Centre for Internet and Society

Making Mobile Phones and Services Accessible for Persons with Disabilities

nirmita — 2013-04-26T05:00:19Z

This report is published by the International Telecommunication Union in cooperation with G3ict – The Global Initiative for Inclusive Information and Communication Technologies. Nirmita Narasimhan and Axel Leblois are the lead authors. The contributors include Deepti Bharthur, Lakshmi Haridas, Pranav Lal, Peter Looms, Roopakshi Pathania, Deva Prasad, Susan Schorr, and Mukesh Sharma.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/accessibility/making-mobile-phone-and-services-accessible-for-persons-with-disabilities.pdf

Loyola Faculty Enlightened About Open Edn Resources

praskrishna — 2014-07-02T04:50:48Z

“The tremendous changes in the digital technology have introduced the newage faculty to certain open and collaborative tools like Wiki, termed as open educational resources (OER),” Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) progarmme director T Vishnu Vardhan has said.

The article published in the New Indian Express on June 25, 2014 can be read here. T. Vishnu Vardhan gave his inputs.

Adressing a two-day national workshop on ‘“Openness of Knowledge in Digital Era’ at Andhra Loyola College here Tuesday, Vishnu Vardhan stressed that within this context of digital era, openness and transparency gained newer significance, which creates a pre-condition for the transformation of society into knowledge society.

Pointing out that many of the websites were offering opportunity to access the information in almost all Indian languages and with everyone making use of Wikipedia as an OER tool, he explained the changes in the digital technology and also introduced the faculty to certain open and collaborative tools like Wikipedia.

Besides to giving a historical overview of the free and open source software movement, mass collaboration on the internet, details about Wikipedia authors and users, the participants were educated about using the simple technological tools like QR code to create increased and seamless access to knowledge using pervasive technologies like mobile phones.

Graduate and postgraduate teaching faculty from various streams partcipated in the workshop meant to discuss and learn new development in the fields of knowledge sharing and access in digital era.

CIS programme officer Rahimanuddin Shaik, jounalist Malladi Kameswara Rao, ALC principal Fr Kishore, college vice-principal Fr Anil kumaralso participated.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/the-new-indian-express-june-25-2014-loyola-faculty-enlightened-about-open-edn-resources

Lost your phone? Here's how you can make your mobile theft-proof

praskrishna — 2017-01-19T02:40:21Z

Losing a phone has become even more costly after the government's push for a cashless society.

The article by Sanjay Kumar Singh was published in the Business Standard on January 16, 2017. Udbhav Tiwari was quoted. Read the full article on Press Reader. Udbhav Tiwari was quoted.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi, while pitching for cashless transactions, has coined a new phrase — your mobile is a bank. If you really want to use your mobile phone as a bank, remember the costs of losing it are much higher. Earlier, if you lost your mobile phone, there was the risk of misuse of personal data. Now, with most gadgets also carrying mobile wallet apps, there is the added risk of serious financial loss. A number of security solutions, available in the form of external security software or in-built into the phone, can help you track the device, lock it and minimise the probability of misuse.

First, it should give you some satisfaction that if your device is of recent vintage, someone stealing your phone will not be able to use it. Earlier, thieves would wipe the data on the phone (if it had a pin), set up a new account, and use it. But if it is an Apple phone that came out after 2014 or a phone with Android 6.0 Marshmallow or higher operating system (OS), the server will ask for login information of the first account (with which the owner had initially set up the phone). Only then will it allow someone to set up a second account on the same device. Since that information is not likely to be available to the thief, the phone will be of little use to him.

Track your device

Both Apple and Android have in-built features that allow you to track your device if it gets lost. In Apple it is called 'Find my phone' and on Android, 'Android device manager'. When you log in through your Apple or Google account while setting up the phone, this feature gets enabled by default. After your phone is stolen, go online and type 'Find my phone' or 'Android device manager'. Use your account credentials to log in. As long as your phone is on and is connected to the Internet, it will broadcast its location. If it has been switched off or can't connect to the Internet, you will only be able to see the last location from where it transmitted.

Antivirus software for mobile phones also offer tracking features. "Using our mobile security software, users can locate their lost device on a map or receive the location coordinates through an SMS," says Ritesh Chopra, country manager, Norton by Symantec. These software also enable you to lock the lost device remotely either from the antivirus software's web site or by sending an SMS. Chopra informs that you can also remotely delete all the data stored either on the device or its memory card. Users can also trigger an alarm if they think their device is still in the vicinity. "Some antivirus software also allow you to take snapshots of the illegal user once the original user has reported it as stolen," says Udbhav Tiwari, policy officer at the Centre for Internet and Society, Bengaluru.

Take preventive security measures

How well your phone and the data on it are protected after theft will, however, depend on the security measures you adopt proactively while the phone is in your possession.

Install a password: The first stage of protection you should adopt is a pin, pattern lock, or password for your mobile phone. If you don't set up a pin, everything that doesn't require a second level of authentication is available to anyone who gets possession of your device. If you lose your laptop but have logged out of your email or social networking account, the thief can't access them. But on mobile phones most of these services don't require a second level of authentication.

Most alarming from a financial standpoint is the fact that most mobile wallets don't ask for a password before allowing you to transact (Paytm has introduced one recently). "If you have a mobile wallet and don't have a pin on your phone and it gets stolen, the thief can easily transfer money from your wallet to another," says Tiwari. Most mobile and net banking apps, however, require a login and password every time you want to access them, and are hence safer.

Set a pin promptly--a strong one that can't be easily guessed. Numbers associated with you, such as your birthday, are a strict no-no. If your phone carries especially sensitive or important data, eschew pins altogether and use a detailed password with a diverse combination of characters.

Nowadays you can also deploy fingerprint-based unlocking feature on your phone. "By using Fonetastic for the Android platform, you can set the fingerprint unlock feature on your phone," informs Sanjay Katkar, managing director and chief technology officer, Quick Heal Technologies.

Encrypt data on your device: Even if you set up a pin or password, the data on your mobile phone is not protected. Hackers can bypass it and gain access to your files. To protect data, OS developers like Google and Apple encrypt data. The device encryption feature works using something unique on your device, such as its serial number, and your pin. Even if someone gets access to your files via a computer, they will not be able to open them. These files will open only on your phone, and for that they will need your pin, password or pattern lock (presuming you have set one).

In all iOS phones, the moment you set your pin, all files get automatically encrypted. In any Android phone purchased within the last one year (that runs on Android 6.0 Marshmallow by default), the same holds true. But if you have an older Android phone or OS version, you need to enable this feature manually. Go to Settings, then to Security, find an option called 'Encrypt phone' and click on it.

Install an app lock: Some security apps allow you to lock the apps on your phone and also encrypt the files produced by those apps. When you start an app, the security app will ask for a pin. And when you exit an app, it will encrypt the files stored within the app. Go to Google Play or iStore and type 'encrypted file storage' to get the most popular lock-and-encrypt apps. "If you use device-level encryption, you may not need these apps, as the former locks and encrypts the entire device," says Tiwari

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/business-standard-january-16-2017-sanjay-kumar-singh-lost-your-phone-here-is-how-you-can-make-your-mobile-theft-proof

Looking ahead to the future of the Kannada Wikipedia: Vasanth S.N.

subha — 2016-02-29T14:15:41Z

Vasanth S.N. has edited the Kannada-langauge Wikipedia since 2006. As part of the WikipediansSpeak series, I caught up with Vasanth to learn about his contributions to the Kannada Wikipedia, which just celebrated its 13th anniversary. In the discussion Vasanth shares his long time involvement in the Wikimedia movement, and what drives him every day to edit Wikipedia and helping other fellow Wikimedians.

Subhashish Panigrahi (SP): Hi Vasanth, thanks for agreeing to share about yourself. Can you tell me little about yourself and how you started contributing to Kannada Wikipedia?

Vasanth S.N. (VSN): I grew up in a small town in the Indian state of Karnataka. After completing my PG Diploma in Human Resources studies from Indira Gandhi National Open University (IGNOU) I started working at Dharmasthala temple in Karnataka where I have been working over last 35 years. As a student, I was voracious reader of Kannada-language books. Science, art and culture were my favorite subjects back then. I started contributing to Kannada Wikipedia back in 2006. Shushrutha, a scientist based outside India helped me with several technical needs like creating templates in Kannada Wikipedia. With his help, I contributed to articles related chemical elements. He helped a lot in importing templates then. These days another Wikipedia editor Omshivaprakash is helping in importing templates and several other technical needs I have, thanks to Pavanaja who is also helping and encouraging me regularly.

SP: What are you currently working on?

VSN: After the 14 volume Kannada encyclopedia “Kannada Vishwakosha” got relicensed under CC-BY-SA 3.0 license by Mysore University, we have started digitizing it on Kannada Wikisource. I am taking the digitized articles from here to Kannada Wikisource. I first check for the English Wikipedia article, use some of the updated content from there with citations, and wikify the Kannada Vishwakosha articles to create articles on Kannada Wikipedia.

SP: What are the kind of challenges you generally face?

VSN: Something that really bothers me is the low participation of Kannadiga s in contributing to Kannada Wikipedia. I wish there could be more discussions in the village pump and collaborations between fellow editors. Many of the long time Wikimedians like Radhatanaya, who is probably over 70 years old, need more support with complex Wikipedia policies, and more appreciation. And so are B.S. Chandra from Sagara, Karnataka and many other editors so that every single editor feels to be an important aspect of the community. We also have to bring back editors like Tejas Jain who were active some time back but have slowed down over time. I feel bad that we are lagging behind our neighboring Wikimedia communities like Tamil and Malayalam. When we cannot scale up too fast, a valuable resource like Kannada Vishwakosha that I mentioned before would be really useful in populating Kannada Wikipedia with good quality article. The Vishwakosha is not just compiled by subject experts but has been updated over time. I am more than happy if more editors are willing to join use this encyclopedia as a resource and I am sure we could create over 14,000 articles that a handful of editors like me will take over years to complete otherwise. However the community is skeptical about just one citation but i think we could always rely on English Wikipedia and search for more resources for additional citations.

SP: What do you suggest we—all the Wikimedians, the Wikimedia India chapter, and us (CIS-A2K)—should work on?

VSN: I feel that we are focusing so much only on cities and there might be potential editors in rural areas. But may be reaching out to people who have access to computer and internet is a low hanging fruit as compared to outreach in rural Karnataka. There are over 46,000 state-run schools and many have computers. Taking Kannada Wikipedia to select schools with the facilities needed might result in bringing in flesh blood to the community. I also think that the veteran professors and educators could help grow Wikipedia by correcting articles and wikifying if not writing articles. There might be collectives of such people that I do not know of but in my opinion, it is worth trying. I tried to request some professors in Ujjire, Karnataka to help with correcting over 60 articles related to plant varieties of Karnataka but could not get much help. But that is just one failure and should not stop reaching out to more professors. And if a collective of professors does not exist we could find a common area of interest and create a group.

Subhashish Panigrahi, Wikimedian and Programme Officer, Access to Knowledge (CIS-A2K), Centre for Internet and Society

This post is part of the WikipediansSpeak series, which aims to chronicle the voices of the Wikipedia community. You can find more of these posts on the Wikimedia Commons. The views expressed are not necessarily those of the Wikimedia Foundation or Wikipedia; responses and critical commentary are invited in the comments section below.

Read the original published on Wikimedia Blog

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/wikimedia-blog-february-28-2016-subhashish-panigrahi-looking-ahead-to-future-of-kannada-wikipedia

Locating the Mobile: An Ethnographic Investigation into Locative Media in Melbourne, Bangalore and Shanghai

Larissa Hjorth and Genevieve Bell — 2015-10-24T13:41:47Z

From Google maps, geoweb, GPS (Global Positioning System), geotagging, Foursquare and Jie Pang, locative media is becoming an integral part of the smartphone (and shanzhai or copy) phenomenon. For a growing generation of users, locative media is already an everyday practice.

The transition from the analogue to the digital, from dial-up to broadband internet access was dramatic in how it changed our notions of space, catalysing new ways of thought and practice. In the case of locative media the uptake is more accelerated with it already engaging more than ten times those involved in the analogue-digital transition. The spread and usage of locative media is fast and promises to produce an even more dramatic transformation as the net becomes portable and pervasive.

As yet we know little about the impact locative media is having, and will have upon people’s livelihoods and identity, or on public policy around privacy, identity, security and cultural production. Discourse in the field has opened up questions of art, innovation and experimentation (de Souza e Silva & Sutko 2009; Hjorth 2010, 2011). However, there remains a dearth of nuanced research on locative media that provides in-depth, contextual accounts of its socio-cultural and political dimensions. Little work has been conducted into locative media as it migrates from art and into the ‘messy’ (Dourish & Bell 2011) area of the everyday.

Locating the Mobile seeks to address this knowledge gap by undertaking close studies of locative media in three locations—Bangalore, Melbourne and Shanghai. We aim to capture and analyse the multiplicities of locative media practice emerging in both developed and developing contexts.

These three locations have relatively high smartphones (or copies like shanzhai) usage and are indicative of twenty-first century migration, diaspora and transnational practices. As one of the leading regions for mobile media innovation (Hjorth 2009; Bell 2005; Miller & Horst 2005), the various contested localities in the Asia-Pacific provide a rich and complex case study for mobile media as it moves into locative media. The three locations also show how the presence of digital and internet technologies is ‘flattening’ the globalised landscape and bringing about dramatic changes in the ways in which these cities shape and develop (Shah 2010). We consider how place informs locative media practices and how, in turn, these practices are shaping new narratives of place.

Locating the Mobile seeks to collect and analyse some of the emergent, tacit, innovative and ‘making-do’ practices informing the rise, and resistance to, locative media. Drawing on pertinent issues for the present and future of locative media, Locating the Mobile aims to:

Pioneer and develop models and templates for comprehending the implications of locative media.
Develop a nuanced and situated understanding of locative media as part of cultural practice.
Provide, through multi-site analysis, new insights into the impact of locative media upon narratives of place and belonging.
Develop socio-cultural understandings of the role locative media plays in notions of intimacy and privacy.

By bringing together an expert team that represent a commitment to probing the social, cultural and community dimensions of technological innovation, Locating the Mobile will develop methodologies that capture the dynamic and mundane features of this emergent media practice. By doing so, Locating the Mobile will move beyond binary debates about surveillance and privacy or ‘parachute’ case studies of locative art towards nuanced and complex understandings of locative media and its implication for future cultural practices.

Significance and Innovation

The nascent field of locative media is impacting upon cultural practice, place-making and policy in ways we can only imagine. While much analysis has been conducted in mobile media (Goggin & Hjorth 2009) and experimental forms of locative media/art (de Souza e Silva & Sutko 2009), the increased ubiquity of locative media through devices such as the smartphone will undoubtedly transform the way in which place and mobility is articulated. Locating the Mobile seeks to substantially expand and contextualise upon the burgeoning area of locative media through a variety of innovative and significant ways.

Locating the Mobile is original in its topic, method, outcomes and industry collaboration. Firstly, it is significant in that it brings depth and innovation to the emergent area of locative media, and its impact upon discourses around mobile media in ideas of mobility and place-making. In the face of parachute nature of many locative art research (de Souza e Silva & Sutko 2009), Locating the Mobile is one of the first studies internationally to explore locative media over time in specific locations. Secondly, it deploys a variety of methods (such as surveys, focus groups, interviews and diaries for scenario of use, overlaid with data-mining) across different devices (mobile phone, iPad) and platforms (Foursquare, Jie Pang) to analyse the local and socio-cultural dimensions of use. With its team of experts in mobile media (Hjorth, Bell and Horst), communication for development (C4D) (Tacchi and Shah), gaming (Hjorth), social networking (Shah, Zhou and Hjorth) as well as a range of methodologies, this three-year study will investigate and contextualise locative media in Bangalore, Melbourne and Shanghai. Despite its ubiquity in many locations in the Asia-Pacific region, much of the locative media literature remains Anglophonic or Eurocentric in focus. Thirdly, through multi-site analysis of locative media practices we will provide innovative ways in which to reflect upon narratives of place, belonging and transnationalism. Fourthly, by pioneering the first multi-site analysis of locative media over time, Locating the Mobile will develop the much missing socio-cultural understandings of locative media and how it impacts upon intimacy and privacy upon individual, group and policy levels. We will now detail these four key areas of significance and innovation. We will pioneer and develop models and templates for comprehending the implications of locative media. In these models we actively address locative media in the transnational context of contemporary feelings about belonging, possession, mobility, migration, and dislocation. As locative media becomes more pervasive, the power of its banality needs further understanding beyond ‘global’ generalisations (see www.pleaserobme.com). Like the rise of mobile media that was accompanied by the ‘subversive user’ (Hjorth 2009), we need to figure out the digital subject who is shaped—both historically and socio-culturally—through the pervasive spread of locative media. As Gabriella Coleman (2010) observes in her review of ethnographic approaches to digital media, there are three main overlapping categories: research on the relationship between digital media and the cultural politics of media; the vernacular cultures of digital media; the prosaics of digital media (and this attention to the commonplace, the unromantic, the quotidian). In the case of locative media, ethnographic approaches—emphasising the situated, vernacular and prosaic—are needed in order to understand the relocations of mobility across a variety notions: technological, electronic and psychological to name a few. Moreover, given the relatively high proportion of Indian and Chinese migrants in Melbourne—and migration in Bangalore and Shanghai—exploring locative media can provide new models for conceptualising the impact of migration, diaspora, and transnationalism on place.

We will develop a nuanced and situated understanding of locative media as part of cultural practice through methods that deploy both qualitative (ethnographic) and quantitative (datamining) approaches such as ‘ethno-mining’ (Anderson et al. 2009). With the emergence of ethnomining approaches—that is, data-based mining combined with ethnography—new models for analysing media and mobility can be found. Locating the Mobile addresses this need for innovative methodologies that capture the dynamic nature of locative media by situating it within three legacies: social, cultural and historical mediatisation. Further, Locating the Mobile seeks to frame locative media as evolving through the cultural precepts informing mobile media and urbanity LP120200829 (Submitted to RO) Dr Larissa Hjorth PDF Created: 16/11/2011 Page 8 of 123 discourses. Drawing upon case studies from a region renowned for divergent and innovative use of mobile media (Hjorth 2009) and gaming (Hjorth & Chan 2009)—the Asia-Pacific—Locating the Mobile seeks to understand the lived and local dimensions of locative media and how it can inform emergent and older forms of place-making, belonging and migration. By focusing upon this nascent but burgeoning area in global mobile media practice—locative media—Locating the Mobile not only places Australia as a forerunner in innovative, original, and challenging methodologies for new media, but also, by bringing together key industry partners, Intel, CIS and Fudan University,

Locating the Mobile seeks to contextualise the research in terms of industry and community outcomes. In this sense, Locating the Mobile clearly addresses the National Priority 3, Frontier Technologies (see below for more details).

