Centre for Internet and Society

Facial recognition at airports promises convenience in exchange for surveillance

nishant — 2019-11-02T07:07:41Z

If smart technology is promising you a few hours of convenience, what is it asking you to sign away?

The article was published in the Indian Express on October 20, 2019.

I was checking in for a flight, when the desk manager asked me if I would like to participate in a beta-programme that they are deploying for their frequent flyers. “No more checking-in, no more boarding passes, no more verification queues,” she narrated with a beaming smile. Given the amount of travelling I do, and the continued frustrations of travelling with a passport that is not easily welcome everywhere, I was immediately intrigued. Anything that makes the way to a flight easier, and reduces the variable scrutiny of systemically biased algorithmic checks was welcome. I asked about the programme.

It is a biometric facial recognition programme. It recognises my face from the minute I present myself at the airport, and from there on, till I am in the flight, it tracks me, locates me, offers me a visual map of my traces, and gives me seamless mobility, alerting the systems that I am transacting with, that I am pre-approved. I saw some mock-ups, and imagined the ease of no longer fishing out passports and boarding passes at every interaction in the airport. I could also see how this could eventually be linked to my credit card or bank account, so that even purchases I make are just seamlessly charged to me, and if there is ever any change of schedule or emergency, I could be located and given the assistance that would be needed. It was an easy fantasy.

I was almost tempted to sign up for it, when out came a data consent form. It was about two-pages long, with tiny print that makes you think of ants crawling on paper in orchestrated unison. I stared at those pages for a while, and turned to the manager. “How exactly does this system work?” She was startled for a second and then gave me a long, reassuring answer. It didn’t have much information, but it did have all the buzzwords in it — “machine learning”, “artificial intelligence”, “self-learning”, “data-driven”, “intuitive”, “algorithmic” and “customized” were used multiple times. That’s the equivalent of asking somebody what a piece of poetry could mean and they say, “nouns”, “verbs”, “adjectives”, “adverbs”, and “participles”.

Her answer was a non-answer. So I cut through all of it, and asked her to tell me who will collect my data, how it will be stored, and whether I will be able to see how it will be used. She pointed at the unreadable two pages in front of me, and said that I would find all the information that I need in there. I walked off to my flight, without signing on the dotted line or the consent forms, but I was surprised at how uncanny this entire experience was. I had just been asked to submit myself to extreme surveillance for a trade-off that would have saved a few hours a year in my life, and enabled some imagined ease of mobility in purchasing things. It wasn’t enough that I was going to pay money, I was also going to pay with my data.

In that fluffy dream of easy movement and transacting, I had accepted the fact that this service, which was being presented as a privilege, was an extremely invasive process of surveillance. I had also skipped the due diligence of who will use this data of my body and being, and for what purposes. When I asked for information, I was given a black box: a legal contract that is as inscrutable as it is unreadable, and empty words that pretend to describe a system when all they produce is an opaque description of concept-words. Had I not asked the couple of extra questions, and if I was not more persistent in getting actual information, I would have just voluntarily entered a system that would track, trace, and record me at a level that turns the airport into a zoo.

This is the trope that SMART technologies have perfected — trading surveillance for promised convenience. The airport is already a highly surveilled space, but when these SMART technologies enter our everyday spaces, the amount of information they collect and store about us is alarming. The possibility that every surface in the city is an observation unit, that every move we make is recorded, that our lives are an endless process of silent verifications that seamlessly authorise us, is scary. Because, by corollary, when we become deviant, unintelligible, or undesirable, the same checks can turn hostile and be used for extreme persecution and punishment. I am not a technology sceptic but I am also getting wary of smart technologies being presented as magic where we don’t need to worry about how it is done, and just look at the sleight of hand that keeps on showing us the illusion while hiding the menace.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/indian-express-nishant-shah-october-20-2019-digital-native-in-your-face-artificial-intelligence-biometric-facial-recognition-smart-technologies

Session Briefs

Admin — 2019-10-20T07:31:59Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/session-briefs

Internet Liability

Admin — 2019-10-20T07:04:53Z

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“Politics by other means”: Fostering positive contestation and charting ‘red lines’ through global governance in cyberspace

basu — 2019-10-21T15:40:38Z

The past year has been a busy one for the fermentation of global governance efforts in cyberspace with multiple actors-states, industry, and civil society spearheading a variety of initiatives. Given the multiplicity of actors, ideologies, and vested interests at play in this ecosystem, any governance initiative will be, by default, political, and desirably so.

Arindrajit Basu's essay for this year's Digital Debates: The CyFy Journal was published jointly by Global Policy and ORF. It was written in response to a framing essay by Dennis Broeders under the governance theme. The article was edited by Gurshabad Grover. Arindrajit also acknowledges the contributions of the editorial team at ORF: Trisha, Akhil and Meher.

There is no silver bullet that will magically result in universally acknowledged rules of the road. Instead, through consistent probing and prodding, the global community must create inclusive processes to galvanize consensus to ensure that individuals across the world can repose trust and confidence in their use of global digital infrastructure.^[2] This includes both ‘red lines’ applicable to clearly prohibited acts of cyberspace and softer norms for responsible state behaviour in cyberspace, that arise from an application of the tenets of International Law to cyberspace.

Infrastructure is political

Networked infrastructures typically originate when a series of technological systems with varying technical standards converge, or when a technological system achieves dominance over other self-contained technologies.^[3] Through this process of convergence, networked infrastructures must adapt to a variety of differing political conditions, legal regulations and governance practices.^[4] Internet infrastructure was never self-contained technology, but an amalgamation of systems, protocols, standards and hardware along with the standards bodies, private actors and states that define it.^[5] The architecture has always been deeply socio-technical^[6] and any attempt to severe the technology from the politics of internet governance would be a fool’s errand.

Politics catalyzed the development of the technological infrastructure that lead to the creation of the internet. During the heyday of nuclear brinkmanship between the USA and USSR, Paul Baran, an engineer with the US Department of Defense think tank RAND Corporation was tasked with building a means of communication that could continue running even if some parts were to be knocked out by a nuclear war.^[7]

As Baran’s ‘Bomb proof network’ morphed into the US Department of Defense funded ARPANET, it was initially apparent that it was not meant for either mass or commercial use, but instead saw its nurturing in the US as a tool of strategic defense.^[8]

This enabled the US to retain a disproportionate -- and till the 1990s, relatively uncontested -- influence on internet governance. As the internet rapidly expanded across the globe, various actors found that single state control over an invaluable global resource was unjust.^[9] Others (9which included US Senator Ted Cruz), argued that the internet would be safer in the hands of the United States than an international forum whose processes could be reduced to stalemate as a result of politicized conflict between democratic and non-democratic states who seek to use online spaces as an instrument of suppression.^[10] The ICANN and IANA transitions were therefore not rooted in technical considerations but much-needed geopolitical pressure from states and actors who felt ‘disregarded’^[11] in the governance of the internet. An inclusive multi-stakeholder process fueled by inclusive geopolitical contestation is far more effective in the long run and has the potential of respecting the rights of ‘disregarded’ communities all across the globe far more than a unilateral process that ignores any voices of opposition.

It is now clear that despite its continued outsized influence, the United States is no longer the only major state player in global cyber governance. China has propelled itself as a major political and economic challenger to the United States across several regimes^[12], including in the cyber domain. China’s export of the ‘information sovereignty’^[13] doctrine at various cyber norms proliferation fora, including at the United Nations-Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), and regional forums like the Shanghai Co-operation (SCO), is an example of its desire to impose its ideological clout on global conceptions of the internet.

As a rising power, China’s aspirations in global internet governance are not limited to ideology. China is at an ‘innovation imperative’, where it needs to develop new technologies to retain its status and fuel long-term growth.^[14] This locks it into direct economic, and therefore strategic competition with the United States that seeks to retain control over the same supply chains and continues to assert its economic and military superiority.

China has dominated the 5G space in an unprecedented way, and has been a product of a concerted ‘whole of government’ effort.^[15] Beijing charted out an industrial policy that enabled the deployment of 5G networks as a key national priority.^[16] China has also successfully weaponized global technical standard-setting efforts to promote its geo-economic interests.^[17] Reeling from the failure of its domestic 3G standard that was ignored globally, China realised the importance of the ‘first-movers’ advantage’ in setting standards for companies and businesses.^[18] Through an aggressive strategic push at a number of international bodies such as the International Telecommunications Union, China’s diplomatic pivot has allowed it to push standards established domestically with little external input, thereby giving Chinese companies the upper hand globally.^[19]

Politics continues to frame the technical solutions that enable cybersecurity.19 Following Snowden’s revelations, some stakeholders in the global community have shaped their politics to frame the problem as one of protecting individuals’ data from governments and private companies looking to extract and exploit it. The technical solutions developed in this frame are encryption standards and privacy enhancing technologies. However, intelligence agencies continue to frame the problem differently: they see it as an issue of collecting and aggregating data in order to identify malicious actors and threat vectors. The technical solutions they devise are increased surveillance and data analysis -- problems the first framing intended to solve. The techno-political gap, both in academic scholarship and global norms proliferation efforts continues to jeopardize attempts at framing cybersecurity governance.^[20] Instead of artificially depoliticizing technology, it is imperative that we ferment political contestation in a manner that holistically promulgates the perception that internet infrastructure can be trusted and utilised by individuals and communities around the world.

Fostering ‘red lines’ and diffusing ‘unpeace’ in cyberspace

‘Unpeace’ in cyberspace continues to ferment through ‘below the threshold’ operations that do not amount to the ‘use of force’ as per Article 2(4), or an ‘armed attack’ triggering the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This makes the application of jus ad bellum (‘right to war’) inapplicable to most cyber operations.^[21] However, the application of ‘jus in bello’ (law that governs the way in which warfare is conducted) or International Humanitarian Law (IHL) does not require armed force to be of a specific intensity but seeks to protect civilians and prevent unnecessary suffering. Therefore the principles of IHL that have evolved in The Geneva Conventions should be used as red lines that limit collateral damage as a result of cyber operations.^[22] No state should conduct cyber operations that intend to harm civilians, and should us all means at its disposal to avoid this harm to civilians. It should act in line with the principles of necessity^[23] and proportionality.^[24]

Cultivating ‘red lines’ is easier said than done. The debate around the applicability of IHL to cyberspace was one of the reasons for the breakdown of the fifth UN-GGE in 2017.^[25] States have also been reluctant to state their positions on the rules developed by the International Group of Experts (IGE) in the Tallinn Manual.^[26] This is due to two main reasons. First, not endorsing the rules may allow them to retain operational advantages in cyberspace where they continue engaging in cyber operations without censure. Second, even those states who wish to apply and adhere to the rules hesitate to do so in the absence of effective processes that censure states that do not comply with the rules.

Both these issues stem from the difficulties in attributing a cyber attack to a state as cyber attacks are multi-stage, multi-step and multi-jurisdictional, which makes the attacker several degrees removed from the victim.^[27] Technical challenges to attribution, however should not take away from international efforts that adopt an integrated and multi-disciplinary approach to attribution which must be seen as a political process working in conjunction with robust technical efforts.^[28] The Cyber Peace Institute, which was set up earlier in September 2019, and adopts an ecosystem approach to studying cyber attacks, thereby improving global attribution standards may institutionally serve this function.^[29] As attribution processes become clearer and hold greater political weight, an increasing number of states are likely to show their cards and abandon their policy of silence and ambiguity -- a process that has already commenced with a handful of states releasing clear statements on the applicability of international law in cyberspace.^[30]

Below the threshold operations are likely to continue. However, the process of contestation should result in the international community drawing out norms that ensure that public trust and confidence in the security of global digital infrastructure is not eroded. This would include norms such as protecting electoral infrastructure or a prohibition on coercing private corporations to aid intelligence agencies in extraterritorial surveillance29 The development of these norms will take time and repeated prodding. However, given the entangled and interdependent nature of the global digital economy, protracted effort may result in universal consensus in some time.

The Future of Cyber Diplomacy

The recently rejuvenated UN driven norms formulation processes are examples of this protracted effort. Both the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) and Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) processes are pushing states towards publicly declaring their positions on multiple questions of cyber governance, which will only further certainty and predictability in this space. The GGE requires all member states to clearly chart out their position on the applicability of various questions of International Law, which will be included as an Annex to the final report and is definitely a step in the right direction.

