent authority in writing within three working days about the emergency and of the interception, monitoring or decryption and obtain the approval of the competent authority within a period of seven working days. If the approval of the competent authority is not obtained within the said period of seven working days, such interception or monitoring or decryption shall cease and the information shall not be intercepted or monitored or decrypted thereafter without the prior approval of the competent authority.[125] If a state wishes to intercept information that is beyond its jurisdiction, it must request permission to issue the direction from the Secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs.[126]

In order to avoid the risk of unauthorised interception, the IT Interception Rules provide for the following safeguards:

If authorised by the competent authority, any agency of the government may intercept, monitor, or decrypt information transmitted, received, or stored in any computer resource only for the purposes specified in section 69(1) of the IT Act.[127]
The IT Interception Rules further provide that the competent authority may give any decryption direction to the decryption key holder.[128]
The officer issuing an order for interception is required to issue requests in writing to designated nodal officers of the service provider.[129]
Any direction issued by the competent authority must contain the reasons for direction, and must be forwarded to the review committee seven days after being issued.[130]
In the case of issuing or approving an interception order, in arriving at its decision the competent authority must consider all alternate means of acquiring the information.[131]
The order must relate to information sent or likely to be sent from one or more particular computer resources to another (or many) computer resources.[132]
The reasons for ordering interceptions must be recorded in writing, and must specify the name and designation of the officer to whom the information obtained is to be disclosed, and also specify the uses to which the information is to be put.[133]
The directions for interception will remain in force for a period of 60 days, unless renewed. If the orders are renewed they cannot be in force for longer than 180 days.[134]
Authorized agencies are prohibited from using or disclosing contents of intercepted communications for any purpose other than investigation, but they are permitted to share the contents with other security agencies for the purpose of investigation or in judicial proceedings. Furthermore, security agencies at the union territory and state level will share any information obtained by following interception orders with any security agency at the centre.[135]
All records, including electronic records pertaining to interception are to be destroyed by the government agency “every six months, except in cases where such information is required or likely to be required for functional purposes”.[136]
The contents of intercepted, monitored, or decrypted information will not be used or disclosed by any agency, competent authority, or nodal officer for any purpose other than its intended purpose.[137]
The agency authorised by the Secretary of Home Affairs is required to appoint a nodal officer (not below the rank of superintendent of police or equivalent) to authenticate and send directions to service providers or decryption key holders.[138]

The IT Interception Rules also place the following obligations on the service providers:

In addition, all records pertaining to directions for interception and monitoring are to be destroyed by the service provider within a period of two months following discontinuance of interception or monitoring, unless they are required for any ongoing investigation or legal proceedings.[139]
Upon receiving an order for interception, service providers are required to provide all facilities, co-operation, and assistance for interception, monitoring, and decryption. This includes assisting with: the installation of the authorised agency's equipment, the maintenance, testing, or use of such equipment, the removal of such equipment, and any action required for accessing stored information under the direction.[140]
Additionally, decryption key holders are required to disclose the decryption key and provide assistance in decrypting information for authorized agencies.[141]

Every fifteen days the officers designated by the intermediaries are required to forward to the nodal officer in charge a list of interceptions orders received by them. The list must include the details such as reference and date of orders of the competent authority.[142]
The service provider is required to put in place adequate internal checks to ensure that unauthorised interception does not take place, and to ensure the extreme secrecy of intercepted information is maintained.[143]
The contents of intercepted communications are not allowed to be disclosed or used by any person other than the intended recipient.[144]
Additionally, the service provider is required to put in place internal checks to ensure that unauthorized interception of information does not take place and extreme secrecy is maintained. This includes ensuring that the interception and related information are handled only by the designated officers of the service provider.[145]

Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Monitoring and Collecting Traffic Data or Information) Rules, 2009

The Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Monitoring and Collecting Traffic Data or Information) Rules, 2009, under section 69B of the Information Technology Act, stipulate that directions for the monitoring and collection of traffic data or information can be issued by an order made by the competent authority[146] for any or all of the following purposes related to cyber security:

forecasting of imminent cyber incidents;
monitoring network application with traffic data or information on computer resource;
identification and determination of viruses or computer contaminant;
tracking cyber security breaches or cyber security incidents;
tracking computer resource breaching cyber security or spreading virus or computer contaminants;
identifying or tracking any person who has breached, or is suspected of having breached or likely to breach cyber security;
undertaking forensic of the concerned computer resource as a part of investigation or internal audit of information security practices in the computer resources;
accessing stored information for enforcement of any provisions of the laws relating to cyber security for the time being in force;
any other matter relating to cyber security.[147]

According to these Rules, any direction issued by the competent authority should contain reasons for such direction and a copy of such direction should be forwarded to the Review Committee within a period of seven working days.[148] Furthermore, these Rules state that the Review Committee shall meet at least once in two months and record its finding on whether the issued directions are in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 69B of the Act. If the Review Committee is of the opinion that the directions are not in accordance with the provisions referred to above, it may set aside the directions and issue an order for the destruction of the copies, including corresponding electronic record of the monitored or collected traffic data or information.[149]

Information Technology (Guidelines for Cyber Cafes) Rules, 2011

The Information Technology (Guidelines for Cyber Cafes) Rules, 2011, were issued under powers granted under section 87(2), read with section 79(2) of the Information Technology Act, 2000.[150] These rules require cyber cafes in India to store and maintain backup logs for each login by any user, to retain such records for a year and to ensure that the log is not tampered. Rule 7 requires the inspection of cyber cafes to determine that the information provided during registration is accurate and remains updated.

5. The Indian Post Office Act, 1898
Section 26 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898, empowers the Central Government and the State Governments to intercept postal articles.[151] In particular, section 26 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898, states that on the occurrence of any public emergency or in the interest of public safety or tranquility, the Central Government, State Government or any officer specially authorised by the Central or State Government may direct the interception, detention or disposal of any postal article, class or description of postal articles in the course of transmission by post. Furthermore, section 26 states that if any doubt arises regarding the existence of public emergency, public safety or tranquility then a certificate to that effect by the Central Government or a State Government would be considered as conclusive proof of such condition being satisfied.

According to this section, the Central Government and the State Governments of India can intercept postal articles if it is deemed to be in the instance of a 'public emergency' or for 'public safety or tranquility'. However, the Indian Post Office Act, 1898, does not cover electronic communications and does not mandate their interception, which is covered by the Information Technology Act, 2000 and the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885.

6. The Indian Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1933
The Indian Wireless Telegraphy Act was passed to regulate and govern the possession of wireless telegraphy equipment within the territory of India. This Act essentially provides that no person can own “wireless telegraphy apparatus”[152] except with a license provided under this Act and must use the equipment in accordance with the terms provided in the license.[153]

One of the major sources of revenue for the Indian State Broadcasting Service was revenue from the licence fee from working of wireless apparatus under the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885.The Indian State Broadcasting Service was losing revenue due to lack of legislation for prosecuting persons using unlicensed wireless apparatus as it was difficult to trace them at the first place and then prove that such instrument has been installed, worked and maintained without licence. Therefore, the current legislation was proposed, in order to prohibit possession of wireless telegraphy apparatus without licence.

Presently the Act is used to prosecute cases, related to illegal possession and transmission via satellite phones. Any person who wishes to use satellite phones for communication purposes has to get licence from the Department of Telecommunications.[154]

7. The Code of Criminal Procedure
Section 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure regulates targeted surveillance. In particular, section 91 states that a Court in India or any officer in charge of a police station may summon a person to produce any document or any other thing that is necessary for the purposes of any investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceeding under the Code of Criminal Procedure.[155] Under section 91, law enforcement agencies in India could theoretically access stored data. Additionally, section 92 of the Code of Criminal Procedure regulates the interception of a document, parcel or thing in the possession of a postal or telegraph authority.

Further section 356(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that in certain cases the Courts have the power to direct repeat offenders convicted under certain provisions, to notify his residence and any change of, or absence from, such residence after release for a term not exceeding five years from the date of the expiration of the second sentence.

Policy Suggestions

In order to avoid the different standards being adopted for different aspects of surveillance and in different parts of the country, there should be one single policy document or surveillance and interception manual which should contain the rules and regulations regarding all kinds of surveillance. This would not only help in identifying problems in the law but may also be useful in streamlining the entire surveillance regime. However it is easier said than done and requires a mammoth effort at the legislative stage. This is because under the Constitutional scheme of India law and order is a State subject and the police machinery in every State is under the authority of the State government. Therefore it would not be possible to issue a single legislation dealing with all aspects of surveillance since the States are independent in their powers to deal with the police machinery.

Even when we look at the issue of interception, certain state legislations especially the ones dealing with organized crime and bootleggers such as the Maharashtra Control of Organized Crime Act, 1999, the Andhra Pradesh Control of Organized Crime Act, 2001, also deal with the issue of interception and contain provisions empowering the state government to intercept communications for the purpose of using it to investigate or prevent criminal activities. Further even the two central level legislations that deal with interception, viz. the Telegraph Act and the Information Technology Act, specifically empower the State governments also to intercept communications on the same grounds as the Central Government. Since interception of communications is mostly undertaken by security and law enforcement agencies, broadly for the maintenance of law and order, State governments cannot be prevented from issuing their own legislations to deal with interception.

Due to the abovementioned legal and constitutional complexities the major problem in achieving harmonization is to get both the Central and State governments on to the same page. Even if the Central government amends the Telegraph Act and the IT Act to bring them in line with each other, the State governments will still be free to do whatever they please. Therefore it seems the best approach in order to achieve harmonization may be to have a two pronged strategy, i.e. (i) issue a National Surveillance Policy covering both interception and general surveillance; and (ii) amend the central legislations i.e. the Telegraph Act and the Information Technology Act in accordance with the National Surveillance Policy. Once a National Surveillance Policy, based on scientific data and the latest theories on criminology is issued, it is hoped that State governments will themselves like to adopt the principles enshrined therein and amend their own legislations dealing with interception to fall in line with the National Surveillance Policy.

[1] Section 6(2)(b) of the Model Police Manual.

[2] Section 191 (D) of the Model Police Manual.

[3] Section 200 (D) of the Model Police Manual.

[4] Section 2011 (I) of the Model Police Manual.

[5] Section 201 (II) of the Model Police Manual.

[6] Section 201 (IV) of the Model Police Manual.

[7] Section 193 (III) of the Model Police Manual.

[8] Surjan Das & Basudeb Chattopadhyay, Rural Crime in Police Perception: A Study of Village Crime Note Books, 26(3) Economic and Political Weekly 129, 129 (1991).

[9] Section 201 (III) of the Model Police Manual.

[10] Section 201 (V) of the Model Police Manual.

[11] Section 201 (VII) of the Model Police Manual.

[12] Section 356(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code states as follows:

356. Order for notifying address of previously convicted offender.

(1) When any person, having been convicted by a Court in India of an offence punishable under section 215, section 489A, section 489B, section 489C or section 489D of the Indian Penal Code, (45 of 1860 ) or of any offence punishable under Chapter XII or Chapter XVII of that Code, with imprisonment for a term of three years or upwards, is again convicted of any offence punishable under any of those sections or Chapters with imprisonment for a term of three years or upwards by any Court other than that of a Magistrate of the second class, such Court may, if it thinks fit, at the time of passing a sentence of imprisonment on such person, also order that his residence and any change of, or absence from, such residence after release be notified as hereinafter provided for a term not exceeding five years from the date of the expiration of such sentence.

[13] The Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, http://www.ijlt.in/pdffiles/Indian-Telegraph-Act-1885.pdf

[14] Privacy International, Report: “India”, Chapter 3: “Surveillance Policies”, https://www.privacyinternational.org/reports/india/iii-surveillance-policies

[15] Rule 419A(1), Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.

[16] Rule 419A(1), Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.

[17] Rule 419A(2), Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.

[18] Rule 419A(3), Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.

[19] Rule 419A(4), Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.

[20] Rule 419A(5), Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.

[21] Rule 419A(6), Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.

[22] Rule 419A(7), Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.

[23] Rule 419A(8), Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.

[24] Rule 419A(9), Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.

[25] Rule 419A(18), Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Rule 419A(10), Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.

[28] Rule 419A(11), Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.

[29] Rule 419A(12), Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.

[30] Rule 419A(13), Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.

[31] Rule 419A(14), Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.

[32] Rule 419A(15), Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.

[33] Rule 419A(19), Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Section 46 of the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1967. The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 has certain additional safeguards such as not allowing intercepted information to be disclosed or received in evidence unless the accused has been provided with a copy of the same atleast 10 days in advance, unless the period of 10 days is specifically waived by the judge.

[37] State owned Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) (Mahanager Telephone Nigam Limited (MTNL) and Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL)) were issued licenses for provision of CMTS as third operator in various parts of the country. Further, 17 fresh licenses were issued to private companies as fourth cellular operator in September/ October, 2001, one each in 4 Metro cities and 13 Telecom Circles.

[38] Section 45.2 of the CMTS License.

[39] Section 41.09 of the CMTS License.

[40] Section 41.09 of the CMTS License.

[41] Section 44.4 of the CMTS License. Similar provision exists in section 44.11 of the CMTS License.

[42] Section 34.28 (xix) of the ISP License.

[43] Section 34.12 of the ISP License.

[44] Section 34.13 of the ISP License.

[45] Section 34.22 of the ISP License.

[46] Section 34.6 of the ISP License.

[47] Section 34.15 of the ISP License.

[48] Section 34.28 (xiv) of the ISP License.

[49] Section 34.28 (xi) of the ISP License.

[50] Section 34.14 of the ISP License.

[51] Section 34.28 (ix)&(x) of the ISP License.

[52] Section 30.1 of the ISP License.

[53] Section 33.4 of the ISP License.

[54] Section 34.4 of the ISP License.

[55] Section 34.7 of the ISP License.

[56] Section 34.9 of the ISP License.

[57] Section 34.27 (a)(i) of the ISP License.

[58] Section 34.27(a)(ii-vi) of the ISP License.

[59] Section 32.1, 32.2 (i)(ii), 32.3 of the ISP License.

[60] Section 34.8 of the ISP License.

[61] Section 34.18 of the ISP License.

[62] Section 34.28 (xv) of the ISP License.

[63] Section 41.10 of the ISP License.

[64] Section 41.10 of the ISP License.

[65] Section 41.19(i) of the ISP License.

[66] Section 41.19(ii) of the ISP License.

[67] Section 41.19(iv) of the ISP License.

[68] Section 39.1 of the UASL. Similar provision is contained in section 41.4, 41.12 of the UASL.

[69] Section 39.3 of the UASL.

[70] Section 39.2 of the UASL.

[71] Section 23.2 of the UASL. Similar provisions are contained in section 41.7 of the UASL regarding provision of monitoring equipment for monitoring in the “interest of security”.

[72] Section 42.2 of the UASL.

[73] Section 41.20(xx) of the UASL.

[74] Section 41.10 of the UASL.

[75] Section 41.10 of the UASL.

[76] Section 41.14 of the UASL.

[77] Section 41.16 of the UASL.

[78] Section 41.20(ix) of the UASL.

[79] Section 41.20(ix) of the UASL.

[80] Section 41.19(ii) of the UASL.

[81] Section 41.20(xii) of the UASL.

[82] Section 41.20(xiii) of the UASL.

[83] Section 41.20(xiv) of the UASL.

[84] Section 41.20 (xix) of the UASL.

[85] Section 41.20(xvi) of the UASL.

[86] The different services covered by the Unified License are:

a. Unified License (All Services)

b. Access Service (Service Area-wise)

c. Internet Service (Category-A with All India jurisdiction)

d. Internet Service (Category-B with jurisdiction in a Service Area)

e. Internet Service (Category-C with jurisdiction in a Secondary Switching Area)

f. National Long Distance (NLD) Service

g. International Long Distance (ILD) Service

h. Global Mobile Personal Communication by Satellite (GMPCS) Service

i. Public Mobile Radio Trunking Service (PMRTS) Service

j. Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) Closed User Group (CUG) Service

k. INSAT MSS-Reporting (MSS-R) Service

l. Resale of International private Leased Circuit (IPLC) Service

Authorisation for Unified License (All Services) would however cover all services listed at para 2(ii) (b) in all service areas, 2 (ii) (c), 2(ii) (f) to 2(ii) (l) above.

[87] Chapter IV, Para 23.2 of the UL.

[88] Chapter VI, Para 40.2 of the UL.

[89] Chapter V, Para 37.1 of the UL. Similar provision is contained in Chapter VI, Para 39.4,

[90] Chapter V, Para 37.5 of the UL/

[91] Chapter V, Para 37.3 of the UL.

[92] Chapter V, Para 37.2 of the UL.

[93] Chapter VI, Para 39.23(xii) of the UL.

[94] Chapter VI, Para 39.23 (xiii) of the UL.

[95] Chapter VI, Para 39.23 (xiv) of the UL.

[96] Chapter VI, Para 39.23 (xix) of the UL.

[97] Chapter VIII, Para 8.3 of the UL.

[98] Chapter VIII, Para 8.4 of the UL.

[99] Chapter VIII, Para 8.5 of the UL.

[100] Chapter IX, Paras 7.1 to 7.3 of the UL. Further obligations have also been imposed on the Licensee to ensure that its ILL customers maintain the usage of IP addresses/Network Address Translation (NAT) syslog, in case of multiple users on the same ILL, for a minimum period of one year.

[101] Chapter IX, Paras 8.1 to 8.3 of the UL.

[102] Chapter IX, Paras 8.4 and 8.5 of the UL.

[103] Chapter X, Para 5.2 of the UL.

[104] Chapter XI, Para 6.3 of the UL.

[105] Chapter XI, Para 6.4 of the UL.

[106] Chapter XI, Para 6.6 of the UL.

[107] Chapter XI, Para 6.7 of the UL.

[108] Chapter XII, Para 7.4 of the UL.

[109] Chapter XII, Para 7.5 of the UL.

[110] Chapter XII, Para 7.6 of the UL.

[111] Chapter XII, Para 7.7 of the UL.

[112] Chapter XII, Para 7.8 of the UL.

[113] Chapter XIII, Para 7.1 of the UL.

[114] Chapter XIV, Para 8.1 of the UL.

[115] Chapter XIV, Para 8.2 of the UL.

[116] Chapter XV, Para 8.1 of the UL.

[117] Chapter XV, Para 8.5 of the UL.

[118] Chapter XVI, Paras 4.1 - 4.4 of the UL.

[119] Section 69 of the Information Technology Act, 2000.

[120] Ibid.

[121] Section 69B of the Information Technology Act, 2000.

[122] Section 32 of the ISP License.

[123] Rule 3, Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[124] Rule 2(d), Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[125] Rule 3, Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[126] Rule 6, Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[127] Rule 4, Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[128] Rule 5, Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[129] Rule 13, Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[130] Rule 7, Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[131] Rule 8, Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[132] Rule 9, Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[133] Rule 10, Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[134] Rule 11, Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[135] Rule 25(2)&(6), Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[136] Rule 23, Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[137] Rule 25, Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[138] Rule 12, Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[139] Rule 23(2), Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[140] Rule 19, Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[141] Rule 17, Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[142] Rule 18, Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[143] Rule 20& 21, Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[144] Rule 25, Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[145] Rule 20, Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[146] Rule 3(1) of the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009.

[147] Rule 3(2) of the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009.

[148] Rule 3(3) of the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009.

[149] Rules 7 of the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009.

[150] Introduction to the Information Technology (Guidelines for Cyber Cafe) Rules, 2011.

[151] The Indian Post Office Act, 1898, http://www.indiapost.gov.in/Pdf/Manuals/TheIndianPostOfficeAct1898.pdf

[152] The expression “wireless telegraphy apparatus” has been defined as “any apparatus, appliance, instrument or material used or capable of use in wireless communication, and includes any article determined by rule made under Sec. 10 to be wireless telegraphy apparatus, but does not include any such apparatus, appliance, instrument or material commonly used for other electrical purposes, unless it has been specially designed or adapted for wireless communication or forms part of some apparatus, appliance, instrument or material specially so designed or adapted, nor any article determined by rule made under Section 10 not to be wireless telegraphy apparatus;”

[153] Section 4, Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1933.

[154] Snehashish Ghosh, Indian Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1933, http://cis-india.org/telecom/resources/indian-wireless-telegraphy-act.

[155] The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 91, http://www.icf.indianrailways.gov.in/uploads/files/CrPC.pdf

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/policy-paper-on-surveillance-in-india

Policy Brief: Oversight Mechanisms for Surveillance

elonnai — 2015-11-24T06:09:01Z

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Introduction

Across jurisdictions, the need for effective and relevant oversight mechanisms (coupled with legislative safeguards) for state surveillance has been highlighted by civil society, academia, citizens and other key stakeholders.[1] A key part of oversight of state surveillance is accountability of intelligence agencies. This has been recognized at the international level. Indeed, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, The United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and the Inter-Parliamentary Union have all recognized that intelligence agencies need to be subject to democratic accountability.[2] Since 2013, the need for oversight has received particular attention in light of the information disclosed through the 'Snowden Revelations'. [3] Some countries such as the US, Canada, and the UK have regulatory mechanisms for the oversight of state surveillance and the intelligence community, while many other countries – India included - have piecemeal oversight mechanisms in place. The existence of regulatory mechanisms for state surveillance does not necessarily equate to effective oversight – and piecemeal mechanisms – depending on how they are implemented, could be more effective than comprehensive mechanisms. This policy brief seeks to explore the purpose of oversight mechanisms for state surveillance, different forms of mechanisms, and what makes a mechanism effective and comprehensive. The brief also reviews different oversight mechanisms from the US, UK, and Canada and provides recommendations for ways in which India can strengthen its present oversight mechanisms for state surveillance and the intelligence community.

What is the purpose and what are the different components of an oversight mechanism for State Surveillance?

The International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communication Surveillance, developed through a global consultation with civil society groups, industry, and international experts recommends that public oversight mechanisms for state surveillance should be established to ensure transparency and accountability of Communications Surveillance. To achieve this, mechanisms should have the authority to:

Access all potentially relevant information about State actions, including, where appropriate, access to secret or classified information;
Assess whether the State is making legitimate use of its lawful capabilities;
Evaluate whether the State has been comprehensively and accurately publishing information about the use and scope of Communications Surveillance techniques and powers in accordance with its Transparency obligations publish periodic reports and other information relevant to Communications Surveillance;
Make public determinations as to the lawfulness of those actions, including the extent to which they comply with these Principles[4]

What can inform oversight mechanisms for state surveillance?

The development of effective oversight mechanisms for state surveillance can be informed by a number of factors including:

Rapidly changing technology – how can mechanisms adapt, account for, and evaluate perpetually changing intelligence capabilities?
Expanding surveillance powers – how can mechanisms evaluate and rationalize the use of expanding agency powers?
Tensions around secrecy, national interest, and individual rights – how can mechanisms respect, recognize, and uphold multiple competing interests and needs including an agency's need for secrecy, the government's need to protect national security, and the citizens need to have their constitutional and fundamental rights upheld?
The structure, purpose, and goals of specific intelligence agencies and circumstances– how can mechanisms be sensitive and attuned to the structure, purpose, and functions of differing intelligence agencies and circumstances?

These factors lead to further questions around:

The purpose of an oversight mechanism: Is an oversight mechanism meant to ensure effectiveness of an agency? Perform general reviews of agency performance? Supervise the actions of an agency? Hold an agency accountable for misconduct?
The structure of an oversight mechanism: Is it internal? External? A combination of both? How many oversight mechanisms that agencies should be held accountable to?
The functions of an oversight mechanism: Is an oversight mechanism meant to inspect? Evaluate? Investigate? Report?
The powers of an oversight mechanism: The extent of access that an oversight mechanism needs and should have to the internal workings of security agencies and law enforcement to carry out due diligence? The extent of legal backing that an oversight mechanism should have to hold agencies legally accountable.

What oversight mechanisms for State Surveillance exist in India?

In India the oversight 'ecosystem' for state surveillance is comprised of:

Review committee: Under the Indian Telegraph Act 1885 and the Rules issued thereunder (Rule 419A), a Central Review Committee that consists of the Cabinet Secretary, Secretary of Legal Affairs to the Government of India, Secretary of Department of Telecommunications to the Government of India is responsible for meeting on a bi-monthly basis and reviewing the legality of interception directions. The review committee has the power to revoke the directions and order the destruction of intercepted material.[5] This review committee is also responsible for evaluating interception, monitoring, and decryption orders issued under section 69 of the Information Technology Act 2000.[6] and orders for the monitoring and collection of traffic data under section 69B of the Information Technology Act 2000.[7]
Authorizing Authorities: The Secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs of the Central Government is responsible for authorizing requests for the interception, monitoring, and decryption of communications issued by central agencies.[8] The Secretary in charge of the Home Department is responsible for authorizing requests for the interception, monitoring, and decryption of communications from state level agencies and law enforcement.[9] The Secretary to the Government of India in the Department of Information Technology under the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology is responsible for authorizing requests for the monitoring and collection of traffic data.[10] Any officer not below the rank of Joint Secretary to the Government of India, who has been authorised by the Union Home Secretary or the State Home Secretary in this behalf, may authorize the interception of communications in case of an emergency.[11] A Commissioner of Police, District Superintendent of Police or Magistrate may issue requests for stored data to any postal or telegraph authority.[12]
Administrative authorities: India does not have an oversight mechanism for intelligence agencies, but agencies do report to different authorities. For example: The Intelligence Bureau reports to the Home Minister, the Research and Anaylsis Wing is under the Cabinet Secretariat and reports to the Prime Minister, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) and Aviation Research Centre (ARC) report to the National Security Adviser; and the National Security Council Secretariat under the NSA which serves the National Security Council.[13]

It is important to note that though India has a Right to Information Act, but most of the security agencies are exempt from the purview of the Act[14] as is disclosure of any information that falls under the purview of the Official Secrets Act 1923.[15] [Note: There is no point in listing out all the exceptions given in section 8 and other sections as well. I think the point is sufficiently made when we say that security agencies are exempt from the purview of the Act.] The Official Secrets Act does not provide a definition of an 'official secret' and instead protects information: pertaining to national Security, defence of the country, affecting friendly relations with foreign states, etc.[16] Information in India is designated as classified in accordance to the Manual of Departmental Security Instruction which is circulated by the Ministry of Home Affairs. According to the Public Records Rules 1997, “classified records" means the files relating to the public records classified as top-secret, confidential and restricted in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Manual of Departmental Security Instruction circulated by the Ministry of Home affairs from time to time;”[17] Bi-annually officers evaluate and de-classify classified information and share the same with the national archives.[18] In response to questions raised in the Lok Sabha on the 5th of May 2015 regarding if the Official Secrets Act, 1923 will be reviewed, the number of classified files stored with the Government under the Act, and if the Government has any plans to declassify some of the files – the Ministry of Home Affairs clarified that a committee consisting of Secretaries of the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Department of Personnel and Training, and the Department of Legal Affairs has been established to examine the provisions of the Official Secrets Act, 1923 particularly in light of the Right to Information Act, 2005. The Ministry of Home Affairs also clarified that the classification and declassification of files is done by each Government Department as per the Manual of Departmental Security Instructions, 1994 and thus there is no 'central database of the total number of classified files'.[19]

How can India's oversight mechanism for state surveillance be clarified?

Though these mechanisms establish a basic framework for an oversight mechanism for state surveillance in India, there are aspects of this framework that could be clarified and there are ways in which the framework could be strengthened.

Aspects of the present review committee that could be clarified:

Powers of the review committee: Beyond having the authority to declare that orders for interception, monitoring, decryption, and collection of traffic data are not within the scope of the law and order for destruction of any collected information – what powers does the review committee have? Does the committee have the power to compel agencies to produce additional or supporting evidence? Does the committee have the power to compel information from the authorizing authority?
Obligations of the review committee: The review committee is required to 'record its findings' as to whether the interception orders issued are in accordance with the law. Is there a standard set of questions/information that must be addressed by the committee when reviewing an order? Does the committee only review the content of the order or do they also review the implementation of the order? Beyond recording its findings, are there any additional reporting obligations that the review committee must fulfill?
Accountability of the review committee: Does the review committee answer to a higher authority? Do they have to submit their findings to other branches of the government – such as Parliament? Is there a mechanism to ensure that the review committee does indeed meet every two months and review all orders issued under the relevant sections of the Indian Telegraph Act 1885 and the Information Technology Act 2008?

Proposed oversight mechanisms in India

Oversight mechanisms can help with avoiding breaches of national security by ensuring efficiency and effectiveness in the functioning of security agencies. The need for the oversight of state surveillance is not new in India. In 1999 the Union Government constituted a Committee with the mandate of reviewing the events leading up to Pakistani aggression in Kargil and to recommend measures towards ensuring national security. Though the Kargil Committee was addressing surveillance from the perspective of gathering information on external forces, there are parellels in the lessons learned for state surveillance. Among other findings, in their Report the Committee found a number of limitations in the system for collection, reporting, collation, and assessment of intelligence. The Committee also found that there was a lack of oversight for the intelligence community in India – resulting in no mechanisms for tasking the agencies, monitoring their performance and overall functioning, and evaluating the quality of the work.

The Committee also noted that such a mechanism is a standard feature in jurisdictions across the world. The Committee emphasized this need from an economic perspective – that without oversight – the Government and the nation has no way of evaluating whether or not they are receiving value for their money. The Committee recommended a review of the intelligence system with the objective of solving such deficiencies.[20]

In 2000 a Group of Ministers was established to review the security and intelligence apparatus of the country. In their report issued to the Prime Minister, the Group of Ministers recommended the establishment of an Intelligence Coordination Group for the purpose of providing oversight of intelligence agencies at the Central level. Specifically the Intelligence Coordination Group would be responsible for:

Allocation of resources to the intelligence agencies
Consideration of annual reviews on the quality of inputs
Approve the annual tasking for intelligence collection
Oversee the functions of intelligence agencies
Examine national estimates and forecasts[21]

Past critiques of the Indian surveillance regime have included the fact that intelligence agencies do not come under the purview of any overseeing mechanism including Parliament, the Right to Information Act 2005, or the General Comptroller of India.

In 2011, Manish Tewari, who at the time was a Member of Parliament from Ludhiana, introduced the Private Member's Bill - “The Intelligence Services (Powers and Regulation) Bill” proposed stand alone statutory regulation of intelligence agencies. In doing so it sought to establish an oversight mechanism for intelligence agencies within and outside of India. The Bill was never introduced into Parliament.[22] Broadly, the Bill sought to establish: a National Intelligence and Security Oversight Committee which would oversee the functionings of intelligence agencies and would submit an annual report to the Prime Minister, a National Intelligence Tribunal for the purpose of investigating complaints against intelligence agencies, an Intelligence Ombudsman for overseeing and ensuring the efficient functioning of agencies, and a legislative framework regulating intelligence agencies.[23]

Proposed policy in India has also explored the possibility of coupling surveillance regulation and oversight with private regulation and oversight. In 2011 the Right to Privacy Bill was drafted by the Department of Personnel and Training. The Bill proposed to establish a “Central Communication Interception Review Committee” for the purposes of reviewing orders for interception issued under the Telegraph Act. The Bill also sought to establish an authorization process for surveillance undertaken by following a person, through CCTV's, or other electronic means.[24] In contrast, the 2012 Report of the Group of Experts on Privacy, which provided recommendations for a privacy framework for India, recommended that the Privacy Commissioner should exercise broad oversight functions with respect to interception/access, audio & video recordings, the use of personal identifiers, and the use of bodily or genetic material.[25]

A 2012 report by the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses titled “A Case for Intelligence Reforms in India” highlights at least four 'gaps' in intelligence that have resulted in breaches of national security including: zero intelligence, inadequate intelligence, inaccurate intelligence, and excessive intelligence – particularly in light of additional technical inputs and open source inputs.[26] In some cases, an oversight mechanism could help in remediating some of these gaps. Returning to the 2012 IDSA Report, the Report recommends the following steps towards an oversight mechanism for Indian intelligence:

Establishing an Intelligence Coordination Group (ICG) that will exercise oversight functions for the intelligence community at the Central level. This could include overseeing functions of the agencies, quality of work, and finances.
Enacting legislation defining the mandates, functions, and duties of intelligence agencies.
Holding intelligence agencies accountable to the Comptroller & Auditor General to ensure financial accountability.
Establishing a Minister for National Security & Intelligence for exercising administrative authority over intelligence agencies.
Establishing a Parliamentary Accountability Committee for oversight of intelligence agencies through parliament.
Defining the extent to which intelligence agencies can be held accountable to reply to requests pertaining to violations of privacy and other human rights issued under the Right to Information Act.

Highlighting the importance of accountable surveillance frameworks, in 2015 the external affairs ministry director general of India Santosh Jha stated at the UN General Assembly that the global community needs to "to create frameworks so that Internet surveillance practices motivated by security concerns are conducted within a truly transparent and accountable framework.”[27]

In what ways can India's mechanisms for state surveillance be strengthened?

Building upon the recommendations from the Kargil Committee, the Report from the Group of Ministers, the Report of the Group of Experts on Privacy, the Draft Privacy Bill 2011, and the IDSA report, ways in which the framework for oversight of state surveillance in India could be strengthened include:

Oversight to enhance public understanding, debate, accountability, and democratic governance: State surveillance is unique in that it is enabled with the objective of protecting a nations security. Yet, to do so it requires citizens of a nation to trust the actions taken by intelligence agencies and to allow for possible access into their personal lives and possible activities that might infringe on their constitutional rights (such as freedom of expression) for a larger outcome of security. Because of this, oversight mechanisms for state surveillance must balance securing national security while submitting itself to some form of accountability to the public.
Independence of oversight mechanisms: Given the Indian context, it is particularly important that an oversight mechanism for surveillance powers and the intelligence community is capable of addressing and being independent from political interference. Indeed, the majority of cases regarding illegal interceptions that have reached the public sphere pertain to the surveillance of political figures and political turf wars.[28] Furthermore, though the current Review Committee established in the Indian Telegraph Act does not have a member from the Ministry of Home Affairs (the Ministry responsible for authorizing interception requests), it is unclear how independent this committee is from the authorizing Ministry. To ensure non-biased oversight, it is important that oversight mechanisms are independent.
Legislative regulation of intelligence agencies: Currently, intelligence agencies are provided surveillance powers through the Information Technology Act and the Telegraph Act, but beyond the National Intelligence Agency Act which establishes the National Intelligence Agency, there is no legal mechanism creating, regulating and overseeing intelligence agencies using these powers. In the 'surveillance ecosystem' this creates a policy vacuum, where an agency is enabled through law with a surveillance power and provided a procedure to follow, but is not held legally accountable for the effective, ethical, and legal use of the power. To ensure legal accountability of the use of surveillance techniques, it is important that intelligence are created through legislation that includes oversight provisions.
Comprehensive oversight of all intrusive measures: Currently the Review Committee established under the Telegraph Act is responsible for the evaluation of orders for the interception, monitoring, decryption, and collection of traffic data. The Review Committee is not responsible for reviewing the implementation or effectiveness of such orders and is not responsible for reviewing orders for access to stored information or other forms of electronic surveillance. This situation is a result of 1. Present oversight mechanisms not having comprehensive mandates 2. Different laws in India enabling different levels of access and not providing a harmonized oversight mechanism and 3.Indian law not formally addressing and regulating emerging surveillance technologies and techniques. To ensure effectiveness, it is important for oversight mechanisms to be comprehensive in mandate and scope.
Establishment of a tribunal or redress mechanism: India currently does not have a specified means for individuals to seek redress for unlawful surveillance or surveillance that they feel has violated their rights. Thus, individuals must take any complaint to the courts. The downsides of such a system include the fact that the judiciary might not be able to make determinations regarding the violation, the court system in India is overwhelmed and thus due process is slow, and given the sensitive nature of the topic – courts might not have the ability to immediately access relevant documentation. To ensure redress, it is important that a tribunal or a redress mechanism with appropriate powers is established to address complaints or violations pertaining to surveillance.
Annual reporting by security agencies, law enforcement, and service providers: Information regarding orders for surveillance and the implementation of the same is not disclosed by the government or by service providers in India.[29] Indeed, service providers by law are required to maintain the confidentiality of orders for the interception, monitoring, or decryption of communications and monitoring or collection of traffic data. At the minimum, an oversight mechanism should receive annual reports from security agencies, law enforcement, and service providers with respect to the surveillance undertaken. Edited versions of these Reports could be shared with Parliament and the public.
Consistent and mandatory reviews of relevant legislation: Though committees have been established to review various legislation and policy pertaining to state surveillance, the time frame for these reviews is not clearly defined by law. These reviews should take place on a consistent and publicly stated time frame. Furthermore, legislation enabling surveillance in India do not require review and assessment for relevance, adequacy, necessity, and proportionality after a certain period of time. Mandating that legislation regulating surveillance is subject to review on a consistent is important in ensuring that the provisions are relevant, proportionate, adequate, and necessary.
Transparency of classification and declassification process and centralization of de-classified records: Currently, the Ministry of Home Affairs establishes the process that government departments must follow for classifying and de-classifying information. This process is not publicly available and de-classified information is stored only with the respective department. For transparency purposes, it is important that the process for classification of records be made public and the practice of classification of information take place in exceptional cases. Furthermore, de-classified records should be stored centrally and made easily accessible to the public.
Executive and administrative orders regarding establishing of agencies and surveillance projects should be in the public domain: Intelligence agencies and surveillance projects in India are typically enabled through executive orders. For example, NATGRID was established via an executive order, but this order is not publicly available. As a form of transparency and accountability to the public, it is important that if executive orders establish an agency or a surveillance project, these are made available to the public to the extent possible.
Oversight of surveillance should incorporate privacy and cyber/national security: Increasingly issues of surveillance, privacy, and cyber security are interlinked. Any move to establish an oversight mechanism for surveillance and the intelligence committee must incorporate and take into consideration privacy and cyber security. This could mean that an oversight mechanism for surveillance in India works closely with CERT-IN and a potential privacy commissioner or that the oversight mechanism contains internal expertise in these areas to ensure that they are adequately considered.
Oversight by design: Just like the concept of privacy by design promotes the ideal that principles of privacy are built into devices, processes, services, organizations, and regulation from the outset – oversight mechanisms for state surveillance should also be built in from the outset of surveillance projects and enabling legislation. In the past, this has not been the practice in India– the National Intelligence Grid was an intelligence system that sought to link twenty one databases together – making such information easily and readily accessible to security agencies – but the oversight of such a system was never defined.[30] Similarly, the Centralized Monitoring System was conceptualized to automate and internalize the process of intercepting communications by allowing security agencies to intercept communications directly and bypass the service provider.[31] Despite amending the Telecom Licenses to provide for the technical components of this project, oversight of the project or of security agencies directly accessing information has yet to be defined.[32]

Examples of oversight mechanisms for State Surveillance: US, UK, Canada and United States

United States

In the United States the oversight 'ecosystem' for state surveillance is made up of:

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court

The U.S Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA) is the predominant oversight mechanism for state surveillance and oversees and authorizes the actions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the National Security Agency.[33] The court was established by the enactment of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 1978 and is governed by Rules of Procedure, the current Rules being formulated in 2010.[34] The Court is empowered to ensure compliance with the orders that it issues and the government is obligated to inform the Court if orders are breached.[35] FISA allows for individuals who receive an order from the Court to challenge the same,[36] and public filings are available on the Court's website.[37] Additionally, organizations, including the American Civil Liberties Union[38] and the Electronic Frontier Foundation, have filed motions with the Court for release of records. [39] Similarly, Google has approached the Court for the ability to publish aggregate information regarding FISA orders that the company recieves.[40]

Government Accountability Office

The U.S Government Accountability Office (GAO) is an independent office that works for Congress and conducts audits, investigates, provides recommendations, and issues legal decisions and opinions with regard to federal government spending of taxpayer's money by the government and associated agencies including the Defence Department, the FBI, and Homeland Security.[41] The head of the GAO is the Comptroller General of the United States and is appointed by the President. The GAO will initiate an investigation if requested by congressional committees or subcommittees or if required under public law or committee reports. The GOA has reviewed topics relating to Homeland Security, Information Security, Justice and Law Enforcement, National Defense, and Telecommunications.[42] For example, in June 2015 the GOA completed an investigation and report on 'Foreign Terrorist Organization Process and U.S Agency Enforcement Actions” [43] and an investigation on “Cyber Security: Recent Data Breaches Illustrate Need for Strong Controls across Federal Agencies”.[44]

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

The U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is a standing committee of the U.S Senate with the mandate to review intelligence activities and programs and ensure that these are inline with the Constitution and other relevant laws. The Committee is also responsible for submitting to Senate appropriate proposals for legislation, and for reporting to Senate on intelligence activities and programs.[45] The House Permanent Select Committee holds similar jurisdiction. The House Permanent Select Committee is committed to secrecy and cannot disclose classified information excepted authorized to do so. Such an obligation does not exist for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the committee can disclose classified information publicly on its own.[46]

Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB)

The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board was established by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 and is located within the executive branch.[47] The objective of the PCLOB is to ensure that the Federal Government's actions to combat terrorism are balanced against privacy and civil liberties. Towards this, the Board has the mandate to review and analyse ant-terrorism measures the executive takes and ensure that such actions are balanced with privacy and civil liberties, and to ensure that privacy and civil liberties are liberties are adequately considered in the development and implementation of anti-terrorism laws, regulations and policies.[48] The Board is responsible for developing principles to guide why, whether, when, and how the United States conducts surveillance for authorized purposes. Additionally, officers of eight federal agencies must submit reports to the PCLOB regarding the reviews that they have undertaken, the number and content of the complaints, and a summary of how each complaint was handled. In order to fulfill its mandate, the Board is authorized to access all relevant records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, recommendations, and classified information. The Board may also interview and take statements from necessary personnel. The Board may request the Attorney General to subpoena on the Board's behalf individuals outside of the executive branch.[49]

To the extent possible, the Reports of the Board are made public. Examples of recommendations that the Board has made in the 2015 Report include: End the NSA”s bulk telephone records program, add additional privacy safeguards to the bulk telephone records program, enable the FISC to hear independent views on novel and significant matters, expand opportunities for appellate review of FISC decisions, take advantage of existing opportunities for outside legal and technical input in FISC matters, publicly release new and past FISC and DISCR decisions that involve novel legal, technical, or compliance questions, publicly report on the operation of the FISC Special Advocate Program, Permit Companies to Disclose Information about their receipt of FISA production orders and disclose more detailed statistics on surveillance, inform the PCLOB of FISA activities and provide relevant congressional reports and FISC decisions, begin to develop principles for transparency, disclose the scope of surveillance authorities affecting US Citizens.[50]

The Wiretap Report

The Wiretap Report is an annual compilation of information provided by federal and state officials regarding applications for interception orders of wire, oral, or electronic communications, data address offenses under investigation, types and locations of interception devices, and costs and duration of authorized intercepts.[51] When submitting information for the report a judge will include the name and jurisdiction of the prosecuting official who applied for the order, the criminal offense under investigation, the type of intercept device used, the physical location of the device, and the duration of the intercept. Prosecutors provide information related to the cost of the intercept, the number of days the intercept device was in operation, the number of persons whose communications were intercepted, the number of intercepts, and the number of incriminating intercepts recorded. Results of the interception orders such as arrest, trials, convictions, and the number of motions to suppress evidence are also noted in the prosecutor reports. The Report is submitted to Congress and is legally required under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. The report is issued by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.[52]

