Centre for Internet and Society

Big Brother is here: Amid snooping row, govt report says monitoring system 'practically complete'

Admin — 2018-12-26T15:22:27Z

The recently released 2017-18 annual report of the Centre for Development of Telematics (C-DOT) says that surveillance equipment is being rolled out in 21 service areas across the country.

The article by Keerthana Sankaran was published in New Indian Express on December 26, 2018.

While last week's government order on snooping caused an uproar, the Centre's plans for a far-reaching monitoring system have been in the making for almost a decade -- with the groundwork being done by the previous UPA regime. The recently released 2017-18 annual report of the Centre for Development of Telematics (C-DOT) says that India’s ‘Central Monitoring System’ (CMS) is “practically complete”, confirming that the Orwellian ‘Big Brother’ is here.

The report says that surveillance equipment is being rolled out in 21 service areas across the country and operations have commenced in 12 service areas. The system will monitor and intercept calls and messages.

The government claims the CMS is based on the Telegraph Act of 1885 which states that the central or state government may intercept messages if the government is “satisfied that it is necessary or expedient to do so in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the state, friendly relations with foreign states or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of an offence.”

Even though the surveillance system was publicly announced in 2009, C-DOT’s annual report of 2007-2008 had hinted at a testing phase for a “lawful interception, monitoring” system.

A post from the website of the Centre for Internet and Society describes how the CMS could work. Network providers are all required to give interconnected Regional Monitoring Centres access to their network servers. The article also points out that there is no law that describes the CMS.

The CMS was approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security during the UPA government in 2011, receiving flak from experts and the press for not safeguarding the citizen’s right to privacy. However, in a Lok Sabha session in May 2016, Telecom Minister Ravi Shankar Prasad said that the system is for the “process of lawful interception”, adding that regional monitoring centres in Delhi and Mumbai had been operationalised.

The latest C-DOT report also talks about a Centre of Excellence for Lawful Interception being set up, which would use high-end technologies - such as open source intelligence, image processing and search engine tools to scan Twitter and Facebook - for surveillance.

On Thursday, the Ministry of Home Affairs released a notification, authorising 10 central agencies to intercept, monitor and decrypt any "information generated, transmitted, received or stored in any computer." While the public and opposition parties expressed alarm over the new order, the C-DOT report clearly shows that state surveillance plans are already in an advanced stage.

These government moves are taking place despite the August 2017 landmark judgement by the Supreme Court, which declared the right to privacy as a fundamental right which will protect citizens from intrusive activities by the state.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/new-indian-express-keerthana-sankaran-december-26-2018-big-brother-is-here-amid-snooping-row-govt-report-says-monitoring-system-practically-complete

Feminist Methodology in Technology Research

ambika — 2018-12-25T15:17:02Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/feminist-methodoloty-in-technology-research.pdf

How data privacy and governance issues have battered Facebook ahead of 2019 polls

Admin — 2018-12-25T01:43:59Z

Rohit S, an airline pilot, had enough of Facebook. With over 1,000 friends and part of at least a dozen groups on subjects ranging from planes to politics, the 34-year-old found himself constantly checking his phone for updates and plunging headlong into increasingly noisy debates, where he had little personal connect.

The article by Rahul Sachitanand was published in Economic Times on December 9, 2018. Elonnai Hickok was quoted.

While he had originally signed up with Facebook a decade ago to reconnect with school classmates, he found himself more and more disconnected from the sprawl the social network had become. “It was a mess of impersonal shares, unverified half-truths and barely any personal updates,” he says, a week after permanently logging out. “I’d rather reconnect the old-fashioned way.”

This kind of user disenchantment has become increasingly common among Facebook users. Many like Rohit, who signed up with more altruistic aims, find themselves distanced by how the social networking platform has evolved.

All through 2018, Facebook and its embattled cofounder, Mark Zuckerberg, have found themselves battling one fire after another. Starting with the mess involving Cambridge Analytica and ending with the document dump unearthed by UK’s Parliament this week (that showed the firm as a cut-throat corporation at best), this has been a year to forget. “Unfortunately, Facebook cannot be trusted with the privacy of its users’ data,” says Alessandro Acquisti, professor, Carnegie Mellon University. “Time and again, Facebook has shown a cavalier attitude towards the handling of users’ data as well as towards informing users clearly and without deception about the actual extent of Facebook’s data collection and handling policies.”

This perception has caused problems with Facebook, both around the world and at home, with privacy advocates pushing for stronger monitoring to counter the seeming free reign enjoyed by the platform.

Mishi Choudhary, legal director of Software Freedom Law Center in the US and Mishi Choudhary and Associates, a New Delhi-law firm, says the pay-for-data model necessitates a stronger data protection regime that doesn’t leave users at the mercy of self-governing corporate entities.

“The contrast between Facebook’s public statements and private strategies to monetise user data reveals the truth of surveillance capitalism carried out stealthily and steadily,” she says.

In an election year in India, this could cause problems for Facebook.

The company has already tried to clean up its act, implementing more transparent political advertising norms and looking to clean up fake news claims (on itself and WhatsApp, the messaging platform it owns) to try to win back user trust. Facebook has also launched video monetisation capabilities and Lasso, a short video offering similar to Tik Tok, the Chinese startup that has been massively popular here. The company, that has over 250 million users in India, plans to train five million people on digital technologies in three years, to try to increase awareness.

Facebook didn’t respond to an email seeking more specific comments for this piece.

In a country where privacy legislation is yet in the works, experts are worried about the overt and covert interest in users’ private data. Hundreds of millions of users here, many unwittingly, accepting user terms and giving apps too many permissions could easily give away confidential information, the experts argue. This is especially so in the case of Android users in the country, who access the web on cheap handsets and don’t have a full understanding of what they sign up for. “Very few people know about the origin or provenance of apps that they download or what data they track or phone features that they access,” says Shiv Putcha, founder and principal analyst, Mandala Insights, a telecom consultancy. “These are all potential security breaches of a massive order.”

Alessandro Acquisti, professor, Carnegie Mellon University. This situation has privacy advocates closely watching Facebook and pushing for more stringent rules to monitor the company. "The criticality of human rights impact assessment for all products and services by companies like Facebook is underscored," says Elonnai Hickok, from the Centre for Internet and Society, a think tank in Bengaluru. "To build user trust, these assessments should be made public."