There are multiple lessons from parliamentary diplomacy culminating in past global governance regimes that negotiators in these processes can borrow from.^[31] As in the past, the tenets of international law can influence collective expectations and serve as a facilitative mechanism for chalking out bargaining points, and driving the negotiations within an inclusive, efficient and understandable framework.^[32]

Both processes will be politicized as before with states seeking to use these as fora for furthering national interests. However, this is not necessarily a bad thing. Protracted contestation is preferable to unilateralism where a select group of states decides the future of cyber governance. The inclusive, public format of the OEWG running in parallel to the closed-door deliberations at the GGE enables concerted dialogue to continue. Most countries had voted for the resolutions setting up both these processes and while the end-game is unknown, it appears that states remain interested in cultivating cyber norms.

Of course, the USA and its NATO allies had voted against the resolution setting up the OEWG and Russia, China and the SCO allies had voted against the resolution resurrecting the GGE. However, given the economic interests of all states in a relatively stable cyberspace, it is clear that both these blocks desire global consensus on some rules of the road for responsible behaviour in cyberspace. This means that both processes may arrive at certain similar outcomes. These outcomes might over time evolve into norms or even crystallise into rules of customary international law if they are representative of the interests of a large number of states.

However, sole reliance on state-centric mechanisms to achieve a stable governance regime may be misplaced. As seen with Dupont’s contribution to the Montreal Protocol that banned the global use of Chloro-Fluoro-Carbons (CFCs)^[33] or the International Committee of the Red Cross’s concerted efforts in rallying states to sign the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions^[34], norm-entrepreneurship and the mantle of leadership in norm-entrepreneurship need not be limited to state actors. Non-state actors often have the gifts of flexibility and strategic neutrality that make them a better fit for this role than states. Microsoft’s leadership and its ascent to this leadership mantle in the cyber governance space must therefore be taken heed off. The key role it played in charting out the CyberSecurity Tech Accords, Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace and its most recent initiative, the Cyber Peace Institute, must be commended. However, the success of its entrepreneurship relies on how well it can work both with multilateral mechanisms under the aegis of the United Nations and multi-stakeholder fora such as the Global Commission on Stability in Cyberspace. This will lead to a cohesive set of rules that adequately govern the conduct of both state and non-state actors in cyberspace.

It is unfortunate, however, that most governance efforts in cyberspace are driven by the United States or China or their allies. For example, only UK^[35], France^[36], Germany,^[37] Estonia^[38],Cuba^[39] (backed by China and Russia), and the USA^[40] have all engaged in public posturing advocating their ideological position on the applicability of International Law in cyberspace in varying degrees of detail with other countries largely remaining silent. Other emerging economies need to get into the game to make the process more representative and equitable.

More recently, India has begun to take a leadership role in the global debate on cross-border data transfers, spurred largely by their domestic political and policy ecosystem championing ‘digital nationalism.’ At the G20 summit in Osaka in July this year, India, alongside the BRICS grouping emphasized the development dimensions of data for emerging economies and pushed the notion of ‘data sovereignty’-broadly understood as the sovereign right of nations to govern data within their territories/jurisdiction in the national interest and for the welfare of its people.^[41] Resisting calls from Western allies including the United States to get on board Japan’s initiative promoting the free flow of data across borders, Vijay Gokhale also mentioned that discussions on data flows must not take place at plurilateral forums outside the World Trade Organization as this would prevent inclusive discussions.^[42]This form of posturing should be sustained by emerging economies like India and extended to the security domain as well through which the hegemony that a few powerful actors retain over the contours of cyber governance can be reduced.

To paraphrase Clausewitz, technological governance is the conduct of politics by other means. Internet infrastructure has become so deeply intertwined with the political ethos of most countries that it has become the latest front for geopolitical contestation among state and non-state actors alike. Politicizing cyber governance prevents a deracinated approach to the process that ignores simmering inequalities, power asymmetries and tensions that a limited technical lens prevents us from viewing.

The question is, not if but how cyber governance will be politicized. Will it be a politics of inclusion that protects the rights of the disregarded and adequately represents their voices in line with the requirements of International Law, or will it be a politics of convenience through which states and non-state actors utilise cyber governance for reaping strategic dividends? The global cyber policy ecosystem must continue the battle to ensure that the former remains essential.

Endnotes

^[1] Arindrajit Basu and Elonnai Hickok (2018) “Cyberspace and External Affairs: A memorandum for India”, 8-13.

^[2] In its draft definition of cyber stability, The Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace has adopted a bottom up user centric definition of Cyber Stability where individuals can be confident in the stability of cyberspace as opposed to an objective top-down determination of cybersecurity metrics.

^[3] PN Edwards, GC Bowker Jackson SJ, R Williams 2009. Introduction: an agenda for infrastructure studies. J. Assoc. Inf. Syst.10(5):364–74

^[4] Brian Larkin, “ The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure” Annual Rev. Anthropol 2013,42:327-43

^[5] Ibid.

^[6] Kieron O’Hara and Wendy Hall, “Four Internets: The Geopolitics of Digital Governance” CIGI Report No.208, December 2018.

^[7] Cade Metz, “Paul Baran, the link between nuclear war and the internet” Wired, 4th Sept. 2012.

^[8] Kal Raustila (2016) “Governing the Internet” American Journal of International Law 110:3,491

^[9] Samantha Bradshaw, Laura DeNardis, Fen Osler Hampson, Eric Jardine & Mark Raymond, The Emergence of Contention in Global Internet Governance 3 (Global Comm’n on Internet Governance, Paper Series No. 17, July 2015).

^[10] Klint Finley, "The Internet Finally Belongs to Everyone”, Wired, March 18th, 2016.

^[11] Richard Stewart (2014), Remedying Disregard in Global Regulatory Governance: Accountability, Participation and Responsiveness” AJIL 108:2

^[12] Tarun Chhabra, Rush Doshi, Ryan Hass and Emilie Kimball, “Global China: Domains of strategic competition and domestic drivers” Brookings Institution, September 2019.

^[13] According to this view, a state can manage and define its ‘network frontiers; through domestic legislation or state policy and patrol information at it state borders in any way it deems fit. Yuan Yi,. “网络空间的国界在哪 ” [Where Are the National Borders of cyberspace]? 学习时报.May 19, 2016.

^[14] Anthea Roberts, Henrique Choer Moraes and Victor Ferguson (2019), “Toward a Geoeconomic Order in International Trade and Investment” (May 16, 2019).

^[15] Eurasia Group (2018), “The Geopolitics of 5G”

^[16] Ibid.( In 2013, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry of Science and technology (MOST) established the IMT-2020 5G Promotion Group to push for a government all-industry alliance on 5G.)

^[17] Bjorn Fagersten&Tim Ruhlig (2019), "China’s standard power and it’s geopolitical implications for Europe” Swedish Institute for International Affairs.

^[18] Alan Beattie, “Technology: how the US, EU and China compete to set industry standards” Financial Times, Jul 14th, 2019

^[19] Laura Fitchner, Walter Pieters.,&Andre Herdero Texeira(2016). Cybersecurity as a Politikum: Implications of Security Discourses for Infrastructures. In Proceedings of the 2016 New Security Paradigms Workshop (36-48). New York: Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)

^[20] Michael Crosston,” Phreak the Speak: The Flawed Communications within cyber intelligentsia” in Jan-Frederik Kremer and Benedikt Muller,”Cyberspace and International Relations: Theory, Prospects and Challenges (2013, Springer) 253.

^[21] “Fundamental Principles of International Humanitarian Law".

^[22] Veronique Christory “Cyber warfare: IHL provides an additional layer of protection” 10 Sept. 2019.

^[23] See (The “principle of military necessity” permits measures which are actually necessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose and are not otherwise prohibited by international humanitarian law. In the case of an armed conflict, the only legitimate military purpose is to weaken the military capacity of the other parties to the conflict.

^[24] See Proportionality; The principle of proportionality prohibits attacks against military objectives which are “expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”

^[25] Declaration by Miguel Rodriguez, Representative of Cuba, At the final session of group of governmental experts on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security (June 23 2017).

^[26] Dan Efrony and Yuval Shany (2018), “ A Rule Book on the Shelf? Tallinn Manual 2.0 on Cyberoperations and Subsequent State Practice” AJIL 112:4

^[27] David Clark and Susan Landau. “Untangling Attribution.” Harvard National Security Journal (Harvard University) 2 (2011

^[28] Davis, John S., Benjamin Adam Boudreaux, Jonathan William Welburn, Jair Aguirre, Cordaye Ogletree, Geoffrey McGovern and Michael S. Chase. Stateless Attribution: Toward International Accountability in Cyberspace. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, (2017). At

^[29] See “CyberPeace Institute to Support Victims Harmed by Escalating Conflicts in Cyberspace”.

^[30] Dan Efrony and Yuval Shany (2018), “ A Rule Book on the Shelf? Tallinn Manual 2.0 on Cyberoperations and Subsequent State Practice” AJIL 112:4

^[31] Arindrajit Basu and Elonnai Hickok (2018), “Conceptualizing an International Security architecture for cyberspace”.

^[32] Monica Hakimi (2017), “The Work of International Law,” Harvard International Law Journal 58:1.

^[33] James Maxwell and Forrest Briscoe (2007),” There’s money in the air: The CFC Ban and Dupont’s Regulatory Strategy” Business Strategy and the Environment 6, 276-286.

^[34] Francis Buignon (2004). “The International Committee of the Red Cross and the development of international humanitarian law.” Chi. J. Int’l L.5: 19137

^[35] Jeremy Wright, “Cyber and International Law in the 21st Century” Govt. UK.

^[36] Michael Schmitt, “France’s Major Statement on International Law and Cyber: An Assessment” Just Security, September 16th, 2019.

^[37] Nele Achten, "Germany’s Position on International Law in Cyberspace”, Lawfare, Oct 2, 2018,

^[38] Michael Schmitt, “Estonia Speaks out on Key Rules for Cyberspace” Just Security, June 10, 2019.

^[39] https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Cuban-Expert-Declaration.pdf

^[40] https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Brian-J.-Egan-International-Law-and-Stabilityin-Cyberspace-Berkeley-Nov-2016.pdf

^[41] Justin Sherman and Arindrajit Basu, "Fostering Strategic Convergence in US-India Tech Relations: 5G and Beyond”, The Diplomat, July 03, 2019.

^[42] Aditi Agrawal, "India and Tech Policy at the G20 Summit”, Medianama, Jul 1, 2019.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/arindrajit-basu-orfonline-october-21-2019-politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace

The Mother and Child Tracking System - understanding data trail in the Indian healthcare systems

ambika — 2019-12-30T17:18:05Z

This article was first published by Privacy International, on October 17, 2019

Case study of MCTS: Read

On October 17th 2019, the UN Special Rapporteur (UNSR) on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Philip Alston, released his thematic report on digital technology, social protection and human rights. Understanding the impact of technology on the provision of social protection – and, by extent, its impact on people in vulnerable situations – has been part of the work the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) and Privacy International (PI) have been doing.

Earlier this year, PI responded to the UNSR's consultation on this topic. We highlighted what we perceived as some of the most pressing issues we had observed around the world when it comes to the use of technology for the delivery of social protection and its impact on the right to privacy and dignity of benefit claimants.

Among them, automation and the increasing reliance on AI is a topic of particular concern - countries including Australia, India, the UK and the US have already started to adopt these technologies in digital welfare programmes. This adoption raises significant concerns about a quickly approaching future, in which computers decide whether or not we get access to the services that allow us to survive. There's an even more pressing problem. More than a few stories have emerged revealing the extent of the bias in many AI systems, biases that create serious issues for people in vulnerable situations, who are already exposed to discrimination, and made worse by increasing reliance on automation.

Beyond the issue of AI, we think it is important to look at welfare and automation with a wider lens. In order for an AI to function it needs to be trained on a dataset, so that it can understand what it is looking for. That requires the collection large quantities of data. That data would then be used to train and AI to recognise what fraudulent use of public benefits would look like. That means we need to think about every data point being collected as one that, in the long run, will likely be used for automation purposes.

These systems incentivise the mass collection of people's data, across a huge range of government services, from welfare to health - where women and gender-diverse people are uniquely impacted. CIS have been looking specifically at reproductive health programmes in India, work which offers a unique insight into the ways in which mass data collection in systems like these can enable abuse.

Reproductive health programmes in India have been digitising extensive data about pregnant women for over a decade, as part of multiple health information systems. These can be seen as precursors to current conceptions of big data systems within health informatics. India’s health programme instituted such an information system in 2009, the Mother and Child Tracking System (MCTS), which is aimed at collecting data on maternal and child health. The Centre for Internet and Society, India, undertook a case study of the MCTS as an example of public data-driven initiatives in reproductive health. The case study was supported by the Big Data for Development network supported by the International Development Research Centre, Canada. The objective of the case study was to focus on the data flows and architecture of the system, and identify areas of concern as newer systems of health informatics are introduced on top of existing ones. The case study is also relevant from the perspective of Sustainable Development Goals, which aim to rectify the tendency of global development initiatives to ignore national HIS and create purpose-specific monitoring systems.