We will provide, through multi-site analysis, new insights into the impact of locative media upon narratives of place and belonging through our three case study locations—Melbourne, Bangalore and Shanghai. Locative media can provide new models for conceptualising the impact of migration, diaspora, and transnationalism on place. Although place has always mattered to mobile media (Ito 2003; Bell 2005; Hjorth 2003), locative media both amplify, redirect and redefine practices around place, community and a sense of belonging—phenomenon that impacts upon cultural policy and media regulation (Goggin 2011). Along with the digital interfaces that overlay our physical experiences as we enter into a state of augmented reality (AR), the presence of these cartographic, geospatial locative platforms also changes the ways in which the cities and how we navigate with them (Shah 2010). With the rise of locative media like Google maps we are seeing new ways to frame and narrate a sense of place through various technological lenses overlaying the social with the informational. This phenomenon is especially the case with smartphones and their plethora of applications (apps) drawing heavily upon locative media—even most photo apps come with locative media. With locative media we see the arrival of increased accessibility to augmented
reality (AR). Instead of replacing the analogue with the digital, the physical with the virtual, they open up ‘hybrid realities’ (a term used by de Souza e Silva to describe AR mobile games) that need new conceptual tools and located frameworks to unravel the dynamics. We are no longer looking at just the technology mediated hypervisual digitality but also exploring what these locative media augment and simulate in everyday practices.

We will develop socio-cultural understandings of the role locative media plays in notions of intimacy and privacy and how we might comprehend locative media’s implications on individual and cultural practices, and regulation. In the second generation of locative media that sees it move increasingly into the mainstream, questions about security, privacy and identity—and how these are shaped by the local—come into focus (Dourish & Anderson 2006). For Dourish and Anderson (2006) locative media can been viewed as a form of ‘Collective Information Practice’ that have social and cultural implications upon how privacy and security are conceptualised. For others such as Siva Vaidhyanathan (2011) locative media like Google maps and street views are about a corporate surveillance. As a burgeoning field of media practice intersecting daily life, there is a need for in-depth situated accounts into locative media and their cultural-economic dimensions to understand the impact they will have on intimacy, privacy, identity and place-making. In Locating the Mobile, by developing and implementing new hybrid models for analysing locative media (Anderson et al. 2009), we consider the role locative media plays in how place shapes, and is shaped by, these practices and the future implications around cultural policy. The comparative dimension brings a rich data-set to bear on our understanding of locative media and the questions it may pose in the future. The outputs are significant not only for Australian mobile communication, gaming and internet studies—by providing a regional context for evaluating the socio-technologies—but also demonstrates internationally Australia’s lead in ground-breaking research into locative media (Priority 3, ‘frontier technologies’) in arguably the most significant sites for global ICTs production and consumption, the Asia-Pacific.

National Research Priorities: With the rise of smartphones becoming ubiquitous, location-based services have burgeoned. And yet, little is known about this area and its impact upon individuals, LP120200829 (Submitted to RO) Dr Larissa Hjorth PDF Created: 16/11/2011 Page 9 of 123 organisations and governments. Given this phenomenon, a comprehensive understanding of the impact upon locative media upon notions of privacy, identity and place-making is needed. In the twenty-first century, locative media will become an increasingly important part of everyday life—for individuals, communities, businesses and government agencies. Thus it is imperative that we have a robust comparative understanding of locative media in Australia and across the region. By conceptualising this impact within the context of the region, Locating the Mobile ensures Australia is at the frontier of new technologies and their impact upon future technological practices and policies. Such an understanding is fundamental to Australia’s technology and cultural sectors, thus contributing to National Research Priority 3 through one of the strongest currencies in twenty-first century global market, mobile media, as well as contributing to the broader long-term project of locating Australia in the region. By drawing on qualitative, cross-cultural longitudinal research into locative media, Locating the Mobile will document, analysis and provide future recommendations for how locative media is impacting upon people’s experience of place and identity. A study like this is important as it is innovative for not only pioneering methodologies to evaluate this media phenomenon but also to understand some of its long-term implications on how mobile media intervenes and even reconfigures experiences and perceptions of place which, in turn, impact upon cultural policy.

Collaborators: Larissa Hjorth (RMIT University, Melbourne), Genevieve Bell (Intel, Shanghai)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/digital-humanities/blogs/locating-mobile/locating-the-mobile

Locating Internets: Histories of the Internet(s) in India — Research Training and Curriculum Workshop: Call for Participation

praskrishna — 2011-07-21T06:00:39Z

Deadline for submission: 26th July 2011-06-08; When: 19th - 22nd August, 2011; Where: Centre for Environmental Planning and Technology (CEPT) University, Ahmedabad; Organised by: Centre for Internet and Society, Bangalore and CEPT University, Ahmedabad. Please Note: Travel support is only available for domestic travel within India.

LOCATING INTERNETS is an innovative, multi-disciplinary, workshop that engages with some of the most crucial debates around Internet and Society within academic scholarship, discourse and practice in India. It explores Where, When, How and What has changed with the emergence of Internet and Digital Technologies in the country. The Internet is not a singular monolithic entity but is articulated in various forms – sometimes materially, through accessing the web; at others, through our experiences; and yet others through imaginations of policy and law. Internets have become a part of our everyday practice, from museums and archives, to school and university programmes, living rooms and public spaces, relationships and our bodily lived realities. It becomes necessary to reconfigure our existing concepts, frameworks and ideas to make sense of the rapidly digitising world around us. The Internet is no longer contained in niche disciplines or specialised everyday practices. LOCATING INTERNETS invites scholars, teachers, researchers, advanced research students and educationalists from any discipline to learn and discuss how to ask new questions and design innovative curricula in their discipline by introducing concepts and ideas from path-breaking research in India.

Comprised of training, public lectures, open discussion spaces, and hands-on curriculum building exercises, this workshop will introduce the participants to contemporary debates, help them articulate concerns and problems from their own research and practice, and build knowledge clusters to develop innovative and open curricula which can be implemented in interdisciplinary undergraduate spaces in the country. It showcases the research outputs produced by the Centre for Internet and Society’s Researchers @ Work Programme, and brings together nine researchers to talk about alternative histories, processes, and bodies of the Internets, and how they can be integrated into mainstream pedagogic practices and teaching environments.

Knowledge Clusters for the Workshop

LOCATING INTERNETS is designed innovatively to accommodate for various intellectual and practice based needs of the participants. While the aim is to introduce the participants to a wide interdisciplinary range of scholarship, we also hope to address particular disciplinary and scholarly concerns of the participants. The workshop is further divided into three knowledge clusters which help the participants to focus their energies and ideas in the course of the four days.

Bridging the Gap: This workshop seeks to break away from the utopian public discourse of the Internets as a-historical and completely dis-attached from existing technology ecologies in the country. This knowledge cluster intends to produce frameworks that help us contextualize the contemporary internet policy, discourse and practice within larger geo-political and socio-historical flows and continuities in Modern India. The first cluster chartsdifferent pre-histories of the Internets, mapping the continuities and ruptures through philosophy of techno-science, archiving practices, and electronifcation of governments,to develop new technology-society perspectives.
Paradigms of Practice:One of the biggest concerns about Internet studies in India and other similar developed contexts is the object oriented approach that looks largely at specific usages, access, infrastructure, etc. However, it is necessary to understand that the Internet is not merely a tool or a gadget. The growth of Internets produces systemic changes at the level of process and thought. The technologies often get appropriated for governance both by the state and the civil society, producing new processes and dissonances which need to be charted. The second cluster looks at certain contemporary processes that the digital and Internet technologies change drastically in order to recalibrate the relationship between the state, the market and the citizen.
Feet on the Ground: The third cluster looks at contemporary practices of the Internet to understand the recent histories of movements, activism and cultural practices online. It offers an innovative way of understanding the physical objects and bodies that undergo dramatic transitions as digital technologies become pervasive, persuasive and ubiquitous. It draws upon historical discourse, everyday practices and cultural performances to form new ways of formulating and articulating the shapes and forms of social and cultural structures.

Workshop Outcomes

The participants are expected to engage with issue of Internet and it various systemic processes through their own disciplinary interests. Apart from lectures and orientation sessions, the participants will actively work on their own project ideas during the period in groups and will be guided by experts. The final outcome of the workshops would be curriculum for undergraduate and graduate teaching space of various disciplines in the country.

Participation Guidelines

LOCATING INTERNETS is now accepting submissions from interested participants in the following format:

Name:
Institutional affiliation and title:
Address:
Email address:
Phone number:
A brief resume of work experience (max. 350 words)
Statement of interest (max. 350 words)
Key concerns you want to address in the Internet and Society field (max. 350 words)
Identification with one Knowledge-cluster of the workshop and a proposal for integrating it in your research/teaching practice (max. 500 words)
Current interface with technologies in your pedagogic practices (max. 350 words)
Additional information or relevant hyperlinks you might want to add (Max. 10 lines)

Notes:

Submissions will be accepted only from participants in India, as attachments in .doc, .docx or .odt formats at locatingInternets@cis-india.org
Submissions made beyond 26th July 2011 may not be considered for participation.
Submissions will be scrutinized by the organisers and selected participants will be informed by the 30th July 2011, about their participation.
Selected participants will be required to make their own travel arrangements to the workshop. A 2nd A.C. train return fare will be reimbursed to the participants. Shared accommodation and selected meals will be provided at the workshop.
A limited number of air-fare reimbursements will be available to participants in extraordinary circumstances. All travel support is only available for domestic travel in the country.

Chairs: Nishant Shah, Director-Research, Centre for Internet and Society Bangalore;

Pratyush Shankar, Associate Professor & Head of Undergraduate Program, Faculty of Architecture, CEPT University

Supported by: Kusuma Foundation, Hyderabad

Experts:Anja Kovacs, Arun Menon, Asha Achuthan, Ashish Rajadhykasha, Aparna Balachandran, Namita Malhotra, Nithin Manayath, Nithya Vasudevan, Pratyush Shankar, Rochelle Pinto and Zainab Bawa

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/research/conferences/conference-blogs/workshop

Living in the Archival Moment

sneha-pp — 2016-06-30T05:08:22Z

An extended survey of digital initiatives in arts and humanities practices in India was undertaken during the last year. Provocatively called 'mapping digital humanities in India', this enquiry began with the term 'digital humanities' itself, as a 'found' name for which one needs to excavate some meaning, context, and location in India at the present moment. Instead of importing this term to describe practices taking place in this country - especially when the term itself is relatively unstable and undefined even in the Anglo-American context - what I chose to do was to take a few steps back, and outline a few questions/conflicts that the digital practitioners in arts and humanities disciplines are grappling with. The final report of this study will be published serially. This is the fifth among seven sections.

Sections

01. Digital Humanities in India?

02. A Question of Digital Humanities

03. Reading from a Distance – Data as Text

04. The Infrastructure Turn in the Humanities

05. Living in the Archival Moment

06. New Modes and Sites of Humanities Practice

07. Digital Humanities in India – Concluding Thoughts

In a rather delightful essay titled ‘Unpacking my Library’, Walter Benjamin (1968: 59-67) dwells upon the many nuances of the art of collecting (books in this particular case), on everything from the sometimes impulsive acquisition to the processes of careful selection and classification which go into creating a library. "Ownership is the most intimate relationship one can have with objects" (67) he says, and this becomes important given the many ways in which we can acquire books today, as well as the problems of copyright, authorship and authority over meaning and knowledge that become a bone of contention in the digital age. The collector defines the nature of the object here, because he lives in and through them. While describing the personal process that is collecting, Benjamin is also aware that it may not be a process that will last as it is - a foreboding of the age when the impulse to collect, hoard and categorise has only grown tremendously due to increased access to books owing to the internet, but also where the figure of the collector seems to have been slowly effaced, thus presenting a ‘chaos of memories’ (60) in unarranged collections spread over several hard disks instead of book shelves. The figure of the collector, and the idea of ‘ownership’ emerge as an important trope in understanding the notion of order, or rather disorder of the art of collecting in the digital space.

This figure of the collector and practice of collecting are important to our understanding of a central concept in DH - the archive - particularly as it occupies a predominant space in the imagination of the field in India, and processes of knowledge production and the history of disciplines in general. The influx of digital technologies into the archival space in the last decade has been an impetus for the large scale digitisation of material, but it has also thrown up several challenges for traditional archival practice, including the preservation of analogue material, the problems of categorising and interpreting large volumes of data, and the gradual disappearance or re-definition of the traditional figure of the collector – a concern echoed across several spaces extending from private online archival efforts to large collaborative knowledge repositories like the Wikipedia. With the questions that DH seems to have posed to traditional notions of authorship or subject expertise, the 'digital humanist', when we imagine such a person, can be seen as a reinvention of this figure of the collector - a curator of materials and traces, here of course, digital traces.

The concept of the archive has been important to knowledge production and particularly the development of academic disciplines; whether driven by concerns of the state or the impulses of the market, there have been different ways of defining and understanding the archive, not only as a documentary record of history, but as a metaphor for collective memory and remembrance which includes technology in its very imagination. One of the most elaborate formulations of the archive has been in the work of Jacques Derrida, where apart from proposing the death and preservation drives as primary to the archival impulse, he also highlights the process of archivisation, or the technical process of archive-building that shapes history and memory (1995). Michel Foucault in his concept of the archive looks at it as "a system of discursivity which establishes the possibility of what can be said," [1] thus pointing to the archive as a space not just of preservation but also production, with an impact on the process of knowledge creation. There is today a consensus, at least in its academic understanding that archives cannot be relegated to being self-contained linear spaces of objective historical record, but that archival practice itself has political implications in terms of how collective memory and history, or as indicated by Foucault, histories are preserved and retold through a process of careful selection. Disciplines themselves may therefore be seen as archives of knowledge, and one may stretch this analogy to say that they may also appear as self-contained spaces with restrictions on entry for different ways of remembering and reading. More importantly, the question of what constitutes the archive and what objects or materials may be archived reflects a larger debate about problems with the definition of disciplines and shifting disciplinary boundaries [2]. With the shift to the digital archive, new questions about access, sharing and collaboration have emerged, as illustrated by the number of new archival spaces that have emerged, and growth of expansive archives such at the Walt Whitman, Rossetti and Blake archives in the West (Drucker 2011). However, as is apparent, the conditions of access to such archives and their interpretation have not been problematised enough, if at all, particularly with respect to how they contribute to generating new kinds of knowledge or scholarship.

While DH debates in the West have focussed quite significantly on archives and the possibilities that digital collections have now opened up research and creative practice involving archival material, in the Indian context it is the 'incompleteness of the archive' that still seems to be a bone of contention. Some of the scholars and practitioners interviewed as part of this study see archive creation as one of the key questions of DH as it has emerged in India, and the possibilities and challenges that this brings to the fore, (particularly in terms of access to rare materials and extending these debates to regional languages) as something that the field will need to contend with at some point. The role of digital technologies in fostering this activity of archive-building is stressed in these debates. In an earlier monograph titled Archives and Access produced as part of CIS-RAW, Aparna Balachandran and Rochelle Pinto trace a material history of archival practice in India, specifically looking at conflicts and debates surrounding state and colonial archives, and the politics of access, preservation and digitisation (2011). The monograph also points towards in some way the move of the archive from being solely the prerogative of the state to the now within the reach of the individual, engendered by increased access to technology, and the ‘publicness’ that the visual nature of the internet fosters. However they also talk of the possibility of continuing forms of state or market control over the archive precisely through the internet and digital technologies, with the nature of individual access and use again being mediated through digitisation. Abhijeet Bhattacharya, Documentation Officer with the archives at the Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Kolkata who was also part of the Archives and Access project, and has been part of some early conversations on DH in India, speaks about this change [3]. Even twenty years ago, it was difficult to define the archive, as it was considered the prerogative of the state, and this defined the nature of archival practice and management as well. From there it has slowly transformed into a practice that encompasses various methods of digitisation and has become increasingly personal. While digitisation may have resolved some issues of preserving content and the problems of physically accessing archives to a large extent, it may not always be the best option, as the archival or analogue material needs to be in good condition so as to make for good digitised copies, thus emphasising the need for more effective methods and better training in preservation practices. Also, as he point out, digitisation may be able to capture and preserve the content of an artifact, but not its form, which is equally important. He therefore rues the fact that even with technological advancements, there is still a lack of interest in archival practice, and often institutional mandates determine the archival agenda which may not be in the interest of generating more research and scholarship around material, as this is the only way to keep the archive alive.

The growth of private collections, which create new kinds of intellectual and nostalgic spaces, has been an important shift here, with their focus on archiving the personal and the everyday, he says, though in many instances such material may not be available for public use or consumption. While on the subject of private collections and personal narratives, Dr. C S Lakshmi, writer and academic who is director of the Mumbai-based Sound and Picture Archives for Research on Women (SPARROW) [4], has particular concerns about digitalisation making large amounts of information available for consumption online, particularly with respect to women. While digitisation is an effective tool for preservation and offers several possibilities for documentation, unmediated access is problematic and often a breach of privacy. There is so much information out there that the digital sphere makes available, sometimes this excessive communication also contributes to certain silences and obscures or makes invisible people and their stories. So very often its not a question of just making information available to people. What are you making available, how much are you making available and to whom, for what purpose - these are all important questions that contour the notion of access and need to be addressed according to Dr. Lakshmi. Curation therefore emerges as an important process. The publicness or hyper-visibility that the visual nature of the internet and digital technologies accords to the archive is seen tied to a narrative of loss here, and against the rhetoric of preservation which is still in many spaces deemed to be the primary function and imagination of the archive. What this sets up is also a conflict between the possibilities of open access and sharing of material, and concerns of privacy, and the need to find a space where both these seemingly contradictory ends meet.

The increased availability of space for data accumulation due to digital technologies contributes to a 'problem of excess', and that is where curation and building new kinds of tools come in as a critical and creative exercise. Dr. Amlan Dasgupta reiterates this opinion. He talks about the internet as fostering an 'age of altruism', where the proliferation of technological gadgets has brought about a culture of voluntarily sharing materials online. This of course challenges notions of authority and brings forth the problems of the unarranged library which Benjamin’s essay also points towards, but the archive can be used as a metaphor to understand how notions of authorship and authority are being challenged as is apparent in the DH discourse. The theory-practice divide is also something that ails this particular domain like many others; not only is there an inadequate understanding of how to access and use the archive on the part of students and researchers alike, but there is a lack of standardisation of the practice of archive management and the science itself, in terms of metadata, problems of ownership and copyright, and most importantly inadequate infrastructure, training and expertise on preservation of analogue materials. While it may not be within the ambit of DH to address all of these questions, the renewed interest in archival practice and the diversification of its modes is something is that would continue to be an integral aspect of its practice. In fact what digitisation has also led to is diversity in the modes of documentation itself, and the larger process of archiving, which has important implications for the kinds of questions one may ask within certain disciplinary formations, history being an important example. The nature of material in the archive is never quite the same, so is the manner of working with and interpreting them. Dr. Indira Chowdhury, who has been engaged with archival practice herself, and is now working on setting up oral history archives through the Centre for Public History, speaks of the changes that digital technologies have produced in studying oral history, specifically in terms of recording and interpretation of interviews. The mode of documentation, particularly the digital, adds a new layer to the manner in which the voice, sounds or even silence is recorded or interpreted. She refers to Alessandro Portelli’s work on oral history, which talks about the nuances of the sound, such as tone, volume and speed of speaking which are all bearers of meaning and can tell you so much about what the person is trying to say, but can never be fully translated into the written word.(2006, 32-42) Although there are still some basic but crucial obstacles such as with transcription, the digital space may allow for tools that help with more nuanced interpretation of recorded material, and large volumes of it; a possibility that CPH is looking into at the moment. There are several institutions in India who want to set up their archives, most of their materials include many hours of interviews, with many people at a time and transcription is a problem, because it takes time, and there is still no software to aid or completely automate this process effectively. One of the approaches of DH may be to address these knowledge gaps through critical tool-building, in terms of how one may work with different ways of reading and interpreting material using digital tools.