As India finalises its privacy legislation, it is important to ensure that such assessments are undertaken according to law, citizens and their rights are upheld and companies are held accountable. "This also demonstrates that India needs a privacy legislation that allows the government to address a situation if data of Indian citizens is impacted."

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/economic-times-rahul-sachitanand-december-9-2018-how-data-privacy-and-governance-issues-have-battered-facebook

Centre’s order on computer surveillance threatens right to privacy, experts say

Admin — 2018-12-25T00:50:48Z

The Constitutional validity of the notification allowing ten agencies to intercept information is uncertain.

The blog post by Abhishek Dey was published in Scroll.in on December 22, 2018.

A notification issued by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs on Thursday allowing ten agencies to intercept, monitor and decrypt any information generated from any computer poses a grave threat to the fundamental right to privacy, said lawyers and cyber security experts.

The notification led to a political storm on Friday and criticism from the Opposition forced Parliament to be adjourned. However, Union Finance Minister Arun Jaitley accused the Opposition of “making a mountain where a molehill does not exist”. The government on Friday issued a clarification stating that the directive does not confer any new powers on it and has the legal backing of the Information Technology Act.

Experts agreed that Thursday’s notification lists powers already available to the authorities in the Information Technology Act 2000. The legal provisions to allow interception were introduced in 2008 by the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance government. However, with the fresh directive, experts said that the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government seems to be trying to formalise surveillance through the interception of computer information, they said.

“It is true that such [interception] powers already existed,” said Pavan Duggal, a lawyer with expertise in cyber security. “But neither any such formal directives were issued which I know of, nor any agency were specifically notified to have those powers.”

Privacy test

The Information Technology Act 2000 was amended in 2008 to allow to the monitoring and interception of computer information, while the rules under which this would operate were promulgated in 2009. In 2017, the Supreme Court delivered a judgment establishing privacy as a fundamental right. The legal foundation of the computer interception directive could be still be challenged in court because it has not yet been considered in light of the privacy judgment, said Duggal. “It is now a matter of Constitutional validity,” he said

Thursday’s notification lists the agencies authorised to intercept, monitor and decrypt computer data: the Intelligence Bureau, Narcotics Control Bureau, Enforcement Directorate, Central Board of Direct Taxes, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Central Bureau of Investigation, National Investigation Agency, Cabinet Secretariat (RAW), Directorate of Signal Intelligence (for service areas of Jammu and Kashmir, North East and Assam) and the Commissioner of Police, Delhi. The Act provides a jail term of seven years for anyone who refuses to cooperate with these agencies.

On Friday, experts questioned whether a notification listing the 10 agencies had actually been issued earlier, as the Centre claimed.

“It is a fresh notification,” said Apar Gupta, a lawyer who specialises in technology and media issues. “With this, interception of computers has received formal acceptance in the public domain and it can have serious implications on privacy.”

Senior officials of the Delhi Police also said this appeared to be a fresh order. Asked if this meant that the agencies would not need to ask for authorisation in every case since a blanket order has been issued, the officials said that this still needs to be clarified.

Lacking proportionality

The order has raised questions about the validity of the cases of interception of computer information conducted by the state police and other security agencies between 2009 (the year the interception rules were promulgated) and 2018 (the year the notification has been issued), Pranesh Prakash, co-founder of the Centre for Internet and Society.

One possibility, he said, may be that they were all unlawful.

But if they were indeed conducted with legal backing, Prakash said, then permission for this would been sanctioned in the form of an order by a competent authority. This is what Rule 3 of the interception rules mandate. But if so, Rule 4, which deals with the government authorising agencies to conduct such interceptions, is redundant. “How can it not be when any state police or other agency is capable of acquiring an order for interception under Rule 3?” he said

Besides, Prakash said, the new directive does not pass the test of proportionality.

In 2007, the Central government introduced rules to amend the Indian Telegraph Act 1951 to allow for information to be intercepted, Prakash said. However, the rules say that the competent authority should resort to interception only after considering all alternative means to acquire information. Thursday’s directive, though, is silent about the circumstances in which interception will be permitted, he said.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/scroll-abhishek-dey-december-22-2018-centres-order-on-computer-surveillance-threatens-right-to-privacy

Ten Indian government agencies can now snoop on people’s internet data

Admin — 2018-12-25T00:33:47Z

In a significant attack on online privacy, India’s Home Affair’s Ministry has authorised no fewer than ten different central government agencies to intercept, monitor, and decrypt “any information generated, transmitted, received or stored in any computer”.

The blog post by David Spencer was published by VPN Compare on December 24, 2018. Pranesh Prakash was quoted.

The move has angered many Indian internet users, with the number of Indians turning to VPNs like ExpressVPN to protect their online privacy is expected to rise significantly.

Extending powers under and old law

The authorisation has been made under Section 69 (1) of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and Rule 4 of the Information Technology (Procedure and safeguard for Monitoring and Collecting Traffic Data or Information) Rules.

While these laws have been in place for almost a decade, it is only now that the Ministry has decided to use them toenable the decryption and access of online data.

The agencies that can now look at what every single Indian citizen is doing online include the Intelligence Bureau, the Narcotics Control Bureau, the Enforcement Directorate, the Central Board of Direct Taxes, and the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence.

Other which will also be permitted to hack into people’s devices are the Central Bureau of Investigation; National Investigation Agency, the Cabinet Secretariat (R&AW), the Directorate of Signal Intelligence (only for the service areas of Jammu & Kashmir and North-East and Assam) and the Delhi Commissioner of Police.

The laws do notionally limit the circumstances in which these agencies can access private internet data, but as is so often the case, the definition of these circumstances are so vague as to render the restrictions almost meaningless.

Permissible circumstances include cases thought to be “in the interest of the sovereignty or integrity of India, defence of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of any recognizable offence relating to above or for investigation of any offence.”

Indian lawyers have said that all of the above agencies will still have to comply with Rule 3 of Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

This requires permission from either the union home secretary or the secretary of the Home Affair’s Ministry before interception can take place.

The new powers could be illegal

The new permissions also raise the interesting prospect that all previous interception of data by these agencies could be both unconstitutional and illegal, according to one Indian technology policy analyst, Pranesh Prakash.