After being launched in 2011, 120 million (12 crore) pregnant women and 111 million (11 crore) children have been registered on the MCTS as of 2018. The central database collects data on each visit of the woman from conception to 42 days postpartum, including details of direct benefit transfer of maternity benefit schemes. While data-driven monitoring is a critical exercise to improve health care provision, publicly available documents on the MCTS reflect the complete absence of robust data protection measures. The risk associated with data leaks are amplified due to the stigma associated with abortion, especially for unmarried women or survivors of rape.

The historical landscape of reproductive healthcare provision and family planning in India has been dominated by a target-based approach. Geared at population control, this approach sought to maximise family planning targets without protecting decisional autonomy and bodily privacy for women. At the policy level, this approach was shifted in favour of a rights-based approach to family planning in 1994. However, targets continue to be set for women’s sterilisation on the ground. Surveillance practices in reproductive healthcare are then used to monitor under-performing regions and meet sterilisation targets for women, this continues to be the primary mode of contraception offered by public family planning initiatives.

More recently, this database - among others collecting data about reproductive health - is adding biometric information through linkage with the Aadhaar infrastructure. This data adds to the sensitive information being collected and stored without adhering to any publicly available data protection practices. Biometric linkage is aimed to fulfill multiple functions - primarily authentication of welfare beneficiaries of the national maternal benefits scheme. Making Aadhaar details mandatory could directly contribute to the denial of service to legitimate patients and beneficiaries - as has already been seen in some cases.

The added layer of biometric surveillance also has the potential to enable other forms of abuse of privacy for pregnant women. In 2016, the union minister for Women and Child Development under the previous government suggested the use of strict biometric-based monitoring to discourage gender-biased sex selection. Activists critiqued the policy for its paternalistic approach to reduce the rampant practice of gender-biased sex selection, rather than addressing the root causes of gender inequality in the country.

There is an urgent need to rethink the objectives and practices of data collection in public reproductive health provision in India. Rather than continued focus on meeting high-level targets, monitoring systems should enable local usage and protect the decisional autonomy of patients. In addition, the data protection legislation in India - expected to be tabled in the next session in parliament - should place free and informed consent, and informational privacy at the centre of data-driven practices in reproductive health provision.

This is why the systematic mass collection of data in health services is all the more worrying. When the collection of our data becomes a condition for accessing health services, it is not only a threat to our right to health that should not be conditional on data sharing but also it raises questions as to how this data will be used in the age of automation.

This is why understanding what data is collected and how it is collected in the context of health and social protection programmes is so important.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/privacy-international-ambika-tandon-october-17-2019-mother-and-child-tracking-system-understanding-data-trail-indian-healthcare

We need a better AI vision

basu — 2019-10-14T13:55:59Z

Artificial intelligence conjures up a wondrous world of autonomous processes but dystopia is inevitable unless rights and privacy are protected.

The blog post by Arindrajit Basu was published by Fountainink on October 12, 2019.

he dawn of Artificial Intelligence (AI) has policy-makers across the globe excited. In India, it is seen as a tool to overleap structural hurdles and better understand a range of organisational and management processes while improving the implementation of several government tasks. Notwithstanding the apparent enthusiasm in the government and private sectors, an adequate technological, infrastructural, and financial capacity to develop these models at scale is still in the works.

A number of policy documents with direct or indirect references to India’s AI future—to be powered by vast troves of data—have been released in the past year and a half. These include the National Strategy for Artificial Intelligence (which I will refer to as National Strategy) authored by NITI Aayog, the AI Taskforce Report, Chapter 4 of the Economic Survey, the Draft e-Commerce Bill and the Srikrishna Committee Report.

While they extol the virtues of data-driven analytics, references to the preservation or augmentation of India’s constitutional ethos through AI has been limited though it is crucial for safeguarding the rights and liberties of citizens while paving the way for the alleviation of societal oppression.

In this essay, I outline the variety of AI use cases that are in the works. I then highlight India’s AI vision by culling the relevant aspects of policy instruments that impact the AI ecosystem and identify lacunae that can be rectified. Finally, I attempt to “constitutionalise AI policy” by grounding it in a framework of constitutional rights that guarantee protection to the most vulnerable sections of society.

In the manufacturing industry, AI adoption is not uniform across all sectors. But there has been a notable transformation in electronics, heavy electricals and automobiles.

It is crucial to note that these cases, still emerging in India, have been implemented at scale in other countries such as the United Kingdom, United States and China. Projects were rolled out to the detriment of ethical and legal considerations. Hindsight should make the Indian policy ecosystem much wiser. By closely studying the research produced in these diverse contexts, Indian policy-makers should try to find ways around the ethical and legal challenges that cropped up elsewhere and devise policy solutions that mitigate the concerns raised.

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Before anything else we need to define AI—an endeavour fraught with multiple contestations. My colleagues and I at the Centre for Internet & Society ducked this hurdle when conducting our research by adopting a function-based approach. An AI system (as opposed to one that automates routine, cognitive or non-cognitive tasks) is a dynamic learning system that allows for the delegation of some level of human decision-making to the system. This definition allows us to capture some of the unique challenges and prospects that stem from the use of AI.

The research I contributed to at CIS identified key trends in the use of AI across India. In healthcare, it is used for descriptive and predictive purposes.

For example, the Manipal Group of Hospitals tied up with IBM’s Watson for Oncology to aid doctors in the diagnosis and treatment of seven types of cancer. It is also being used for analytical or diagnostic services. Niramai Health Analytix uses AI to detect early stage breast cancer and Adveniot Tecnosys detects tuberculosis through chest X-rays and acute infections using ultrasound images. In the manufacturing industry, AI adoption is not uniform across all sectors. But there has been a notable transformation in the electronics, heavy electricals and automobiles sector gradually adopting and integrating AI solutions into their products and processes.

It is also used in the burgeoning online lending segment in order to source credit score data. As many Indians have no credit scores, AI is used to aggregate data and generate scores for more than 80 per cent of the population who have no credit scores. This includes Credit Vidya, a Hyderabad-based data underwriting start-up that provides a credit score to first time loan-seekers and feeds this information to big players such as ICICI Bank and HDFC Bank, among others. It is also used by players such as Mastercard for fraud detection and risk management. In the finance world, companies such as Trade Rays are being used to provide user-friendly algorithmic trading services.

AI is also being increasingly used in the education sector for providing services to students such as decision-making assistance and also for student-progress monitoring.

The next big development is in law enforcement. Predictive policing is making great strides in various states, including Delhi, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and Maharashtra. A brainchild of the Los Angeles Police Department, predictive policing is the use of analytical techniques such as Machine Learning to identify probable targets for intervention to prevent crime or to solve past crime through statistical predictions.

Conventional approaches to predictive policing start with the mapping of locations where crimes are concentrated (hot spots) by using algorithms to analyse aggregated data sets. Police in Uttar Pradesh and Delhi have partnered with the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) in a Memorandum of Understanding to allow ISRO’s Advanced Data Processing Research Institute to map, visualise and compile reports about crime-related incidents.

There are aggressive developments also on the facial recognition front. Punjab Police, in association with Gurugram-based start-up Staqu has started implementing the Punjab Artificial Intelligence System (PAIS) which uses digitised criminal records and automated facial recognition to retrieve information on the suspected criminal. At the national level, on June 28, the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) called for tenders to implement a centralised Automated Facial Recognition System (AFRS), defining the scope of work in broad terms as the “supply, installation and commissioning of hardware and software at NCRB.”

AI is also being increasingly used in the education sector for providing services to students such as decision-making assistance and also for student-progress monitoring. The Andhra Pradesh government had started collecting information from a range of databases and processes the information through Microsoft’s Machine Learning Platform to monitor children and devote student focussed attention on identifying and curbing school drop-outs.

In Andhra Pradesh, Microsoft collaborated with the International Crop Institute for Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) to develop an AI Sowing App powered by Microsoft’s Cortana Intelligence Suite. It aggregated data using Machine Learning and sent advisories to farmers regarding optimal dates to sow. This was done via text messages on feature phones after ground research revealed that not many farmers owned or were able to use smart phones. The NITI Aayog AI Strategy specifically cited this use case and reported that this resulted in a 10-30 per cent increase in crop yield. The government of Karnataka has entered into a similar arrangement with Microsoft.

Finally, in the defence sector, our research found enthusiasm for AI in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) functions, cyber defence, robot soldiers, risk terrain analysis and moving towards autonomous weapons systems. These projects are being developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation but the level of trust and support in AI-driven processes reposed by the wings of the armed forces is yet to be publicly clarified. India also had the privilege of leading the global debate on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) with Amandeep Singh Gill chairing the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (UN-GGE) on the issue. However, ‘lethal’ autonomous weapons systems at this stage appear to be a speck in the distant horizon.

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Along with the range of use cases described above, a patchwork of policy imperatives is emerging to support this ecosystem. The umbrella document is the National Strategy for Artificial Intelligence published by the NITI Aayog in June 2018. Despite certain lacunae in its scope, the existence of a cohesive and robust document that lends a semblance of certainty and predictability to a rapidly emerging sphere is in itself a boon. The document focuses on how India can leverage AI for both economic growth and social inclusion. The contents of the document can be divided into a few themes, many of which have also found their way into multiple other instruments.

NITI Aayog provides over 30 policy recommendations on investment in scientific research, reskilling, training and enabling the speedy adoption of AI across value chains. The flagship research initiative is a two-tiered endeavour to boost AI research in India. First, new centres of research excellence (COREs) will develop fundamental research. The COREs will act as feeders for international centres for transformational AI which will focus on creating AI-based applications across sectors.

This is an impressive theoretical objective but questions surrounding implementation and structures of operation remain to be answered. China has not only conceptualised an ecosystem but through the Three Year Action Plan to Promote the Development of New Generation Artificial Intelligence Industry, it has also taken a whole-of-government approach to propelling the private sector to an e-leadership position. It has partnered with national tech companies and set clear goals for funding, such as the $2.1 billion technology park for AI research in Beijing.

The contents of the NITI document can be divided into a few themes, many of which have also found their way into multiple other instruments. First, it proposes an “AI+X” approach that captures the long-term vision for AI in India. Instead of replacing the processes in their entirety, AI is understood as an enabler of efficiency in processes that already exist. NITI Aayog therefore looks at the process of deploying AI-driven technologies as taking an existing process (X) and adding AI to them (AI+X). This is a crucial recommendation all AI projects should heed. Instead of waving AI as an all-encompassing magic wand across sectors, it is necessary to identify specific gaps AI can seek to remedy and then devise the process underpinning this implementation.

A cacophony of policy instruments by multiple government departments seeks to reconceptualise data to construct a theoretical framework that allows for its exploitation for AI-driven analytics.

The AI-driven intervention to develop sowing apps for farmers in Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh are examples of effective implementation of this approach. Instead of other knee-jerk reactions to agrarian woes such as a hasty raising of Minimum Support Price, effective research was done in this use-case to identify a lack of predictability in weather patterns as a key factor in productive crop yields. They realised that aggregation of data through AI could provide farmers with better information on weather patterns. As internet penetration was relatively low in rural Karnataka, text messages to feature phones that had a far wider presence was indispensable to the end game.

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This is in contrast to the ill-conceived path adopted by the Union ministry of electronics and information technology in guidelines for regulating social media platforms that host content (“intermediaries”). Rule 3(9) of the Draft of the Information Technology [Intermediary Guidelines (Amendment) Rules] 2018 mandates intermediaries to use “automated tools or appropriate mechanisms, with appropriate controls, for proactively identifying and removing or disabling public access to unlawful information or content”.

Proposed in light of the fake news menace and the unbridled spread of “extremist” content online, the use of the phrase “automated tools or appropriate mechanisms” is reflective of an attitude that fails to consider ground realities that confront companies and users alike. They ignore, for instance, the cost of automated tools: whether automated content moderation techniques developed in the West can be applied to Indic languages or grievance redress mechanisms users can avail of if their online speech is unduly restricted. This is thus a clear case of the “AI” mantra being drawn out of a hat without studying the “X” it is supposed to remedy.

The second focus of the National Strategy that has since morphed into a technology policy mainstay across instruments is on data governance, access and utilisation. The document says the major hurdle to the large scale adoption of AI in India is the difficulty in accessing structured data. It recommends developing big annotated data sets to “democratise data and multi-stakeholder marketplaces across the AI value chain”. It argues that at present only one per cent of data can be analysed as it exists in various unconnected silos. Through the creation of a formal market for data, aggregators such as diagnostic centres in the healthcare sector would curate datasets and place them in the market, with appropriate permissions and safeguards. AI firms could use available datasets rather than wasting effort sourcing and curating the sets themselves.