The digital archive is one space where many of these questions about the process of archive-creation and the separation between preservation and production that is often made in the existing discourse come into conflict, thus inflating the definition of the term much more. New technologies of publishing, the proliferation of electronic databases and growth of networks that in turn encourage production and the increasing amount of born-digital materials then present new questions for the concept of the archive and scholarship.

The role of technology has been significant in the development of the concept of the archive; in fact the archive, in its very nature would be a technological object, or a space where one can trace a history of the disciplines in relation to technology. The introduction of the digital has added yet another dimension to this question. Dr. Ravi Sundaram, Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies and one of the co-initiators of the Sarai programme at the Centre for Developing Societies (CSDS) [5], speaks of how the advent of the digital has brought about several shifts in the imagination of the archive, which he sees as two distinct phases. Sarai was one of the early models of a concept driven, networked archive, based on a culture of 'mailing lists' that built conversations around topics which in themselves constituted the archive. The shifts came with Web 2.0 with which archiving the everyday became a possibility, given the access to inexpensive gadgets and the pervasiveness of social media. While the model of the networked, curated and public archive still has valence today, a significant next step would be to see how one can extend these questions to thinking differently about the archive, by developing new protocols for entering, sharing and circulation of material, and producing new knowledge or concepts around these ideas. This would be crucial in terms of generating research and scholarship around the archive itself as a concept, and realising the full potential of network-generated information. Another pertinent question is that of information and technology infrastructure, which is a political question as well. The investment on infrastructure for the archive is determined by different kinds of interests and will play an important role in how archival efforts will ultimately develop. As Dr. Sundaram reiterates, the point to note is that new archival efforts are not only general repositories, but critical interventions in themselves. They foster new kinds of visibilities. The Pad.ma archive [6], for example, works with existing footage and reinvents or adds new layers of meaning to it through annotations and citations. This also opens up possibilities for new kinds of questions to be asked about existing material. Private archival efforts, many initiated by individuals are also becoming more niche and specific, driven by a specific research agenda, public interest in conservation or as critical and creative interventions in a particular area. Some examples of this are the Sound and Picture Archives for Research on Women (SPARROW), Pad.ma and Indiancine.ma [7], the Indian Memory Project [8], and Osianama [9]. In some of these examples, the archive may be used as more of a metaphor rather than a description or classificatory term, because of the layers of meaning that they generate around an existing object or 'trace'.

They are also reflective of a different milieu that came about with the digital turn in India. Shaina Anand, artist and filmmaker who set up the artist’s studio and collective CAMP in Mumbai [10], and is also part of the team behind the Pad.ma and Indiancine.ma platforms, speaks of the various factors that contributed to the setting up these two online archival spaces. As artists for them the larger concern was the ever-changing electronic media or technological landscape, as seen in some of their earlier projects such as Russel TV, which involved creating content around media ecologies and intellectual property in a sort of pro-piracy, and access to knowledge framework. The focus for them was the ecology or the landscape, and within that the sharp point was where there were irregularities and inequalities and there was a need to redistribute things in a certain way. Pad.ma grew out of a larger idea of understanding this changing milieu around the early 2000s, where the digital had already become pervasive – filmmakers were editing on a laptop or desktop computer, they had access to the internet and DIY tools, resources were cheaper and more accessible as the internet was opening up a world of possibilities. Therefore, as the team realised, if there was to be an archive of the contemporary, it had to be digital or visual, or video specifically, and located online. This was also the time when the independent filmmaker had become a prominent figure and the challenges and advantages of sharing unused and raw footage became quite possible and apparent with a platform like Pad.ma. The archive was created as something contemporary, non-state and non-canonical, with a wide range of stakeholders and contributors ranging across NGOs, activists, independent filmmakers to individuals with an interest in film and video. There were however several difficulties as well, chiefly in getting people to share material, issues of privacy, and a resistance to the use of this platform as a pedagogic and academic resource, which over the years have come down with the people becoming more open to using material on the platform as primary texts, and the development of more tools for editing and annotations. Indiancine.ma that way is more of a traditional form of film studies, but with more possibilities now for working with the film text.

However, while entering the digital space may have enabled more sharing and dissemination of material, how much of these efforts also make their way into larger civil society and policy debates, scholarship and pedagogy is still a crucial question. Pad.ma and Indiancine.ma have been used by students, in media and film in particular but the efforts remain niche and restricted to certain disciplines only. Some part of this comes from a resistance to the film or a certain kind of text as academic, and therefore scholarly or relevant to a larger cross-section of research. This also stems from a predominant imagination of the archive as a static, linear repository. As Ashish Rajadhyaksha, film and cultural studies scholar, who was part of the team that created Pad.ma and Indiancine.ma, points out, the distinction between the archive as a repository space and an interpretive space is one that needs to be made clearly, and archives are clearly a form of the later. In fact the idea of the digital as a permanent medium is false, and it should not be the solution to problems of storage and preservation. Further, in a lot of expansive archives, whether digital or physical, it is seen that only up to five percent of the material is used, and more often than not it is the same five percent! This is because most people do know about the existence of certain kinds of material which is buried deep within the archive, and therefore do not access it. The emphasis of archival practice, and particularly in the time of the digital archive where space is not seen as a constraint, yet, should be to enliven the archive to ensure that material from the 'dead space of the archive' is made more searchable and accessible for use.

Curation then comes back again as an important aspect of the archive, even in the time of the digital. Indira Chowdhury sees this as one of the main shifts from the traditional archive, where the curator or the archivist performed the role of a custodian or gatekeeper who grants restricted access to the archive only to researchers or scholars. Now with the advent of the internet and shift to the digital, it’s more about collaboration, and adding to the archive, and this has encouraged a diversity of users, and uses of the archive. This comes with its own problems however, such as with metadata standards for instance, and particularly questions of format which become important from the perspective of technological obsolescence (as discussed in the earlier chapter). The digital archive has made practitioners think about what they are archiving, for whom and what purpose, and in what formats, but these questions also go back to the traditional archive, and in fact are dependent on how we think about and defined the archive itself, then and now how we imagine the virtual archive. These are as she says, questions that may be routed through technology, but not necessarily about technology. Also, even with the traditional archive, making material accessible and usable was a concern, and this is where the archivist or custodian played an important role. She speaks about using pre-digital archives, where there are handwritten descriptions of material, all meticulously preserved, indexed and cross-referenced, and you know what material to look for because the archivist knew what was in the archive and how to find it. She speaks of her own experience of setting up the archives at TIFR, which was not digital then, but has been digitised now, and even though she has not been associated with them for a while now she still gets the occasional email requesting help to find something in the archive, because she knows the material. A lot of the new digital archives therefore, despite their huge collection which are also searchable, need archivists and assistants who oversee the organisation of material, because those cross-references and connections have just not been made (often it is not humanly possible because of the sheer volume of data), which is really what the historians will look for, and that is the challenge here.

Padmini Ray Murray, another faculty member at the Centre for Public History, also sees this as a problem of not imagining the archive as a database, but as this legacy where content is being held together under this one overarching frame. She finds that there is a metanarrative that is created at the level of the database, because of the context in which the archive becomes a database – the historical / institutional questions, and what is being used to create the archive. A point of divergence however could be that it’s easier to lie with the archive, because with the database there is the empirical identifier, so the truth claim is better. This is something that Dr. Chowdhury agrees upon as well, as she finds that because archives have the potential of being multilayered, and are therefore complex, verification is difficult; it’s only another scholar who will check the materials referenced or used by one – and the interpretation would change, and this had implications for the way the archive generates scholarship. Another difference is pulling data from the archive in a way that it allows the making of computational hypotheses about other possibilities, which is the heart of DH – such as topic modelling and algorithmic shortcuts to crunch through data to posit some hypothetical claims. She feels that in India at the moment we are not doing in enough with the archive as database, which also restricts its many possibilities. Even in terms of access to the archive, which the digital archive is supposed to make easier, it comes with certain conditions, such as copyrights, privacy and even different kinds of Creative Commons licenses for open source content. It also depends on what Dr. Ray Murray describes as the ‘flavour of the archive’, something particularly relevant to a lot of new private archival spaces like the Indian Memory Project, or Indiancine.ma or Pad.ma, which focussed on 'building the archive', as opposed to working with an existing archive of material. As such these are somewhat ephemeral archives, always in the making, and where the digital intersects clearly with the archival space is in terms of finding an audience for it; the internet creates these niche spaces of interest, so you find that people want to access such spaces, and do it differently from the traditional archive, as the varied nature and functionalities of these two examples demonstrate.

What the long discussion seems to illustrate then is the gradual shift of the archive to become something of a metaphor, as the way the archive has been previously imagined, and its functions have changed with the advent of the internet. As Wolfgang Ernst asks:

Does the archive become metaphorical in multimedia space? This is a plea for archiving the term archive itself for the description of multimedia storage processes. Digital archaeology, though, is not a case for future generations but has to be performed in the present already. In the age of digitalizability, that is, when we have the option of storing all kinds of information, a paradoxical phenomenon appears: cyberspace has no memory. (Ernst 2013: 138)

What Ernst suggests is that the Internet forms a different kind of multimedia archive, or anarchive, or is a phantasm, which differs from the printed of state archives because “the archive is a given, well-defined lot; the Internet, on the contrary, is a collection not just of unforeseen texts but of sound and images as well, an anarchive of sensory data for which no genuine archival culture has been developed so far in the occident” (139). The internet, in documenting the discontinuities and ‘disorder’ of the history of multimedia forms thus gives rise to a new memory culture, and this is important to the process of understanding how new archival spaces are being created, and theorised.

Archive-building has an impact on how knowledge is produced, organised and disseminated is a crucial aspect of meaning-making practices. Related to this is another issue in terms of the amount of data that is available in the archives by the sheer amount of material that it can now hold, which demands new protocols of access and collaboration, and the role of curation in making such data relevant and comprehensible. The problem of excess mentioned by many of the scholars and practitioners would be relevant to the question of big data; accessing or interpreting such large volumes of information would require critical tools and new kinds of architecture. These shifts also relocate the figure of the collector from traditional practices to new ways of visualising collections and the art of collecting itself, which are now beyond the scope of the human subject. As illustrated by practices such as distant reading, it is now humanly difficult to read, and process such large volumes of data that the digital archive now makes available to us. What this then throws up as questions for archival practice, and DH of course, is the new modes by which knowledge is produced through access to such corpora – for instance the impact such changes have on history, its reading and writing, the growth of public history and the role of the internet archive in fostering its growth. On a much broader level, it also points towards the implications of this shift for pedagogy and scholarship in the humanities, in the digital age, questions which will be discussed in the next chapter.

Notes

[1] Michel Foucault quoted in Manoff (2004: 18).

[2] Ibid.

[3] A session on 'Digital Humanities and the State of the Archives in South Asia' was conducted by Prof. Abhijit Bhattacharya and his team as part of a workshop on research methodology in Women's Studies, held at Tezpur University between April 6-7, 2010.See http://www.tezu.ernet.in/notices/ResearchMethodology.pdf

[4] See: http://www.sparrowonline.org/.

[5] See: http://sarai.net/.

[6] See: http://pad.ma/.

[7] See: http://indiancine.ma/.

[8] See: http://www.indianmemoryproject.com/.

[9] See: http://osianama.com/.

[10] See: http://studio.camp/.

References

Balachandran, Aparna, and Rochelle Pinto.Archives and Access. Bangalore: The Centre for Internet and Society, 2011

Benjamin, Walter. "Unpacking my Library: A Talk about Book Collecting" In Illuminations, edited by Hannah Arendt.Translated by Harry Zohn, 59-67.New York: Schoken Books, 1968

Derrida, Jacques. Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression.Translated by Eric Prenowitz.Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1996

Drucker, Johanna. "Humanistic Theory and Digital Scholarship" In Debates in the Digital Humanities, edited by M.K. Gold. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012.Accessed December 11, 2015.http://dhdebates.gc.cuny.edu/debates/text/34

Ernst, Wolfgang. "Discontinuities:Does the Archive become Metaphorical in Multimedia Space?" In Digital Memory and the Archive, edited by Jussi Parikka, 113 - 140.Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013

Manoff, M. “Theories of the Archive from Across the Disciplines.” Portal: Libraries and the Academy, Vol.4, No.1 (2005): 9-25.Accessed December 10, 2015. http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/35687

Portelli, Alessandro "What makes oral history different?”. In The Oral History Reader, edited by Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson, 32-42. London: Routledge, 2006.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/living-in-the-archival-moment

Live Chat: For a neutral net

praskrishna — 2015-05-09T07:13:40Z

How much do you know about net neutrality? How does it affect you?

This was published in the Hindu on April 15, 2015. Pranesh Prakash participated in the chat.

Join us at The Hindu for a live chat at 5 p.m., today with Pranesh Prakash from Centre for Internet and Society, Vijay Anand from The Start Up Centre and Sriram Srinivasan, The Hindu's Business Editor - Online.

Here is the transcript of the chat:

The debate on net neutrality

The Hindu: Hello and welcome to The Hindu's live chat on net neutrality in India.

The Hindu: We have with us Pranesh Prakash from The Centre for Internet and Society and Vijay Anand from The Start Up Centre joining us today!

The Hindu: Also on the panel is The Hindu's Business Editor Online - Sriram Srinivasan who will be moderating this discussion.

Pranesh Prakash: Hi Sriram, thanks for having me on.

Sriram Srinivasan: Hi Pranesh, thanks for joining us

Vijay Anand: Thanks for the invite and looking forward Sriram.

Sriram Srinivasan: The topic of the day is proving to be of huge interest to the public. Pranesh, do you want to start off outlining why Net neutrality is such a big deal.

Sriram Srinivasan: Welcome Vijay, thanks for joining us.

Sriram Srinivasan: Vijay, would like to have your thoughts on the Net neutrality issue too. And how do you see the recent events, starting from the consultation paper that Trai published?

Vijay Anand: Sure, I'll get started as Pranesh puts together his thoughts. In the past few years if you have noticed, entrepreneurship has taken off with a boom. And I'd credit it mostly to the nature of the web - the web being open and allowing anyone with an entrepreneurial thought to build a solution over it. Considering the various constraints we have in a country like India, being ranked over 100 in a list of 146 countries when it comes to the ease of doing business, the fact that the internet is the equaliser has been a huge relief. Thats been recently threatened when Airtel forced TRAI's hand in putting out that 118 page consultation paper. Though, the issue has been brewing for a while now.

Pranesh Prakash: Today, we no longer live in a world of “roti, kapda, makaan”, but in the world of “roti, kapda, makaan aur broadband”. Telecom regulation and net neutrality has a very important role in enabling this vision of Internet as a basic human need that we should aim to fulfil. According to the IAMAI, as of October 2014, India had 278 million internet users. Of these, the majority access Internet through their mobile phones, and the WEF estimates only 3 in 100 have broadband on their mobiles. Thus, the bulk of our population is without broadband.

Pranesh Prakash: All ICT regulation should be aimed at achieving three goals: achieving universal, affordable access; ensuring effective competition in an efficient market and avoiding market failures; protecting against consumer harms.

Sriram Srinivasan: We have sort of taken the openness of the Internet for granted isn't it!

Pranesh Prakash: Given that background, net neutrality is the principle that we should regulate gatekeepers like ISPs to ensure they do not use their power to unjustly discriminate between similarly situated persons, content or traffic.

Vijay Anand: Sriram, we have. The internet by default is open. Thats the way it was built as well, and by nature, carries it through.

Sriram Srinivasan: Pranesh, Vijay, were you both surprised by the kind of reactions that have come in to the Trai paper?

Pranesh Prakash: Currently, ISPs get to play gatekeepers: they can throttle speeds for any service, they can say that a service they don't like (such as WhatsApp) should have to pay them more money to reach their customers (or that customers ought to pay more money to use WhatsApp), etc.

Pranesh Prakash: Well, the Internet has generally been an unregulated space, but the carriers -- those on whose pipes the Internet gets delivered -- have always been highly regulated.

Pranesh Prakash: So, no, the openness of the Internet (by which I guess you mean the unregulated aspect of the Internet) cannot be taken for granted.

Sriram Srinivasan: Just to highlight the issue in a more stark manner, what do both of you see as the best case scenario and worst case scenario facing us now?

Pranesh Prakash: No, I believe that the kinds of responses to the TRAI paper has attracted are predictable. There is a large group of people (including me) who believe the TRAI paper is incredibly biased toward the telecom industry who want greater regulation of "OTTs" like WhatsApp and Facebook and Flipkart.

Pranesh Prakash: What is unexpected is the volume of responses.

Vijay Anand: Sriram, there has been hints of this coming quite sometime back infact. Folks like Nikhil Pawa from Medianama has been raising flags about this issue for almost a year. I dont think it was the TRAI Paper that stirred the waters much as Airtel announcing the differential pricing to charge VoIP calls that woke people up.

Pranesh Prakash: More than 5 lakh responses have been sent in so far!

Vijay Anand: I agree with pranesh. We thought we'd do phenomenally well if we got 10,000 folks to write to TRAI. As of now thats crossed 500,000.

Sriram Srinivasan: That's huge!

Sriram Srinivasan: Vijay is referring to Airtel's decision to charge extra for VoIP apps, which they rolled back immediately.

Vijay Anand: Sriram, they sneakily announced the plan a day after Christmas, hoping everyone was on holidays. But yep the backlash started almost immediately.

Sriram Srinivasan: At that time, Airtel said they were waiting for more clarity from Trai. And then Trai's consultation paper was released around the end of March.

Pranesh Prakash: The worst case scenario is that we have TRAI & the govt setting regulations to enshrine "net non-neutrality" or "network discrimination". The best case scenario is we have TRAI and the govt setting in place good net neutrality regulations and creating an effective marketplace for competitive zero-rating.

Sriram Srinivasan: Pranesh, could you elaborate on what an effective marketplace for competitive zero-rating would look like?

Pranesh Prakash: That's a complicated question... but let me give it a shot.

Vijay Anand: IMO, thats leaving the web as is. Operators not taking a call or having the power to decide, but letting users decide. :)

Sriram Srinivasan: Readers will remember that plans like internet.org and Airtel Zero are zero-rating plans, where some select sites are allowed for access by subscribers free of charge

Pranesh Prakash: Leaving the web as it is, for me, isn't a viable option, since currently operators (who are *gatekeepers*) have the power to decide winners and losers.

Pranesh Prakash: Zero-rating is the practice of not counting (aka “zero-rating”) certain traffic towards a subscriber’s regular Internet usage. The zero-rated traffic could be zero-priced or fixed-price, capped or uncapped, metered or unmetered, subscriber-paid, Internet service-paid, or unpaid. Further, depending on the terms, zero-rating could be competitive or anti-competitive.

Pranesh Prakash: I believe that anti-competitive zero-rating (for instance, Airtel zero-rating it's own Hike chat service's traffic) should be prohibited.

Sriram Srinivasan: Pranesh, what do you think about internet.org?

Sriram Srinivasan: Thanks Vijay, this is very useful

Pranesh Prakash: Internet.org provides free access to a range of Internet services. I hate that they are calling it "Internet.org", when they don't provide access to the whole of the Internet.

Pranesh Prakash: But having said that, Internet.org (for which no operator gets paid) could be competitive or anti-competitive depending on the existence of regulations to ensure a competitive marketplace.

Vijay Anand: I agree with Pranesh on that bit. The name is a bit misleading, and even papers reported it as facebook's web, or facebook giving the Internet for free.

Sriram Srinivasan: But isn't it surprising that criticism against it has been muted, compared to say Airtel Zero. Is that because of its message that it wants to reach out to those who aren't connected with the Net?