United Kingdom

The Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) of Parliament

The Intelligence Security Committee was established by the Intelligence Services Act 1994. Members are appointed by the Prime Minster and the Committee reports directly to the same. Additionally, the Committee submits annual reports to Parliament. Towards this, the Committee can take evidence from cabinet ministers, senior officials, and from the public.[53] The most recent report of the Committee is the 2015 “Report on Privacy and Security”.[54] Members of the Committee are subject to the Official Secrets Act 1989 and have access to classified material when carrying out investigations.[55]

Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)

This Joint Intelligence Committee is located in the Cabinet office and is broadly responsible for overseeing national intelligence organizations and providing advice to the Cabinet on issues related to security, defense, and foreign affairs. The JIC is overseen by the Intelligence and Security Committee.[56]

The Interception of Communications Commissioner

The Interception of Communications Commissioner is appointed by the Prime Minster under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 for the purpose of reviewing surveillance conducted by intelligence agencies, police forces, and other public authorities. Specifically, the Commissioner inspects the interception of communications, the acquisition and disclosure of communications data, the interception of communications in prisons, and the unintentional electronic interception.[57] The Commissioner submits an annual report to the Prime Minister. The Reports of the Commissioner are publicly available.[58]

The Intelligence Services Commissioner

The Intelligence Services Commissioner is an independent body appointed by the Prime Minister that is legally empowered through the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000. The Commissioner provides independent oversight on the use of surveillance by UK intelligence services.[59] Specifically, the Commissioner is responsible for reviewing authorized interception orders and the actions and performance of the intelligence services.[60] The Commissioner is also responsible for providing assistance to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, submitting annual reports to the Prime Minister on the discharge of its functions, and advising the Home Office on the need of extending the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures regime.[61] Towards these the Commissioner conducts in-depth audits on the orders for interception to ensure that the surveillance is within the scope of the law, that the surveillance was necessary for a legally established reason, that the surveillance was proportionate, that the information accessed was justified by the privacy invaded, and that the surveillance authorized by the appropriate official. The Commissioner also conducts 'site visits' to ensure that orders are being implemented as per the law.[62] As a note, the Intelligence Services Commissioner does not undertake any subject that is related to the Interception of Communications Commissioner. The Commissioner has access to any information that he feels is necessary to carry out his investigations. The Reports of the Intelligence Service Commissioner are publicly available.[63]

Investigatory Powers Tribunal

The Investigatory Powers Tribunal is a court which investigates complaints of unlawful surveillance by public authorities or intelligence/law enforcement agencies.[64] The Tribunal was established under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and has a range of oversight functions to ensure that public authorities act and agencies are in compliance with the Human Rights Act 1998.[65] The Tribunal specifically is an avenue of redress for anyone who believes that they have been a victim of unlawful surveillance under RIPA or wider human rights infringements under the Human Rights Act 1998. The Tribunal can provide seven possible outcomes for any application including 'found in favor of complainant, no determination in favour of complainant, frivolous or vexatious, out of time, out of jurisdiction, withdrawn, or no valid complaint.[66] The Tribunal has the authority to receive and consider evidence in any form, even if inadmissible in an ordinary court.[67] Where possible, cases are available on the Tribunal's website. Decisions by the Tribunal cannot be appealed, but can be challenged in the European Court of Human Rights.[68]

Canada

In Canada the oversight 'ecosystem' for state surveillance includes:

Security Intelligence Review Committee

The Security Intelligence Review Committee is an independent body that is accountable to the Parliament of Canada and reports on the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.[69] Members of the Security Intelligence Review Committee are appointed by the Prime Minister of Canada. The committee conducts reviews on a pro-active basis and investigates complaints. Committee members have access to classified information to conduct reviews. The Committee submits an annual report to Parliament and an edited version is publicly available. The 2014 Report was titled “Lifting the Shroud of Secrecy”[70] and includes reviews of the CSIS's activities, reports on complaints and subsequent investigations, and provides recommendations.

Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner

The Communications Security Commissioner conducts independent reviews of Communications Security Establishment (CSE) activities to evaluate if they are within the scope of Canadian law.[71] The Commissioner submits a report to Parliament on an annual basis and has a number of powers including the power to subpoena documents and personnel.[72] If the Commissioner believes that the CSE has not complied with the law – it must report this to the Attorney General of Canada and to the Minister of National Defence. The Commissioner may also receive information from persons bound to secrecy if they deem it to be in the public interest to disclose such information.[73] The Commissioner is also responsible for verifying that the CSE does not surveil Canadians and for promoting measures to protect the privacy of Canadians.[74] When conducting a review, the Commissioner has the ability to examine records, receive briefings, interview relevant personnel, assess the veracity of information, listen to intercepted voice recordings, observe CSE operators and analysts to verify their work, examine CSI electronic tools, systems and databases to ensure compliance with the law.[75]

Office of the Privacy Commissioner

The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) oversees the implementation of and compliance with the Privacy Act and the Personal information and Electronic Documents Act.[76]

The OPC is an independent body that has the authority to investigate complaints regarding the handling of personal information by government and private companies, but can only comment on the activities of security and intelligence agencies. For example, in 2014 the OPC issued the report “Checks and Controls: Reinforcing Privacy Protection and Oversight for the Canadian Intelligence Community in an Era of Cyber Surveillance”[77] The OPC can also provide testimony to Parliament and other government bodies.[78] For example, the OPC has made appearances before the Senate Standing Committee of National Security and Defense on Bill C-51.[79] The OPC cannot conduct joint audits or investigations with other bodies.[80]

Annual Interception Reports

Under the Criminal Code of Canada, regional governments must issue annual interception reports. The reports must include number of individuals affected by interceptions, average duration of the interception, type of crimes investigated, numbers of cases brought to court, and number of individuals notified that interception had taken place.[81]

Conclusion

The presence of multiple and robust oversight mechanisms for state surveillance does not necessarily correlate to effective oversight. The oversight mechanisms in the UK, Canada, and the U.S have been criticised. For example, Canada . For example, the Canadian regime has been characterized as becoming weaker it has removed one of its key over sight mechanisms – the Inspector General of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service which was responsible for certifying that the Service was in compliance with law.[82]

Other weaknesses in the Canadian regime that have been highlighted include the fact that different oversight bodies do not have the authority to share information with each other, and transparency reports do not include many new forms of surveillance.[83] Oversight mechanisms in the U.S on the other hand have been criticized as being opaque[84] or as lacking the needed political support to be effective.[85] The UK oversight mechanism has been criticized for not having judicial authorization of surveillance requests, have opaque laws, and for not having a strong right of redress for affected individuals.[86] These critiques demonstrate that there are a number of factors that must come together for an oversight mechanism to be effective. Public transparency and accountability to decision making bodies such as Parliament or Congress can ensure effectiveness of oversight mechanisms, and are steps towards providing the public with means to debate in an informed manner issues related to state surveillance and allows different bodies within the government the ability to hold the state accountable for its actions.

.[1]. For example, “Public Oversight” is one of the thirteen Necessary and Proportionate principles on state communications surveillance developed by civil society and academia globally, that should be incorporated by states into communication surveillance regimes. The principles can be accessed here: https://en.necessaryandproportionate.org/

[2]. Hans Born and Ian Leigh, “Making Intelligence Accountable. Legal Standards and Best Practice for Oversight of Intelligence Agencies.” Pg. 13. 2005. Available at: http://www.prsindia.org/theprsblog/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/making-intelligence.pdf. Last accessed: August 6, 2015.

[3]. For example, this point was made in the context of the UK. For more information see: Nick Clegg, 'Edward Snowden's revelations made it clear: security oversight must be fit for the internet age,”. The Guardian. March 3rd 2014. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/03/nick-clegg-snowden-security-oversight-internet-age. Accessed: July 27, 2015.

[4]. International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance. Available at: https://en.necessaryandproportionate.org/

[5]. Sub Rules (16) and (17) of Rule 419A, Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951. Available at:http://www.dot.gov.in/sites/default/files/march2007.pdf Note: This review committee is responsible for overseeing interception orders issued under the Indian Telegraph Act and the Information Technology Act.

[6]. Information Technology Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring, and Decryption of Information Rules 2009. Definition q. Available at: http://dispur.nic.in/itact/it-procedure-interception-monitoring-decryption-rules-2009.pdf

[7]. Information Technology (Procedure and safeguard for Monitoring and Collecting Traffic Data or Information Rules, 2009). Definition (n). Available at: http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/it-procedure-and-safeguard-for-monitoring-and-collecting-traffic-data-or-information-rules-2009

[8]. This authority is responsible for authorizing interception requests issued under the Indian Telegraph Act and the Information Technology Act. Section 2, Indian Telegraph Act 1885 and Section 4, Information Technology Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring, and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009

[9]. This authority is responsible for authorizing interception requests issued under the Indian Telegraph Act and the Information Technology Act. Section 2, Indian Telegraph Act 1885 and Section 4, Information Technology Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring, and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009

[10]. Definition (d) and section 3 of the Information Technology (Procedure and safeguard for Monitoring and Collecting Traffic Data or Information Rules, 2009). Available at: http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/it-procedure-and-safeguard-for-monitoring-and-collecting-traffic-data-or-information-rules-2009

[11]. Rule 1, of the 419A Rules, Indian Telegraph Act 1885. Available at:http://www.dot.gov.in/sites/default/files/march2007.pdf This authority is responsible for authorizing interception requests issued under the Indian Telegraph Act and the Information Technology Act.

[12]. Section 92, CrPc. Available at: http://www.icf.indianrailways.gov.in/uploads/files/CrPC.pdf

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[40]. United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Washington DC. In Re motion for consent to disclosure of court records or, in the alternative a determination of the effect of the Court's rules on statutory access rights. Available at: https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/misc-13-01-opinion-order.pdf

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[45]. Committee Legislation. Available at: http://ballotpedia.org/United_States_Senate_Committee_on_Intelligence_(Select)#Committee_legislation

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For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/policy-brief-oversight-mechanisms-for-surveillance

PMA Policy and COAI Recommendations

dipankar — 2014-07-02T06:45:22Z

Introduction

The Ministry of Communications and Information Technology on the 10th of February, 2012 released a notification [1] in the Official Gazette outlining the Preferential Market Access [2] Policy for Domestically Manufactured Electronic Goods 2012. The Policy is applicable to procurement of telecom products by Government Ministries/Departments and to such electronics that had been deemed to having security concerns, thus making the policy applicable to private bodies in the latter half. The Notification reasoned that preferential access was to be given to domestically manufactured electronic goods predominantly for security reasons. Each Ministry or Department was to notify the products that had security implications, with reasons, after which the notified agencies would be required to procure the same from domestic manufacturers. This policy was also meant to be applicable to even procurement of electronic goods by Government Ministries/Agencies for Governmental purposes except Defence. Each Ministry would be required to notify its own percentage of such procurement, though it could not be less than 30%, and also had to specify the Value Addition that had to be made to a particular product to qualify it as a domestically manufactured product, with the policy again specifying the minimum standards. The policy was also meant for procurement of electronic hardware as a service from Managed Service Providers (MSPs).

The procurement was to be done as according to the policies of the each procuring agency. The tender was to be apportioned according to the procurement percentage notified and the preference part was to be allotted to the domestic manufacturer at the lowest bid price. If there were no bidders who were domestic manufacturers or if the tender was not severable, then it was to be awarded to the Foreign Manufacturer and the percentage adjusted as against other electronic procurement for that period.

Telecom equipment that qualifies as domestically manufactured telecom products for preferential market access include: encryption and UTM platforms, Core/Edge/Enterprise routers, Managed leased line network equipment, Ethernet Switches, IP based Soft Switches, Media gateways, Wireless/Wireline PABXs, CPE, 2G/3G Modems, Leased-line Modems, Set Top Boxes, SDH/Carrier Ethernet/Packet Optical Transport Eqiupments, DWDN systems, GPON equipments, Digital Cross connects, small size 2G/3G GSM based Base Station Systems, LTE based broadband wireless access systems, Wi-Fi based broadband wireless access systems, microwave radio systems, software defined radio cognitive radio systems, repeaters, IBS, and distributed antenna system, satellite based systems, copper access systems, network management systems, security and surveillance communication systems (video and sensors based), optical fiber cable.

The Policy also mentioned the creation of a self-certification system to declare domestic value addition to the vendor. The checks would be done by the laboratories accredited by the Department of Information Technology. The policy was to be in force for a period of 10 years and any dispute concerning the nature of product was to be referred to the Department of Information Technology.

International and Domestic Response to the Policy

There was a large scale opposition, usually from international sectors, towards the mooting of this policy. Besides business houses, even organizations like those of the United States Trades Representatives criticized the policy as being harmful to the global market and in violation of the World Trade Organization Guidelines.[3] Criticism also poured in from domestic bodies in terms of recommendations towards modification of the policy largely on three grounds: (i) the high domestic value addition requirement and the method of calculation of the same, (ii) the lack of a link between manufacturing and security and (iii) application of the policy to the private sector.

The Cellular Operations Association of India (COAI) in a letter dated March 15, 2012 to the Secretary of the Department Technology and Chairman of the Telecom Commission expressed its views on the telecom manufacturing in the country.[4]The COAI stated that such a development had to be done realistically and holistically so that the whole eco-system was developed as a comprehensive whole. In that regard it also forwarded a study that had been commissioned by COAI and conducted by M/s. Booz and Company titled “Telecom Manufacturing Policy – Developing an Actionable Roadmap”. The report was a comprehensive study of the telecom industry and outlined the challenges and opportunities that lay on its development trajectory. It also talked about Government involvement in the development process. The Report while citing the market share of Indian Telecom Industry which would be around 3% [5] of the Global Market highlighted the fact that no country could be self-sufficient in technology. It further talked about the development of local clusters in order to cut costs and encourage manufacturing, while ensuring that the PMA Policy was consistent with the WTO Guidelines. It further recommended opening up of foreign investments and making capital available to ensure growth of innovation. Finally it highlighted the lack of a connection between manufacturing and security and instead stressed upon proper certification, checks and development of a comprehensive CIIP framework across all sensitive networks for security purposes.

In a further letter to the Joint Secretary of the Department of Information and Technology dated April 25, 2012 the COAI expressed some reservations concerning the draft guidelines that had been published along with the notification.[6] While stressing upon the fact that a higher value addition would be impossible with the lack of basic manufacturing capabilities for the development of technological units, it also highlighted the need to redefine Bill of Materials which had been left ambiguous and subject to exploitation. It further highlighted the fact that allowing every Ministry to make its own specifications would lead to inconsistent definitions and an administrative challenge and hence such matters should be handled by a Central Body. Furthermore it opined that the calculation of BOMs and the Value Additions should be done using the concept of substantial transformation as has been given in the Booz Study. Furthermore, while discouraging the use of disincentives, it stated that one individual Ministry should be in charge of specifying such incentives to avoid confusion and for the sake of ease of business.

In another letter to a Member of the Department of Telecommunications dated July 12, 2012 the COAI stressed upon the futility of having high value additions as the same was impossible under the present scenario.[7] There was a lack of manufacturing sector which had to be comprehensively developed backed by fiscal incentives and comprehensive policies. In spite of that, it stressed that no country could become self-reliant and that such policies, like the PMA, were reminiscent of the “license and permit raj” era. It further said that such policies should be consistent with WTO Guidelines and should not give undue preference to domestic manufacturers to the detriment of other manufacturers. Countering the security aspect, it said that the same had been addressed by the DoT License Amendment of May 31, 2011 whereby all equipments on the network would have to comply with the “Safe to Connect” standard, and stressed upon the lack of any link between manufacturing and security. Furthermore for calculation of Value Addition it suggested an alternative to the method proposed by the Government as the same would lead to disclosures of sensitive commercial information which were contained in the BOMs. The COAI said that the three stages as laid out in the Substantial Transformation (as mentioned in the Booz Study) should be used for calculating the VA. It made several proposals to develop the telecom manufacturing industry in India including provision of fiscal incentives, development of telecom clusters and comprehensive policies which led to harmonization with laws and creation of SEZs among other such benefits.

In October 2012 the Government released a draft notification notifying products due to security consideration in furtherance of the PMA Policy.[8] The document outlined the minimum PMA and VA specification for a range of products. It also stated several security reasons for pursuing such a policy and stated that India had to be completely self-reliant for its active telecom products. It also contained data on the predicted growth of the telecom market in India. The COAI thereafter released a document commenting upon the draft notification of the Government.[9]

Besides highlighting the fact that the COAI still had not received a response to its former comments, it again stressed upon the lack of a link between security and manufacturing. It reiterated its point on the impossibility of a complete self-reliance on any nation’s part, and stressed upon the need of involving other stakeholders in the promulgation of such policies. It also made changes to the notified list of equipments, reclassifying it according to technology and only listing equipments which had volumes. Furthermore it also suggested changes towards the calculation of value addition to include materials sourced from local suppliers, in-house assemblage to be considered local material and the calculation to be done for complete order and not for each item in the order. It further recommended a study be conducted and the industry be involved while predicting demands as such were dated and needed revision. The Government thereafter released a revised notification[10] on October 5, 2012 but it did not contain much of the commented changes that the COAI had proposed.

Thereafter in April 2013, the DeitY released draft guidelines[11] for providing preference to domestically manufactured electronic products in Government Procurement in further of the second part of the PMA Policy. The guidelines besides containing definitions to several terms such as BOM also prescribed a minimum of 20% domestic procurement while leaving the specifications onto individual Ministries. It recommended the establishment of a technical committee by the concerned Ministry or Department that would recommend value addition to products. It followed a BOM based calculation of Value Addition while leaving the matter of certification to be dealt by DeitY certified laboratories that are notified for such purposes by the concerned Ministry/Department. DeitY was the nodal ministry for monitoring the implementation of the policy while particular monitoring was left to each Ministry or Department concerned. Among the annexures were indicative lists of generic and telecom products and a format for Self Certification regarding Domestic Value Addition in an Electronic Product.

The COAI thereafter released a revised draft containing its own comments on April 15, 2013.[12] The COAI pointed out faults in the definition of BOM. It highlighted the difficulty in splitting R&D according to countries, and also stressed upon the impractical usage of BOM in calculation of value addition as the same was confidential business information. As it had already suggested earlier, it reiterated the usage of the Substantial Transformation process for the calculation of Value Addition. While removing the lists of equipments mentioned, it further pointed out that the disqualification in the format for self-certification would be a very harsh disincentive and would result in driving away manufacturers. It suggested that there should be incentives for compliance instead.

The COAI along with the Association of Unified Telecom Service Providers of India sent a letter dated January 24, 2013 to the Secretary, DoT containing their inputs on Draft List of Security Sensitive Telecom Products for Preferential Market Access (PMA).[13] It again stressed upon the fact that security and manufacturing were not related and that the security aspect had been dealt by the “Safe to Connect” requirement mandated by the DoT License Amendment. It talked of the impossibility of arriving at VA figures until the same is defined to internationally accepted norms. Further it opined that if the Government had security concerns it should consider VA at a network level in the configurations as would be deployed in the network or its segments rather at element or subsystem levels as the latter would leave too many calculations open and the procurement entities will find it very difficult to ensure if they meet the PMA requirement or not. It further stressed upon the need to comply with WTO Guidelines while stressing upon the need to pay heed to certification standards than pursue the unavailable link between manufacturing and security through a PMA Policy. Finally it suggested a grouping of telecom products for the policy based on technology rather than individual products.

Pursuant to a Round Table Conference Organized by the Department of Information and Technology, AUSPI and COAI sent another letter dated April 15, 2013 to the Secretary, Department of Information and Technology.[14] It reiterated several points that both the AUSPI and COAI had been suggesting to the Government on the Telecom Manufacturing Policy. It cited the examples of other manufacturing nations to reiterate the fact that no country could be completely self-reliant in manufacturing electronics and such positions would only lead to creation of an environment that would not be conducive to global business. It further stressed upon the need to change the manner of calculation of VA while highlighting the fact that every Department should notify its list of products having security implications and the list of telecom equipment should be deleted from the draft guidelines being issued by DeitY to ensure better implementation.

A major change came in on July 8, 2013 when the Prime Minister’s Office made a press release withdrawing the PMA policy for review and withholding all the notifications that had been issued in that regard.[15] It said that he revised proposal will incorporate a detailed provision for project / product / sector specific security standards, alternative modes of security certification, and a roadmap for buildup of domestic testing capacity. It further noted that the revised proposal on PMA in the private sector for security related products will not have domestic manufacturing requirements, percentage based or otherwise and that the revised proposal will incorporate a mechanism for a centralised clearing house mechanism for all notifications under the PMA Policy.

The COAI thereafter on November 7, 2013 sent a letter to the DoT containing feedback on the list of items slated for Government procurement.[16] It noted that there were 23 products on which PMA was applicable. It pointed out that there were no local manufacturers for many of the products notified. It also asked the Government to take steps to ensure that fiscal incentives were given to encourage manufacturing sector which was beset by several costs such as landing costs which acted as impediments to its development. It stressed upon the tiered development of the industry needed to ensure that a holistic and comprehensive growth is attained which would result in manufacturing of local products. It requested that the Government "focus on right enablers (incentives, ecosystem, infrastructure, taxation) as the outcome materializes once all of these converge."

The COAI sent a further letter dated November 13, 2013 to the DoT concerning the investment required in the telecom manufacturing industry.[17] It noted the projected required investment of 152bn USD in the telecom sector and that the Government had projected that 92% of the investment would have to come from the Private Sector. COAI, while stressing upon the need of the Government and the Private Industry to work in tandem with each other, suggested that the Government devise methods to attract investments in the telecom sectors from international telecom players and that the Telecom Equipment Manufacturing Council meet to review and revise methods for attracting such investments.

Pursuant to the PMO directive, DeitY released a revised PMA Policy on the 23rd of December, 2014.[18] While there have been a few major changes, not all of recommendations by various bodies have been adhered to.[19] The major changes in the revised policy included the exemption of the private sector from the policy and the removal of PMA Policy to equipments notified for security reasons. The manner of calculation of the domestic value addition has not been changed though there has been a reduction in the percentage of value addition needed to qualify a product as domestic product. Another addition has been of a two-tiered implementation mechanism for the Policy. Tier-I includes a National Planning and Monitoring Council for Electronic Products which would design a 10-year roadmap for the implementation of the policy including notification of the products and subsequent procurement. Under Tier-II, the Ministries and Departments will be issuing notifications specifying products and the technical qualifications of the same, after approval by the Council. The former notifications under the 2012 Policy, including the notification of 23 telecom products by Department of Telecom,[20] are still valid until revised further.[21]

[1]. No. 8(78)/2010-IPHW. Available at http://www.dot.gov.in/sites/default/files/5-10-12.PDF (accessed 03 June, 2014).

[2]. Preferential Market Access

[3]. See The PMA Debate, DataQuest at http://www.dqindia.com/dataquest/feature/191001/the-pma-debate/page/1 (accessed June 2014).

[4]. The letter is available at http://www.coai.com/Uploads/MediaTypes/Documents/letter-to-dit-on-pma-notification.pdf (accessed June, 2014).

[5]. Around $17bn.

[6]. The letter is available at http://www.coai.com/Uploads/MediaTypes/Documents/letter-to-dit-on-pma-notification.pdf (accessed June, 2014).

[7]. The letter is available at http://www.coai.com/Uploads/MediaTypes/Documents/coai-to-dot-on-enhancing-domestic-manufacturing-of-telecom-equipment-bas.pdf (accessed June, 2014).

[8]. The notification no. 18-07/2010-IP can be found at http://www.coai.com/Uploads/MediaTypes/Documents/DoT-draft-notification-on-Policy-for-preference-to-domestically-manufactured-telecom-products-in-procurement-October-2012.pdf (accessed June, 2014).

[9]. The commented COAI draft can be found at http://www.coai.com/Uploads/MediaTypes/Documents/Annexure-1-Comments-on-draft-notification-by-DoT.pdf (accessed June, 2014).

[10]. Available at http://www.coai.com/Uploads/MediaTypes/Documents/dots-notification-on-telecom-equipment-oct-5,-2012.pdf (accessed June, 2014).

[11]. The draft guidelines can be found at http://www.coai.com/Uploads/MediaTypes/Documents/pma_draft-govt-procurement-guidelines-april-2013.pdf (accessed June, 2014).

[12]. The COAI commented draft can be found at http://www.coai.com/Uploads/MediaTypes/Documents/pma-draft-security-guidelines-15-april-2013.pdf (accessed June, 2014).

[13]. The letter can be found at http://www.coai.com/Uploads/MediaTypes/Documents/jac-007-to-dot-on-Januarys-list-of-telecom-products-final.pdf (accessed June, 2014).

[14]. The letter can be found at http://www.coai.com/Uploads/MediaTypes/Documents/jac-to-moc-on-pma.pdf (accessed June, 2014).

[15]. The press release can be found at http://www.coai.com/Uploads/MediaTypes/Documents/pmo-on-pma.pdfhttp://www.coai.com/Uploads/MediaTypes/Documents/pmo-on-pma.pdf (accessed June, 2014).

[16]. The letter can be found at http://www.coai.com/Uploads/MediaTypes/Documents/COAI-letter-to-DoT-on-Feedback-on-List-of-Items-for-Govt-Procurement.pdf (accessed June, 2014).

[17]. The letter can be found at http://www.coai.com/Uploads/MediaTypes/Documents/COAI-letter-to-DoT-on-Investments-Required-(TEMC)-Nov%2013-2013.pdf (accessed June, 2014).

[18]. The Notification No. 33(3)/2013-IPHW can be found at http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/Notification_Preference_DMEPs_Govt_%20Proc_23_12_2013.pdf (accessed June, 2014).

[19]. For more information, see http://electronicsb2b.com/policy-corner/revised-preferential-market-access-policy/# (accessed June, 2014).

[20]. The notification has been mentioned and discussed above.

[21]. A list of notifications dealing with electronic products except telecom products can be found on the website of DeitY at http://deity.gov.in/esdm/pma (accessed June, 2014).

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/pma-policy-and-coai-recommendations

Plugging into India’s broadband revolution

Navadha Pandey — 2019-06-05T14:02:48Z

After many false starts, the plan to wire India’s digital future may finally take off with Jio GigaFiber’s entry.

The article by Navadha Pandey was published in Livemint on June 4, 2019. Sunil Abraham was quoted.

All through 2018, 58-year-old Ashok Kumar Rai’s Lucknow-based small architecture firm used to spend a princely sum of ₹11,800 each month for the privilege of a good broadband internet connection. “We used to send building walk-through files to clients every day and the size of each file could go up to 1GB (gigabytes)," he says. Doling out cash for reliable internet was a necessity. All that changed when a new player, Atria Convergence Technologies Ltd (ACT), came to Rai’s upmarket Gomti Nagar neighbourhood in Lucknow. In the summer of 2019, Rai’s internet access speed has shot up from 4 to 150 Mbps (megabits per second). And the monthly bill has come crashing down to about ₹1,000.

For far too long, India’s internet action lay centered in its metros, leaving out even relatively big cities like Lucknow. The fledgling online access push into smaller cities and rural India happened primarily via mobile data transmitted over wireless spectrum. Home broadband was nowhere in the picture. But all that seems set for some dramatic change. If the country’s richest man, Mukesh Ambani, has his way, high-speed broadband will become a reality in at least 1,600 cities.

In the process, he aims to also leapfrog India from its current rank—134—in fixed-line broadband penetration to the top five with the help of Jio GigaFiber.

The dream of a broadband revolution, however, has its fair share of detractors. Bhaskar Ramamurthi, for example, who helms the Centre of Excellence in Wireless Technology (CWEiT at Indian Institute of Technology Madras (IIT Madras), says: “Fiber penetration will take a long time in India."

The logic is simple: unlike mobile towers, fiber needs to reach each home physically. China’s broadband boom happened because it has rebuilt nearly its entire housing stock in the last 15 years, fuelled by a construction-led growth bubble. “In India, initially only all the upcoming new buildings may get connected to fiber-based (fast) internet," says Ramamurthi.

But India’s untapped millions are about to set off a race. And this journey, which will clearly not be a cakewalk, has huge rewards in store. Sample this: India has 1.16 billion mobile subscribers but just 18.42 million wired broadband subscribers. And many of them, like Rai, are data hungry. There is an existing playbook: what happened to mobile broadband after 2014.

In 2014, the cost of one GB of mobile data was ₹270. Now, it is ₹10 per GB. As a result, mobile data consumption has soared. In late-2014, an average user on Airtel’s network (India’s largest telecom operator back then) used 622 megabytes (MB) of data in a month. By late-2018, the number of users had tripled, but, despite a broader base, average data usage stood at 10GB a month.

First-mover advantage

The expansion in wired broadband access may have far-reaching implications beyond a mere spike in data usage. When Mukesh Ambani, chairman and managing director of Reliance Industry Ltd which owns Reliance Jio Infocomm Ltd, declared optical fibre based fixed-line broadband as “the future" last July, the real play was not on the infrastructure itself, but the services that would ride on top—from smart home experiences to new forms of e-commerce. The revenue and the first-mover advantage lie in who gets to tap into the “ecosystem"—of how a household connects to the wider world to buy, watch, and exchange.

Essentially, new businesses could emerge to feed the “ecosystem". And some existing small and medium-scale businesses may finally become viable enough to expand and go big. Netflix, for example, emerged as one of the world’s largest video streaming platform, riding on top of the US broadband boom. But India already has a crowded pack of 34 web video streaming entertainment platforms, most of which have cropped up to sustain the attention of mobile data guzzling Indians. With wired broadband following mobile usage expansion, unlike in most other countries, India’s new-age internet businesses are likely to be unique and different.

Home-based surveillance and security systems could be one space that could gain significant traction, says Sunil Abraham, executive director of the Bengaluru-based think-tank Centre for Internet and Society. “If there are 40 families (in a high-rise apartment) who have babies and need surveillance facilities, each apartment going for an individual connection from a telecom service provider would involve a huge amount of money. But a fibre-based intranet or peer network could connect all 40 flats for a much smaller price," he says.

There could also be unintended consequences for the country’s digital gender divide. Only 29% of India’s current internet users are women, according to a recent Unicef report. If the cost of wired broadband begins to crash—thereby increasing the number of homes which have access—women who will never get access to a phone (due to the cost of device and patriarchy) will finally be able to see things on the internet, says Nandini Chami, a researcher at IT for Change, a non-governmental organization. “How this negotiation will happen inside the house, we will have to wait and watch," she says. Household-level access would also confuse corporate entities trying to “hyper-profile" users since multiple people will be accessing the internet through shared devices at home, she adds.

But as internet access improves, making the digital economy more vital, Chami says, governments would have an important role in ensuring women get to use the internet “on terms that are empowering". “We can think of innovative models when fixed broadband becomes cheap. The household is not the space for this. It can be libraries which have special times for young girls or digital labs for women. We need to rethink the missed opportunity of the BharatNet and the national optic fibre network. Internet access should not stop at just the panchayat office. We must think of different points of access, particularly for women," Chami adds.

The possibility of many of these radical changes in both the social and business realms will, of course, entirely rely on the pace at which India goes broadband. Despite the rapid expansion in mobile internet, data originating from mobile devices still account for only 20% of India’s data consumption. That is why what happens in the wired broadband space will matter increasingly. And that is also why Jio is betting big on expanding the existing wired user base (18 million) to 50 million.

The Jio gameplan

Jio is currently running beta trials for GigaFiber in New Delhi and Mumbai, providing 100GB of data at 100 Mbps for free, except for the ₹4,500 one-time deposit for a router. While the landline will come with unlimited calling facility, television channels will be delivered over the internet (Internet Protocol Television, or IPTV). The packaged trio of fast Internet, landline telephony, and television access will remain free for a while—similar to what had happened in the mobile phone services segment in 2016. After commercial launch, the per month cost is expected to be ₹600, roughly half of what similar services cost currently.

Jio’s rival Bharti Airtel Ltd has decided that it is not interested in the entire pie but just the creamy top layer. It will focus on premium customers and expand its broadband services across India’s top 100 cities, instead of copying Reliance Jio’s ambitious plan to create a fibre-optic network across the country. To achieve this, Airtel, which already has 2.36 million fibre customers, will stay focussed on high-rise buildings rather than horizontal deployment, as this business model is more economical and logical.

The dark horse in this race is, of course, ACT with its existing 1.42 million customers. Its presence is much smaller with just 18 cities, largely in the south India and the newly expanded zones of Delhi, Jaipur and Lucknow. On the ACT fibre network, average data consumption per user is already at 130GB a month.

“We have seen a 150% increase in average consumption in the last 18 months," says Bala Malladi, chief executive officer, ACT. “People are now looking at higher speeds and the experience is taking precedence over cost. In fact, even in the hinterland, people want higher speeds and non-buffered experience," he adds.

But why hasn’t fibre penetration gone up if the demand is booming? Why did India miss the bus when other countries like the US have an 80% fibre penetration?

Policy paralysis

Firstly, fibre is expensive to lay, unlike a SIM card which can be given away for free. Moreover, India till a few years ago was mostly a voice calls market and not a data market. Secondly, municipalities in India have complicated right-of-way (RoW) procedures which act as a big hurdle for digging and laying fibre. This is one of the reasons why even government (such as the Delhi government) plans to set up citywide surveillance and Wi-Fi hotspots have failed.

“The centre has finally issued a very good RoW model, but now every state has to come up with its own policy modelled on the central guidelines. They are taking their own sweet time," says Rajan Mathews, director general, Cellular Operators Association of India (COAI).

The lack of forward movement on these fixable policy issues assumes significance given the government’s focus on fibre in its National Digital Communications Policy-2018, which has a target of attracting $100 billion worth of investments in digital communications.

The policy’s goals include universal broadband for all, creating four million jobs in digital communications, and raising the share of digital communications in India’s gross domestic product (GDP) to 8% (from less than 6% in 2017). Deployment of five million public Wi-Fi hotspots by 2020 through a National Broadband Mission is also on the agenda. The key goal, however, is to provide 1 Gbps (gigabit per second) connectivity to all gram panchayats by 2020 and 10 Gbps by 2022.

The sad reality is that the last five years were an absolute failure in laying fibre in the country. BharatNet, the flagship mission to connect 250,000 gram panchayats with broadband, which was being implemented by Bharat Broadband Network Ltd (BBNL), a special purpose vehicle set up under the department of telecommunications (DoT) in February 2012, has been a disappointment, to say the least.

The government has completed laying optical fibre cables across more than 100,000 gram panchayats in the first phase and had aimed to complete connecting the remaining 150,000 councils by March 2019. The second phase has seen “zero progress", according to government officials close to the matter. Pained by poor utilization of digital infrastructure, the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (Trai) suggested auctioning BharatNet infrastructure on an “as is where is" basis after a meeting held in December at the prime minister’s office to take stock of the mission.

To start with, the DoT plans to monetize fibre assets built by the government under its flagship mission BharatNet through outright sale to private players or by leasing these assets for a 20-year period after a bidding process. If successful, it could boost connectivity in Indian villages, which have so far been kept out of the digital dividend.

Bigger cities, however, will have a different consumption story. With intra-city fibre coverage leading to improved penetration, wired broadband would not just offer an enhanced content viewing experience, but also open doors for internet of things, or IoT. “Home security is going to become a big business going forward, riding on fibre. Even gaming will see a lot of traction as you can enjoy a 4K game in real-time, thanks to low latency and high speed of an optic network," Malladi of ACT says.

The looming question, however, is how much investment can operators put in given the current low tariff environment in the telecom sector. Big players are stressed for funds and are diluting their non-core assets to generate funds to keep networks afloat. “If you are looking at what will happen in the next three years... I believe that there is a business case to be made and tariffs should sustain it (the investment)," Mathews says.

Whether that happens or not could become an important footnote in India’s growth story. The far-reaching implications of fast internet access pushed billionaire tech entrepreneur Elon Musk, chief executive officer of Space Exploration Technologies Corp. (SpaceX), to launch 60 internet-beaming satellites last month. The grand scheme is a response to the practical constraint of laying fibre, a concern which is more pressing in India’s vast landmass.

Unlike Musk, the country’s broadband dreams, however, still remain rooted to the ground—in the simple tech of optic fibre. And the success or failure of those dreams will be written by how fast the fibre network expands.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/telecom/news/livemint-navadha-pandey-june-4-2019-plugging-into-indias-broadband-revolution

Pleasure and Pornography: Impassioned Objects

namita — 2011-08-02T08:35:20Z

In this post, a third in the series documenting her CIS-RAW project, Pleasure and Pornography, Namita Malhotra explores the idea of fetish as examined by Anne McClintock (i) . This detour is an exploration of the notion of fetish, its histories and meanings, and how it might relate to the story of Indian porn.

The etymology of fetish derives from the word fetico (Portuguese) which means sorcery or magic arts. In 1760, it was used to refer to primitive religions, especially in relation to the growing project of imperialism. In 1867, Marx coined the term commodity fetishism – using the implied meaning of primitive magic to express the central social form of modern industrial economy, whereby the social relation between people metamorphoses into the relation between things. It was only after this, in 1905, that Freud transferred the word, with all these meanings still clinging to it, to the realm of sexuality and perversions. As Anne McClintock points out, in her useful account and re-understanding of the fetish in the book Imperial Leather (ii), psychoanalysis, philosophy, and Marxism all take shape around the invention of the primitive fetish, which conveniently displaces what the modern mind cannot accommodate onto the invented domain of the primitive. She states that the not-so-concealed rationale of imperialism is fetishism. Fetishists (racial, sexual and other) became a mode of warranting and justifying conquest and control -- whether it was the policing of sexual fetishism for control of classes in Europe and colonies, or the invention of racial fetishism central to the regime of imposing sexual surveillance in the colonies. The imperial discourse on fetishism became a discipline of containment (iii) .

On the other hand in the realm of sexuality, fetish becomes a question of male sexuality alone -- male perversion par excellence. There are no female fetishists, either for Freud or Lacan, for to speak of female fetishism would involve displacing the basic precepts of psychoanalysis -- namely the scene of castration leading to phallic fetishism. However, McClintock points to the usefulness of studying female fetishism, as it allows for certain things to happen. First, it dislodges the centrality of the phallus in this discourse, which surprisingly makes way for the presence and legitimacy of a multiplicity of pleasures, needs, and contradictions that can’t be resolved or reduced merely to the desire to preserve the phallus. Very often, feminists such as McClintock read the Lacanian insistence on the centrality of the phallus as itself a fetishistic nostalgia for a single, male myth of origins and fetishistic disavowal of difference. Such a notion of fetish, embedded in phallic theory, gets easily reduced to sexual difference and does not allow/admit race or class as crucially formative categories as well; thus, race and class remain continuously of secondary status in the primarily sexually signifying chain.

“The racist fetishizing of white skin, black fetishizing gold chains, the fetishizing of black dominatraces, lesbians, cross dressing as men the fetishizing of national flags, slave fetishism, class cross-dressing, fetishes such as nipple clips and bras in male transvestism, leather bondage, PVC fetishism, babyism and so on -- these myriad different deployments of fetishistic ambiguity cannot be categorized under a single mark of desire, without great loss of theoretical subtlety and historical complexity.” Also McClintock points to racist, nationalistic and patriotic fetishes -- such as flags, crowns, maps, swastikas (or for instance chaddis) -- that can’t be simply rendered equivalent to the disavowal of male castration anxiety.

McClintock calls for a renewed investigation of fetishism -- to open it up to a more complex and valuable history in which racial and class hierarchies would play as formative a role as sexuality. Rejecting the Lacanian and Freudian fixation on the phallus as central to psychoanalysis would call for a mutually transforming investigation into the disavowed relations of psychoanalysis and social history. In a way, it would be the bringing together of the varied ways in which fetish has been used -- by Freud (in the domain of psychoanalysis) in the realm of domesticity and the private, and by Marx (in the domain of male socio-economic history) in the realm of the market and possibly in the public. If these meanings were to speak to each other, what we discover is that fetish is in fact the historical enactment of ambiguity itself.

Fetishism involves the displacement onto an object of contradictions that the individual cannot resolve at a personal level. These contradictions could indeed be social, though lived with profound intensity in the imagination and flesh of the person. The fetish -- rather than being a merely an insignificant sexual or personal practice -- inhabits both personal and historical memory. It marks a crisis in social meaning -- the embodiment of an impossible resolution. This crisis/contradiction is displaced onto and embodied in the fetish object, which is thus destined to recur in compulsive ways. By displacing this power onto the fetish, then manipulating or controlling the fetish, the individual gains symbolic control over what might otherwise be terrifying ambiguities.

The fetish then can be called an impassioned object; something that emerges from a variety of social contradictions, rather than merely from the scene of castration or phallic centric domains. Hence they are neither universal, nor are they entirely about personal histories alone, but are about personal and historical memory or a social contradiction that is experienced at an intensely personal level. “As composite symbolic objects, fetishes thus embody the traumatic coincidence not only of individual but also of historical memories held in contradiction” (McClintock). This reading of fetishism gives rise to far richer possibilities of cultural analysis.

Fetish was neither proper to African or Christian European culture, but sprang into being from an abrupt encounter between two heterogeneous worlds during an era of mercantile capitalism and slavery. At this point it clearly embodies the problem of contradictory social value -- whether it is gold as valuable, or gold as warding off bad luck. Though initially just about heathen customs and rituals, it later also becomes a marking of certain groups of people for conquest. It is from this context that Freud transports the word, laden with meanings of conquest and violence, to the realm of sexuality. Obviously these meanings stain future connotations of fetish, the word fetish itself becoming prey to contradictory meanings of race and sex and difference.

For Freud, the fetish is the embodiment in one object of two positions -- castration and its denial. Though this does capture some sense of the ambiguity that McClintock also refers to, here the meanings oscillate between two, and only two, fixed options (a recurring male economy). The fetish becomes both a permanent memorial to the horror of castration, embodied not in the male but in the female -- as well as a token of triumph, and safeguard against the threat of castration. This has, of course, been critiqued by feminists quite severely. McClintock’s basic argument is that it is indeed hard, considering the varied nature of fetish objects, to find a single originary explanation in the psychic development of the individual -- in a single originary trauma. What is important here, however is to take on this notion of the fetish as an historical enactment of ambiguity itself, and see if as a theoretical concept it has any value to the study of the loose category of Indian porn, especially MMS porn.

Soap in these strange days: fetish objects

“Such spectacle creates the promise of a rich sight: not the sight of particular fetishized objects, but sight itself as richness, as the grounds for extensive experience.”
Dana Polan (iv)

Anne McClintock’s work on fetish also looks at the seemingly ubiquitous object of soap as the carrier of many ambiguous meanings around gender, class, imperialism -- both the cult of domesticity (the running of the empire of home with servants, sweepers, cleaners, women, maids etc.) and the cult of new imperialism found in soap in its exemplary mediating form. The story of soap, for McClintock, reveals that fetishism rather than a quintessentially African propensity (belonging in the realm of lands and peoples that were being discovered through imperialism) was in fact central to industrial modernity; fetishism was not original either to industrial capitalism or precolonial economies, but was from the outset the embodiment and record of an incongruous and violent encounter (between two or more heterogenous cultures) and about rapid changes of modernity, rather than about the ‘primitive’.

Marx says that the mystique of the commodity fetish lies not in its use value, but in its exchange value and its potency as a sign: “So far as (a commodity) is a value in use, there is nothing mysterious about it”. This could be linked to the idea of a mobile phone that is supposed to achieve so much beyond mere communication, at least according to the advertising -- they should mend ruptured relations and homes, get all the hot chicks, grow beautiful gardens, change the boring routine of life. For some time, the Samsung mobile phone ad with Estella Warren played in India, which probably moves the mobile phone with camera out of merely its symbolic use as enhancing attractiveness, to actually ‘getting’ or rather capturing girls by clicking. Magically in the ad, the act of clicking photographs make the girl not just willing, but she also takes the phone and photographs herself. Barring one scary moment when it looks like she might turn into an avenging warrior like Xena or The Bride, but instead she simpers into a loving sexy pose, she is willing. The ad can’t be easily dismissed as misogynistic, but it does give an intriguing glimpse of the intimate pictures and moments that can be captured with a mobile phone.

That a mobile phone is fetishized as a commodity is probably evident, from the rush to get the more enhanced phone with the better camera and features, though mobile phones are also a ubiquitous element of one’s life, in some ways exactly like soap. Probably in a country like India, having a mobile phone can be read as opening up sexual possibilities in a way that wouldn’t be obvious in a more developed country. If the fetish is a social contradiction that is experienced at an intensely personal level, then the mobile phone, especially after the DPS MMS clip, is precariously located between the zones of the private and personal, and that which is entirely in the public domain beyond any control of the person(s). This ability of the mobile phone to occupy simultaneous universes because of its interconnectedness in a network, and that it is (for most people now) an entirely personal object with messages, numbers, conversations, images, videos, is what makes it unpredictable.

Looking at MMS porn
“Memories were meant to fade. They were built that way for a reason”
Mace, Strange Days

When looking at MMS porn, I’m irresistibly reminded of the movie Strange Days, in which Angela Basset’s character Mace expresses her frustration with Lenny (played by Ralph Fiennes). Lenny is obsessed with preserving memory and accessing other people’s experiences, through what in the movie are called playbacks. Playbacks are recordings of events in the brain that were fed back into brain waves to reproduce the earlier event -- the feelings, the sensations of touch, the smells and not just the visual. Playbacks haven’t been invented yet, but the obsessiveness with which Lenny wheels and deals (he’s also a dealer and collector of playbacks) gives a peculiar insight into how mobile phones are becoming fetish objects of sorts -- particularly MMSs recorded on mobile phones where other people are able to occupy the space of an unknown character that conveniently rarely ever appears on the screen. The famous pornographic ones are the DPS MMS clip and other MMS scandals, including the hidden voyeuristic ones taken without permission, and a precursor of this is Mysore Mallige where the man appears rarely on the screen and only at the end, almost like a signature. In a peculiar way MMS porn becomes like playback from Strange Days, a movie that is attempting to unravel the unknown future mired in technological changes that are messily intertwined with human desire and frailty. A future (set on the date of turning the millennium) that we’ve hopelessly gone past without even asking many of the questions that the characters in the movie pose.

Indian websites advertise MMS scandals as a specific category of pornography. This category also includes genuine MMS clips of celebrities kissing (Kareena Kapoor), wardrobe malfunctions from Fashion Week, and also fake ones with celebrity look-alikes bathing, changing, having sex (Preity Zinta, Mallika Sherawat). Mostly what is being talked about are videos made on mobile phones by men, who record themselves having sex with ‘gullible’ women. The alleged gullibility of these women is probably essential to the erotic charge of such videos. They are shaky videos, especially when sex is underway, and have a grainy quality that makes them eerily real. Their perspective is usually that of the man who is holding the phone camera and rarely enters the frame himself, whereas the woman is definitely the desirable object that is being captured. Maybe this phenomenon can be understood better if one looks at McClintock’s idea of fetish and whether MMS/images on mobile phones can be located within that category -- whether the ambiguous nature of the video or image recorded on the mobile phone and its ability to be an intensely personal and private object and also to be so easily transmitted into networks signifies a crisis in social meanings around private and public. The mobile phone then merely becomes an object onto which this anxiety is displaced, and the recording of images repeatedly (and anxieties and fears triggered when they accidentally slip into the public domain) are ways of trying to control terrifying ambiguities over the private and the public (where aspects of sexuality, family and selfhood could be calamitously disrupted by a slip between the two categories). (v)

In a strange way this is a parable for a larger phenomenon of pornographic circulation and the law, as well. The mass circulation of pornography is perceived as a private secret that is kept by all, and whenever there is slip between the two categories, the law and public discourse are barely able to deal with the furore of anxieties. And if not, then the law and public discourse proceed to deal with the banal unbuttoning of Akshay Kumar’s jeans by his wife as obscenity in courtrooms, as if we hadn’t all imagined an MMS that allowed us to be doing the same.

i. Anne Mcclintok’s work on sadomasochism illuminates some of the arguments that I make in relation to sexual subjectivity and the state’s interests and desires in policing it. (unpublished article for book on queer issues and the law). Her work borrows from notions developed by Foucault. “Sadomasochism plays social power backwards, visibly and outrageously staging hierarchy, difference and power, the irrational, ecstasy or alienation of the body, placing these ideas at the centre of western reason.” The analysis of sexual subjectivity and State’s interest in it also looks at the judgment on sadomasochism by the House of Lords, England that declares such activities that cause severe injuries and maim the body, as illegal, regardless of consent of parties.
ii. Anne Mcclintok, Imperial Leather: Race, gender and sexuality in the colonial contest, Routledge, 1995.
iii. Ibid
iv. Cited from Laura Mulvey, Some Thoughts on Theories of Fetishism in the Context of Contemporary Culture, October, Vol. 65 (Summer, 1993), pp. 3-20.

v. As in the story of Chanda in Dev.d loosely inspired from the DPS MMS clip incident

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/histories-of-the-internet/blogs/law-video-technology/impassioned-objects-unraveling-the-history-of-fetish

Platforms, Power, and Politics: Perspectives from Domestic and Care Work in India

Aayush Rathi, and Ambika Tandon — 2021-07-07T15:19:37Z

CIS has been undertaking a two-year project studying the entry of digital platforms in the domestic and care work in India, supported by the Association for Progressive Communications as part of the Feminist Internet Research Network. Implemented through 2019-21, the objective of the project is to use a feminist lens to critique platform modalities and orient platformisation dynamics in radically different, worker-first ways. Ambika Tandon and Aayush Rathi led the research team at CIS. The Domestic Workers’ Rights Union is a partner in the implementation of the project, as co-researchers. Geeta Menon, head of DWRU, was an advisor on the project, and the research team consisted of Parijatha G.P., Radha Keerthana, Zeenathunnisa, and Sumathi, who are office holders in the union and are responsible for organising workers and addressing their concerns.

The Executive Summary for the project report is below.

The full report, ‘Platforms, power, and politics: Perspectives from domestic and care work in India’, can be found here.

The press release can be found here.

Introduction

Paid domestic and care work is witnessing the entry of digital intermediaries over the past decade. More recently, there has been tremendous growth of digital platforms. This holds the potential to impact millions of workers in the sector, which is characterised by a long history of informality and exclusion from rights-according legal frameworks. Digital intermediation of domestic and care work has been a space of high-growth, but also high-attrition. In India, order books of digital platforms providing domestic and care work services were reported to have been growing by upto 60 percent month-on-month in 2016. This is expected to shift the organisation of workers and employment relations profoundly.

Broadly, the discourse on digital platforms providing home-based services can be summarised as follows: proponents argue that digitisation will act as a step towards bringing formalisation to the sector, while critics argue that platforms could replicate the exploitation of workers by further disguising the employer-employee relationship. Similar debates around lack of protections and precarity have also taken place in other occupations in gig work such as transportation and food delivery. In fact, the similarity in precarity and the informal nature of this relationship across gig work and domestic work has led to domestic workers being labelled the original gig workers. Domestic work is a particularly vulnerable and unprotected sector, which makes work in the sector qualitatively different from most other sectors in the gig or sharing economy.

Through a feminist approach to digital labour, our project aimed to examine the dynamics of platformisation in, and of domestic or reproductive care work. Our hypothesis was that platforms are reconfiguring labour conditions, which could empower and/or exploit workers in ways qualitatively different from non-standard work off the platform. In order to interrogate this further, we studied several aspects of the work relationship, including wages, conditions of work, social security, skill levels, and worker surveillance off platforms.

Methodology

We borrowed from ethnographic methods and feminist principles to co-design and implement the research tools with grassroots workers and organisers. Between June to November 2019, we conducted 65 in-depth semi-structured interviews primarily in New Delhi and Bengaluru. A majority of these were with domestic workers who were seeking or had found work through platforms. We also did interviews with workers who had found work through traditional placement agencies to compare our findings, and with representatives from platforms, government labour departments, and workers collectives. Of the workers we interviewed, a majority were women, but men were included as well. Interviews in New Delhi were undertaken by CIS, while interviews with workers in Bengaluru were undertaken by grassroots activists in Bengaluru, affiliated with the Domestic Workers Rights Union (DWRU).

In implementing the data collection approach, we employed feminist methodological principles of intersectionality, self-reflexivity, and participation. The methodology draws on standpoint theory, which encourages knowledge production that centres the lived experiences of marginalised groups. We were acutely aware of our own positionality as high income, Savarna researchers studying a sector dominated by Dalit, Bahujan and Adivasi women from low income groups. This power differential was softened partially by involving DWRU through the course of the project. Workers across both field sites were also interviewed in spaces familiar to them, most often their homes, in languages that they were comfortable with including Hindi, Kannada, and Tamil.

Feminist principles also instrumental during the data analysis, with focus on intersectionality and self-reflexivity. We highlighted the ways in which inequalities of gender, income, migration status, caste, and religion are replicated and amplified in the platform economy. In particular, we discussed the impact of the digital gender gap in access and skills on workers’ ability to find economic opportunities.

Findings

Our typology of platforms mediating domestic work finds three types of platforms – (i) marketplace, or platforms that list workers’ data on their profile, provide certain filters for automated selection of a pool of workers, and charge a fee from customers for access to workers’ contact details, (ii) digital placement agency, or platforms that provide an end-to-end placement service to customers, identify appropriate workers on the basis of selection criteria, and negotiate conditions of work on behalf of workers, and (iii) on-demand platforms, or companies that provide services or ‘gigs’ such as cleaning on an hourly basis, performed by a roster of workers who are characterised as ‘independent contractors’.

When it comes to the role played by platforms in determining employment relations, there is a wide variation within and across platform categories. There are both weak and strong models of intervention. On one end of the spectrum are marketplaces, with minimal intervention in the recruitment process, and on the other on-demand platforms, that exact control over each aspect of work. Digital platforms reconfigure the conception of intermediaries in the domestic work sector, functioning as next-generation placement agencies. All three platform types contain aspects that provide workers agency, as well as those that reinforce their positions of low-power. Platform design impacts the role platforms play in setting conditions of work, but does not determine it entirely.

(Re)shaping the terms of work
Across the three types of platforms, wages are slightly higher than or matching those of workers off platforms. Some marketplace platforms have incorporated features to nudge customers towards setting higher wages, such as enforcing minimum wage standards, or informing customers of expected wages in their locality. Conversely, on-demand platforms charge a high rate of commission from workers, despite refusing to recognise them as employees. This indicates that this is a misclassification of an employment relationship, given that workers are unable to set their own conditions or wages for work. Despite the high rates of commission and appropriation of labour by platforms, on-demand workers earn higher wages than workers on other platforms. The relatively high wage is a result of marketing on-demand cleaning as professionalised and more skilled than day-to-day cleaning. Tasks in the sector continue to be distributed along the lines of gender and caste, as has historically been the case. Dalit, Bahujan and Adivasi women are more likely to take up work such as cleaning and washing dishes, while men and women across castes are equally distributed in cooking work. Women dominate tasks such as elderly and childcare, as in the traditional economy. Workers in professionalised tasks such as deep cleaning that requires technical equipment and chemicals are almost entirely men.

Digital divides and workers’ agency
We find that workers are primarily onboarded onto platforms by learning about it from other workers, through onboarding camps held by platforms, or offline advertising by platforms. Such in-person onboarding techniques allows workers with no digital access or literacy to register themselves on marketplace platforms and digital placement agencies.

However, we find that low levels of education and digital literacy continue to impact platformed labour by creating a strong informational asymmetry between workers and platforms. For instance, we find that women workers from low income communities have very little information about how platforms work, causing deep distrust. Workers with digital devices and literacy (and therefore a relatively better understanding of the functionality of the platform), physical mobility and the resources to bear indirect costs that were outsourced to them were at a significant advantage in finding better-paying jobs. Workers who were seeking flexibility and were not necessarily dependent on the platform for their primary income were also better placed than those entirely dependent on platforms. Women workers tended to be disadvantaged on all these counts, limiting their agency and capacity to reap the benefits of the platform economy.

Across the three types of platforms, systems of placement and ratings add to the information asymmetry, as workers are not aware of the impact of ratings on their ability to find work or charge better wages. Ratings and filtering systems also hard-code the impact of workers’ social characteristics on their work. Workers are unable to exercise control over their data, further undermining their agency vis-a-vis platforms and employers. We identify a clear need for collective bargaining structures to protect workers’ rights, although platformed domestic workers remained distant from both domestic work unions and emergent unions of platform workers in other sectors.

Intersectionalities of formalisation
We find that inequalities of caste, class, and gender that have historically shaped the sector continue to be replicated or even amplified in the platform economy. What remains clear is that platforms in the domestic work sector adopt the logics of this sector, more than the converse. Platformisation is conflated with formalisation, and it is within this vector, from complete informality to piecemeal formalisation, that platforms operate. Labour benefits do not take the form of labour protections or welfare entitlements that are the central function of formalisation processes. Instead, the so-called benefits are intended to transform domestic workers to participate within the logics and vagaries of the market.

Policy Recommendations

Recognise and implement labour protections for domestic workers
Domestic workers have historically occupied the most vulnerable positions in the workforce, with limited legal protections. Exposed to the regulatory grey areas that platforms operate in, this doubly exposes domestic workers to precarious conditions of work. Despite an avowed move towards formalisation of domestic work, platform-mediated labour continues to retain characteristics of informal labour, even heightening some.

If pushed to do so, platform companies can be instrumental in resolving some of the implementation challenges that governments have faced in enforcing legislative protections sought to be made available to domestic workers. Platforms have databases of workers, which can be used to mandatorily register them for social security schemes offered by the government. This data can also be used for better policy making, in the absence of reliable statistics particularly on migrant workers in the informal economy.

Reduce the protective gap between employment and self-employment
The (mis)classification of “gig” work within labour law frameworks is still a matter that continues to be hotly debated within policy practitioners, legal scholarship, and civil society actors. Three positions, in particular, have been taken—treating gig workers as employees, independent contractors, or occupying a third intermediate category. More recently, there have been some legal victories guaranteeing employment protections and increasing platform companies’ accountability. However, these successes have been more visible in Global North jurisdictions.

Regardless of the resolution of these ongoing debates over employment status, labour frameworks should provide some universal protections to all categories of labour. Such protections must include universal coverage of social security, in addition to rights such as freedom of association, collective bargaining, equal remuneration and anti-discrimination. Policies geared towards achieving this objective would be significant in reducing the protective gaps between different categories of labour, and would particularly help historical and emerging occupational categories of workers such as “gig” workers and domestic workers.

Recognise the specific challenge(s) and potential of platformisation of domestic work
Platforms hold the potential of acting as effective facilitators in informal labour markets. Even when they do not replace existing recruitment pathways, they provide alternate ones. Workers were more likely to register on a platform if they were entering the domestic work labour market recently (often distress and migration driven), or had not enjoyed success with informal, word-of-mouth networks. However, platforms also heighten labour market insecurities, and create new ones. These potential risks need to be specifically recognised through appropriate frameworks, such as social security, discrimination law and data protection.

Tailor policy-making to platform models
We identify three types of platforms, each of which intervene to varying degrees in the work relationship. We recommend that digital placement agencies and marketplace platforms be registered with governments and enforce basic protections for workers such as provision of minimum wage, preventing abuse (including non-payment of wages) and trafficking. On-demand companies on the other hand, must be treated as employers, and workers be accorded employment protections including social security.

In addition to rights-based policy actions, legal-regulatory mechanisms geared towards mitigating the precariousness of platform-based work are required. This can take the shape of clarifying and expanding existing legal-regulatory formulations, or preparing new ones. Such policy making should factor in the power and information asymmetry between domestic workers (and gig workers, generally) and platforms.

Further, in the absence of health or retirement benefits, risks and indirect costs of operations are shifted from employers to workers. For instance, workers provide capital in the form of tools or equipment, support the fluctuation of business and income, and can be ‘deactivated’ from an application as a result of poor ratings or periods of inactivity. Any regulation aiming to extend employee status should mandate platforms to support such indirect costs.

Related Publications

1. Research notes with reflections from union members.
2. The event report from a stakeholder consultation with workers, unions, companies and government representatives.
3. A reflection note on the participatory approach taken by the project.
4. A paper with a comparative analysis of the policy landscape on domestic work in the platform economy.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/platforms-power-and-politics-perspectives-from-domestic-and-care-work-in-india

Platforms, Power, and Politics Press Release pdf

pranav — 2021-06-29T13:06:22Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/platforms-power-and-politics-press-release-pdf

Platforms, Power, and Politics pdf

pranav — 2021-07-07T15:15:20Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/platforms-power-and-politics-pdf

Platforming precarity: Data narratives of workers sustaining urban platform services

2024-10-15T02:42:26Z

CIS conducted quantitative surveys with over 800 workers employed in the app-based taxi and delivery sectors across 4 cities in India as part of the ‘Labour Futures’ project supported by the Internet Society Foundation. The surveys covered key employment indicators, including earnings and working hours, work-related cost burdens, income and social security, and platform policies and management. Findings from these surveys are presented as data visualisation briefs centring workers’ everyday experiences. These data briefs form a foundational evidence base for policy and action around labour rights, social protection, and urban inclusion in platform work.

It has been over a decade since app-based delivery and taxi sectors began operations in India, and have since expanded to several metropolitan and smaller cities. These sectors together account for the largest proportion of the platform workforce in India. Workers’ organising and collective action have long revealed extractive labour practices in the platform economy. Their demands call for the recognition of their labour rights by policymakers and platforms, an end to exploitative working conditions, and the introduction of effective policy that protects their rights and wellbeing.

In 2021-22, the labour research vertical at the Centre for Internet and Society conducted quantitative surveys with over 800 workers in the app-based taxi services and app-based delivery services sectors. Spanning four cities (Delhi-NCR, Mumbai, Guwahati, Lucknow), the surveys gathered comprehensive data on the conditions of work in the platform economy in these cities, within its two dominant sectors.

The survey covered key labour indicators—(i) the conditions of work for workers, including recruitment, wages, incentive structures, and work-related cost burdens (ii) workforce management, including hours spent working for the platform, surveillance and control measures, and (iii) workers’ coverage under income security, social security and social protections, including provident funds, health and accident insurance, and pensions.

Key Findings

The generation of city-level data aimed to support policymaking and advocacy towards achieving just outcomes for workers in the rapidly platformising Indian economy. These survey findings speak to i) top-down approaches of regulatory, legislative, and judicial action through evidence-building, and ii) bottom-up approaches of mobilisation and advocacy campaigns of workers’ collectives.

The city-wise data briefs highlight region-specific differences and similarities shaped by histories and newer developments of labour platforms operating in the urban economy. Across the four survey cities, the data briefs reveal the ways in which precarity materialised in platform work. Workers grappled with numerous socioeconomic vulnerabilities that influenced their entry and continued employment in platform work. They faced low-wage outcomes, worsened by a reduction in bonuses, and high operational work-related expenses. Earnings remained low and uncertain despite workers putting in immensely long hours working for platforms. Worsening these burdens was widespread income insecurity that workers faced in both app-based taxi and delivery sectors.

Mapping delivery and taxi platform services across cities

The taxi services sector in all cities was dominated by two large platforms—Uber and Ola Cabs. These platforms had established a highly concentrated labour market for taxi workers. The exception to this was the taxi platform labour market in Guwahati, where the local platform, PeIndia, employed 35% of taxi workers in the city.

The delivery services sector in all cities had a high concentration of pan-India platforms. Food delivery services were concentrated by Swiggy and Zomato across cities. E-commerce delivery services had a diversity of platforms including Amazon, Flipkart, E-kart Logistics, and Shadowfax, as well as grocery delivery services like Big Basket, Dunzo, and Jio Mart.

Economic necessity and a lack of alternative employment pushing workers into precarious platform work

The pathway to precarious platform work was distress-driven, borne out of low wages in previous salaried work, or a lack of alternative employment. A large proportion of workers were previously engaged in salaried employment, who then shifted to platform work, marking increased informality and precarity in their employment status. In Mumbai, over 64% of workers were in salaried employment previously, and this also the case for over 50% of workers in Guwahati, and over 42% of workers in Delhi-NCR. In Lucknow and Delhi-NCR, pandemic-driven unemployment was a key driver for a staggering proportion of workers who joined platform work as a distress employment source. Over 30% of workers in Lucknow and Delhi-NCR were previously unemployed.

These socioeconomic vulnerabilities influenced workers entry and continued employment in platform work. Key factors for workers entering were the lack of alternative employment sources and the hope for better pay and potential job flexibility. The lack of alternative jobs was a major push into platform work for workers in Delhi-NCR and Lucknow—over 60% of workers in Delhi-NCR and over 50% of workers in Lucknow. At least 40% of workers across cities mentioned the expectation of better pay as a major reason to start platform work, while potential job flexibility was also a key reason for workers in Mumbai and Guwahati. However, as the findings below show, workers’ expectations were unmet.

Externalised joining, statutory, and operational costs

High joining, statutory, and operational costs were offloaded onto workers to access and continue platform work. This was especially the case for taxi workers who owned their vehicles, and had to incur vehicle investment costs and downpayment, as well as statutory costs that included operating permits, road tax, vehicle insurance, and fitness fee. Across all cities, average monthly expenses for taxi workers were above INR 30,000. For delivery workers, average monthly expenses mostly comprised fuel costs, and were around INR 5,500 in Guwahati and Lucknow, and around INR 6,700 in Delhi-NCR and Mumbai. These high externalised costs reveal the economic vulnerabilities inherent within platform work.

Compounding these costs, platforms in the taxi services sectors also charged commissions unevenly and in varying fee structures—ranging from 20% to 30% of the fare in Mumbai and Lucknow, and going as high as 35% in Delhi-NCR and Guwahati. It is important to note that high commissions persist despite the mandate under the Motor Vehicle Aggregator Guidelines, 2020 to cap commissions and other platform charges at 20% of the fare.

Platforms’ offloading of costs to workers have resulted in workers’ having to rely on informal leasing, debt, and subcontracting arrangements. These arrangements were seen across all cities, where workers in the city were either renting the vehicle they were driving, paying a commission to a vehicle owner, paying off vehicle EMIs on someone else’s behalf, or were paid a fixed salary by a vehicle owner. Notably, in Lucknow, around 35% of taxi workers were engaged under these informal arrangements.

Insufficient incomes and economic vulnerabilities

Workers' experiences, across cities, highlight how a majority contended with low-wage outcomes. Earnings remained low and uncertain for workers despite the fact that they were putting in long work hours. Several factors contributed to this insufficiency and uncertainty in workers’ earnings: stringent platform requirements around high acceptance rates and ratings, which were important determinants, decreased flexibility, and high offloaded work-related expenses.

Across cities, earnings for delivery workers were considerably lower than those for taxi workers. When earnings were adjusted for standard weekly work hours (48 hours/week), over 50% of delivery workers in Mumbai, Guwahati, and Lucknow were earning less than the corresponding state-wise minimum wages. Further, over 75% of delivery workers in these cities were earning below estimated state-wise living wages. Platform work was also insufficient in meeting essential living needs for taxi workers in Mumbai, Guwahati, and Lucknow. Around 30% of taxi workers (23% in Guwahati) were earning less than minimum wages, and around 50% (80% in Mumbai) were earning less than estimated living wages. Earnings for both delivery and taxi workers in Delhi-NCR were substantially lower than minimum wage and living wage standards. 69% of workers in the taxi services sector and 87% of workers in the delivery services sector earned less than the minimum wage in Delhi. Moreover, 92% of workers in the taxi sector and 97% of workers in the delivery sector earned lower than the estimated living wage.

These insufficient incomes were particularly damaging to workers’ lives and livelihoods, considering their high dependence on income from platform work. An overwhelming proportion of workers (over 94% across all cities) were engaged in platform work as their main source of income, as opposed to part-time employment. They also faced significant economic burdens such as being sole earners in their household, having multiple financial dependents, having financial commitments to provide remittances back home, and so on. Worsening these burdens was widespread income insecurity that workers faced across all cities—for over 43% of workers (up to 65% in Guwahati), earnings from platform work were insufficient for covering basic household expenses.

Workplace risks and ineffective redressal mechanisms

Workers in both sectors were working immensely long hours in order to try and make adequate earnings while working for platforms, working several hours above standard weekly work hours (48 hours/week) typically prescribed by occupational health standards. Across all cities, delivery workers spent a median of over 60 weekly hours working for platforms, and taxi workers spent a median of around 84 weekly hours.

Alongside the adverse health impacts of long work hours, workers faced grievous workplace risks, including risks of physical assault, theft, poor road safety, and harsh weather conditions. Around 75% of delivery and taxi workers faced these issues in Mumbai and Lucknow. An even greater proportion of workers were exposed to these risks in Delhi-NCR (84%) and Guwahati (90%).

Despite several workplace risks, platforms remained unaccountable for their failure to guarantee safe working conditions. Across all cities, less than 10% of workers found that their platform took steps to improve working conditions. Workers’ overall experience with platform grievance redressal mechanisms was mixed. For instance, in Lucknow, only around 25% of workers who raised grievances did not receive a resolution. In contrast, 50% of taxi workers in Delhi-NCR did not receive a resolution, as was the case for 76% of taxi workers in Mumbai. Workers have limited recourse when their grievances go unanswered. Platforms, however, wield significant control over terms of work, making it difficult for workers to challenge unfair decisions.

Low coverage and accessibility of social protection mechanisms

Social security covered by platforms typically included health insurance and accident insurance. Workers faced significant gaps in insurance coverage, and these gaps were particularly glaring in the taxi services sector. Across cities, health and accident insurance coverage for taxi workers was below 10% (an exception was 11% of workers covered by accident insurance in Delhi-NCR). It is important to note that this low coverage exists despite the Motor Vehicle Aggregator Guidelines, 2020 mandating provision of health insurance and term insurance from platforms.

Delivery workers had a relatively higher percentage of insurance coverage from platforms, although coverage varied across cities. Health insurance coverage was low for delivery workers in Delhi-NCR (21%) and Guwahati (14%), but higher for workers in Lucknow (34%) and Mumbai (44%). In the case of accident insurance, insurance was covered by platforms for over 40% of delivery workers in Delhi-NCR and Lucknow, while a greater proportion of workers were covered in Mumbai (63%) and Guwahati (72%). Even though delivery workers were covered by platform-provisioned insurance, claiming benefits was an unreliable and time-consuming process. Workers who attempted to access benefits faced several obstacles, including poor awareness of available schemes, inadequate coverage, and little to no platform support in navigating complex claims procedures.

The inadequacy of platform-provisioned insurance was exacerbated by the exclusion of workers from government social protection mechanisms. In Delhi-NCR, Guwahati, and Lucknow, over 35% of workers in both sectors were left outside of social protection from governments. In Mumbai, over 66% of workers were excluded.

Contributors

Conceptualisation + planning: Aayush Rathi, Abhishek Sekharan, Ambika Tandon, Chetna V M, Chiara Furtado, and Nishkala Sekhar

Writing: Aayush Rathi, Ambika Tandon, Chetna V M, Chiara Furtado, and Nishkala Sekhar

Data analysis: Abhishek Sekharan, Chetna V M, and Nishkala Sekhar

Data visualisation: Sriharsha Devulapalli

Design + design direction: Annushka Jaliwala and Yatharth

Review: Aayush Rathi and Abhineet Nayyar

Survey design + planning: Abhishek Sekharan and Ambika Tandon

Survey implementation: Abhishek Kumar

Research advice: Nora Gobel and Uma Rani Amara

We are deeply grateful to the workers who participated in the surveys for generously sharing their time, experiences, and insights with us.

This work was supported by the Internet Society Foundation, as part of the “Labour Futures” project at the Centre for Internet and Society.

This work is shared under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License (CC BY-SA 4.0)

To know more about this work, please write to us at chiara@cis-india.org

Explore more of CIS’ research on labour and digitalisation at platformwork.in

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/platforming-precarity-data-narratives-workers