A cacophony of policy instruments by multiple government departments seeks to reconceptualise data to construct a theoretical framework that allows for its exploitation for AI-driven analytics.The first is “community data” and appears both in the Srikrishna Report that accompanied the draft Data Protection Bill in 2018 and the draft e-commerce policy.

But there appears to be some conflict between its usage in the two. Srikrishna endorses a collective protection of privacy by protecting an identifiable community that has contributed to community data. This requires the fulfilment of three key conditions: first, the data belong to an identifiable community; second, individuals in the community consent to being a part of it, and third, the community as a whole consents to its data being treated as community data. On the other hand, the Department of Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade’s (DPIIT) draft e-commerce policy looks at community data as “societal commons” or a “national resource” that gives the community the right to access it but government has ultimate and overriding control of the data. This configuration of community data brings into question the consent framework in the Srikrishna Bill.

The government’s attempt to harness data as a national resource for the development of AI-based solutions may be well-intentioned but is fraught with core problems in implementation.

The matter is further confused by treating “data as a public good”. This is projected in Chapter 4 of the 2019 Economic Survey published by the Ministry of Finance. It explicitly states that any configuration needs to be deferential to privacy norms and the upcoming privacy law. The “personal data” of an individual in the custody of a government is also a “public good” once the datasets are anonymised. At the same time, it pushes for the creation of a government database that links several individual databases, which leads to the “triangulation” problem, where matching different datasets together allows for individuals to be identified despite their anonymisation in seemingly disparate databases.

“Building an AI ecosystem” was also one of the ostensible reasons for data localisation—the government’s gambit to mandate that foreign companies store the data of Indian citizens within national borders. In addition to a few other policy instruments with similar mandates, Section 40 of the Draft Personal Data Protection Bill mandates that all “critical data” (this is to be notified by the government) be stored exclusively in India. All other data should have a live, serving copy stored in India even if transfer abroad is allowed. This was an attempt to ensure foreign data processors are not the sole beneficiaries of AI-driven insights.

The government’s attempt to harness data as a national resource for the development of AI-based solutions may be well intentioned but is fraught with core problems in implementation. First, the notion of data as a national resource or as a public good walks a tightrope with constitutionally guaranteed protections around privacy, which will be codified in the upcoming Personal Data Protection Bill. My concerns are not quite so grave in the case of genuine “public data” like traffic signal data or pollution data. However, the Economic Survey manages to crudely amalgamate personal data into the mix.

It also states that personal data in the custody of a government is a public good once the datasets are anonymised. This includes transactions data in the User Payments Interface (UPI), administrative data including birth and death records, and institutional data including data in public hospitals or schools on pupils or patients. At the same time, it pushes for a government database that will lead to the triangulation problem outlined above. The chapter also suggests that said data may be sold to private firms (unclear if this includes foreign or domestic firms). This not only contradicts the notion of public good but is also a serious threat to the confidentiality and security of personal data.

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Therefore, along with the concerted endeavour to create data marketplaces, it is crucial for policy-makers to differentiate between public data and personal data individuals may consent to be made public. The parameters for clearly defining free and informed consent, as codified in the Draft Personal Data Protection Bill need to be strictly followed as there is a risk of de-anonymisation of data once it finds its way into the marketplace. Second, it is crucial for policy-makers to define clearly a community and parameters for what constitutes individual consent to be part of a community. Finally, along with technical work on setting up a national data marketplace, there must be protracted efforts to guarantee greater security and standards of anonymisation.

The National Strategy mentions that India should position itself as a “garage” for AI in emerging economies. This could mean Indian citizens are used as guinea pigs for AI-driven solutions at the cost of their rights.

Assuming that a constitutionally valid paradigm may be created, the excessive focus on data access by tech players dodges the question of the capabilities of analytic firms to process this data and derive meaningful insights from the information. Scholars on China, arguably the poster-child of data-driven economic growth, have sent mixed messages. Ding argues that despite having half the technical capabilities of the US, easy access to data gives China a competitive edge in global AI competition. On the contrary, Andrew Ng has argued that operationalising a sufficient number of relevant datasets still remains a challenge. Ng’s views are backed up by insiders at Chinese tech giant Tencent who say the company still finds it difficult to integrate data streams due to technical hurdles. NITI Aayog’s idea of a multi-stream data marketplace may theoretically be a solution to these potential hurdles but requires sustained funding and research innovation to be converted into reality.

The National Strategy suggests that government should create a multi-disciplinary committee to set up this marketplace and explore levers for its implementation. This is certainly the need of the hour. It also rightly highlights the importance of research partnerships between academia and the private sector, and the need to support start-ups. There is therefore an urgent need for innovative allied policy instruments that support the burgeoning start-up sector. Proposals such as data localisation may hurt smaller players as they will have to bear the increased fixed costs of setting up or renting data centres.

The National Strategy also incongruously mentions that India should position itself as a “garage” for the use of AI in emerging economies. This could mean Indian citizens are used as guinea pigs for AI-driven solutions at the cost of their fundamental rights. It could also imply that India should occupy a leadership position and work with other emerging economies to frame the global rights based discourse to seek equitable solutions for the application of AI that works to improve the plight of the most vulnerable in society.

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Our constitutional ethos places us in a unique position to develop a framework that enables the actualisation of this equitable vision—a goal the policy instruments put out thus far appear to have missed. While the National Strategy includes a section on privacy, security and ethical implications of AI, it stops short of rooting it in fundamental rights and constitutional principles. As a centralised policy instrument, the National Strategy deserves praise for identifying key levers in the future of India’s AI ecosystem and, with the exception of the concerns I outlined above, it is at par with the policy-making thought process in any other nation.

When we start the process of using constitutional principles for AI governance, we must remember that as per Article 12, an individual can file a writ against the state for violation of a fundamental right if the action is taken under the aegis of a “public function”. To combat discrimination by private actors, the state can enact legislation compelling private actors to comply with constitutional mandates. In July, Rajeev Chandrashekhar, a Rajya Sabha MP, suggested a law to combat algorithmic discrimination along the lines of the Algorithmic Accountability Bill proposed in the US Senate. There are three core constitutional questions along the lines of the “golden triangle” of the Indian Constitution any such legislation will need to answer—those of accountability and transparency, algorithmic discrimination and the guarantee of freedom of expression and individual privacy.

Algorithms are developed by human beings who have their own cognitive biases. This means ostensibly neutral algorithms can have an unintentional disparate impact on certain, often traditionally disenfranchised groups.

In the MIT Technology Review, Karen Hao explains three stages at which bias might creep in. The first stage is the framing of the problem itself. As soon as computer scientists create a deep-learning model, they decide what they want the model to finally achieve. However, frequently desired outcomes such as “profitability”, “creditworthiness” or “recruitability” are subjective and imprecise concepts subject to human cognitive bias. This makes it difficult to devise screening algorithms that fairly portray society and the complex medley of identities, attributes and structures of power that define it.

The second stage Hao mentions is the data collection phase. Training data could lead to bias if it is unrepresentative of reality or represents entrenched prejudice or structural inequality. For example, most Natural Language Processing systems used for Parts of Speech (POS) tagging in the US are trained on the readily available data sets from the Wall Street Journal. Accuracy would naturally decrease when the algorithm is applied to individuals—largely ethnic minorities—who do not mimic the speech of the Journal.

According to Hao, the final stage for algorithmic bias is data preparation, which involves selecting parameters the developer wants the algorithm to consider. For example, when determining the “risk-profile” of car owners seeking insurance premiums, geographical location could be one parameter. This could be justified by the ostensibly neutral argument that those residing in inner-city areas with narrower roads are more likely to have scratches on their vehicles. But as inner cities in the US have a disproportionately high number of ethnic minorities or other vulnerable socio-economic groups, “pin code” becomes a facially neutral proxy for race or class-based discrimination.

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The right to equality has been carved into multiple international human rights instruments and into the Equality Code in Articles 14-18 of the Indian Constitution. The dominant approach to interpreting the right to equality by the Supreme Court has been to focus on “grounds” of discrimination under Article 15(1), thus resulting in a lack of recognition of unintentional discrimination and disparate impact.

A notable exception, as constitutional scholar Gautam Bhatia points out, is the case of N.M. Thomas which pertained to reservation in promotions. Justice Mathew argued that the test for inequality in Article 16(4) is an effects-oriented test independent of the formal motivation underlying a specific act. Justice Krishna Iyer and Mathew also articulated a grander vision wherein they saw the Equality Code as transcending the embedded individual disabilities in class driven social hierarchies. This understanding is crucial for governing data driven decision-making that impacts vulnerable communities. Any law or policy on AI-related discrimination must also include disparate impact within its definition of “discrimination” to ensure that developers think about the adverse consequences even of well-intentioned decisions.

AI driven assessments have been challenged on grounds of constitutional violations in other jurisdictions. In 2016, the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered the legality of using risk assessment tools such as COMPAS for sentencing criminals. It affirmed the trial court’s findings and held that using COMPAS did not violate constitutional due process standards. Eric Loomis had argued that using COMPAS infringed both his right to an individualised sentence and to accurate information as COMPAS provided data for specific groups and kept the methodology used to prepare the report a trade secret. He additionally argued that the court used unconstitutional gendered assessments as the tool used gender as one of the parameters.

The Wisconsin Supreme Court disagreed with Loomis arguing that COMPAS only used publicly available data and data provided by the defendant, which apparently meant Loomis could have verified any information contained in the report. On the question of individualisation, the court argued that COMPAS provided only aggregate data for groups similarly placed to the offender. However, it went on to argue as the report was not the sole basis for a decision by the judge, a COMPAS assessment would be sufficiently individualised as courts retained the discretion and information necessary to disagree.

By assuming that Loomis could have genuinely verified all the data collected about similarly placed groups and that judges would exercise discretion to prevent the entrenchment of inequalities through COMPAS’s decision-making patterns, the judges ignored social realities. Algorithmic decision-making systems are an extension of unequal decision-making that re-entrenches prevailing societal perceptions around identity and behaviour. An instance of discrimination cannot be looked at as a single instance but as one in a menagerie of production systems that define, modulate and regulate social existence.

The policy-making ecosystem needs, therefore, to galvanise the “transformative” vision of India’s democratic fibre and study existing systems and power structures AI could re-entrench or mitigate. For example, in the matter of bank loans there is a presumption against the credit-worthiness of those working in the informal sector. The use of aggregated decision-making may lead to more equitable outcomes given that there is concrete thought on the organisational structures making these decisions and the constitutional safeguards provided.

Most case studies on algorithmic discrimination in Virgina Eubanks’ Automating Inequality or Safiya Noble’s Algorithms of Oppression are based on western contexts. There is an urgent need for publicly available empirical studies on pilot cases in India to understand the contours of discrimination. Primary research questions should explore three related subjects. Are specified ostensibly neutral variables being used to exclude certain communities from accessing opportunities and resources or having a disproportionate impact on their civil liberties? Is there diversity in the identities of the coders themselves? Are the training data sets used representative and diverse and, finally, what role does data driven decision-making play in furthering the battle against embedded structural hierarchies?

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A key feature of AI-driven solutions is the “black box” that processes inputs and generates actionable outputs behind a veil of opacity to the human operator. Essentially, the black box denotes that aspect of the human neural decision-making function that has been delegated to the machine. A lack of transparency or understanding could lead to what Frank Pasquale terms a “Black Box Society” where algorithms define the trajectories of daily existence unless “the values and prerogatives of the encoded rules hidden within black boxes” are challenged.

Ex-post facto assessment is often insufficient for arriving at genuine accountability. For example, the success of predictive policing in the US was drawn from the fact that police have indeed found more crimes in areas deemed “high risk”. But this assessment does not account for the fact that this is a product of a vicious cycle through which more crime is detected in an area simply because more policemen are deployed. Here, the National Strategy rightly identifies that simply opening up code may not deconstruct the black box as not all stakeholders impacted by AI solutions may understand the code. The constant aim should be explicability which means the human developer should be able to explain how certain factors may be used to arrive at a certain cluster of outcomes in a given set of situations.

The requirement of accountability stems from the Right to Life provision under Article 21. As stated in the seven-judge bench in Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India, any procedure established by law must be seen to be “fair, just and reasonable” and not “fanciful, oppressive or arbitrary.”

The Right to Privacy was recognised as a fundamental right by the nine-judge bench in K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) vs. Union of India. Mass surveillance can lead to the alteration of behavioural patterns which may in turn be used for the suppression of dissent by the State. Pulling vast tracts of data on all suspected criminals—as in facial recognition systems like PAIS—create a “presumption of criminality” that can have a chilling effect on democratic values.

Therefore, any use, particularly by law enforcement would need to satisfy the requirements for infringing on the right to privacy: the existence of a law, necessity—a clearly defined state objective—and proportionality between the state object and the means used restricting fundamental rights the least. Along with centralised policy instruments such as the National Strategy, all initiatives taken in pursuance of India’s AI agenda must pay heed to the democratic virtues of privacy and free speech and their interlinkages.

India needs a law to regulate the impact of Artificial Intelligence and enable its development without restricting fundamental rights. However, regulation should not adopt a “one-size-fits-all” approach that views all uses with the same level of rigidity. Regulatory intervention should be based on questions around power asymmetries and the likelihood of the use case adversely affronting human dignity captured by India’s constitutional ethos.

As an aspiring leader in global discourse, India can lay the rules of the road for other emerging economies not only by incubating, innovating and implementing AI powered technologies but by grounding it in a lattice of rich constitutional jurisprudence that empowers the individual.

The High Level Task Force on Artificial Intelligence (AI HLEG) set up by the European Commission in June 2018 published a report on “Ethical Guidelines for Trustworthy AI” earlier this year. They feature seven core requirements which include human agency and oversight; technical robustness and safety; privacy and data governance; transparency; diversity, non-discrimination and fairness; societal and environmental well-being; and accountability. While the principles are comprehensive, this document stops short of referencing any domestic or international constitutional law that helps cement these values. The Indian Constitution can help define and concretise each of these principles and could be used as a vehicle to foster genuine social inclusion and mitigation of structural injustice through AI.

At the centre of the vision must be the inherent rights of the individual. The constitutional moment for data driven decision-making emerges therefore when we conceptualise a way through which AI can be utilised to preserve and improve the enforcement of rights while also ensuring that data does not become a further avenue for exploitation.

National vision transcends the boundaries of policy and to misuse Peter Drucker, “eats strategy for breakfast”. As an aspiring leader in global discourse, India can lay the rules of the road for other emerging economies not only by incubating, innovating and implementing AI powered technologies but by grounding it in a lattice of rich constitutional jurisprudence that empowers the individual, particularly the vulnerable in society. While the multiple policy instruments and the National Strategy are important cogs in the wheel, the long-term vision can only be framed by how the plethora of actors, interest groups and stakeholders engage with the notion of an AI-powered Indian society.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/fountain-ink-october-12-2019-arindrajit-basu-we-need-a-better-ai-vision

Digital mediation of domestic and care work in India: Project Announcement

Ambika Tandon and Aayush Rathi — 2019-10-10T08:09:34Z

It is our great pleasure to announce that we are undertaking a study on digital mediation of domestic and care work in India, as part of and supported by the Feminist Internet Research Network led by the Association for Progressive Communications (APC), funded by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC). The study is exploring the ways in which structural inequalities, such as those of gender and class, are being reproduced or challenged by digital platforms. The project sites are Delhi and Bangalore, where we are conducting interviews with workers, companies, and unions. In Bangalore, we are collaborating with Stree Jagruti Samiti to collect qualitative data from different stakeholders. The outputs of the research will include a report, policy brief, and other communication materials in English, Hindi, and Kannada. This study is being led by Ambika Tandon and Aayush Rathi, along with Sumandro Chattapadhyay.

Feminist Internet Research Network: apc.org/en/project/firn-feminist-internet-research-network

Introduction to the Project

This project seeks to investigate the mediation of domestic and care work through digital platforms in India. These forms of labour fall within the informal economy, which employs the largest share of non-agricultural workers in the global South [1]. Workers and economic units in the informal economy differ widely in terms of all metrics, including income levels, size and type of enterprise, and status of worker. According to the International Labour Organisation’s Resolution on decent work and the informal economy, it refers to “all economic activities by workers and economic units that are - in law of practice - not covered or insufficiently covered by formal arrangements” [2]. What this implies in practice for workers in the informal economy is greater vulnerability to poor work conditions, poverty, and violation of labour rights [3].

Women, particularly those with intersectional marginalities, including that of caste and class, are overrepresented in the informal economy globally and in India. Domestic work in particular has been stratified along the lines of caste and gender historically. Further, class has become more salient in producing stratifications in labour relations following urbanisation and gentrification. These intersections have shaped employment relations in the sector in different ways, which range from feudal to contractual models. Digital platforms are increasingly becoming intermediaries in this space, mediating between so called ‘semi-skilled’ or ‘low-skilled’ workers from lower classes, and millions of middle and upper class employers in tier I cities. This is expected to shift the stratification of workers and employment relations in key ways.

Through a feminist approach to digital labour, our project aims to examine platforms offering domestic or reproductive care work. This will be situated within larger feminist critiques around the devaluation and invisibilisation of women’s labour within patriarchal-capitalist economic discourse. The project further seeks to unpack technocratic imaginaries of the platform economy by looking at access and meaningful use of technology and qualifying narratives around labour market optimisation, empowerment, and agency. We will include within this scope two kinds of platforms: marketplaces for workers to post their profiles; and on-demand platforms with algorithmic matching of workers and employers.

Research Questions

Our hypothesis is that platforms are reconfiguring labour conditions, which would empower and/or exploit workers in ways qualitatively different than non-standard work off the platform. In order to interrogate this further, we will study wages, conditions of work, social security, skill levels, and worker surveillance off platforms. This will be used to develop contextual knowledge around the conditions of work among (a) domestic workers on and off platforms in particular, and (b) informal sector workers joining the web-based gig economy in general.

The overarching question that the research will address is, what are the ways in which structural inequalities are challenged or reproduced through the growth of digital platforms in reproductive and care work?

How are relations of social inequality, including along the axes of caste and gender, reworked through digital platforms, especially in a context where domestic and care work remains historically undervalued and dominated by women workers with intersectional marginalities?
How do workers on platforms envision the role of the state, market, and informal networks of kinship in intervening in employment relations?
How is inequality and exploitation in informal labour reconfigured through platforms, with specific reference to work conditions (including hours of work, and physical and mental demands of the workplace), wages, social security, and surveillance?
What strategies of negotiation are being and have been adopted by care workers on and off platforms?
Is collectivisation an aspiration for care workers across different models of employment?
How can negotiation and collectivisation strategies inform the ongoing challenges faced by both care workers and platform workers?

Endnotes

[1] International Labour Office, (2018). Women and men in the informal economy: A statistical picture. Third Edition. International labour Organisation. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/docu- ments/publication/wcms_626831.pdf

[2] International Labour Organisation, (2002). 2002 ILC Resolution and Conclusions on Decent Work and the Informal Economy. https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/employment-promotion/informal-economy/lang--en/index.htm

[3] Ibid.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/digital-domestic-work-india-announcement

SC directs govt to further regulate social media: Is it necessary? Experts weigh in

Geetika Mantri — 2019-09-30T14:28:10Z

With the SC's directive to the Indian government for further regulation of social media, TNM asked experts what were the challenges associated with the same.

The article by Geetika Mantri was published in the News Minute on September 28, 2019. Pranesh Prakash was quoted.

The Supreme Court recently expressed the need to regulate social media to curb fake news, defamation and trolling. It also asked the Union government to come up with guidelines to prevent misuse of social media while protecting users’ privacy in three weeks’ time.

The apex court made these statements while hearing a transfer petition by Facebook which has asked for petitions on regulation of social media filed in Madras, Bombay and Madhya Pradesh High Courts on similar issues to be transferred to the SC so that the scope can be expanded.

In India, social media platforms already come under the purview of the Information Technology (IT) Act, the ‘intermediaries guidelines’ that were notified under the IT Act in 2011 and the Indian Penal Code.

With the SC's directive to the Indian government for further regulation of social media, TNM asked experts what were the challenges associated with the same.

Existing regulations and misuse

Executive Director of the Internet Freedom Foundation (which is also an intervenor in the above case in SC) and lawyer Apar Gupta points out that under existing laws, social media channels are already required to take down content if they are directed to do so by a court or law enforcement.

There are also reporting mechanisms on these platforms, where they exercise discretion to ascertain whether a reported post is violating community guidelines and needs to be taken down. These, however, have been reported to be arbitrary – many posts on body positivity and menstruation, for instance, have been taken down in the past while other explicit imagery continues to be allowed.

“But it’s necessary to have minimum legal standards that need to be fulfilled to compel such take-downs on social media. If platforms had to take down posts based on individual complaints, it could result in many frivolous take-downs. Free speech should be the norm, and removal of content, the exception,” Apar argues.

IT consultant Kiran Chandra says that many of the existing regulations themselves are “dangerously close to censorship and may have a chilling effect on freedom of speech, which is why cases are being fought on those in courts.”

Even under existing regulations, there is scope for misuse - which has also been documented in the past - to curb dissent.

“One of the key problems of a lot of regulatory measures is the vagueness of language which is exploited by state agencies to behave in a repressive way,” Kiran says. “Any regulation has to be clear and concrete so that there is no scope for overreach."

Much of fake news is driven by politics

Fake news isn't exactly new, but its proliferation and extent have expanded manifold with social media.

Srinivas Kodali, an independent security researcher, says that it is not as though governments do not know where a good portion of fake news is coming from. “Most political parties have IT cells that dedicatedly work on creating and spreading fake news. But what is the Election Commission or anyone else doing to stop that?” he questions.

Kiran points out that this machinery exists with a view to gain electoral dividends. “There can be no countering fake news without taking on these structures and the political forces behind them,” he says.

He adds that social media giants also need to take responsibility. “Currently, considering the role social media companies play in the society, they are doing almost nothing [about fake news]. In fact, virality - and a lot of fake news tends to be viral - is the basis of the business model of many social media companies, including Facebook, and WhatsApp, which it owns. At the very least, these companies need to dedicate far more resources, and must provide more transparency into their functioning if any dent has to be made in countering fake news.”

Kiran also says that there is a need to support websites that bust fake news, and make people more aware of the need to verify news.

Defamation and online harassment

Experts say that when it comes to the SC’s observation that there should be redressal mechanisms for someone who has been ‘defamed’ on social media, the recourse is pretty clear-cut.

Pranesh Prakash, a fellow at the Centre for Internet and Society, says, “If it concerns defamation, it is very likely that the victim knows where the defamatory post has come from. Even if it is not an original message, the defamation law does not require you to find out the origin of such a message. Anyone who has put it, forwarded it, is liable.”

That being said, it is the social media giants that need to pick up the slack when it comes to dealing with targeted harassment and online bullying.

It has been reported earlier that Facebook, due to its lack of understanding of the Indian context as well as diversity, often fails in effectively removing hate speech from the platform in India. Facebook's community guidelines are unavailable in several Indian languages too.

Kiran says that while there already exist legal provisions for dealing with offensive speech, the problem is that they are either misused or underused. “Critics of the government get hit with these cases unreasonably while many who engage in hate speech and abuse are followed by the most powerful people in the country. Here again, social media firms need to massively increase the resources they spend on weeding out such content.”

Privacy and surveillance concerns

Any conversation on additional regulation of social media brings up concerns about privacy and surveillance.

Apar says if regulators want easy access to user information for curbing misuse, spread of fake news and the like, it would require online platforms to modify their products to increase surveillance - to have exact details about who said what, when and about whom. “This is why it’s important for legal standards and conditions for accessing user information to be followed. Government also needs to become more accountable on what information on users they are demanding from social media companies.”

Kiran cautions that “any bid at regulating expression online has to be proportional and concrete with adequate redressal mechanisms and without any blanket provisions.”

“We need strong data protection and privacy laws which restrict the scope of these companies and reduce their footprint online,” he adds, referring, for instance to Facebook's monopoly - the company also owns Instagram. “Similarly, the role they play in elections and political processes as a whole, needs to be checked.”

Srinivas points out that ultimately, social media is a reflection of what is happening in the society: “If there is no rule of law offline, it won’t be there online.”

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-news-minute-geetika-mantri-september-28-2019-sc-directs-govt-to-further-regulate-social-media

September 2019 Newsletter

praskrishna — 2019-12-06T04:53:12Z

The newsletter for the month of September 2019.

Highlights for September 2019
Centre for Internet & Society's application for membership of the Christchurch Call Advisory Network has been accepted! As a part of this network, we, along with other civil society groups based out of various jurisdictions, would be providing inputs on making the Call a robust, human rights-centred initiative. A book by Amber Sinha titled 'The Networked Public: How Social Media is Changing Democracy' was published by Rupa Publications. The book looks at how networks exert unchecked power in subverting political discourse and polarizing the public in India. Towards that, it investigates the history of misinformation and the biases that make the public susceptible to it, how digital platforms and their governance impacts the public’s behaviour in them, as well as the changing face of political targeting in a data-driven ecosystem. Akriti Bopanna and Gayatri Puthran co-authored a research paper which compares the Manila Principles to Draft of The Information Technology [Intermediary Guidelines(Amendment) Rules], 2018, introduced by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) in December, 2018. Gurshabad Grover and Torsha Sarkar along with Rajashri Seal and Neil Trivedi co-authored a paper that examines the constitutionality of the government prohibition on the broadcast of news against private and community FM channels. The authors also mapped chronologically the history of the development of community and private radio channels in India. Ambika Tandon and Aayush Rathi generated empirical evidence about the CCTV programme well underway in Delhi. The case study was published by Centre for Development Informatics, Global Development Institute, SEED, in the Development Informatics working paper series housed at the University of Manchester. Shruti Trikanand and Amber Sinha published a blog post titled Core Concepts and Processes by which the authors hope to arrive at a shared vocabulary to discuss and critically analyse digital identity systems, both within our team and in engagements with other stakeholders. Pooja Saxena and Akash Sheshadri contributed to the project. The Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace released a public consultation process that sought to solicit comments and obtain feedback on the definition of “Stability of Cyberspace”, as developed by the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (GCSC). CIS gave detailed commentary on the definitions and suggested a new definition of cyber stability. CIS is undertaking a study on digital mediation of domestic and care work in India, as part of and supported by the Feminist Internet Research Network led by the Association for Progressive Communications (APC), funded by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC). The study is exploring the ways in which structural inequalities, such as those of gender and class, are being reproduced or challenged by digital platforms. The project sites are Delhi and Bangalore, where we are conducting interviews with workers, companies, and unions. In Bangalore, we are collaborating with Stree Jagruti Samiti to collect qualitative data from different stakeholders. The outputs of the research will include a report, policy brief, and other communication materials in English, Hindi, and Kannada. This study is being led by Ambika Tandon and Aayush Rathi, along with Sumandro Chattapadhyay. CIS-A2K has put up a call for joining the Free Knowledge movement #Wikipedia #Wikimedia. Are you an individual or do you represent any organisation, institution, groups or enterprises? You can actually help the ‘Free Knowledge’ movement by donating photos, media, content or archives.

CIS and the News

The following articles and research papers were authored by CIS secretariat during the month:

Doing Standpoint Theory (Ambika Tandon and Aayush Rathi; Gender IT.org; September 1, 2019).
Traffic Rules, Mindset and On-Time Payments (Shyam Ponappa; Business Standard; September 4, 2019).
Kashmir’s digital blackout marks a period darker than the dark side of the moon (Nishant Shah; Indian Express; September 15, 2019).
The Networked Public: How Social Media Changed Democracy (Amber Sinha; Rupa Publications; September 19, 2019).
Capturing Gender and Class Inequities: The CCTVisation of Delhi (Aayush Rathi and Ambika Tandon; Centre for Development Informatics, Global Development Institute; September 27, 2019).

CIS in the News

CIS secretariat was consulted for the following articles published during the month in various publications:

Why having more CCTV cameras does not translate to crime prevention (Manasa Rao; The News Minute; September 3, 2019).
Android 10 out, big on ‘privacy’ (Roshan H. Nair; Deccan Herald; September 4, 2019).
Internet pour toutes (Isabelle Grégoire; L'Actualite; September 11, 2019).
Chennai residents rue fuzzy CCTV surveillance (Vivek Narayanan and R. Srinivasan; The Hindu; September 18, 2019).

Millions of kids in India access the Net on their parents’ devices, says study (Varun Aggarwal; Hindu Businessline; September 27, 2019).
SC directs govt to further regulate social media: Is it necessary? Experts weigh in (Geetika Mantri; The News Minute; September 28, 2019).

Access to Knowledge

Access to Knowledge is a campaign to promote the fundamental principles of justice, freedom, and economic development. It deals with issues like copyrights, patents and trademarks, which are an important part of the digital landscape.

Wikipedia

Under a grant from Wikimedia Foundation we are doing a project for the growth of Indic language communities and projects by designing community collaborations and partnerships that recruit and cultivate new editors and explore innovative approaches to building projects.

News

Bhuvana Meenakshi elected Mozilla Rep for July 2019 (Bhuvana Meenakshi was selected as a Rep of the Month (July 2019) by Mozilla for her active contributions).

Openness

Participation in Events

FOSSCON India 2019 (Organized by KLS Gogte Institute of Technology; Belgaum; August 29 - 31, 2019). Bhuvana Meenakshi gave a talk on "The revolution of WebXR".
DevFest'19 (Organized by Google Developers Groups; Coimbatore; September 14, 2019).
React India 2019 (Organized by React India; Goa; September 26 - 28, 2019). Bhuvana Meenakshi was a speaker.

Internet Governance

The Tunis Agenda of the second World Summit on the Information Society has defined internet governance as the development and application by governments, the private sector and civil society, in their respective roles of shared principles, norms, rules, decision making procedures and programmes that shape the evolution and use of the Internet. As part of internet governance work we work on policy issues relating to freedom of expression primarily focusing on the Information Technology Act and issues of liability of intermediaries for unlawful speech and simultaneously ensuring that the right to privacy is safeguarded as well.

Freedom of Speech & Expression

Under a grant from the MacArthur Foundation, CIS is doing research on the restrictions placed on freedom of expression online by the Indian government and contribute studies, reports and policy briefs to feed into the ongoing debates at the national as well as international level. As part of the project we bring you the following outputs:

Research Papers

Examining the Constitutionality of the Ban on Broadcast of News by Private FM and Community Radio Stations (Gurshabad Grover, Torsha Sarkar, Rajashri Seal and Neil Trivedi; September 27, 2019).
Comparison of the Manila Principles to Draft of The Information Technology [Intermediary Guidelines(Amendment) Rules], 2018 (Akriti Bopanna and Gayatri Puthran; September 30, 2019).

News

Turning off the internet: Chips with Everything podcast (Gurshabad Grover and Ambika Tandon recorded an episode with the Guardian's podcast on digital culture, called Chips with Everything).

Privacy

Under a grant from Privacy International and IDRC we are doing a project on surveillance. CIS is researching the history of privacy in India and how it shapes the contemporary debates around technology mediated identity projects like Aadhar. As part of our ongoing research, we bring you the following outputs:

Submission

Submission to Global Commission on Stability of Cyberspace on the definition of Cyber Stability (Arindrajit Basu and Elonnai Hickok; September 11, 2019).

Participation in Events

Policy Design Jam (Organized by Whatsapp and ISPP; Qutub Institutional Area, New Delhi; September 16, 2019). Pallavi Bedi, Akash Sheshadri and Anubha Sinha attended the event.
Conceptualising India's Digital Policy Vision (Organized by National University of Juridical Sciences; National University of Juridical Sciences; Kolkata; September 18, 2019).
All Partners Meeting (Organized by Partnership on AI; London; September 26 - 27, 2019). Elonnai Hickok reprsented CIS as the co-chair for the Labour and Economy Expert Group.

Digital Identity

Omidyar Network is investing in establishment of a three-region research alliance — to be co-led by the Institute for Technology & Society (ITS), Brazil, the Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Technology Law (CIPIT) , Kenya, and CIS. As part of this Alliance, CIS is examining the policy objectives of digital identity projects, how technological policy choices can be thought through to meet the objectives, and how legitimate uses of a digital identity framework may be evaluated.

Featured Research

Core Concepts and Processes (Shruti Trikanand and Amber Sinha; September 13, 2019). Research by Shruti Trikanad and Amber Sinha. Conceptualization by Pooja Saxena and Amber Sinha. Illustrations by Akash Sheshadri and Pooja Saxena.

Artificial Intelligence

With origins dating back to the 1950s Artificial Intelligence (AI) is not necessarily new. However, interest in AI has been rekindled over the recent years due to advancements of technology and its applications to real-world scenarios. We conduct research on the existing legal and regulatory parameters:

Participation in Events

AI in Healthcare (Organized by Center for Information Technology and Public Policy and International Institute of Information Technology; Bangalore). Radhika Radhakrishnan gave a talk.
Responsible AI Workshop (Organized by Facebook; September 17, 2019; New Delhi). Sunil Abraham participated in the meeting.
Constitutionalizing Artificial Intelligence (Organized by Constitutional Law Society; National University of Juridical Sciences; Kolkata). Arindrajit Basu delivered a lecture.

Researchers@Work

The researchers@work programme at CIS produces and supports pioneering and sustained trans-disciplinary research on key thematics at the intersections of internet and society; organise and incubate networks of and fora for researchers and practitioners studying and making internet in India; and contribute to development of critical digital pedagogy, research methodology, and creative practice.

Announcement

Digital mediation of domestic and care work in India: Project Announcement (Ambika Tandon and Aayush Rathi; October 1, 2019).

Essays on #List — Selected Abstracts

In response to a recent call for essays that social, economic, cultural, political, infrastructural, or aesthetic dimensions of the #List, we received 11 abstracts. Out of these, we have selected 4 pieces to be published as part of a series titled #List on the r@w blog.

Blog Entries

#HookingUp (Akhil Kang, Christina Thomas Dhanraj, Dhrubo Jyoti, and Gowthaman Ranganathan; August 1, 2019).
Call for Contributions and Reflections: Your experiences in Decolonizing the Internet’s Languages! (P.P. Sneha; August 7, 2019).
Simiran Lalvani - Workers’ fictive kinship relations in Mumbai app-based food delivery (Sumandro Chattapadhyay; August 16, 2019).

Telecom

The growth in telecommunications in India has been impressive. While the potential for growth and returns exist, a range of issues need to be addressed for this potential to be realized. One aspect is more extensive rural coverage and the second aspect is a countrywide access to broadband which is low at about eight million subscriptions. Both require effective and efficient use of networks and resources, including spectrum.

Monthly Blog

Traffic Rules, Mindset and On-Time Payments (Shyam Ponappa; September 4, 2019).

About CIS

CIS is a non-profit organisation that undertakes interdisciplinary research on internet and digital technologies from policy and academic perspectives. The areas of focus include digital accessibility for persons with disabilities, access to knowledge, intellectual property rights, openness (including open data, free and open source software, open standards, open access, open educational resources, and open video), internet governance, telecommunication reform, digital privacy, and cyber-security. The academic research at CIS seeks to understand the reconfigurations of social and cultural processes and structures as mediated through the internet and digital media technologies.

Follow CIS on:

Twitter: http://twitter.com/cis_india
Twitter - Access to Knowledge: https://twitter.com/CISA2K
Twitter - Information Policy: https://twitter.com/CIS_InfoPolicy
Facebook - Access to Knowledge: https://www.facebook.com/cisa2k
E-Mail - Access to Knowledge: a2k@cis-india.org
E-Mail - Researchers at Work: raw@cis-india.org
List - Researchers at Work: https://lists.ghserv.net/mailman/listinfo/researchers

Support CIS:

Please help us defend consumer and citizen rights on the Internet! Write a cheque in favour of 'The Centre for Internet and Society' and mail it to us at No. 194, 2nd 'C' Cross, Domlur, 2nd Stage, Bengaluru - 5600 71.

Collaborate with CIS:

We invite researchers, practitioners, artists, and theoreticians, both organisationally and as individuals, to engage with us on topics related internet and society, and improve our collective understanding of this field. To discuss such possibilities, please write to Sunil Abraham, Executive Director, at sunil@cis-india.org (for policy research), or Sumandro Chattapadhyay, Research Director, at sumandro@cis-india.org (for academic research), with an indication of the form and the content of the collaboration you might be interested in. To discuss collaborations on Indic language Wikipedia projects, write to Tanveer Hasan, Programme Officer, at tanveer@cis-india.org.

CIS is grateful to its primary donor the Kusuma Trust founded by Anurag Dikshit and Soma Pujari, philanthropists of Indian origin for its core funding and support for most of its projects. CIS is also grateful to its other donors, Wikimedia Foundation, Ford Foundation, Privacy International, UK, Hans Foundation, MacArthur Foundation, and IDRC for funding its various projects.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/about/newsletters/september-2019-newsletter

Capturing Gender and Class Inequities: The CCTVisation of Delhi

Aayush Rathi and Ambika Tandon — 2019-09-27T15:24:10Z

Ambika Tandon and Aayush Rathi generated empirical evidence about the CCTV programme well underway in Delhi. The case study was published by Centre for Development Informatics, Global Development Institute, SEED, in the Development Informatics working paper series housed at the University of Manchester.

Abstract

Cityscapes across the global South, following historical trends in the North, are increasingly being littered by closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras. In this paper, we study the wholesale implementation of CCTV in New Delhi, a city notorious for incredibly high rates of crime against women. The push for CCTV, then, became one of many approaches explored by the state in making the city safer for women.

In this paper, we deconstruct this narrative of greater surveillance equating to greater safety by using empirical evidence to understand the subjective experience of surveilling and being surveilled. By focussing on gender and utilising work from feminist thought, we find that the experience of surveillance is intersectionally mediated along the axes of class and gender.The gaze of CCTV is cast upon those already marginalised to arrive at normative encumbrances placed by private, neoliberal interests on the urban public space. The politicisation of CCTV has happened in this context, and continues unabated in the absence of any concerted policy apparatus regulating it. We frame our findings utilising an analytical data justice framework put forth by Heeks and Shekhar (2019). This comprehensively sets out a social justice agenda that situates CCTV within the socio-political contexts that are intertwined in the development and implementation of the technology itself.

Click to download the full research paper

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/development-informatics-paper-number-81-aayush-rathi-and-ambika-tandon-capturing-gender-and-class-inequities

Development Informatics

Aayush Rathi and Ambika Tandon — 2019-09-27T15:12:01Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/development-informatics

Why having more CCTV cameras does not translate to crime prevention

manasa — 2019-09-25T02:13:28Z

Can technology substitute addressing social, psychological, economic and other individual factors that largely lead to criminality? And what are the perils of over-reliance on technology to fight crime?

The article by Manasa Rao published by the News Minute quotes Pranav M. Bidare of CIS.

In August, a couple from Tamil Nadu’s Tirunelveli district made national headlines for their bravery. True to the Tamil adage ‘vallavanukku pullum aayudham’ (for the strong man, even a blade of grass is a weapon), when thieves entered their home, they fought them with chairs, slippers and even a bucket. Despite being armed with sickles, the masked miscreants fled the scene unable to match the counter-attack mounted by 70-year-old Shanmugavel and 65-year-old Senthamarai. The incident was caught on CCTV camera and the couple, whose video quickly went viral, was celebrated for their valour and made for the perfect social media feel-good story. However, as the news cycle was focused on them, senior police officers from the state and many commentators pointed to the importance of the CCTV camera footage. After all, the whole world watched their courage thanks to the CCTV camera affixed on the couple's front yard.

Since 2017, the Tamil Nadu Police has been aggressively pushing for citizens to install CCTV cameras. A techno-futuristic awareness campaign video released last year even roped in popular Kollywood star Vikram to help the police force. “If there are CCTV cameras, crimes are prevented, evidenced and importantly, it provides evidence in court. So, each of us will compulsorily fix a CCTV camera wherever we are,” says Vikram. In a bold declaration, the motto of the campaign affirms, “With CCTV everywhere, Tamil Nadu has become a place without crime.” At the end of the video Vikram suggests Big Brother is watching, stating, “Everything. Everywhere. We're watching.”

But do more CCTV cameras necessarily translate to crime prevention and deterrence? Can technology substitute addressing social, psychological, economic and other individual factors that largely lead to criminality? And what are the perils of over-reliance on technology to fight crime?

What the numbers say

A study released in August by tech research group Comparitech ranked Chennai as 32nd out of 50 of the most surveilled cities in the world. The research group, with the use of government reports, police websites and news articles, puts the total number of cameras in the city at 50,000. With a 2016 estimated population of 1.07 crore in Chennai, that is 4.67 cameras per 1,000 people.

With the help of Numbeo, a crowd-sourced database of perceived crime rates, the study puts Chennai’s crime index at 40.39. On a scale of 0 to 100, this is an estimation of overall level of crime in a given city. This score means Chennai’s crime index is ranked ‘moderate’. Similarly, on a 100 point scale, the city's safety index— quite the opposite of crime index— is at 59.61. The higher the safety index, the safer a city is considered to be.

The two other Indian cities on the list of 50 are New Delhi ranked No. 20 with 1,79,000 cameras for 1.86 crore people (9.62 cameras per 1,000 people) and Lucknow ranked at No. 40 with 9,300 cameras for 35.89 lakh people (2.59 cameras per 1,000 people). The capital's crime index is at 58.77 while its safety index is 41.23. The UP city on the other hand has a crime index of 45.30 and a safety index of 54.70.

Stating that the higher number of cameras ‘just barely correlates’ with a higher safety index and lower crime index, the study concludes, “Broadly speaking, more cameras doesn’t necessarily result in people feeling safer.” While the presence of CCTV cameras may not inherently be bad, experts say that they cannot become a substitute for tackling crime and its causes which transcend the realm of technology. These involve tailored and specific approaches which stem from community building.

The infallible CCTV myth

Pranav MB, policy officer at the Centre for Internet and Society in Bengaluru observes that in the long run, over-reliance on CCTV cameras would merely propel criminals to innovate, as opposed to helping deter the crime from taking place. He says, “While it seems intuitive that the presence of a CCTV camera will have a deterring effect on criminal activity, numerous studies over the past decade have concluded that this is not really the case. The idea of a deterring effect also relies on the assumption that the actors are making educated intelligent choices about their future, which is often not the case with persons that commit criminal acts. So the deterring effect of CCTV cameras is not likely to be much more than the already deterring effect that exists because of criminal law and law enforcement.”

Busting the myth that CCTV cameras are foolproof, Pranav adds that public infrastructure as simple as a streetlight could aid in safer neighbourhoods. “The fact remains, however, that if you are not using advanced technology, a simple mask will render you unidentifiable by most basic CCTV cameras. As more advanced and more expensive technology is used, you are only necessitating the need for innovation among criminals to identify new loopholes that they can exploit in the technology. This is not an argument that generally holds against the use of technology, but in the case of CCTV cameras, it has been seen that simple street lights much better serve the goal of deterrence of crimes,” he says.

However, cops disagree with the findings. One IPS officer who works with the police’s Law and Order department in Chennai tells TNM that the presence of CCTV cameras has helped them nab a range of criminals from chain-snatchers to stalkers who have hacked women to death. Praising the use of facial recognition software like FaceTagr that was introduced a few years ago, the officer says, “CCTV cameras have a dissuading effect on criminals. At the very least they serve as a warning but in most cases, we can easily match them to criminals on our existing local, station-wise database. Especially when it comes to areas like T Nagar, Purasawalkam or other crime-prone suburbs, CCTV cameras are an invaluable tool for law enforcement.”

“Even in cases of sexual abuse, street harassment or trafficking, private CCTV cameras have been helpful. Shop owners or residents have come forward with the footage in public interest,” he says, admitting that the Centre’s release of the long-pending National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) statistics could show a correlation between the push to install CCTVs and crime rates.

With a lack of NCRB data, there are no statistical answers to whether indeed installation of CCTV cameras has helped lowering of crime rates. However, as per one report in The Hindu, the police report a 30% drop in the crime rate in the city following the installation of CCTV cameras. According to their estimate for chain snatching alone, the city police claims that the number of cases have dropped from 792 in 2012 to 538 following the installation of CCTV cameras in 2018.

Over-reliance on technology

Agreeing that law enforcement must be cautious while employing technology to solve crimes, Dr M Priyamvadha, associate professor at the Department of Criminology, University of Madras says her detailed interviews with over 200 incarcerated burglars across Tamil Nadu reveal that they are always on the lookout for a CCTV camera. “They simply use a jammer worth Rs 2,000 (a handy device that disrupts the signal range of a camera) to skirt the presence of a CCTV camera,” she reports. However, the professor cautions that one must not over-sell the capabilities of a CCTV camera in crime prevention.

“We must remember that CCTV cameras don't deter all crimes. If there is family or domestic violence, there won't be a CCTV camera inside the four walls of a house to reveal it. For burglaries, robberies and such offences, you can rely on CCTV cameras. How far it helps is a question mark. You can neither completely say it prevents crime nor that it is a waste,” she says.

The professor points out that even when deploying CCTV cameras across the city, law enforcement does not account for wear and tear and maintenance which forms an important part of monitoring security.

Echoing the sentiment, Pranav says that CCTV cameras primarily serve as sources of electronic evidence in criminal cases. “Their deterring effect has repeatedly been observed to not balance out the costs of installing and running them.”

Privacy, data protection concerns

Chennai-based independent tech researcher Srikanth points to the inherent surveillance dangers thanks to the centralised way in which the city police collects the CCTV data. “There is something concerning especially about Chennai City Traffic Police and other various city police’s approach to CCTV. The fundamental shift is that, at least in the city, these cameras are connected to the police control room. So data gets centrally collated. When centralization kicks in, power abuse isn't far away. This way it is far easier for police to destroy evidence,” he alleges.

Srikanth also points out, “CCTVs (especially connected ones) are usually funded by residents and/or merchants who spend their money in putting up the infrastructure, but freely give away the data to the police (often in good faith). There is no oversight on usage, storage, retention of this data and by sheer monopoly on law and order, the police is able to connect a vast number of private CCTVs on to its network.”

Significantly, he expresses concerns about there being no laws that govern the usage of CCTV footage by the police. “Even if one gives into the legitimate state aim to control crime, even if one can argue violation of privacy is proportional, there is no law around use of CCTV by police, let alone using them in investigations. That the state engages with private vendors (such as FaceTagr) and many others also provides these service providers access to data,” he explains.

Pranav also warns, “Furthermore, CCTV cameras also result in compromising the privacy of individuals, and if implemented by the state (as in the case of law enforcement), creates added surveillance risks. Compounding on this is the issue of the recorded video footage, which if stored/transmitted/managed in an non-secure manner creates data protection risks as well. This is especially true in India, where it is difficult to obtain the required infrastructure and expertise in running an effective and secure CCTV camera system.”

'Technology cannot replace interpersonal relationships'

Advising pragmatic thinking when it comes to crime prevention, professor Priyamvadha says that technology should complement what she calls the ‘human touch'. Junking the ‘holistic’ one-size-fits-all approach that is often paraded as a solution, the criminologist says that each crime requires a tailored method of tackling it. “For each and every crime, there is a different strategy. There maybe crimes committed by juveniles, crimes committed against women. For example, if female foeticide is rampant in a village, it is important to understand the village, the preferences of the people there and the caste practices present among them,” she observes.

While technology often allows law enforcement to cover more ground in cases of limited manpower, there’s also a chance the cameras could be seen as a substitute for forging interpersonal relationships between police and the people they seek to protect. “With quick transferring of cops nowadays, the local police station doesn’t have an understanding of the ongoings. Interpersonal relationships are more important than technological advances,” she notes.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-news-minute-september-3-2019-manasa-rao-why-having-more-cctv-cameras-does-not-translate-to-crime-prevention

Chennai residents rue fuzzy CCTV surveillance

Vivek Narayanan and R. Srinivasan — 2019-09-19T14:35:51Z

Poor quality of footage, lack of maintenance and inadequate back-up reduce the gadgets’ deterrent value.

The article by Vivek Narayanan and R. Srinivasan was published in the Hindu on September 18, 2019. Pranav M.B. was quoted.

Last month, Sandeep (name changed), a cyclist, was hit by an ambulance on GST Road near the Madras Export Processing Zone (MEPZ) signal. He was rushed to hospital in the same ambulance. His hopes of finding out who hit him, via CCTV cameras, came crashing after he saw the poor quality of footage that was obtained to identify the vehicle.

“The police officers in Tambaram themselves told me that the quality of the CCTV cameras was poor and they were unable to trace the number,” said Mr. Sandeep.

While the police have been claiming a reduction in crime rates due to CCTV cameras in the city, residents and experts doubt if the equipment is indeed a deterrent, and want the police to install better quality cameras with the capacity to retain footage for a longer period, and to maintain the devices, too.

Extensive Coverage

Several high profile cases such as the 2016 Swathi murder case drove law enforcers to increase CCTV coverage of the city. Now, there are over 2 lakh cameras covering all of Chennai, its alleys and its fringes.

Cameras have also been installed at every major junction and at street corners. In many cases, they are linked to the control room of the nearest police station.

According to the police, there is one CCTV camera for every 50 m. They are meant to help the police crack cases and nab the accused. “Some DVRs (digital video recorders) are also in the house or premises of the sponsors. This is for safety purposes,” said a police officer.

The unique nature of the Traffic Police’s ‘third eye campaign’ is the involvement of the public, too. Apart from the police, MPs and MLAs, many resident welfare associations have also donated resources for the installation of CCTV cameras.

Residents, however, expressed concern. S. Kumara Raja, vice president, Annai Indira Nagar Residents Welfare Association said: “Though many CCTVs cameras are found on the street, it isn’t clear if they are working or not. We also don’t know if anyone is maintaining the cameras.”

P. Saravanakumar, founder of the South Madipakkam Residents’ Welfare Association, said that the equipment is not connected with the police control room and the data remains with those who have installed the CCTV system.

V. N. Subramaniyan, president, Mylapore Residents Welfare Association, felt that cameras installed on private properties were working properly.

“Cameras are obtained from private persons as a charitable activity, so the quality can be challenged. The police should give the maintenance of CCTV cameras to private companies. There should be proper back-up and monitoring,” he pointed out.

While the equipment is considered important for gathering evidence, policemen themselves complain that the quality of the footage from many cameras is poor.

“We cannot zoom into the footage obtained from every camera involved. Most of them are 1 or 2 megapixel cameras and the image is often blurred. Only in a few places do we find powerful cameras,” said a policeman.

'Not a deterrent'

Pranav M. B., researcher, Centre for Internet and Society, said that as according to global studies, CCTV cameras are not useful as deterrents. “But they come in handy for providing evidence after a crime,” said Mr. Pranav.

Though advanced cameras can provide footage with more clarity, it’s cost intensive to maintain them. “For deterrence, one need not invest in high-end cameras — quality street lights are sufficient. We cannot expect the perpetrator of a crime to make a decision over whether to commit a crime or not after looking at the camera,” he added.

However, there is a 30% higher chance of identifying an accused when a camera is deployed, than without. “Nevertheless, like any other technology or method, it is not entirely foolproof,” Mr. Pranav said.

Police officers disagree on the subject of CCTV systems not serving as deterrents. “From January to June 2018, a total of 258 chain snatching incidents were reported, but during the same period this year, the number plummeted to 137 — a fall of nearly 50%,” said a senior police officer.

'Needs improvement'

Similarly, the police claim that, this year, public nuisance cases have gone down by 41%, and burglary cases by 17%, compared with last year. Police officers agreed that the quality of some cameras needs to be improved.

“Initially, we did not know the type of quality [of cameras] needed. So, we fixed 1 and 2 megapixel cameras. Now, we are installing 4 megapixel cameras and have better clarity. Besides, we are now categorising the number and type of cameras available in different parts of the city, and will change the older ones,” said a senior police officer.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/vivek-narayanan-and-r-sivaraman-the-hindu-september-18-2019-chennai-residents-rue-fuzzy-cctv-surveillance

GCSC Response

Admin — 2019-09-11T01:30:47Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/gcsc-response

August 2019 Newsletter

praskrishna — 2019-12-06T04:54:20Z

Centre for Internet & Society newsletter for the month of August 2019.

Highlights for August 2019
The Oxford Internet Institute and CIS are creating a State of the Internet’s Languages report, as baseline research with both numbers and stories, to demonstrate how far we are from making the internet multilingual. The call is available in Arabic, Brazilian Portuguese, English, IsiZulu, Spanish, and Tamil. CIS invites friends and communities to translate the call into other languages. CIS's Access to Knowledge (A2K) team is conducting a free knowledge movement and as part of this initiative it is inviting contributions from the Wikipedia community. Photos, media, content or archives donated by community members would be used worldwide to disseminate information. The content you are donating must be under Creative Commons Share-like content. You must have the copyright of the content under CC licenses. Over the last few years, several digital identity schemes have been initiated in different countries across the world. There has been significant momentum on digital ID, especially after the adoption of UN Sustainable Development Goal 16.9, which calls for legal identity for all by 2030. Authors, Amber Sinha and Pooja Saxena, explore about the uses and design of digital identity systems and ask two core questions a) What are appropriate uses of ID?, and b) How should we think about the technological design of ID? Together with the Institute of Technology & Society (ITS), Brazil, and the Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Technology Law(CIPIT), Kenya, CIS participated at a side event in RightsCon 2019 held in Tunisia, titled Holding ID Issuers Accountable, What Works?, organised by the Omidyar Network. A report of the event is published here. As governments across the globe implement new, foundational, digital identification systems (“Digital ID”), or modernize existing ID programs, there is dire need for greater research and discussion about appropriate uses of Digital ID systems. At RightsCon 2019 in Tunis, we presented working drafts on appropriate use of Digital ID by the partner organisations of this three-region research alliance - ITS from Brazil, CIPIT from Kenya, and CIS from India. CIS gave its comments to the ID4D Practitioners’ Guide: Draft For Consultation released by ID4D in June, 2019. The submission is divided into three main parts. The first part (General Comments) contains the high-level comments on the Practitioners’ Guide, while the second part (Specific Comments) addresses individual sections in the Guide. The third and final part (Additional Comments) does not relate to particulars in the Practitioners' Guide but other documents that it relies upon. The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare had released the National Digital Health Blueprint on 15 July 2019 for comments. CIS submitted its comments. CIS notes that the nature of data which would be subject to processing in the proposed digital framework pre-supposes a robust data protection regime in India, one which is currently absent. Accordingly, it urges the ministry to cease the implementation of the framework until the Personal Data Protection Bill is passed by the Parliament. Aayush Rathi , Vedika Pareek , Divij Joshi and Pranav Bidare co-authored a research paper 'Future of Work in the ASEAN'. The authors reveal that the future of work will be mediated through region and country specific factors such as socioeconomic,geopolitical and demographic change. The report was edited by Elonnai Hickok and Ambika Tandon with research assistance by Sankalp Srivastava and Anjanaa Aravindan. The research is supported by Tides Foundation.

CIS and the News

The following articles were authored by CIS secretariat during the month:

The Knowledge Base is Liberated (Subodh Kulkarni and Madhav Gadgil; Loksatta; August 3, 2019).
Private Sector and the cultivation of cyber norms in India (Arindrajit Basu; Nextrends India; August 5, 2019).
Rethinking the intermediary liability regime in India (Torsha Sarkar; CyberBRICS; August 16, 2019).
Digital Native: How free is the internet? (Nishant Shah; Indian Express; August 18, 2019).
Linking Aadhaar with social media or ending encryption is counterproductive (Sunil Abraham; Prime Time; August 26, 2019).
A judicial overreach into matters of regulation (Gurshabad Grover; The Hindu; August 28, 2019).
Kashmir’s information vacuum (Aayush Rathi and Akriti Bopanna; The Hindu; August 29, 2019).

CIS in the News

CIS secretariat was consulted for the following articles published during the month in various publications:

Will Modi govt move on Kashmir’s Article 370 stand the scrutiny of Supreme Court? (The Print; August 6, 2019).
‘I’m just helpless’: Concern about Kashmir mounts as communication blackout continues (Niha Masih; Washington Post; August 6, 2019).
Why the Madras HC case on WhatsApp traceability could have wider ramifications (Haripriya Suresh; The News Minute; August 8, 2019).
Ministry of Health's public consultation on National Digital Health Blueprint: Legal issues around telemedicine, consent, and 'egosystems' in healthcare (Trisha Jalan; Medianama; August 8, 2019).
Abuse linked to Net fixation (Nina C. George; Deccan Herald; August 13, 2019).
India Shut Down Kashmir’s Internet Access. Now, ‘We Cannot Do Anything.’ (Vindu Goel, Karan Deep Singh and Sameer; New York Times; August 14, 2019).
India’s top science institution is trying hard to fix its “manel” problem (Quartz India; August 16, 2019). This piece was originally published on Connect under the headline, “We Learned (The Hard Way) Not to Have Manels.”
Perché l'India ha tagliato internet al Kashmir (Raffaele Angius; WIRED.IT; August 19, 2019).
US pressure threatens to weaken data - localisation mandate in India's landmark data-protection bill (Sandhya Sharma; ET Prime; August 19, 2019).
Linking Aadhaar to Facebook, WhatsApp won't curb fake news, but may undermine its legislation: Experts (Swathy Moorthy; Moneycontrol; August 20, 2019).
Linking Aadhaar to Facebook, Twitter: Possible witch-hunt or key to curb crime & fake news? (Taran Deol and Revathi Krishanan; The Print; August 21, 2019).
AI is biased, you’ll see if you Google ‘hands’ (Rajmohan Sudhakar; Deccan Herald; August 25, 2019).
Government plans tighter rules for social media brands like Facebook, TikTok, ShareChat (Sunny Sen; CNBC TV 18; August 28, 2019).
What Centre will tell Supreme Court on Aadhaar and social media account linkage (Amrita Madhukalya; Hindustan Times; August 28, 2019).

Access to Knowledge

Wikipedia

Blog Entry

Call for joining the Free Knowledge movement #Wikipedia #Wikimedia (Bhuvana Meenakshi; August 19, 2019).

Internet Governance

Freedom of Speech & Expression

Participation in Events

Packets, net neutrality and gaming public policy outcomes (Organized by Has Geek; Bangalore; August 15, 2019). Gurshabad Grover attended Prof. Vishal Misra's lecture on net neutrality.

Privacy

Submission

Comments on the National Digital Health Blueprint (Samyukta Prabhu, Ambika Tandon, Torsha Sarkar and Aayush Rathi; August 7, 2019).

Participation in Events

Digital ID Forum 2019 (Organized by UNDP; Chulalongkorn University, Thailand; July 3, 2019). Sunil Abraham was one of the panelists at this event.
BIS LITD 17 meeting (Organized by Bureau of Indian Standards; New Delhi; July 3, 2019). Gurshabad Grover attended the sixteenth meeting of the Information Systems Security and Biometrics Section Committee (LITD17).
Facebook Data for Good in Bangalore (Organized by Facebook; Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore; July 25, 2019).
Roundtable with the WhatsApp leadership (Organized by WhatsApp; Mountbatten, The Oberoi, New Delhi; July 26, 2019). Will Cathcart, WhatsApp's new global head, visited India and invited Sunil Abraham for a discussion.
Facebook Data for Good in New Delhi (Organized by Facebook; University of Chicago Center, New Delhi; July 29, 2019).

IT / Information Technology

A research on the usage of systems (computers and telecommunications) for storing, retrieving and sending information as well as the IT Act:

Research Paper

Future of Work in the ASEAN (Aayush Rathi , Vedika Pareek , Divij Joshi and Pranav Bidare; edited by Elonnai Hickok and Ambika Tandon with research assistance from Sankalp Srivastava and Anjanaa Aravindan; August 31, 2019).

Participation in Event

Cyber Policy 2.0 (Organized by National Law University; Bangalore; August 17, 2019). Arindrajit Basu was a speaker.

Artificial Intelligence

Participation in Events

Emergence of Chinese Technology:Rising stakes for innovation, competition and governance (Organized by Omidyar Network in partnership with the Esya Centre; New Delhi; August 12, 2019). Arindrajit Basu attended the event.
Impact of Industrial Revolution 4.0 - IT and Automotive Sector in India (Organized by the Dialogue and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung; Bangalore; August 21, 2019). Aayush Rathi attended the event.
Policies for the Platform Economy (Organized by IT for Change; India Habitat Centre; New Delhi; August 30, 2019). Amber Sinha and Anubha Sinha were panelists.

Digital Identity

Omidyar Network is investing in establishment of a three-region research alliance — to be co-led by the Institute for Technology & Society (ITS), Brazil, the Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Technology Law (CIPIT) , Kenya, and CIS. As part of this Alliance, we at the CIS will look at the policy objectives of digital identity projects, how technological policy choices can be thought through to meet the objectives, and how legitimate uses of a digital identity framework may be evaluated.

Research Paper

Design and Uses of Digital Identities - Research Plan (Amber Sinha and Pooja Saxena; August 8, 2019).

Submissions

The Appropriate Use of Digital Identity (Amber Sinha; August 8, 2019).
Comments to the ID4D Practitioners’ Guide (Amber Sinha; August 8, 2019).

Participation in Event

Holding ID Issuers Accountable, What Works? (Organized by Omidyar Network; RightsCon 2019; August 8, 2019).

Researchers@Work

Participation in Event

Workshop on Archival Standards and Digitisation Workflow (Organized by British Library; NCBS; Bangalore; August 19 - 20, 2019). P.P. Sneha attended the event.

Blog Entries

#HookingUp (Akhil Kang, Christina Thomas Dhanraj, Dhrubo Jyoti, and Gowthaman Ranganathan; August 1, 2019).
Call for Contributions and Reflections: Your experiences in Decolonizing the Internet’s Languages! (P.P. Sneha; August 7, 2019).
Simiran Lalvani - Workers’ fictive kinship relations in Mumbai app-based food delivery (Sumandro Chattapadhyay; August 16, 2019).

About CIS

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For more details visit https://cis-india.org/about/newsletters/august-2019-newsletter