Pranesh Prakash: And the good side of Internet.org is that it provides access. That, as I pointed out earlier, is one of the three goals of ICT regulation.

Vijay Anand: Sriram: It could also be that there arent a lot of subscribers on Reliance, as compared to Airtel, Vodafone and Idea, which i believe has close to 75% of the user base.

Sriram Srinivasan: Let's also remind readers that this isn't a fight confined to India. It's happening all over the world, each with their own unique issues. The one in the US was the most high-profile and recent and would be fresh in everyone's mind.

Pranesh Prakash: I think the reason why people view them as being different is that Airtel Zero is explicitly commercial but Wikipedia Zero and Airtel.org are non-commercial (in that they don't pay Airtel or any other provider for carrying their content). But I, personally, don't think this should make a difference.

Comment From Sabiya

What is the scope of zero-rating vis-a-vis important government websites?

Vijay Anand: Its something to think about. And i think this proposal will get floated. But one has to think about Net Neutrality from the perspective of "is this person who is picked, the best person to provide the service (forever)". In the future, i somehow anticipate that it would make far more sense for the government to build the fundamental system and build APIs that other entrepreneurs can build front-ends to, rather than them ending up more clones of IRCTC. Does that answer your question?

Comment From Sankar

Is net neutrality the socialism of the internet world? Is it sustainable on a long run?

Pranesh Prakash: 1. I don't believe it is socialism. In fact, the most important concept that underlies Net Neutrality is competition law. 2. It is sustainable in the long run, since discriminatory practices hurt competition, and harm consumers as well. In fact, not having Net Neutrality will be unsustainable.

Vijay Anand: Sankar: Quite the opposite, it is the platform that enables a free market. In that sense its democratic.

Comment From Guest

How can we make sure that neutrality is made public in India like US or Canada did. What should we do about it? I understand that all ISP have power to decide the winner but its also about consumers who has to pay more to get basic requirements done in right way.

Vijay Anand: If the policy makers and protests that are going on do their job, we will have a net neutrality policy. Canada doesnt have a net Neutality policy by the way. Only 7 countries in the world do. Canada isnt one of them. In a way we are ahead of this trend.

Comment From Ravi

In a country which is democratic, how can one be more free in communication can the other?

Pranesh Prakash: Well put. But do remember that rich people *are* currently more free in communicating with others than poor people since the rich have greater access to the platforms of communication.

Vijay Anand: IMO, I am opposed to zero rating, because saying we want to give access to the "poor" for free, sounds a lot like the aid model. I am not a big fan of that, since I havent seen many who have been weaned of that. An entire continent of Africa has been subject to that. You are right, if you ask me.

Comment From Nayan

I hate technology. So why should I still be bothered about Net Neutrality

Sriram Srinivasan: So that your voice can still be heard.

Pranesh Prakash: To ensure that when Airtel offers you "free Internet" it isn't in fact locking you up in a walled garden of a few services instead of the Internet.

Comment From Pranav

Should we not put pressure on the government to amend the Telegraph Act, 1885 instead of focusing on TRAI? An amendment to the act would ensure that net neutrality remains rather than just focusing on consultation papers by TRAI.

Vijay Anand: Pranesh would know how to answer this best.

Comment From Abhinav Goyal

To save internet from the general perception "more you pay easier it gets for you" , neutral net is essential.

Pranesh Prakash: If we dogmatically oppose all zero rating, then it will take much much longer for Internet services to trickle down to poor people. So as things stand, the more you pay, the more free you are. And if you're poor, you're not free to access Internet services.

Comment From Guest

how is airtel zero similar to net non neutrality. isnt it like OLX/quicker who return search result with preference to their paid advertiser

Vijay Anand: Yes. or a Google for that matter. But unlike the operators who are the gateway to the internet, OLX and Quickr both have to fight to better their experience for folks to come to them in the first place. Take the case of Google for example, if you are starting to get better search results in bing, you might switch. But operators could dramatically alter the way that goes, when they start prioritizing.

Pranesh Prakash: Stated as a general principle, I don't think those two situations are alike. In economic jargon: OLX/Quickr don't exhibit as strong a network effect as Airtel does, and thus are lesser "gatekeepers" than Airtel. So them showing preferential treatment to some matters less than when Airtel does it.

Pranesh Prakash: Airtel Zero is similar to Facebook, though. Not to OLX/Quickr. Facebook exhibits huge network effects, and the shifting costs (to VK or Sina Weibo) are huge since the people and businesses you want to reach are present in Facebook but not on VK.

Comment From Guest

Could you please explain in detail what are all the possible ways in which Airtel Zero could unduly make money if the platform is given the permission to operate.

Vijay Anand: If you say come up with an idea to start a music service - or prefer Gaana.com or you listen in Saavn or rdio, but Airtel says data is free if you use Wynk, which would people prefer? Thats the issue. Operators could have the opportunity to pick winners, (based on who could pay), whereas the web, being an open platform was always about the best solution winning.

Sriram Srinivasan: It could make it difficult for internet start-ups to compete with incumbents, therefore.

Pranesh Prakash: Three potential problems which are closely linked, are cross-subsidization, tying (anti-competitive bundling) of multiple services, and vertical price squeeze. All three of these are especial concerns now, with the increased diversification of traditional telecom companies, and with the entry into telecom of companies that create content. Hence, if Airtel cross-subsidizes the Hike chat application that it recently acquired, or if Reliance Jio requires customers to buy a subscription to an offering from Reliance Big Entertainment, or if Reliance Jio meters traffic from Reliance Big Entertainment differently from that from Saavn, all those would be violative of the principle of non-discrimination by gatekeepers.

Comment From Abhishek

Sir dont u think always and everytime there is a protest when something emerges which is out of conventional stuffs......this protest culture is holding back India to develop a healthy competitive culture.

Vijay Anand: Who is protesting, usually has a lot to say. At times very very good things come out of protests. thats the way democracy works. Doesnt it?

Pranesh Prakash: There are some modes of protest that I didn't agree with (down-voting the Flipkart app on Google Play Store and on iTunes, eg). But what's wrong with protest?

Comment From abutiger@gmail.com

Panel members : Can any members explain what is Net Neutrality. In what it is going to effect the net user had the new law come in to force? Thank you. Abu

Vijay Anand: Abu, there is no new law yet. There is a proposal from the operators asking for differential pricing based on a few factors. You can read that 118 page proposal on the website. At the moment, the government is considering both sides of the argument.

Sriram Srinivasan: Comments on the paper can be sent till April 25. And counter-comments close on May 8.

Sriram Srinivasan: Apologies, it should be April 24

Comment From Badri Narayanan

How is net neutrality in developed nations? Does it work differently there?

Vijay Anand: Only 7 countries in the world (pranesh can correct me if wrong) have a policy in place. it is assumed that by default the internet is open and neutral. Its only when that is challenged that we need a policy in place, so that there are no grey areas.

Sriram Srinivasan: Also, even in developed countries, the telecom companies do keep complaining about OTT services, the apps, and how they are cannabalising into their business.

Comment From kasthuri rangan

I support the TRAI suggestion as it will put an end to unwanted sites that spoils the youth and waste their tiem

Vijay Anand: I'd agree, but one can do that on a more individual household level, rather than on a national / network level. Who decides what we consume? What if tomorrow the government decides everyone watching youtube is wasting their time, or watching cricket should be doing something better. That starts to tread into censorship - which infact is a totally different matter altogether.

Sriram Srinivasan: Totally agree with Vijay.

Comment From RAJAT

My question is that why the ISPs want to disrupt the ongoing net neautrality?/

Vijay Anand: To make more money :) Even though their revenues are doubling every year from selling data services.

Pranesh Prakash: Currently net neutrality doesn't exist. So ISPs can't destroy it.

Comment From Amit Jha

Who owns the Internet and where does money come for its maintenance/expansion etc.

Vijay Anand: Amit, thats a brilliant question, Worthy of going into Quora infact. Its a long answer. The core of the web is managed by an organization called iCANN which is infact a confederation. However the extension, hosting, services etc are put together by virtually everyone and anyone. You can plug a computer into the internet and decide to be a server or a consumer. That's the beauty of the internet.

Sriram Srinivasan: You might want to read a very interesting book called 'Tubes' by Andrew Blum. It is about "a journey to the center of the internet." The author wanted to understand the physicality of the Internet.

Comment From Jyotiranjan

In the garb of net neutrality are the companies like whatsapp, skype getting their business without paying licencing fee where as telcos had to pay substantial sum for doing business?

Sriram Srinivasan: It's a completely different business model. It's tech that has enabled of lot of these things, in the same way that telcos can now play a part, albeit small, in the banking industry.

Vijay Anand: Jyoti, In a way yes. But skype or whatapp still doesnt work unless we pay for the data through which all of this rides. So infact even when we use skype and think its a free call there is cost of bandwidth associated with it. With the fact that the call is no longer circuit switched by packet switched, the charges that the operator claims they incur are also eliminated. its a far more efficient system.

Comment From VA

If airtel is providing free access to certain websites, I welcome that. I already have access to other websites via other service providers for which I pay. I don't understand what is this fuss all about.

Pranesh Prakash: This can be a good thing if it doesn't harm competition. If it harms competition, then in the long run, it is bad (even if immediately consumers think it is good). Think about predatory pricing: http://www.ictregulationtoo... Consumers might like predatory pricing in the beginning, but that allows for a company to squeeze out competition and then raise prices later. Harming competition is harmful for consumers in the long run. That's why we need to ensure that we only allow competitive zero-rating.

Vijay Anand: I agree. Users will want this. I Would want this. But the truth is, when you think about it from the other side, of people who are building companies, and coming up with new ideas to make things better, it makes it an uphill battle.

Comment From sapan

i would like request to Trai. do not give Net Nuutrality

Pranesh Prakash: Why do you think it would be harmful? Protection of consumers from harm is something you oppose? Ensuring fair non-discriminatory competition is something you oppose? I'm unclear why.

Vijay Anand: Sapan, I presume you mean the other way around.

The Hindu: Thank you Pranesh, Vijay and Sriram for all the replies!

Vijay Anand: It was a pleasure. And thanks for having me.

The Hindu: Is there anything else you'd like to say before we close this chat?

Pranesh Prakash: Net neutrality is the principle that we should regulate gatekeepers to ensure they do not use their power to unjustly discriminate between similarly situated persons, content or traffic. It is a democratic principle (in line with the right to equality in our Constitution) and it is important for freedom of speech and expression. Let us ensure that through effective regulation of competition we can ensure a free and open Internet that is accessible by all!

Sriram Srinivasan: Thanks! Also, readers, would be great to treat this as a consultation process initiated by Trai. There will be different points of view. It's not like a usual protest. It's just to find the right way forward for us. Also, please do participate in the process, whatever your views.

The Hindu: Well said! Thank you to all the readers who followed and participated in this live chat. Do connect with us on Twitter/Facebook for more questions and discussions on this topic.

The Hindu: Thanks and have a great evening!

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-hindu-april-15-2015-chat-for-neutral-net

Live Chat: Aadhaar: An identity crisis?

praskrishna — 2015-04-03T06:54:25Z

The Aadhaar card is not compulsory for citizens and "no person should be denied any benefits or ‘suffer’ for not having the Aadhaar cards issued by Unique Identification Authority of India," the Supreme Court ruled on Monday.

The live chat was published in the Hindu on March 17, 2015. Sunil Abraham took part in the discussions.

Four years after Aadhaar was launched – and touted as a panacea to access social services and subsidies – its users continue to be dogged by an array of problems ranging from technical glitches to procedural delays. And those who do not have an Aadhaar card find themselves quizzed by government authorities.

The Hindu’s Tamil Nadu edition today highlighted the challenges ordinary citizens - both those who have cards and those who do not – face, be it from non-availability of application forms or glitches in the biometrics process.

We will be hosting a live chat on Aadhaar at 5 pm today. You can pose questions and share your views with Sunil Abraham, Executive Director of Bangalore-based research organisation, Centre for Internet and Society; K. Gopinath, Professor at the Computer Science and Automation Department at the Indian Institute of Science (IISc) and The Hindu’s K. Venkatraman.

Comment From Anon

What could have happened such that the current government, who were once in the opposition, were members of the parliamentary committee that strongly opposed UIDAI, now suddenly wants to use it everywhere? What could have transpired such that the PM got so convinced that it would help its citizens more than it could potentially harm?

Sunil Abraham: Usually the party that is in power is pro-surveillance and anti-censorship and the opposition is pro-privacy and pro-free speech. After the elections - if the parties swap positions as a result of the mandate - then they usually also swap positions on surveillance and censorship. This phenomenon is not specific to India.

K. Gopinath: The leakage in the current models is very high. Hence, the attraction.

The issue earlier was whether there was some costs to the use of sw (esp. proprietary) from outside the country. Probably, these have been addressed.

Comment From Saurabh

Aadhaar was supposed to be a good 2 factor authentication mechanism, what happens to it now ?

Sunil Abraham: Aadhaar architecture was designed to allow for multiple authentication factors. Unfortunately biometrics is a poor authentication factor since it cannot be revoked. Any two-factor authentication scheme where one factor is biometrics is in reality only a one-factor scheme. Pin code as with credit cards and debit cards would have been much more secure for authentication.

K Venkataramanan: It will continue to be relevant, but is unlikely to be mandatory for quite some time.

K. Gopinath: Real-time 2-factor auth (biometrics, signatures) are not easy, esp over Internet, and would require a much longer rollout

Comment From Saurabh

I did not get Aadhar for myself or my family. Does this mean, I will not have to as yet.

Sunil Abraham: As per the UIDAI - Aadhaar is not mandatory. Also according to the latest remarks from the Supreme Court - Aadhaar should not be made mandatory without enabling law. But many state and central government agencies have ignored the comments made by the SC and have made Aadhaar mandatory for various programmes and schemes.

The Hindu: Is Aadhaar virtually redundant now following the SC order? Nothing more than an expensive experiment?

K. Gopinath: I think it will be used as an addl auth mechanism (just like elec./ph. receipts). May be once the technology is demo'ed properly (it has not been done seriously anywhere else), it will be taken up again.

Comment From Abubacker

I am an NRI and need to have Aadhaar Card? How to obtain Appointmet - I am from Tuticorin, Tamil Nadu

K Venkataramanan: Your family member or representative living in Tuticorin may apply for Aadhaar through the local body. It may be possible to get a date for recording biometrics. However, you have to come down here for recording biometric details.

Comment From Kishore J

Why is Govt. not able to legalize the Aadhar, I'm assuming the only reason Supreme court keeps blocking it is because its not a law passed by Parliament ?

K. Gopinath: SC goes by the constitution. If there is some concern someone is being "excluded", they will block it.

Sunil Abraham: The NIA bill was proposed in parliament and then referred to a Standing Committee. Our summary and detailed feedback to the Bill is available here: http://cis-india.org/intern... The Standing Committee harshly criticized the Bill. See: http://164.100.47.134/lsscommittee/Finance/42%20Report.pdf After which the Bill has not been reworked by the UIDAI or the Planning Commission /Niti Aayog for re-presentation to the Parliament.

Sunil Abraham: No - it is not just an expensive experiment. It is much more dangerous - it is what security experts call a Honey Pot. A centralized repository of biometrics harvested from residents of India. These biometrics can be used to authenticate transactions in the UIDAI database and other services. If there is a breach - then this huge collection of authentication factors will end us in the hands of criminal elements or some foreign state.

Comment From vaz

Aadhar is a joke, i have so many IDs and i cannot get any benefits out of it, it is simply wasting time, if Govt really want mandate make it easy for people, i pay taxes and Govt should treat me like one , i can not waste my time standing in queues to get that card, get me time slot and don't waste my time.

Sunil Abraham: This is because the process of registration has been outsourced to private agencies. These private agencies have futher outsourced to others and so on and so forth. Consequently, there is very poor management and quality control by these agencies. If indeed corruption was a priority - we should have tackled high-ticket corruption first. We could have had biometric registration just for only the politicians and bureaucrats. We could use biometric authentication with them to create a non-repudiable audit trail of subsidies flowing from the Centre to the Panchayat. Unfortunately, we tried to register everybody simultaneously and that has resulted in poor quality of biometrics and demographic data. We have visited some of the registration centre and have seen the reality on the ground.

Comment From Guest

I have been threatened by Gas Agency people if i don't link Aadhar to Bank Account, won't be given a refilling cylinder.Is this a right one?

K Venkataramanan: There is an option for getting DBT even without Aadhaar. The bank account and the gas agency consumer account can be linked without Aadhar. Please check www.mylpg.in for knowing how to apply for DBT registration without Aadhaar

The Hindu: Your views Prof Gopinath? Do you see it as a biometrics Honey Pot too?

K. Gopinath: From a security pov, it is certainly risky. It needs really robust technologies before one can think of rolling out. For example, we have "denial of service" attacks. ie, a service can be shut out by random bombardment of msgs. Most curr large scale systems are designed to handle it but some cannot handle it if large numbers collude. This only prevents access to service but other attacks can exfiltrate (take out) data, modify data, etc.

The Hindu: And Mr. Venkataramanan, your thoughts?

Comment From kuldeep singh chauhan

We need a strong law for data security. Aadhar is collecting data but there is no provision except some provisions of IT Act and IPC for data security.

K. Gopinath: Yes, the legislation is weak or unnecessarily vague (eg. the IT2000 act) or too broad in scope. I think what we need is a citizen's charter for data access, security and privacy. Also, what needs to be done when systems do not work!

Sunil Abraham: There are two interpretations of Sec. 43A of the IT Act. Acccording to most experts it only applies to Body Corporates in other words it does not apply to the Government when it plays the role of a data controller. According to an order issued by the IT Secy of Maharastra [the court of first instance for 43A of ITA] -this section will also apply to the Government. But beyond that order we have no clarity on this question.

Comment From Pavan

With no privacy laws, isn't it a bad idea to store citizen's data in a database? We all know how inept our government is in ensuring any security/privacy.

Sunil Abraham: With or without laws. Centralized approaches to identity/authentication management are much more fragile and vulnerable compared to decentralized options. The Internet is secured by digital signatures - there is no centralized repository of all these signatures. Therefore there is no centralized point of failure for the Internet. If the Aadhaar project was based on Smart Cards instead of Biometrics - then just like the Internet it would be robust without a central point of failure. http://cis-india.org/intern...

K. Gopinath: Storing all info in a single place is a big security risk. It needs very robust technologies (such as replication and "secret sharing protocols") that work inspite of failures. These have been done here and there but doing it on a large scale requires care.

Comment From Kunal Soni

SC Adhar card recommendations, ok Got it! But what about the banks for example SBI who ask for adhar cards stating its the bank's rule? Who's going to answer the question as they would never listen to common man and they never did.

Comment From Sandeep

Hi,May be it is a strong message, but what exactly is the need to make/introduce the Adhaar card, which is not recognizable worldwide? Why dont we make our passport smart enough and reduce it to a chip as in Europe. This will also enable everyone to get enrolled in our administrative system. Basically, we are only repeating the entire process with no international recognition.

Comment From Krishna Rao

Need to make it mandatory in the lines of SSN in US. Else it would be very difficult to manage and ensure the subsidies and benefits reach the really deserved section.

Comment From Ramesh

It is a great concept it all information like property purchases, tax returns, ration card, pf, esi, bank accounts , rail, air tickets are all linked. will reduce corrupt practice considerably. It should be the main identity of an Indian

Comment From arun

@Sunil what are the privacy safeguards that are in place currently regarding protection of information collected by the government and private agencies designated for this?