He also told The Wire that he believed “Section 69 and 69B of the IT Act are unconstitutional for being over-broad in what they allow interception and monitoring for, in demanding decryption from accused persons, and the punishments that they prescribe.”

The New Delhi based Internet Freedom Foundation echoed this opinion, releasing a statement which said, “the decision to authorise electronic snooping is unconstitutional and in breach of the telephone tapping guidelines, the Privacy Judgement and the Aadhaar judgement.”

Opponents of the Indian President, Narendra Modi, have argued that this latest decision is further evidence that he is turning India into a surveillance state.

Congress Party chief, Rahul Gandhi, said this move showed Modi is “an insecure dictator”, while others have argued that that this increased surveillance will have a “chilling effect” on democratic debate and dissent in India.

Srinivas Kodali, an independent security researcher in Hyderabad, told Al Jazeera the new powers would “make data collection from critics and political opponents easier [and] facilitate targeted raids against the opposition and critics.”

For their part, the Indian Government have used the age-old argument about the new powers helping them to combat “terrorism”.

VPN use expected to rise in India

For innocent India internet users, the reality is that their rights to online privacy have been significantly undermined by the new powers. There are now multiple central government agencies with the power to intercept, decrypt, and access their private online data, with minimal safeguards in place to protect their rights.

For most Indians, the new powers are a step to far, as has been seen by the angry response on social media.

It seems highly likely that the move will see more and amore Indian’s turning to a VPN to protect their online privacy. By connecting to a VPN, such as ExpressVPN, they are able to ensure all of their online data is encrypted by state-of-the-art encryption and also effectively anonymised.

It means that no government agency will be able to see what they are doing online and it will be almost impossible for their online activity to be traced back to them.

Using a VPN should protect internet users from the erosion of online rights the Indian Government is trying to implement. But it seems unlikely that it will stop the Modi administration from trying.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/vpn-compare-david-spencer-december-24-2018-ten-government-agencies-can-now-snoop-on-peoples-internet-data

Centre’s order on computer surveillance is backed by law – but the law lacks adequate safeguards

Admin — 2018-12-24T17:04:22Z

The Information Technology Act’s surveillance scheme furthers a colonial hangover.

The blog post by Nehaa Chaudhari and Tuhina Joshi was published by Scroll.in on December 23, 2018.

On Thursday, the Ministry of Home Affairs issued a statutory order authorising 10 “security and intelligence agencies” to intercept, monitor and decrypt electronic information and communication. A media frenzy soon ensued, with Opposition political parties seizing the notification as evidence that the government was running a surveillance state. The ministry responded with a press release, clarifying that the order was in keeping with Section 69(1) of the Information Technology Act, 2000, and the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009, proving that the order was sound in law.

Several government officials and Bharatiya Janata Party representatives have since defended this order as being in India’s sovereign and national security interest. They say it will bring transparency and accountability into surveillance, and that is is only an extension of the previous Congress-led government’s policy from 2009.

No doubt, Central and state governments have had the power to intercept, monitor and decrypt any information in any computer resource since 2008, when Section 69 of the Information Technology Act was amended to expand the government’s powers of interception. This amendment was one of many changes introduced to India’s surveillance framework to tackle crime and terrorism in the wake of the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai.

However, the ministry’s December 20 directive is the first time such an order has been introduced under this section; and in this difference between a legislation being on the statute books versus it being implemented lies the reason for collective public outrage. That said, research by the Centre for Internet and Society and SFLC.in shows that the Indian state has long engaged in surveilling electronic communications, and other kinds of interception and monitoring.

While railing against the ministry’s order is very welcome, it is futile if it does not lead to a conversation around the root of the problem – Section 69(1) of the Information Technology Act and the accompanying Information Technology Rules. This section empowers the Central and state governments to authorise government agencies to intercept, monitor or decrypt “any information generated, transmitted, received or stored in any computer resource”. It lays down six grounds on the basis of which such authorisation may be granted. These are:

The preservation of India’s sovereignty or integrity.
The security of the state.
Public order.
Maintaining friendly relations with other countries.
Preventing offences relating to 1. to 4. from being incited or committed.
Criminal investigations.

All authorisation orders issued by the government under Section 69(1) must be reasoned and written, and must be subject to the procedure laid down in the Information Technology Rules. As per these rules, all such orders must be scrutinised by a review committee of the Centre, or the state in question, set up under Rule 419A of the Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951. All review committees set up under Rule 419A comprise only of government secretaries. This means that the executive sits in judgment over its own decisions. This goes against one of the most basic principles of justice and fairness – that no person shall be a judge in their own case.

Threat to privacy

State surveillance threatens individual privacy and must be subject to adequate safeguards. Privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution of India, as recognised by nine judges of the Supreme Court in August 2017. Like all other fundamental rights, the right to privacy is not absolute, and can be restricted. According to the Supreme Court, these restrictions must be: (1) backed by law, (2) for a legitimate state aim, and (3) proportionate.

Consequently, any government order under Section 69(1) of the Information Technology Act must fulfil this three-part test to be constitutional. The absence of judicial or legislative oversight over the executive’s decision-making under Section 69(1) is likely to make it a disproportionate restriction on an individual’s fundamental right to privacy and, therefore, unconstitutional.

Even the government-appointed Justice Srikrishna Committee of Experts, which has been given the task of framing India’s data protection law, was concerned about this lack of legislative or judicial review. This committee has cited Germany, the United Kingdom, South Africa and the United States as countries with adequate procedural safeguards over government surveillance actions. On page 125 of its final report, it has noted, “Executive review alone is not in tandem with comparative models in democratic nations which either provide for legislative oversight, judicial approval or both.”

The Information Technology Act and the Information Technology Rules are but one of many means of government surveillance in India. Similar provisions exist in the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, the Telegraph Rules, 1951, and the Indian Post Office Act, 1898. These laws are the extension of a colonial legacy, used by a foreign power to keep tabs on an alien population. Disappointingly, the Information Technology Act’s surveillance scheme only furthers this colonial hangover. Indian privacy thought, especially in the past few years, has reflected the idea that we must evolve an Indian privacy framework, grounded in our constitutional values, and tailored to the Indian context. It is about time that our surveillance laws begin to reflect our constitutional values as well.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/scroll-nehaa-chaudhari-and-tuhina-joshi-december-23-2018-centres-order-on-computer-surveillance-is-backed-by-law-but-the-law-lacks-adequate-safeguards

European E-Evidence Proposal and Indian Law

vipul — 2018-12-23T16:45:02Z

In April of 2018, the European Union issued the proposal for a new regime dealing with cross border sharing of data and information by issuing two draft instruments, an E-evidence Regulation (“Regulation”) and an E-evidence Directive (“Directive”), (together the “E-evidence Proposal”). The Regulation is a direction to states to put in place the proper legislative and regulatory machinery for the implementation of this regime while the Directive requires the states to enact laws governing service providers so that they would comply with the proposed regime.