Sunil Abraham: Do you mean legal or technical?

K Venkataramanan: @The Hindu: Yes, there are serious privacy issues involved in a centralised database. However, their is a counter-view that this is no different from any other data base available in the hands of the government such as the one relating to PAN. The main concern of those worried about the privacy problem in Aadhaar is that data collection is done by private agencies, and details such as biometric data could be misused

The Hindu: Sunil, a question for you from arun

Comment From Pawan

Govt should give it legal recognition and give legal guarantee about the usage and storage of the data... After that there would be no concern related to identity security or enforcing it on the people.. People would trust it and come forward to register for it.

Sunil Abraham: Legal recognition and guarantees are not sufficient. You cannot use the law to fix poor technology design. The security of the Internet is not a function of good law. It is a function of good technological design.

Comment From Pappan

the so called Europe, US an other developed countries already have Social security numbers, why cant we just look at it like that?

Sunil Abraham: Social Security Number are an additional identifier. The database just contains a collection of identifiers. If that database is compromised the information cannot be used to authenticate transactions. This is very unlike the UIDAI centralized database which is a collection of authentication factors. Think of it as a database filled with the passwords of all Indian residents.

K Venkataramanan: @Kunal Soni - SBI can't insist on it as of now. The person who issued any circular to that effect may be hauled up in court

Comment From Guest

I have two questions. First, why is the honourable supreme court strking down aadhar, on what grounds? Second, how can the government come around those objections and allay the courts fears/objections? The informed panelists may please give their opinions too. Thank you

Sunil Abraham: There are 3 sets of petitioners who are being heard by the SC in the combined case. Some of them associated with the right are arguing that the UID is a threat to national security as it legitimizes illegal immigrants. Those associated with the left are arguing that it is a violation of the right to privacy. Still other who are ex-officers from the armed forces are arguing that the project is mired in corrupt practices.

K Venkataramanan: The Court has not struck down Aadhaar. It has only passed interim orders protecting the access to services of those who have not yet had them.

Comment From Aashish Gupta

Aadhaar was supposed to usher in portability of benefits. That is, you could migrate to a different state and still get the benefit you deserved.

Sunil Abraham: The Aadhaar database only contains information that identifies you and also allow you to authenticate against that database. It does not indicate eligibility for various schemes/subsidies. The migration across State level eligibility lists has to be done by the State. It is not a functionality provided by the UIDAI.

Comment From Ramesh

Supreme Court should have suggested a better option instead of coming down heavily on the Aadhar Card. The card will straight eliminate multiple rations cards and voter ids.

Sunil Abraham: The previous technology adopted by the NDA government - smart cards or SCOSTA [for the MNIC]. This technology option is free from many of the flaws of UIDAI's current design.

Comment From Mrigesh

Why is Aadhaar needed? I am for a middle class or for the elite class?

Comment From Geetha

Has the government (or concerned agencies/departments) formulated any policy on using the Aadhar information collected? For instance, what agency can use the information, under what conditions, with whose approval, for what limited purposes? Is this policy publicly available?

Sunil Abraham: No. Anyone who is approved by the UIDAI as a legitimate can use the KYC API. Absolutely anyone can use the Authentication API. There is no policy on what data collection/retention practices must be adhered to by the users of both these APIs.

Comment From Arun Jayapal

Has the government ever considered/analyzed a way to link the existing resources (such as ration card, DL, passport, voter id, etc.,) and not have come up with a completely new system (aadhaar). Is this not an absolute waste of time and resources?

Sunil Abraham: Yes, you are absolutely right. The government should have used biometrics as a means to dedup an existing high value database like the Electoral Rolls or more importantly the PAN Card database. That would have been better RoI for our anti-corruption Rupee.

K Venkataramanan: @Ramesh The Court has come down heavily on only officials who insist on Aadhar for delivery of services when there are clear orders that it should not be mandatory

Comment From George J

I'm an NRI. I presently work and live in a country where the first order of business on landing/Birth is to register one self and get a unique ID number and ID. This the case for expats as well as residents be they foreigners or Citizens. The registration process includes collection of Biometric data. This single No and Id is used for everything from Bank Accounts to School Admissions. It is good that India is doing something similar. It is high time people with multiple ration cards, Passports and the like are weeded out and provided a single verifiable identity. Data Security is of essence and necessary safeguards are available.

Sunil Abraham: Could you name the country? And can you use biometrics your country to authenticate transactions in a centralized database for all sorts of transactions? If yes, then the technology design in your country is as poor as in ours and it is only a question of time when the centralized database leaks.

Comment From Aashish Gupta

Apart from the Honey Pot, Aadhaar does not serve its primary purpose: tackling corruption. Most pilots of Aadhaar have crash landed, and as a result, state governments have created their own simpler systems to tackle corruption.

Sunil Abraham: See: http://www.thehindu.com/opi... If the authentication match is not working [1:1 match]. Then basically the dedup will not work [1:n] match. That is why they are doing demographic dedup before biometric dedup - because they know that the biometric dedup is fallible.

Comment From Balu

A citizenship card , backed with a strond database is a must for every citixen . Some serious thoughts should be done in this matter at the earliest , instead of wasting time and money on different schemes .

Sunil Abraham: We should use decentralized Internet scale technologies based on open standards that are already proven. If we had used smart cards based on SCOSTA or EMV standard we would be in a much better place.

Comment From PRASHANTH

Comment From vikash

supreme court should not have to push such legal hurdles given that the 750 million card has already been generated.A lot of money has been investad in the project

Comment From Saket

Aaadhar card is full of errors. At the place where I got registered person was issuing it in a hurry which creates lots of typing errors in DOB and Place.

Comment From Aashish Gupta

The supreme court has not struck down aadhaar, it has said that aadhaar cannot be mandatory. This is to make sure that people who do not have an aadhaar card do not miss out on their entitlements.

Comment From Ramesh

Aadhaar should be made mandatory with necessary safeguards. Unless there is an ultimatum and time frame to get the card it will never be implemented. Even now many do not know where to get it done.

Comment From Aadharam

Could you clarify whether this is an interim order or a final order on Aadhar? Is there scope for a retraction/shift on the Supreme Court's part?

Comment From Onkar Tiwari

Why supreme court doesnt understand Adhar is necessary? it can curb corruption. it wll reduce corruption specially in manrega where people enters fake details and grab the money.

K Venkataramanan: It is only an interim order. The Court will, hopefully, resolve the questions raised by the petitioners about privacy and data security issues

Comment From George J

I have taken Aadhar Card. The procedure asks the applicant themselves to verify the data entered for typing mistakes etc. before being uploaded, in fact where I registered they had asked for a sign off on the final data on a printout. So how errors can creep in is beyond me. However the photography equipment and skill of the data entry operator leave much to be desired as the mug shot is not very kind to me!

Comment From Guest

There should be a guide line which need to be followed as it is in the hands of private partners who are also ask for bribe from the poor people for the aadhar and they have no other option to pay for it as they thought that this only can help them to get the govt. facilities and subsidies.

K Venkataramanan: @Onkar Tiwari, It is up to the government to convince the court that Aadhaar will help curb corruption, and how. The Court is unlikely to stop the use of technology to improve delivery of services and curb corruption.

Comment From v subrahmanian

help line over phone and the email correspondence is total waste.. they themselves are helpless. Any query has never been replied to the caller's satisfaction. Getting them on line itself is a challenge. It's so complex. Of course, every eligible citizen of this complex country must have the identity card. Why not if it is done through employer in case of organized salaried employees?

Comment From Ramakrishna Rao

Hi !! I request the panelists to kindly sum up in few 4 or 5 points the reasons/grounds on which the parliamentary committee has rejected the aadhar

Comment From Guest

The agencies who are collecting data for Aadhar Card are not doing good. The aadhar card is full with many kind of errors including Name and DOB.. Even a person is able to register twice under this scheme.

The Hindu: Mr. Venkataramanan would you like to respond to Ramakrishna Rao?

Comment From Guest

@K Gopinath - how robust is the de-duplication UID claims to have. And in real time transactions, is it possible to authenticate n request without 'false positives' or 'negatives'?

K. Gopinath: Dedup claims assume “good” conditions. For example, a farmhand may have rough skin, etc that may make the fingerprints problematic. 1% errors have been reported in the past. Real time txns: I think the current Aadhar is not geared for it. The connectivity is not there. Also, with fingerprint technologies, the ability to check large number of fingerprints for a match is not good enough. It has never been scaled to the extent that is being planned.

Comment From Sandeep

Still not sure if Aadhaar then other ID cards not needed ? Or Still all along with Aadhaar ? then what is meaning of Aadhaar ? Only for LPG connection? Why not govt making Aadhaar is mandatory in all other fields as well , As Govt spent huge money for Aadhaar

Comment From Guest

@ Sunil - How plausible is the idea that govt can use UID data to profile public?

Comment From Sushubh

I for one is very happy that at least the Supreme Court is not falling for this privacy infringing scam. People defending this card here on this platform needs to read more about it.

Comment From Guest

Govt. created panic among public regarding adhaar. Public is highly annoyed with the way the government is handling this adhaar project. Only court reprimands,govt. backtracks as far as the adhaar is concerned. It is high time for govt. to have serious insight into this.

K Venkataramanan: The parliamentary committee on Finance had objected to the UID being extended to non-citizens on the ground that it may end up in illegal immigrants getting Aadhaar numbers.

It had also questioned the rollout ofthe scheme before legislation was passed. It had objected to its implementation without regard to its consequences.

Comment From Srinivasa

I believe Nandan Nilkeni had mentioned certain very good examples of the system flagging duplicates. So I assume the system is robust. We need to make it mandatory for all services delivery and have suitable policy and technology to protect data.

Sunil Abraham: I don't think we can go by the assurance of someone no longer associated with the project. It is not persons that keep us safe it is proper technology and law.

The Hindu: Welcome back Sunil! Lots of questions await you

K Venkataramanan: The committee had said UIDAI had no conceptual clarity, no proper assessment of the costs involved, and that it could end up in the hands of private agencies, that the technology was untested and the UID may not meet the objectives for which it was conceived

Sunil Abraham: Sorry I was logged out.

Comment From Guest

There was a recent news in The Hindu about linking of Adhar cards to election voter ID cards in Andhra Pradesh. Do you think that adopting such moves by every state result in mandating the procedure eventually?

Comment From Guest

First Passport then PAN , voter id and now adahar, in any country there is only passport and SSN, why india needs so many identity cards

K. Gopinath: The PAN database has been problematic just as the voter id. Hence, every technology cycle, a new system is usually attempted that attempts to be "better" than the before. However, this requires care which is not in good supply in the govt where the "lowest" bidder wins or outsourcing happens.

The Hindu: We have Prof Gopinatha back too. Sorry about that technical glitch.

Comment From Deepak Vasudevan

Why are different apex agencies managing Aadhar like UIDAI, Census and NPR? There should be one root (apex) body and others should report onto it.

Sunil Abraham: Yes. The division of work between UIDAI and NPR is not very clear and has added to the confusion.

K Venkataramanan: The parliamentary standing committee, too pointed out the overlap of functions involving UIDAI and NPR

The Hindu: There was this question for you earlier on the thread @K Gopinath - how robust is the de-duplication UID claims to have. And in real time transactions, is it possible to authenticate n request without 'false positives' or 'negatives'?

Comment From Guest

When Union Of India aimed to greater transparency... these are the road blocks they get... If Aadhar is not mandatory... then make Voter ID, PAN Card, Ration card also not mandatory in their respective Govt Businesses ... make self declaration as mandatory .. lets go to the stone age in this Information age. Instead SC should direct the center to come up with procedure to accommodate legitimate citizens of India into the scheme in a time bound manner and frame policies to avoid misuse of the personal data. are we looking the current world Information age thru the same old glasses... it is time to adopt the change...

Sunil Abraham: Indeed we need more transparency. But privacy protections must be inversely proportionate to power and as Julian Assange says transparency requirements should be directly proportionate to power See: http://openup2014.org/priva...

K Venkataramanan: Linking Aadhaar and voter ID cards is also being tried out in other states It is only one more means of eliminating fake voters or duplicates, but is unlikely tobe a ground to make Aadhaar mandatory

Comment From Ganesh

@Mr.Sunil, The current technology adopted for UIDAI is not good compared to last regime?

Sunil Abraham: Please see my our open letter on this question http://cis-india.org/intern...

Comment From Madhavan R

Just because UPA government bring this, its not good for NDA to object it.. STOP wasting our money.. Just try to make best out of it..

Sunil Abraham: Pouring more money into a failed project will not save it. It has serious technological flaw and without addressing it we are just making a bad situation worse.

Comment From George J

Currently all embassy's are collecting biometric data when you apply for a visa. Most of this collection is done by private parties on behalf of the respective governments. So if an Indian has travelled abroad the chances of his Biometric data being available to foreign govts is 99%. So what is the big scare about this? The need that it should be secure and should not be misused is sacrosanct. with the kind of revelations that have been made about mass eavesdropping I think people should get used to living in glass houses!

Comment From Pappan

@Sunil, please clarify about your comment on technology inadequecy

Comment From Yuvaraj

I strongly support Adhaar card implemenataion. intially they may face challeneges but for the long run its very effective mechanism to monitor every thing

Sunil Abraham: Monitoring everything means you monitor nothing. The bigger the haystack the harder it is to find the needle. Good surveillance practices means targetting survelliance not en masse data collection.

Comment From Guest

It is heard that privacy of citizens is at stake with adhaar card. can panelists respond to this?

Sunil Abraham: I have dealt with your question here: http://www.business-standar...

Comment From Srinivasa

That comparison of the two standards (SCOSTA and Aadhar) made interesting reading. Why not a system where you collect biometrics and iris and then issue a SCOSTA card? the biometrics and iris can be used to remove duplicates and maintain a clean registry by failing the duplicate SCOSTA cards. And all further transactions will only need a card based access.

Comment From Loganathan

This is one the worst move by any government in the center to remember. With no motive for the card, they introduced just to add to the loss in exchequer and there is no benefit out of it. Many have wrong data entered against their name and totally the waste one of all

Comment From Sabari Arasu

I am aware of someone who is not Indian citizen got Aadhar card for himself and his family. This scares me a lot as anyone(read Bangaladheshis, Sri Lankans, Pakintanis, etc..) can get Aadhar card. Is there a measure taken by Government to identify these issues?

Sunil Abraham: This is possible because the technology [biometrics] cannot verify citizenship. Even worse biometrics can be imported from foreign countries and can be used to create resident ghosts. This is because the technology cannot even verify if the person in India. We will need surveillance cameras at every point of registration to take care of this possible fraud.

Comment From Chandra Sekhar

Aadhaar card was a huge opportunity for the government to improve the efficiency of governance.It was a challenging task and required great amount accuracy.The way this project was executed is a question mark on efficiency of governance.

The Hindu: Sunil, Venkatramanan, Gopinath - would you agree that Aadhaar was an opportunity to improve governance? @chandra sekhar

Comment From Guest

Freebee lovers/netas will always oppose when you want to implement some thing which might deny them the benefit.

Sunil Abraham: Any evidence to backup this statement?

Comment From Guest

if the ASDHAAR is nt necessary as per SC then why everywhere it is being preferred identity such as Subsidy, Passport etc.

Sunil Abraham: Preference is not the same as a mandatory requirement.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-hindu-march-17-2015-aadhaar-an-identity-crisis

Litt Review

praskrishna — 2016-01-22T02:50:08Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/litt-review.pdf

Links in the Chain - Volume X, issue 3

praskrishna — 2012-12-05T07:33:34Z

Digital Natives newsletter, Volume X, issue 3.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/digital-natives/blog/changing-face-of-citizen-action.pdf

Linking Aadhaar with social media or ending encryption is counterproductive

sunil — 2019-08-28T01:39:47Z

Should Aadhaar be used as KYC for social media accounts? We have recently seen a debate on this question with even the courts hearing arguments in favour and against such a move.

The article was published in Prime Time on August 26, 2019.

The case began in Madras High Court and later Facebook moved the SC seeking transfer of the petition to the Apex court. The original petition was filed in July, 2018 and sought linking of Aadhaar numbers with user accounts to further traceability of messages.

Before we try and answer this question, we need to first understand the differences between the different types of data on social media and messaging platforms. If a crime happens on an end to end cryptographically secure channel like WhatsApp the police may request the following from the provider to help solve the case:

Identity data: Phone numbers of the accused. Names and addresses of the accused.
Metadata: Sender, receiver(s), time, size of message, flag identifying a forwarded messages, delivery status, read status, etc.
Payload Data: Actual content of the text and multimedia messages.

Different countries have taken different approaches to solving different layers of the surveillance problem. Let us start with identity data. Some like India require KYC for sale of SIM cards while others like the UK allow anonymous purchases. Corporations also have policies when it comes to anonymous speech on their platforms – Facebook for instance enforces a soft real ID policy while Twitter does not crack down on anonymous speech. The trouble with KYC the old fashioned way is that it exposes citizens to further risk. Every possessor of your identity documents is a potential attack surface. Indian regulation should not result in Indian identity documents being available in the millions to foreign corporations. Technical innovations are possible, like tokenisation, Aadhaar paperless local e-KYC or Aadhaar offline QR code along with one time passwords. These privacy protective alternatives must be mandatory for all and the Aadhaar numbers must be deleted from previously seeded databases. Countries that don’t require KYC have an alternative approach to security and law enforcement. They know that if someone like me commits a crime, it would be easy to catch me because I have been using the same telecom provider for the last fifteen years. This is true of long term customers regardless if they are pre-paid or post-paid. The security risk lies in the new numbers without this history that confirms identity. These countries use targeted big data analytics to determine risk and direct surveillance operations to target new SIM cards. My current understanding is that when it comes to basic user data – all the internet giants in India comply with what they consider as legitimate law enforcement requests. Some proprietary and free and open source [FOSS] alternatives to services offered by the giants don’t provide such direct cooperation in India.

When it comes to payload data – it is almost impossible (meaning you will need supercomputers) to access the data unless the service/software provider breaks end-to-end cryptography. It is unwise, like some policy-makers are proposing, to prohibit end-to-end cryptography or mandate back doors because our national sovereignty and our capacity for technological self-determination depends on strong cryptography. A targeted ban or prohibition against proprietary providers might have a counterproductive consequence with users migrating to FOSS alternatives like Signal which won’t even give the police identity data. As a supporter of the free software movement, I would see this as a positive development but as a citizen I am aware that the fight against crime and terror will become harder. So government must pursue other strategies to getting payload data such as a comprehensive government hacking programme.

Meta-data is critical when it comes to separating the guilty from the innocent and apportioning blame during an investigation. For example, who was the originator of a message? Who got it and read it last? WhatsApp claims that it has implemented the Signal protocol faithfully meaning that they hold no meta-data when it comes to the messages and calls. Currently there is no regulation which mandates data retention for over the top providers but such requirements do exist for telecom providers. Just like access to meta-data provides some visibility into illegal activities it also provides visibility into legal activities. Therefore those using end-to-end cryptography on platforms with comprehensive meta-data retention policies will have their privacy compromised even though the payload data remains secure. Here is a parallel example to understand why this is important. Early last year, the Internet Engineering Task Force chose a version of TLS 1.3 that revealed less meta-data over one that provided greater visibility into the communications. This hardening of global open standards, through the elimination of availability of meta-data for middle-boxes, makes it harder for foreign governments to intercept Indian military and diplomatic communications via imported telecom infrastructure. Courts and policy makers across the world have to grapple with the following question: Are meta-data retention mandates for the entire population of users a “necessary and proportionate” legal measure to combat crime and terror. For me, it should not be illegal for a provider who voluntarily wishes to retain data, provided it is within legally sanctioned limits but it should not be requirement under law.

There are technical solutions that are yet to be properly discussed and developed as an alternative to blanket meta-data retention measures. For example, Dr. V Kamakoti has made a traceability proposal at the Madras High Court. This proposal has been critiqued by Anand Venkatanarayanan as being violative in spirit of the principles of end-to-end cryptography. Other technical solutions are required for those seeking justice and for those who wish to serve as informers for terror plots. I have proposed client side metadata retention. If a person who has been subjected to financial fraud wishes to provide all the evidence from their client, it should be possible for them to create a digital signed archive of messages for the police. This could be signed by the sender, the provider and also the receiver so that technical non-repudiation raises the evidentiary quality of the digital evidence. However, there may be other legal requirements such as the provision of notice to the sender so that they know that client side data retention has been turned on.

The need of the hour is sustained research and development of privacy protecting surveillance mechanisms. These solutions need to be debated thoroughly amongst mathematicians, cryptographers, scientists, technologists, lawyers, social scientists and designers so that solutions with the least negative impact can be rolled out either voluntarily by providers or as a result of regulation.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/prime-time-august-26-2019-sunil-abraham-linking-aadhaar-with-social-media-or-ending-encryption-is-counterproductive

Limits to Privacy

Prashant Iyengar — 2012-12-14T10:28:55Z

In his research article, Prashant Iyengar examines the limits to privacy for individuals in light of the provisions of the Constitution of India, public interest, security of state and maintenance of law and order. The article attempts to build a catalogue of all these justifications and arrive at a classification of all such frequently used terms invoked in statutes and upheld by courts to deprive persons of their privacy.

Introduction

In 1965, the Supreme Court of India heard and decided State of UP v. Kaushaliya[1], a case which involved the question of whether women who are engaged in prostitution can be forcibly removed from their residences and places of occupation, or whether they were entitled, along with other citizens of India, to the fundamental right to move freely throughout the territory of India, and to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India [under Article 19(1)(d) and (e) of the Constitution of India]. In other words, did these women possess an absolute right of privacy over their decisions in respect to their occupation and place of residence? In its decision, the Supreme Court denied them this right holding that "the activities of a prostitute in a particular area... are so subversive of public morals and so destructive of public health that it is necessary in public interest to deport her from that place." In view of their 'subversiveness', the statutory restrictions imposed by the Suppression of Immoral Traffic Act on prostitutes, were upheld by the court as constitutionally-permissible “reasonable restrictions” on their movements.

The legal alibis that the State employs to justify its infringement of our privacy are numerous, and range from ‘public interest’ to 'security of the state' to the 'maintenance of law and order'. In this chapter we attempt to build a catalogue of these various justifications, without attempting to be exhaustive, with the objective of arriving at a rough taxonomy of such frequently invoked terms. In addition we also examine some the more important justifications such as 'public interest' and 'security of the state' that have been invoked in statutes and upheld by courts to deprive persons of their privacy.

The statutory venues of deprivation of privacy by the state being many – strictly, any statute that imposes any restriction on movement, or authorizes the search or examination of any residence or book, or the interception of communication may be read as a violation of a privacy right — tracking each of these down would not only be an impossible exercise, but also contribute little to the analytical exercise we are attempting here. Instead, in this chapter we only list provisions from a few statutes that are the familiar instruments by which the state impinges on our privacy. This is done with the limited object of arriving at a rough inventory of the common technologies which the state employs to impinge on our privacy.

Even if intrusions into our privacy are statutorily authorised, these statutes must withstand constitutional scrutiny. We therefore, begin this chapter with a discussion of the constitutional framework within which these statutes operate, and against which the severity of their incursions must be measured.

Constitutional Jurisprudence on Privacy

The 'right to privacy' has been canvassed by litigants before the higher judiciary in India by including it within the fold of two fundamental rights: the right to freedom under Article 19 and the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21.

It would be instructive to provide a brief background to each of these Articles before delving deeper into the privacy jurisprudence expounded by the courts under them.

Part III of the Constitution of India (Articles 12 through 35) is titled ‘fundamental rights’ and lists out several rights which are regarded as fundamental to all citizens of India (some apply all persons in India whether citizens or not). Article 13 forbids the State from making “any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part”.

Thus, Article 19(1) (a) stipulates that "all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression". However this is qualified by Article 19(2) which states that this will not "affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right … in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence".

Thus, the freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 19(1) (a) is not absolute, but a qualified right that is susceptible, under the Constitutional scheme, to being curtailed under specified conditions.

The other important fundamental right from the perspective of privacy jurisprudence is Article 21 which reads "No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law."

Where Article 19 contains a detailed list of conditions under which freedom of expression may be curtailed, by contrast Article 21 is thinly-worded and only requires a "procedure established by law" as a pre-condition for the deprivation of life and liberty. However, the Supreme Court has held in a celebrated case Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India [2] that any procedure "which deals with the modalities of regulating, restricting or even rejection of a fundamental right falling within Article 21 has to be fair, not foolish, carefully designed to effectuate, not to subvert, the substantive right itself. Thus, understood, 'procedure' must rule out anything arbitrary, freakish or bizarre."

Four decisions by the Supreme Court have established the right to privacy in India as flowing from Articles 19 and 21.

The first was a seven-judge bench judgment in Kharak Singh vs The State of U.P.[3] The question for consideration before this court was whether 'surveillance' under Chapter XX of the U.P. Police Regulations constituted an infringement of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. Regulation 236(b) which permitted surveillance by 'domiciliary visits at night' was held to be violative of Article 21.The word ‘life’ and the expression ‘personal liberty’ in Article 21 were elaborately considered by this court in Kharak Singh`s case. Although the majority found that the Constitution contained no explicit guarantee of a ‘right to privacy’, it read the right to personal liberty expansively to include a right to dignity. It held that "an unauthorised intrusion into a person's home and the disturbance caused to him thereby, is as it were the violation of a common law right of a man —an ultimate essential of ordered liberty, if not of the very concept of civilization."

In a minority judgment in this case, Justice Subba Rao held that "the right to personal liberty takes is not only a right to be free from restrictions placed on his movements, but also free from encroachments on his private life. It is true our Constitution does not expressly declare a right to privacy as a fundamental right but the said right is an essential ingredient of personal liberty. Every democratic country sanctifies domestic life; it is expected to give him rest, physical happiness, peace of mind and security. In the last resort, a person's house, where he lives with his family, is his 'castle' it is his rampart against encroachment on his personal liberty." This case, especially Justice Subba Rao’s observations, paved the way for later elaborations on the right to privacy using Article 21.

In 1972, the Supreme Court decided a case — one of the first of its kind — on wiretapping. In R. M. Malkani vs State of Maharashtra [4] the petitioner’s voice had been recorded in the course of a telephonic conversation where he was attempting blackmail. He asserted in his defence that his right to privacy under Article 21 had been violated. The Supreme Court declined his plea holding that “the telephonic conversation of an innocent citizen will be protected by courts against wrongful or high handed interference by tapping the conversation. The protection is not for the guilty citizen against the efforts of the police to vindicate the law and prevent corruption of public servants.”

The third case, Govind vs. State of Madhya Pradesh [5] , by a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court is regarded as being a setback to the right to privacy jurisprudence. Here, the court was evaluating the constitutional validity of Regulations 855 and 856 of the Madhya Pradesh Police Regulation which provided for police surveillance of habitual offenders including domiciliary visits and picketing. The Supreme Court desisted from striking down these invasive provisions holding that "It cannot be said that surveillance by domiciliary visit, would always be an unreasonable restriction upon the right of privacy. It is only persons who are suspected to be habitual criminals and those who are determined to lead criminal lives that are subjected to surveillance."

The court went on to make some observations on the right to privacy under the Constitution:

"Too broad a definition of privacy will raise serious questions about the propriety of judicial reliance on a right that is not explicit in the Constitution. The right to privacy will, therefore, necessarily, have to go through a process of case by case development. Hence, assuming that the right to personal liberty, the right to move freely throughout India and the freedom of speech create an independent fundamental right of privacy as an emanation from them it could not he absolute. It must be subject to restriction on the basis of compelling public interest. But the law infringing it must satisfy the compelling state interest test. It could not be that under these freedoms that the Constitution-makers intended to protect or protected mere personal sensitiveness."

The next case in the series was R. Rajagopal vs. State of Tamil Nadu [6] which involved a balancing of the right of privacy of citizens against the right of the press to criticize and comment on acts and conduct of public officials. The case related to the alleged autobiography of Auto Shankar who was convicted and sentenced to death for committing six murders. In the autobiography, he had commented on his contact and relations with various police officials. The right of privacy of citizens was dealt with by the Supreme Court in the following terms: -

The right to privacy is implicit in the right to life and liberty guaranteed to the citizens of this country by Article 21. It is a "right to be let alone". A citizen has a right to safeguard the privacy of his own, his family, marriage, procreation, motherhood, childbearing and education among other matters. None can publish anything concerning the above matters without his consent — whether truthful or otherwise and whether laudatory or critical. If he does so, he would be violating the right to privacy of the person concerned and would be liable in an action for damages. Position may, however, be different, if a person voluntarily thrusts himself into controversy or voluntarily invites or raises a controversy.
The rule aforesaid is subject to the exception, that any publication concerning the aforesaid aspects becomes unobjectionable if such publication is based upon public records including court records. This is for the reason that once a matter becomes a matter of public record, the right to privacy no longer subsists and it becomes a legitimate subject for comment by press and media among others. We are, however, of the opinion that in the interests of decency [Article 19(2)] an exception must be carved out to this rule, viz., a female who is the victim of a sexual assault, kidnap, abduction or a like offence should not further be subjected to the indignity of her name and the incident being publicised in press/media.

Elsewhere in the same decision, the court took a cautionary stance and held that "the right to privacy...will necessarily have to go through a process of case-by-case development."

The final case that makes up the 'privacy quintet' in India was the case of PUCL v. Union of India [7] in which the court was called upon to consider whether wiretapping was an unconstitutional infringement of a citizen’s right to privacy. The court held:

The right privacy — by itself — has not been identified under the Constitution. As a concept it may be too broad and moralistic to define it judicially. Whether right to privacy can be claimed or has been infringed in a given case would depend on the facts of the said case. But the right to hold a telephone conversation in the privacy of one’s home or office without interference can certainly be claimed as a ‘right to privacy’. Conversations on the telephone are often of an intimate and confidential character. Telephone conversation is a part of modern man's life. It is considered so important that more and more people are carrying mobile telephone instruments in their pockets. Telephone conversation is an important facet of a man's private life. Right to privacy would certainly include telephone-conversation in the privacy of one's home or office. Telephone-tapping would, thus, infract Article 21 of the Constitution of India unless it is permitted under the procedure established by law.

The court also read this right to privacy as simultaneously deriving from Article 19. "When a person is talking on telephone, he is exercising his right to freedom of speech and expression", the court observed, and therefore "telephone-tapping unless it comes within the grounds of restrictions under Article 19(2) would infract Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution."

However, the court in this case made two observations which would have a lasting impact on privacy jurisprudence in India –firstly, it rejected the contention that 'prior judicial scrutiny' should be mandated before any wiretapping could take place and accepted the contention that administrative safeguards would be sufficient.

Thus, to conclude this section of this chapter, it may be observed that the right to privacy in India is, at its foundations a limited right rather than an absolute one. In the sections that follow, it will become apparent that this limited nature of the right provides a somewhat unstable assurance of privacy since it is frequently made to yield to all manners of competing interests which happen to have a more pronounced legal standing.

Vocabularies of Privacy Limitation

Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) defines privacy in the following terms:

"No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks."

Similarly, Article 17 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (to which India is a party) declares that:

"No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home and correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation."

In this section, we look briefly at sections in some statutes that authorize the deprivation of privacy. These statutes have been classified under three headings, following the aforementioned international covenants, each dealing with a) our communications, b) our homes and c) bodily privacy.

Privacy of Communications

Communications laws

All laws dealing with mediums of inter-personal communication — post, telegraph and telephony and email – contain similarly worded provisions permitting interception under specified conditions.

Thus, section 26 of the India Post Office Act 1898 confers powers of interception of postal articles for the 'public good'. According to this section, this power may be invoked "On the occurrence of any public emergency, or in the interest of the public safety or tranquillity". The section further clarifies that “a certificate from the State or Central Government” would be conclusive proof as to the existence of a public emergency or interest of public safety or tranquillity.

Similarly, section 5(2) of the Telegraph Act authorizes the interception of any message

on the occurrence of any public emergency, or in the interest of the public safety; and
if satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of an offence,

Thus, the events that trigger an action of interception are the occurrence of any ‘public emergency’ or in the interests of ‘public safety’.

Most recently, section 69 of the Information Technology Act 2008 contains a more expanded power of interception which may be exercised "when they [the authorised officers] are satisfied that it is necessary or expedient" to do so in the interest of:

sovereignty or integrity of India,
defence of India,
security of the State,
friendly relations with foreign States or
public order or
preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to above or
for investigation of any offence,

[More details of the occasions and the mandatory procedural safeguards before these powers may be exercised are contained in our briefing notes on Privacy and Telecommunications and Privacy and the IT Act]

From a plain reading of these sections, there appears to be a gradual loosening of standards from the Post Office Act to the latest Information Technology Act. The Post Office Act requires the existence of a ‘state of public emergency’ or a ‘threat to public safety and tranquillity’ as a precursor to the exercise of the power of interception. This requirement is continued in the Telegraph Act with the addition of a few more conditions, such as expediency in the interests of sovereignty, etc. Under the most recent IT Act, the requirement of a public emergency or a threat to public safety is dispensed with entirely – here, the government may intercept merely if it feels it ‘necessary or expedient’.

How much of a difference does it make?

In Hukam Chand Shyam Lal v. Union of India and ors [8] , the Supreme Court was required to interpret the meaning of ‘public emergency’. Here, the court was required to consider whether disconnection of a telephone could be ordered due to an ‘economic emergency’. The Government of Delhi had ordered the disconnection of the petitioner’s telephones due to their alleged involvement, through the use of telephones, in (then forbidden) forward trading in agricultural commodities. According to the government, this constituted an ‘economic emergency’ due to the escalating prices of food. Declining this contention, the Supreme Court held that:

a 'public emergency' within the contemplation of this section is one which raises problems concerning the interest of the public safety, the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States or public order or the prevention of incitement to the commission of an offence.

Economic emergency is not one of those matters expressly mentioned in the statute. Mere 'economic emergency'— as the high court calls it—may not necessarily amount to a 'public emergency' and justify action under this section unless it raises problems relating to the matters indicated in the section.

In addition the other qualifying term, 'public safety' was interpreted in an early case by the Supreme Court to mean "security of the public or their freedom from danger. In that sense, anything which tends to prevent dangers to public health may also be regarded as securing public safety. The meaning of the expression must, however, vary according to the context."[9]

Thus, the words ‘public emergency’ and 'public safety' does provide some legal buffer before the government may impinge on our privacy in the case of post and telecommunications. In a sense, they operate both as limits on our privacy as well as limits on the government’s ability to impinge on our privacy — since the government must demonstrate their existence to the satisfaction of the court, failing which their actions would be illegal.

However, as mentioned, even these requirements have been dispensed with in the case of electronic communications falling under the purview of the Information Technology Act where sweeping powers of interception have been provided extending from matters affecting the sovereignty of the nation, to the more mundane 'investigation of any offence'.

Privileged Communications

In addition to laying down procedural safeguards which restrict the conditions under which our communication may be intercepted, the law also safeguards our privacy in certain contexts by taking away the evidentiary value of certain communications.

Thus, for instance, under the Evidence Act, communications between spouses and communications with legal advisors are accorded a special privilege.

Section 122 of the Evidence Act forbids married couples from disclosing any communications made between them during marriage without the consent of the person who made it. This however, does not apply in suits “between married persons, or proceedings in which one married person is prosecuted for any crime committed against the other.”

This rule was applied in a case before the Kerala High Court, T.J. Ponnen vs M.C. Varghese [10] where a man sued his son-in-law for defamation based on statements about him written in a letter addressed to his daughter. The trial court held that the prosecution was invalid since it was based on privileged communications between the couple. This was upheld by the high court. The petitioner had attempted to argue that it was immaterial how he gained possession of the letter. The high court disagreed with this contention holding that this would defeat the purpose of section 122.

Similarly section 126 forbids “barristers, attorneys, pleaders or vakils” from disclosing, without their client’s express consent “any communication made to him in the course and for the purpose of his employment as such barrister, pleader, attorney or vakil... or to state the contents or condition of any document with which he has become acquainted in the course and for the purpose of his professional employment or to disclose any advice given by him to his client in the course and for the purpose of such employment.”

As with section 122, this privilege also comes with exceptions. Thus, the following kinds of communications are exempted from the privilege:

any communication made in furtherance of any illegal purpose,
any fact observed by any barrister, pleader, attorney or vakil, in the course of his employment as such showing that any crime or fraud has been committed since the commencement of his employment.

Section 127 extends the scope attorney-client privilege to include any interpreters, clerks and servants of the attorney or barrister. They are also not permitted to disclose the contents of any communication between the attorney and her client.

Section 129 enacts a reciprocal protection and provides that clients shall not be compelled to disclose to the court any "confidential communication which has taken place between him and his legal professional adviser."

Section 131 of the Evidence Act further cements the legal protection afforded to married couples, attorneys and their clients by providing that "No one shall be compelled to produce documents in his possession, which any other person would be entitled to refuse to produce if they were in his possession" unless that person consents to the production of such documents.

Note that these privileges do not limit the ability of the state to intercept communications – they merely negate the evidentiary value of any communications so intercepted.

Privacy of the Home: Search and Seizure Provisions

Under what circumstances may the State invade the privacy of our homes? What are the limits of these powers? Technically, any law that authorizes “search and seizure” can be said to authorize an invasion of our privacy. Many laws permit searches, for various grounds — ranging from the Income Tax Act which authorizes searches to recover undisclosed income, to the Narcotics Act which prescribes a procedure to search and sieze drugs, to the Excise Act and the Customs Act which do so in order to discover goods that are manufactured or imported in violation of those respective statutes. In this section we deal only with the general provisions for search and seizure under the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) provides that a house or premises may be searched either under a search warrant issued by a court, or, in the absence of a court-issued-warrant, by a police officer in the course of investigation of offences.

Thus, a court may issue a search warrant where

it has reason to believe that a person to whom a summons has been, or might be, addressed, will not or would not produce the document or thing as required by such summons; or
where such document or thing is not known to the court to be in the possession of any person, or
where the court considers that the purposes of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code will be served by a general search or inspection,

Similarly, section 165 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits for searches to be conducted by “police officers in charge of police station or a police officer making an investigation” without first obtaining a warrant. Such a search may be conducted if he has “reasonable grounds for believing that anything necessary for the purposes of an investigation into any offence which he is authorised to investigate may be found in any place within the limits of the police station of which he is in charge, or to which he is attached”, and if, in his opinion, such thing cannot “be otherwise obtained without undue delay”.

Such officer must record in writing the grounds of his belief and specify “so far as possible” the thing for which search is to be made.