The main feature of the E-evidence Proposal is twofold: (i) establishment of a legal regime whereunder competent authorities can issue European Production Orders (EPOs) and European Preservation Orders (EPROs) to entities in any other EU member country (together the “Data Orders”); and (ii) an obligation on service providers offering services in any of the EU member countries to designate legal representatives who will be responsible for receiving the Data Orders, irrespective of whether such entity has an actual physical establishment in any EU member country.

In this article we will briefly discuss the framework that has been proposed under the two instruments and then discuss how service providers based in India whose services are also available in Europe would be affected by these proposals. The authors would like to make it clear that this article is not intended to be an analysis of the E-evidence Proposal and therefore shall not attempt to bring out the shortcomings of the proposed European regime, except insofar as such shortcomings may affect the service providers located in India being discussed in the second part of the article.

Part I - E-evidence Directive and Regulation

The E-evidence Proposal introduces the concept of binding EPOs and EPROs. Both Data Orders need to be issued or validated by a judicial authority in the issuing EU member country. A Data Order can be issued to seek preservation or production of data that is stored by a service provider located in another jurisdiction and that is necessary as evidence in criminal investigations or a criminal proceeding. Such Data Orders may only be issued if a similar measure is available for the same criminal offence in a comparable domestic situation in the issuing country. Both Data Orders can be served on entities offering services such as electronic communication services, social networks, online marketplaces, other hosting service providers and providers of internet infrastructure such as IP address and domain name registries. Thus companies such as Big Rock (domain name registry), Ferns n Petals (online marketplace providing services in Europe), Hike (social networking and chatting), etc. or any website which has a subscription based model and allows access to subscribers in Europe would potentially be covered by the E-evidence Proposal. The EPRO, similarly to the EPO, is addressed to the legal representative outside of the issuing country’s jurisdiction to preserve the data in view of a subsequent request to produce such data, which request may be issued through MLA channels in case of third countries or via a European Investigation Order (EIO) between EU member countries. Unlike surveillance measures or data retention obligations set out by law, which are not provided for by this proposal, the EPRO is an order issued or validated by a judicial authority in a concrete criminal proceeding after an individual evaluation of the proportionality and necessity in every single case.^{^[1]} Like the EPO, it refers to the specific known or unknown perpetrators of a criminal offence that has already taken place. The EPRO only allows preserving data that is already stored at the time of receipt of the order, not the access to data at a future point in time after the receipt of the EPRO.

While EPOs to produce subscriber data^{^[2]} and access data^{^[3]} can be issued for any criminal offence an EPO for content data^{^[4]} and transactional data^{^[5]} may only be issued by a judge, a court or an investigating judge competent in the case. In case the EPO is issued by any other authority (which is competent to issue such an order in the issuing country), such an EPO has to be validated by a judge, a court or an investigating judge. In case of an EPO for subscriber data and access data, the EPO may also be validated by a prosecutor in the issuing country.

To reduce obstacles to the enforcement of the EPOs, the Directive makes it mandatory for service providers to designate a legal representative in the European Union to receive, comply with and enforce Data Orders. The obligation of designating a legal representative for all service providers that are operating in the European Union would ensure that there is always a clear addressee of orders aiming at gathering evidence in criminal proceedings. This would in turn make it easier for service providers to comply with those orders, as the legal representative would be responsible for receiving, complying with and enforcing those orders on behalf of the service provider.

Grounds on which EPOs can be issued

The grounds on which Data Orders may be issued are contained in Articles 5 and 6 of the Regulation which makes it very clear that a Data Order may only be issued in a case if it is necessary and proportionate for the purposes of a criminal proceeding. The Regulation further specifies that an EPO may only be issued by a member country if a similar domestic order could be issued by the issuing state in a comparable situation. By using this device of linking the grounds to domestic law, the Regulation tries to skirt around the thorny issue of when and on what basis an EPO may be issued. The Regulation also assigns greater weight (in terms of privacy) to transactional and content data as opposed to subscriber and access data and subjects the production and preservation of the former to stricter requirements. Therefore while Data Orders for access and subscriber data may be issued for any criminal offence, orders for transactional and content data can only be issued in case of criminal offences providing for a maximum punishment of atleast 3 years and above. In addition to that EPOs for producing transactional or content data can also be issued for offences specifically listed in Article 5(4) of the Regulation. These offences have been specifically provided for since evidence for such cases would typically be available mostly only in electronic form. This is the justification for the application of the Regulation also in cases where the maximum custodial sentence is less than three years, otherwise it would become extremely difficult to secure convictions in those offences.^{^[6]}

The Regulation also requires the issuing authority to take into account potential immunities and privileges under the law of the member country in which the service provider is being served the EPO, as well as any impact the EPO may have on fundamental interests of that member country such as national security and defence. The aim of this provision is to ensure that such immunities and privileges which protect the data sought are respected, in particular where they provide for a higher protection than the law of the issuing member country. In such situations the issuing authority “has to seek clarification before issuing the European Production Order, including by consulting the competent authorities of the Member State concerned, either directly or via Eurojust or the European Judicial Network.”

Grounds to Challenge EPOs

Service Providers have been given the option to object to Data Orders on certain limited grounds specified in the Regulation such as, if it was not issued by a proper issuing authority, if the provider cannot comply because of a de facto impossibility or force majeure, if the data requested is not stored with the service provider or pertains to a person who is not the customer of the service provider.^{^[7]} In all such cases the service provider has to inform the issuing authority of the reasons for the inability to provide the information in the specified form. Further, in the event that the service provider refuses to provide the information on the grounds that it is apparent that the EPO “manifestly violates” the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union or is “manifestly abusive”, the service provider shall send the information in specified Form to the competent authority in the member state in which the Order has been received. The competent authority shall then seek clarification from the issuing authority through Eurojust or via the European Judicial Network.^{^[8]}

If the issuing authority is not satisfied by the reasons given and the service provider still refuses to provide the information requested, the issuing authority may transfer the EPO Certificate along with the reasons given by the service provider for non compliance, to the enforcing authority in the addressee country. The enforcing authority shall then proceed to enforce the Order, unless it considers that the data concerned is protected by an immunity or privilege under its national law or its disclosure may impact its fundamental interests such as national security and defence; or the data cannot be provided due to one of the following reasons:

(a) the European Production Order has not been issued or validated by an issuing authority as provided for in Article 4;

(b) the European Production Order has not been issued for an offence provided for by Article 5(4);

(c) the addressee could not comply with the EPOC because of de facto impossibility or force majeure, or because the EPOC contains manifest errors;

(d) the European Production Order does not concern data stored by or on behalf of the service provider at the time of receipt of EPOC;

(e) the service is not covered by this Regulation;

(f) based on the sole information contained in the EPOC, it is apparent that it manifestly violates the Charter or that it is manifestly abusive.

In addition to the above mechanism the service provider may refuse to comply with an EPO on the ground that disclosure would force it to violate a third-country law that either protects “the fundamental rights of the individuals concerned” or “the fundamental interests of the third country related to national security or defence.” Where a provider raises such a challenge, issuing authorities can request a review of the order by a court in the member country. If the court concludes that a conflict as claimed by the service provider exists, the court shall notify authorities in the third-party country and if that third-party country objects to execution of the EPO, the court must set it aside.^{^[9]}

A service provider may also refuse to comply with an order because it would force the service provider to violate a third-country law that protects interests other than fundamental rights or national security and defense. In such cases, the Regulation provides that the same procedure be followed as in case of law protecting fundamental rights or national security and defense, except that in this case the court, rather than notifying the foreign authorities, shall itself conduct a detailed analysis of the facts and circumstances to decide whether to enforce the order.^{^[10]}

Service Provider “Offering Services in the Union”

As is clear from the discussion above, the proposed regime puts an obligation on service providers offering services in the Union to designate a legal representative in the European Union, whether the service provider is physically located in the European Union or not. This appears to be a fairly onerous obligation for small technology companies which may involve a significant cost to appoint and maintain a legal representative in the European Union, especially if the service provider is not located in the EU. Therefore the question arises as to which service providers would be covered by this obligation and the answer to that question lies in the definitions of the terms “service provider” and “offering services in the Union”.

The term service provider has been defined in Article 2(2) of the Directive as follows:

“‘service provider’ means any natural or legal person that provides one or more of the following categories of services:

(a) electronic communications service as defined in Article 2(4) of [Directive establishing the European Electronic Communications Code];^{^[11]}

(b) information society services as defined in point (b) of Article 1(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the Council^{^[12]} for which the storage of data is a defining component of the service provided to the user, including social networks, online marketplaces facilitating transactions between their users, and other hosting service providers;

(c) internet domain name and IP numbering services such as IP address providers, domain name registries, domain name registrars and related privacy and proxy services;”

Thus broadly speaking the service providers covered by the Regulation would include providers of electronic communication services, social networks, online marketplaces, other hosting service providers and providers of internet infrastructure such as IP address and domain name registries, or on their legal representatives where they exist. An important qualification that has been added in the definition is that it covers only those services where “storage of data is a defining component of the service”. Therefore, services for which the storage of data is not a defining component are not covered by the proposal. The Regulation also recognizes that most services delivered by providers involve some kind of storage of data, especially where they are delivered online at a distance; and therefore it specifically provides that services for which the storage of data is not a main characteristic and is thus only of an ancillary nature would not be covered, including legal, architectural, engineering and accounting services provided online at a distance.^{^[13]}

This does not mean that all such service providers offering the type of services in which data storage is the main characteristic, in the EU, would be covered by the Directive. The term “offering services in the Union” has been defined in Article 2(3) of the Directive as follows:

“‘offering services in the Union’ means:

(a) enabling legal or natural persons in one or more Member State(s) to use the services listed under (3) above; and

(b) having a substantial connection to the Member State(s) referred to in point (a);”

Clause (b) of the definition is the main qualifying factor which would ensure that only those entities whose offering of services has a “substantial connection” which the member countries of the EU would be covered by the Directive. The Regulation recognizes that mere accessibility of the service (which could also be achieved through mere accessibility of the service provider’s or an intermediary’s website in the EU) should not be a sufficient condition for the application of such an onerous condition and therefore the concept of a “substantial connection” was inserted to ascertain a sufficient relationship between the provider and the territory where it is offering its services. In the absence of a permanent establishment in an EU member country, such a “substantial connection” may be said to exist if there are a significant number of users in one or more EU member countries, or the “targeting of activities” towards one or more EU member countries. The “targeting of activities” may be determined based on various circumstances, such as the use of a language or a currency generally used in an EU member country, the availability of an app in the relevant national app store, providing local advertising or advertising in the language used in an EU member country, making use of any information originating from persons in EU member countries in the course of its activities, or from the handling of customer relations such as by providing customer service in the language generally used in EU member countries. A substantial connection can also be assumed where a service provider directs its activities towards one or more EU member countries as set out in Article 17(1)(c) of Regulation 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters.^{^[14]}

Part II - EU Directive and Service Providers located in India

In this part of the article we will discuss how companies based in India and running websites providing any “service” such as social networking, subscription based video streaming, etc. such as Hike or AltBalaji, Hotstar, etc. and how such companies would be affected by the E-evidence Proposal. At first glance a website providing a video streaming service may not appear to be covered by the E-evidence Proposal since one would assume that there may not be any storage of data. But if it is a service which allows users to open personal accounts (with personal and possibly financial details such as in the case of TVF, AltBalaji or Hotstar) and uses their online behaviour to push relevant material and advertisements to their accounts, whether that would make the storage of data a defining component of the website’s services as contemplated under the proposal is a question that may not be easy to answer.

Even if it is assumed that the services of an Indian company can be classified as information society services for which the storage of data is a defining component, that by itself would not be sufficient to make the E-evidence Proposal applicable to it. The services of an Indian company would still need to have a “substantial connection” with an EU member country. As discussed above, this substantial connection may be said to exist based on the existence of (i) a significant number of users in one or more EU member countries, or (ii) the “targeting of activities” towards one or more EU member countries. The determination of whether a service provider is targeting its services towards an EU member country is to be made based on a number of factors listed above and is a subjective determination with certain guiding factors.

There does not seem to be clarity however on what would constitute a significant number of users and whether this determination is to be based upon the total number of users in an EU member country as a proportion of the population of the country or is it to be considered as a proportion of the total number of customers the service provider has worldwide. To explain this further let us assume that an Indian company such as Hotstar has a total user base of 100 million customers.^{^[15]} If there is a situation where 10 million of these 100 million subscribers are located in countries other than India, out of which there are about 40 thousand customers in France and another 40 thousand in Malta; then it would lead to some interesting analysis. Now 40 thousand customers in a customer base of 100 million is 0.04% of the total customer base of the service provider which generally speaking would not constitute a “significant number”. However if we reckon the 40 thousand customers from the point of view of the total population of the country of Malta, which is approximately 4.75 Lakh,^{^[16]} it would mean approx. 8.4% of the total population of Malta. It is unlikely that any service affecting almost a tenth of the population of the entire country can be labeled as not having a significant number of users in Malta. If the same math is done on the population of a country such as France, which has a population of approx. 67.3 million,^{^[17]} then the figure would be 0.05% of the total population; would that constitute a significant number as per the E-evidence Proposal.

The issues discussed above are very important for any service provider, specially a small or medium sized company since the determination of whether the E-evidence Proposal applies to them or not, apart from any potential legal implications, imposes a direct economic cost for designating a legal representative in an EU member country. Keeping in mind this economic burden and how it might affect the budget of smaller companies, the Explanatory Memorandum to the Regulation clarifies that this legal representative could be a third party, which could be shared between several service providers, and further the legal representative may accumulate different functions (e.g. the General Data Protection Regulation or e-Privacy representatives in addition to the legal representative provided for by the E-evidence Directive).^{^[18]}

In case all the above issues are determined to be in favour of the E-evidence Directive being applicable to an Indian company and the company designates a legal representative in an EU member country, then it remains to be seen how Indian laws relating to data protection would interact with the obligations of the Indian company under the E-evidence Directive. As per Rule 6 of the Information Technology (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data or Information) Rules, 2011 (“SPDI Rules”) service providers are not allowed to disclose sensitive personal data or information except with the prior permission of the except disclosure to mandated government agencies. The Rule provides that “the information shall be shared, without obtaining prior consent from provider of information, with Government agencies mandated under the law to obtain information including sensitive personal data or information for the purpose of verification of identity, or for prevention, detection, investigation including cyber incidents, prosecution, and punishment of offences….”. Although the term “government agency mandated under law” has not been defined in the SPDI Rules, the term “law” has been defined in the Information Technology Act, 2000 (“IT Act”) as under:

“’law’ includes any Act of Parliament or of a State Legislature, Ordinances promulgated by the President or a Governor, as the case may be. Regulations made by the President under article 240, Bills enacted as President's Act under sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of article 357 of the Constitution and includes rules, regulations, byelaws and orders issued or made thereunder;”^{^[19]}

Since the SPDI Rules are issued under the IT Act, therefore the term “law” referred as used in the would have to be read as defined in the IT Act (unless court holds to the contrary). This would mean that Rule 6 of the SPDI Rules only recognises government agencies mandated under Indian law and therefore information cannot be disclosed to agencies not recognised by Indian law. In such a scenario an Indian company may not have any option except to raise an objection and challenge an EPO issued to it on the grounds provided in Article 16 of the Regulation, which process itself could mean a significant expenditure on the part of such a company.

Conclusion

The framework sought to be established by the European Union through the E-evidence Proposal seeks to establish a regime different from those favoured by countries such as the United States which favours Mutual Agreements with (presumably) key nations or the push for data localisation being favoured by countries such as India, to streamline the process of access to digital data. Since the regime put forth by the EU is still only at the proposal stage, there may yet be changes which could clarify the regime significantly. However, as things stand Indian companies may be affected by the E-evidence Proposal in the following ways:

Companies offering services outside India may inadvertently trigger obligations under the E-evidence Proposal if their services have a substantial connection with any of the member states of the European Union;
Indian companies offering services overseas will have to make an internal determination as to whether the E-evidence Proposal applies to them or not;
In case of Indian companies which come under the E-evidence Proposal, they would be obligated to designate a legal representative in an EU member state for receiving and executing Data Orders as per the E-evidence Proposal.
If a legal representative is designated by the Indian company they may have to incur significant costs on maintaining a legal representative especially in a situation where they have to object to the implementation of an EPO. The company would also have to coordinate with the legal representative to adequately put forth their (Indian law related) concerns before the competent authority so that they are not forced to fall foul of their legal obligations in either jurisdiction. It is also unclear the extent to which appointed legal representatives from Indian companies could challenge or push back against requests received.

Disclaimer: The author of this Article is an Indian trained lawyer and not an expert on European law. The author would like to apologise for any incorrect analysis of European law that may have crept into this article despite best efforts.

^{^[1]} Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European Production and Preservation Orders for Electronic Evidence in Criminal Matters, Pg. 4, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52018PC0225&from=EN.

^{^[2]} Subscriber data means data which is used to identify the user and has been defined in Article 2 (7) as follows:

“‘subscriber data’ means any data pertaining to:

(a) the identity of a subscriber or customer such as the provided name, date of birth, postal or geographic address, billing and payment data, telephone, or email;

(b) the type of service and its duration including technical data and data identifying related technical measures or interfaces used by or provided to the subscriber or customer, and data related to the validation of the use of service, excluding passwords or other authentication means used in lieu of a password that are provided by a user, or created at the request of a user;”

^{^[3]} The term access data has been defined in Article 2(8) as follows:

“‘access data’ means data related to the commencement and termination of a user access session to a service, which is strictly necessary for the sole purpose of identifying the user of the service, such as the date and time of use, or the log-in to and log-off from the service, together with the IP address allocated by the internet access service provider to the user of a service, data identifying the interface used and the user ID. This includes electronic communications metadata as defined in point (g) of Article 4(3) of Regulation concerning the respect for private life and the protection of personal data in electronic communications;”

^{^[4]} The term content data has been defined in Article 2 (10) as follows:

“‘content data’ means any stored data in a digital format such as text, voice, videos, images, and sound other than subscriber, access or transactional data;”

^{^[5]} The term transactional data has been defined in Article 2(9) as follows:

“‘transactional data’ means data related to the provision of a service offered by a service provider that serves to provide context or additional information about such service and is generated or processed by an information system of the service provider, such as the source and destination of a message or another type of interaction, data on the location of the device, date, time, duration, size, route, format, the protocol used and the type of compression, unless such data constitues access data. This includes electronic communications metadata as defined in point (g) of Article 4(3) of [Regulation concerning the respect for private life and the protection of personal data in electronic communications];”

^{^[6]} Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European Production and Preservation Orders for Electronic Evidence in Criminal Matters, Pg. 17, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52018PC0225&from=EN.

^{^[7]} Articles 9(4) and 10(5) of the Regulation.

^{^[8]} Article 10(5) of the Regulation.

^{^[9]} Article 15 of the Regulation.

^{^[10]} Article 16 of the Regulation. Also see https://www.insideprivacy.com/uncategorized/eu-releases-e-evidence-proposal-for-cross-border-data-access/.

^{^[11]} Article 2(4) of the Directive establishing European Electronic Communications Code provides as under:

‘electronic communications service’ means a service normally provided for remuneration via electronic communications networks, which encompasses 'internet access service' as defined in Article 2(2) of Regulation (EU) 2015/2120; and/or 'interpersonal communications service'; and/or services consisting wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals such as transmission services used for the provision of machine-to-machine services and for broadcasting, but excludes services providing, or exercising editorial control over, content transmitted using electronic communications networks and services;”

^{^[12]} Information Society Services have been defined in the Directive specified as “any Information Society service, that is to say, any service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at the individual request of a recipient of services.”

^{^[13]} Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Laying Down Harmonised Rules on the Appointment of Legal Representatives for the Purpose of Gathering Evidence in Criminal Proceedings, Pg 8, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52018PC0226&from=EN.

^{^[14]} Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Laying Down Harmonised Rules on the Appointment of Legal Representatives for the Purpose of Gathering Evidence in Criminal Proceedings, Pg 9, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52018PC0226&from=EN.

^{^[15]} Hotstar already has an active customer base of 75 million, as of December, 2017; https://telecom.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/netflix-restricted-to-premium-subscribers-hotstar-leads-indian-ott-content-market/62351500

^{^[16]} https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malta

^{^[17]} https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/France

^{^[18]} Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Laying Down Harmonised Rules on the Appointment of Legal Representatives for the Purpose of Gathering Evidence in Criminal Proceedings, Pg 5, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52018PC0226&from=EN.

^{^[19]} Section 2(y) of the Information Technology Act, 2000.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/vipul-kharbanda-december-23-2018-european-e-evidence-proposal-and-indian-law

Women in the Future of Work

Ambika Tandon and Aayush Rathi — 2019-02-22T01:41:32Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/women-in-future-of-work.pdf

Critical Look at Visual Representation of Cybersecurity

Admin — 2019-08-21T07:58:07Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/critical-look-at-visual-representation-of-cybersecurity

A Critical Look at the Visual Representation of Cybersecurity

Paromita Bathija, Padmini Ray Murray, and Saumyaa Naidu — 2019-08-21T08:00:11Z

The Centre for Internet and Society and design collective Design Beku came together on the 15th of November for a workshop on Illustrations and Visual Representations of Cybersecurity. Images in the public sphere such as visuals in the media, Wikipedia commons, and stock images - play a vital role in the public’s perception of cybercrime and cybersecurity.

Edited by Karan Saini / Illustrations by - Paul Anthony George, and Roshan Shakeel

Download the file here

The existing imagery comprises of largely stereotypical images of silhouettes of men in hoodies, binary codes, locks, shields; all in dark tones of blue and green. The workshop aimed at identifying the concerns with these existing images and ideating on creating visuals that capture the nuanced concepts within cybersecurity as well as to contextualise them for the Global South. It began with a discussion on the various concepts within cybersecurity including disinformation, surveillance in the name of security, security researchers, regulation of big technology companies, gender and cybersecurity, etc. This was followed by a mapping of different visual elements in the existing cybersecurity imagery to infer the biases in them. Further, an ideation session was conducted to create alternate visualisations that counter these biases. A detailed report of the workshop can be read here.

The participants began by discussing the concerning impacts of present visualisations – there is a lack of representation and context of the global south. Misrepresentation of cybersecurity leads people to be susceptible to disinformation, treats cybercrime as an abstract concept that does not have a direct impact, and oversimplifies the problem and its solutions. The ecosystem in which this imagery exists also presented a larger issue. A majority of the images are created as clickbait alongside media articles. Media houses thus benefit from the oversimplification and mystification of cybersecurity in such images.

Through the mapping of existing images present online, several concerns were identified. The vague elements and unclear representation add to the mystification of cybersecurity as a concept. In present depictions, the use of technological devices and objects, leads to the lack of a human element, distancing the threat from any real impact to people using these devices. The metaphor of a physical threat is often used to depict cybersecurity using elements such as a lock and key. Recurring use of these elements gives a false idea of what is being secured or breached and how. Representations rely on tropes regarding the identity of hackers, and fail to capture the vulnerability of the system. The imagery gives the impression that systems which are breached are immensely secure to begin with and are compromised only as a result of sophisticated attacks carried out by malicious actors. The identity of hackers is commonly associated with cyber attacks and breaches, and the existing imagery reinforces this. Visuals showing a masked man or a silhouette of a man in dark background are the usual markers of a malicious hacker in conventional cybersecurity imagery. While there is a lack of representation of women in stock cybersecurity images, another trope found was that of a cheerful woman coder. There were also images of faceless women with laptops^{^[1]}. The reductive nature of these images point to deeper concerns around gender representation in cybersecurity.

The participants examined what the implications of such visual representation would be, and why there is a need to change the imagery. How can visual depictions be more representative? Can they avoid subscribing to a homogenised idea of an Indian context – specific without being reductive? Can better depiction broaden understanding of cybercrime and emphasize the proximity of those threats? With technology, concepts are often understood through metaphors – how data is explained impacts how people perceive it. Visual imagery can play a critical role in demystifying concepts when done well; illustrations can change the discourse. They must begin to incorporate intersecting aspects of gender, privacy, susceptibility of vulnerable populations, generational and cultural gaps, as well as manifestations of the described crimes to make technological laypersons more aware of the threat.

Potential new imagery would need to address aspects such as disinformation, the importance of privacy and who has a right to it, change representation of hackers, depict the cybersecurity community, explain specific concepts to both – the general user and to the people part of cybersecurity efforts in the country, the implications of cybercrime on vulnerable populations, and more in an attempt to deconstruct and disseminate what cybersecurity looks like today.

The ideation session involved rethinking specific concepts such as disinformation, and ethical hacking to create alternate imagery. For instance, disinformation was visually imagined as a distortion of an already distorted message being perceived by the viewer. In order to bring attention to the impact of devices, a phone was thought of as a central object to which different concepts of cybersecurity can be connected.

‘Fake News Cascade’ by Paul Anthony George

‘Fake News’ by Paul Anthony George

‘Disinformation/ Fake News’ by Roshan Shakeel; The sketch is about questioning the validity of what we see online, and that every message we see is constructed in some form or the other by someone else.

‘Disinformation/ Fake News’ by Roshan Shakeel; The sketch visualizes how the source of information ('the original') gets distorted after a certain point.

For ethical hacking, a visualisation depicting a day in the life of an ethical hacker was thought of to normalize hacking and to focus on their contribution in security research.

‘A Day in the Life of an Indian Hacker’ by Paul Anthony George

'Surveillance in the Name of Security' by Roshan Shakeel

Resources on ethical hacking (HackerOne)^[2] and hacker culture (2600.com)^[3] were also consulted as part of the exercise to gather references on the work done by hackers. This allowed a deeper understanding of how the hacker community depicts itself. Check Point Research^[4] and Kerala Police Cyberdome^[5] were also examined for further insight into cybersecurity. With regard to gender representation, sources that use visual techniques to communicate concerns and advocacy campaigns were also referred to. The Gendering Surveillance^[6] initiative by the Internet Democracy project^[7], which looks at how surveillance harms and restricts women, also offered insights on the use of illustrations supporting the case studies. Another reference was the "Visualising Women's Rights in the Arab World"^[8] project by the Tactical Technology Collective^[9]. The project aims to “strengthen the use of visual techniques by women's rights advocates in the Arab world, and to build a network of women with these skills”.^[10]

More visual explainers and animations^{^[11]} from the Tactical Technology Collective were noted for their broader engagement with digital security and privacy. A video by the Internet Democracy Project that explains the Internet through rangoli^{^[12]}, was observed specifically for setting the concept in Indian context through the use of aesthetics.

The workshop concluded with a discussion of potential visual iterations – imagery of cybersecurity that is not technology-oriented but focussed on the behavioural implications of access to such technology, illustrated public service announcements enhancing the profile of cybersecurity researchers or the everyday hacker. The impact of the discussion itself can indicate the relevance of such an effort. Artists and designers can be encouraged to create a body of imagery that shifts discourse and perception, to begin visualising for advocacy, demystify and stop the abstraction of cybercrime that can lead to a false sense of security, incorporate unique aspects of the debate within the Indian context, and generate new dialogue and understanding of cybersecurity. A potential step forward from this workshop would be to engage with the design community at large along with the domain experts to create more effective imagery for cybersecurity.

^{^[1]} https://www.hackerone.com/

^{^[2]} https://2600.com/

^{^[3]} https://research.checkpoint.com/about-us/

^{^[4]} http://www.cyberdome.kerala.gov.in/

^{^[5]} https://genderingsurveillance.internetdemocracy.in/

^{^[6]} https://internetdemocracy.in/

^{^[7]} https://visualrights.tacticaltech.org/index.html

^{^[8]} https://tacticaltech.org/

^{^[9]} https://visualrights.tacticaltech.org/content/about-website.html

^{^[10]} https://tacticaltech.org/projects/survival-in-the-digital-age-ono-robot-2012/

^{^[11]} https://internetdemocracy.in/2018/08/dots-and-connections/

^{^[12]} https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/features/women-in-tech-its-time-to-drop-the-old-stereotypes-7608794.html

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/paromita-bathija-padmini-ray-murray-and-saumyaa-naidu

Cyber-Security Mapping

pranav — 2018-12-10T10:10:07Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/cyber-security-mapping

Workshop on Cyber Security Illustrations

pranav — 2018-12-10T06:08:59Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/workshop-on-cyber-security-illustrations

Report: From Oppression to Liberation: Reclaiming the Right to Privacy

Admin — 2018-12-05T02:48:31Z

Eva Blum-Dumontet, Research Officer at Privacy International, published her report on gender and privacy on November 28, 2018. The report, titled 'From Oppression to Liberation: Reclaiming the Right to Privacy', traces the history of privacy as a tool of oppressing women across different spheres, eventually calling for a feminist reclamation of privacy. Ambika Tandon was quoted.

Whose privacy are we fighting for when we say we defend the right to privacy? In this report we take a hard look at the right to privacy and its reality for women, trans and gender diverse people. We highlight how historically privacy has been appropriated by patriarchal rule and systems of oppression to keep women, trans and gender diverse people in the private sphere.

For us, this report is also an opportunity to show how surveillance and data exploitation are also uniquely affecting women, trans and gender diverse people. We demonstrate how patriarchy and systems of oppression rely on surveillance to perpetuate themselves and how surveillance and data exploitation need the rigid and gender-normative categories of patriarchy to function. We conclude by presenting how protecting the right to privacy can address some of these challenges.

We hope this report will be read as a call for action: privacy needs to be reclaimed by women, trans and gender diverse people.

Download the report

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/report-from-oppression-to-liberation-reclaiming-the-right-to-privacy

From Opression to Liberation

Admin — 2018-12-05T02:45:04Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/from-opression-to-liberation

International Network on Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 2018

Admin — 2018-12-04T15:46:02Z

The event was co-organized by Feminist Approaches to Bioethics and Sama - A Resource Centre for Women and Health and was held at St. John's Medical College in Bangalore between December 3 and 5, 2018.

Aayush Rathi and Ambika Tandon participated in the event as speakers. Aayush presented a paper 'Sexual Surveillance and Data Regimes: Development in the Data Economy' co-authored by himself and Ambika.

Download the agenda

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/international-network-on-feminist-approaches-to-bioethics-2018