In both cases, the Code of Criminal Procedure requires the search to conform to procedures including the presence of "two or more independent and respectable inhabitants of the locality”. The preparation, in their presence, of “a list of all things seized in the course of such search, and of the places in which they are respectively found", the delivery of this list to the occupant of the place being searched.

However, in reality, these requirements are observed more in the breach. Courts have consistently held that not following these provisions would not make evidence obtained inadmissible — it would make the search irregular, not unlawful. Thus, in State of Maharashtra v. Natwarlal Damodardas Soni [11], where a search was conducted under the Customs Act to recover smuggled gold, the Supreme Court held that

Assuming that the search was illegal it would not affect either the validity of the seizure and further investigation by the customs authorities or the validity of the trial which followed on the complaint of the Assistant Collector of Customs.

In a different case, Radhakrishan v. State of U.P. [12] which involved an illegal search in contravention of the Code of Criminal Procedure , the Supreme Court held that:

"So far as the alleged illegality of the search is concerned, it is sufficient to say that even assuming that the search was illegal the seizure of the Articles is not vitiated. It may be that where the provisions of ... Code of Criminal Procedure, are contravened the search could be resisted by the person whose premises are sought to be searched. It may also be that because of the illegality of the search the Court may be inclined to examine carefully the evidence regarding the seizure. But beyond these two consequences no further consequence ensues."

India inherits the common law notion that a man’s house is his castle. In the light of the cases discussed above, this claim certainly appears to be lofty. However, there is still hope. In a recent case, the Supreme Court struck down provisions of a legislation on grounds that it was too intrusive of citizens’ right to privacy. The case involved an evaluation of the Andhra Pradesh Stamp Act which authorized the collector to delegate “any person” to enter any premises in order to search for and impound any document that was found to be improperly stamped. Thus, for instance, banks could be compelled to cede all documents in their custody, including clients documents, for inspection on the mere chance that some of them may be improperly stamped. These banks were then compelled under law to pay the deficit stamp duty on the documents, even if they themselves were not party to the transactions recorded in the documents.

After an exhaustive analysis of privacy laws across the world, and in India, the Supreme Court held that in the absence of any safeguards as to probable or reasonable cause or reasonable basis, this provision was violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy, both of the house and of the person. [13]

The case marks a welcome redrawing of the boundaries of the right to privacy against state intrusion.

Privacy of the Body

To what extent do we have a right to privacy that protects what we may do with our own bodies and may be done to them? This section deals with this question in the context of four issues that have arisen before courts:

the ability of the state to order persons to undergo medical-examination,
to undergo a range of 'truth technologies' including narco analysis, brain mapping, etc.,
to submit to DNA testing and d) to abortion. In most cases, as we shall see, the right to privacy cedes ground to any available competing interest.

Court-ordered Medical Examinations

Can courts compel persons to undergo medical examinations against their will? In the case of Sharda v. Dharmpal[14], decided in 2003, the Supreme Court held that they could. Here a man filed for divorce on that grounds that his wife suffered from a mental illness. In order to establish his case, he requested the court to direct his wife to submit herself to a medical examination. The trial court and the high court both granted his application. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the woman contested the order on grounds firstly, that compelling a person to undergo a medical examination by an order of the court would be violative of her right to 'personal liberty' guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Secondly, in absence of a specific empowering provision, a court dealing with matrimonial cases cannot subject a party to undergo medical examination against his her volition. The court could merely draw an adverse inference.

The Supreme Court rejected these contentions holding that the right to privacy in India was not absolute. If the "respondent avoids such medical examination on the ground that it violates his/her right to privacy or for a matter right to personal liberty as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, then it may in most of such cases become impossible to arrive at a conclusion. It may render the very grounds on which divorce is permissible nugatory."

The court upheld the rights of matrimonial courts to order a person to undergo medical test. Such an order, the court held, would not be in violation of the right to personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. However, this power could only be exercised if the applicant had a strong prima facie case, and there was sufficient material before the court. Crucially, the court held that if, despite the order of the court, the respondent refused to submit herself to medical examination, the court would be entitled to draw an adverse inference against him.

Thus, oddly, one limitation on the right to privacy appears to be the statutory rights of others. One is entitled to the privacy of one’s body, to the extent that another person is not, thereby, deprived of a statutory right – as in this case, to divorce.

Reproductive Rights

Ahmedabad: A 13-year-old girl, who conceived after being repeatedly raped, has moved the Gujarat High Court and sought permission to medically terminate her pregnancy after a sessions court rejected her plea.

Express India(April 2010) [15]

To what extent do pregnant women enjoy a right to privacy over their bodies and their reproductive decisions? Are there circumstances when the State can intervene and either order or forbid an abortion?

According to the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 a pregnancy may be terminated before the twentieth week if:

the continuance of the pregnancy would involve a risk to the life of the pregnant woman or of grave injury to her physical or mental health; or
there is a substantial risk that if the child were born, it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities to be seriously handicapped.
where any pregnancy is alleged by the pregnant woman to have been caused by rape,
where any pregnancy occurs as a result of failure of any device or method used by any married woman or her husband for the purpose of limiting the number of children.

Consent for termination needs to be obtained from the guardian in cases of minors or women who are mentally ill. In all other cases, the woman herself must consent.

Beyond the period of 20 weeks, the pregnancy may only be terminated if there is immediate danger to the life of the woman.

In August 2009, the Supreme Court heard an expedited appeal that was filed on behalf of a destitute mentally retarded woman who had become pregnant consequent to having been raped at a government run shelter. The government had approached the high court seeking permission to terminate her pregnancy, which had been granted by that court despite the finding by an ‘expert body’ of medical practitioners that she was keen on continuing the pregnancy. On appeal the Supreme Court held, very curiously, that the woman was not ‘mentally ill’, but ‘mentally retarded’, and consequently her consent was imperative under the Act. [16] However, not content to stop there, the court made several puzzling and contradictory observations:

Firstly, the court took the opportunity to affirm, generally, women’s rights to make reproductive choices as a dimension of their `personal liberty' as guaranteed by Article 21 (Right to Life and Personal Liberty) of the Constitution of India. The court observed:

“It is important to recognise that reproductive choices can be exercised to procreate as well as to abstain from procreating. The crucial consideration is that a woman's right to privacy, dignity and bodily integrity should be respected. This means that there should be no restriction whatsoever on the exercise of reproductive choices such as a woman's right to refuse participation in sexual activity or alternatively the insistence on use of contraceptive methods. Furthermore, women are also free to choose birth-control methods such as undergoing sterilisation procedures. Taken to their logical conclusion, reproductive rights include a woman's entitlement to carry a pregnancy to its full term, to give birth and to subsequently raise children. (emphasis mine) [17]

However, the court went on to affirm, in language that curiously imitates Roe v Wade,[18] that there was “a `compelling state interest' in protecting the life of the prospective child.[19]

Secondly, the Supreme Court upheld the woman’s consent as determinative and in doing so, categorically rejected the high court approach. The court held that since she suffered from `mild mental retardation' this did not render her "incapable of making decisions for herself". Simultaneously, however, the Supreme Court proceeded gratuitously to apply the common law doctrine of `parens patriae' to resume jurisdiction over the woman in her “best interests”. According to a court-appointed expert committee, her mental age was “close to that of a nine-year old child” and she was capable of “learning through rote memorisation and imitation” and of performing “basic bodily functions”.[20] In this light, the court deemed in her ‘best interests’, as defined by an expert committee, to defer to her wishes.

The findings recorded by the expert body indicate that her mental age is close to that of a nine-year old child and that she is capable of learning through rote-memorisation and imitation. Even the preliminary medical opinion indicated that she had learnt to perform basic bodily functions and was capable of simple communications. In light of these findings, it is the `best interests' test alone which should govern the inquiry in the present case and not the `substituted judgment' test. [21]

If one disregards the liberalism of its outcome, there are various problems with this decision. Chiefly, the Supreme Court relied on the woman’s expressed consent to deny the legitimacy of the high court’s decision in favour of abortion. Inexplicably, however, in the same move, the Supreme Court reserved to itself the right to adjudicate the ‘best interests’ of the woman. Thus, in relation to abortion, mentally retarded women are more autonomous than minor girls (since their own consent is determinative, rather than their guardians) but they are still less autonomous than ‘normal’ women (since their decisions are subject to adjudication based on what the court thinks is in their best interests)!

DNA Tests in Civil Suits

Do we have a right to privacy over the interiors of our body – our blood, our tissue, our DNA? There is, by now, a strong line of cases decided by the Supreme Court in which our right to ‘bodily integrity’ has been held to not be absolute, and may be interfered with in order to settle many terrestrial issues. In most cases, this question has arisen in the context of the determination of paternity – either in divorce or maintenance proceedings. Central in the determination of these issues is section 112 of the Evidence Act which stipulates that birth of a child during the continuance of a valid marriage (or within 280 days of its dissolution) would be conclusive proof of legitimacy of that child, “unless it can be shown that the parties to the marriage had no access to each other at any time when he could have been begotten.”

As is evident, this section creates a strong legal presumption of legitimacy that leaves no room for a scientific rebuttal. Various litigants have, nevertheless, sought the courts’ indulgence in accepting medical evidence to displace this formidable legal presumption. These efforts have yielded a measure of success, and a steady line of precedents since the early 1990s now affirms the right of courts to direct medical evidence in cases they consider fit. In these cases, the court has frequently invoked privacy rights as an important consideration to be weighed before ordering a person to submit to any test.

In one of the earliest and most frequently invoked cases, Goutam Kundu vs State of West Bengal and Anr (1993) [22] the Supreme Court laid down guidelines governing the power of courts to order blood tests. The court held:

courts in India cannot order blood test as matter of course;

wherever applications are made for such prayers in order to have roving inquiry, the prayer for blood test cannot be entertained.

There must be a strong prima facie case in that the husband must establish non-access in order to dispel the presumption arising under section 112 of the Evidence Act.

The court must carefully examine as to what would be the consequence of ordering the blood test; whether it will have the effect of branding a child as a bastard and the mother as an unchaste woman.

No one can be compelled to give sample of blood for analysis.

On the particular facts of this case, the Supreme Court refused to order the respondent to submit to the test, since in its view, there was no prima facie case made out that cast doubts on the legal presumption of legitimacy.

These guidelines have been frequently invoked in subsequent cases. In a complex set of facts, in Ms. X vs Mr. Z and Anr (2001), [23] the Delhi High Court was called to consider whether a foetus had a ‘right to privacy’ – or whether the mother of the foetus could assert a right to privacy on it’s behalf. A woman had given birth to a still-born child and tissues from the foetus had been stored at the All India Institute of Medical Sciences. Her husband approached to obtain an order permitting a DNA test to be carried out to determine if he was the father. In her defence, the woman claimed that this would offend her right to privacy. The high court reaffirmed the guidelines laid down in the Gautam Kundu case (supra), and also upheld the petitioner’s right to privacy over her own body. However, the court took the stance that she did not have a right of privacy over the foetus once it had been discharged from her body:

"The petitioner indeed has a right of privacy but is being not an absolute right, therefore, when a foetus has been preserved in All India Institute of Medical Science, the petitioner, who has already discharged the same cannot claim that it affects her right of privacy.

However, if the petitioner was being compelled to subject herself to blood test or otherwise, she indeed could raise a defense that she cannot be compelled to be a witness against herself in a criminal case or compelled to give evidence against her own even in a civil case but the position herein is different. The petitioner is not being compelled to do any such act. Something that she herself has discharged, probably with her consent, is claimed to be subjected to DNA test. In that view of the matter, in the peculiar facts, it cannot be termed that the petitioner has any right of privacy."

The decision has wide-ranging implications since it virtually divests control and ownership over any material that has been discarded from the body – from nails to hair to tissue samples. In an interesting case in the US, Moore v. Regents of the University of California [24], the Supreme Court of California was faced with a suit to determine whether a man retained ownership over cells that had been removed from his body through a surgical procedure. In this case, cells from a patient’s spleen were used to conduct research which resulted in the patenting of a cell-line by the defendant. The patient sued for a share in the profits, but this was rejected by the court which held that he had no property rights to his discarded cells or any profits made from them. The court specifically rejected the argument that his spleen should be protected as property as an aspect of his privacy and dignity. The court held these interests were already protected by informed consent.

In a sense the Ms. X vs Mr. Z case arrives at identical conclusions without as much deliberation on its implications. It would be interesting to see how subsequent courts interpret and apply this precedent.

One of the most critical factors, consistently weighed by courts alongside the privacy rights implicated, is the ‘best interests’ of the child. Thus, in Bhabani Prasad Jena v. Convenor Secretary, Orissa State Commission for Women & Anr.[25], the Supreme Court quashed a high court-mandated DNA test to determine the paternity of an unborn child in a woman’s womb. In doing so, the SC observed:

“In a matter where paternity of a child is in issue before the court, the use of DNA is an extremely delicate and sensitive aspect. One view is that when modern science gives means of ascertaining the paternity of a child, there should not be any hesitation to use those means whenever the occasion requires. The other view is that the court must be reluctant in use of such scientific advances and tools which result in invasion of right to privacy of an individual and may not only be prejudicial to the rights of the parties but may have devastating effect on the child. Sometimes the result of such scientific test may bastardise an innocent child even though his mother and her spouse were living together during the time of conception. In our view, when there is apparent conflict between the right to privacy of a person not to submit himself forcibly to medical examination and duty of the court to reach the truth, the court must exercise its discretion only after balancing the interests of the parties and on due consideration whether, for a just decision in the matter, DNA is eminently needed. (emphasis added)

A strong trend, evident in this case, is the bussing of the interests of the child (in not being declared illegitimate), along with the privacy rights of the mother. The two create a composite interest opposed to that of the putative father, which the courts have been reluctant to interfere with except for the most compelling reasons. But what happens when then the interests of the child conflict with the privacy rights of either parent?

In a high profile case in 2010, Shri Rohit Shekhar vs Shri Narayan Dutt Tiwari[26], the Delhi High was called upon to determine whether a man had a right to subject the person he named as his biological father to a DNA test. Contrary to the trend in the preceding cases, it was the biological father who pleaded his right to privacy in this case. The court relied on international covenants to affirm the “right of the child to know of her (or his) biological antecedents” irrespective of her (or his) legitimacy. The court ruled:

There is of course the vital interest of child to not be branded illegitimate; yet the conclusiveness of the presumption created by the law in this regard must not act detriment to the interests of the child. If the interests of the child are best sub-served by establishing paternity of someone who is not the husband of her (or his) mother, the court should not shut that consideration altogether.

The protective cocoon of legitimacy, in such case, should not entomb the child’s aspiration to learn the truth of her or his paternity.

The court went on to draw a distinction between legitimacy and paternity that may both "be accorded recognition under Indian law without prejudice to each other. While legitimacy may be established by a legal presumption [under section 112 of the Evidence Act], paternity has to be established by science and other reliable evidence"[27] The court, however, reaffirmed that the same considerations would apply as was laid down in previous cases – i.e., the plaintiff would have to establish a prima facie case and weigh the competing interests of privacy and justice before it could order a DNA test. In this case, the petitioner was able to produce DNA evidence that excluded the possibility that his legal father was his biological father. In addition, photographic and testimonial evidence suggested that the respondent could be his biological father. On these grounds the Delhi High Court ordered the respondent to undergo a DNA test. This was upheld in an appeal to the Supreme Court.

So from the foregoing cases, it appears that it is the ‘best interests of the child’ that undergrids the right to privacy of either parent. When the two are in conflict it is the former that will, the case law suggests, invariably prevail.

Bodily Effects — Fingerprints, handwriting samples, photographs, Irises, narco-analysis, brain maps and DNA

The human body easily betrays itself. We are incessantly dropping residues of our existence wherever we go – from shedding hair and fingernails, to fingerprints and footprints, handwriting – which, through use of modern technology, can implicate our bodies, and identify us against our will. Not even our thoughts are immune as new technologies like brain mapping pretend to be able to harvest psychic clues from our physiology.

In this section we explore occasions when the state may compel us to 'perform' our existence for instance, by submitting to photography, providing finger impressions or handwriting samples, submit to narco-analysis and truth tests, and more recently to provide iris scan data or our DNA.

Section 73 of the Evidence Act stipulates that the court "may direct any person present in the court to write any words or figures for the purpose of enabling the court to compare the words or figures so written with any words or figures alleged to have been written by such person."

This section was interpreted by the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Ram Babu Misra [28] where it was held that there must be “some proceeding before the court in which...it might be necessary... to compare such writings”. This specifically excludes, say, a situation where the case is still under investigation and there is no present proceeding before the court. “The language of section 73 does not permit a court to give a direction to the accused to give specimen writings for anticipated necessity for comparison in a proceeding which may later be instituted in the court.”

The pre-independence Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920 provides for the mandatory taking, by police officers, of 'measurements' and photograph of persons arrested or convicted for any offence punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term of one year of upwards or ordered to give security for his good behaviour under section 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. [29] The Act also empowers a magistrate to order a person to be measured or photographed if he is satisfied that it is required for the purposes of any investigation or proceeding under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. [30]

The Act also provides for the destruction of all photographs and records of measurements on discharge or acquittal. [31]

In addition, the Code of Criminal Procedure was amended in 2005 to enable the collection of a host of medical details from accused persons upon their arrest. Section 53 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that upon arrest, an accused person may be subjected to a medical examination if there are “reasonable grounds for believing” that such examination will afford evidence as to the crime. The scope of this examination was expanded in 2005 to include “the examination of blood, blood-stains, semen, swabs in case of sexual offences, sputum and sweat, hair samples and finger nail clippings by the use of modern and scientific techniques including DNA profiling and such other tests which the registered medical practitioner thinks necessary in a particular case.”

In a case in 2004, the Orissa High Court affirmed the legality of ordering a DNA test in criminal cases to ascertain the involvement of persons accused. Refusal to co-operate would result in an adverse inference drawn against the accused.

After weighing the privacy concerns involved, the court laid down the following considerations as relevant before the DNA test could be ordered:

the extent to which the accused may have participated in the commission of the crime;
the gravity of the offence and the circumstances in which it is committed;
age, physical and mental health of the accused to the extent they are known;
whether there is less intrusive and practical way of collecting evidence tending to confirm or disprove the involvement of the accused in the crime;
the reasons, if any, for the accused for refusing consent [32]

Most recently the draft DNA Profiling Bill pending before the Parliament attempts to create an ambitious centralized DNA bank that would store DNA records of virtually anyone who comes within any proximity to the criminal justice system. Specifically, records are maintained of suspects, offenders, missing persons and “volunteers”. The schedule to the Bill contains an expansive list of both civil and criminal cases where DNA data will be collected including cases of abortion, paternity suits and organ transplant. Provisions exist in the bill that limit access to and use of information contained in the records, and provide for their deletion on acquittal. These are welcome minimal guarantors of privacy.

It is evident that the utility of this mass of information – fingerprints, handwriting samples and photographs, DNA data – in solving crimes is immense. Without saying a word, it is possible for a person to be convicted based on these various bodily affects – the human body constantly bears witness and self-incriminates itself. Both handwriting and finger impressions beg the question of whether these would offend the protection against self-incrimination contained in Article 20(3) of our Constitution which provides that “No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.” This argument was considered by the Supreme Court in the State of Bombay vs Kathi Kalu Oghad and Ors. [33] The petitioner contended that the obtaining of evidence through legislations such as the Identification of Prisoners Act amounted to compelling the person accused of an offence "to be a witness against himself" in contravention of Article 20(3) of the Constitution. The court held that “there was no infringement of Article 20(3) of the Constitution in compelling an accused person to give his specimen handwriting or signature, or impressions of his thumb, fingers, palm or foot to the investigating officer or under orders of a court for the purposes of comparison. ...Compulsion was not inherent in the receipt of information from an accused person in the custody of a police officer; it will be a question of fact in each case to be determined by the court on the evidence before it whether compulsion had been used in obtaining the information.” [34]

Over the past two decades, forensics has shifted from trying to track down a criminal by following the trail left by her bodily traces, to attempting to apply a host of invasive technologies upon suspects in an attempt to ‘exorcise’ truth and lies directly from their body. One statement by Dr M.S. Rao, Chief Forensic Scientist, Government of India captures this shift:

Forensic psychology plays a vital role in detecting terrorist cases. Narco-analysis and brainwave fingerprinting can reveal future plans of terrorists and can be deciphered to prevent terror activities⁄ Preventive forensics will play a key role in countering terror acts. Forensic potentials must be harnessed to detect and nullify their plans. Traditional methods have proved to be a failure to handle them. Forensic facilities should be brought to the doorstep of the common man⁄ Forensic activism is the solution for better crime management. [35]

Although there are several such 'technologies' which operate on principles ranging from changes in respiration, to mapping the electrical activity in different areas of the brain, what is common to them all, in Lawrence Liang’s words is that they “maintain that there is a connection between body and mind; that physiological changes are indicative of mental states and emotions; and that information about an individual’s subjectivity and identity can be derived from these physiological and physiological measures of deception” [36]

So, how legal are these technologies, in view of the constitutional protections against self-incrimination? In a case in 2004 the Bombay High Court upheld these technologies by applying the logic of the Kathi Kalu Oghad case discussed above. The court drew a distinction between ‘statements’ and ‘testimonies’ and held that what was prohibited under Article 20(3) were only ‘statements’ that were made under compulsion by an accused. In the court’s opinion, “the tests of Brain Mapping and Lie Detector in which the map of the brain is the result, or polygraph, then either cannot be said to be a statement”. At the most, the court held, “it can be called the information received or taken out from the witness.” [37]

This position was however overturned recently by the Supreme Court in Selvi v. State of Karnataka (2010)[38]. In contrast with the Bombay High Court, the Supreme Court expressly invoked the right of privacy to hold these technologies unconstitutional.

“Even though these are non- invasive techniques the concern is not so much with the manner in which they are conducted but the consequences for the individuals who undergo the same. The use of techniques such as 'Brain Fingerprinting' and 'FMRI-based Lie-Detection' raise numerous concerns such as those of protecting mental privacy and the harms that may arise from inferences made about the subject's truthfulness or familiarity with the facts of a crime.”

Further down, the court held that such techniques invaded the accused’s mental privacy which was an integral aspect of their personal liberty.

“There are several ways in which the involuntary administration of either of the impugned tests could be viewed as a restraint on 'personal liberty' ... the drug-induced revelations or the substantive inferences drawn from the measurement of the subject's physiological responses can be described as an intrusion into the subject's mental privacy”

Following a thorough-going examination of the issue, the Supreme Court directed that “no individual should be forcibly subjected to any of the techniques in question, whether in the context of investigation in criminal cases or otherwise. Doing so would amount to an unwarranted intrusion into personal liberty.” The court however, left open the option of voluntary submission to such techniques and endorsed the following guidelines framed by the National Human Rights Commission:

No Lie Detector Tests should be administered except on the basis of consent of the accused. An option should be given to the accused whether he wishes to avail such test.
If the accused volunteers for a Lie Detector Test, he should be given access to a lawyer and the physical, emotional and legal implication of such a test should be explained to him by the police and his lawyer.
The consent should be recorded before a judicial magistrate.
During the hearing before the magistrate, the person alleged to have agreed should be duly represented by a lawyer.
At the hearing, the person in question should also be told in clear terms that the statement that is made shall not be a `confessional' statement to the magistrate but will have the status of a statement made to the police.
The magistrate shall consider all factors relating to the detention including the length of detention and the nature of the interrogation.
The actual recording of the lie detector test shall be done by an independent agency (such as a hospital) and conducted in the presence of a lawyer. 250
A full medical and factual narration of the manner of the information received must be taken on record.

Although the right against self-incrimination and the inherent fallaciousness of the technologies were the main ground on which decision ultimately rested, this case is valuable for the court’s articulation of a right of ‘mental privacy’ grounded on the fundamental right to life and personal liberty. It remains to be seen whether this articulation will find resonance in other determinations in domains such as, say, communications.

Privacy of Records

Since at least the mid-nineteenth century, we have been living in what Nicholas Dirks has termed an 'ethnographic state' — engaged relentlessly and fetishistically in the production and accumulation of facts about us. From records of birth and death, to our academic records, most of our important transactions, our income tax filings, our food entitlements and our citizenship, most of us have assuredly been documented and lead a shadow existence somewhere on the files. Not only does the government keep records about us, but a host of private service providers including banks, hospitals, insurance and telecommunications companies maintain volumes of records about us. In this last section of this paper, we look at the privacy expectation of records both maintained by the government and the private sector.

Various statutes require records to be maintained of activities conducted under their authority and entire bureaucracies exist solely in service of these documents. Thus, for instance, the Registration Act requires various registers to be kept which record documents which have been registered under the Act. [39]; Once registered under this Act, all documents become public documents and State Rules typically contain provisions enabling the public to obtain copies of all documents for a fee. Similarly, a number of legislation – typically dealing with land records at the state level contain enabling provisions that allow the public to access them upon payment of a fee.

Where no provisions are provided within the statute itself that enable the public to obtain records, two recourses are still available.

Firstly, the Evidence Act enables courts to access records maintained by any government body. Secondly, private citizens may access records kept in public offices through the Right to Information Act. Each of these avenues is described in some details below:

Section 74 of the Evidence Act defines 'public documents' as including the following

Documents forming the acts, or records of the acts

Of the sovereign authority,
Of Official bodies and the Tribunals, and
Of public officers, legislative, judicial and executive, of any part of India or of the Commonwealth, or of a foreign country.

Public records kept in any state of private documents

It is clear from this definition that most records maintained by any government body are regarded as public documents. Section 76 mandates that every public officer "having custody of a public document, which any person has a right to inspect, shall give that person on demand a copy of it on payment of the legal fees therefor together with a certificate written at the foot of such copy that it is a true copy of such document or part thereof".

Since there is no legislative guidance within the Evidence Act to indicate who may be said to possess "a right to inspect", this has been interpreted to mean that where the right to inspect and take a copy is not expressly conferred by a statute (as in the Registration Act mentioned above), “the extent of such right depends on the interest which the applicant has in what he wants to copy, and what is reasonably necessary for the protection of such interest". So it isn’t any officious meddler who may access such records – only persons with genuine interests in the matter, either personal or pecuniary, may obtain copies through this route.

In addition to the Evidence Act, copies of documents may also be obtained under the Right to Information Act 2005 which confers on citizens the right to inspect and take copies of any information held by or under the control of any public authority. Information is defined widely to include "any material in any form, including records, documents, memos, e-mails, opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, orders, logbooks, contracts, reports, papers, samples, models, data material held in any electronic form and information relating to any private body which can be accessed by a public authority under any other law for the time being in force".

Section 8 (j) of the Act exempts "disclosure of personal information the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity or interest, or which would cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the individual” unless the relevant authority “is satisfied that the larger public interest justifies the disclosure of such information".

In an interesting case Mr. Ansari Masud A.K vs Ministry of External Affairs (2008)[40] , the Central Information Commission has held that “details of a passport are readily made available by any individual in a number of instances, example to travel agents, at airline counters, and whenever proof of residence for telephone connections etc. is required. For this reason, disclosure of details of a passport cannot be considered as causing unwarranted invasion of the privacy of an individual and, therefore, is not exempted from disclosure under Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act.” This is despite the fact that nothing in the Passport Act itself authorizes disclosure of any documents under any circumstances.

However, the Right to Information Act isn’t as convenient a vehicle for privacy abuse as this case may suggest. The RTI adjudicatory apparatus has on several occasions upheld the denial of information on grounds of privacy violation – most famously in a case where an applicant sought information from the Census Department on the ‘religion and faith’ of Sonia Gandhi – the President of the largest party currently in power in India. Both the Central Information Commission – the apex body adjudicating RTI appeals as well as the Punjab and Haryana High Court upheld the denial of information as it would otherwise lead to an unwarranted incursion into her privacy.[41]

A similar concept of 'public interest' would seem to apply when private companies disclose personal information without a person’s consent. Without delving into the issue in too much detail, it would suffice here to mention one of the most important cases to have come up on the issue. In Mr. X vs Hospital Z[42] , a person sued a hospital for having disclosed his HIV status to his fiancé without his knowledge resulting in their wedding being called off. The Supreme Court held that the hospital was not guilty of a violation of privacy since the disclosure was made to protect the public interest. While affirming the duty of confidentiality owed to patients, the court ruled that the right to privacy was not absolute and was "subject to such action as may be lawfully taken for the prevention of crime or disorder or protection of health or morals or protection of rights and freedom of others."

Conclusion

Reflecting on the volume of case law that we have in India on privacy, one is struck at once, both by the elasticity of the concept of privacy — spanning, as it does, diverse fields from criminal law to paternity suits to wiretapping —as well as its fragility — the flag of privacy is constantly being raised only to be ultimately overridden on pretexts that range from security of state, to a competing private interest.

On the one hand, one marvels at the success of the concept, only a few decades old in Indian law, in insinuating itself into legal arguments across diverse contexts. On the other hand, one is dismayed by the fact that rarely does the concept seem to score a victory. There is an almost ritual quality to the way in which the “right to privacy” is invoked in these cases - always named as a relevant factor; it never seems to substantially influence the outcome of the case at hand.

The right to privacy in India was an Oops baby, born on the ventilator of a minority decision of the Supreme Court, and nourished in the decades that followed by sympathetic judges, who never failed to point out that this right was contingent — not absolute, not meant to be under the Constitution, but carved out anyway. Some five decades after its first invocation by the Supreme Court, one gets the feeling that the right to privacy, conceptually, hasn’t moved, and is still what it was then. We don’t, today, for the many times it has been invoked by courts, have a thicker, more robust concept of privacy than we started out with. So the question, that one is stuck with is, what work does this concept of privacy do?

One of the failings of the concept of privacy in India is that it doesn’t exist as a positive right, but is merely a resistive right against targeted intrusion. So for instance, the right to privacy would be useless as a concept to resist something like generalized street video surveillance – as long as a citizen is not singled out for a disadvantage, this right would be of no use. So this right to privacy is a negative right to not be interfered with. Under it one does not have the right to be as private as one wishes, but only no less than the next person. Still, even this limited concept could be useful, if it were applied more rigorously.

Unfortunately, as the case law indicates, the right to privacy cedes too quickly to competing interests. An incomplete rough catalog of these competing rights, drawn from the case law surveyed in this paper include:

public emergency and public safety (communications)
criminal investigation (search and seizure/communications)
competing private interests (divorce proceedings)
best interests of the child (paternity suits)
public interest (Right to Information)
competing fundamental rights (HIV status)

One may perhaps add judicial inactivity as one of the limiting factors on privacy. By holding that violations of procedure by investigating agencies would not vitiate trials, the judiciary has been complicit in perhaps some of the more damaging incursions into privacy. Once a person is implicated in any manner in the criminal justice system – either as a victim, a witness or an offender, investigating agencies are immediately invested with plenary powers. They can search his house without warrant. They can place him arrest. Subject him to ‘medical examinations’, take his fingerprints and DNA and hold it in a bank and there is nothing you can do. In this context, perhaps the strongest privacy safeguard can come from a reform in criminal procedure alone.

Notes

[1].The State of Uttar Pradesh V. Kaushaliya and Others AIR 1964 SC 416

[2].(1978) 2 SCR 621

[3]. 1 SCR 332

[4].AIR 1973 SC 157, 1973 SCR (2) 417

[5].(1975) 2 SCC 148

[6].(1994) 6 S.C.C. 632

[7].AIR 1997 SC 568

[8].AIR 1976 SC 789,1976 SCR (2)1060, (1976) 2 SCC 128

[9].Romesh Thappar vs The State Of Madras AIR 1950 SC 124 , 1950 SCR 594

[10].1966 AIR 1967 Ker 228, 1967 CriLJ 1511

[11].AIR 1980 SC 593 , 1980 SCR (2) 340

[12].[1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 408

[13].Distt. Registrar & Collector, Hyderabad v. Canara bank etc. AIR 2005 SC 186

[14].(2003) 4 SCC 493

[15].13-yr-old rape victim to HC: let me abort -, EXPRESS INDIA, April 21, 2010, http://tinyurl.com/13yrindian (last visited May 2, 2010).

[16].Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration, (2009) 9 SCC 1. http://courtnic.nic.in/supremecourt/temp/dc%201798509p.txt (last visited May 2, 2010).

[17].Ibid

[18].410 U.S. 113 (1973)

[19].Article 21 does not limit the abridgement of the right to life by the state to only cases where the state has compelling state interest. The Article reads “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal librty except according to procedure established by law”

[20].Ibid

[21].Ibid

[22].AIR 1993 SC 2295, 1993 SCR (3) 917 <http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1259126/>

[23].AIR 2002 Delhi 217 <http://indiankanoon.org/doc/627683/>

[24].51 Cal. 3d 120; 271 Cal. Rptr. 146; 793 P.2d 479

[25].AIR 2010 SC 2851 <http://indiankanoon.org/doc/486945/>

[26].23 December, 2010 <http://indiankanoon.org/doc/504408/>

[27].Ibid

[28].AIR 1980 SC 791 , 1980 SCR (2)1067 , (1980) 2 SCC 343

[29].Sections 3 & 4 of the Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920

[30].Ibid, Section 5

[31].Section 7

[32].Thogorani Alias K. Damayanti vs State Of Orissa And Ors 2004 Cri L J 4003 (Ori) < http://indiankanoon.org/doc/860378/>

[33].AIR 1961 SC 1808 < http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1626264/>

[34].Ibid

[35].Keynote address given to the 93rd Indian Science Congress. See http://mindjustice.org/india2-06.htm, cited in Liang, L., 2007. And nothing but the truth, so help me science. In Sarai Reader 07 - Frontiers. Delhi: CSDS, Delhi, pp. 100-110. Available at: http://www.sarai.net/publications/readers/07-frontiers/100-110_lawrence.pdf [Accessed April 11, 2011].

[36].Ibid

[37].Ramchandra Ram Reddy v. State of Maharashtra [1 (2205) CCR 355 (DB)

[38].(2010) 7 SCC 263 http://indiankanoon.org/doc/338008/

[39].See Section 52 of the Registration Act 1908

[40].CIC/OK/A/2008/987/AD dated December 22, 2008 <http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1479476/>

[41].Anon, 2010. High Court dismisses appeal seeking information on Sonia Gandhi’s religion. NDTV Online. Available at: http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/high-court-dismisses-appeal-seeking-information-on-sonia-gandhi-s-religion-69356 [Accessed April 12, 2011].

[42].(2003) 1 SCC 500 40

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For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/privacy/limits-to-privacy

Limits to Privacy

praskrishna — 2012-12-14T10:28:59Z

In this chapter we attempt to build a catalogue of these various justifications, without attempting to be exhaustive, with the objective of arriving at a rough taxonomy of such frequently invoked terms. In addition we also examine some the more important justifications such as “public interest” and “security of the state” that have been invoked in statutes and upheld by courts to deprive persons of their privacy.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/publications/limits-privacy.pdf

Letter to MPs on Concerns on Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership

sinha — 2016-07-29T02:39:44Z

The Centre for Internet and Society sent a letter to Members of Parliament on July 27, 2016 to appeal to re-examine the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

To,

The Hon’ble Chief Minister / Member of Parliament

We are writing to you to draw your attention to the concerns related to India’s engagement in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a mega-regional trade agreement (MRTA), currently under negotiation. We write as part of a forum on free trade agreements (FTAs), which is a network of over 80 civil society organisations and concerned individuals from across India. It came together in 2008 to analyse the impacts of India’s FTAs on people’s lives & livelihoods.

As you may know, RCEP is a FTA consisting of 10 ASEAN Countries plus Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Japan, China and India. It is a comprehensive FTA dealing with not only tariff cuts but also a range of other issues such as investment, intellectual property rights, e-commerce, services, competition, etc. RCEP has far reaching implications on India’s future economic and social development. India is currently facing huge trade deficit with ASEAN, South Korea, Japan and China. RCEP is expected to worsen the huge trade deficit and damage India’s manufacturing sector.

Similarly, concerns are expressed in the field of intellectual property (IP). Many proposals by Japan and South Korea in the area of IP go well beyond our current national IP legislation, especially the Indian Patents Act 1970. Whereas, the Indian act permits only a narrow scope for patenting of software, the RCEP texts reveal disastrous proposals to hugely widen the scope, which, if accepted could compromise access to technologies in many critical areas. Likewise, Japanese & Korean negotiators' proposals run contrary to existing Indian copyright legislation. They mandate that all RCEP member countries to increase the term of copyright protection to 70 years from the year of the death of the author. The leaked chapters also envisage strong technological protection measures, without any limitations or exceptions for fair dealing use; creating new rights for making copies for temporary storage and blanket prohibition on re-transmission over the internet. All these changes would be extremely damaging to increasing access to knowledge in a developing country like India.

Further, the proposals also urge RCEP members to become members of another IP agreement on seeds – the UPOV Convention. Firstly, this would be ‘TRIPS-plus’, taking us beyond what WTO requires us to do in the area of seed. Secondly, it will mean going against the ‘farmer’s rights’ provisions in our national law – Protection of Plant Varieties & Farmers’ Rights Act (passed by Parliament in 2001 in compliance with WTO).

The leaked investment chapter shows that the proposals are going against India’s current position on investment treaties. India has developed a model BIPA text. India has also re-negotiating 57 of its 83 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) on the basis of its new model BIPA & to avoid one-sided approach to protecting investor’s interest. But demands being made in RCEP, may push us beyond our position on investments as well, for example, on the investor-state dispute mechanism.

The RCEP talks have picked up pace, hence the appeal to you to get involved.

Since 2013 RCEP negotiations have completed 13 rounds. The 14th round of negotiations is to take place in Vietnam on 15th of August. The Chief negotiators from each of the 16 countries are meeting 18-19th July in Jakarta, Indonesia. The upcoming RCEP Ministerial meeting on 5th August at Laos is expected set the new deadline for the conclusion of the negotiation.

However, there are no studies available in the public domain with regard to the implications of RCEP on India. In reply to an RTI query, Government denied existence of any cost and benefit analyses of RCEP. Similarly, there is no consultation with State governments with regard to RCEP and no texts are available in the public domain. Against this background we request you to take initiative:

to demand socio-economic assessment of RCEP on India’s development, especially on poor and marginalised populations, including implications for women & children

To ask for wider consultations on RCEP including consultations with state governments and ordinary people (such stakeholder consultations have already been held with industry bodies).
To make publicly available all the negotiating texts and institutionalise the process of making them open.
To ensure discussion on the cost and benefits of FTAs in general and RCEP in particular in both houses of the Parliament, including in the relevant Parliamentary Standing Committee.
To demand a while paper on India’s experience - costs and benefits, from FTAs with Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia and ASEAN.

Anticipating your kind attention on this urgent matter.

Thank you.

Yours truly,

Anubha Sinha
Centre for Internet & Society

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/letter-to-mps-on-concerns-on-regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership