Centre for Internet and Society

Genetic Profiling: Is it all in the DNA?

praskrishna — 2015-09-13T09:47:17Z

A Bill seeks to make genetic profiling mandatory for the fight against crime—and generates a debate about the clash of ethics, freedom, science and data.

The article by Ullekh NP was published in Open Magazine on August 7, 2015. Sunil Abraham gave his inputs.

When British geneticist Sir Alec Jeffreys first developed the DNA profiling test 31 years ago in his laboratory at Leicester University, he didn’t help the police prove a man guilty. His test—back then it took weeks to complete DNA profiling procedures as opposed to a few hours now—proved that a rape suspect in police custody was innocent. Details from the whole exercise also subsequently helped the local police nab the real criminal, who had killed his teenaged rape victim. Later, the police found that he was the one who had committed a similar crime three years earlier in a village nearby. Britain was destined to make great gains in solving crimes thanks to DNA identification, while the rest of the developed world, including the US, caught up later, but only after lagging initially thanks to the relentless—and sometimes ill-founded—opposition from civil liberties activists. In India, the Human DNA Profiling Bill, 2015, a proposed law that envisages collecting DNA finger prints—which are unique to an individual—especially of criminals, has been in the making for the past 12 years. The draft bill, which will shortly be placed before the Union Cabinet for its nod, has been prepared by the Department of Biotechnology and the Centre for DNA Fingerprinting & Diagnostics (CDFD), a Hyderabad-based Central Government-run agency, after examining and reviewing submissions by a panel of experts, holding consultations with various stakeholders and getting responses from the public. Notwithstanding the claims of safeguards against any misuse of the intended DNA data base, activists, lawyers, internet freedom fighters, civil liberty activists and columnists have been up in arms against the Government, arguing that the DNA profiling bill is ill- conceived and naïve—to the extent that it would destroy an individual’s right to privacy as it lacks provisions to check data tampering.

The international experience has proved otherwise. Ever since Sir Jeffreys extracted DNA from human muscle tissue, identified and processed genetic markers (which are unique to individuals except in the case of identical twins) from what was until then considered ‘seemingly purposeless segments of the human DNA’ in the words of writers Peter Reinharz and Howard Safir, more than 500,000 ‘otherwise unsolvable’ cases have been solved in the developed world thanks to the DNA identification, note CDFD scientists. DNA is the hereditary material in the human body. It is found in blood, saliva, urine, strands of hair, semen, tears, skin, etcetera.

Dr Madhusudan Reddy Nandineni, staff scientist and group leader, laboratory of DNA fingerprinting services and laboratory of genomics and profiling applications, CDFD, is worried that opposition to the Bill is gaining momentum in India due to a raft of reasons. Of course, the West, too, has witnessed sharp protests against DNA profiling laws. One of the key reasons anti-profiling activists have an edge, says a senior Home Ministry official who asks not to be named, is that there is a “general public anxiety” over “anything to do with disclosing personal details”. He agrees that the tests are going to be intrusive, because muscle tissue may have to be collected from private parts. The procedure of DNA sample collection—as explained in the draft Bill submitted in January by a committee headed by TS Rao, senior adviser to the department of biotechnology—talks about obtaining intimate body samples of living persons (on page 6-7 of the 48- page document) from ‘the genital or anal area, the buttocks and also breasts in the case of a female’. According to the draft Bill, it also involves external examination of private parts, taking samples from pubic hair or by swabs or washing or by vacuum suction, by scraping or by lifting by tape and taking of a photograph or video recording of, or an impression or cast of a wound in those areas. “But then, it is par for the course,” says the Home Ministry official by way of justification.

American military historian and author Edward Luttwak agrees that DNA profiling is a significant intrusion into the “very body of a citizen”. That is the price one has to pay in the choice between liberty and equality before investigation, he posits. Luttwak is glad that in the US, as well as in other countries that have such profiling laws, DNA identification has yielded results. “It protects suspicious/ low status but innocent people from false accusations and helps to catch clever/high-status law-breakers,” he says.

+++

For his part, Dr Nandineni says that every aspect of the Human DNA Profiling Bill for India is based on similar legislation that has already been implemented in the US, Canada, UK, Australia and Continental Europe for more than 20 years. He also contends that the benefits that have accrued there are enormous, which India has missed out on for all these years. “In all these countries, the concerns of the general public on privacy matters have been allayed in their legislation,” he adds. He points out that the retention of DNA profiles in a ‘DNA Data Bank’ is meant to apprehend repeat offenders and thus serve a larger societal good. As regards privacy concerns, Dr Nandineni says that consultations on the preparations of the Bill lasted for 2-3 years and took into account the views of an expert committee whose members included representatives of NGOs.

Dr Nandineni is of the view that the opponents of the Bill have managed to get an upper hand in a national debate thanks to their media-savvy backgrounds. Agrees the Home Ministry official: “Perhaps the drafters of the Bill have not been communicative enough in getting their points across to the public and the media. Which might explain why the Bill has come under tremendous attack in the media. Even otherwise, global trends also show that civil liberty rights activists have had great initial advantage in their campaign against DNA profiling.” After all, the potential for misuse of DNA samples is not restricted to biological material collected under the provisions of the DNA Bill alone, Nandineni offers. “Any and every blood sample collected by a clinical laboratory has the same potential for misuse,” he says.

While Dr J Gowrishankar, director, CDFD, has been vocal about the positives of the Bill, its opponents have been louder. Many of those who oppose the Bill say the question is not one of being loud or feeble, but about being naïve or not.

The likes of Sunil Abraham, executive director of Bangalore-based internet research organisation Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), have no argument against DNA profiling being the gold standard for all forensic investigations. “There is nothing wrong with using DNA evidence for forensic purposes,” says Abraham, “However, the draft Bill is filled with techno-utopianism; it assumes that the people and machines that leverage DNA technologies are infallible.” He goes on, “This is not true. It is easier to tamper with DNA evidence than it is to tamper with a video recording. Therefore, all we are asking for are process checks that prevent compromised persons and machines from using DNA evidence to convict or exonerate the wrong person.” His contention is that if the DNA sample is sent to two different labs and both labs come back with exactly the same result, then the courts can be convinced of the veracity of the result. “Also the Bill says that DNA labs will give courts ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers to questions related to DNA matching. But ideally, the lab must give the exact match percentage along with all the detailed information that emerges from the match process so that the court can fully appreciate the significance of the DNA evidence,” he suggests.

Abraham and legal scholar Usha Ramanathan—both members of the expert panel who filed notes of dissent and disagreed with various aspects of the Bill—have a problem with the claim that the proposed DNA data bank will cover only criminals and not the general public. Points out Ramanathan: “The Bill does not restrict the data base to criminals alone, not by a long shot. The provision in the proposed Bill reads: ‘(Clause 31(4)) Every DNA Data Bank shall maintain following indices for various categories of data, namely: (a) a crime scene index; (b) a suspects’ index; (c) an offenders’ index; (d) a missing persons’ index; (e) unknown deceased persons’ index; (f) a volunteers’ index; and (g) such other DNA indices as may be specified by regulations.’ That is an elaborate set of indices. There is certainly a lot of the ‘general public’ in it.”

Supporters of the DNA Profiling Bill have maintained that a DNA data bank is not for the public but only for a limited category of individuals. The proposed law also provides for storing profiles with the consent of relatives of missing children and grownups so that relationship identities can be established.

Ramanathan is also worried that apart from purposes of criminal justice, DNA profiling may be extended to parental disputes (maternity or paternity), issues related to pedigree, those related to assisted reproductive technologies (surrogacy, in vitro fertilisation or IVF, intrauterine implantation or IUI, and so on), to transplantation of human organs (donor and recipient) under the Transplantation of Human Organs Act, 1994, and also related to immigration or emigration. She had objected to the requirement of revealing a person’s caste in the application form for offering blood samples. “This Bill is certainly not a convict data base. The ambitions are much much vaster, and little to do with crime control,” she alleges.

Abraham agrees that some safeguards have been built in the proposed law to prevent any misuse of DNA data under pressure from expert panel members such as him. However, he says, cyber security and privacy-related issues are not addressed in a comprehensive manner. “The Bill basically hopes that the Privacy Bill will address all of this when it becomes law. But unfortunately, a bill could take 7-10 years before it becomes law,” he says.

Dr Gowrishankar of CDFD and others have conceded that it was the decision of the expert panel to include an enabling provision for the privacy issues of DNA profiling to comply with the proposed Privacy Bill.

Abraham says that various measures to prevent ‘privacy harms’ to volunteers are missing in the latest draft of the Bill. “Given that biometric technology works on probabilistic matching, the larger the size of the database, the larger the incidence of mistaken identification. Therefore it is important that the database remain as small as necessary,” he asserts.

+++

The estimated cost of the Bill is Rs 20 crore—to create the infrastructure for the DNA Profiling Board and the data bank, which includes buildings, furniture, computer servers and so on. Among other things, the DNA Profiling Board is tasked with the responsibility of laying down and implementing standards for laboratories and proper protocols for ‘Data Bank’ operations.

CDFD scientists and government officials are keen to highlight the ‘under- hyped’ benefits of DNA profiling –similar to the Innocence Project in the US, which was aimed at securing the release of people who were erroneously convicted on the basis of other lines of evidence. Abraham has no patience for such comparisons. “DNA profiling for forensic purposes is very advanced and sophisticated, but technologies do not exist in a vacuum,” he says, “These advanced technologies have to work within traditional institutions with vulnerabilities and flaws. We need to, therefore, have non-technological procedural fixes that ensure that these technologies are not compromised by money and power. The choice is between the right to privacy and the rights and requirements of the criminal justice process.”

Ramanathan agrees with that view. “In the Indian context, the state of investigation is so poor that we have been looking for ways of circumventing our problems, not addressing them. That is how narco-analysis began to be used, till the court struck it down. DNA may be more reliable than most other scientific tools available to us today, but it is not all about the science. We also have to worry about contamination, what happens in the chain of custody, its potential for being planted or otherwise abused, and the errors even in the laboratory. You may remember the avowed mix-up of results in the Aarushi [Talwar murder] case, something the lab said they noticed over two years after they had given it to the investigators. The danger of treating DNA as conclusive and not needing corroboration is exacerbated in this kind of a vulnerable system. Which is why bringing this into a DNA data base law and not putting any checks on criminal procedure is less than wise,” she elaborates. She is least impressed with the ‘idea’ of ‘pedigree’ and of ‘population genetics’ in the Bill. “Institutions like the CDFD have been collecting DNA from suspects and asking for the caste of the person on the form. How does this seem innocent and safeguarded?” she asks.

Meanwhile, columnist and author Salil Tripathi says that it is sheer hubris to think that technology will provide all the answers to crime-fighting. “Tech- nology is enormously useful and powerful, but it is value-neutral; it can be used for good or bad ends… There have to be sufficient safeguards, overseen not only by technologists, law enforcement officers and bureaucrats, but also by lawyers and civil liberties experts, who can point out potential flaws and misuse and prevent those.”

Tripathi, too, is piqued that one of the markers sought is of caste. “Why?” he asks, emphatic that the country’s people should be concerned about allowing the state so much power over their lives. “And it may not be only the state; given that the scope of its future expansion is undefined, what guarantees are there that private actors won’t have access to the data, and if so, what security protocols would apply?”

Dr Gowrishankar and Dr Nandineni are right in saying that without DNA fingerprinting, many international criminals would still be at liberty, and the opponents of the Bill do not disagree with the efficacy of the technique developed by Sir Jeffreys. Instead, they are placing the spotlight on various objectionable aspects in the proposed law. In a country which first needs—according to former RAW chief Vikram Sood—to ensure access to Photofit (a technique to create an accurate image of a person that gels with a witness’ description) for its ground-level police operatives to combat crime, critics of the Bill seem to have won the war of words.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/open-magazine-august-7-2015-ullekh-np-genetic-profiling

India blocks access to 857 porn sites

pranesh — 2015-08-05T01:31:32Z

India has blocked free access to 857 porn sites in what it says is a move to prevent children from accessing them.

The story was published by BBC on August 3, 2015. Pranesh Prakash gave his inputs.

Adults will still be able to access the sites using virtual private networks (VPNs) or proxy servers. In July, the Supreme Court expressed its unhappiness over the government's inability to block sites, especially those featuring child pornography.

Telecom companies have said they will not be able to enforce the "ban" immediately.

"We have to block each site one by one and it will take a few days for all service providers to block all the sites," an unnamed telecom company executive told The Times of India newspaper.

A senior official, who preferred to remained unnamed, told the BBC Hindi that India's department of telecommunications had "advised" telecom operators and Internet service providers to "control free and open access" to 857 porn sites.

"There is no total ban. This was done in the backdrop of Supreme Court's observation on children having free access to porn sites. The idea is also to protect India's cultural fabric. This will not prevent adults from visiting porn sites," the official said.

In July, the top court had observed that it was not for the court to order a ban on porn sites.

"It is an issue for the government to deal with. Can we pass an interim order directing blocking of all adult websites? And let us keep in mind the possible contention of a person who could ask what crime have I committed by browsing adult websites in private within the four walls of my house. Could he not argue about his right to freedom to do something within the four walls of his house without violating any law?," the court said.

According to statistics released by adult site Pornhub, India was its fourth largest source of traffic in 2014, behind the US, UK and Canada. Pranesh Prakash of the Bangalore based Centre for Internet and Society said the directive to block the 857 sites was "the largest single order of its kind" in India.

"The government's reasoning that it is not a ban because adults can still access the porn sites is ridiculous," he told the BBC. The move has caused a great deal of comment on Indian social media networks, with many prominent personalities coming forward to condemn it.

Popular author Chetan Bhagat, writer and commentator Nilanjana Roy, politician Milind Deora and director Ram Gopal Varma have all added their voices to the debate.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/bbc-news-august-3-2015-india-blocks-access-to-857-porn-sites

India launches crackdown on online porn

pranesh — 2015-08-05T01:21:12Z

India has launched a crackdown on internet pornography, banning access to more than 800 adult websites, including Playboy and Pornhub.

The article by James Crabtree published in Financial Times on August 3, 2015 quotes Pranesh Prakash.

The restrictions followed a ruling from India’s telecoms ministry ordering internet service providers, including international telecoms groups operating in the country such as the UK’s Vodafone, to block 857 such sites.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government provided no public justification for the unexpected ban when it came into effect at the weekend. However, on Monday India’s telecoms ministry said that the order, issued under India’s Information Technology Act, had been prompted by comments made by a supreme court judge during a hearing in July.

The ministry said that the restrictions were temporary and did not amount to a “blanket” ban, arguing that internet users running virtual private networks, which can be used to access blocked sites, could still view the material. “It isn’t that they are being banned lock, stock and barrel,” the ministry said. “The justice noted that free and open access to these websites.... should be controlled, but these sites will continue to be available through the mechanism of a VPN.”

The crackdown is set to raise fresh concerns about sudden and sweeping legal restrictions in India, after the introduction of a ban on the sale of beef earlier this year in the western state of Maharashtra, a move that was supported by Mr Modi’s government. The ruling also drew criticism from legal experts following broader concerns about a recent rise in poorly-targeted internet rules, including some restrictions on global social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter.

Pranesh Prakash of the Bangalore-based Centre for Internet and Society think-tank questioned the basis of the ruling, describing it as a further example of a “clumsy” approach to online regulation.

“There is no proper justification that they have given for banning all porn, rather than child porn or revenge porn or something like that,” he said. “The reaction is heavy handed, and has been done under the cloak of secrecy.” The remarks by a judge cited by India’s government as a rationale for the ban were a comment made in court rather than a legal ruling, Mr Prakash added, casting further doubt on the basis for the restrictions.

India’s mix of strict regulation and conservative public morals mean explicit sexual content is almost unheard of in mainstream media, where Bollywood films seldom featuring more than a chaste on-screen embrace.However India’s fast-growing internet population of about 300m is now both the world’s second largest after China, and an increasingly important sources for traffic for global pornographic websites.

Pornhub, which is the world’s 66th most visited website according to ranking service Alexa, said Indians were the fourth largest national users of its content during 2014.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/financial-times-james-crabtree-august-3-2015-india-launches-crackdown-on-online-porn

Policy Paper on Surveillance in India

vipul — 2015-08-03T15:27:41Z

This policy brief analyses the different laws regulating surveillance at the State and Central level in India and calls out ways in which the provisions are unharmonized. The brief then provides recommendations for the harmonization of surveillance law in India.

Introduction

The current legal framework for surveillance in India is a legacy of the colonial era laws that had been drafted by the British. Surveillance activities by the police are an everyday phenomenon and are included as part of their duties in the various police manuals of the different states. It will become clear from an analysis of the laws and regulations below, that whilst the police manuals cover the aspect of physical surveillance in some detail, they do not discuss the issue of interception of telephone or internet traffic. These issues are dealt with separately under the Telecom Act and the Information Technology Act and the Rules made thereunder, which are applicable to all security agencies and not just the police. Since the Indian laws deal with different aspects of surveillance under different legislations, the regulations dealing with this issue do not have any uniform standards. This paper therefore argues that the need of the hour is to have a single legislation which deals with all aspects of surveillance and interception in one place so that there is uniformity in the laws and practices of surveillance in the entire country.

Legal Regime

India does not have one integrated policy on surveillance and law enforcement and security agencies have to rely upon a number of different sectoral legislations to carry out their surveillance activities. These include:

1. Police Surveillance under Police Acts and Model Police Manual

Article 246(3) of the Constitution of India, read with Entry 2, List II, of the VIIth Schedule, empowers the States to legislate in matters relating to the police. This means that the police force is under the control of the state government rather than the Central government. Consequently, States have their own Police Acts to govern the conduct of the police force. Under the authority of these individual State Police Acts, rules are formulated for day-to-day running of the police. These rules are generally found in the Police Manuals of the individual states. Since a discussion of the Police Manual of each State with its small deviations is beyond the scope of this study, we will discuss the Model Police Manual issued by the Bureau of Police Research and Development.

As per the Model Police Manual, “surveillance and checking of bad characters” is considered to be one of the duties of the police force mentioned in the “Inventory of Police Duties, Functions and Jobs”.[1] Surveillance is also one of the main methods utilized by the police for preventing law and order situations and crimes.[2] As per the Manual the nature and degree of surveillance depends on the circumstances and persons on whom surveillance is mounted and it is only in very rare cases and on rare occasions that round the clock surveillance becomes necessary for a few days or weeks.[3]

Surveillance of History Sheeted Persons: Beat Police Officers should be fully conversant with the movements or changes of residence of all persons for whom history sheets of any category are maintained. They are required to promptly report the exact information to the Station House Officer (SHO), who make entries in the relevant registers. The SHO on the basis of this information reports, by the quickest means, to the SHO in whose jurisdiction the concerned person/persons are going to reside or pass through. When a history-sheeted person is likely to travel by the Railway, intimation of his movements should also be given to the nearest Railway Police Station.[4] It must be noted that the term “history sheet” or “history sheeter” is not defined either in the Indian Penal Code, 1860, most of the State Police Acts or the Model Police Manual, but it is generally understood and defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as persons with a criminal record.

Surveillance of “Bad Characters”: Keeping tabs on and getting information regarding “bad characters” is part of the duties of a beat constable. In the case of a “bad character” who is known to have gone to another State, the SHO of the station in the other state is informed using the quickest means possible followed by sending of a BC Roll 'A' directly to the SHO.[5] When a “bad character” absents himself or goes out of view, whether wanted in a case or not, the information is required to be disseminated to the police stations having jurisdiction over the places likely to be visited by him and also to the neighbouring stations, whether within the State or outside. If such person is traced and intimation is received of his arrest or otherwise, arrangements to get a complete and true picture of his activities are required to be made and the concerned record updated.[6]

The Police Manual clarifies the term “bad characters” to mean “offenders, criminals, or members of organised crime gangs or syndicates or those who foment or incite caste, communal violence, for which history sheets are maintained and require surveillance.”[7] A fascinating glimpse into the history of persons who were considered to be “bad characters” is contained in the article by Surjan Das & Basudeb Chattopadhyay in EPW[8] wherein they bring out the fact that in colonial times a number of the stereotypes propagated by the British crept into their police work as well. It appears that one did not have to be convicted to be a bad character, but people with a dark complexion, strong built, broad chins, deep-set eyes, broad forehead, short hair, scanty or goatee beard, marks on face, moustache, blunt nose, white teeth and monkey-face would normally fit the description of “bad characters”.

Surveillance of Suspicious Strangers: When a stranger of suspicious conduct or demeanour is found within the limits of a police station, the SHO is required to forward a BC Roll to the Police Station in whose jurisdiction the stranger claims to have resided. The receipt of such a roll is required to be immediately acknowledged and replied. If the suspicious stranger states that he resides in another State, a BC Roll is sent directly to the SHO of the station in the other State.[9] The manual however, does not define who a “suspicious stranger” is and how to identify one.

Release of Foreign Prisoners: Before a foreign prisoner (whose finger prints are taken for record) is released the Superintendent of Police of the district where the case was registered is required to send a report to the Director, I.B. through the Criminal Investigation Department informing the route and conveyance by which such person is likely to leave the country.[10]

Shadowing of convicts and dangerous persons: The Police Manual contains the following rules for shadowing the convicts on their release from jails:

(a) Dangerous convicts who are not likely to return to their native places are required to be shadowed. The fact, when a convict is to be shadowed is entered in the DCRB in the FP register and communicated to the Superintendent of Jails.

(b) The Police Officer deputed for shadowing an ex-convict is required to enter the fact in the notebook. The Police Officers area furnished with a challan indicating the particulars of the ex-convict marked for shadowing. This form is returned by the SHO of the area where the ex-convict takes up his residence or passes out of view to the DCRB / OCRS where the jail is situated, where it is put on record for further reference and action if any. Even though the subjects being shadowed are kept in view, no restraint is to put upon their movements on any account.[11]

Apart from the provisions discussed above, there are also provisions in the Police Manual regarding surveillance of convicts who have been released on medical grounds as well as surveillance of ex-convicts who are required to report their movements to the police as per the provisions of section 356 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.[12]

As noted above, the various police manuals are issued under the State Police Acts and they govern the police force of the specific states. The fact that each state has its own individual police manual itself leads to non-uniformity regarding standards and practices of surveillance. But it is not only the legislations at the State levels which lead to this problem, even legislation at the Central level, which are applicable to the country as a whole also have differing standards regarding different aspects of surveillance. In order to explore this further, we shall now discuss the central legislations dealing with surveillance.

2. The Indian Telegraph Act, 1885

Section 5 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, empowers the Central Government and State Governments of India to order the interception of messages in two circumstances: (1) in the occurrence of any public emergency or in the interest of public safety, and (2) if it is considered necessary or expedient to do so in the interest of:[13]

the sovereignty and integrity of India; or
the security of the State; or
friendly relations with foreign states; or
public order; or
for preventing incitement to the commission of an offence.

The Supreme Court of India has specified the terms 'public emergency' and 'public safety', based on the following[14]:

"Public emergency would mean the prevailing of a sudden condition or state of affairs affecting the people at large calling for immediate action. The expression 'public safety' means the state or condition of freedom from danger or risk for the people at large. When either of these two conditions are not in existence, the Central Government or a State Government or the authorised officer cannot resort to telephone tapping even though there is satisfaction that it is necessary or expedient so to do in the interests of it sovereignty and integrity of India etc. In other words, even if the Central Government is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do in the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of India or the security of the State or friendly relations with sovereign States or in public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of an offence, it cannot intercept the message, or resort to telephone tapping unless a public emergency has occurred or the interest of public safety or the existence of the interest of public safety requires. Neither the occurrence of public emergency nor the interest of public safety are secretive conditions or situations. Either of the situations would be apparent to a reasonable person."

In 2007, Rule 419A was added to the Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951 framed under the Indian Telegraph Act which provided that orders on the interception of communications should only be issued by the Secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs. However, it provided that in unavoidable circumstances an order could also be issued by an officer, not below the rank of a Joint Secretary to the Government of India, who has been authorised by the Union Home Secretary or the State Home Secretary.[15]

According to Rule 419A, the interception of any message or class of messages is to be carried out with the prior approval of the Head or the second senior most officer of the authorised security agency at the Central Level and at the State Level with the approval of officers authorised in this behalf not below the rank of Inspector General of Police, in the belowmentioned emergent cases:

in remote areas, where obtaining of prior directions for interception of messages or class of messages is not feasible; or
for operational reasons, where obtaining of prior directions for interception of message or class of messages is not feasible;

however, the concerned competent authority is required to be informed of such interceptions by the approving authority within three working days and such interceptions are to be confirmed by the competent authority within a period of seven working days. If the confirmation from the competent authority is not received within the stipulated seven days, such interception should cease and the same message or class of messages should not be intercepted thereafter without the prior approval of the Union Home Secretary or the State Home Secretary.[16]

Rule 419A also tries to incorporate certain safeguards to curb the risk of unrestricted surveillance by the law enforcement authorities which include the following:

Any order for interception issued by the competent authority should contain reasons for such direction and a copy of such an order should be forwarded to the Review Committee within a period of seven working days;[17]
Directions for interception should be issued only when it is not possible to acquire the information by any other reasonable means;[18]
The directed interception should include the interception of any message or class of messages that are sent to or from any person n or class of persons or relating to any particular subject whether such message or class of messages are received with one or more addresses, specified in the order being an address or addresses likely to be used for the transmission of communications from or to one particular person specified or described in the order or one particular set of premises specified or described in the order;[19]
The interception directions should specify the name and designation of the officer or the authority to whom the intercepted message or class of messages is to be disclosed to;[20]
The directions for interception would remain in force for sixty days, unless revoked earlier, and may be renewed but the same should not remain in force beyond a total period of one hundred and eighty days;[21]
The directions for interception should be conveyed to the designated officers of the licensee(s) in writing by an officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police or Additional Superintendent of Police or the officer of the equivalent rank;[22]
The officer authorized to intercept any message or class of messages should maintain proper records mentioning therein, the intercepted message or class of messages, the particulars of persons whose message has been intercepted, the name and other particulars of the officer or the authority to whom the intercepted message or class of messages has been disclosed, etc.;[23]
All the requisitioning security agencies should designate one or more nodal officers not below the rank of Superintendent of Police or the officer of the equivalent rank to authenticate and send the requisitions for interception to the designated officers of the concerned service providers to be delivered by an officer not below the rank of Sub-Inspector of Police;[24]
Records pertaining to directions for interception and of intercepted messages should be destroyed by the competent authority and the authorized security and Law Enforcement Agencies every six months unless these are, or likely to be, required for functional requirements;[25]

According to Rule 419A, service providers \are required by law enforcement to intercept communications are required to comply with the following[26]:

Service providers should designate two senior executives of the company in every licensed service area/State/Union Territory as the nodal officers to receive and handle such requisitions for interception;[27]
The designated nodal officers of the service providers should issue acknowledgment letters to the concerned security and Law Enforcement Agency within two hours on receipt of intimations for interception;[28]
The system of designated nodal officers for communicating and receiving the requisitions for interceptions should also be followed in emergent cases/unavoidable cases where prior approval of the competent authority has not been obtained;[29]
The designated nodal officers of the service providers should forward every fifteen days a list of interception authorizations received by them during the preceding fortnight to the nodal officers of the security and Law Enforcement Agencies for confirmation of the authenticity of such authorizations;[30]
Service providers are required to put in place adequate and effective internal checks to ensure that unauthorized interception of messages does not take place, that extreme secrecy is maintained and that utmost care and precaution is taken with regards to the interception of messages;[31]

Service providers are held responsible for the actions of their employees. In the case of an established violation of license conditions pertaining to the maintenance of secrecy and confidentiality of information and unauthorized interception of communication, action shall be taken against service providers as per the provisions of the Indian Telegraph Act, and this shall not only include a fine, but also suspension or revocation of their license;[32]

Service providers should destroy records pertaining to directions for the interception of messages within two months of discontinuance of the interception of such messages and in doing so they should maintain extreme secrecy.[33]

Review Committee

Rule 419A of the Indian Telegraph Rules requires the establishment of a Review Committee by the Central Government and the State Government, as the case may be, for the interception of communications, as per the following conditions:[34]

(1) The Review Committee to be constituted by the Central Government shall consist of the following members, namely:

(a) Cabinet Secretary - Chairman

(b) Secretary to the Government of India in charge, Legal Affairs - Member

(2) The Review Committee to be constituted by a State Government shall consist of the following members, namely:

(a) Chief Secretary – Chairman

(b) Secretary Law/Legal Remembrancer in charge, Legal Affairs – Member

(3) The Review Committee meets at least once in two months and records its findings on whether the issued interception directions are in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the Indian Telegraph Act. When the Review Committee is of the opinion that the directions are not in accordance with the provisions referred to above it may set aside the directions and order for destruction of the copies of the intercepted message or class of messages;[35]

It must be noted that the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, (which is currently used against most acts of urban terrorism) also allows for the interception of communications but the procedures and safeguards are supposed to be the same as under the Indian Telegraph Act and the Information Technology Act.[36]

3. Telecom Licenses

The telecom sector in India has seen immense activity in the last two decades ever since it was opened up to private competition. These last twenty years have seen a lot of turmoil and have offered a tremendous learning opportunity for the private players as well as the governmental bodies regulating the sector. Currently any entity wishing to get a telecom license is offered a UL (Unified License) which contains terms and conditions for all the services that a licensee may choose to offer. However there were a large number of other licenses before the current regime, and since the licenses have a long phase out, we have tried to cover what we believe are the four most important licenses issued to telecom operators starting with the CMTS License:

Cellular Mobile Telephony Services (CMTS) License

In terms of National Telecom Policy (NTP)-1994, the first phase of liberalization in mobile telephone service started with issue of 8 licenses for Cellular Mobile Telephony Services (CMTS) in the 4 metro cities of Delhi, Mumbai, Calcutta and Chennai to 8 private companies in November 1994. Subsequently, 34 licenses for 18 Territorial Telecom Circles were also issued to 14 private companies during 1995 to 1998. During this period a maximum of two licenses were granted for CMTS in each service area and these licensees were called 1st & 2nd cellular licensees.[37] Consequent upon announcement of guidelines for Unified Access (Basic & Cellular) Services licenses on 11.11.2003, some of the CMTS operators were permitted to migrate from CMTS License to Unified Access Service License (UASL) but currently no new CMTS and Basic service licenses are being awarded after issuing the guidelines for Unified Access Service Licence (UASL).

The important provisions regarding surveillance in the CMTS License are listed below:

Facilities for Interception: The CMTS License requires the Licensee to provide necessary facilities to the designated authorities for interception of the messages passing through its network.[38]

Monitoring of Telecom Traffic: The designated person of the Central/State Government as conveyed to the Licensor from time to time in addition to the Licensor or its nominee have the right to monitor the telecommunication traffic in every MSC or any other technically feasible point in the network set up by the licensee. The Licensee is required to make arrangement for monitoring simultaneous calls by Government security agencies. The hardware at licensee’s end and software required for monitoring of calls shall be engineered, provided/installed and maintained by the Licensee at licensee’s cost. In case the security agencies intend to locate the equipment at licensee’s premises for facilitating monitoring, the licensee is required to extend all support in this regard including space and entry of the authorised security personnel. The interface requirements as well as features and facilities as defined by the Licensor are to be implemented by the licensee for both data and speech. The Licensee is also required to ensure suitable redundancy in the complete chain of Monitoring equipment for trouble free operations of monitoring of at least 210 simultaneous calls.[39]

Monitoring Records to be maintained: Along with the monitored call following records are to be made available:

Called/calling party mobile/PSTN numbers.
Time/date and duration of interception.
Location of target subscribers. Cell ID should be provided for location of the target subscriber. However, Licensor may issue directions from time to time on the precision of location, based on technological developments and integration of Global Positioning System (GPS) which shall be binding on the LICENSEE.
Telephone numbers if any call-forwarding feature has been invoked by target subscriber.
Data records for even failed call attempts.
CDR (Call Data Record) of Roaming Subscriber.

The Licensee is required to provide the call data records of all the specified calls handled by the system at specified periodicity, as and when required by the security agencies.[40]

Protection of Privacy: It is the responsibility of the Licensee to ensure the protection of privacy of communication and ensure unathorised interception of messages does not take place.[41]

License Agreement for Provision of Internet Services (ISP License)

Internet services were launched in India on 15th August, 1995 by Videsh Sanchar Nigam Limited. In November, 1998, the Government opened up the sector for providing Internet services by private operators. The major provisions dealing with surveillance contained in the ISP License are given below:

Authorization for monitoring: Monitoring shall only be by the authorization of the Union Home Secretary or Home Secretaries of the States/Union Territories.[42]

Access to subscriber list by authorized intelligence agencies and licensor: The complete and up to date list of subscribers will be made available by the ISP on a password protected website – accessible to authorized intelligence agencies.[43] Information such as customer name, IP address, bandwidth provided, address of installation, data of installation, contact number and email of leased line customers shall be included in the website.[44] The licensor or its representatives will also have access to the Database relating to the subscribers of the ISP which is to be available at any instant.[45]

Right to monitor by the central/state government: The designated person of the central/state government or the licensor or nominee will have the right to monitor telecommunications traffic in every node or any other technically feasible point in the network. To facilitate this, the ISP must make arrangements for the monitoring of simultaneous calls by the Government or its security agencies.[46]

Right of DoT to monitor: DoT will have the ability to monitor customers who generate high traffic value and verify specified user identities on a monthly basis.[47]

Provision of mirror images: Mirror images of the remote access information should be made available online for monitoring purposes.[48] A safeguard provided for in the license is that remote access to networks is only allowed in areas approved by the DOT in consultation with the Security Agencies.[49]

Provision of information stored on dedicated transmission link: The ISP will provide the login password to DOT and authorized Government agencies on a monthly basis for access to information stored on any dedicated transmission link from ISP node to subscriber premises.[50]

Provision of subscriber identity and geographic location: The ISP must provide the traceable identity and geographic location of their subscribers, and if the subscriber is roaming – the ISP should try to find traceable identities of roaming subscribers from foreign companies.[51]

Facilities for monitoring: The ISP must provide the necessary facilities for continuous monitoring of the system as required by the licensor or its authorized representatives.[52]

Facilities for tracing: The ISP will also provide facilities for the tracing of nuisance, obnoxious or malicious calls, messages, or communications. These facilities are to be provided specifically to authorized officers of the Government of India (police, customs, excise, intelligence department) when the information is required for investigations or detection of crimes and in the interest of national security.[53]

Facilities and equipment to be specified by government: The types of interception equipment to be used will be specified by the government of India.[54] This includes the installation of necessary infrastructure in the service area with respect to Internet Telephony Services offered by the ISP including the processing, routing, directing, managing, authenticating the internet calls including the generation of Call Details Record, IP address, called numbers, date, duration, time, and charge of the internet telephony calls.[55]

Facilities for surveillance of mobile terminal activity: The ISP must also provide the government facilities to carry out surveillance of Mobile Terminal activity within a specified area whenever requested.[56]

Facilities for monitoring international gateway: As per the requirements of security agencies, every international gateway location having a capacity of 2 Mbps or more will be equipped will have a monitoring center capable of monitoring internet telephony traffic.[57]

Facilities for monitoring in the premise of the ISP: Every office must be at least 10x10 with adequate power, air conditioning, and accessible only to the monitoring agencies. One local exclusive telephone line must be provided, and a central monitoring center must be provided if the ISP has multiple nodal points.[58]

Protection of privacy: There is a responsibility on the ISP to protect the privacy of its communications transferred over its network. This includes securing the information and protecting against unauthorized interception, unauthorized disclosure, ensure the confidentiality of information, and protect against over disclosure of information- except when consent has been given.[59]

Log of users: Each ISP must maintain an up to date log of all users connected and the service that they are using (mail, telnet, http, etc). The ISPs must also log every outward login or telnet through their computers. These logs as well as copies of all the packets must be made available in real time to the Telecom Authority.[60]

Log of internet leased line customers: A record of each internet leased line customer should be kept along with details of connectivity, and reasons for taking the link should be kept and made readily available for inspection.[61]

Log of remote access activities: The ISP will also maintain a complete audit trail of the remote access activities that pertain to the network for at least six months. This information must be available on request for any agency authorized by the licensor.[62]

Monitoring requirements: The ISP must make arrangements for the monitoring of the telecommunication traffic in every MSC exchange or any other technically feasible point, of at least 210 calls simultaneously.[63]

Records to be made available:

CDRS: When required by security agencies, the ISP must make available records of i) called/calling party mobile/PSTN numbers ii) time/date and duration of calls iii) location of target subscribers and from time to time precise location iv) telephone numbers – and if any call forwarding feature has been evoked – records thereof v) data records for failed call attempts vi) CDR of roaming subscriber.[64]
Bulk connections: On a monthly basis, and from time to time, information with respect to bulk connections shall be forwarded to DoT, the licensor, and security agencies.[65]
Record of calls beyond specified threshold: Calls should be checked, analyzed, and a record maintained of all outgoing calls made by customers both during the day and night that exceed a set threshold of minutes. A list of suspected subscribers should be created by the ISP and should be informed to DoT and any officer authorized by the licensor at any point of time.[66]
Record of subscribers with calling line identification restrictions: Furthermore, a list of calling line identification restriction subscribers with their complete address and details should be created on a password protected website that is available to authorized government agencies.[67]

Unified Access Services (UAS) License

Unified Access Services operators provide services of collection, carriage, transmission and delivery of voice and/or non-voice messages within their area of operation, over the Licensee’s network by deploying circuit and/or packet switched equipment. They may also provide Voice Mail, Audiotex services, Video Conferencing, Videotex, E-Mail, Closed User Group (CUG) as Value Added Services over its network to the subscribers falling within its service area on a non-discriminatory basis.

The terms of providing the services are regulated under the Unified Access Service License (UASL) which also contains provisions regarding surveillance/interception. These provisions are regularly used by the state agencies to intercept telephonic and data traffic of subscribers. The relevant terms of the UASL dealing with surveillance and interception are discussed below:

Confidentiality of Information: The Licensee cannot employ bulk encryption equipment in its network. Any encryption equipment connected to the Licensee’s network for specific requirements has to have prior evaluation and approval of the Licensor or officer specially designated for the purpose. However, any encryption equipment connected to the Licensee’s network for specific requirements has to have prior evaluation and approval of the Licensor or officer specially designated for the purpose. However, the Licensee has the responsibility to ensure protection of privacy of communication and to ensure that unauthorised interception of messages does not take place.[68] The Licensee shall take necessary steps to ensure that the Licensee and any person(s) acting on its behalf observe confidentiality of customer information.[69]

Responsibility of the Licensee: The Licensee has to take all necessary steps to safeguard the privacy and confidentiality of any information about a third party and its business to whom it provides the service and from whom it has acquired such information by virtue of the service provided and shall use its best endeavors to secure that :

No person acting on behalf of the Licensee or the Licensee divulges or uses any such information except as may be necessary in the course of providing such service to the third party; and
No such person seeks such information other than is necessary for the purpose of providing service to the third party.[70]

Provision of monitoring facilities: Requisite monitoring facilities /equipment for each type of system used, shall be provided by the service provider at its own cost for monitoring as and when required by the licensor.[71] The license also requires the Licensee to provide necessary facilities to the designated authorities for interception of the messages passing through its network.[72] The licensor in this case is the President of India, as the head of the State, therefore all references to the term licensor can be assumed to be to the government of India (which usually acts through the department of telecom (DOT). For monitoring traffic, the licensee company has to provide access of their network and other facilities as well as to books of accounts to the security agencies.[73]

Monitoring by Designated Person: The designated person of the Central/ State Government as conveyed to the Licensor from time to time in addition to the Licensor or its nominee has the right to monitor the telecommunication traffic in every MSC/Exchange/MGC/MG or any other technically feasible point in the network set up by the Licensee. The Licensee is required to make arrangement for monitoring simultaneous calls by Government security agencies. The hardware at Licensee’s end and software required for monitoring of calls shall be engineered, provided/installed and maintained by the Licensee at Licensee’s cost. However, the respective Government instrumentality bears the cost of user end hardware and leased line circuits from the MSC/ Exchange/MGC/MG to the monitoring centres to be located as per their choice in their premises or in the premises of the Licensee. In case the security agencies intend to locate the equipment at Licensee’s premises for facilitating monitoring, the Licensee should extend all support in this regard including space and entry of the authorized security personnel. The Licensee is required to implement the interface requirements as well as features and facilities as defined by the Licensor for both data and speech. The Licensee is to ensure suitable redundancy in the complete chain of Monitoring equipment for trouble free operations of monitoring of at least 210 simultaneous calls for seven security agencies.[74]

Monitoring Records to be maintained: Along with the monitored call following records are to be made available:

Called/calling party mobile/PSTN numbers.
Time/date and duration of interception.
Location of target subscribers. Cell ID should be provided for location of the target subscriber. However, Licensor may issue directions from time to time on the precision of location, based on technological developments and integration of Global Positioning System (GPS) which shall be binding on the LICENSEE.
Telephone numbers if any call-forwarding feature has been invoked by target subscriber.
Data records for even failed call attempts.
CDR (Call Data Record) of Roaming Subscriber.

The Licensee is required to provide the call data records of all the specified calls handled by the system at specified periodicity, as and when required by the security agencies.[75]

List of Subscribers: The complete list of subscribers shall be made available by the Licensee on their website (having password controlled access), so that authorized Intelligence Agencies are able to obtain the subscriber list at any time, as per their convenience with the help of the password.[76] The Licensor or its representative(s) have an access to the Database relating to the subscribers of the Licensee. The Licensee shall also update the list of his subscribers and make available the same to the Licensor at regular intervals. The Licensee shall make available, at any prescribed instant, to the Licensor or its authorized representative details of the subscribers using the service.[77] The Licensee must provide traceable identity of their subscribers,[78] and should be able to provide the geographical location (BTS location) of any subscriber at a given point of time, upon request by the Licensor or any other agency authorized by it.[79]

CDRs for Large Number of Outgoing Calls: The call detail records for outgoing calls made by subscribers making large number of outgoing calls day and night and to the various telephone numbers should be analyzed. Normally, no incoming call is observed in such cases. This can be done by running special programs for this purpose.[80] Although this provision itself does not say that it is limited to bulk subscribers (subscribers with more than 10 lines), it is contained as a sub-clause of section 41.19 which talks about specific measures for bulk subscribers, therefore it is possible that this provision is limited only to bulk subscribers and not to all subscribers.

No Remote Access to Suppliers: Suppliers/manufacturers and affiliate(s) are not allowed any remote access to the be enabled to access Lawful Interception System(LIS), Lawful Interception Monitoring(LIM), Call contents of the traffic and any such sensitive sector/data, which the licensor may notify from time to time, under any circumstances.[81] The Licensee is also not allowed to use remote access facility for monitoring of content.[82] Further, suitable technical device is required to be made available at Indian end to the designated security agency/licensor in which a mirror image of the remote access information is available on line for monitoring purposes.[83]

Monitoring as per the Rules under Telegraph Act: In order to maintain the privacy of voice and data, monitoring shall be in accordance with rules in this regard under Indian Telegraph Act, 1885.[84] It interesting to note that the monitoring under the UASL license is required to be as per the Rules prescribed under the Telegraph Act, but no mention is made of the Rules under the Information Technology Act.

Monitoring from Centralised Location: The Licensee has to ensure that necessary provision (hardware/ software) is available in its equipment for doing lawful interception and monitoring from a centralized location.[85]

Unified License (UL)

The National Telecom Policy - 2012 recognized the fact that the evolution from analog to digital technology has facilitated the conversion of voice, data and video to the digital form which are increasingly being rendered through single networks bringing about a convergence in networks, services and devices. It was therefore felt imperative to move towards convergence between various services, networks, platforms, technologies and overcome the incumbent segregation of licensing, registration and regulatory mechanisms in these areas. It was for this reason that the Government of India decided to move to the Unified License regime under which service providers could opt for all or any one or more of a number of different services.[86]

Provision of interception facilities by Licensee: The UL requires that the requisite monitoring/ interception facilities /equipment for each type of service, should be provided by the Licensee at its own cost for monitoring as per the requirement specified by the Licensor from time to time.[87] The Licensee is required to provide necessary facilities to the designated authorities of Central/State Government as conveyed by the Licensor from time to time for interception of the messages passing through its network, as per the provisions of the Indian Telegraph Act.[88]

Bulk encryption and unauthorized interception: The UL prohibits the Licensee from employing bulk encryption equipment in its network. Licensor or officers specially designated for the purpose are allowed to evaluate any encryption equipment connected to the Licensee’s network. However, it is the responsibility of the Licensee to ensure protection of privacy of communication and to ensure that unauthorized interception of messages does not take place.[89] The use of encryption by the subscriber shall be governed by the Government Policy/rules made under the Information Technology Act, 2000.[90]

Safeguarding of Privacy and Confidentiality: The Licensee shall take necessary steps to ensure that the Licensee and any person(s) acting on its behalf observe confidentiality of customer information.[91] Subject to terms and conditions of the license, the Licensee is required to take all necessary steps to safeguard the privacy and confidentiality of any information about a third party and its business to whom it provides services and from whom it has acquired such information by virtue of the service provided and shall use its best endeavors to secure that: a) No person acting on behalf of the Licensee or the Licensee divulges or uses any such information except as may be necessary in the course of providing such service; and b) No such person seeks such information other than is necessary for the purpose of providing service to the third party.

Provided the above para does not apply where: a) The information relates to a specific party and that party has consented in writing to such information being divulged or used, and such information is divulged or used in accordance with the terms of that consent; or b) The information is already open to the public and otherwise known.[92]

No Remote Access to Suppliers: Suppliers/manufacturers and affiliate(s) are not allowed any remote access to the be enabled to access Lawful Interception System(LIS), Lawful Interception Monitoring(LIM), Call contents of the traffic and any such sensitive sector/data, which the licensor may notify from time to time, under any circumstances.[93] The Licensee is also not allowed to use remote access facility for monitoring of content.[94] Further, suitable technical device is required to be made available at Indian end to the designated security agency/licensor in which a mirror image of the remote access information is available on line for monitoring purposes.[95]

Monitoring as per the Rules under Telegraph Act: In order to maintain the privacy of voice and data, monitoring shall be in accordance with rules in this regard under Indian Telegraph Act, 1885.[96] Just as in the UASL, the monitoring under the UL license is required to be as per the Rules prescribed under the Telegraph Act, but no mention is made of the Rules under the Information Technology Act.

Terms specific to various services

Since the UL License intends to cover all services under a single license, in addition to the general terms and conditions for interception, it also has terms for each specific service. We shall now discuss the terms for interception specific to each service offered under the Unified License.

Access Service: The designated person of the Central/ State Government, in addition to the Licensor or its nominee, shall have the right to monitor the telecommunication traffic in every MSC/ Exchange/ MGC/ MG/ Routers or any other technically feasible point in the network set up by the Licensee. The Licensee is required to make arrangement for monitoring simultaneous calls by Government security agencies. For establishing connectivity to Centralized Monitoring System, the Licensee at its own cost shall provide appropriately dimensioned hardware and bandwidth/dark fibre upto a designated point as required by Licensor from time to time. In case the security agencies intend to locate the equipment at Licensee’s premises for facilitating monitoring, the Licensee should extend all support in this regard including space and entry of the authorized security personnel.

The Interface requirements as well as features and facilities as defined by the Licensor should be implemented by the Licensee for both data and speech. The Licensee should ensure suitable redundancy in the complete chain of Lawful Interception and Monitoring equipment for trouble free operations of monitoring of at least 480 simultaneous calls as per requirement with at least 30 simultaneous calls for each of the designated security/ law enforcement agencies. Each MSC of the Licensee in the service area shall have the capacity for provisioning of at least 3000 numbers for monitoring. Presently there are ten (10) designated security/ law enforcement agencies. The above capacity provisions and no. of designated security/ law enforcement agencies may be amended by the Licensor separately by issuing instructions at any time.

Along with the monitored call following records are to be made available:

Called/calling party mobile/PSTN numbers.
Time/date and duration of interception.
Location of target subscribers. Cell ID should be provided for location of the target subscriber. However, Licensor may issue directions from time to time on the precision of location, based on technological developments and integration of Global Positioning System (GPS) which shall be binding on the LICENSEE.
Telephone numbers if any call-forwarding feature has been invoked by target subscriber.
Data records for even failed call attempts.
CDR (Call Data Record) of Roaming Subscriber.

The Licensee is required to provide the call data records of all the specified calls handled by the system at specified periodicity, as and when required by the security agencies.[97]

The call detail records for outgoing calls made by those subscribers making large number of outgoing calls day and night to the various telephone numbers with normally no incoming calls, is required to be analyzed by the Licensee. The service provider is required to run special programme, devise appropriate fraud management and prevention programme and fix threshold levels of average per day usage in minutes of the telephone connection; all telephone connections crossing the threshold of usage are required to be checked for bona fide use. A record of check must be maintained which may be verified by Licensor any time. The list/details of suspected subscribers should be informed to the respective TERM Cell of DoT and any other officer authorized by Licensor from time to time.[98]

The Licensee shall provide location details of mobile customers as per the accuracy and time frame mentioned in the Unified License. It shall be a part of CDR in the form of longitude and latitude, besides the co-ordinate of the BTS, which is already one of the mandated fields of CDR. To start with, these details will be provided for specified mobile numbers. However, within a period of 3 years from effective date of the Unified License, location details shall be part of CDR for all mobile calls.[99]

Internet Service: The Licensee is required to maintain CDR/IPDR for Internet including Internet Telephony Service for a minimum period of one year. The Licensee is also required to maintain log-in/log-out details of all subscribers for services provided such as internet access, e-mail, Internet Telephony, IPTV etc. These logs are to be maintained for a minimum period of one year. For the purpose of interception and monitoring of traffic, the copies of all the packets originating from / terminating into the Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) shall be made available to the Licensor/Security Agencies. Further, the list of Internet Lease Line (ILL) customers is to be placed on a password protected website in the format prescribed in the Unified License.[100]

Lawful Interception and Monitoring (LIM) systems of requisite capacities are to be set up by the Licensees for Internet traffic including Internet telephony traffic through their Internet gateways and /or Internet nodes at their own cost, as per the requirement of the security agencies/Licensor prescribed from time to time. The cost of maintenance of the monitoring equipment and infrastructure at the monitoring centre located at the premises of the licensee shall be borne by the Licensee. In case the Licensee obtains Access spectrum for providing Internet Service / Broadband Wireless Access using the Access Spectrum, the Licensee shall install the required Lawful Interception and Monitoring systems of requisite capacities prior to commencement of service. The Licensee, while providing downstream Internet bandwidth to an Internet Service provider is also required to ensure that all the traffic of downstream ISP passing through the Licensee’s network can be monitored in the network of the Licensee. However, for nodes of Licensee having upstream bandwidth from multiple service providers, the Licensee may be mandated to install LIM/LIS at these nodes, as per the requirement of security agencies. In such cases, upstream service providers may not be required to monitor this bandwidth.[101]

In case the Licensee has multiple nodes/points of presence and has capability to monitor the traffic in all the Routers/switches from a central location, the Licensor may accept to monitor the traffic from the said central monitoring location, provided that the Licensee is able to demonstrate to the Licensor/Security Agencies that all routers / switches are accessible from the central monitoring location. Moreover, the Licensee would have to inform the Licensor of every change that takes place in their topology /configuration, and ensure that such change does not make any routers/switches inaccessible from the central monitoring location. Further, Office space of 10 feet x 10 feet with adequate and uninterrupted power supply and air-conditioning which is physically secured and accessible only to the monitoring agencies shall be provided by the Licensee at each Internet Gateway location at its cost.[102]

National Long Distance (NLD) Service: The requisite monitoring facilities are required to be provided by the Licensee as per requirement of Licensor. The details of leased circuit provided by the Licensee is to be provided monthly to security agencies & DDG (TERM) of the Licensed Service Area where the licensee has its registered office.[103]

International Long Distance (ILD) Service: Office space of 20’x20’ with adequate and uninterrupted power supply and air-conditioning which is physically secured and accessible only to the personnel authorized by the Licensor is required to be provided by the Licensee at each Gateway location free of cost.[104] The cost of monitoring equipment is to be borne by the Licensee. The installation of the monitoring equipment at the ILD Gateway Station is to be done by the Licensee. After installation of the monitoring equipment, the Licensee shall get the same inspected by monitoring /security agencies. The permission to operate/commission the gateway will be given only after this.[105]

The designated person of the Central/ State Government, in addition to the Licensor or its nominee, has the right to monitor the telecommunication traffic in every ILD Gateway / Routers or any other technically feasible point in the network set up by the Licensee. The Licensee is required to make arrangement for monitoring simultaneous calls by Government security agencies. For establishing connectivity to Centralized Monitoring System, the Licensee, at its own cost, is required to provide appropriately dimensioned hardware and bandwidth/dark fibre upto a designated point as required by Licensor from time to time. In case the security agencies intend to locate the equipment at Licensee’s premises for facilitating monitoring, the Licensee should extend all support in this regard including Space and Entry of the authorized security personnel. The Interface requirements as well as features and facilities as defined by the Licensor should be implemented by the Licensee for both data and speech. The Licensee should ensure suitable redundancy in the complete chain of Monitoring equipment for trouble free operations of monitoring of at least 480 simultaneous calls as per requirement with at least 30 simultaneous calls for each of the designated security/ law enforcement agencies. Each ILD Gateway of the Licensee shall have the capacity for provisioning of at least 5000 numbers for monitoring. Presently there are ten (10) designated security/ law enforcement agencies. The above capacity provisions and number of designated security/ law enforcement agencies may be amended by the Licensor separately by issuing instructions at any time.[106]

The Licensee is required to provide the call data records of all the specified calls handled by the system at specified periodicity, as and when required by the security agencies in the format prescribed from time to time.[107]

Global Mobile Personal Communication by Satellite (GMPCS) Service: The designated Authority of the Central/State Government shall have the right to monitor the telecommunication traffic in every Gateway set up in India. The Licensee shall make arrangement for monitoring of calls as specified in the Unified License.[108]

The hardware/software required for monitoring of calls shall be engineered, provided/installed and maintained by the Licensee at the ICC (Intercept Control Centre) to be established at the GMPCS Gateway(s) as also in the premises of security agencies at Licensee’s cost. The Interface requirements as well as features and facilities shall be worked out and implemented by the Licensee for both data and speech. The Licensee should ensure suitable redundancy in the complete chain of Monitoring equipment for trouble free operations. The Licensee shall provide suitable training to the designated representatives of the Licensor regarding operation and maintenance of Monitoring equipment (ICC & MC). Interception of target subscribers using messaging services should also be provided even if retrieval is carried out using PSTN links. For establishing connectivity to Centralized Monitoring System, the Licensee at its own cost shall provide appropriately dimensioned hardware and bandwidth/dark fibre upto a designated point as required by Licensor from time to time.[109] The License also has specific obligations to extend monitored calls to designated security agencies as provided in the UL.[110] Further, the Licensee is required to provide the call data records of all the calls handled by the system at specified periodicity, if and as and when required by the security agencies.[111] It is the responsibility of the service provider for Global Mobile Personal Communication by Satellite (GMPCS) to provide facility to carry out surveillance of User Terminal activity.[112]

The Licensee has to make available adequate monitoring facility at the GMPCS Gateway in India to monitor all traffic (traffic originating/terminating in India) passing through the applicable system. For this purpose, the Licensee shall set up at his cost, the requisite interfaces, as well as features and facilities for monitoring of calls by designated agencies as directed by the Licensor from time to time. In addition to the Target Intercept List (TIL), it should also be possible to carry out specific geographic location based interception, if so desired by the designated security agencies. Monitoring of calls should not be perceptible to mobile users either during direct monitoring or when call has been grounded for monitoring. The Licensee shall not prefer any charges for grounding a call for monitoring purposes. The intercepted data is to be pushed to designated Security Agencies’ server on fire and forget basis. No records shall be maintained by the Licensee regarding monitoring activities and air-time used beyond prescribed time limit.

The Licensee has to ensure that any User Terminal (UT) registered in the gateway of another country shall re-register with Indian Gateway when operating from Indian Territory. Any UT registered outside India, when attempting to make/receive calls from within India, without due authority, shall be automatically denied service by the system and occurrence of such attempts along with information about UT identity as well as location shall be reported to the designated authority immediately.

The Licensee is required to have provision to scan operation of subscribers specified by security/ law enforcement agencies through certain sensitive areas within the Indian territory and shall provide their identity and positional location (latitude and longitude) to Licensor on as and when required basis.

Public Mobile Radio Trunking Service (PMRTS): Suitable monitoring equipment prescribed by the Licensor for each type of System used has to be provided by the Licensee at his own cost for monitoring, as and when required.[113]

Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) Closed User Group (CUG) Service: Requisite monitoring facilities/ equipment for each type of system used have to be provided by the Licensee at its own cost for monitoring as and when required by the Licensor.[114] The Licensee shall provide at its own cost technical facilities for accessing any port of the switching equipment at the HUB for interception of the messages by the designated authorities at a location to be determined by the Licensor.[115]

Surveillance of MSS-R Service: The Licensee has to provide at its own cost technical facilities for accessing any port of the switching equipment at the HUB for interception of the messages by the designated authorities at a location as and when required.[116] It is the responsibility of the service provider of INSAT- Mobile Satellite System Reporting (MSS-R) service to provide facility to carry out surveillance of User Terminal activity within a specified area.[117]

Resale of International Private Leased Circuit (IPLC) Service: The Licensee has to take IPLC from the licensed ILDOs. The interception and monitoring of Resellers circuits will take place at the Gateway of the ILDO from whom the IPLC has been taken by the Licensee. The provisioning for Lawful Interception & Monitoring of the Resellers’ IPLC shall be done by the ILD Operator and the concerned ILDO shall be responsible for Lawful Interception and Monitoring of the traffic passing through the IPLC. The Resellers shall extend all cooperation in respect of interception and monitoring of its IPLC and shall be responsible for the interception results. The Licensee shall be responsible to interact, correspond and liaise with the licensor and security agencies with regard to security monitoring of the traffic. The Licensee shall, before providing an IPLC to the customer, get the details of services/equipment to be connected on both ends of IPLC, including type of terminals, data rate, actual use of circuit, protocols/interface to be used etc. The Resellers shall permit only such type of service/protocol on the IPLC for which the concerned ILDO has capability of interception and monitoring. The Licensee has to pass on any direct request placed by security agencies on him for interception of the traffic on their IPLC to the concerned ILDOs within two hours for necessary actions.[118]

4. The Information Technology Act, 2000

The Information Technology Act, 2000, was amended in a major way in 2008 and is the primary legislation which regulates the interception, monitoring, decryption and collection of traffic information of digital communications in India.

More specifically, section 69 of the Information Technology Act empowers the central Government and the state governments to issue directions for the monitoring, interception or decryption of any information transmitted, received or stored through a computer resource. Section 69 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 expands the grounds upon which interception can take place as compared to the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885. As such, the interception of communications under Section 69 is carried out in the interest of[119]:

The sovereignty or integrity of India

Defence of India

Security of the State
Friendly relations with foreign States
Public order
Preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offense relating to the above
For the investigation of any offense

While the grounds for interception are similar to the Indian Telegraph Act (except for the condition of prevention of incitement of only cognizable offences and the addition of investigation of any offence) the Information Technology Act does not have the overarching condition that interception can only occur in the case of public emergency or in the interest of public safety.

Additionally, section 69 of the Act mandates that any person or intermediary who fails to assist the specified agency with the interception, monitoring, decryption or provision of information stored in a computer resource shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and shall be liable for a fine.[120]

Section 69B of the Information Technology Act empowers the Central Government to authorise the monitoring and collection of information and traffic data generated, transmitted, received or stored through any computer resource for the purpose of cyber security. According to this section, any intermediary who intentionally or knowingly fails to provide technical assistance to the authorised agency which is required to monitor and collection information and traffic data shall be punished with an imprisonment which may extend to three years and will also be liable to a fine.[121]

The main difference between Section 69 and Section 69B is that the first requires the interception, monitoring and decryption of all information generated, transmitted, received or stored through a computer resource when it is deemed “necessary or expedient” to do so, whereas Section 69B specifically provides a mechanism for all metadata of all communications through a computer resource for the purpose of combating threats to “cyber security”. Directions under Section 69 can be issued by the Secretary to the Ministry of Home Affairs, whereas directions under Section 69B can only be issued by the Secretary of the Department of Information Technology under the Union Ministry of Communications and Information Technology.

Overlap with the Telegraph Act

Thus while the Telegraph Act only allows for interception of messages or class of messages transmitted by a telegraph, the Information Technology Act enables interception of any information being transmitted or stored in a computer resource. Since a “computer resource” is defined to include a communication device (such as cellphones and PDAs) there is a overlap between the provisions of the Information Technology Act and the Telegraph Act concerning the provisions of interception of information sent through mobile phones. This is further complicated by the fact that the UAS License specifically states that it is governed by the provisions of the Indian Telegraph Act, the Indian Wireless Telegraphy Act and the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, but does not mention the Information Technology Act.[122] This does not mean that the Licensees under the Telecom Licenses are not bound by any other laws of India (including the Information Technology Act) but it is just an invitation to unnecessary complexities and confusions with regard to a very serious issue such as interception. This situation has thankfully been remedied by the Unified License (UL) which, although issued under section of 4 of the Telegraph Act, also references the Information Technology Act thus providing essential clarity with respect to the applicability of the Information Technology Act to the License Agreement.

Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009

The interception of internet communications is mainly covered by the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009under the Information Technology Act (the “IT Interception Rules”). In particular, the rules framed under Section 69 and 69B include safeguards stipulating to who may issue directions of interception and monitoring, how such directions are to be executed, the duration they remain in operation, to whom data may be disclosed, confidentiality obligations of intermediaries, periodic oversight of interception directions by a Review Committee under the Indian Telegraph Act, the retention of records of interception by intermediaries and to the mandatory destruction of information in appropriate cases.

According to the IT Interception Rules, only the competent authority can issue an order for the interception, monitoring or decryption of any information generated, transmitted, received or stored in any computer resource under sub-section (2) of section 69 of the Information Technology Act.[123] At the State and Union Territory level, the State Secretaries respectively in charge of the Home Departments are designated as “competent authorities” to issue interception directions.[124]In unavoidable circumstances the Joint Secretary to the Government of India, when so authorised by the Competent Authority, may issue an order. Interception may also be carried out with the prior approval of the Head or the second senior most officer of the authorised security agency at the Central Level and at the State Level with the approval of officers authorised in this behalf not below the rank of Inspector General of Police, in the belowmentioned emergent cases:

(1) in remote areas, where obtaining of prior directions for interception or monitoring or decryption of information is not feasible; or

(2) for operational reasons, where obtaining of prior directions for interception or monitoring or decryption of any information generation, transmitted, received or stored in any computer resource is not feasible,

however, in the above circumstances the officer would have to inform the competent authority in writing within three working days about the emergency and of the interception, monitoring or decryption and obtain the approval of the competent authority within a period of seven working days. If the approval of the competent authority is not obtained within the said period of seven working days, such interception or monitoring or decryption shall cease and the information shall not be intercepted or monitored or decrypted thereafter without the prior approval of the competent authority.[125] If a state wishes to intercept information that is beyond its jurisdiction, it must request permission to issue the direction from the Secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs.[126]

In order to avoid the risk of unauthorised interception, the IT Interception Rules provide for the following safeguards:

If authorised by the competent authority, any agency of the government may intercept, monitor, or decrypt information transmitted, received, or stored in any computer resource only for the purposes specified in section 69(1) of the IT Act.[127]
The IT Interception Rules further provide that the competent authority may give any decryption direction to the decryption key holder.[128]
The officer issuing an order for interception is required to issue requests in writing to designated nodal officers of the service provider.[129]
Any direction issued by the competent authority must contain the reasons for direction, and must be forwarded to the review committee seven days after being issued.[130]
In the case of issuing or approving an interception order, in arriving at its decision the competent authority must consider all alternate means of acquiring the information.[131]
The order must relate to information sent or likely to be sent from one or more particular computer resources to another (or many) computer resources.[132]
The reasons for ordering interceptions must be recorded in writing, and must specify the name and designation of the officer to whom the information obtained is to be disclosed, and also specify the uses to which the information is to be put.[133]
The directions for interception will remain in force for a period of 60 days, unless renewed. If the orders are renewed they cannot be in force for longer than 180 days.[134]
Authorized agencies are prohibited from using or disclosing contents of intercepted communications for any purpose other than investigation, but they are permitted to share the contents with other security agencies for the purpose of investigation or in judicial proceedings. Furthermore, security agencies at the union territory and state level will share any information obtained by following interception orders with any security agency at the centre.[135]
All records, including electronic records pertaining to interception are to be destroyed by the government agency “every six months, except in cases where such information is required or likely to be required for functional purposes”.[136]
The contents of intercepted, monitored, or decrypted information will not be used or disclosed by any agency, competent authority, or nodal officer for any purpose other than its intended purpose.[137]
The agency authorised by the Secretary of Home Affairs is required to appoint a nodal officer (not below the rank of superintendent of police or equivalent) to authenticate and send directions to service providers or decryption key holders.[138]

The IT Interception Rules also place the following obligations on the service providers:

In addition, all records pertaining to directions for interception and monitoring are to be destroyed by the service provider within a period of two months following discontinuance of interception or monitoring, unless they are required for any ongoing investigation or legal proceedings.[139]
Upon receiving an order for interception, service providers are required to provide all facilities, co-operation, and assistance for interception, monitoring, and decryption. This includes assisting with: the installation of the authorised agency's equipment, the maintenance, testing, or use of such equipment, the removal of such equipment, and any action required for accessing stored information under the direction.[140]
Additionally, decryption key holders are required to disclose the decryption key and provide assistance in decrypting information for authorized agencies.[141]

Every fifteen days the officers designated by the intermediaries are required to forward to the nodal officer in charge a list of interceptions orders received by them. The list must include the details such as reference and date of orders of the competent authority.[142]
The service provider is required to put in place adequate internal checks to ensure that unauthorised interception does not take place, and to ensure the extreme secrecy of intercepted information is maintained.[143]
The contents of intercepted communications are not allowed to be disclosed or used by any person other than the intended recipient.[144]
Additionally, the service provider is required to put in place internal checks to ensure that unauthorized interception of information does not take place and extreme secrecy is maintained. This includes ensuring that the interception and related information are handled only by the designated officers of the service provider.[145]

Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Monitoring and Collecting Traffic Data or Information) Rules, 2009

The Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Monitoring and Collecting Traffic Data or Information) Rules, 2009, under section 69B of the Information Technology Act, stipulate that directions for the monitoring and collection of traffic data or information can be issued by an order made by the competent authority[146] for any or all of the following purposes related to cyber security:

forecasting of imminent cyber incidents;
monitoring network application with traffic data or information on computer resource;
identification and determination of viruses or computer contaminant;
tracking cyber security breaches or cyber security incidents;
tracking computer resource breaching cyber security or spreading virus or computer contaminants;
identifying or tracking any person who has breached, or is suspected of having breached or likely to breach cyber security;
undertaking forensic of the concerned computer resource as a part of investigation or internal audit of information security practices in the computer resources;
accessing stored information for enforcement of any provisions of the laws relating to cyber security for the time being in force;
any other matter relating to cyber security.[147]

According to these Rules, any direction issued by the competent authority should contain reasons for such direction and a copy of such direction should be forwarded to the Review Committee within a period of seven working days.[148] Furthermore, these Rules state that the Review Committee shall meet at least once in two months and record its finding on whether the issued directions are in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 69B of the Act. If the Review Committee is of the opinion that the directions are not in accordance with the provisions referred to above, it may set aside the directions and issue an order for the destruction of the copies, including corresponding electronic record of the monitored or collected traffic data or information.[149]

Information Technology (Guidelines for Cyber Cafes) Rules, 2011

The Information Technology (Guidelines for Cyber Cafes) Rules, 2011, were issued under powers granted under section 87(2), read with section 79(2) of the Information Technology Act, 2000.[150] These rules require cyber cafes in India to store and maintain backup logs for each login by any user, to retain such records for a year and to ensure that the log is not tampered. Rule 7 requires the inspection of cyber cafes to determine that the information provided during registration is accurate and remains updated.

5. The Indian Post Office Act, 1898
Section 26 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898, empowers the Central Government and the State Governments to intercept postal articles.[151] In particular, section 26 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898, states that on the occurrence of any public emergency or in the interest of public safety or tranquility, the Central Government, State Government or any officer specially authorised by the Central or State Government may direct the interception, detention or disposal of any postal article, class or description of postal articles in the course of transmission by post. Furthermore, section 26 states that if any doubt arises regarding the existence of public emergency, public safety or tranquility then a certificate to that effect by the Central Government or a State Government would be considered as conclusive proof of such condition being satisfied.

According to this section, the Central Government and the State Governments of India can intercept postal articles if it is deemed to be in the instance of a 'public emergency' or for 'public safety or tranquility'. However, the Indian Post Office Act, 1898, does not cover electronic communications and does not mandate their interception, which is covered by the Information Technology Act, 2000 and the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885.

6. The Indian Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1933
The Indian Wireless Telegraphy Act was passed to regulate and govern the possession of wireless telegraphy equipment within the territory of India. This Act essentially provides that no person can own “wireless telegraphy apparatus”[152] except with a license provided under this Act and must use the equipment in accordance with the terms provided in the license.[153]

One of the major sources of revenue for the Indian State Broadcasting Service was revenue from the licence fee from working of wireless apparatus under the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885.The Indian State Broadcasting Service was losing revenue due to lack of legislation for prosecuting persons using unlicensed wireless apparatus as it was difficult to trace them at the first place and then prove that such instrument has been installed, worked and maintained without licence. Therefore, the current legislation was proposed, in order to prohibit possession of wireless telegraphy apparatus without licence.

Presently the Act is used to prosecute cases, related to illegal possession and transmission via satellite phones. Any person who wishes to use satellite phones for communication purposes has to get licence from the Department of Telecommunications.[154]

7. The Code of Criminal Procedure
Section 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure regulates targeted surveillance. In particular, section 91 states that a Court in India or any officer in charge of a police station may summon a person to produce any document or any other thing that is necessary for the purposes of any investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceeding under the Code of Criminal Procedure.[155] Under section 91, law enforcement agencies in India could theoretically access stored data. Additionally, section 92 of the Code of Criminal Procedure regulates the interception of a document, parcel or thing in the possession of a postal or telegraph authority.

Further section 356(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that in certain cases the Courts have the power to direct repeat offenders convicted under certain provisions, to notify his residence and any change of, or absence from, such residence after release for a term not exceeding five years from the date of the expiration of the second sentence.

Policy Suggestions

In order to avoid the different standards being adopted for different aspects of surveillance and in different parts of the country, there should be one single policy document or surveillance and interception manual which should contain the rules and regulations regarding all kinds of surveillance. This would not only help in identifying problems in the law but may also be useful in streamlining the entire surveillance regime. However it is easier said than done and requires a mammoth effort at the legislative stage. This is because under the Constitutional scheme of India law and order is a State subject and the police machinery in every State is under the authority of the State government. Therefore it would not be possible to issue a single legislation dealing with all aspects of surveillance since the States are independent in their powers to deal with the police machinery.

Even when we look at the issue of interception, certain state legislations especially the ones dealing with organized crime and bootleggers such as the Maharashtra Control of Organized Crime Act, 1999, the Andhra Pradesh Control of Organized Crime Act, 2001, also deal with the issue of interception and contain provisions empowering the state government to intercept communications for the purpose of using it to investigate or prevent criminal activities. Further even the two central level legislations that deal with interception, viz. the Telegraph Act and the Information Technology Act, specifically empower the State governments also to intercept communications on the same grounds as the Central Government. Since interception of communications is mostly undertaken by security and law enforcement agencies, broadly for the maintenance of law and order, State governments cannot be prevented from issuing their own legislations to deal with interception.

Due to the abovementioned legal and constitutional complexities the major problem in achieving harmonization is to get both the Central and State governments on to the same page. Even if the Central government amends the Telegraph Act and the IT Act to bring them in line with each other, the State governments will still be free to do whatever they please. Therefore it seems the best approach in order to achieve harmonization may be to have a two pronged strategy, i.e. (i) issue a National Surveillance Policy covering both interception and general surveillance; and (ii) amend the central legislations i.e. the Telegraph Act and the Information Technology Act in accordance with the National Surveillance Policy. Once a National Surveillance Policy, based on scientific data and the latest theories on criminology is issued, it is hoped that State governments will themselves like to adopt the principles enshrined therein and amend their own legislations dealing with interception to fall in line with the National Surveillance Policy.

[1] Section 6(2)(b) of the Model Police Manual.

[2] Section 191 (D) of the Model Police Manual.

[3] Section 200 (D) of the Model Police Manual.

[4] Section 2011 (I) of the Model Police Manual.

[5] Section 201 (II) of the Model Police Manual.

[6] Section 201 (IV) of the Model Police Manual.

[7] Section 193 (III) of the Model Police Manual.

[8] Surjan Das & Basudeb Chattopadhyay, Rural Crime in Police Perception: A Study of Village Crime Note Books, 26(3) Economic and Political Weekly 129, 129 (1991).

[9] Section 201 (III) of the Model Police Manual.

[10] Section 201 (V) of the Model Police Manual.

[11] Section 201 (VII) of the Model Police Manual.

[12] Section 356(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code states as follows:

356. Order for notifying address of previously convicted offender.

(1) When any person, having been convicted by a Court in India of an offence punishable under section 215, section 489A, section 489B, section 489C or section 489D of the Indian Penal Code, (45 of 1860 ) or of any offence punishable under Chapter XII or Chapter XVII of that Code, with imprisonment for a term of three years or upwards, is again convicted of any offence punishable under any of those sections or Chapters with imprisonment for a term of three years or upwards by any Court other than that of a Magistrate of the second class, such Court may, if it thinks fit, at the time of passing a sentence of imprisonment on such person, also order that his residence and any change of, or absence from, such residence after release be notified as hereinafter provided for a term not exceeding five years from the date of the expiration of such sentence.

[13] The Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, http://www.ijlt.in/pdffiles/Indian-Telegraph-Act-1885.pdf

[14] Privacy International, Report: “India”, Chapter 3: “Surveillance Policies”, https://www.privacyinternational.org/reports/india/iii-surveillance-policies

[15] Rule 419A(1), Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.

[16] Rule 419A(1), Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.

[17] Rule 419A(2), Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.

[18] Rule 419A(3), Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.

[19] Rule 419A(4), Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.

[20] Rule 419A(5), Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.

[21] Rule 419A(6), Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.

[22] Rule 419A(7), Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.

[23] Rule 419A(8), Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.

[24] Rule 419A(9), Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.

[25] Rule 419A(18), Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Rule 419A(10), Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.

[28] Rule 419A(11), Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.

[29] Rule 419A(12), Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.

[30] Rule 419A(13), Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.

[31] Rule 419A(14), Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.

[32] Rule 419A(15), Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.

[33] Rule 419A(19), Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Section 46 of the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1967. The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 has certain additional safeguards such as not allowing intercepted information to be disclosed or received in evidence unless the accused has been provided with a copy of the same atleast 10 days in advance, unless the period of 10 days is specifically waived by the judge.

[37] State owned Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) (Mahanager Telephone Nigam Limited (MTNL) and Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL)) were issued licenses for provision of CMTS as third operator in various parts of the country. Further, 17 fresh licenses were issued to private companies as fourth cellular operator in September/ October, 2001, one each in 4 Metro cities and 13 Telecom Circles.

[38] Section 45.2 of the CMTS License.

[39] Section 41.09 of the CMTS License.

[40] Section 41.09 of the CMTS License.

[41] Section 44.4 of the CMTS License. Similar provision exists in section 44.11 of the CMTS License.

[42] Section 34.28 (xix) of the ISP License.

[43] Section 34.12 of the ISP License.

[44] Section 34.13 of the ISP License.

[45] Section 34.22 of the ISP License.

[46] Section 34.6 of the ISP License.

[47] Section 34.15 of the ISP License.

[48] Section 34.28 (xiv) of the ISP License.

[49] Section 34.28 (xi) of the ISP License.

[50] Section 34.14 of the ISP License.

[51] Section 34.28 (ix)&(x) of the ISP License.

[52] Section 30.1 of the ISP License.

[53] Section 33.4 of the ISP License.

[54] Section 34.4 of the ISP License.

[55] Section 34.7 of the ISP License.

[56] Section 34.9 of the ISP License.

[57] Section 34.27 (a)(i) of the ISP License.

[58] Section 34.27(a)(ii-vi) of the ISP License.

[59] Section 32.1, 32.2 (i)(ii), 32.3 of the ISP License.

[60] Section 34.8 of the ISP License.

[61] Section 34.18 of the ISP License.

[62] Section 34.28 (xv) of the ISP License.

[63] Section 41.10 of the ISP License.

[64] Section 41.10 of the ISP License.

[65] Section 41.19(i) of the ISP License.

[66] Section 41.19(ii) of the ISP License.

[67] Section 41.19(iv) of the ISP License.

[68] Section 39.1 of the UASL. Similar provision is contained in section 41.4, 41.12 of the UASL.

[69] Section 39.3 of the UASL.

[70] Section 39.2 of the UASL.

[71] Section 23.2 of the UASL. Similar provisions are contained in section 41.7 of the UASL regarding provision of monitoring equipment for monitoring in the “interest of security”.

[72] Section 42.2 of the UASL.

[73] Section 41.20(xx) of the UASL.

[74] Section 41.10 of the UASL.

[75] Section 41.10 of the UASL.

[76] Section 41.14 of the UASL.

[77] Section 41.16 of the UASL.

[78] Section 41.20(ix) of the UASL.

[79] Section 41.20(ix) of the UASL.

[80] Section 41.19(ii) of the UASL.

[81] Section 41.20(xii) of the UASL.

[82] Section 41.20(xiii) of the UASL.

[83] Section 41.20(xiv) of the UASL.

[84] Section 41.20 (xix) of the UASL.

[85] Section 41.20(xvi) of the UASL.

[86] The different services covered by the Unified License are:

a. Unified License (All Services)

b. Access Service (Service Area-wise)

c. Internet Service (Category-A with All India jurisdiction)

d. Internet Service (Category-B with jurisdiction in a Service Area)

e. Internet Service (Category-C with jurisdiction in a Secondary Switching Area)

f. National Long Distance (NLD) Service

g. International Long Distance (ILD) Service

h. Global Mobile Personal Communication by Satellite (GMPCS) Service

i. Public Mobile Radio Trunking Service (PMRTS) Service

j. Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) Closed User Group (CUG) Service

k. INSAT MSS-Reporting (MSS-R) Service

l. Resale of International private Leased Circuit (IPLC) Service

Authorisation for Unified License (All Services) would however cover all services listed at para 2(ii) (b) in all service areas, 2 (ii) (c), 2(ii) (f) to 2(ii) (l) above.

[87] Chapter IV, Para 23.2 of the UL.

[88] Chapter VI, Para 40.2 of the UL.

[89] Chapter V, Para 37.1 of the UL. Similar provision is contained in Chapter VI, Para 39.4,

[90] Chapter V, Para 37.5 of the UL/

[91] Chapter V, Para 37.3 of the UL.

[92] Chapter V, Para 37.2 of the UL.

[93] Chapter VI, Para 39.23(xii) of the UL.

[94] Chapter VI, Para 39.23 (xiii) of the UL.

[95] Chapter VI, Para 39.23 (xiv) of the UL.

[96] Chapter VI, Para 39.23 (xix) of the UL.

[97] Chapter VIII, Para 8.3 of the UL.

[98] Chapter VIII, Para 8.4 of the UL.

[99] Chapter VIII, Para 8.5 of the UL.

[100] Chapter IX, Paras 7.1 to 7.3 of the UL. Further obligations have also been imposed on the Licensee to ensure that its ILL customers maintain the usage of IP addresses/Network Address Translation (NAT) syslog, in case of multiple users on the same ILL, for a minimum period of one year.

[101] Chapter IX, Paras 8.1 to 8.3 of the UL.

[102] Chapter IX, Paras 8.4 and 8.5 of the UL.

[103] Chapter X, Para 5.2 of the UL.

[104] Chapter XI, Para 6.3 of the UL.

[105] Chapter XI, Para 6.4 of the UL.

[106] Chapter XI, Para 6.6 of the UL.

[107] Chapter XI, Para 6.7 of the UL.

[108] Chapter XII, Para 7.4 of the UL.

[109] Chapter XII, Para 7.5 of the UL.

[110] Chapter XII, Para 7.6 of the UL.

[111] Chapter XII, Para 7.7 of the UL.

[112] Chapter XII, Para 7.8 of the UL.

[113] Chapter XIII, Para 7.1 of the UL.

[114] Chapter XIV, Para 8.1 of the UL.

[115] Chapter XIV, Para 8.2 of the UL.

[116] Chapter XV, Para 8.1 of the UL.

[117] Chapter XV, Para 8.5 of the UL.

[118] Chapter XVI, Paras 4.1 - 4.4 of the UL.

[119] Section 69 of the Information Technology Act, 2000.

[120] Ibid.

[121] Section 69B of the Information Technology Act, 2000.

[122] Section 32 of the ISP License.

[123] Rule 3, Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[124] Rule 2(d), Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[125] Rule 3, Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[126] Rule 6, Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[127] Rule 4, Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[128] Rule 5, Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[129] Rule 13, Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[130] Rule 7, Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[131] Rule 8, Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[132] Rule 9, Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[133] Rule 10, Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[134] Rule 11, Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[135] Rule 25(2)&(6), Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[136] Rule 23, Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[137] Rule 25, Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[138] Rule 12, Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[139] Rule 23(2), Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[140] Rule 19, Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[141] Rule 17, Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[142] Rule 18, Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[143] Rule 20& 21, Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[144] Rule 25, Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[145] Rule 20, Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[146] Rule 3(1) of the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009.

[147] Rule 3(2) of the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009.

[148] Rule 3(3) of the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009.

[149] Rules 7 of the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009.

[150] Introduction to the Information Technology (Guidelines for Cyber Cafe) Rules, 2011.

[151] The Indian Post Office Act, 1898, http://www.indiapost.gov.in/Pdf/Manuals/TheIndianPostOfficeAct1898.pdf

[152] The expression “wireless telegraphy apparatus” has been defined as “any apparatus, appliance, instrument or material used or capable of use in wireless communication, and includes any article determined by rule made under Sec. 10 to be wireless telegraphy apparatus, but does not include any such apparatus, appliance, instrument or material commonly used for other electrical purposes, unless it has been specially designed or adapted for wireless communication or forms part of some apparatus, appliance, instrument or material specially so designed or adapted, nor any article determined by rule made under Section 10 not to be wireless telegraphy apparatus;”

[153] Section 4, Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1933.

[154] Snehashish Ghosh, Indian Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1933, http://cis-india.org/telecom/resources/indian-wireless-telegraphy-act.

[155] The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 91, http://www.icf.indianrailways.gov.in/uploads/files/CrPC.pdf

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/policy-paper-on-surveillance-in-india

July 2015 Bulletin

praskrishna — 2015-11-21T16:23:52Z

Our newsletter for the month of July is below:

We are happy to share with you the seventh issue of the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) newsletter (July 2015). The past editions of the newsletter can be accessed at http://cis-india.org/about/newsletters.

Highlights

NVDA team conducted a training at SIES College, Sion, Mumbai. Thirty-four delegates attended the training programme. A training workshop was held at Anne Jane Askwith Higher Secondary School for the Visually Impaired, Palayamkottai, Tirunelveli by NVDA team. Sixteen delegates participated in this. Konkani Wikipedia is the second Wikimedia project after Odia Wikisource that has gone live out of incubation. The project stayed in the incubation for nine long years and the community has gone through a long debate to have a Wikipedia of their own. Subhashish Panigrahi has blogged on this highlighting the three Konkani Wikimedians. The 30^th Session of the WIPO Standing Committee on Copyrights and Related Rights was held in Geneva from June 29 to July 3. Nehaa Chaudhari prepared a statement about the negotiations on the Proposed Treaty for Broadcasting Organisations. Sumandro Chattapadhyay wrote an article in the Hindustan Times about India’s “Digital India” initiative to develop communication infrastructure, government information systems, and general capacity to digitise public life in India. CIS published the first draft of its analysis on technology business incubators ("TBI") in India. The report prepared by Sunil Abraham, Vidushi Marda, Udbhav Tiwari and Anumeha Karnatak looks at operating procedures, success stories and lessons that can be learnt from TBIs in India. Pranesh Prakash did a brief analysis about the Department of Telecommunications Panel Report on Net Neutrality. CIS has participated in the Expert Committee for DNA Profiling constituted by the Department of Biotechnology in 2012 for the purpose of deliberating on and finalizing the draft Human DNA Profiling Bill and appreciates this opportunity. CIS has prepared a dissent note to the Expert Committee on DNA Profiling. In the last few decades, all major common law jurisdictions have decriminalised non-procreative sex – oral and anal sex (sodomy) – to allow private, consensual, and non-commercial homosexual intercourse. Bhairav Acharya brought out the developments from across the world in a blog entry. As part of its project on mapping cyber security actors in South Asia and South East Asia, CIS conducted interviews with a Tibetan security researcher and information activist and Shantanu Ghosh, Managing Director, Symantec Product Operations, India. CIS, the Observer Research Foundation, the Internet Policy Observatory, the Centre for Global Communication Studies and the Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania had organized a conference in April in New Delhi. The findings have been condensed in a report titled “Effective research, policy formulation, and the development of regulatory frameworks in South Asia”. Pranesh Prakash in a research paper titled Regulatory Perspectives on Net Neutrality gives an overview on why India needs to put in place net neutrality regulations, and the form that those regulations must take to avoid being over-regulation. Rakshanda Deka undertook an analysis on the anti-spam laws in different jurisdictions. This analysis is a part of a larger attempt at formulating a model anti-spam law for India by analysing the existing spam laws across the world. As part of the 'Studying Internets in India' series, RAW has published blog entries on WhatsApp and the Creation of a Transnational Sociality; Users and the Internet; Effective Activism: The Internet, Social Media, and Hierarchical Activism in New Delhi; Studying the Internet Discourse in India through the Prism of Human Rights; and 'Originality,' 'Authenticity,' and 'Experimentation': Understanding Tagore’s Music on YouTube. The National Optic Fibre Network, a part of the Government's Digital India Initiative, has been in the news since the recent Expert Committee Report. Aditya Garg in a blog entry examined the accountability of the funding of the project.

Accessibility and Inclusion

Under a grant from the Hans Foundation we are doing two projects. The first project is on creating a national resource kit of state-wise laws, policies and programmes on issues relating to persons with disabilities in India. CIS in partnership with CLPR (Centre for Law and Policy Research) compiled the National Compendium of Policies, Programmes and Schemes for Persons with Disabilities (29 states and 6 union territories). The publication has been finalised and is being printed. The draft chapters and the quarterly reports can be accessed on the project page. The second project is on developing text-to-speech software for 15 Indian languages. The progress made so far in the project can be accessed here.

NVDA and eSpeak

Monthly Updates

July 2015 Report (Suman Dogra; July 31, 2015).

Event Reports

The training programmes were held in June and the reports were published in July:

Tamil Computing with NVDA Training Workshop (Organized by NVDA team: Anne Jane Ask with Higher Secondary School for the Visually Impaired, Palayamkottai, Tirunelveli; June 3 – 7, 2015).
Training in eSpeak Marathi (Organized by NVDA team; SIES College, Sion, Mumbai; June 28, 2015).

Access to Knowledge

As part of the Access to Knowledge programme we are doing two projects. The first one (Pervasive Technologies) under a grant from the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) is for research on the complex interplay between pervasive technologies and intellectual property to support intellectual property norms that encourage the proliferation and development of such technologies as a social good. The second one (Wikipedia) under a grant from the Wikimedia Foundation is for the growth of Indic language communities and projects by designing community collaborations and partnerships that recruit and cultivate new editors and explore innovative approaches to building projects.

Submission / Comment

Statement by the Centre for Internet and Society on the Broadcast Treaty at SCCR 30 (Nehaa Chaudhari; July 2, 2015).

Wikipedia

As part of the project grant from the Wikimedia Foundation we have reached out to more than 3500 people across India by organizing more than 100 outreach events and catalysed the release of encyclopaedic and other content under the Creative Commons (CC-BY-3.0) license in four Indian languages (21 books in Telugu, 13 in Odia, 4 volumes of encyclopaedia in Konkani and 6 volumes in Kannada, and 1 book on Odia language history in English).

Blog Entries

Reading Devanagari Script based sites like Konkani Wikipedia in Kannada Script (Dr. U.B. Pavanaja; July 13, 2015).
Konkani Wikipedia Goes Live After 'Nine Years' of Incubation (Subhashish Panigrahi; July 18, 2015).

Events Co-organized

Christ University Undergraduate Programme (Organized by CIS-A2K; Bangalore; July 1 - 8, 2015). Students were initiated into the Wikimedia activities with hands on sessions of typing on Wikisource. Faculty of the Christ University helped the A2K team in deciding on the texts that were to be typed. These texts will provide much needed impetus for Wikisource related activities in Indian Languages. Wikipedia Education Programme at Christ University received support from Ravishankar.A of the Tamil Wikimedia community and Sayant Mahato from Sanskrit Wikimedia community.
Aloysius College (Organized by CIS-A2K; Mangalore; July 1 – 4, 2015). Tulu and Kannada Wikipedia workshops were conducted in St. Aloysis College, Mangalore. Tulu Wikipedia is in Incubator and a small community is growing in Mangalore. Pavanaja U.B. and Rahmanuddin Shaik participated in this events.
Media Wiki Train the Trainer Program (Organized by CIS-A2K; Bangalore; June 24 – 27, 2015): A four-day long train-the-trainer program aimed at building leadership among technical contributors to Indic language Wikimedians in the areas of bugs, bots--Pywikipedia and Auto Wiki Browser, various MediaWiki tools, and translations. Ravishankar A. from Wikimedia India, MediaWiki developers Pavithra H., Yogesh Omshivaprakash H.L. and Harsh Kothari, and Tamil Wikimedian Dineshkumar Ponnusamy provided support for the event.

Participation in Events

Wikimania 2015 (Organized by Wikimedia Foundation; Mexico City; July 15 - 19, 2015): A whole day was dedicated for evaluation of strategies and activities by various major stakeholders of the Wikimedia movement. Community members who lead major activities, Wikimedia chapters, affiliate organizations and Wikimedia Foundation itself took part in the discussions. There were several group activities, exchange of ideas focused on project and community level outreach and other activities, tools and techniques, and best practices. Subhashish Panigrahi participated in this event and gave a talk on How to do Guerrilla GLAM. Subhashish Panigrahi was a panelist along with Rohini Lakshané in the session “Edit-a-thons for Bridging the Gender Gap on Wikimedia: A Panel Discussion”. An Indic Meet-up was also organized. Wikimedians from India, Bangladesh and Nepal representing various language communities, Wikimedia India, Wikimedia Bangladesh, Wikimedia Nepal, and Access to Knowledge (CIS-A2K) gathered to discuss about various challenges, cross-community collaborative projects, organizing larger events, and strategies to grow the Wikimedia movement in South Asia.
Classical Languages in the Digital Era Conference (Organized by Central Institute of Indian Languages, Mysore; July 17, 2015) Tanveer Hasan participated in this conference aimed at discussing about the future of Indian classical languages in the digital era.

Media Coverage

Not many contributors for Kannada-centric Wiki page (The Times of India, July 5, 2015)
Upload More Kannada Articles on Wikipedia (Indian Express, July 5, 2015)
Kannada Wikipedia Workshop in Mangaluru (Udayavani; July 5, 2015)
Kannada Wikipedia Workshop in Mangaluru (Prajavani; July 5, 2015)

Staff Movement

Tito Dutta, Luis Gomes and Abhinav Garule have joined the CIS-A2K team as Programme Associates from March this year. Tito is working for internal documentation and resource building, and Luis and Abhinav are implementing the Konkani and Marathi work plan respectively along with community liaison.

Internet Governance

As part of its research on privacy and free speech, CIS is engaged with two different projects. The first one (under a grant from Privacy International and International Development Research Centre (IDRC)) is on surveillance and freedom of expression (SAFEGUARDS). The second one (under a grant from MacArthur Foundation) is on studying the restrictions placed on freedom of expression online by the Indian government.

Free Speech and Expression

Blog Entries

Regulatory Perspectives on Net Neutrality (Pranesh Prakash; July 8, 2015). Vidushi Marda and Tarun Krishnakumar assisted Pranesh Prakash in this.
Free Speech Policy in India: Community, Custom, Censorship, and the Future of Internet Regulation (Bhairav Acharya; July 13, 2015).
Net Neutrality and the Law of Common Carriage (Bhairav Acharya; July 14, 2015).
Freedom of Expression in a Digital Age (Geetha Hariharan and Jyoti Panday; July 14, 2015). CIS, the Observer Research Foundation, the Internet Policy Observatory, the Centre for Global Communication Studies and the Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania organized this conference on April 21, 2015 in New Delhi. Elonnai Hickok edited the report.
Clearing Misconceptions: What the DoT Panel Report on Net Neutrality Says (and Doesn't) (Pranesh Prakash; July 21, 2015).
Role of Intermediaries in Countering Online Abuse (Jyoti Panday; July 31, 2015). This got published as two blog entries in the NALSAR Law Tech Blog. Part 1 can be accessed here and Part 2 here.

Event Co-organized

A Public Discussion on Criminal Defamation in India (Organized by CIS, the Network of Women in Media, India; and Media Watch; Bangalore; July 29, 2015). The event was a public discussion about the continued criminalisation of defamation in India.

Participation in Event

Roundtable discussion on WHOIS (Organized by Department of Electronics & Information Technology (DeitY), Govt. of India; July 28, 2015; New Delhi). Sunil Abraham and Vidushi Marda participated in the discussion remotely. Aditya Garg attended in person.

Privacy

Blog Entries

Anti-Spam Laws in Different Jurisdictions: A Comparative Analysis (Rakshanda Deka; July 2, 2015).
A Dissent Note to the Expert Committee for DNA Profiling (Elonnai Hickok; July 17, 2015). Click for DNA Bill Functions, DNA List of Offences, and CIS Note on DNA Bill. A modified version was published by Citizen Matters Bangalore on July 28.
Privacy, Autonomy, and Sexual Choice: The Common Law Recognition of Homosexuality (Bhairav Acharya; July 18, 2015).
Aadhaar Number vs the Social Security Number (Elonnai Hickok; July 21, 2015).

Participation in Event

7th Best Practices Meet 2015 (Organized by Data Security Council of India; Bangalore; July 9 – 10, 2015). Sunil Abraham was a panelist in the session "Architecting Security for transformation to Digital India". Elonnai Hickok was a panelist in the session "Steering privacy in the age of extreme innovation technology & business models."

Cyber Security

Videos

Cyber Security Series Part 23 (Purba Sarkar; July 13, 2015). CIS interviews a Tibetan security researcher and information activist.
Cyber Security Series Part 24 (Purba Sarkar; July 15, 2015). CIS interviews Shantanu Ghosh, Managing Director, Symantec Product Operations, India, as part of the Cybersecurity Series.

Miscellaneous

Article

Iron out contradictions in the Digital India programme (Sumandro Chattapadhyay; Hindustan Times; July 28, 2015).

Research Paper

First draft of Technology Business Incubators: An Indian Perspective and Implementation Guidance Report (Sunil Abraham, Vidushi Marda, Udbhav Tiwari and Anumeha Karnatak; July 25, 2015).

Telecom

CIS is involved in promoting access and accessibility to telecommunications services and resources and has provided inputs to ongoing policy discussions and consultation papers published by TRAI. It has prepared reports on unlicensed spectrum and accessibility of mobile phones for persons with disabilities and also works with the USOF to include funding projects for persons with disabilities in its mandate:

Op-ed

The Centrality of Cash Flows (Shyam Ponappa; Business Standard; July 1, 2015 and Organizing India Blogspot; July 2, 2015).

Blog Entry

Funding of National Optic Fibre Network (NOFN) - Who's Accountable? (Aditya Garg; July 17, 2015).

Researchers at Work

The Researchers at Work (RAW) programme is an interdisciplinary research initiative driven by contemporary concerns to understand the reconfigurations of social practices and structures through the Internet and digital media technologies, and vice versa. It is interested in producing local and contextual accounts of interactions, negotiations, and resolutions between the Internet, and socio-material and geo-political processes:

Blog Entries

WhatsApp and the Creation of a Transnational Sociality (Maitrayee Deka; July 1, 2015).
Users and the Internet (Purbasha Auddy; July 10, 2015).
Effective Activism: The Internet, Social Media, and Hierarchical Activism in New Delhi (Sarah McKeever; July 16, 2015).
Studying the Internet Discourse in India through the Prism of Human Rights (Deva Prasad M.; July 22, 2015).
'Originality,' 'Authenticity,' and 'Experimentation': Understanding Tagore’s Music on YouTube) (Ipsita Sengupta; July 27, 2015).

News & Media Coverage

CIS gave its inputs to the following media coverage:

'IRCTC’s Aadhaar play can violate SC order and derail National Security' (Shubhra Rishi; CIO.IN; July 1, 2015).
The Digital Divide: pros and cons of Modi's latest big initiative (Suhas Munshi; July 2, 2015).
Corporate push to Modi’s Rs.4.5-billion digital dream (Rakesh Kumar; The Statesman; July 13, 2015).
Criminal Defamation: The Urgent Cause That has United Rahul Gandhi, Arvind Kejriwal and Subramanian Swamy (Betwa Sharma; Huffington Post; July 15, 2015).
Five Nations, One Future? (Bjorn Ludtke, Ellen Lee, Jaideep Sen, Gwendolyn Ledger, David Nicholson, and Jesko Johannsen; Voestalpine; July 18, 2015).
The scariest bill in Parliament is getting no attention – here’s what you need to know about it (Nayantara Narayanan; Scroll.in; July 24, 2015)
Regulation, misuse concerns still dog DNA profiling bill (Nikita Mehta; Livemint; July 29, 2015)

About CIS

The Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) is a non-profit organisation that undertakes interdisciplinary research on internet and digital technologies from policy and academic perspectives. The areas of focus include digital accessibility for persons with diverse abilities, access to knowledge, intellectual property rights, openness (including open data, free and open source software, open standards, open access, open educational resources, and open video), internet governance, telecommunication reform, digital privacy, and cyber-security. The academic research at CIS seeks to understand the mediation and reconfiguration of social and cultural processes and structures by the internet and digital media technologies.

► Follow us elsewhere

CIS - Twitter: http://twitter.com/cis_india
Access to Knowledge - Twitter: https://twitter.com/CISA2K
Access to Knowledge - Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/cisa2k
Access to Knowledge - E-Mail: a2k@cis-india.org
Researchers at Work - E-Mail: raw@cis-india.org
Researchers at Work - Mailing List: https://lists.ghserv.net/mailman/listinfo/researchers

► Support Us

Please help us defend consumer / citizen rights on the Internet! Write a cheque in favour of ‘The Centre for Internet and Society’ and mail it to us at No. 194, 2nd ‘C’ Cross, Domlur, 2nd Stage, Bengaluru – 5600 71.

► Request for Collaboration

We invite researchers, practitioners, artists, and theoreticians, both organisationally and as individuals, to engage with us on topics related internet and society, and improve our collective understanding of this field. To discuss such possibilities, please write to Sunil Abraham, Executive Director, at sunil@cis-india.org (for policy research), or Sumandro Chattapadhyay, Research Director, at sumandro@cis-india.org (for academic research), with an indication of the form and the content of the collaboration you might be interested in. To discuss collaborations on Indic language Wikipedia projects, write to Tanveer Hasan, Programme Officer, Access to Knowledge, at tanveer@cis-india.org.

CIS is grateful to its primary donor the Kusuma Trust founded by Anurag Dikshit and Soma Pujari, philanthropists of Indian origin for its core funding and support for most of its projects. CIS is also grateful to its other donors, Wikimedia Foundation, Ford Foundation, Privacy International, UK, Hans Foundation, MacArthur Foundation, and IDRC for funding its various projects.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/about/newsletters/july-2015-bulletin

Comparative Transparency Review of Collective Management Organisations in India, United Kingdom and the United States

maggie — 2015-08-21T17:12:10Z

This Transparency Review seeks to compare the publicly available information on the websites of music collective management organizations (“CMOs”) operating within India, the United States, and the United Kingdom. A total of 10 CMOs were selected, which included a range of non-profit, government registered organizations to for-profit, private organizations, managing works on behalf of record labels, publishers, composers, lyricists, and music performers. This exercise intends to contribute to the growing body of research on the relationship between transparency and effectiveness of CMOs. It concludes with recommendations and learnings which may lead to more transparent and effective functioning of copyright societies in India, and management of music copyright overall.

The research paper was co-authored by Maggie Huang, Arpita Sengupta, Paavni Anand.

Taking into account the needs of users and members of CMOs, the following pieces of information was determined to be useful to report on the websites: : membership lists, governing directors, user types, tariff rates, royalty distribution schemes, and annual revenue reports. Collectively, the presence of these became rough parameters for transparency. The authors then reviewed each website to determine whether this information was made publicly available, and whether such disclosure was voluntary or mandated by law. As a proxy for effectiveness, percentage of revenue distributed as royalties was calculated for those who made their annual revenue report available.

Broadly, the review found that India's 2012 Copyright Amendment Act and 2013 Copyright Rules were by far the most stringent regarding registration, operations, rate setting, and reporting. Despite India's strict laws, it appears there is little compliance, particularly by PPL which failed to report the mandated tariff rates, royalty distribution policy, and its annual revenue report. ISRA had all the information sought on their website except for the crucial annual revenue report. IPRS however clearly made an effort to comply, with all information sought, provided.

Relative to India, CMOs in the United Kingdom were regulated less strictly, with U.K.'s 2014 Copyright Regulations allowing self regulation provided CMOs follow guidelines to comply with the operating code of conduct. All six indicators were available on websites of both UK PPL and PRS for Music, although the latter required user authorization to access membership/repertoire data.

In comparison, the U.S. seems to have the most lax reporting standards of the three, really only mandating basic reporting for CMOs administering statutory licenses. However, similar to India, rate-setting in the U.S. for certain digital broadcasts are subject to significant government control, in addition to anticompetetive measures which prevent partial withdrawal of rights from certain CMOs’ blanket licenses. Availability of information varied, with BMI and Sound Exchange complying with the more demanding parts of US legislation and disclosing all information sought, while ASCAP and HFA were missing tariff rates and user types respectively. SESAC was the least informative, with governing directors absent, and more crucially, their annual revenue report.

To determine relative efficiency, the authors calculated the percentage of royalties distributed per total revenue for those CMOs which published their revenue reports. All distributed royalties ranged between 80%-90%. Though not necessarily the most accurate measure, there appeared no significant correlation between the percentage of distributed royalties, and amount of information found; therefore a correlation between effectiveness and information transparency remain unknown.

However, throughout the exercise, the limitations of the research design became clear, leading to its own learnings for future research. Methodologically, the more attention should have been paid to spanning a wider spectrum of legal control, drawing clear lines of which types of CMOs to include in the study, being careful not to equate presence of information with usability or effectiveness, deeper assessment of the legal provisions, and the inclusion of membership exclusive data as part of the exercise.

Nevertheless, the comparative review process did produce several learnings that Indian CMOs could adopt for enhanced transparency and potentially improved effectiveness as well. These recommendations are as follows:

Publish the full repertoire of works the CMO is authorized to license, and its corresponding rights holder information in a searchable format;
Provide a platform for collectively identifying the rights-holder of orphan works (works which are registered whose royalties are collected, but ownership information is unknown);
Guide new users and potential members through a more user-friendly designed page with simplified, accessible introduction to music licensing;
Increase clarity surrounding royalty distribution policies;
Publish updated annual revenue reports; and
Clarify the dispute resolution processes.

This review concludes by suggesting future research through stronger methodological design, further exploring membership exclusive data, assessing effectiveness outcomes between multiple, competing licensing bodies versus a single, state-granted monopoly society, and the possibility of alternative compensation schemes for music financing and production.

MOTIVATIONS FOR RESEARCH: MUSIC COPYRIGHT MANAGEMENT IN THE MOBILE MUSIC AGE for the PERVASIVE TECHNOLOGIES PROJECT

Managing copyright in the digital age is one of the most contentious issues today amongst music industries globally. Innovation in digital technologies has opened up formerly restricted production and distribution channels, resulting in a proliferation of music like never before.

The mobile phone is one of these innovations, particularly since becoming the most preferred music listening device in India. [1] The overarching utility of the mobile phone has made it the object of study for the Centre for Internet and Society's Pervasive Technologies project[2], which seeks to identify intellectual property levers which can enhance access to affordable mobile devices' hardware, software, and content within India and China.

Access to music content[3] via the mobile phone is one of the chapter's primary focus, with a research objective of balancing access to music for internet and mobile consumers, while ensuring the protection of rights and remuneration for artists and creators.

The initial phases of this research found that new stakeholders such as device manufacturers, telecom operators, and streaming services were developing business models based on a free, ad-supported service with a paid premium tier, ultimately resulting in high royalty payouts and low profit margins. However, artists in India and worldwide are raising grievances due to decreasing royalty revenue, putting to question whether these business models are sustainable in the long term.

We had hoped to answer these questions within the Indian context, but the findings were ultimately inconclusive. This was primarily due to two reasons: 1) lack of data transparency at multiple levels of the music distribution chain, and 2) a copyright management system heavily in flux due to poor enforcement of the ambiguous 2012 Copyright Amendment Act. The copyright societies in India embodied both these issues in India, resulting in a need to study these institutions further as one of the main objects of research.

INTRODUCTION to COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS and the NEED FOR TRANSPARENCY

Music copyright societies, commonly referred to as collecting agencies or collective management organizations ("CMOs") provides music rights holders (authors, owners, and performers of lyrics, compositions, and sound recordings) the ability to authorize the licensing of their copyrighted works to another body (the CMO) who can collect royalties from the numerous sources of usage on behalf of its members. If the law allows, these CMOs are also able to collectively negotiate for rates as well. Royalties derived from these licenses are often collected and distributed by CMOs as a source of income for the creators of musical works, after administrative costs are deducted.

CMOs and their rights-holder members represent a principle-agent relationship as agent-CMOs collects royalties from users on behalf of its principle rightsholder-members. However, if a conflict of interest arises, the inherent information asymmetry may give rise to abuse. In the case of CMOs, this standard principle-agent problem has manifested in forms ranging from inefficient administration overhead, to more dubious acts of corruption and collusion.

Economic theory tells us that the key to a free and fair market is "perfect information", or when stakeholders are equipped with the relevant information needed to make market decisions. Information enforces accountability, an idea that sparked the Right to Information movement in India. This is why transparency is especially critical in the music industry, characterized by complex revenue and consumption patterns, an intricate copyright law framework and stakeholders with varying levels of bargaining power.

Given many CMOs operate as state-granted monopolies which exclusively administer specific class of works, it is important that the collection and distribution of royalties occur in a transparent manner so members and regulators can scrutinize its functioning to ensure greatest effectiveness. For countries which allow competition between CMOs, transparency in operations and revenue data can provide users and members the ability to make an informed choice, and the opportunity for other competing players to enter the market.

Within India, transparency has been a recurring issue due to allegations of mismanagement and corruption[4] of the copyright societies. This was one of the motivations for the 2012 Copyright Amendment and subsequent2013 Copyright Rules which attempted to address, amongst other issues, regulations around transparency for registered copyright societies in India.

Thus, in light of new transparency and operations regulations for India, and inconclusive research findings due to sparse data, the authors sought to review the transparency of various CMO websites and their corresponding regulatory measures in the hopes of answering the following questions:

1. How does India's level of CMO transparency compare to other countries?

2. Is disclosure of information a result of regulatory pressures or voluntary?

3. What kind of learnings and recommendations can be made from the voluntary information disclosure and/or legal regulatory environments of other countries?

METHODOLOGY

Selecting countries for comparison

Since one of the broader goals of this review was to identify legal and/or industry led proposals for increased CMO effectiveness in India, the authors wanted to select case study country samples which were relevant and useful for the Indian context, while also considering differing legal and regulatory regimes.

The United States was chosen due to its competitive CMO structure where multiple CMOs administering the same class of musical works, and representing similar kinds of rights-holders can co-exist as private entities. Aside from statutory rate-setting of sound recording broadcasts, and anticompetitive consent decrees for ASCAP and BMI, the United States seem to have little to no regulation overall surrounding CMO operations and management.

The United Kingdom was selected due to its recent growing interests in the Indian music industry. This was demonstrated by the high volume of British attendants at recent Indian music industry conferences , several of which were directly sponsored by UK Trade & Investment as a music trade export mission.[5] In addition, U.K.'s CMO structure seemed to be more streamlined, with class of works separately managed under two main music CMOs.

Indian research participants of ongoing research also expressed interest in registering their musical works with CMOs in the U.S. and U.K. given increasing market demand, higher currency exchange, and increased reliability of royalty receipts. This was further indication of relevant country case studies for a comparison with India.

Identifying the Relevant CMOs

Due to challenges enforcing India's 2012 Copyright Amendment Act, and subsequent ambiguity of copyright societies' registration statuses, the selection criteria for CMOs consisted of those organizations which generally issued music licenses and collected royalty revenue on behalf of other rights-holder members.

In India, the following three CMOs were identified for this review: the Indian Performing Right Society ("IPRS") which collects on behalf of composers, lyricists, and publisher-members[6]; the Phonographic Performance Limited ("PPL") which exclusively controls public performance and broadcasting rights for its music label members[7]; and the Indian Singers Rights Association ("ISRA") which is currently the sole officially registered copyright society collecting on behalf of singers for their Performer's Rights. [8]

The status of IPRS and PPL as registered societies are ambiguous due to recent reports of registration withdrawal [9]; therefore compliance to Section 33 of the Copyright Act is uncertain. However, the authors chose to uphold the same standards in this review due to similarity in purpose and functioning.

In the U.S., the identified CMOs included the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers ("ASCAP"), Broadcast Music, Inc, ("BMI") and SESAC (originally the Society of European Stage Authors and Composers) which are all competing Performing Rights Organizations collecting on behalf of songwriters and music publishers for public performance rights. SoundExchange is responsible for managing digital sound recordings for copyright owners (mostly music labels) and performing artists; while Harry Fox Agency ("HFA") collects mechanical royalties on behalf of publishers and songwriters when their compositions are reproduced.

In the U.K., two CMOs were identified: PRS for Music which manages public performance rights on behalf of songwriters, composers, and music publishers; and Phonographic Performance Limited ("PPL-UK"), which manages the rights of performers and record producers. Unlike the United States and India, each society exclusively manages separate categories of works. Although technically a compulsory collective licensing scheme is mandated under Indian copyright law for musical works incorporated in cinematograph films or sound recordings, ambiguity in India remains due to the unregistered/deregistered yet still functioning licensing bodies.

Identifying the comparative parameters

To compare CMOs transparency, the authors sought to develop a feasible proxy to determine their website's degree of disclosure. This was done considering two main stakeholders who most often access CMO websites: rights-holders, and users. The rights holders are owners and/or authors of a copyright or related right (i.e. performer's right) who is a member, has sought membership, or is a potential member of the CMO. The user is any person or organization who seeks to use the copyrighted work and is hence made to pay a fee for such use. This fee is generally based on the licensing agreement, struck between the CMO and the user on behalf of their collective rights holders.

Thus, the following information was identified to be useful for comparative assessment: list of members, governing directors, usage types, tariff rates, royalty distribution policy, annual revenue report, and percentage of distributed royalties. The justifications, and comparative findings are outlined below.

FINDINGS

List of members

Publishing members lists is useful for potential users since it can collectively reduce search costs for ownership information, making the process of licensing and royalty collection more efficient overall. In addition, users approached for licensing payment can also verify that the CMO is indeed authorized to administer those works. This has been a recurring issue in recent history for CMOs in both the United States [10] and India[11], which have reported extortion-like licensing demands for songs which may not have been even owned by their member rights-holders. Some have been alleged to demand licenses for broad, undefined catalogs like entire genres of music.[12] Having members lists published can prevent these discrepancies.

In India, all identified CMOs published their membership lists in accordance with Rule 66, section 1(c) of the Copyright Rules, which mandates the disclosure of members lists explicitly on the website.

In the U.S., all CMOs have published their membership data either as full lists or in the form of a searchable repertoire database corresponding with the specific work. This presentation format was similar in the U.K. although PRS for Music restricted access to authorized users. Nevertheless, this disclosure went beyond U.K.'s Copyright Regulations which only require the number of rights holders represented, whether as members or non-member rights holders to be published in the annual report. To the authors' knowledge, the U.S. does not seem to have an equivalent law as such.

Several CMO websites in the U.S. and U.K. also feature a search for owners of orphan works - copyrighted songs within their catalog in which the due rights-holders are unable to be contacted, or simply unknown due to a multitude of reasons, including lack of data collection, transfer of rights, unknown inheritance from deceased rights holders, amongst others. Many of these CMOs hold undistributed royalties for these works, bringing to question whether rights-holder members truly give genuine authorization for their continued licensing.

India's CMOs could enhance their transparency by adopting the repertoire format of membership disclosure which corresponds with each copyrighted work. It could also provide a platform to collectively identify orphan works' due rights-holders.

Country	CMO	List of Members Available on Website?	Regulation?
India	IPRS	Yes	Copyright Rules, 2013, Rule 66 Code of Conduct for Copyright Societies. Section (1): Every society shall make available on its website... c) List of all members in the general body
	PPL	Yes
	ISRA	Yes
United States	ASCAP	Yes, members can be searched through a database[13]	N/A
	BMI	Yes, members can be searched through a database.[14]
	SESAC	Yes, member list available through repertoire search and as downloadable full list.[15]
	SoundExchange	Yes
	HFA	Yes, artists can be individually searched via HFA's 'Songfile' database[16] but not available as a whole
United Kingdom	PPL UK	Yes, repertoire search database including member/label search exists.[17]	The Copyright (Regulation of Relevant Licensing Bodies )Regulations , 2014 Reporting Requirements 6. The code of practice shall require the relevant licensing body to publish an annual report which includes: a) the number of right holders represented, whether as members or through representative arrangements including, where possible and if applicable, an estimate of the number of non-member right holders represented by any Extended Collective Licensing Scheme
	PRS for Music	A database exists but restricted to authorized users

Governing directors

For rights holder members, knowledge of the governing members directing the functioning of the CMO can help ensure decision making occurs in a representative, accountable manner. In 2011, it was found that IPRS and PPL of India were governed by the same Board of Directors [18], despite theoretically managing distinct sets of rights and representing different rights-holder members. Stopps (2013) in WIPO's 'How to Make a Living from Music' states that democratic governance is highly desirable if not essential, since the board structure should ideally reflect the rights they administer.[19]

In India, all CMOs comply with the 2013 Copyright Rules which mandates the publishing of Governing Council members on its website. All CMOs in the United States, with the exception of SESAC have published information on their governing or executive board. SESAC does highlight the appointment of the CEO within its 'news' section, but not in an easily accessible location.

In the UK, the governing directors are disclosed, though not explicitly mandated for disclosure on the website. Copyright Regulations does require the appointment procedure of the Directors and their remuneration be included in the Annual Report. India's 2014 Copyright Rules appears relatively stringent in comparison given the process is specified in detail rather than a self-regulated process.

Country	CMO	Governing Directors Available on Website?	Regulation?
India	IPRS	Yes	Copyright Rules, 2013, Rule 66 Code of Conduct for Copyright Societies. Section (1): Every society shall make available on its website… d) Names and address of chairman, other members of the Governing Council and other officers in the society Copyright Rules 59 Management of Copyright Society (1) Every copyright society shall have… a) General body…b) Governing Council with Chairman… c) a CEO… (3) The Chairman shall be elected by two third of the majority….
	PPL	Yes
	ISRA	Yes
United States	ASCAP	Yes	N/A
	BMI	Yes, management
	SESAC	Appointment of CEO announced under 'News' section.[20] No other members found
	SoundExchange	Yes
	HFA	Yes
United Kingdom	PPL UK	Yes	Copyright (Regulation of Relevant Licensing Bodies) Regulations, 2014 requires the procedure for appointment of Directors, and the list of remuneration of the Directors to be included in the Annual Report.
	PRS for Music	Yes

User Categories

The categorization of users simply allow potential licensees to understand when they would be legally required to purchase a music license given the scope and scale of their business/usage. User categories can range from restaurants, internet streaming, radio broadcasting, and live performance; to the physical reproduction of a musical composition or sound recording (for example through photocopying of sheet music or burning of CDs).

All CMOs identified had user categories displayed on the websites, with some presenting the distinctions through search options while others outlined usage types as a general list. Only India's Copyright Rules mandated the publishing of different categories of users as part of their tariff scheme.
U.S.'s HFA did not not distinguish licensing requirements by user type, but did communicate when a license would be needed through simple questions regarding usage.

Country	CMO	User categories Available on Website?	Regulation?
India	IPRS	Yes	According to Rule 56 of the Copyright Rules, 2013, it is mandatory for Indian CMOs to publish on their website the different categories of users in their Tariff Scheme
	PPL	Yes
	ISRA	Yes
United States	ASCAP	Yes	N/A
	BMI	Yes, Search bar for user types available
	SESAC	Yes
	SoundExchange	Yes
	HFA	Not specifically, but section on 'What kind of license do I need' delineates user types
United Kingdom	PPL UK	Yes	N/A
	PRS for Music	Yes

Tariff Rates

Tariff rates are the costs of licenses issued by the CMOs. The calculation of these rates are done in a myriad of ways, ranging from being fixed by statutory provisions, set collectively by CMOs, or negotiated privately in a willing buyer-willing seller market. Some rate-setting considerations have included anticipated number of listeners, physical size of establishment, time of music use, number of loudspeakers, etc. Due to similarities in mode and scale of usage, most fixed tariff rates such as blanket licenses offered by CMOs are distinguished by different categories of users, most fixed tariff rates are divided accordingly.

In a market like the U.S. where CMOs compete to sublicense similar kinds of rights, publishing tariff rates can enable comparison of licensing fees for the most cost effective choice.[21] It can also allow users to forecast licensing expenses and adjust their business models or anticipated usage accordingly. Lastly, transparent cost calculations as opposed to hidden negotiated rates can prevent price and user discrimination, since licensees can verify the accuracy of their license charge.

In India, IPRS and ISRA complies to Rule 56 (2) of the Copyright Rules 2014 which mandates the publication of rates distinguished by categories of users, mode of exploitation, user group, durations of use, and territory. In U.K., both CMOs comply with Section 5(c) of their Copyright Regulations 2014 which mandates the publication of 'tariff rates in a uniform format' on the website as part of the monitoring and reporting requirements. In the U.S., all CMOs with the exception of ASCAP publish their tariff rates.

Although the U.S. does not seem to mandate the explicit disclosure of rates, both U.S. and India set statutory rates for certain uses of sound recordings. In the U.S. for example, the rates for ephemeral sound recordings akin to non-interactive, radio-like services are set by the Copyright Royalty Board under S17 USC 112 and 114. Similarly, in India, a statutory rate is also fixed by the Copyright Board for radio broadcasting.

As an anticompetitive measure, music consent decrees in the U.S. also mandate that ASCAP and BMI provide licenses on equivalent, non exclusive terms. This means that while its members can still individually refrain from joining a CMO in its entirety, partial withdrawing of their works from blanket licenses are not allowed.[22]

Despite fairly affordable statutory rates for use in non-interactive services, interactive streaming which seeks to host popular content often still requires direct licensing agreements from major record label conglomerates. Due to the importance of acquiring that content, these labels are often able to negotiate exclusive deals with hidden terms. Evolving music consumption patterns and an inconsistent rate-setting landscape have raised grievances, particularly amongst songwriters. In the U.S., this has led to the Copyright Office's review and reconsideration of the music licensing landscape in recent months, while in India, the cost of content acquisition remain a source of debate by the services.

Country	CMO	Tariff Rates Available on Website?	Regulation?
India	IPRS	Yes, listed as per usage types	Section 33A of the Copyright Act, 1957 and Rule 56 of the Copyright Rules, 2013: ...must indicate separate for categories of users, media of exploitation, user group, durations of use and territory, etc.
	PPL	No
	ISRA	Yes
United States	ASCAP	No, must request	No regulation mandating the disclosure of tariff rates. Consent decrees for BMI/ASCAP as an anticompetitive measure mandates offering of licenses to services on equivalent, non exclusive terms. Statutory rates set by the Copyright Royalty Board under 17 U.S.C. 112 and 114.
	BMI	Yes
	SESAC	Yes
	SoundExchange	Yes
	HFA	Yes, rate charts published[23]
United Kingdom	PPL UK	Yes	The Copyright (Regulation of Relevant Licensing Bodies) Regulations 2014 Section 5 of its Specified Criteria mandates 'provide details of tariffs in a uniform format on its website.
	PRS for Music	Yes

Royalty distribution policy

The royalty distribution policy typically outlines the process and manner of royalty distribution, specifying how royalty is split between member-rights holders and the CMO. It usually notes the frequency of payments as well. Since one of the main reasons a rights-holder seeks membership within a CMO is to ensure their royalties are received on a consistent basis without themselves having to track down all users of their work, a transparent distribution policy is of utmost importance.

In India, IPRS and ISRA published the distribution policy on their website in compliance with Rule 58 of the Copyright Rules. Upon review of both, it was interesting to note the lack of detail in India's policies. Although it is specified in the Act, ISRA does not convey on its website clearly the distribution of percentages, nor the administrative cut it seeks to take. IPRS was very unclear about their frequency of payments, noting that "The distribution of Royalties shall be carried out promptly from time to time", despite the Copyright rules stipulating that the frequency be set at every quarter.

In the U.S., S . 370.5 (c )of the Code of Federal Regulations for statutorily set sound recordings do state that online-published Annual Reports must have information on how royalties are collected, distributed, and spent as administrative expenses. All CMOs seem to comply.

In the UK, Section 6 of the 2014 Copyright Regulations Specified Criteria mandates reporting of the distribution policy in its annual report. Both identified CMOs comply.

Country	CMO	Royalty Distribution Policy Available on Website?	Regulation?
India	IPRS	Yes, although quite vague, unclear frequency of payments[24]	Rule 58 of the Copyright Rules 2013 outline the terms of the Royalty Distribution Policy
	PPL	No
	ISRA	Yes, but vague, unclear re: distribution of percentages and administrative deduction.
United States	ASCAP	Yes, it outlines exactly how it is calculated	For designated collection and distribution companies for use of sound recordings under statutory licenses: S . 370.5 ( c ) of the Code of Federal Regulations , as part of the annual Report, Collectives must indicate how royalties are collected and distributed.
	BMI	Yes, in the Royalty Policy Manual
	SESAC	Yes
	SoundExchange	Yes
	HFA	Yes, rate charts[25] and commission rates revealed.
United Kingdom	PPL UK	Yes	The Copyright (Regulation of Relevant Licensing Bodies) Regulations 2014 Section 6 Reporting Requirements of its Specified Criteria mandates the publishing of the distribution policy in its annual report.
	PRS for Music	Yes

Annual revenue report

The annual revenue report provides an overview of total income, which is particularly important for a CMO acting as a non-profit organization. Rightsholders can assess what the rest of the revenue is being used for, and cross-verify whether the self-reported data is true. For market and policy researchers, the annual revenue report can also provide the breakdown of which licensing services or catalogs are being used. An externally audited revenue report also enhances trust in the organization and ensures reliable financial transparency. Thus, the publication of the annual revenue report forms one of the most important benchmarks of transparency.

In India, only IPRS has published their 2013-14 annual revenue report in compliance with Rule 66 of the Copyright Rules which mandates the publishing of an annual report and audited accounts on their website. None of the other CMOs seem to have done this.

In the United States,S . 370.5 (c ) of the Code of Federal Regulations mandates that CMOs collecting and distributing for statutorily licensed sound recordings must publish their annual revenue report. CMO SoundExchange complies, while HFA does so voluntarily. ASCAP and BMI also post their reports on occasion with a few years missing, but SESAC's report seems to be absent, possibly due to private incorporated company status.

In the UK, both CMOs comply with the 2014 Copyright Regulations under Rule 6 mandating the publication of an annual report.

Country	CMO	Annual Revenue Report Available on Website?	Regulation?
India	IPRS	Yes, for year '13-'14	Rule 66 of the Copyright Rules, 2013, CMOs mandate the publishing of an annual report and audited accounts on their website.
	PPL	No
	ISRA	No
United States	ASCAP	Yes, until 2013	For designated collection and distribution companies for use of sound recordings under statutory licenses: S . 370.5 ( c ) of the Code of Federal Regulations .
	BMI	Sporadically posted
	SESAC	No (possibly because privately held company?)
	SoundExchange	Yes
	HFA	Yes
United Kingdom	PPL UK	Yes, until 2013	In UK, the Copyright (Regulation of Relevant Licensing Bodies) Regulations, 2014 under Rule 6 requires that every CMO publish an annual report containing the annual financial statements, collections from the different licenses and the distribution of royalties.
	PRS for Music	Yes, until 2014

Percentage of Revenue as Distributed Royalties

Given the main function of CMOs are to secure royalties for rights-holders, the percentage of revenue as distributed royalties was calculated using numbers from the latest published annual revenue reports. Although there are differences in CMO mandates and subsequently their investment on litigation and advocacy for example, the proportion of revenue as distributed royalties was used as a simplified proxy of effectiveness for this review. [26]

For those CMOs who published their annual revenue reports, it was found that the percentage of revenue as distributed royalties seemed to range between 80-90%. Given the controversies surrounding collecting societies in India, it was admittedly surprising that IPRS' distributed royalty percentage averaged almost 1% higher than comparable societies in the UK. It is also interesting that the United States seem to have the most efficient CMOs, with two rounding to 90%.

Country	CMO	Data reported on Website	Percentage of Revenue as Distributed Royalties
India	IPRS	From 2013/14 annual revenue report: Net royalties payable: Rs 396743413 / License fees total revenue Rs 470934348:	0.84246013204 = 84.25%
	PPL	N/A	N/A
	ISRA	N/A	N/A
United States	ASCAP	Self reported 88cents/dollar goes back to artists. 2014 Revenue Report: Total receipts: 945 385 Total distribution to members: 850 984	850 984/945 385 = 0.90014544339 90.01%
	BMI	Self reported numbers from press release: "For the fiscal year ending June 30, 2012, BMI reported revenues of $898.7 million and royalty distributions to our affiliates totaling $749.8 million."	749.8 / 898.7 = 0.83431623456 83.43%
	SESAC	N/A
	SoundExchange	Self reported from pre-audit 2013 fiscal report[27]: Total Royalties Collected $656 Total gross distributions $590	590 / 656 = 0.8993902439 89.94%
	HFA	N/A but self reported 11.5% commission[28]	N/A
United Kingdom	PPL UK	Self reported from 2013 financial statement:[29] Total license fee income: £176.9 m Net distributable revenue: £148.4m	0.83889202939 83.89%
	PRS for Music	Self-reported from 2014 annual revenue report[30]: Our royalty revenues for the year were £664.3m, of which we distributed £565.6m to members.	565.6/664.3 = 0.85142255005 85.14%

LIMITATIONS & LEARNINGS

The major limitation of this review is rooted in its various methodological weaknesses, ranging from the sampling of countries, inclusion of ambiguous CMOs, possible bias towards Indian copyright law during the parameter design, limitations of distributed royalties percentage as an effectiveness proxy, lack of measurable factors when attempting to evaluate 'ease of website use', and somewhat shallow legal research. Nevertheless, these were part and parcel of the learnings which stemmed from this review.

Limitations in Country Selection Process

The selection of countries to be assessed was not very methodologically sound. After further literature review, it seems a more representative sample could have been selected. Dr. Fabrice Rochelandet in his 1996 conference paper ' Are Collecting Societies Efficient? An evaluation of collective administration of copyright in Europe' categorized legal supervision systems in the following spectrum: lack of control, control at request, setting up control, permanent control, and extreme control. [31]

Rochelandet (1996) identifies UK as having 'control at request' since decisions surrounding operations are generally left up to the CMO themselves, exemplified by the freedom to develop their own functioning and code of practices, which then must be approved. Control at request is also demonstrated by rights-holder members ability to procure certain documentation upon request, and call upon the tribunals for dispute resolution if desired.

Using this taxonomy, India would likely span across 'setting up control', 'control at request', and possibly 'permanent control'. Setting up control is fitting since the 2012 Copyright Amendment mandates the registration of any organization in the business of issuing and granting licenses for underlying musical works (composition and lyrics) as a 'copyright society'. Typically this requires extensive documentation on procedural and governance matters, most of which is predetermined in detail in the 2012 Copyright Act and 2014 Rules. Permanent control may also apply since the Central Government has powers to cancel the registration of any copyright society and legally cease its functioning. Additionally, quite substantial regulations determine rate setting process and even calculation, as well as distribution of royalties. Lastly, control at request may also be fitting since similar to the UK system, an internal dispute resolution is legally mandated. However, any dispute can also be brought to the quasi-judicial Copyright Board if unable to settle matters internally.

The United States appears as if it would deviate from former examples of more involved legal supervision since it would likely be characterized by 'lack of control'. Few requirements exist regarding specific operations of licensing bodies, with the exception of rate setting for ephemereal sound recordings and anticompetitive consent decrees, the U.S. does provide a contrasting comparative system.

Although these examples do span across part of the spectrum of legal control, a future case study country could include one which mandates complete control such as in the case of Italy with a single state granted monopolist or New Zealand in which a single clearance license is offered to reduce complexity and transaction costs for music users.[32]

Limitations of CMO Identification

Throughout the methodology design, one of the main challenges was deciding which CMOs to include in the review. Due to lack of in-depth knowledge of U.S. and U.K.'s music licensing space, the initial survey and selection included bodies irrelevant to music licensing specifically. Due to the ambiguity in India, all organizations who were involved in some form collective licensing were initially included, including private entities like Novex Communications, and the South Indian Music Companies Association, due to their seeming similarities in functioning. However, they were eventually excluded in the final review to include only those which have received registered society status, or are currently registered as such.

There was also a lack of distinction made between licensing bodies specifically managing underlying works like music composition and lyrics, sound recording (phonographic rights), and performance rights. Although interesting insights may have been able to be drawn between similarly managed members and rights, the disaggregated rights management in the U.S. made these categorizations and comparisons challenging.

Part of the confusion stemmed from the vast variety of CMO systems and characteristics. Ficsor (2003) distinguishes these differences from four varying viewpoints: the level of collectivization, rights' owners freedom of choice, scope of rights and rights-owners covered, and the freedom of CMOs to set rates and other licensing terms.[33] The level of collectivization range in terms of representation, authorization, and even distribution of royalties/returns. The freedom of rights owners' have range in the ability to choose joint management of rights, or even which CMO to manage their rights -- assuming the option is not restricted by their respective copyright laws. The scope of rights and rights owners covered by a CMO varies from exclusively managing its own members rights, occasionally managing other members rights, and occasionally managing all similar members rights with no ability to opt out. Lastly, the freedom of CMOs to set rates and licensing terms range from free negotiations with the possibility of an arbitration body, to legally fixed predetermined rates and conditions.

The tremendous variety of CMO characteristics and the lack of bright lines in defining control factors for this review's selection meant that major music publishers, music services who directly issue payment, and even content aggregators who collate and distribute works for a certain fee could have been included. However, the decision to include only those officially recognized and legally registered as CMOs enhanced the feasibility of this review.

Limitations of Parameter Selection

While reviewing the parameters for transparency, it soon became clear that there were several limitations to the information identified. These include heavy influence in its development from India's context and legal provisions, an assumed value in transparency for transparency's sake, lack of specificity when surveying 'ease of website use', overly simplified proxy for efficiency measurement, a relatively shallow review of the law, and lack of assessment of membership data.

While selecting the comparative parameters, the process of developing a feasible transparency proxy may have been tilted towards the context and legal developments of India. This appeared to be the case when the first round of data collection was inconsistent with further reviews due to what appeared to be differences in the terms being sought - terms used in the Indian Copyright Act - rather than the substance of the content. This is indicative of how India's laws heavily influenced the development of the parameters.

Exposure to mistrust and lack of data in the Indian context may have also led authors to a somewhat presumed ideal of transparency for transparency's sake, implying in a weak correlation between publicly available information, the more effective the website and possibly the CMO . However, Schroff (2014) noted that information overload could occur if a potential licensee is uncertain what they are looking for.[34] From an efficiency point of view, search costs may actually decrease if less information is provided upfront, but better presented in more accessible language and format to guide the user to the relevant information.

Following review of the websites for a list of members, it appears that a more fruitful parameter may have been the publication of actual works and affiliated creators, rather than only the rights-holder members themselves. A grievance occasionally raised is the lack of recognition of composers and producers within a song, since it is typically the singer (or in the case of Indian film music, the actor and the film) who the audience associates with the work. Thus, a full repertoire list could be a useful addition for Indian websites to consider.

The selection of governing directors as a marker of transparency may have also been influenced by India's recent concerns surrounding copyright societies' leadership. Although it is a useful indicator, private, for-profit CMOs which have exclusive membership does not necessarily have the same burdens of a compulsory collective licensing scheme in which representation is necessary. What may be more useful for members is ensuring a dispute resolution process is easily accessible so that any grievances can be taken up through proper channels.

Identifying a relatively simple proxy for effectiveness and efficiency was also challenging. Many CMOs in their annual reports highlighted figures such as 'administrative costs', 'operation costs', 'cost to income ratios', and other similar indicators to report expenses outside of royalty licensing, collection, and distribution. However, due to differences in calculations, a simplified proxy was developed to assess the effectiveness of their core purpose of royalty distribution. However, this calculation does not account for absolute sums, year on year growth, taxation, and other non-monetary benefits. In addition, the differing years, geographies, and class of works makes comparison not very methodologically sound.

The authors had initially included 'ease of website use' as part of the review. However, this parameter was not very clearly developed and defined, and thus reviewed subjectively by different research assistants with varying assessments. Nevertheless, closer attention was paid to web design and user interface to enable greater efficiency in searching for relevant information. Future assessments could measure the number of clicks or amount of time it takes to find a certain piece of oft-sought information.

The assessment of each country's relevant laws was based on whether reporting the information online was mandated by law. However, throughout the exercise it soon became clear that beyond reporting standards, more interesting distinctions such as the level of control and specificity to which the law sought to determine functioning and operations of the CMOs. Although this was briefly touched upon throughout the review, further research should be explored in this area.

Lastly, data the authors did not seek due to logistical limitations were membership-exclusive information. Recent complaints about royalties of streaming services have resulted in the publishing of
numerous HFA and SoundExchange royalty reports by their rights-owners. These reports outline the services and songs from which they have received their royalties, allowing for more informed debate and discussion of royalty payouts and business models of the various digital services. Ongoing research surrounding copyright management in India have found that detailed reports on how royalty was calculated, or from which works/services they were generated are often absent upon receipt of their royalty cheques.

CONCLUSIONS

Despite India's strict legal provisions and control regarding registration, operations, rate setting, and reporting, it appears there is little enforcement and even less compliance, particularly by Phonographic Performance Limited which failed to report tariff rates, royalty distribution policy, and its annual revenue report. The Indian Singers Rights Association published all parameters sought with the exception of their annual revenue report, leaving authors without data needed to calculate the percentage of distributed royalty. The Indian Performing Rights Association provided all information sought in this review, with an 84.25% of revenue as distributed royalties as calculated from its 2013/14 annual revenue report.

Relative to India, CMOs in United Kingdom were regulated less strictly, allowing self-developed codes of conduct providing adherence to certain broad guidelines on operations and reporting. It appears the government only imposes rules in the absence of adequate self-regulation. U.K.'s Phonographic Performance Limited displayed all six indicators sought, with 83.9% as distributed revenues from its 2013 financial statement. PRS for Music did not make its members list and repertoire open to the general public, but did publish all other parameters with 85.1% of distributed revenues as calculated from its 2014 annual revenue report.

To the authors' knowledge, the U.S. has the least operations regulation for CMOs with the exception of reporting laws for those issuing statutory licenses. Anticompetitive consent decrees also prevent partial withdrawal from blanket licenses to ensure non-discrimination towards select services. Despite relaxed regulation, BMI and SoundExchange reported all identified parameters, while ASCAP and HFA reported five, with SESAC only having four. ASCAP, Sound Exchange, and BMI were the only ones to have published their annual revenue report, with percentage of revenue royalty calculated to 90.0%, 89.9%, and 83.4% respectively.

It is important to reiterate however that information transparency demonstrated by CMOs website does not necessarily indicate effectiveness. Though not necessarily the most accurate indicator, there appeared no significant correlation between the percentage of distributed royalties, and amount of information found. All three countries have recently, or are currently undergoing regulatory reviews and reform to enhance copyright management. India's Copyright Amendment Act and Copyright Rules was a response to allegations of corruption and collusion of copyright societies. The legal status of certain CMOs and other private authorized agents not included here are ambiguous. Though they seem to function similarly to private CMOs in the US, whether they will be obliged to comply with copyright societies regulation is uncertain. The United States' Copyright Office has recently undergone a major study of the music licensing landscape. One of the major grievances highlighted was the disparity between negotiated sound recording rates and statutory rates of licenses for works of composers and publishers for the rapidly growing use of internet radio streaming. This disparity is furthered by the aforementioned Consent Decrees. In early 2014, the European Commission had also adopted the Collective Rights Management Directive with the main objectives of increasing transparency and efficiency of CMOs, and to facilitate cross-border licensing for music online. Thus, transparency and increased effectiveness of CMOs particularly in light of the digital age are being made a priority within legislation; and hopefully, in execution as well.

Recommendations

Through reviewing other CMO websites, a few learnings were found which could be adopted by Indian CMOs for enhanced transparency and effectiveness:

Publish a full repertoire of works the CMO is authorized to license with corresponding rights holder information. This recommendation stems from other CMO websites which present their administrable works in a searchable database, allowing users the ability to efficiently identify whether the work they seek to use are covered by the license.
Provide a platform for collectively identifying the due rights-holder of orphan works. This recommendation was a feature found in several other websites which lost contact with the rights holder through failure to update ownership information in the case of rights transfer, changes in contact details ,passing of the original author, unknown inheritance, and more.
Guide new users and potential members through a more user-friendly designed page with simplified, accessible introduction to music licensing. As exemplified by the layout of other websites, the webpage could be subdivided between information useful for prospective or current licensees, and prospective or current member rights-holders. Basic questions framed in accessible language can guide the website user to the correct information.
Increase clarity surrounding royalty distribution policies. During the review, IPRS and ISRA's royalty distribution scheme were noticeably vague. Although ISRA noted the most crucial elements, certain details like how "reliable statistical data" were to be procured and calculated in the case of missing log sheets was absent. IPRS was even more obscure, noting their frequency of royalty distribution would occur "promptly, from time to time."
Publish updated annual revenue reports. This document is probably one of the key indicators of how a CMO is doing financially, and it is important that these are made available so CMOs remain transparent and accountable to its rights-holder members and users.
Clarify dispute resolution processes. This is important particularly for those jurisdictions which do not allow much choice, if at all, between various institutions and rate-setting processes. Membership and representation would ideally provide and promote proper channels for raising and addressing grievances prior to seeking legal remedies.

Further Questions

Although a few insights were found through this review, the numerous limitations indicate a better designed exercise asking different, more nuanced questions may uncover some more fruitful conclusions. Future research could explore membership-exclusive data, and how reporting is presented across CMOs. From a legal standpoint, a more detailed analysis of regulations across different jurisdictions may shed light on different international standards of transparency and reporting. Additionally, given that the highest percentage of distributed royalties were from CMOs based in the U.S., the correlation leads to the question of whether more relaxed reporting requirements, or perhaps a competitive CMO structure can actually contribute to increased effectiveness? Lastly, given the increasingly complex licensing environment and continued creation of rights due to technological innovations, the feasibility of this system to monitor and finance music should be questioned as well. Further research on alternative compensation schemes considering tax-based, or patron-based financing will increasingly become more feasible and important systems to explore.

WORKS CITED

Agarwal, Devika. "After IPRS, PPL next to Claim It Is Not a 'Copyright Society.'" SpicyIP, n.d. http://spicyip.com/2015/03/after-iprs-ppl-next-to-claim-that-it-is-not-a-copyright-society.html.
Andrew. "Transparency and the Collective Management Organisations." CREATe, October 1, 2014. http://www.create.ac.uk/blog/2014/10/01/transparency-and-the-collective-management-organisations.
ASCAP. "Ascap Clearance Express (ACE) Search." ASCAP We Create Music, n.d. https://www.ascap.com/Home/ace-title-search/index.aspx.
Basheer, Shamnad. "Indian Copyright Collecting Societies and Foreign Royalties: Whither Transparency?," November 18, 2008. http://spicyip.com/2008/11/indian-copyright-collecting-societies.html.
BMI. "BMI Search." BMI, n.d. http://www.bmi.com/search.
Centre for Internet and Society. "Research Proposal: Pervasive Technologies: Access to Knowledge in the Marketplace.," n.d. http://www.google.com/url?q=http%3A%2F%2Fcis-india.org%2Fa2k%2Fpervasive-technologies-research-proposal.pdf&sa=D&sntz=1&usg=AFQjCNF4hnAUXGIRMcUozZfs5QOFwvO55A.
FICCI & KPMG. "The Stage Is Set: FICCI-KPMG Indian Media and Entertainment Industry Report 2014." Industry Report. FICCI-KPMG, 2014. https://www.kpmg.com/IN/en/Topics/FICCI-Frames/Documents/FICCI-Frames-2014-The-stage-is-set-Report-2014.pdf.
Ficsor, Mihali. Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights. Geneva: WIPO, 2002. http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/copyright/855/wipo_pub_855.pdf.
Future of Music Coalition. "ASCAP - BMI Consent Decrees." Future of Music Coalition, October 3, 2014. https://futureofmusic.org/article/fact-sheet/ascap-bmi-consent-decrees.
Harry Fox. "Songfile Search." Songfile, n.d. https://secure.harryfox.com/songfile/termsofuse/publictermsofuse.do.
HFA. "HFA Commission Rates." HFA, n.d. https://www.harryfox.com/publishers/commission_rate.html.
---. "Rate Charts," 2014. https://www.harryfox.com/find_out/rate_charts.html.
Huang, Maggie. "Copyright Management in the Age of Mobile Music," December 26, 2014. http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/copyright-management-in-age-of-mobile-music.
IPRS. "Distribution Scheme As Per 17-5-2013." Indian Performing Right Association, 2012. http://www.iprs.org/cms/IPRS/DistributionScheme.aspx.
---. "The Indian Performing Right Society Limited.," n.d. http://www.iprs.org/cms/.
ISRA. "About ISRA." ISRA Copyright, n.d. http://isracopyright.com/about_isra.php.
Philipes, Richard Hayes. "How One Independent Musician Defeated BMI." Woodpecker.com, 2003. http://www.woodpecker.com/writing/essays/phillips.html.
PPL. "About Us." Phonographic Performance LImited, n.d. http://www.pplindia.org/aboutus.aspx.
---. "PPL Member/Label Search," n.d. http://repsearch.ppluk.com/ars/faces/pages/licenseSearch.jspx?_afrWindowMode=0&_afrLoop=6609527708771000&_adf.ctrl-state=17ajb42h7o_4.
PPL UK. "Annual Review 2014." Annual Revenue Report, 2014. http://www.ppluk.com/Documents/Annual%20reviews/PPL_Annual_Report_2014.pdf.
PRS for Music. "PRS for Music 2014 Review." Annual Review, 2014. https://www.prsformusic.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/About%20MCPS-PRS/financial-results/prs-for-music-financial-review-2014.pdf.
Reddy, Prashant. "Did the Big Music Companies on IPRS & PPL Collude to Deny Lyricists and Composers Crores of Rupees in 'Ringtone Royalties? - An Investigation." Http://spicyipindia.blogspot.in/2011/02/did-big-music-companies-on-iprs-ppl.html. Spicy IP, February 14, 2011. http://spicyipindia.blogspot.in/2011/02/did-big-music-companies-on-iprs-ppl.html.
Reid, Harvey. "ASCAP & BMI - Protectors of Artists or Shadowy Thieves?" Wooedpecker.com, 1993. http://www.woodpecker.com/writing/essays/royalty-politics.html.
SESAC. "Repertory Seearch." SESAC, n.d. https://www.sesac.com/repertory/RepertorySearch.aspx?x=100&y=22.
---. "SESAC Announces the Appointment of John Josephson as Chairman and CEO of SESAC," July 31, 2014. http://www.sesac.com/News/News_Details.aspx?id=2109.
Smirke, Richard. "U.K. Music Industry Sets Trade Mission to India." Billboard, September 4, 2014. http://www.billboard.com/articles/business/6243633/ukti-aim-bpi-trade-mission-india-mumbai.
Sound Exchange. "Sound Exchange Draft Annual Report 2013." Annual Report. Sound Exchange, 2013. http://www.soundexchange.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/2013-Fiscal-Report-PRE-AUDIT.pdf.
Stopps, David. "How to Make a Living from Music." Creative Industries. WIPO, 2013. http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/copyright/939/wipo_pub_939.pdf.

[1] FICCI & KPMG. "The Stage Is Set: FICCI-KPMG Indian Media and Entertainment Industry Report 2014." https://www.kpmg.com/IN/en/Topics/FICCI-Frames/Documents/FICCI-Frames-2014-The-stage-is-set-Report-2014.pdf

[2] Centre for Internet and Society. "Research Proposal: Pervasive Technologies: Access to Knowledge in the Marketplace.," http://www.google.com/url?q=http%3A%2F%2Fcis-india.org%2Fa2k%2Fpervasive-technologies-research-proposal.pdf&sa=D&sntz=1&usg=AFQjCNF4hnAUXGIRMcUozZfs5QOFwvO55A.

[3] Huang, Maggie. "Copyright Management in the Age of Mobile Music," December 26, 2014. http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/copyright-management-in-age-of-mobile-music.

[4] Reddy, Prashant. "The Background Score to the Copyright (Amendment) Act." NUJS Review 5, no. 4 (2012). http://nujslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/01_prashant.pdf.

[5] Smirke, Richard. "U.K. Music Industry Sets Trade Mission to India." Billboard, Sept 4, 2014. http://www.billboard.com/articles/business/6243633/ukti-aim-bpi-trade-mission-india-mumbai.

[6] IPRS. "The Indian Performing Right Society Limited.," http://www.iprs.org/cms/.

[7] PPL. "About Us." Phonographic Performance LImited, n.d. http://www.pplindia.org/aboutus.aspx.

[8] ISRA. "About ISRA." ISRA Copyright, n.d. http://isracopyright.com/about_isra.php.

[9] Agarwal, Devika. "After IPRS, PPL next to Claim It Is Not a 'Copyright Society.'" SpicyIP, Mar 30 2015. http://spicyip.com/2015/03/after-iprs-ppl-next-to-claim-that-it-is-not-a-copyright-society.html.

[10] Reid, Harvey. "ASCAP & BMI - Protectors of Artists or Shadowy Thieves?" Wooedpecker.com, 1993. http://www.woodpecker.com/writing/essays/royalty-politics.html.

[11] Basheer, Shamnad. "Indian Copyright Collecting Societies and Foreign Royalties: Whither Transparency?," November 18, 2008. http://spicyip.com/2008/11/indian-copyright-collecting-societies.html.

[12] Philipes, Richard Hayes. "How One Independent Musician Defeated BMI." Woodpecker.com, 2003. http://www.woodpecker.com/writing/essays/phillips.html.

[13] ASCAP. "Ascap Clearance Express (ACE) Search." ASCAP We Create Music, https://www.ascap.com/Home/ace-title-search/index.aspx.

[14] BMI. "BMI Search." BMI http://www.bmi.com/search.

[15] SESAC. "Repertory Seearch." SESAC, https://www.sesac.com/repertory/RepertorySearch.aspx?x=100&y=22.

[16] Harry Fox. "Songfile Search." Songfile,

https://secure.harryfox.com/songfile/termsofuse/publictermsofuse.do.

[17] PPL. "PPL Member/Label Search," http://repsearch.ppluk.com/ars/faces/pages/licenseSearch.jspx?_afrWindowMode=0&_afrLoop=6609527708771000&_adf.ctrl-state=17ajb42h7o_4.

[18] Reddy, Prashant. "Did the Big Music Companies on IPRS & PPL Collude to Deny Lyricists and Composers Crores of Rupees in 'Ringtone Royalties? - An Investigation." http://spicyipindia.blogspot.in/2011/02/did-big-music-companies-on-iprs-ppl.html. Spicy IP, Feb 14 2011.

[19] Stopps, David. "How to Make a Living from Music." Creative Industries. WIPO, 2013. http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/copyright/939/wipo_pub_939.pdf.

[20] SESAC. "SESAC Announces the Appointment of John Josephson as Chairman and CEO of SESAC," July 31, 2014. http://www.sesac.com/News/News_Details.aspx?id=2109.

[21] Although it is important to note that each work can only be registered exclusively to one society, so the catalogs won't be identical.

[22] Future of Music Coalition. "ASCAP - BMI Consent Decrees." Future of Music Coalition, October 3, 2014. https://futureofmusic.org/article/fact-sheet/ascap-bmi-consent-decrees.

[23] HFA. "Rate Charts," 2014. https://www.harryfox.com/find_out/rate_charts.html.

[24] IPRS. "Distribution Scheme As Per 17-5-2013." Indian Performing Right Association, 2012. http://www.iprs.org/cms/IPRS/DistributionScheme.aspx.

[25] HFA. "Rate Charts," 2014. https://www.harryfox.com/find_out/rate_charts.html.

[26] However, it is important to note the major limitations of these numbers in making any sort of conclusions due to data acquired from different years, varying geographies, without accounting for differing mandates and non-royalty collection activities. More reflections on this in the Limitations and Learnings Section

[27] "Sound Exchange Draft Annual Report 2013." Annual Report. Sound Exchange, 2013. http://www.soundexchange.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/2013-Fiscal-Report-PRE-AUDIT.pdf.

[28] "HFA Commission Rates." HFA, https://www.harryfox.com/publishers/commission_rate.html.

[29] PPL UK. "Annual Review 2014." Annual Revenue Report, 2014. http://www.ppluk.com/Documents/Annual%20reviews/PPL_Annual_Report_2014.pdf.

[30] PRS for Music. "PRS for Music 2014 Review." Annual Review, 2014. https://www.prsformusic.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/About%20MCPS-PRS/financial-results/prs-for-music-financial-review-2014.pdf.

[31] Rochelandet, Fabrice. "Are Copyright Collecting Societies Efficient? An Evaluation of Collective Administration of Copyright in Europe." Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 2002.

[32] Resnikoff, Paul. "New Zealand Invents the 'Single Music License' for ALL Performances…." Digital Music News, September 30, 2013. http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/permalink/2013/09/30/newzealand.

[33] Ficsor, Mihali. Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights. Geneva: WIPO, 2002. http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/copyright/855/wipo_pub_855.pdf.

[34] Andrew. "Transparency and the Collective Management Organisations." CREATe, October 1, 2014. http://www.create.ac.uk/blog/2014/10/01/transparency-and-the-collective-management-organisations.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/comparative-transparency-review-of-collective-management-organisations-in-india-uk-usa

'Originality,' 'Authenticity,' and 'Experimentation': Understanding Tagore’s Music on YouTube

Ipsita Sengupta — 2016-07-07T02:18:12Z

This post by Ipsita Sengupta is part of the 'Studying Internets in India' series. In this essay, she explores the responses to various renditions of songs composed by Rabindranath Tagore available on YouTube and the questions they raise regarding online listening cultures and ideas of authorship of music.

Introduction

On typing “Rabindra Sangeet” on YouTube, one finds videos of the concerned Bengali songs in diverse visual and aural compositions. Just like for every other type of video that is put up on the site, as interesting as the videos may be, is the feedback they receive.

At the centre of this essay are such videos found on the social media platform YouTube, ones that play Rabindra Sangeet. Literally, “Songs of Rabindra(nath)”, this is a term used to identify poetic and musical pieces penned and composed in the late 19th- early 20th centuries by the Bengali writer and artist Rabindranath Tagore. The body of work has today become a genre among Indian music.

User-generated expression of YouTube makes it a medium with simultaneous individual and group dynamics. Apart from feedback as quantitative data through “Views”, “Likes” and “Dislikes”, the opinions of many users can be found in the “Comments” section.

Visuals of YouTube song videos of Rabindra Sangeet are diverse. So are renditions, with solitary or duet or band performances, and with varying rhythm and instrumental accompaniment. The set of comments below each video sometimes take the form of a conversation. Between applause and criticism, the latter is of special interest here.

Content of specific kinds seem to face disapproval: visual montages and stills from contemporary cinema, like images of urban youth, romance, longing. Some have shots of band performers and some, album cover images. Some of these renditions can be categorized as remixes because of their fast pace, bouncy vocals and electronic melody. The comments in question reflect and reveal hurt sentiments of people trying to preserve some kind of sanctity and authenticity of Rabindra Sangeet.

They state in different ways that the ethics of presenting the genre have been violated, via their notation and design; either by either makers of the film in the song’s incorporation, or by the way young pop stars have been placed in particular montages.

Here are some comments below to illustrate what audiences find wrong. The video is embedded below, followed by the comments posted on the video page.

What a rubbish song! Just remember please that Rabindra sangeet is not for Band musicians ! Please do not distort Rabindra sangeet. Only idiots will try to do so. Shame on you lot !
Unfortunately these band party can never be anything like that great man....hence they should stop making fun of his creation....
This song is from Shyama and I think that the innocent beauty of a young boy falling in love with a court dancer. The arrangement does not suit the lyrics.

Who has sung this? Started well, but after a while it changed the melody on its own. Only Bengalis are so indecent to change the work of the composer while performing. But otherwise, the voice is promising.

Robindra shongoter ijjot nosto kore dise... super dislike... (“They have destroyed the dignity of Rabindra Sangeet... super dislike...”)
Henshit! rock does not suit to melody and classics. Don't fusion "Sangeet"/ folk/patriotic songs.

Rabindra sangeet is usually better off with minimum instrumental accompaniment. That is why the Kishore Kumar version is more appealing. And the maestro Hemanta Mukherji used only a harmonium and tabla for most of his superb renditions.
Simply bogus. In Bengali... Shreya r nyaka voice just intolerable (“Shreya's coquettish voice just intolerable”).

some confused experiments with a song rendered by many exponents. This singer in his misguided modernism mostly misses the target.
bhalo lagche na shunte...Rabindra Nath er gaan er opor please bekar improvisation ta korben na...onar opor churi kachi ta nai ba chalalen... (“I am not enjoying listening to this... please do not do useless improvisations on Rabindranath's songs... do not use knives and scissors on him...)
… Tomra please originality maintain kore experiment koro … (...Could you please maintain originality while experimenting...)

...Go listen to the original tagore score and then come here with some innovative posts, k?
Absolutely bogus. Very badly sung. Who the hell is the singer? It has Jhankar beats too!!! Who the hell is the music director? Shame that people of such low taste and caliber are directing Bengali movies nowadays. Maobadi der diye petano uchit eder (“They should be beaten up by the Maoists)!!!!!

THere should be a self imposing limit of Screwing rabindra sangeet.
F...king Indian Hindi speaking bas....ds

This is not to say that these voices reign supreme. The listeners who enjoy the works leave great appreciation and also debate with the naysayers. But here I am taking into account the criticism that the videos receive. They have turned out to be more descriptive than the appreciation, and because of this they open up a lot of questions. We observe them in the light of both the medium as well as some understanding of the artistic ideals Tagore aspired to in his lifetime. The complete list of URLs of videos with their comments is given in the bibliography.

The Poetic/Musical Works of Tagore and Technologies of Access

Tagore was born in 1858 in a wealthy landowning household in Bengal. In his growing up years, the household Jorasanko was a space where Western and Indian lifestyles and artistic developments coexisted. Besides his own training in musical performance, and education and cultural exposure abroad, he also grew up amidst the rich musical, literary and theatrical talent of his family members.

Tagore was impressed and inspired by all kinds of artists and musical styles, and traces of these are found in his compositions and lyrics- whether folk, the ritualistic Kirtan, the mystic Bauls of rural Bengal, or even songs native to the West. For example the Scottish song ‘Auld Lang Syne’ influenced ‘purano shei diner kotha’ and ‘Ye banks and braes’ inspired ‘phule phule dhole dhole’ (Som, 2009).

From a young age itself, the poet was uncomfortable with strict boundaries and rules, one of them being the tight-rope walk over Raaga-based notations and rhythm structures of Indian classical music. He did believe in the power of Raagas to evoke the emotion they were said to be designed for, and while placing his poetry in musical compositions, he based his tunes on Raagas depending on the mood of his verse. However, he would combine melodic characteristics of established Raagas very often- a common practice with artists resulting in “mishra”, or mixed Raagas. He even combined rhythms or Taalas, and designed new ones for his songs. He found the classical genre embellishments of Taan and Aalaap unnecessary and left them out. “He declared his songs to be his unabashed expression of modernity because in them he could escape adhering to any expected literary standard” (Som, 2009).

Tagore lived in an era when Indian classical music was being written down with notations which were intelligible to Western audiences. Though he put on paper notations for his own songs, it so happened sometimes that when he was asked to sing in a public gathering, he could not remember the exact composition he’d first created. He would improvise immediately and complete the performance successfully. There were also times when his students or family members would sing their own interpretation of his tunes. Though his contemplation on it was based on a personal judgment of how well they adapted what he'd taught and how talented they were, he realised that the other singer was “not a gramophone” and he’d have to “grant that artistic independence” (Som, 2009).

“The art with which he matched melody with each nuanced lyric or combined ragas and improvised novel musical expressions, made each song a gem to be discovered anew everytime it is sung” (ibid, 2009). We may admit this but through this thought we may also understand that every live vocal rendition is intangible, however much we stick to notations.

In the electronic age, however much we record a rendition on devices, it is stored as data taking up space. Data is a common form that text, visuals, and audio all take. Though some recordings of Tagore's voice can be found online, they are digital versions that have been converted from the analog. Besides the technical transition, today's listener is also accessing it through a device and not listening to him performing. Two dynamics could happen here: either his performances are immortalised by the technology which has collected the sound of his voice in the exact way he has performed them and audiences will form an idea of “authentic” or “original”. And the other is that the audience will understand that in his time, when his voice was recorded, effects like electronic disco beats had not been invented.

That way, the performances of Tagore's verses that we are witnessing on YouTube today are the tangible notations combining with fresh new thought processes and constantly changing music performance styles, and manifesting on a contemporary media space. It is beyond just a copy, as we will see later, and to put it in Tagore's own words, it is “not a gramophone”.

Perhaps the accompanying instruments that were recommended for the verses have been replaced in a particular video with other and/or newer sources of musical sound- like digital sound. And the visuals in the video were probably not what the author was familiar with in his lifetime- body language of human actors, their clothes, the cityscape, and the like. In the film clips and non-cinematic material of Rabindra Sangeet videos, contemporary visuals include digital copies of photographs of Tagore and his contemporaries that help us make sense of his era.

“Adapting Chion’s theorisation of Dolby sound, the aesthetics of the remix may be thought of not as a consequence of technical changes but rather as the way in which technology combines with different musics to create the remix” (Duggal, 2010). It's not that new technology like electronic beats happens to an old composition when time passes and corrupts it like fungus or dust, it is that one one applies new aesthetics to an older text to innovate.

Describing the prime place of music in the hierarchy of sound in the cultural history of the West, Kahn discussed the phobia of sound that was not “significant” (Kahn, 2003). For a long time, sounds that reproduced the world for us- such as ambient sounds or noise- and which came via machines instead of established musical instruments were not considered valid within music. His stand in this context was that “it would make more sense to experience artistic works in their own right, not how they might conform to gross categorical distinctions”.

Given the artistic spontaneity which Tagore believed in, and the changing technology, what do we mean when we say that Rabindra Sangeet is being “distorted”, or its dignity (“ijjot”) or “innocence” threatened? What is the misunderstood modern? What is this “original” missing from “experimentation”? Especially when the composer himself is not witness to the forms his songs are taking today, what is this imagination of the ideal performance that leads to the judgment that another type of performance is not acceptable?

Perhaps at this point we can also shine a tiny light on Tagore's beliefs in other spheres. “Nationalism” is a compilation of a series of lectures given around the world, which Tagore gave in the 1916-‘17. In the introduction to this compilation, Guha illustrates Tagore’s realisation that mindless boycotting of everything that the West introduced in India in the name of Swadeshi (which he used to support) was to throw out the baby with the bath water. Quoting a letter Tagore wrote to a friend in 1908, he writes, “ ‘I will not buy glass for the price of diamonds and I will never allow patriotism to triumph over humanity as long as I live” ’ (Guha, 2009).

Soon after delivering these lectures in US and Japan, the Visva Bharati University was founded in December 1918. Tagore envisioned “a synthesis of the East and the West through a healthy intellectual and cultural interaction” (Som, 2009). Ironically, Visva Bharati, for over six decades after his death, held a copyright on Tagore’s work and assumed exclusive right of approval over song recordings of how notations were to be followed.

Surely it is not only due to a lack of understanding of Tagore's ideals that some renditions are marked as wrong? Many who don't appreciate the new versions may actually be well aware of his life story or beliefs. At various instances, the beats, the voice, the performers are targeted. Can we put a finger on the problem? Does it have something to do with the means of interaction of the medium? What is this search for the authentic or the correct? Is there a xenophobia of generational shifts in lifestyle - the opposition to a lifestyle because that is the “other” of a fantasy of tradition, it is not “high culture”? Because internet access transcends boundaries of class, education, and generation?

Mechanical Reproduction and Digital Media

In the early 20th century, when Tagore was writing his songs, in another part of the world political thinker Benjamin wrote in his timeless essay that when a work of art is mechanically reproduced, when there are only copies and the “original” in a particular place and space in history loses significance, its distribution boosts its “exhibition value” (Benjamin, 1936). “The work of art becomes a creation with entirely new functions, among which the one we are conscious of, the artistic function, later may be recognized as incidental.” The “social significance” (ibid.) of an art work increases with multiple reproductions of it reaching the masses because the ritual value of it goes down, and it becomes open to as much criticism as enjoyment or reverence.

On social media spaces this democracy is visible on the same page- such as the “Comments” discussion. The “aura” (ibid.) of the “original” Tagore cannot exist in the flux of digital reproductions and uploads of individual creations- how valid then is the fight over it? Or is it in fact a fear of losing in this flux a memory of something revered? Does that imagined revered have something to do with defining and maintaining a community identity in this passageway of a multitude of identities that is the internet?

One of the integral features of a social media space is the option of “sharing” the content, i.e., individuals transmit it further to other users. While YouTube’s Likes and Comments give the content a boost and analytics from YouTube automatically circulate this more “popular” content, individual users have a major role in the circulation of online content.

Besides directly sharing, they can take either the audio or visual aspects of a video piece, restructure or redesign the piece, creating as a result an all new video and circulating that. Through “appropriation and reproduction”, “the web in general, and the web video in particular intensify the culture of the copy, for it provides its users free access to an immense database of ready-to-use information” (Vanderbeeken, 2011).

Someone may download from elsewhere an audio composition used earlier in a video of “concentration music”, attach it to different visuals, and upload it back on YouTube under “relaxation music”. After all, as studies have found, the response to one’s online content through mechanisms such as “likes” give the author a sense of gratification and encourages him/her to keep checking notifications every few minutes- on various social media platforms.

In such a situation, “the original creator suddenly occupies the position of yet another spectator. Within this process, the role of transmitters is so important that they assume a vague position of authority over the works” (Menotti, 2011). Through its one on one connection with the spectator, each individual video exists as an independent entity subject to active, on the spot feedback as well as manipulation by every individual who watches it. And of course, circulation is in the hands of each viewer resulting in content originating as altogether new information.

At this juncture I would like to make an intervention using a formulation by Frith, about the fluid, transitional nature of identity. “It is in deciding- playing and hearing what sounds right- that we both express ourselves, our own sense of rightness, and suborn ourselves, lose ourselves, in an act of participation” (Frith, 1996).

Let us take for example, another type of video found on YouTube. Instrumental pieces of music with descriptions such as “music for concentration”, “study music”, and even “brain music”. If we break down the description along these lines, we have firstly, tunes of any kind and varying pace on string and wind instruments. Then colourful visuals of mostly natural landscapes, the human body, or graphical representations of the “mind”. The written word accompanies the frame, and each aspect combines to add meaning to the other two.

Just because the label says that the music will enhance concentration, does it always have that effect? Our everyday experiences with the audio-visual would have surely shown us that the design of a composition- both musical and cinematic- does not necessarily make everyone feel the same way. Moreover, the credibility of video descriptions is always subject to doubt, as discussed above.

We see thus that in case of online media, it holds true all the more that one acquires or asserts an identity in playing/listening to a performance of some sort of music and adding opinions below, as much as the performance or presentation itself. We can actually trace this to a perspective that a remixed video is a form of feedback too- to an earlier understanding of Rabindra-Sangeet by the maker who thought that the genre could be expressed this way as well. “The intrinsic relationship of ‘original’ to ‘imitation’ is weakened” (Vanderbeeken, 2011), and this is where digital media picks up from where analog technology left off.

In such an interaction, between human beings exchanging data with equal authorship over it, could YouTube be playing a role in the “production of the rhetoric of the classical and canonical” (Duggal, 2010) around a historical figure from eastern India, where some audio-visual images are acceptable to his definition and others not?

An older and a newer understanding of the same cultural object co-exist on one space such as the standardised video frames of YouTube. Alongside Tagore's voice are those of Kishore Kumar, Hemant Kumar, Jayati Chakraborty, Shreya Ghoshal, and many others. A sense of the “original” exists beyond Tagore's voice because everybody has not sung it fast- if its rules were to go slow. And if somebody wants to give a tribute to Rabindra Sangeet by pepping it up, he/she obviously must not have meant to “ruin” it.

Is it the anonymity of the Comments space which makes the discussions the way they are? Because one cannot see the person who has uploaded it and is confident that what they were taught was the only truth- the uploader/ content creator probably comes across as an imposter.

But maybe this search for the “correct” rendition is a search for political correctness in a world densely connected through information technology, where one's identity through a databank of online searches does not belong just to oneself but to corporations and advertisers too. Could there also be people who believe that the very act of having Rabindra Sangeet online is a mismatch of the authentic Tagore experience- because the internet is not from his time or geographical location?

Conclusion

As described earlier, when Tagore composed his music largely based on the notational arrangements prescribed by Raagas, he removed what he determined were complications of the indigenous classical music system. What he retained were what he comprehended as the moods evoked by particular Raagas, and engineered several songs on selected rules of different Raagas. In the process, he created a genre which those who were not fortunate enough to get formal training in the classical grammar of music could sing and engage in.

From the point of view of pure classical renditions being “high art”, Rabindra Sangeet thus could not fit into that umbrella. But it was popular and regarded because it spoke to the people, as a result of which it is still given a special place in collective memory after 100 years. Thus we see that “in terms of aesthetic process there is no real difference between high and low music” (Frith, 1996).

Social media exposes today that musical spontaneity has constraints in the collective memory of forms. Proving at the same time that music truly cannot be contained- since it has such diverse imaginations of the “real” at a time when the author is not alive any more. Tagore was “comfortable in the knowledge that his songs were like wild flowers” (Som, 2009), drawing from natural landscapes and human emotions. Is YouTube telling us that in this century, some consumers of his music might be narrowing down definitions of “significant sound” to identity politics around a literary figure and his homeland? Or simply trying to hold on to something familiar in an ever changing zone, resisting- perhaps unconsciously- an attempt by others to reinterpret it through their reality or sense of beauty?

Bibliography

Benjamin, Walter. 1936. The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction. Trans. Harry Zohn. Ed. Hannah Arendt. Schocken/Random House, 2005. https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/benjamin.htm

Duggal, Vebhuti. The Hindi Film Song Remix: Memory, History, Affect. Diss. Jawaharlal Nehru University, 2010.

Frith, Simon. “Music and Identity”. Questions of Cultural Identity. Eds. Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay. Sage Publications, 1996.

Guha, Ramachandra. Introduction. Nationalism. Rabindranath Tagore. Penguin Books, 2009.

Kahn, Douglas. “The Sound of Music”. The Auditory Culture Reader. Eds. Michael Bull and Les Black. Berg Publishers, 2003.

Menotti, Gabriel. “Objets Propages: The Internet Video as an Audiovisual Format”. Video Vortex Reader II: Moving Images Beyond YouTube. Eds. Geert Lovink and Rachel Somers Miles. INC Reader #6, 2011.

Som, Reba. Rabindranath Tagore: The Singer and his Song. Penguin Books India, 2009.

Tagore, Rabindranath. Nationalism. Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1918.

Vanderbeeken, Robrecht. “Web Video and the Screen as a Mediator and Generator of Reality”. Video Vortex Reader II: Moving Images Beyond YouTube. Eds. Geert Lovink and Rachel Somers Miles. INC Reader #6, 2011.

The post is published under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license, and copyright is retained by the author.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/blog_understanding-tagores-music-on-youtube

Civic BRICS Forum 2015

sinha — 2015-08-10T14:27:35Z

I attended the Civil BRICS Forum in Moscow last month. My session fell under the Economics and Trade category; and I spoke on the importance of maintaining a balanced IP regime, strengthening access to knowledge and medicines, and ensuring free speech and innovation. The event was held in Moscow from June 29 to July 1, 2015.

The working group also invited comments to the Zero draft recommendations and I drafted a quick response to the problematic aspects of the draft. See the Civic BRICS Forum Statement.

BRICS is a unique interactive format of the five largest and most dynamically developing countries - Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. BRICS member states in total occupied about a quarter of the land on the world map. The total population of the BRICS countries is about 40%. The cumulative gross domestic product (GDP) is about 26% of the global one. However, BRICS is not only a club intended to strengthen the economic impact of the rapidly developing countries, but as well a fundamentally new form of international or rather an inter-civilizational dialogue based on the principles of polycentricity, non-hierarchy and networking. Therefore it seems that BRICS is able to propose a new concept of equal interaction over all vectors of interstate cooperation: in the monetary sphere, allocation of resources, trade, political and human relations.

Our Internet resource will help not only to get acquainted closer with history and activity of the BRICS club, to trace news and analytical articles on the agenda both the international process of BRICS, and Civil BRICS, but also to participate directly in Civil BRICS activity by means of forums of the Dialogues Internet platform.

List of Panels

Culture of BRICS countries 2015-2040: challenges for public administration (2 parts, longer session)
D K Hari, Bharath Gyan
Building racial, ethnic and religious tolerance and nondiscrimination, regulation of migration and integration of migrants (2 parts, longer session)
Anasua Basu Rau Choudhary, ORF Kolkata
System of intellectual property protection and promotion of innovations
Anubha Sinha, Programme Officer, Access to Knowledge
BRICS and construction of a multipolar world
Anchal Vohra, CNN-IBN
MDGs Implementation, SDGs and role of the BRICS countries
Gautam Kirtane, ORF Mumbai
Social role ofintellectual property protection in healthcare
Nilanjana Bose, GHS
Modern global challenges and the role of the BRICS in ensuring peace and security
Rajeswari Rajagopalan, ORF Delhi
Sustainable Energy and Climate Change
Sonali Mitra, ORF Delhi
The role of education and science in the development of human capital
Aparna Sundaresan, ORF Mumbai
Public healthcare development and access to medical services as priority of BRICS international development
Anjali Nayyar, GHS
Socially responsible trade as a tool for further economic development of the BRICS countries
Nilanjan Ghosh, ORF Kolkata
Economics in the finite world
Rajrishi Singhal, Gateway House
Non-Western view on the World's future
Varun Sahni, JNU
BRICS and global South societies in addressing growing inequality
Ashok Malik, ORF Delhi
Involvement of civil society in global governance and shaping the world’s future (open discussion)
TCA Rangachari
BRICS New Development Bank: acting for the common good (open discussion)
Samir Saran, ORF Delhi
Food security and civil society
Rahul Goswami, Centre for Social Markets
Challenges and threats of the modern world: "color revolutions" and use of "soft power"
Mihir Sharma, Business Standard
Money as a Weapon (open discussion)
Pranay Kothasthane, Takshashila Institution
Green economy and innovative development (open discussion)
Kanika Chawla, CEEW
Sustainable development of local administration: municipal and private innovative entrepreneurship projects
Rumi Aijaz, ORF Delhi
BRICS educational space: ways to strengthen scientific and academic ties. Aiming at high quality education (open discussion)
Dhaval Desai, ORF Mumbai
Disease prevention and promotion of healthy lifestyles among children and youth from BRICS-countries (open discussion)
Sarah Farooqui, Takshashila Institution

Download the schedule

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/news/civic-brics-forum

Studying the Internet Discourse in India through the Prism of Human Rights

Deva Prasad M — 2015-07-22T04:18:37Z

This post by Deva Prasad M is part of the 'Studying Internets in India' series. Deva Prasad is Assistant Professor at the National Law School of India University (NLSIU), Bangalore. In this essay, he analyses key public discussions around Internet related issues from the human rights angle, and explores how this angle may contribute to understanding the features of the Internet discourse in India.

Introduction

The significance of Internet as an important element and tool in day-to-day life of mankind is an established experiential fact. The intrinsic value that Internet brings to our lives has transformed the access to Internet as a necessity. Internet’s intrinsic value acts an enabling tool for information, communication and commerce to be effectively and expeditiously carried forward. It is to due to this enormous intrinsic value attached with Internet that there is an emerging trend of exploring Internet from the perspective of human rights. Moreover, Internet as a medium also helps in furtherance of human rights [1]. Social movements have attained a new lease of life with the digital activism over Internet. Arab spring is an epitome of this phenomenon.

There is an emerging positive trend of linking established norms of human rights with Internet. The Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of opinion and expression has vividly explained the possibility and feasibility of extending and extrapolating the right of freedom of opinion and expression to Internet medium (Article 19 of the UDHR and the ICCPR) [2]. The Special Rapporteur also highlights the need to have access to Internet for effective enjoyment of right to freedom of opinion and expression in the digital sphere. The UN High Commissioner on Human Right’s report on‘The Right To Privacy In The Digital Age’ also explicitly highlights the significance of protecting the right to privacy in the internet medium in light of extensive “surveillance and the interception of digital communications and the collection of personal data” [3]. The extensive interception and blocking of the online communication is also a pertinent reason, which calls for human right protection to be extended to Internet.

The WSIS Declaration for Building of Information Society [4] and the Charter of Human Rights and Principles for the Internet [5] also have played a significant role in furthering the inter-linkage between human rights and Internet.

The Internet and human rights policy developments have gathered significant relevance in international human rights law and Internet policy fora. But it is interesting to note that the Indian government and state institutional mechanisms have not yet pro-actively accepted relevance of applying human rights norm to the Internet medium in India.

As an essay in the Studying Internet series, it is important to highlight how human rights acts as underlying factors in many socio-political issues pertaining to Internet in India. Analysis of these issues helps us to understand that, even though the Indian state turns a blind eye to the human rights element in the various socio-political issues relating to Internet, the digitally conscious Indian’s have realized their rights and even fought their own battle for exercising their rights.

In recent years, the Internet discourse in India has witnessed many socio-political concerns. This essay would be exploring the pertinent socio-political issues in Indian context and the underlying link to human rights thread. Globally, exploring Internet from the perspective of human rights brings out multitude of issues, which requires application of established human rights norms of right to privacy, freedom of expression, access. The story in India is no different. In this regard, three socio-political issues relating to Internet, which gained much attention in India roughly in last one year, are being analyzed. Interestingly, all three issues have an underlying thread of human right perspective connecting them and need pertinent deliberation from human rights perspective.

Section 66A and Freedom of Speech and Expression

The lack of freedom of expression on Internet and Section 66A of Information Technology Act, 2000 is an interesting case study. Indian government used Section 66A as a tool for extensive surveillance and had taken criminal legal action against the Internet and social media users for posting the offensive comments and posts. But Section 66A was badly drafted allowing the government to initiate criminal legal action in an arbitrary and whimsical manner. Thus such a provision could be misused by the state for curbing the freedom of expression in the Internet sphere. The rampant usage of the Indian state machinery of Section 66A had led to sharp reaction amongst the Internet and social media users in India. The vagueness in language and unconstitutionality of Section 66A were criticized by legal experts. The action of state machinery in arresting a cartoonist, a professor and two girls in Maharashtra [6] (and many others) for comments and post on social media against politicians, had made it evident the lack of respect for freedom for speech and expression on Internet by the Indian state machinery (Most of these incidents took place during the year 2012). These incidents led to wide spread protest for violation of human right to freedom of speech and expression by the digital media users. When the Public Interest Litigation [7] filed by Shreya Singhal led to the Supreme Court striking down the Section 66A on 24th March, 2015 for lack of due process being followed, it was a water shed moment for internet discourse in India. The significance of human rights (especially the freedom of speech and expression) in the Internet medium got asserted.

Net Neutrality and Internet Access Issue

The recent net neutrality debate in India has also evoked deliberation about the right of equal access to Internet and the need to maintain Internet as a democratic space. The net neutrality debate on keeping Internet a democratic space that is equally accessible to everyone has got much vogue in India. An important point that needs to be emphasized in the debate regarding net neutrality in India is the equal access question being raised. The equal access question is more a product of the lack of regulatory clarity regarding TRAI’s (Telecom Regulatory Authority of India) capacity to regulate the Over-the top (OTT) services; coupled with the lack of well stipulated right to internet access in the Indian context.

The net neutrality rides on the premise that the entire data available on the Internet should be equally accessible to everyone. No discrimination should be allowed regarding access to a particular website or any particular content on the Internet. Tim Wu, a renowned scholar in Internet and communication law has mentioned in his seminal work, Network Neutrality and Broadband Discrimination, that network neutrality signifies “an Internet that does not favor one application” [8].

In this regard, there has been a constructive dialogue between the Federal Communication Commission in United States and the various stakeholders. An interesting development was a proposition, which attempted to classify broadband internet service access as a public utility [9]. There is much relevance for such debates in the Indian context. India also needs public participation (especially strong voices from internet user’s perspective) to highlight these access concerns regarding Internet. Human right’s concerns regarding Internet should be pro-actively brought to the attention of regulatory institutions such as TRAI. There is need to balance the economic and for-profit interest of service providers with the larger public interest based on equal access.

The pressure created by public opinion through online activism upon the TRAI’s proposal to regulate the OTT services helps in understanding the power of public participation in the pertinent human rights issues relating to Internet [10]. The broader design in which the principle of human rights in the context of Internet medium would have to be asserted in India is also vividly seen in the case of protest against OTT regulation.

Right to be Forgotten in EU and Repercussions in India

The repercussions of ‘Right to be Forgotten’ judgment of European Union also had led to debate of similar rights in Indian context. The Google v. AEPD and Mario Cosjeta [11] is an interesting case decided by the Court of Justice of European Union, where the court held that based on the right to privacy and data protection, persons could ask databases (this case was against the search engine Google) on Internet medium to curtail from referring to certain aspects of their personal information [12]. This is basically referred to as ‘right to be forgotten’.

Viktor Mayor Schonberg in his book Delete: The Virtue of Forgetting in Digital Age has elaborated the problem of how the digital age coupled with the Internet has led to store, disseminate and track information in a substantially easy way and advocates for the more informational privacy rights [13]. In this judgment, the Court of Justice of European Union has furthered the information privacy rights in the European Union with the ‘right to be forgotten’.

In the Indian context, it is important to note that information privacy rights are yet to evolve to the extent that of European Union with definite privacy and data protection law. But interestingly, there was a request made to a media news website by a person attempting to enforce the right to be forgotten [14]. Even though the application of right to be forgotten is not directly applicable in the Indian context, this event throws light to the fact that Internet users in India are becoming conscious of their rights in the Internet space. The way Indian news media gave relevance to the right to be forgotten ruling also is an example of how there is an implicit recognition of the interlink between human rights and Internet that is slowly seeping into the Indian milieu.

Internet Discourse in India and Human Rights

Discussion of the three issues mentioned above points out to an important fact that human rights are not pro-actively applied to the Internet medium by the Indian state machinery. Even though the international human rights law and various Internet policy organizations are pushing the Internet and human rights agenda, the same is yet to gain momentum in India.

But at the same time, an interesting development that could be witnessed from the above discussion is the manner in which the Internet users are asserting their rights over the Internet and slowly paving the path for an enriching view towards applying the human rights perspective to Internet. In the first instance, the freedom of speech and expression was not pro-actively applied to the digital space and Internet. This has happened when Article 19 of Constitution of India has clearly provided for freedom of speech and expression. The second instance of net neutrality has thrown wide open the lack of clear policy regarding Internet access in Indian context. The public opinion has pointed out to the fact that there is a public interest demand to ensure that there is no discrimination in the case of Internet access. The third instance of looking at ‘right to be forgotten’ in Indian perspective, provides the understanding that the users of Internet are becoming conscious of their individual rights in the digital space in a more affirmative manner.

Further, the operationalization of human rights in these three instances also needs to be critically looked into. The assertion of the freedom of speech and expression in the Internet medium could be made possible effectively due to the fact that Article 19 of the Constitution of India, 1950, protects freedom of speech and expression. The vast amount of precedence existing in the field of freedom of speech and expression relating to constitutional litigation and allied jurisprudence has helped in crafting the extension of the right of freedom of expression to the digital medium of Internet. Further, using the social action tool of Public Interest Litigation, the unconstitutionality of Article 19 of the Constitution of India, 1950 could be brought before the Supreme Court.

But interestingly, the net neutrality issue, which is concerning the access to Internet in a non-discriminatory manner, is yet to be perceived in Indian context from a strong human rights perspective. Internet access as a public utility concept is yet to be evolved and articulated in concrete manner in the Indian context. Further, the Indian network neutrality discourse attempts to operationalize through the free market approach. In the free market approach the entire non-discriminatory access has to be ensured by the market competition with the necessary regulatory bodies. In this sense, the human rights angle of access to Internet will have to be ensured by effective competition in the market along with the proper oversight of regulatory bodies such as TRAI and Competition Commission of India. It is important for the regulatory bodies to have broad goals for furthering public interest by ensuring non-discriminatory access to Internet. Further, with the financial and infrastructure led limitations of government’s capability of ensuring access to Internet for all, the market-led model with sufficient regulation might be the right way forward.

Looking at the issue of the right to be forgotten, it could be easily perceived that the Indian milieu is yet to articulate privacy rights to that high standard. Even though the right to privacy is being understood in the constitutional law context through effective interpretation by the judiciary, the concept of digital privacy has not yet evolved in India. There is no collective understanding, till now, that has emerged regarding right to be forgotten in India. Even though individual attempts to assert the right was witnessed, there is much room for an evolved collective understanding in Indian context. Civil society organizations would have a crucial role to play in this regard.

There is an emerging consciousness amongst a set of Internet users in India, who values and gives importance to the Internet being a democratic space, without unwanted restriction from the government machinery or even the private entities. Hence looking at the Internet discourse of India from the perspective of human rights, there is an implicit way in which the human rights are being applied to the Internet space. The lack of a state’s pro-active approach in asserting human rights to Internet space is highlighted by the assertions being made by the Internet users in India.

Way Forward

For Internet to remain as a democratic space, there is need for pro-active application of these human rights norms and clear understanding in Internet governance. At present, the state of affairs in India regarding application of human rights to Internet is far from satisfactory.

This essay which is part of the ‘Studying Internet in India’ series, has till now done a stock taking analysis of emerging dimension of human rights and Internet in India. Lack of interest from government and state machinery to further the human rights and Internet dimension need to be seriously reconsidered. Attempting to intervene in Internet law and policy in India from the rights based approach should be an important agenda for furthering digital rights in India. For this, civil society organizations have an important role to play. Exploring the public interest could be done effectively with public participation of stakeholders. Here in, platforms such as India Internet Governance Forum could play a crucial role.

Apart from the civil society organizations, it is also pertinent for state and governmental institutional mechanism to also take a pro-active stance. For ensuring that the rights based approach to Internet has to be duly included in the Internet law and policy; and there should be institutional mechanism, which could look into areas pertaining to human rights and Internet. It is a well know fact that India lacks institutional mechanism for looking into communication and privacy issues regulation. Further, the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) also needs to look at the relevance of human rights for Internet. Inspiration could be drawn from the pioneering work of Australian Commission of Human Rights on applying human rights norms and standards to Internet medium [15]. This essay has only flagged the need to apply the established human rights norms to Internet space. Much more issues such as access to Internet by disabled, safety of children and Internet medium are also pertinent areas.

Moreover, it is important to have digital rights of Internet users in India to be explicitly enshrined in a legal framework. Presently, a gap in law and policy framework regarding human rights and Internet is evident, as highlighted in this essay. The pertinent questions regarding access, privacy and freedom of expression are to be taken seriously by the government and state machinery for which clear and well-defined rights relating to Internet space have to be framed. For Internet and human rights to be taken seriously, it is high time that legal and institutional framework to explore these issues also are evolved.

Emphasizing the Right to Communication in India

Further, the present understanding of right to communication in India, which is perceived in narrow manner, could be re-worked with the help of a pro-active application of human rights norms to the Internet governance. The intrusion into the freedom of speech and expression especially in the telecommunication context has to be highlighted. Protection of communal harmony has been used as rationale for capping the number of the SMS messages that could be sent per day during the exodus of people of Northeastern states origin from Bangalore, Pune and other major cities in India.

This move has been criticized for being unreasonable and universality of capping the number of SMS messages [16]. Further, the telecommunication and Internet services (especially Facebook and YouTube) were blocked in Kashmir for restricting the protest [17]. The telecommunication and Internet services were blocked on the grounds of protection of national security. The reasonableness of restrictions that could be imposed on right to communication is a major concern in the above-mentioned instances. Making a blanket ban applicable in a universal manner undermines the right to communication of various genuine users of bulk messaging and social media sites.

The right to communication especially in the digital and telecommunication media needs to be emphasized. Applying human rights perspective and norms to Internet governance would help in articulating and evolving the right to communication in India. With adequate institutional oversight, the human rights norms could make the digital right to communication an effective right.

To conclude, the Internet discourse in India has already paved path for human rights norms to be applied to Internet space. The seriousness that could be attributed to those rights is evident by the assertions by the Internet users in India. But the state and government machinery in India also should explore the human rights and Internet agenda seriously.

Endnotes

[1] Frank La Rue, Report Of The Special Rapporteur On The Promotion And Protection Of The Right To Freedom Of Opinion And Expression, Available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/A.HRC.17.27_en.pdf (Last accessed on 25/05/2015).

[2] Ibid, Special Rapporteur in the Report points out that the language of Article 19 of ICCPR is media neutral and is applicable to online media technological developments also. Para 20 and 21 of the Report.

[3] UN High Commissioner on Human Right, Report on ‘The Right To Privacy In The Digital Age’, Available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session27/Documents/A.HRC.27.37_en.pdf (Last accessed on 25/05/2015).

[4] WSIS Declaration for Building of Information Society, Available at http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/geneva/official/dop.html. (Last accessed on 25/05/2015). Article 58, WSIS Declaration reads as follows: “The use of ICTs and content creation should respect human rights and fundamental freedoms of others, including personal privacy, and the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion in conformity with relevant international instruments”.

[5] Charter of Human Rights and Principles for the Internet Available at http://internetrightsandprinciples.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/IRP_booklet_final1.pdf, (Last accessed on 25/05/2015).

[6] See Section 66A:Six Cases That Sparked Debate, Available at http://www.livemint.com/Politics/xnoW0mizd6RYbuBPY2WDnM/Six-cases-where-the-draconian-Section-66A-was-applied.html, (Last accessed on 25/05/2015). Also see, Facebook Trouble:10 Cases of Arrest Under Section 66A of IT Act, Available at http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/facebook-trouble-people-arrested-under-sec-66a-of-it-act/article1-1329883.aspx (Last accessed on 25/05/2015).

[7] Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, Available at http://indiankanoon.org/doc/110813550/ (Last accessed on 25/05/2015).

[8] Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, Available at https://cdt.org/files/speech/net-neutrality/2005wu.pdf (Last accessed on 25/05/2015).

[9] F.C.C. Approves Net Neutrality Rules, Classifying Broadband Internet Service as a Utility, Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/27/technology/net-neutrality-fcc-vote-internet-utility.html (Last accessed on 25/05/2015).

[10] The online campaign by www.savetheinternet.in and the AIB video have played a crucial role in gathering public support.

[11] Court of Justice of European Union, Case C-131/12.

[12] Rising like a Phoenix: The ‘Right to be Forgotten’ before the ECJ, Available at http://europeanlawblog.eu/?p=2351 (Last accessed on 25/05/2015).

[13] Viktor Mayor Schonberg, Delete: The Virtue of Forgetting in Digital Age, Princeton University Press (2009).

[14] Right to be Forgotten Poses A Legal Dilemma in India, Available at http://www.livemint.com/Industry/5jmbcpuHqO7UwX3IBsiGCM/Right-to-be-forgotten-poses-a-legal-dilemma-in-India.html, (Last accessed on 25/05/2015). Also see We received a Right to be Forgotten request from an Indian user, Available at http://www.medianama.com/2014/06/223-right-to-be-forgotten-india/ (Last accessed on 25/05/2015).

[15] Human Rights and Internet, Available at https://www.humanrights.gov.au/our-work/rights-and-freedoms/projects/human-rights-and-internet (Last accessed on 25/05/2015).

[16] Chinmayi Arun, SMS Block as Threat to Free Speech, Available at http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/www-the-hindubusinessline-op-ed-sep-1-2012-chinmayi-arun-sms-block-as-threat-to-free-speech (Last accessed on 15/07/2015).

[17] Pamposh Raina and Betwa Sharma, Telecom Services Blocked to Curb Protests in Kashmir, Available at http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/21/telecom-services-blocked-to-curb-protests-in-kashmir/?_r=0 (Last accessed on 15/07/2015).

Author's Note: All the views expressed are my own and in no way are linked to the opinion of my employers. I thank CIS for this opportunity to explore Internet and Human Rights interface in India as part of the Studying Internet in India essay series.

Note: The post is published under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license, and copyright is retained by the author.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/blog_studying-the-internet-discourse-in-india-through-the-prism-of-human-rights

Odia Wikisource has a new Wikisourcer, and he is the youngest in the Odia Wikimedia community!

subha — 2015-08-21T17:40:56Z

Prateek Pattanaik (User:Shrijagannatha on Odia Wikisource) is a young researcher of Odia literature and Odissi music. He has not just digitized as many as 54 Odia-language poetry dating early 18th century but has also annotated, both poetic and prosaic translation in his blogs “Sri Jagannatha” and “Utkal Sangeet”. He has also brought a complete book “Kisora chandranana champu” on Odia Wikisource. A recent entrant into the Odia Wikimedia community, Prateek is also the youngest Odia Wikimedian. He has also digitized 18-19th century 54 poem written by various poets.

Right after Prateek finished his first digitization of an entire book “Kishorachandranana Champu” by Baladeba Ratha (1779-1845 AD) on the Odia Wikisource (or.wikisource.org), Subhashish Panigrahi caught up with Prateek asking him about his passion for Odia literature and Odissi music.

Subhashish Panigrahi (SP): Hi Prateek, please tell little bit about yourself?
Prateek Pattanaik (PP): I live among the pristine hills of Damanjodi, in the district of Koraput, Odisha, with my parents. My mother, Mrs.Pallabi Mohapatra, is a teacher in Delhi Public School, Damanjodi, where I study. My father, Mr. Dipak Kumar Pattanaik, is lecturer in Botany in the Government College, Koraput. Currently I'm studying in 11^th standard in the Science Stream.

SP: What influenced you to take so much interest in Odia literature and Odissi music?
PP: When I was young, my grandfather, Dr. P. C. Mohapatra, would tell me bedtime stories that recounted the exploits of Lord Jagannatha – tales about King Indradyumna, Chodaganga Deva, Jayadeva, the Panchasakha; those of Dasia Bauri, Salabega; about how Lord Jagannatha would wander hopelessly in hunger, banished by Lakshmi; how he would chase the eggplant-plucking lady, enchanted by her rendition of the Gita Govinda. Those tales fascinated my imagination, and attracted me towards the Lord. And thus it began, my endless journey of discovering the infinite cult that surrounded the smiling Gods at Puri.

As a kid I brought a triad made of neem wood from Puri. I would worship them, and dress them in the Beshas, costumes of Lord Jagannatha, using thermocole and paints- I smeared sandalwood paste on them and covered them with tiny blankets during winter. My mother inspired me – she was the typical Odia homemaker – from making “Pana” on the “Makara Sankranti” to making 'pithas', a large variety of traditional delicacies. And I would offer all of them to my Lords. She made herbal oils for my Lords when they were ill with fever. She would never say no to me no matter how unrealistic my demands. She tried her hand even at making the traditional “patta chitra” canvases for me to draw.

During my summer vacations, I would unconditionally rush to Koraput to my grandparents, and I still do. My Grandmother, Mrs. Kanak Lata Sabat, who is an Odia-language teacher, taught me the Odia alphabet when I was very young. My father would bring me pictures of Lord Jagannatha from the Temple stall outside the Puri Temple. I became famous in my entire family for my ability to tell them apart without seeing their name. I was stubborn – I told him to buy those Odia books even when I did not know how to read. And those were the first books I read in Odia- filled with vivid descriptions of the Beshas of the Lord; with simple lines from the Odia Bhagabata to complex lines from medieval poets. When I asked my grandmother to tell me who was this man called Upendra Bhanja, whom the books praised no end, she revealed to me the master he was, and told me about his unbeatable command over the words he spoke.

I grew up to being automatically attracted to Odissi Music – which I would hear amidst songs of the Gita Govinda in local Temples, and Patachitras- filled in the soaring structures of the Puri Temple. I myself figured out how to do those paintings, and began by singing songs of Bhajan Samrat Bhikari Bal. Later, I heard of age-old classics from my grandma again – songs which she had learnt while in the third standard- “Ki Shobha go Kunje”, “Galani ta Gala Katha” and so on. I learnt them myself, and began going to my sir who would explain to me the nuances of Odissi Classical Music.

When I was in ninth standard, the Jagannatha temple of Koraput came forward to use my PowerPoint presentations on the Jagannatha cult that I had made them for my pleasure, during my leisure time. They took them and printed them, and made a public exhibition. It was praised no end. I became somewhat of a child-size know-it-all of the Jagannatha cult, but I saw there was still more to discover.

SP: How you started learning about “Champu”?
PP: The word “Champu” itself attracted me. It had a distinct ring to it, an alien-sounding word that was never used in real life. My father told me it was a song in which each line started with the same letter. I asked him to show it to me. He could not. He himself had not seen more than a single song. And when the truth dawned on me that it was not 'a' song- it was a collection of 34 songs, after the 34 letters of the Odia alphabet, I had to get my hands on it. Fortunately, the “Open Access to Oriya Books” (OAOB) project by Srujanika had tons of Odia books digitized and hosted on the website http://oaob.nitrkl.ac.in, and I could finally behold what it was. I was amazed – I ran my eyes down the 'Ka' song,and read “Ka-Ka-Ka-Ka”. What talent! My god, who wrote this? Kabisurya. Kabisurya who? Kabisurya Baladeba Ratha. I discovered the man and was similarly amazed by folktales of his talent.

When I saw the 'Ga' song was the same song my Grandma loved – I was again amused. I knew that all the while! Above each song, it was written 'Raga so and so'. So all of these could be sung. But how could I learn how to sing them? A single recorded CD, from the busstand taught me. In a year, I could sing it entirely. I understood the depth of the lines from the simple commentary below them, and was disappointed by how less known they were in this day and age. I thought what I could do – I sung them at the temple during the Ratha Jatra, and they were an instant hit! People longed to hum those ancient tunes. But they could not. These songs were outdated, no one sung them except a few maestros of Odissi Classical Music, and no one could comprehend them. But people loved them. They did not know what they meant, exactly but they sure did get the feeling. And that was what mattered.

SP: From spending your entire childhood to creating two blogs with so much annotation on these early writings, and using social media to popularize them, to bringing them on Wikisource, what made this leap?
PP: One fine day, it struck me that the same way I made PowerPoint slides, I could make something digital. Why not a website which anyone can see? Wouldn't that breathe new life into the traditional melodies? Good. And so over a span of two long years, I typed out the entire Champu and created two websites; Shri Jagannatha (shrijagannatha.wordpress.com) for the Jagannatha cult, and later, Utkal Sangeet (utkalsangeet.wordpress.com) for the classical songs. The Utkal Sangeet project was a great learning experience, I used tags, so that you could find any song, view it on any device, sort songs by Raga, Tala, Poet, Book, etc. I translated songs, and uploaded their recordings as well.

SP: Did you ever share your work with other fellow researchers? You must have struggled to find these resources, isn't it?
PP: U.S. Researcher in Ethnomusicology at U.C. Davis, Dr. David Dennen AKA 'David Uncle',was the first and only person who helped me. He himself has submitted his PhD Thesis on the Kishora Chandrananda Champu, from villages to research centers. He sent me tons of research books in digital form, painfully scanning them himself only for me, from locations like Australia and America. None from Odisha even assisted; the people at the Odisha state museum refused to let a child like me to see their manuscripts, and none of the research institutions even responded in an email. David uncle constantly inspired me to carry on further, not being swayed away. He encouraged me constantly, and he is as important to this project, on the Champu, as my very own parents.

Then in February 2015, it struck me that I could use social networking to propagate the richness of the Cult at Puri – the grandeur in literature, dance, music, art, sculpture, food and all. I started a new Twitter handle @shrijagannatha, and linked it with my site. Now the handle has 820 followers within 6 months. Many Twitter users have been very appreciative, and they became family now. From the Grandfather @nidhi_budha to the 'untimely gourd' @akala_kushmanda, they post random tweets about Odisha to digitization of the Odia script, with which I struggled greatly at the beginning. This soul, devoted to a similar cause as me, was @subhapa, Subhasish Panigrahi, an active volunteer in the Odia Wikipedia, one of the founding fathers. After months, Persuaded by the Wikimedians, I too contributed the entire text of the Kishorachandrananda Champu to the Odia Wikisource by using my Utkal Sangeet project. It is a collaborative project, which will blossom healthily. Since so many people visit the Wikimedia projects, my small contribution to this free online library could probably quench their literary thirst.

SP: What are your plans to expand your work on Wikisource?
PP: In the future, I plan to make my site even more accessible for the layman. I have a few ideas as of now, to make the ideas reach out to everyone, even someone as young as me. I want to be an active, useful member of this online digital movement for Odia language, and go on with my task forever.

SP: Thanks Prateek for taking time to share such an inspiring and insightful story. Would you like to add more about expanding project for digitizing such valuable literature?
PP: As for my future plans, I would like to type out other such works of Kabisurjya Baladeba Ratha, like his “Ratnakara Champu”, “Premodaya Champu” and even the satirical “Hasyakallola”. I would definitely contribute the same to Wikisource. The books being rare, they may be lost if not saved. I would like to translate the Kishora Chandrananda Champu, the main one, into English in its entirety – word by word, retaining its true essence so that the Western Audience and even people of their states can understand the marvel it is. Now, I'm researching on various commentaries and references so that I can write my own. The form itself is rare, and more so, such an intricately interwoven part of the typical 'Odia' identity that it cannot be ignored. Let the world glance upon the talents of (Upendra) Bhanja and Kabisurya (Baladeba Ratha) and identify that a small, peaceful state in the East has been the birthplace for such great art.
Thanks!

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/blog-old/kisorachandrananachampu-on-odia-wikisource

Freedom of Expression in a Digital Age

Geetha Hariharan and Jyoti Panday — 2015-07-15T14:42:23Z

The Centre for Internet & Society, the Observer Research Foundation, the Internet Policy Observatory, the Centre for Global Communication Studies and the Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania organized this conference on April 21, 2015 in New Delhi.

This report was edited by Elonnai Hickok

Effective research, policy formulation, and the development of regulatory frameworks in South Asia

Inside this Report

BACKGROUND TO THE CONFERENCE

THE ORGANIZERS

CONFERENCE PROGRAMME

WELCOME ADDRESS

SESSION 1: LEARNINGS FROM THE PAST

Vibodh Parthasarathi, Associate Professor, Centre for Culture, Media and Governance (CCMG), Jamia Millia Islamia University

Smarika Kumar, Alternative Law Forum

Bhairav Acharya, Advocate, Supreme Court and Delhi High Court & Consultant, CIS

Ambikesh Mahapatra, Professor of Chemistry, Jadavpur University

Questions & Comments

SESSION 2: CURRENT REALITIES

Cherian George, Associate Professor, Hong Kong Baptist University

Zakir Khan, Article 19, Bangladesh

Chinmayi Arun, Research Director, Centre for Communication Governance (CCG), National Law University (Delhi)

Raman Jit Singh Chima, Asia Consultant, Access Now

Questions & Comments

SESSION 3: LOOKING AHEAD

Sutirtho Patranobis, Assistant Editor, Hindustan Times

Karuna Nundy, Advocate, Supreme Court of India

Geeta Seshu, The Hoot

Pranesh Prakash, Policy Director, Centre for Internet & Society

Questions & Comments

Conclusion

Background to the Conference

As the Internet expands and provides greater access and enables critical rights such as freedom of expression and privacy, it also places censorship and surveillance capabilities in the hands of states and corporations. It is therefore crucial that there exist strong protections for the right to freedom of expression that balance state powers and citizen rights. While the Internet has thrown up its own set of challenges such as extremist/hate speech, the verbal online abuse of women, and the use of the Internet to spread rumours of violence, the regulation of cont ent is a question that is far from being settled and needs urgent attention. These are compounded by contextual challenges. What role can and should the law play? When is it justified for the government to intervene? What can be expected from intermediaries, such as social networks and Internet Service Providers (ISPs)? And what can users do to protect the right to free speech - their own and that of others?

Balancing freedom of expression with other rights is further complicated by the challenges of fast paced and changing technologies and the need for adaptable and evolving regulatory frameworks. By highlighting these challenges and questioning the application of existing frameworks we aim to contribute to further promoting and strengthening the right to freedom of expression across South Asia.

The Organizers

Centre for Internet & Society

Established in 2008, the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) is a non-profit research organization that works on policy issues relating to freedom of expression, privacy, accessibility for persons with disabilities, access to knowledge and intellectual property rights, and openness (including open standards and open government data). CIS also engages in scholarly research on the budding disciplines of digital natives and digital humanities. CIS has offices in Bangalore and New Delhi.

Observer Research Foundation

ORF, established in 1990, is India's premier independent public policy think tank and is engaged in developing and discussing policy alternatives on a wide range of issues of national and international significance. The fundamental objective of ORF is to influence the formulation of policies for building a strong and prosperous India in a globalised world. It hosts India's largest annual cyber conference - CyFy: the India Conference on Cyber Security and Internet Governance

The Annenberg School for Communication, The Centre for Global Communication Studies & the Internet Policy Observatory (U. Penn.)

The Annenberg School of Communication (ASC) at the University of Pennsylvania produces research that advances the understanding of public and private communications. The Center for Global Communication Studies (CGCS) is a focused academic center at ASC and a leader in international education and training in comparative media law and policy. It affords students, academics, lawyers, regulators, civil society representatives and others the opportunity to evaluate and discuss international communications issues. The Internet Policy Observatory (IPO) was started by CGCS to research the dynamic technological and political contexts in which Internet governance debates take place. The IPO serves as a platform for informing relevant communities of activists, academics, and policy makers, displaying collected data and analysis.

Conference Programme

'Freedom of Expression in a Digital Age' Effective Research, Policy Formation & the Development of Regulatory Frameworks in South Asia
April 21^st, 2015 - 11 a.m. to 6 p.m.

The Observer Research Foundation

20, Rouse Avenue Institutional Area

New Delhi - 110 002, INDIA

About the Conference

The conference will be a discussion highlighting the challenges in promoting and strengthening online freedom of expression and evaluating the application of existing regulatory frameworks in South Asia

Agenda

Learnings from the past		Current Realities		Looking ahead
11:00 - 1:00	1:00 - 2:00	2:00 - 4:00	4:00- 4:15	4:15 - 6:00
Overview of online FoEx policy and regulatory models across South Asia		Enabling FOEX in South Asia		Challenges associated with formulating regulation for online FoEx
Definitions of FoEx across South Asia		Ways in which FoEx is, or may be, curtailed online		Ways forward to bridge existing gaps between policy formation and policy implementation with respect to FOEX online
Impact of technology and markets on FoEx across South Asia		Balancing FoEx and other digital rights		Exploring emerging regulatory questions for FoEx online
Challenges to FoEx online across South Asia		The impact of jurisdiction, multi-national platforms, and domestic regulation on FoEx online		Impacting and influencing the development and implementation of Internet regulation through research
Effective research techniques and online FoEx		Role and responsibility of intermediaries in regulating online speech across South Asia		Exploration of the future role and interplay of technology and policy in enabling FOEX online

Ms. Mahima Kaul, Head (Cyber & Media Initiative), Observer Research Foundation (ORF), introduced the conference and its context and format, as well as the organisers. In three sessions, the Conference aimed to explore historical lessons, current realities and future strategies with regard to freedom of expression on the Internet in India and South Asia.

Mr. Manoj Joshi, Distinguished Fellow, ORF, provided the welcome address. Mr. Joshi highlighted the complexities and distinctions between print and electronic media, drawing on examples from history. He stated that freedom of expression is most often conceived as a positive right in the context of print media, as restrictions to the right are strictly within the bounds of the Constitution. For instance, during the riots in Punjab in the 1980s, when hate speech was prevalent, constitutionally protected restrictions were placed on the print media. When efforts were made to crack down on journalists with the introduction of the Defamation Bill in the 1980s, journalists were lucky that the Bill also included proprietors as those liable for defamation. This created solidarity between journalists and proprietors of newspapers to fight the Bill, and it was shelved.

Freedom of expression is necessary in a democratic society, Mr. Joshi stated, but it is necessary that this freedom be balanced with other rights such as privacy of individuals and the protection against hate speech. In the absence of such balance, speech becomes one-sided, leaving no recourse to those affected by violative speech.

In the digital age, however, things become complex, Mr. Joshi said. The freedom available to speech is enhanced, but so is the misuse of that freedom. The digital space has been used to foment riots, commit cybercrime, etc. Online, in India the restrictions placed on freedom of speech have become draconian. Section 66A and the incidents of arrests under it are an example of this. It is, therefore, important to consider the kind of restrictions that should be placed on free speech online. There is also the question of self-regulation by online content-creators, but this is rendered complex by the fact that no one owns the Internet. This conference, Mr. Joshi said, will help develop an understanding of what works and what frameworks we will need going forward.

Mr. Pranesh Prakash, Policy Director, Centre for Internet & Society (CIS), introduced the speakers for the first session. Mr. Vibodh Parthasarathi, Associate Professor, Centre for Culture, Media and Governance, Jamia Millia Islamia University, would first share his views and experience regarding the various ways of curtailing freedom of expression by the State, markets and civil society. Ms. Smarika Kumar of theAlternative Law Forum (ALF) would then expand on structural violations of freedom of expression. Mr. Bhairav Acharya, Advocate with the Delhi Bar and Consultant for CIS, would throw light on the development of free speech jurisprudence and policy in India from the colonial era, while Prof. Ambikesh Mahapatra, Professor of Chemistry, Jadavpur University, was to speak about his arrest and charges under Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (am. 2008), providing insight into the way Section 66A was misused by police and the West Bengal government.

Vibodh Parthasarathi, Associate Professor, Centre for Culture, Media and Governance (CCMG), Jamia Millia Islamia University

Mr. Parthasarathi began his talk with an anecdote, narrating an incident when he received a call from a print journalist, who said "TV people can get away with anything, but we can't, and we need to do something about it." The notion of news institutions getting away with non-kosher actions is not new - and has been a perception since the 19^th century. He stressed that there have always been tensions between Freedom of Expression, access, and other rights. Curtailment happens not just by the state, but by private parties as well - market and civil society. Indeed, a large number of non-state actors are involved in curtailing FoE. Subsequently a tension between individual FoE and commercial speech freedom is emerging. This is not a new phenomenon. Jurisprudence relating to free speech makes a distinction between the persons in whom the right inheres: individuals on the one hand (including journalists and bloggers), and proprietors and commercial entities on the other.

In India, freedom of speech cases - from 1947 - relate primarily to the rights of proprietors. These cases form the legal and constitutional basis for issues of access, transmission and distribution, but are not necessarily favourable to the rights of individual journalists or newsreaders. At the individual level, the freedom to receive information is equally important, and needs to be explored further. For entities, it is crucial to consider the impact of curtailment of speech (or threats of curtailment) on entities of different sizes and kinds.

Mr. Parthasarathi further explained that online, freedom of expression depends on similar structural conditions and stressed that scholarship must study these as well. For example, intermediaries in the TV industry and online intermediaries will soon come together to provide services, but scholarship does not link them yet. The law is similarly disjointed. For instance, 'broadcasting' falls in the Union List under Schedule VII of the Constitution, and is centrally regulated. However, distribution is geographically bounded, and States regulate distribution. In order to have a cohesive broadcast regulation, he raised the point that the placement of 'broadcasting' in the Union List may need to be re-thought.

According to Mr. Parthasarathi, the underlying conceptual basis - for the interlinked scholarship and regulation of intermediaries (online and broadcast), of commercial speech and individual access to information, and censorship (State and private, direct and structural) - lies in Article 19(1)(a). He noted that there is a need to rethink the nature of this freedom. For whom do we protect freedom of speech? For individuals alone, or also for all private entities? From what are we protecting this freedom? For Mr. Parthasarathi, freedom of speech needs to be protected from the State, the market, civil society and those with entrenched political interests. Additionally, Mr. Parthasarathi raised the question of whether or not in the online context freedom of the enterprise becomes antithetical to universal access

Mr. Parthasarathi also highlighted that it is important to remember that freedom of expression is not an end in itself; it is a facilitator - the 'road'- to achieve crucial goals such as diversity of speech. But if diversity is what freedom of expression should enable, it is important to ask whether institutional exercise of freedom has led to enhanced diversity of speech. Do media freedom and media diversity go together? For Mr. Parthasarathi, media freedom and media diversity do not always go together. The most vivid example of this is the broadcast environment in India, following the deregulation of broadcast media beginning from the mid 1990s - much of which was done through executive orders on an ad hoc basis.

This led to infrastructural censorship, in addition to the ex-post curtailment of content. Increasingly the conditions on which content is produced are mediated i.e. which entities are eligible to obtain licenses, what type of capital is encouraged or discouraged, how is market dominance measured, accumulation of interests across content and carriage, or various carriage platforms? Mediating the conditions of producing speech, or infra censorship, is primarily operationalised through regulatory silences, as illustrated in the absence of any coherent or systematic anti-competitive measures.

Indian courts are champions in protecting the freedom of expression of 'outlets' - of proprietors and entities. But this has not led to diversity of speech and media. Perhaps there is a need to rethink and reformulate ideas of freedom. He pointed out that it is not enough merely to look at ex post curtailment of speech (i.e., the traditional idea of censorship). Instead the conditions in which speech is made and censored need to be explored; only then can our understanding expand. Mr Parthasarathi ended his talk by stressing that a proactive understanding of freedom of expression can highlight architectural curtailment of speech through the grant of licenses, competition and antitrust laws, media ownership and concentration across carriage and content, etc. This is essential in a digital age, where intermediaries play a crucial, growing role in facilitating freedom of speech.

Smarika Kumar, Alternative Law Forum
Beginning where Mr. Parthasarathi left off, the focus of Ms. Kumar's presentation was the curtailment of speech and the conditions under which speech is produced. At the outset, she sought from the audience a sense of the persons for whom freedom of speech is protected: for government-controlled media, the markets and commercial entities, or for civil society and citizens? Ms. Kumar aimed to derive ideas and conceptual bases to understand freedom of speech in the digital space by studying judicial interpretations of Article 19(1)(a) and its limitations. Towards this end, she highlighted some Indian cases that clarify the above issues.

Ms. Kumar began with Sakal Papers v. Union of India [AIR 1962 SC 305]. In Sakal Papers, the issue concerned the State's regulation of speech by regulation of the number of permitted pages in a newspaper. This regulation was challenged as being in violation of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The rationale for such regulation, the State argued, was that newsprint, being imported, was a scarce commodity, and therefore needed to be equitably distributed amongst different newspapers - big or small. Further, the State defended the regulation citing its necessity for ensuring equal diversity and freedom of expression amongst all newspapers. The petitioners in the case argued that such a regulation would negatively impact the newspapers' right to circulation by reducing the space for advertisements, and thus forcing the newspaper to increase selling prices. Readers of the newspaper additionally argued that such increase in prices would affect their right to access newspapers by making them less affordable, and hence such regulation was against the readers' interests. Ultimately, the Supreme Court struck down the regulation. The Constitution Bench noted that if the number of pages of a newspaper were to be limited and regulated, the space available for advertisements would reduce. Were advertisements to reduce, the cost of newspapers would increase, affecting affordability and access to information for the citizens. Ultimately, newspaper circulation would suffer; i.e., the State's regulation affected the newspapers' right of circulation which would amount to a violation of freedom of expression as the right extends to the matter of speech as well as the ability to circulate such speech.

Apart from the number of pages, the Indian government has sought to regulate newsprint in the past. In Bennett Coleman and Co. & Ors. v. Union of India [AIR 1973 SC 106], a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court considered whether regulation of the number of pages permitted in a newspaper constituted an unreasonable restriction on freedom of expression. Towards this, the Government of India set forth a Newsprint Policy in 1972, under the terms of which the number of pages of all papers were to be limited to ten; where there were small newspapers that did not achieve the ten-page limit, a 20% increase was permitted; and finally, new newspapers could not be started by common ownership units. The Newsprint Order aimed to regulate a scarce resource (newsprint), while the Newsprint Policy sought to promote small newspapers, encourage equal diversity among newspapers and prevent monopolies. The Supreme Court upheld the Newsprint Order, stating that newsprint was indeed a scarce resource, and that the matter of import and distribution of newsprint was a matter of government policy. The Court would not interfere unless there was evidence of mala fides. However, the Court struck down the Newsprint Policy for reasons similar to Sakal Papers ; that the rights afforded to newspapers under Article 19(1)(a) - including circulation - could not be abridged for reasons of protecting against monopolies.

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Mathew stated that in conceiving freedom of expression, it is important to also consider the hearer (the reader). For Justice Mathew, Meiklejohn's view the "what is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said" cannot be affected if, because of concentration of media ownership, media are not available for most speakers. In such a situation, " the hearers [cannot] be reached effectively". However, the imperative is to maximise diversity of speech. For this, we need to balance the rights of citizens against those of the press; i.e., the rights of the reader against those of the speaker.

Ms. Kumar pointed out that this was the first case to consider the right of readers to access a diversity of speech. Justice Mathew distinguished curtailment of speech by the state, and by the market - and that this is crucial in the digital age, where information is predominantly accessible through and because of intermediaries. Ms. Kumar further stressed that especially in an age where 'walled gardens' are a real possibility (in the absence of net neutrality regulation, for instance), Justice Mathew's insistence on the rights of readers and listeners to a diversity of speech is extremely important.

Ms. Kumar went on to explain that though judges in the Supreme Court recognised the rights of readers/listeners (us, the citizens) for the purposes of news and print media, a similar right is denied to us in the case of TV. In Secretary, Ministry of Broadcasting v. Cricket Association of Bengal [AIR 1995 SC 1236], the issue surrounded private operators' right to use airwaves to broadcast. The Supreme Court considered whether government agencies and Doordarshan, the government broadcaster, " have a monopoly of creating terrestrial signals and of telecasting them or refusing to telecast them", and whether Doordarshan could claim to be the single host broadcaster for all events, including those produced or organised by the company or by anybody else in the country or abroad. The Supreme Court held that the TV viewer has a right to a diversity of views and information under Article 19(1)(a), and also that the viewer must be protected against the market. The Court reasoned that " airwaves being public property, it is the duty of the state to see that airwaves are so utilised as to advance the free speech right of the citizens, which is served by ensuring plurality and diversity of views, opinions and ideas ".

If every citizen were afforded the right to use airwaves at his own choosing, "powerful economic, commercial and political interests" would dominate the media. Therefore, instead of affirming a distinct right of listeners, the Court conflated the interests of government-controlled media with those of the listeners, on the ground that government media fall under public and parliamentary scrutiny. According to Ms. Kumar this is a regressive position that formulates State interest as citizen interest. Ms. Kumar argued that in order to ensure freedom of speech there is a need to frame citizens' interests as distinct from those of the market and the government.

Bhairav Acharya, Advocate, Supreme Court and Delhi High Court & Consultant, CIS
Mr. Acharya's presentation focused on the divergence between the jurisprudence and policy surrounding freedom of expression in India. According to him, the policies of successive governments in India - from the colonial period and thereafter - have developed at odds with case-law relating to freedom of expression. Indeed, it is possible to discern from the government's actions over the last two centuries a relatively consistent narrative of governance which seeks to bend the individual's right to speech to its will. The defining characteristics of this narrative - the government's free speech policy - emerge from a study of executive and legislative decisions chiefly in relation to the press, that continue to shape policy regarding the freedom of expression on the Internet. Thus, there has been consistent tension between the individual and the community, as well as the role of the government in enforcing the expectations of the community when thwarted by law.

Today, free speech scholarship (including digital speech) fails to take into account this consistent divergence between jurisprudence and policy. Mr. Acharya pointed out that we think of digital speech issues as new, whereas there is an immense amount of insight to gain by studying the history of free speech and policy in India.

Towards this, Mr. Acharya highlighted that to understand dichotomy between modern and native law and free speech policy, it is useful to go back to the early colonial period in India, when Governor-General Warren Hastings established a system of courts in Bengal's hinterland to begin the long process of displacing traditional law to create a modern legal system. J. Duncan M. Derrett notes that the colonial expropriation of Indian law was marked by a significant tension caused by the repeatedly-stated objective of preserving some fields of native law to create a dichotomous legal structure. These efforts were assisted by orientalist jurists such as Henry Thomas Colebrook whose interpretation of the dharmasastras heralded a new stage in the evolution of Hindu law. By the mid-nineteenth century, this dual system came under strain in the face of increasing colonial pressure to rationalise the legal system to ensure more effective governance, and native protest at the perceived insensitivity of the colonial government to local customs.

Mr. Acharya explained that this myopia in Indian policy research is similar social censorship (i.e., social custom as creating limits to free speech). Law and society scholars have long studied the social censorship phenomenon, but policy research rejects this as a purely academic pursuit. But the truth is that free speech has been regulated by a dual policy of law and social custom in India since colonial times. The then-Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court Elijah Impey required officers to respect local customs, and this extended to free speech as well. But as colonial courts did not interpret Hindu law correctly; interpretations of freedom of speech suffered as well. Mr. Acharya noted that the restrictions on freedom of speech introduced by the British continue to affect individuals in India today. Prior to British amendments, India had drawn laws from multiple sources - indeed customs and laws were tailored for communities and contexts, and not all were blessed with the consistency and precedent so familiar to common law. Since the British were unable to make sense of India's law and customs, they codified the principles of English customary law.

The Indian Penal Code (IPC) saw the codification of English criminal law (the public offences of riots, affray, unlawful assembly, etc., and private offences such as criminal intimidation). In Macaulay's initial drafts, the IPC did not contain sedition and offences of hurting religious sentiments, etc. Sections 124A ("Sedition") and 295A (" Deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs") were added to the IPC in 1860, and changes were made to the Code of Criminal Procedure as well. Today, these sections are used to restrict and criminalise digital speech.

The Right to Offend :

Mr. Acharya then considered the history of the "right to offend", in light of the controversies surrounding Section 66A, IT Act. Before the insertion and strengthening of Section 295A, citizens in India had a right to offend others within the bounds of free speech. He clarified that in 1925 a pamphlet " Rangila Rasool" was published by Lahore-based Mahashe Rajpal (the name(s) of the author(s) were never revealed). The pamphlet concerned the marriages and sex life of the Prophet Mohammed, and created a public outcry. Though the publisher was acquitted of all charges and the pamphlet was upheld, the publisher was ambushed and stabbed when he walked out of jail. Under pressure from the Muslim community, the British enacted Section 295A, IPC. The government was seeking to placate and be sensitive to public feeling, entrenching the idea that the government may sacrifice free speech in the face of riots, etc. The death of India's "right to offend" begins here, said Mr. Acharya.

A prior restraint regime was created and strengthened in 1835, then in 1838, etc. At this time, the press in India was largely British. Following the growth of Indian press after the 1860s, the British made their first statutory attempt at censorship in 1867: a prior sanction was required for publication, and contravention attracted heavy penalties such as deportation and exile. Forfeiture of property, search and seizures and press-inspections were also permitted by the government under these draconian laws. Mr. Acharya noted that it is interesting that many leaders of India's national movement were jailed under the press laws.

Independence and After :

Mr. Acharya further explained that the framers of the Constitution deliberately omitted "freedom of the press" from the text of Article 19(1)(a) and that Jawaharlal Nehru did not think the press ought to be afforded such a right. This is despite a report of the Law Commission of India, which recommended that corporations be provided an Article 19 right. But why distrust the press, though citizens are granted the freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a)? In Mr. Acharya's opinion, this is evidence of the government's divergent approach towards free speech policy; and today, we experience this as a mistrust of the press, publications, and of online speech.

Mr. Acharya also explained that statutory restrictions on free speech grew at odds with judicial interpretation in the 1950s. Taking the examples ofRomesh Thapar v. the State of Madras [AIR 1950 SC 124] and Brij Bhushan v. the State of Delhi [(1950) Supp. SCR 245], Mr. Acharya showed how the judiciary interpreted Article 19 favourably. Despite the government's arguments about a public order danger, the Supreme Court refused to strike down left wing or right wing speech ( Romesh Thapar concerned a left wing publication; Brij Bhushan concerned right wing views), as "public order" was not a ground for restricting speech in the Constitution. The government reacted to the Supreme Court's judgement by enacting the First Amendment to the Constitution: Article 19(2) was amended to insert "public order" as a ground to restrict free speech. Thus, it is possible to see the divergence between free speech jurisprudence and policy in India from the time of Independence. Nehru and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel had supported the amendment, while B.R. Ambedkar supported Romesh Thapar and Brij Bhushan. On the other hand, then-President Rajendra Prasad sought Constitutional protection for the press.

Why Study Free Speech History?

Mr. Acharya noted how the changes in free speech policy continue to affect us, including in the case of content restrictions online. In the 1950s, then-Prime Minister Nehru appointed the First Press Commission, and the newspaper National Herald was established to promote certain (left wing) developmental and social goals. Chalapati Rao was the editor of the National Herald, and a member of the First Press Commission.

At that time, the Commission rejected vertical monopolies of the press. However, today, horizontal monopolies characterize India's press. The First Press Commission also opposed 'yellow journalism' (i.e., sensational journalism and the tabloid press), but this continues today. Decades later, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi called for a "committed bureaucracy, judiciary and press", taking decisive steps to ensure the first two. For instance, Justice Mathew (one of the judges in the Bennett Coleman case) was an admirer of Indira Gandhi. As Kerala's Advocate General, he wanted the Press Registrar to have investigative powers similar to those given in colonial times; he also wanted the attacks on government personalities to be criminalized. The latter move was also supported by M.V. Gadgil, who introduced a Bill in Parliament that sought to criminalise attacks on public figures on the grounds of privacy. Mr. Acharya noted that though Indira Gandhi's moves and motives with regard to a "committed press" are unclear, the fact remains that India's regional and vernacular press was more active in criticizing the Emergency than national press.

Demonstrating the importance of understanding a contexts history - both social and legislative, following the striking down of 66A in Shreya Singhal & Ors. v. Union of India (Supreme Court, March 24, 2015), elements in the government have stated their wish to introduce and enact a new Section 66A. Mr. Acharya explained that such moves from elements in the government shows that despite the striking down of 66A, it is still possible for the repressive and mistrustful history of press policy to carry forward in India. This possibility is supported by colonial and post-Independence press history and policy that has been developed by the government. When looking at how research can impact policy, greater awareness of history and context may allow for civil society, academia, and the public at large to predict and prepare for press policy changes.

Ambikesh Mahapatra, Professor of Chemistry, Jadavpur University

Prof. Mahapatra introduced himself as a victim of the West Bengal administration and ruling party. He stated that though India's citizens have been granted the protection of fundamental rights after Independence, these rights are not fully protected; his experience with the West Bengal ruling party and its abuse of powers under the Information Technology Act, 2000 (am. 2008) ("IT Act") highlights this.

On March 23, 2012, Prof. Mahapatra had forwarded a cartoon to his friends by email. The cartoon poked fun at West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee and her ruling party. On the night of April 12, 2012, individuals not residing in the Professor's housing colony confronted him, dragging him to the colony building and assaulting him. These individuals forced Prof. Mahapatra to write a confession about his forwarding of the cartoon and his political affiliations. Though the police arrived at the scene, they did not interfere with the hooligans. Moreover, when the leader of the hooligans brought the Professor to the police and asked that he be arrested, they did so even though they did not have an arrest warrant. At the police station, the hooligans filed a complaint against him. The Professor was asked to sign a memo mentioning the charges against him (Sections 114 and 500, Indian Penal Code, 1860 & Section 66A, IT Act). Prof. Mahapatra noted that the police complaint had been filed by an individual who was neither the receiver nor the sender of the email, but was a local committee member with the Trinamool Congress (the West Bengal ruling party).

The arrest sparked a series of indignant responses across the country. The West Bengal Human Rights Commission took suo motu cognizance of the arrest, and recommended action against the high-handedness of the police. Fifty six intellectuals appealed to the Prime Minister of India to withdraw the arrest; the former Supreme Court judge Markandey Katju was among those who appealed. Thirty cartoonists' organisations from across the world also appealed to the President and the Prime Minister to withdraw the case.

The West Bengal government paid no heed to the protests, and Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee publicly supported the actions of the police - making public statements against Justice Katju and A.K. Ganguly, former judge of the Supreme Court and head of the West Bengal Human Rights Commission respectively. A charge sheet was framed against Prof. Mahapatra and others, with Section 66A as one of the charges.

The case has been going on for over two years. Recently, on March 10, 2015, the Calcutta High Court upheld the recommendations of the West Bengal Human Rights Commission, and directed the government to implement them. The West Bengal government has preferred an appeal before a division bench, and the case will continue. This is despite the fact that Section 66A has been struck down (by the Supreme Court in Shreya Singhal & Ors. v. Union of India).

Though noting that he was not an expert, Prof. Mahapatra put forward that it seemed that the freedom of expression of the common man depends on the whims of the ruling parties and the State/Central governments. It is of utmost importance, according to him, to protect the common man's freedom of speech, for his recourse against the government and powerful entities is pitifully limited.

Questions & Comments

Q. A participant stated that the core trouble appears to lie in the power struggle of political parties. Political parties wish to retain power and gather support for their views. Despite progressive laws, it is the Executive that implements the laws. So perhaps what is truly required is police and procedural reforms rather than legislative changes.

A. Members of the panel agreed that there is a need for more sensitivity and awareness amongst the law enforcement agencies and this might be long overdue and much needed step in protecting the rights of citizens.

Q. A participant was interested in understanding how it might be possible to correct the dichotomy between FoE policy and doctrine? The participant also wanted the panel to comment on progressive policy making if any.

A. Members of the panel stated that there is no easy way of correcting this dichotomy between custom and law. Scholars have also argued that the relationship between custom and pernicious social censorship is ambiguous. Towards this, more studies are required to come to a conclusion.

Q. A participant requested clarity on what rights can be created to ensure and support a robust right to freedom of expression, and how this might affect the debates surrounding net neutrality?

A. Members of the panel noted that the Internet allows citizens and corporations to regulate speech on their own (private censorship), and this is problematic. Members of the panel also responded that the existing free speech right does not enable diversity of speech. Social and local customs permit social censorship, and this network effect is clearly visible online; individuals experience a chilling effect. Finally, in the context of net neutrality, the interests of content-producers (OTTs, for instance) are different from those of users. They may benefit economically from walled gardens or from non-interference with traffic-routing, but users may not. Therefore, there is a need for greater clarity before coming to a conclusion about potential net neutrality regulation.

Session 2: Current Realities

Dr. Cherian George, Associate Professor, Hong Kong Baptist University
Dr. George began his talk by highlighting how there is no issue as contentious as offensive speech and how it should be dealt with. The debate around free speech is often framed as a battle between those who support democracy and those who oppose it. Yet, this is also a tension within democracy. Citizens should not be unjustly excluded from participating in democracy (companion rights in Article 19 and 20, ICCPR). Relevant UN institutions and Article 19 have come up with reports and ideals that should be universally adopted - norms that apply to many areas including speech. These norms are different from traditional approaches. For example:

Human Rights Norms	Traditional Approach
Regulate incitement of violence (discrimination, hate, etc.)	Law protects people's feelings from speech that offends
Protect minorities as they are more vulnerable to exploitation and uprooting of their values	Law sides with the majority, to protect mainstream values over minority values
Allow robust criticism of ideas, religions, and beliefs	Law protects religion, beliefs, and ideas from criticism
Strive for balance between liberty and equality	Aims for order and maintenance of status quo
Promote harmony through the media	Enforces harmony by the state

Commenting on the traditional approach, Dr. George noted that if the state protects feelings of offence against speech, it allows groups to use such protection as a political weapon: "hate spin", which is the giving or taking of offence as a political strategy. Hate spin is normally framed as a "visceral, spontaneous reaction" to a video, writing, or speech, etc. Yet, the spontaneous reaction of indignation to speech or content can consistently be revealed to result from conscious manipulation by middlemen for political purposes.

South Asia is similar to West Asia - as the legal frameworks provide immunity for dangerous speech. In practice, this allows for the incitement of discrimination, hostility, and violence. At the same time, the legal frameworks allow for excessive sympathy for wounded feelings, and often the taking of offence turns into a political strategy. Power enters the equation here. The law allows the powerful to take offence and use hate speech against those not in powerful positions.

Dr. George highlighted a number of legal quandaries surrounding freedom of expression including:

Enforcement gaps: There is a lack of enforcement of existing laws against incitement.
Non-regulated zones: Socio-political research demonstrates that many problems cannot be regulated, and yet the law can only deal with what can be regulated. Hate speech is one of these as hate speech is not in the speech itself, but in the meaning that is produced in the mind of those saying/listening.
Verdict-proof opportunities: Political entrepreneurs can use legislative and judicial processes to mainstream hateful views, regardless of how legislature and courts ultimately act. The religious right, for instance, can always pit themselves morally against "secular" decisions of apex authorities (SC, etc.). For example, in the context of the US and Islamophobia - the State legislature in Alabama introduced an anti-Shariah law. Yet, the law is against a non-existent threat and appears to be a ploy to normalize anti-Muslim sentiments, including in political rhetoric. While focusing on winning battles in courts or legislature, the intolerant groups do not need to win a legal court case to introduce and entrench language of intolerance in public discourse and discussion. This demonstrates that there is a need to begin moving away from a purely legal analysis (interpretation or development) of the laws, and a need to begin studying these issues through a sociological lens.

Zakir Khan, Article 19, Bangladesh
Mr. Khan introduced Article 19 and its work in Bangladesh and the rest of South Asia. He noted that Article 19 is involved in documenting and analysing laws and regulations affecting freedom of expression, including in Bangladesh. Article 19 also campaigns for changes in law and policy, and responds from a policy perspective to particular instances of government overreach.

Mr. Khan explained that India has the Information Technology Act, 2000 (am. 2008) ("IT Act"), and in Bangladesh, the equivalent legislation is the Information and Communication Technology Act, 2006 ("ICT Act"). The ICT Act was enacted to bring Bangladeshi law in conformity with international law; i.e. in accordance with the UNCITRAL model law on e-commerce and online transactions. The ICT Act deals with hacking, crimes committed with the use of a computer system, breach of data, breach of computer system, and hardware.

Like the IT Act in India, Bangladesh's ICT Act also criminalizes speech and expression online. For instance, Section 57, ICT Act, criminalizes the publication of "fake, obscene or defaming information in electronic form". Similarly, bringing damage to "the state's image" online is criminalized. In 2013, the Bangladesh Ministry of Law amended the ICT Act to increase penalties for online offences, and allow for the detention of suspected offenders, warrantless arrests and indefinite detention without bail. Bloggers and activists have been protesting these changes, and have been targeted for the same.

Mr. Khan noted that Article 19 has developed a tool to report violations online. Individuals who have experienced violations of their rights online can post this information onto a forum, wherein Article 19 tracks and reports on them, as well as creating awareness about the violation. Any blogger or online activist can come and voice concerns and report their stories. Mr. Khan also highlighted that given the ICT Act and the current environment, online activists and bloggers are particularly threatened. Article 19 seeks to create a safe space for online bloggers and activists by creating anonymity tools, and by creating awareness about the distinctions between political agenda and personal ideology.

Chinmayi Arun, Research Director, Centre for Communication Governance (CCG), National Law University (Delhi)
Ms. Arun began by noting that usually conversations around freedom of expression look at the overlap between FoE and content i.e. the focus is on the speaker and the content. Yet, when one targets the mediator - it shifts the focus as it would be approaching the issue from the intermediary's perspective. When structural violation of free speech happens, it either places the middleman in the position of carrying through the violation, or creates a structure through which speech violations are incentivized.

An example of this is the Bazee.com case. At the time of the case the law was structured in such a way that not only perpetrators of unlawful content were punished, but so were the bodies/persons that circulated illegal content. In regulatory terms this is known as "gatekeeper liability". In the Bazee.com case, a private party put obscene content up for sale and Bazee.com could and did not verify all of the content that was for sale. In the case, the Delhi HC held Avnish Bajaj, the CEO of Bazee.com, liable on the precedent of strict liability for circulation of obscene content. The standard of strict liability was established under Ranjit Udeshi case. The standard of strict liability is still the norm for non-online content, but after Bazee.com, a Parliament Standing Committee created a safe harbour for online intermediaries under Section 79 of the IT Act. As per the provision, if content has been published online, but an intermediary has not edited or directly created the content, it is possible for them to seek immunity from liability for the content. The Parliament Standing Committee then stated that intermediaries ought to exercise due diligence. Thus, the Indian legal regime provides online intermediaries with immunity only if content has not been published or edited by an intermediary and due diligence has been exercised as defined by Rules under the Act. While developing India's legal regime for intermediary liability the Parliamentary Standing Committee did not focus on the impact of such regulation on online speech.

To a large extent, present research and analysis of Freedom of Expression is focused on the autonomy of the speaker/individual. An alternative formulation and way of understanding the right, and one that has been offered by Robert Post through his theory of democratic self governance, is that Freedom of Expression is more about the value of the speech rather than the autonomy of the speaker. In such a theory the object of Freedom of Expression is to ensure diversity of speech in the public sphere. The question to ask then is: "Is curtailment affecting democratic dialogue?" The Supreme Court of India has recognized that people have a right to know/listen/receive information in a variety of cases. Ms. Arun explained that if one accepts this theory of speech, the liability of online intermediaries will be seen differently.

Ms. Arun further explained that in Shreya Singhal, the notice-and-takedown regime under section 79 of the IT Act has been amended, but the blocking regime under section 69A has not. Thus, the government can still use intermediaries as proxies to take down legitimate content, and not provide individuals with the opportunity to to challenge blocking orders. This is because as per the Act, blocking orders must be confidential. Though the blocking regime has not been amended, the Supreme Court has created an additional safeguard by including the requirement that the generator of content has to be contacted (to the extent possible) before the government can pass and act upon a blocking order. Mr. Arun noted that hopefully, when implemented, this will provide a means of recourse for individuals and counter, to some extent, the mandated secrecy of content blocking orders.

Raman Jit Singh Chima, Asia Consultant, Access Now
Mr. Chima began his presentation by noting that the Internet is plagued by a few founding myths. Tim Goldsmith and Jack Wu (in Who Controls the Internet: Illusions of a Borderless World) name one: that no laws apply to the Internet; that, because of the borderless nature of the Internet - data flows through cables without regard for State borders - and thus countries' laws do not affect the Internet. These cyber-anarchists, amongst whom John Perry Barlow of the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) is inspiring, also argue that regulation has no role for the Internet.

Mr. Chima countered these 'myths', arguing that the law affects the Internet in many ways. The US military and Science departments funded the invention of the Internet. So the government was instrumental in the founding of the Internet, and the US Department of Commerce has agreements with ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) to govern the Domain Names System. So the law, contracts and regulation already apply to the Internet.

Mr. Chima further explained that today organisations like EFF and civil society in India argue for, and seek to influence, the creation of regulation for the protection of journalists against unfair and wrongful targeting by the government. This includes moves to protect whistleblowers, to ensure the openness of the Internet and its protection from illegitimate and violative acts against freedom of expression, access and other rights. Some governments, like India, also place conditions in the licenses granted to Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to ensure that they bring access to the rural, unconnected areas. Such law and regulation are not only common, but they are also good; they help the population against virtual wrongdoing.

Mr. Chima pointed out that when States contemplate policy-making for the Internet, they look to a variety of sources. Governments draw upon existing laws and standards (like India with the virtual obscenity offence provision Section, 67 and 67A, IT Act, which is drawn from the real-world penal provision Section 292, IPC) and executive action (regulation, by-laws, changes to procedural law) to create law for the Internet. Additionally, if a government repeats a set of government actions consistently over time, such actions may take on the force of law. Mr. Chima also spoke of web-developers and standards-developers (the technical community), who operate by rules that have the force of law, such as the 'rough consensus and running code' of the IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force). Governments also prescribe conditions ("terms of use") that companies must maintain, permitting or proscribing certain kinds of content on websites and platforms.

Finally, Mr. Chima highlighted international legal and policy standards that play a role in determining the Internet's law and regulation. ICANN, the administrator of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions and governing body for the Domain Names System, functions by a set of rules that operate as law, and in the creation of which, the international legal community (governments, companies, civil society and non-commercial users, and the technical community) play a role. The ITU (International Telecommunications Union) and organisations like INTERPOL also play a role.

Mr. Chima explained that when one wants to focus on issues concerning freedom of expression, multiple laws also apply. Different States set different standards. For instance, in the US, the main standards for the Internet came from issues relating to access to certain types of online content. In Reno v. ACLU (1997), the US Supreme Court considered what standards should be created to access obscene and indecent content on the Internet. The judges held that the Internet, as a medium of unprecedented dynamism, deserved the higher protection from governmental overreach.

In Asia, the main legal standards for the Internet came from Internet commerce: the UNCITRAL model law, which prescribed provisions best suited to the smoother commercial utilization of a fast and growing medium, became the foundation for Internet-related law in Asian states. Predictably, this did not offer the strongest rights protections, but rather, focused on putting in place the most effective penalties. But when Asian states drew from the European UNCITRAL law, many forgot that European states are already bound by the European Convention for Human Rights, the interpretation of which has granted robust protections to Internet-related rights.

Mr. Chima provided the example of Pakistan's new Cybercrime Bill. The Bill has troubling provisions for freedom of expression, and minimal to no due process protections. While drafting the law, Pakistan has drawn largely from model cybercrime laws from the Council of Europe, which are based on the Budapest Convention. In Europe and the US, States have strong parallel protections for rights, but States in Asia and Africa do not.

Mr. Chima concluded that when one talks of freedom of expression online, it is important to also remember the roles of intermediaries and companies. The ISPs can be made liable for content that flows through their wires, through legal mechanisms such as license provisions. ISPs can also be made to take further control over the networks, or to make some websites harder to access (like the Internet Watch Foundation's blacklist). When policy organisations consider this, it is critical that they ask whether industry bodies should be permitted to do this without public discussion, on the basis of government pressure.

Questions & Comments

Q. Participants asked for panel members to talk about the context in which bloggers find themselves in danger in Bangladesh.

A. Panel members stated that the courts are not fair to bloggers as often they side with government. It was added that courts have labelled bloggers as atheist, and subsequently all bloggers are being associated with the label. Further, it was added that most people who are outraged, do not even know what blogging is, and people associate blogging with blasphemy and as opposing religious beliefs. It was also noted that in Bangladesh, while you see violations of FoE from the State, you see more violations of blogger rights from non-state actors.

Q. Participants asked if there is anything specific about the Internet that alters how we should consider hate speech online and their affective/visceral impact.

A. Pa nel members noted that they are still grappling with the question of what difference the Internet makes, but noted that it has indeed complicated an already complex issue as there is always the question about political entrepreneurs using convenient content to foment fires.

Q. Participants questioned panel members about how the right to offend is protected in jurisdictions across Asia where there is still tension between classical liberalism and communitarian ideologies, and where the individuated nature of rights is not clearly established or entrenched.

A. Panel members responded by stating that when one compares the US, Indonesia and India, the US seems to be able to strike a balance between free speech and other competing interests as they are committed to free speech and committed to religious tolerance and plurality of competing interests. Panel members also added that the fabric of civil society also has an impact. For example, Indonesian civil society is simultaneously religious and secular and pro-democracy. In India, there seems to be a tension between secular and religious groups. In Indonesia, people are moving to religion for comfort, while still seeking a world that is religious and secular.

Q. Participants asked for clarification on ways to approach regulation of hate speech given that hate speech is not just about a particular kind of threatening speech, but encompasses rumours and innuendos.

A . Panel members acknowledged that more research needs to be done in this area and added that applying the socio-cultural lens on such issues would be beneficial.

Q. Participants asked if panel members had a framework for a regulating the content practices of private actors, who are sometimes more powerful than the state and also enforcing censorship.

A. Panel members responded that private censorship is an important issue that needs to be reflected upon in some depth, though a framework is far from being developed even as research is ongoing in the space.

Session 3: Looking Ahead

The third and final session of the conference aimed to find principles and methods to achieve beneficial and effective regulation of the Internet. One of the core aims was the search for the right balance between the dangers of the Internet (and its unprecedented powers of dissemination) and the citizens' interest in a robust right to freedom of expression. Mr. Sutirtho Patranobis, Assistant Editor with the Hindustan Times (Sri Lanka desk, previously China correspondent), shared his experience with governmental regulation of online free speech in China and Sri Lanka. Ms. Karuna Nandy,Advocate, Supreme Court of India, analysed the Indian Supreme Court's decision in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (March 24, 2015), and sought to draw lessons for the current debate on net neutrality in India. Ms. Geeta Seshu, founder and editor of the online magazine The Hoot, offered an expanded definition of freedom of speech, focusing on universal access as the imperative. Finally, Mr. Pranesh Prakash, Policy Director, Centre for Internet & Society, offered his views on net neutrality and the issue of zero-rating, as well as arguing for an increased, cooperative role of civil society in creating awareness on issues relating to the Internet.

Sutirtho Patranobis, Assistant Editor, Hindustan Times
During his career, Mr. Patranobis was the China correspondent for the Hindustan Times. Mr. Patranobis began his presentation by sharing his experiences in China. In China, multiple online platforms have become sources of news for citizens. Chinese citizens, especially the urban young, spend increasing amounts of time on their mobile phones and the Internet, as these are the major sources of news and entertainment in the country.

The Chinese government's attitude towards freedom of expression has been characterized by increasing control over these online platforms. The includes control over global companies like Google and Facebook, which have negotiated with the Chinese government to find mutually acceptable operating rules (acceptable to the government and the company, but in most cases unfavourable to the citizens) or have faced being blocked or filtered from the country. Mr. Patranobis noted that free speech regulation in China has evolved into a sophisticated mechanism for control and oppression, and the suppression of dissent. Not only China, but Sri Lanka has also adopted similar approaches to dealing with freedom of expression.

In China, free speech regulations have evolved with an aim to curtail collective action and dissent. China's censorship programmes work towards silencing expression that can represent, reinforce or spur social mobilisation. Mr. Patranobis explained that these programmes aim to put an end to all collective activities (current or future) that may be at odds with government policies. Therefore, any online activity that exposes government action as repressive, corrupted or draconian is meted out harsh treatment. Indeed it is possible to see that there are sharp increases in online censorship and crackdowns when the government implements controversial policies offline.

Mr. Patranobis went on to discuss the nature of objectionable content, and the manner in which different jurisdictions deal with the same. Social and cultural context, governmental ideologies, and political choices dictate the nature of objectionable content in States such as China and Sri Lanka. On the flipside, media literacy, which plays a big role in ensuring an informed and aware public, is extremely low in Sri Lanka, as well as in many other States in South Asia.

Mr. Patranobis raised the question of how the Internet can be regulated while retaining freedom of expression - noting that the way forward is uncertain. In Sri Lanka, for instance, research by UNESCO shows that the conflicting policy objectives are unresolved; these first need to be balanced before robust freedom of expression can be sustained. The Internet is a tool, after all; a tool that can connect people, that can facilitate the spread of knowledge and information, to lift people from the darkness of poverty. The Internet can also be a tool to spread hate and to divide societies and peoples. Finding the right balance, contextualised according to the needs of the citizens and the State, is key to good regulation.

Karuna Nundy, Advocate, Supreme Court of India
Ms. Nandy focused her presentation on two issues currently raging in India's free speech debates: the Supreme Court's reasoning on Sections 66A and 69A, IT Act, in Shreya Singhal & Ors. v. Union of India (Supreme Court, March 24, 2015), and issues of access and innovation in the call for a net neutrality regulation. She stated that the doctrine of the "marketplace of ideas" endorsed by Justices Nariman and Chelameswar in Shreya Singhal speaks to the net neutrality debate.

Ms. Nandy held that a law can be challenged as unconstitutional if it prohibits acts that are legitimate and constitutional. Such an argument refers to the impugned law's "overbroad impact". For instance, the Supreme Court struck down Section 66A, IT Act, on the ground (among others) that the impugned section leads to the prohibition and criminalisation of legitimate and protected speech. Cases such asChintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(1950) SCR 759] and Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar [1962 Supp. (3) SCR 369] speak to this principle. They expand the principle of overbreadth to include the notion of "chilling effect" - i.e., situations where overbroad blocking leads to the prohibition of legitimate constitutional speech. In such situations, citizens are unsure what constitutes protected speech and what does not, leading to a chilling effect and self-censorship for fear of reprisals.

In Shreya Singhal, the Supreme Court also considered the "reasonable person" doctrine that has been developed under the law of obscenity. India had initially adopted the Hicklin test, under which the test to determine what is obscene depended on whether prurient minds (minds that have a tendency to be corrupted) would find the impugned material lascivious and corrupting. This test, laid down in Ranjit Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra [AIR 1965 SC 881] and altered/refined by decades of jurisprudence, was put to rest in Aveek Sarkar v. State of West Bengal [AIR 2014 SC 1495]. In Aveek Sarkar, the Supreme Court adopted the "community standards" test to determine obscene content. According to Ms. Nandy, the "community standards" test rests on the doctrine of reasonable persons. Ms. Nandy noted that in effect there is a need for more police officers to protect those who produce legitimate content from hecklers.

Quoting from the U.S. decision of Whitney v. California [71 L. Ed. 1095], Ms. Nandy submitted that:

" It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one. "

On the issue of website blocking and the Supreme Court's reasoning on Section 69A, IT Act, in Shreya Singhal, Ms. Nandy explained that the Additional Solicitor General had conceded a number of points during the oral arguments. She further explained that website blocking can be applied when the Central Government is satisfied that there is a necessity for it. However, reasons must be recorded in writing. Also, according to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009 (" Blocking Rules"), both the intermediary and the originator of the communication (the content-creator) have to be given a chance to be heard.

Rule 16 of the Blocking Rules, which mandates confidentiality of all blocking requests and orders, was also discussed in Shreya Singhal. Though some confusion has arisen about the Rule's interpretation, Ms. Nandy submitted that Rule 16 has been read down. There is no longer a strict, all-encompassing requirement of confidentiality. While the identity of the complainant and the exact nature of the complaint must be kept confidential, the blocking order and the reasoning behind the order are no longer bound by Rule 16. This is because in §109 of the judgment, the Supreme Court accepts that writ petitions can lie on the basis of blocking orders. In order for writs to lie, affected parties must first be aware of the existence and content of the blocking order. Therefore, Ms. Nandy explained, the effect of the Supreme Court's reasoning is that the confidentiality requirement in Rule 16 has been read down.

On net neutrality, Ms. Nandy argued that zero-rating is an efficient solution to providing universal access to the Internet. Services like Internet.org are not strictly market-driven. This is because there is not a large demand for Facebook or specific over-the-top (OTT) service providers. In speaking about the marketplace for ideas in Shreya Singhal, the Supreme Court did not indirectly outlaw services seeking to balance access with diversity of speech. Ms. Nandy held that price discrimination in the provision of telecom, broadband and mobile Internet services already exists. In light of this, the focus should the provision of these services on the basis of consumer choice.

Geeta Seshu, The Hoot
Ms. Seshu began her presentation by noting that one's perspective on online censorship cannot be the same as that on traditional censorship. Traditional censorship cuts off an individual's access to the censored material, but on the Internet, material that is censored in traditional media finds free and wide distribution. One's conceptualisation of freedom of expression and curtailment of this right must include access to the medium as a crucial part. To this end, it is important to not forget that access to the Internet is controlled by a limited number of Internet service and content providers. Thus, a large section of the population in India cannot exercise their right to free speech because they do not have access to the Internet.

In this context, it is important to understand the way in which the digital rollout is happening in India. Ms. Seshu explained that the rollout process lacks transparency, and noted the example of the 4G/LTE rollout plan in India. There is, of course, a diversity of content: those that have access to the Internet have the ability to exercise their right to free speech in diverse ways. However, introducing access into the free speech universe highlights many inequalities that exist in the right; for instance, Dalit groups in India have limited access to the Internet, and some kinds of content receive limited airtime.

Importantly, Ms. Seshu argued that the government and other entities use technology to regulate content availability. Policymakers exploit the technology and architecture of the networks to monitor, surveil and censor content. For instance, one may see the UID scheme as an adaptation of technology to facilitate not only service-provision, but also as a move towards a Big Brother state. Civil society and citizens need to study and respond to the ways in which technology has been used against them. Unfortunately, the debates surrounding regulation do not afford space for Internet users to be part of the discussion. In order to turn this around, it is important that citizens' and users' rights are developed and introduced into the regulatory equation.

Pranesh Prakash, Policy Director, Centre for Internet & Society
Taking up where Ms. Seshu left off, Mr. Prakash wished to explore whether the Internet was merely an enabler of discussion - allowing, for instance, a ruckus to be raised around the consultation paper of the Telecom Regulatory Authority in India (TRAI) on Over-The-Top (OTT) services and net neutrality - or whether the Internet positively adds value. The Internet is, of course, a great enabler. The discussions surrounding OTTs and net neutrality are an example: in response to the TRAI consultation, a campaign titled "Save the Internet" resulted in over 9.5 lakh comments being submitted to the TRAI. It is inconceivable that such a widespread public discussion on so complex a topic (net neutrality) could take place without the Internet's facilitation.

But, Mr. Prakash held, it is important to remember that the Internet is the tool, the platform, for such mobilisation. Campaigns and conversations such as those on net neutrality could not take place without the organisations and people involved in it. Civil society organisations have played prominent roles in this regard, creating awareness and well-informed discussions. For Mr. Prakash, civil society organisations play their role best when they create such public awareness, and it is important, to play to a stakeholders strengths. Some organisations are effective campaigners, while others (such as CIS) are competent at research, analysis and dissemination.

According to Mr. Prakash, it is equally important to remember that successful discussions, campaigns or debates (such as the ongoing one on net neutrality) do not occur solely because of one organisation's strengths, or indeed because of civil society alone. Networks are especially critical in successful campaigns and policy changes. As researchers, we may not always know where our work is read, but sometimes they reach unexpected venues. For instance, one of Mr. Prakash's papers was used by the hacker collective Anonymous for a local campaign, and he was made aware of it only accidentally. Mr. Prakash noted that civil society has to also accept its failures, pointing to the controversy surrounding the Goondas Act in Karnataka. Where there are strong counter-stakeholders (such as the film lobby in south Indian states), civil society's efforts alone may not lead to success.

On net neutrality, Mr. Prakash noted the example of a strategy employed by the Times of India newspaper, when it undercut its competitors by slashing its own prices. Such moves are not unknown in the market, and they have their benefits. Consumers benefit from the lowered prices. For instance, were a Whatsapp or Facebook pack to be introduced by a telecom operator, the consumers may choose to buy this cheap, limited data pack. This is beneficial for consumers, and also works to expand access to the Internet. At the same time, diversity of speech and consumer choice is severely restricted, as these companies and telecom operators can create 'walled gardens' of information and services. Mr. Prakash put forth that if we can facilitate competitive zero-rating, and ensure that anti-competitive cross-subsidization does not occur, then perhaps zero-rated products can achieve access without forcing a trade off between diversity and choice.

Finally, on the issue of website blocking and takedowns under Sections 69A and 79, IT Act, Mr. Prakash noted that the Shreya Singhal judgment does nothing to restrict the judiciary's powers to block websites. According to Mr. Prakash, at the moment, the Shreya Singhal judgment relieves intermediaries of the responsibility to take down content if they receive private complaints about content. After the judgment, intermediaries will lose their immunity under Section 79, IT Act, only if they refuse to comply with takedown requests from government agencies or judicial orders.

But, as Mr. Prakash explained, the judiciary is itself a rogue website-blocker. In the past few years, the judiciary has periodically ordered the blocking of hundreds of websites. Such orders have resulted in the blocking of a large number of legitimate websites (including, at one point, Google Drive and Github). To ensure that our freedom of expression online is effectively protected, Mr. Prakash argued that ways to stop the judiciary from going on such a rampage must be devised.

Questions & Comments

A. Participants and panel members commented that researchers and commentators err by making analogies between the Internet and other media like newspapers, couriers, TV, satellite, cable, etc. The architecture of the Internet is very different even from cable. On the Internet, traffic flows both ways, whereas cable is not bi-directional. Moreover, pricing models for newspapers have nothing in common with those on the Internet. The comparisons in net neutrality debates stand the danger of incorrectness, and we must guard against that. Zero-rating and net neutrality issues in high-access countries are very different from the issues in low-access countries like India.

B. Participants and panel members commented that access and availability must play a predominant role in thinking about freedom of expression. In India, we are technologically far behind other states, though we have potential. The real end-goal of this is the convergence of services and information, with the user at the centre of the ecosystem. Our technological capabilities include satellite and spectrum; the best spectrum bands are lying vacant and can be re-framed. For this, the government must be educated.

C. Participants and panel members commented that in high-access states, the net neutrality issues surround competition and innovation (since there is no or very little ISP competition and switching costs are not low), while in India and France, where there is already competition amongst providers, access plays a crucial role. On the Internet, the networking or engineering aspects can disrupt the content carried over the network, so that is also a concern.

D. Participants and panel members commented that zero-rating is both a blessing and a curse. Zero-rating would not be detrimental in a market with perfect information and competition. But the reality is information asymmetry and imperfect competition. If today, we were to allow zero-rating, diversity would suffer and we would be left with 'walled gardens'.

Conclusion

The conference addressed a range of issues characteristic of debates surrounding freedom of expression in India and South Asia. Beginning with the conceptual understanding of freedom of expression, panellists advocated an expanded definition, where the right to free speech is teleological. The panellists considered freedom of speech as a tool to ensure diversity of speech, both horizontally and vertically. Towards this end, panellists gave several suggestions:

First , policymakers and scholars must understand freedom of speech as a right of both the speaker and the listener/reader, and carve out a separate listeners' right. Panellists expanded upon this to show the implications for the debate on net neutrality, cross-media ownership and website-blocking, for instance.

Second , there is a need for scholars to examine the historical dichotomy between the policy and jurisprudence of free speech in India and other contexts across South Asia. Such an approach to scholarship and policy research would help predict future government policy (such as in the case of the Indian government's stance towards Section 66A following the Supreme Court's decision in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India) and strategize for the same.

Third , particularly with regard to the Internet, there is a need for policy advocates and policy makers to "bust" the founding myths of the Internet, and look to various domestic and international sources of law and regulation. Studies of regulation of freedom of speech on the Internet in different jurisdictions (Bangladesh, China, Sri Lanka) indicate differing government approaches, and provide examples to learn from. The interpretation and consequences of Shreya Singhal on website-blocking and intermediary liability in India provide another learning platform.

Fourth , panellists discussed the possibilities of cooperation and strategies among civil society and policy organisations in India. Taking the example of the Save the Internet campaign surrounding net neutrality in India, panellists speculated on the feasibility of using the Internet itself as a tool to campaign for governance and policy reform. Together with the audience, the panellists identified several areas that are ripe for research and advocacy, such as net neutrality and zero-rating, and citizens' free speech right as being separate from governmental and corporate interests.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/freedom-of-expression-in-a-digital-age

Net Neutrality and the Law of Common Carriage

bhairav — 2015-08-23T11:09:04Z

Net neutrality makes strange bedfellows. It links the truck operators that dominate India’s highways, such as those that carry vegetables from rural markets to cities, and Internet service providers which perform a more technologically advanced task.

Download PDF

Over the last decade, the truckers have opposed the government’s attempts to impose the obligations of common carriage on them, this has resulted in strikes and temporary price rises; and, in the years ahead, there is likely to be a similar – yet, technologically very different – debate as net neutrality advocates call for an adapted version of common carriage to bind Internet services.

Net neutrality demands a rigorous examination that is not attempted by this short note which, constrained by space, will only briefly trace the law and policy of net neutrality in the US and attempt a brief comparison with the principles of common carriage in India. Net neutrality defies definition. Very simply, the principle demands that Internet users have equal access to all content and applications on the Internet. This can only be achieved if Internet service providers: (i) do not block lawful content; (ii) do not throttle – deliberately slow down or speed up access to selected content; (iii) do not prioritise certain content over others for monetary gain; and, (iv) are transparent in their management of the networks by which data flows.

Almost exactly a year ago, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals – a senior court below the US Supreme Court – struck down portions of the ‘Open Internet Order’ that was issued by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in 2010. Although sound in law, the Court’s verdict impeded net neutrality to raise crucial questions regarding common carriage, free speech, competition, and others. More recently, Airtel’s announcement of its decision to charge certain end-users for VoIP services – subsequently suspended pending a policy decision from the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) – has fuelled the net neutrality debate in India.

Because of its innovative technological history in relation to the Internet, the US has pioneered many legal attempts to regulate the Internet in respect of net neutrality. In 1980, when Internet data flowed through telephone lines, the FCC issued the ‘Computer II’ regime which distinguished basic services from enhanced services. The difference between the two turned on the nature of the transmission. Regular telephone calls involved a pure transmission of data and were hence classified as basic services. On the other hand, access to the Internet required the processing of user data through computers; these were classified as enhanced services. Importantly, because of their essential nature, the Computer II rules bound basic services providers to the obligations of common carriage whereas enhanced services providers were not.

What is common carriage? Common law countries share a unique heritage in respect of their law governing the transport of goods and people. Those that perform such transport are called carriers. The law makes a distinction between common carriers and other carriers. A carrier becomes a common carrier when it “holds itself out” to the public as willing to transport people or goods for compensation. The act of holding out is simply a public communication of an offer to transport, it may be fulfilled even by an advertisement. The four defining elements of a common carrier are (i) a holding out of a willingness (a public undertaking) (ii) to transport persons or property (iii) from place to place (iv) for compensation.

Common carriers discharge a public trust. By virtue of their unique position and essential function, they are required to serve their customers equally and without discrimination. The law of carriage of goods and people places four broad duties upon common carriers. Firstly, common carriers are bound to carry everyone’s goods or all people and cannot refuse such carriage unless certain strict conditions are met. Secondly, common carriers must perform their carriage safely without deviating from accepted routes unless in exceptional circumstances. Thirdly, common carriers must obey the timeliness of their schedules, they must be on time. And, lastly, common carriers must assume liabilities for the loss or damages of goods, or death or injuries to people, during carriage.

The Computer II regime was issued under a telecommunications law of 1934 which retained the classical markers and duties of common carriers. The law extended the principles of common carriage to telephone services providers. In 1980, when the regime was introduced, the FCC did not invest Internet services with the same degree of essence and public trust; hence, enhanced services escaped strict regulation. However, the FCC did require that basic services and enhanced services be offered through separate entities, and that basic services providers that operated the ‘last-mile’ wired transmission infrastructure to users offer these facilities to enhanced services providers on a common carrier basis.

In 1996, the new Telecommunications Act revisited US law after more than sixty years. The new dispensation maintained the broad structure of the Computer II regime: it recognised telecommunications carriers in place of basic services providers, and information-services providers in place of enhanced services. Carriers in the industry had already converged telephone and Internet communications as a single service. Hence, when a user engaged a carrier that provided telephone and broadband Internet services, the classification of the carrier would depend on the service being accessed. When a carrier provided broadband Internet access, it was an information-services provider (not a telecommunications carrier) and vice versa. Again, telecommunications carriers were subjected to stricter regulations and liability resembling common carriage.

In 1998, the provision of broadband Internet over wired telephone lines through DSL technologies was determined to be a pure transmission and hence a telecommunications service warranting common carriage regulation. However, in 2002, the FCC issued the ‘Cable Broadband Order’ that treated the provision of cable broadband through last-mile wired telephone transmission networks as a single and integrated information service. This exempted most cable broadband from the duties of common carriage. This policy was challenged in the US Supreme Court in 2005 in the Brand X case and upheld.

Significantly, the decision in the Brand X case was not made on technological merits. The case arose when a small ISP that had hitherto used regular telephone lines to transmit data wanted equal access to the coaxial cables of the broadcasting majors on the basis of common carriage. Instead of making a finding on the status of cable broadband providers based on the four elements of common carriage, the Court employed an administrative law principle of deferring to the decisions of an expert technical regulator – known as the Chevron deference principle – to rule against the small ISP. Thereafter wireless and mobile broadband were also declared to be information services and saved from the application of common carriage law.

Taking advantage of this exemption from common carriage which released broadband providers from the duty of equal access and anti-discrimination, Comcast began from 2007 to degrade P2P data flows to its users. This throttling was reported to the FCC which responded with the 2008 ‘Comcast Order’ to demand equal and transparent transmission from Comcast. Instead, Comcast took the FCC to court. In 2010, the Comcast Order was struck down by the DC Circuit Court of Appeals. And, again, the decision in the Comcast case was made on an administrative law principle, not on technological merits.

In the Comcast case, the Court said that as long as the FCC treated broadband Internet access as an information service it could not enforce an anti-discrimination order against Comcast. This is because the duty of anti-discrimination attached only to common carriers which the FCC applied to telecommunications carriers. Following the Comcast case, the FCC began to consider reclassifying broadband Internet providers as telecommunications carriers.

However, in the 2010 ‘Open Internet Order’, the FCC attempted a different regulatory approach. Instead of a classification based on common carriage, the new rules recognised two types of Internet service providers: (i) fixed providers, which transmitted to homes, and, (ii) mobile providers, which were accessed by smartphones. The rules required both types of providers to ensure transparency in network management, disallowed blocking of lawful content, and re-imposed the anti-discrimination requirement to forbid prioritised access or throttling of certain content.

Before they were even brought into effect, Verizon challenged the Open Internet Order in the same court that delivered the Comcast judgement. The decision of the Court is pending. Meanwhile, in India, Airtel’s rollback of its announcement to charge its pre-paid mobile phone users more for VoIP services raises very similar questions. Like the common law world, India already extends the principles of common carriage to telecommunications. Indian jurisprudence also sustains the distinction between common carriage and private carriage, and applies an anti-discrimination requirement to telecommunications providers through a licensing regime.

TRAI must decide if it wants to continue this distinction. No doubt, the provision of communications services through telephone and the Internet serves an eminent public good. It was on this basis that President Obama called on the FCC to reclassify broadband Internet providers as common carriers. Telecommunications carriers, such as Airtel, might argue that they have expended large sums of money on network infrastructure that is undermined by the use of high-bandwidth free VoIP applications, and that the law of common carriage must recognise this fact. And still others call for a new approach to net neutrality outside the dichotomy of common and private carriage. Whatever the solution, it must be reached by widespread engagement and participation, for Internet access – as the government’s Digital India project is aware – serves public interest.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/net-neutrality-and-law-of-common-carriage

Reading Devanagari script based sites like Konkani Wikipedia in Kannada Script

pavanaja — 2016-06-18T18:14:43Z

This is a small hack to read websites with Devanagari script (used for Hindi, Marathi, Nepali, Maithili and a few more languages) based sites like Konkani Wikipedia in Kannada script.

Konkani Wikipedia finally went live in this June after being in Incubator for nine years. Konkani language is written using five different scripts; Devanagari (official script for Konkani in Goa), Kannada, Latin, Malayalam and Persian. The current Konkani Wikipedia is available at https://gom.wikipedia.org where “gom” is for the Goan variation of Konkani.

There is a significant Konkani population in coastal Karnataka and to a small extent in northern Kerala that use Kannada script for writing Konkani. Many of these people might be facing issues with reading the Konkani articles in Devanagari script in the Goan Konkani Wikipedia which brings the need for making the Wikipedia available in Kannada and other scripts that Konkani uses.

There are various ways to go about it. Some of the Wikimedia projects like the Serbian and Chinese Wikipedia already had this issue and had multi-script transliteration as a solution. Transliteration between Devanagari and Kannada scripts could be transliterated in multiple ways and below is one of them.

Noted typographer K. P. Rao who is known for creating fonts for almost all the Indian scripts has recently come up with a solution for Devanagari⟷Kannada transliteration by creating a new font “Devama” that has Devanagari Unicode encodings with Kannada glyphs. The font has the rendering logic as per Kannada rules which means if we set this fonts for any text typed using Devanagari script, it will display it in Kannada script. This will help anyone who can read Kannada script to read something written in Devanagari. Mr. Rao has generously released “Devama” under Open Font License (OFL) ver. 1.1. The source file for the font is currently available at https://github.com/pavanaja/DevamaNew for anyone to use and modify with attribution.

How to use the font:

Download and install the font as a .zip file.
Unzip the file and find the “Devama.otf” file. Install it. (the installation will vary based on your operating system, check a how-to guide to learn).
Now inorder to make the font working you need to change the browser settings. (check here for Firefox and Chrome browser settings). You need to set “Devama” as the display font for Devanagari script.
In Mozilla Firefox:

Select “Options” from Tools menu. It will open a new tab. Select the “Content” tab. Click on the button “Advanced...”. Select Devanagari from the drop-down list from “Fonts for” and set “Devama” as the font for all options. Click on “Ok” and close the dialog box. Now reload the Konkani Wikipedia to check if it is working or not.

Not just Konkani Wikipedia, any other site in Devanagari script (used for Hindi, Marathi, Nepali, Maithili, Bihari and a few other Indian languages) could also be read in Kannada. This might be useful for those who could read in Kannada and have problems reading in Devanagari.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/blog-old/reading-devanagri-konkani-wikipedia-in-kannada-script

Regulatory Perspectives on Net Neutrality

pranesh — 2015-07-18T02:46:30Z

In this paper Pranesh Prakash gives an overview on why India needs to put in place net neutrality regulations, and the form that those regulations must take to avoid being over-regulation.

With assistance by Vidushi Marda (Programme Officer, Centre for Internet and Society) and Tarun Krishnakumar (Research Volunteer, Centre for Internet and Society). I would like to specially thank Vishal Misra, Steve Song, Rudolf van der Berg, Helani Galpaya, A.B. Beliappa, Amba Kak, and Sunil Abraham for extended discussions, helpful suggestions and criticisms. However, this paper is not representative of their views, which are varied.

Today, we no longer live in a world of "roti, kapda, makaan", but in the world of "roti, kapda, makaan aur broadband". ^{^[1]} This is recognized by the National Telecom Policy IV.1.2, which states the need to "recognise telecom, including broadband connectivity as a basic necessity like education and health and work towards 'Right to Broadband'."^{^[2]} According to the IAMAI, as of October 2014, India had 278 million internet users. ^{^[3]} Of these, the majority access Internet through their mobile phones, and the WEF estimates only 3 in 100 have broadband on their mobiles.^{^[4]} Thus, the bulk of our population is without broadband. Telecom regulation and net neutrality has a very important role in enabling this vision of Internet as a basic human need that we should aim to fulfil.

1. Why should we regulate the telecom sector?

All ICT regulation should be aimed at achieving five goals: achieving universal, affordable access; ^{^[5]} ensuring and sustaining effective competition in an efficient market and avoiding market failures; protecting against consumer harms; ensuring maximum utility of the network by ensuring interconnection; and addressing state needs (taxation, security, etc.). Generally, all these goals go hand in hand, however some tensions may arise. For instance, universal access may not be provided by the market because the costs of doing so in certain rural or remote areas may outweigh the immediate monetary benefits private corporations could receive in terms of profits from those customers. In such cases, to further the goal of universal access, schemes such as universal service obligation funds are put in place, while ensuring that such schemes either do not impact competition or very minimally impact it.

It is clear that to maximise societal benefit, effective regulation of the ICT sector is a requirement, which otherwise, due to the ability of dominant players to abuse network effect to their advantage, is inherently prone towards monopolies. For instance, in the absence of regulation, a dominant player would charge far less for intra-network calls than inter-network calls, making customers shift to the dominant network. This kind of harm to competition should be regulated by the ICT regulator. However, it is equally true that over-regulation is as undesirable as under-regulation, since over-regulation harms innovation - whether in the form of innovative technologies or innovative business models. The huge spurt of growth globally of the telecom sector since the 1980s has resulted not merely from advancements in technology, but in large part from the de-monopolisation and deregulation of the telecom sector.^{^[6]} Similarly, the Internet has largely flourished under very limited technology-specific regulation. For instance, while interconnection between different telecom networks is heavily regulated in the domestic telecom sector, interconnection between the different autonomous systems (ASes) that make up the Internet is completely unregulated, thereby allowing for non-transparent pricing and opaque transactions. Given this context, we must ensure we do not over-regulate, lest we kill innovation.

2. Why should we regulate Net Neutrality? And whom should we regulate?

We wouldn't need to regulate Net Neutrality if ISPs were not "gatekeepers" for last-mile access. "Gatekeeping" occurs when a single company establishes itself as an exclusive route to reach a large number of people and businesses or, in network terms, nodes. It is not possible for Internet services to reach the customers of the telecom network without passing through the telecom network. The situation is very different in the middle-mile and for backhaul. Even though anti-competitive terms may exist in the middle-mile, especially given the opacity of terms in "transit agreements", a packet is usually able to travel through multiple routes if one route is too expensive (even if that is not the shortest network path, and is thus inefficient in a way). However, this multiplicity of routes is not possible in the last mile.

This leaves last mile telecom operators (ISPs) in a position to unfairly discriminate between different Internet services or destinations or applications, while harming consumer choice. This is why we believe that promoting the five goals mentioned above would require regulation of last-mile telecom operators to prevent unjust discrimination against end-users and content providers.

Thus, net neutrality is the principle that we should regulate gatekeepers to ensure they do not use their power to unjustly discriminate between similarly situated persons, content or traffic.

3. How should we regulate Net Neutrality?

3.1. What concerns does Net Neutrality raise? What harms does it entail?

Discriminatory practices at the level of access to the Internet raises the following set of concerns:

1. Freedom of speech and expression, freedom of association, freedom of assembly, and privacy.

2. Harm to effective competition

a. This includes competition amongst ISPs as well as competition amongst content providers.

b. Under-regulation here may cause harm to innovation at the content provider level, including through erecting barriers to entry.

c. Over-regulation here may cause harm to innovation in terms of ISP business models.

3. Harm to consumers

a. Under-regulation here may harm consumer choice and the right to freedom of speech, expression, and communication.

b. Over-regulation on this ground may cause harm to innovation at the level of networking technologies and be detrimental to consumers in the long run.

4. Harm to "openness" and interconnectedness of the Internet, including diversity (of access, of content, etc.)

a. Exceptions for specialized services should be limited to preserve the open and interconnectedness of the Internet and of the World Wide Web.

It might help to think about Net Neutrality as primarily being about two overlapping sets of regulatory issues: preferential treatment of particular Internet-based services (in essence: content- or source-/destination-based discrimination, i.e., discrimination on basis of 'whose traffic it is'), or discriminatory treatment of applications or protocols (which would include examples like throttling of BitTorrent traffic, high overage fees upon breaching Internet data caps on mobile phones, etc., i.e., discrimination on the basis of 'what kind of traffic it is').

Situations where the negative or positive discrimination happens on the basis of particular content or address should be regulated through the use of competition principles, while negative or positive discrimination at the level of specific class of content, protocols, associated ports, and other such sender-/receiver-agnostic features, should be regulated through regulation of network management techniques . The former deals with instances where the question of "in whose favour is there discrimination" may be asked, while the latter deals with the question "in favour of what is there discrimination".

In order to do this, a regulator like TRAI can use both hard regulation - price ceilings, data cap floors, transparency mandates, preventing specific anti-competitive practices, etc. - as well as soft regulation - incentives and disincentives.

3.1.1 Net Neutrality and human rights

Any discussion on the need for net neutrality impugns the human rights of a number of different stakeholders. Users, subscribers, telecom operators and ISPs all possess distinct and overlapping rights that are to be weighed against each other before the scope, nature and form of regulatory intervention are finalised. The freedom of speech, right to privacy and right to carry on trade raise some of the most pertinent questions in this regard.

For example, to properly consider issues surrounding the practice of paid content-specific zero-rating from a human rights point of view, one must seek to balance the rights of content providers to widely disseminate their 'speech' to the largest audiences against the rights of consumers to have access to a diverse variety of different, conflicting and contrasting ideas.

This commitment to a veritable marketplace or free-market of ideas has formed the touchstone of freedom of speech law in jurisdictions across the world as well as finding mention in pronouncements of the Indian Supreme Court. Particular reference is to be made to the dissent of Mathew, J. inBennett Coleman v. Union of India^{^[7]} and of the majority Sakal Papers v. Union of India^{^[8]} which rejected the approach.

Further, the practice of deep-packet inspection, which is sometimes used in the process of network management, raises privacy concerns as it seeks to go beyond what is "public" information in the header of an IP packet, necessary for routing, to analysing non-public information. ^{^[9]}

3.2 What conditions and factors may change these concerns and the regulatory model we should adopt?

While the principles relating to Net Neutrality remain the same in all countries (i.e., trying to prevent gatekeepers from unjustly exploiting their position), the severity of the problem varies depending on competition in the market, on the technologies, and on many other factors. One way to measure fair or stable allocation of the surplus created by a network - or a network-of-networks like the Internet - is by treating it as a convex cooperation game and thereupon calculating that game's Shapley value:^{^[10]} in the case of the Internet, this would be a game involving content ISPs, transit ISPs, and eyeball (i.e., last-mile) ISPs. The Shapley value changes depending on the number of competitors there are in the market: thus, the fair/stable allocation when there's vibrant competition in the market is different from the fair/stable allocation in a market without such competition. That goes to show that a desirable approach when an ISP tries to unjustly enrich itself by charging other network-participants may well be to increase competition, rather than directly regulating the last-mile ISP. Further, it shows that in a market with vibrant last-mile competition, the capacity of the last-mile ISP to unjustly are far diminished.

In countries which are remote and have little international bandwidth, the need to conserve that bandwidth is high. ISPs can regulate that by either increasing prices of Internet connections for all, or by imposing usage restrictions (such as throttling) on either heavy users or bandwidth-hogging protocols. If the amount of international bandwidth is higher, the need and desire on part of ISPs to indulge in such usage restrictions decreases. Thus, the need to regulate is far higher in the latter case, than in the former case.

The above paragraphs show that both the need for regulation and also the form that the regulation should take depend on a variety of conditions that aren't immediately apparent.

Thus, the framework that the regulator sets out to tackle issues relating to Net Neutrality are most important, whereas the specific rules may need to change depending on changes in conditions. These conditions include:

● last-mile market

○ switching costs between equivalent service providers

○ availability of an open-access last-mile

○ availability of a "public option" neutral ISP

○ increase or decrease in the competition, both in wired and mobile ISPs.

● interconnection market

○ availability of well-functioning peering exchanges

○ availability of low-cost transit

● technology and available bandwidth

○ spectrum efficiency

○ total amount of international bandwidth and local network bandwidth

● conflicting interests of ISPs

○ do the ISPs have other business interests other than providing Internet connectivity? (telephony, entertainment, etc.)

3.3 How should we deal with anti-competitive practices?

Anti-competitive practices in the telecom sector can take many forms: Abuse of dominance, exclusion of access to specific services, customer lock-in, predatory pricing, tying of services, cross-subsidization, etc., are a few of them. In some cases the anti-competitive practice targets other telecom providers, while in others it targets content providers. In the both cases, it is important to ensure that ensure that telecom subscribers have a competitive choice between effectively substitutable telecom providers and an ability to seamlessly switch between providers.

3.3.1 Lowering Switching Costs

TRAI has tackled many of these issues head on, especially in the mobile telephony space, while competitive market pressures have helped too:

● Contractual or transactional lock-in. The easiest way to prevent shifting from one network to another is by contractually mandating a lock-in period, or by requiring special equipment (interoperability) to connect to one's network. In India, this is not practised in the telecom sector, with the exception of competing technologies like CDMA and GSM. Non-contractual lock-ins, for instance by offering discounts for purchasing longer-term packages, are not inherently anti-competitive unless that results in predatory pricing or constitutes an abuse of market dominance. In India, switching from one mobile provider to another, though initiated 15 years into the telecom revolution, is in most cases now almost as easy as buying a new SIM card.^{^[11]} TRAI may consider proactive regulation against contractual lock-in.

● Number of competitors. Even if switching from one network to another is easy, it is not useful unless there are other equivalent options to switch to. In the telecom market, coverage is a very important factor in judging equivalence. Given that last mile connectivity is extremely expensive to provide, the coverage of different networks are very different, and this is even more true when one considers wired connectivity, which is difficult to lay in densely-populated urban and semi-urban areas and unprofitable in sparsely-populated areas. The best way to increase the number of competitors is to make it easier for competitors to exist. Some ways of doing this would be through enabling spectrum-sharing, lowering right-of-way rents, allowing post-auction spectrum trading, and promoting open-access last-mile fibre carriers and to thereby encourage competition on the basis of price and service and not exclusive access to infrastructure.

● Interconnection and mandatory carriage. The biggest advantage a dominant telecom player has is exclusive access to its customer base. Since in the telecom market, no telco wants to not connect to customers of another telco, they do not outright ban other networks. However, dominant players can charge high prices from other networks, thereby discriminating against smaller networks. In the early 2000s, Airtel-to-Airtel calls were much cheaper than Airtel-to-Spice calls. However, things have significantly changed since then. TRAI has, since the 2000s, heavily regulated interconnection and imposed price controls on interconnection ("termination") charges.^{^[12]} Thus, now, generally, inter-network calls are priced similarly to intra-network calls. And if you want cheaper Airtel-to-Airtel calls, you can buy a special (unbundled) pack that enables an Airtel customer to take advantage of the fact that her friends are also on the same network, and benefits Airtel since they do not in such cases have to pay termination charges. Recently, TRAI has even made the interconnection rates zero in three cases: landline-to-landline, landline-to-cellular, and cellular-to-landline, in a bid to decrease landline call rates, and incentivise them, allowing a very low per call interconnection charges of 14 paise for cellular-to-cellular connections. ^{^[13]}

○ With regard to Net Neutrality, we must have a rule that no termination charges or carriage charges may be levied by any ISP upon any Internet service. No Internet service may be discriminated against with regard to carriage conditions or speeds or any other quality of service metric. In essence all negative discrimination should be prohibited. This means that Airtel cannot forcibly charge WhatsApp or any other OTT (which essentially form a different "layer") money for the "privilege" of being able to reach Airtel customers, nor may Airtel slow down WhatsApp traffic and thus try to force WhatsApp to pay. There is a duty on telecom providers to carry any legitimate traffic ("common carriage"), not a privilege. It is important to note that consumer-facing TSPs get paid by other interconnecting Internet networks in the form of transit charges (or the TSP's costs are defrayed through peering). There shouldn't be any separate charge on the basis of content (different layer from the carriage) rather than network (same layer as the carriage). This principle is especially important for startups, and which are often at the receiving end of such discriminatory practices.

● Number Portability. One other factor that prevents users from shifting between one network and another is the fact that they have to change an important aspect of their identity: their phone number (this doesn't apply to Internet over DSL, cable, etc.). At least in the mobile space, TRAI has for several years tried to mandate seamless mobile number portability. The same is being tried by the European Commission in the EU. ^{^[14]} While intra-circle mobile number portability exists in India - and TRAI is pushing for inter-circle mobile number portability as well^{^[15]} - this is nowhere as seamless as it should be.

● Multi-SIM phones. The Indian market is filled with phones that can accommodate multiple SIM cards, enabling customers to shift seamlessly between multiple networks. This is true not just in India, but most developing countries with extremely price-sensitive customers. Theoretically, switching costs would approach zero if in a market with full coverage by n telecom players every subscriber had a phone with n SIM slots with low-cost SIM cards being available.

The situation in the telecom sector with respect to the above provides a stark contrast to the situation in the USA, and to the situation in the DTH market. In the USA, phones get sold at discounts with multi-month or multi-year contracts, and contractual lock-ins are a large problem. Keeping each of the above factors in mind, the Indian mobile telecom space is far more competitive than the US mobile telecom space.

Further, in the Indian DTH market, given that there is transactional lock-in (set-top boxes aren't interoperable in practice, though are mandated to be so by law^{^[16]}), there are fewer choices in the market; further, the equivalent of multi-SIM phones don't exist with respect to set-top boxes. Further, while there are must-carry rules with respect to carriage, they can be of three types: 1) must mandatorily provide access to particular channels^{^[17]} (positive obligation, usually for government channels); 2) prevented from not providing particular channels (negative obligation, to prevent anti-competitive behaviour and political censorship); and 3) must mandatorily offer access to at least a set number of channels (positive obligation for ensuring market diversity). ^{^[18]} Currently, only (1) is in force, since despite attempts by TRAI to ensure (3) as well.^{^[19]}

If the shifting costs are low and transparency in terms of network practice is reported in a standard manner and well-publicised, then that significantly weakens the "gatekeeper effect", which as we saw earlier, is the reason why we wish to introduce Net Neutrality regulation. This consequently means, as explained above in section 3.2, that despite the same Net Neutrality principles applying in all markets and countries, the precise form that the Net Neutrality regulations take in a telecom market with low switching costs would be different from the form that such regulations would take in a market with high switching costs.

3.3.2 Anti-competitive Practices

Some potential anti-competitive practices, which are closely linked, are cross-subsidization, tying (anti-competitive bundling) of multiple services, and vertical price squeeze. All three of these are especial concerns now, with the increased diversification of traditional telecom companies, and with the entry into telecom (like with DTH) of companies that create content. Hence, if Airtel cross-subsidizes the Hike chat application that it recently acquired, ^{^[20]} or if Reliance Infocomm requires customers to buy a subscription to an offering from Reliance Big Entertainment, or if Reliance Infocomm meters traffic from another Reliance Big Entertainment differently from that from Saavn, all those would be violative of the principle of non-discrimination by gatekeepers. This same analysis can be applied to all unpaid deals and non-commercial deals, including schemes such as Internet.org and Wikipedia Zero, which will be covered later in the section on zero-rating.

While we have general rules such as sections 3 and 4 of the Competition Act, we do not currently have specific rules prohibiting these or other anti-competitive practices, and we need Net Neutrality regulation that clearly prohibit such anti-competitive practices so that the telecom regulator can take action for non-compliance . We cannot leave these specific policy prescriptions unstated, even if they are provided for in section 3 of the Competition Act. These concerns are especial concerns in the telecom sector, and the telecom regulator or arbitrator should have the power to directly deal with these, instead of each case going to the Competition Commission of India. This should not affect the jurisdiction of the CCI to investigate and adjudicate such matters, but should ensure that TRAI both has suo motu powers, and that the mechanism to complain is made simple (unlike the current scenario, where some individual complainants may fall in the cracks between TRAI and TDSAT).

3.3.3 Zero-rating

Since a large part of the net neutrality debate in India involves zero-rating practices, we deal with that in some length. Zero-rating is the practice of not counting (aka "zero-rating") certain traffic towards a subscriber's regular Internet usage. The zero-rated traffic could be zero-priced or fixed-price; capped or uncapped; subscriber-paid, Internet service-paid, paid for by both, or unpaid; content- or source/destination-based, or agnostic to content or source/destination; automatically provided by the ISP or chosen by the customer . The motivations for zero-rating may also be varied, as we shall see below. Further, depending on the circumstances, zero-rating could be competitive or anti-competitive. All forms of zero-rating result in some form of discrimination, but not all zero-rating is harmful, nor does all zero-rating need to be prohibited.

While, as explained in the section on interconnection and carriage above, negative discrimination at the network level should be prohibited, that leaves open the question of positive discrimination. It follows from section 3.1 that the right frame of analysis of this question is harm to competition, since the main harm zero-rating is, as we shall see below, about discriminating between different content providers, and not discrimination at the level of protocols, etc.

Whether one should allow for any form of positive discrimination at the network level or not depends on whether positive discrimination of (X) has an automatic and unfair negative impact on all (~X). That, in turn, depends on whether (~X) is being subject to unfair competition. As Wikipedia notes, "unfair competition means that the gains of some participants are conditional on the losses of others, when the gains are made in ways which are illegitimate or unjust." Thus, positive discrimination that has a negative impact on effective competition shall not be permitted, since in such cases it is equivalent to negative discrimination ("zero-sum game") . Positive discrimination that does not have a negative impact on effective competition may be permitted, especially since it results in increased access and increases consumer benefit, as long as the harm to openness and diversity is minimized .

While considering this, one should keep in mind the fact that startups were, 10-15 years ago, at a huge disadvantage with regard to wholesale data purchase. The marketplaces for data centres and for content delivery networks (which speed up delivery of content by being located closer, in network terms, to multiple last-mile ISPs) were nowhere near as mature as they are today, and the prices were high. There was a much higher barrier to startup entry than there is today, due to the prices and due to larger companies being able to rely on economies of scale to get cheaper rates. Was that unfair? No. There is no evidence of anti-competitive practices, nor of startups complaining about such practices. Therefore, that was fair competition, despite specific input costs that were arguably needed (though not essential) for startups to compete being priced far beyond their capacity to pay.

Today the marketplace is very different, with a variety of offerings. CDNs such as Cloudflare, which were once the preserve of rich companies, even have free offerings, thus substantially lowering barriers for startups that want faster access to customers across the globe.

Is a CDN an essential cost for a startup? No. But in an environment where speed matters and customers use or don't use a service depending on speed; and where the startup's larger competitors are all using CDNs, a startup more or less has to. Thankfully, given the cheap access to CDNs these days, that cost is not too high for a startup to bear. If the CDN market was not competitive enough, would a hypothetical global regulator have been justified in outright banning the use of CDNs to 'level' the playing field? No, because the hypothetical global regulator instead had the option to (and would have been justified in) regulating the market to ensure greater competition.

A regulator should not prohibit an act that does not negatively impact access, competition, consumer benefit, nor openness (including diversity), since that would be over-regulation and would harm innovation.

3.3.3.1 Motivations for Zero-Rating

3.3.3.1.1 Corporate Social Responsibility / Incentivizing Customers to Move Up Value Chain

There exist multiple instances where there is no commercial transaction between the OTT involved and the telecom carrier, in which zero-priced zero-rating of specific Internet content happens. We know that there is no commercial transaction either through written policy (Wikipedia Zero) or through public statements (Internet.org, a bouquet of sites). In such cases, the telecom provider would either be providing such services out of a sense of public interest, given the social value of those services, or would be providing such services out of self-interest, to showcase the value of particular Internet set the same time.

The apprehended risk is that of such a scheme creating a "walled garden", where users would be exposed only to those services which are free since the search and discovery costs of non-free Internet (i.e., any site outside the "walled garden") would be rather high. This risk, while real, is rather slim given the fact that the economic incentives for those customers who have the ability to pay for "Internet packs" but currently do not find a compelling reason to do so, or out of both a sense of public interest and self-interest of the telecom providers works against this.

In such non-commercial zero-priced zero-rating, a telecom provider would only make money if and only if subscribers start paying for sites outside of the walled garden. If subscribers are happy in the walled garden, the telecom provider starts losing money, and hence has a strong motivation to stop that scheme. If on the other hand, enough subscribers start becoming paying customers to offset the cost of providing the zero-priced zero-rated service(s) and make it profitable, that shows that despite the availability of zero-priced options a number of customers will opt for paid access to the open Internet and the open Web, and the overall harms of such zero-priced zero-rating would be minimal. Hence, the telecom providers have an incentive to keep the costs of Internet data packs low, thus encouraging customers who otherwise wouldn't pay for the Internet to become paying customers.

There is the potential of consumer harm when users seek to access a site outside of the walled garden, and find to their dismay that they have been charged for the Internet at a hefty rate, and their prepaid balance has greatly decreased. This is an issue that TRAI is currently appraised of, and a suitable solution would need to be found to protect consumers against such harm.

All in all, given that the commercial interests of the telecom providers align with the healthy practice of non-discrimination, this form of limited positive discrimination is not harmful in the long run, particularly because it is not indefinitely sustainable for a large number of sites. Hence, it may not be useful to ban this form of zero-priced zero-rating of services as long as they aren't exclusive, or otherwise anti-competitive (a vertical price-squeeze, for instance), and the harm to consumers is prohibited and the harm to openness/diversity is minimized.

3.3.3.1.2 Passing on ISP Savings / Incentivizing Customers to Lower ISP's Cost

Suppose, for instance, an OTT uses a CDN located, in network distance terms, near an eyeball ISP. In this case, the ISP has to probably pay less than it would have to had the same data been located in a data centre located further away, given that it would have fewer interconnection-related charges.

Hence the monetary costs of providing access to different Web destinations are not equal for the ISP. This cost can be varied either by the OTT (by it locating the data closer to the ISP - through a CDN, by co-locating where the ISP is also present, or by connecting to an Internet Exchange Point which the ISP is also connected to - or by it directly "peering" with the ISP) or by the ISP (by engaging in "transparent proxying" in which case the ISP creates caches at the ISP level of specific content (usually by caching non-encrypted data the ISP's customers request) and serves the cached content when a user requests a site, rather than serving the actual site). None of the practices so far mentioned are discriminatory from the customer's perspective with regard either to price or to prioritization, though all of them enable faster speeds to specific content. Hence none of the above-mentioned practices are considered even by the most ardent Net Neutrality advocates to be violations of that principle. ^{^[21]} However, if an ISP zero-rates the content to either pass on its savings to the customer^{^[22]} or to incentivize the customer to access services that cost the ISP less in terms of interconnection costs, that creates a form of price discrimination for the customer, despite it benefiting the consumer.

The essential economic problem is that the cost to the ISP is variable, but the cost to the customer is fixed. Importantly, this problem is exacerbated in India where web hosting prices are high, transit prices are high, peering levels are low, and Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) are not functioning well. ^{^[23]} These conditions create network inefficiencies in terms of hosting of content further away from Indian networks in terms of network distance, and thus harms consumers as well as local ISPs. In order to set this right, zero-rating of this sort may be permitted as it acts as an incentive towards fixing the market fundamentals. However, once the market fundamentals are fixed, such zero-rating may be prohibited.

This example shows that the desirability or otherwise of discriminatory practices depends fully on the conditions present in the market, including in terms of interconnection costs.

3.3.3.1.3 Unbundling Internet into Services ("Special Packs")

Since at least early 2014, mobile operators have been marketing special zero-rating "packs". These packs, if purchased by the customer, allow capped or in some instances uncapped, zero-rating of a service such as WhatsApp or Facebook, meaning traffic to/from that service will not be counted against their regular Internet usage.

For a rational customer, purchasing such a pack only makes sense in one of two circumstances:

● The person has Internet connectivity on her Internet-capable phone, but has not purchased an "Internet data pack" since she doesn't find the Internet valuable. Instead, she has heard about "WhatsApp", has friends who are on it, and wishes to use that to reduce her SMS costs (and thereby eat into the carriage provider's ability to charge separately for SMSes). She chooses to buy a WhatsApp pack for around ₹25 a month instead of paying ₹95 for an all-inclusive Internet data pack.

● The person has Internet connectivity on her Internet-capable phone, and has purchased an "Internet data pack". However, that data pack is capped and she has to decide between using WhatsApp and surfing web sites. She is on multiple WhatsApp groups and her WhatsApp traffic eats up 65% of her data cap. She thus has to choose between the two, since she doesn't want to buy two Internet data packs (each costing around ₹95 for a month). She chooses to buy a WhatsApp pack for ₹25 a month, paying a cumulative total of ₹120 instead of ₹190 which she would have had to had she bought two Internet data packs. In this situation, "unbundling" is happening, and this benefits the consumer. Such unbundling harms the openness and integrity of the Internet.

If users did not find value in the "special" data packs, and there is no market demand for such products, they will cease to be offered. Thus, assuming a telco's decision to offer such packs is purely customer-demand driven - and not due to deals it has struck with service providers - if Orkut is popular, telcos would be interested in offering Orkut packs and if Facebook is popular, they would be interested in offering a Facebook pack. Thus, clearly, there is nothing anti-competitive about such customer-paid zero-rating packs, whereas they clearly enhance consumer benefit. Would this increase the popularity of Orkut or Facebook? Potentially yes. But to prohibit this would be like prohibiting a supermarket from selectively (and non-collusively) offering discounts on popular products. Would that make already popular products even more popular? Potentially, yes. But that would not be seen as a harm to competition but would be seen as fair competition. This contravenes the "openness" of the Internet (i.e., the integral interconnected diversity that an open network like the Internet embodies) as an independent regulatory goal. The Internet, being a single gateway to a mind-boggling variety of services, allows for a diverse "long tail", which would lose out if the Internet was seen solely as a gateway to popular apps, sites, and content. However, given that this is a choice exercised freely by the consumer, such packs should not be prohibited, as that would be a case of over-regulation.

The one exception to the above analysis of competition, needless to say, is if that these special packs aren't purely customer-demand driven and are the product of special deals between an OTT and the telco. In that case, we need to ensure it isn't anti-competitive by following the prescriptions of the next section.

3.3.3.1.4 Earning Additional Revenues from Content Providers

With offerings like Airtel Zero, we have a situation where OTT companies are offering to pay for wholesale data access used by their customers, and make accessing their specific site or app free for the customer. From the customer's perspective, this is similar to a toll-free number or a pre-paid envelope or free-to-air TV channel being offered on a particular network.

However, from the network perspective, these are very different. Even if a customer-company pays Airtel for the toll-free number, that number is accessible and toll-free across all networks since the call terminates on Airtel networks and Airtel pays the connecting network back the termination charge from the fee they are paid by the customer-company. This cannot happen in case of the Internet, since the "call" terminates outside of the reach of the ISP being paid for zero-rating by the OTT company; hence unless specific measures are taken, zero-rating has to be network-specific.

The comparison to free-to-air channels is also instructive, since in 2010 TRAI made recommendations that consumers should have the choice of accessing free-to-air channels à-la-carte, without being tied up to a bouquet.^{^[24]} This would, in essence, allow a subscriber to purchase a set-top box, and without paying a regular subscription fee watch free-to-air channels. ^{^[25]} However, similar to toll-free numbers, these free-to-air channels are free-to-air on all MSO's set-top boxes, unlike the proposed Airtel Zero scheme under which access to a site like Flipkart would be free for customers on Airtel's network alone.

Hence, these comparisons, while useful in helping think through the regulatory and competition issues, should not be used as instructive exact analogies, since they aren't fully comparable situations.

3.3.3.1.5 Market Options for OTT-Paid Zero-Rating

As noted above, a competitive marketplace already exists for wholesale data purchase at the level of "content ISPs" (including CDNs), which sell wholesale data to content providers (OTTs). This market is at present completely unregulated. The deals that exist are treated as commercial secrets. It is almost certain that large OTTs get better rates than small startups due to economies of scale.

However, at the eyeball ISP level, it is a single-sided market with ISPs competing to gain customers in the form of end-users. With a scheme like "Airtel Zero", this would get converted into a double-sided market, with a gatekeeper without whom neither side can reach the other being in the middle creating a two-sided toll. This situation is ripe for market abuse: this situation allows the gatekeeper to hinder access to those OTTs that don't pay the requisite toll or to provide preferential access to those who pay, apart from providing an ISP the opportunity to "double-dip".

One way to fix this is to prevent ISPs from establishing a double-sided market. The other way would be to create a highly-regulated market where the gatekeeping powers of the ISP are diminished, and the ISP's ability to leverage its exclusive access over its customers are curtailed. A comparison may be drawn here to the rules that are often set by standard-setting bodies where patents are involved: given that these patents are essential inputs, access to them must be allowed through fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory licences. Access to the Internet and common carriers like telecom networks, being even more important (since alternatives exist to particular standards, but not to the Internet itself), must be placed at an even higher pedestal and thus even stricter regulation to ensure fair competition.

A marketplace of this sort would impose some regulatory burdens on TRAI and place burdens on innovations by the ISPs, but a regulated marketplace harms ISP innovation less than not allowing a market at all.

At a minimum, such a marketplace must ensure non-exclusivity, non-discrimination, and transparency. Thus, at a minimum, a telecom provider cannot discriminate between any OTTs who want similar access to zero-rating. Further, a telecom provider cannot prevent any OTT from zero-rating with any other telecom provider. To ensure that telecom providers are actually following this stipulation, transparency is needed, as a minimum.

Transparency can take one of two forms: transparency to the regulator alone and transparency to the public. Transparency to the regulator alone would enable OTTs and ISPs to keep the terms of their commercial transactions secret from their competitors, but enable the regulator, upon request, to ensure that this doesn't lead to anti-competitive practices. This model would increase the burden on the regulator, but would be more palatable to OTTs and ISPs, and more comparable to the wholesale data market where the terms of such agreements are strictly-guarded commercial secrets. On the other hand, requiring transparency to the public would reduce the burden on the regulator, despite coming at a cost of secrecy of commercial terms, and is far more preferable.

Beyond transparency, a regulation could take the form of insisting on standard rates and terms for all OTT players, with differential usage tiers if need be, to ensure that access is truly non-discriminatory. This is how the market is structured on the retail side.

Since there are transaction costs in individually approaching each telecom provider for such zero-rating, the market would greatly benefit from a single marketplace where OTTs can come and enter into agreements with multiple telecom providers.

Even in this model, telecom networks will be charging based not only on the fact of the number of customers they have, but on the basis of them having exclusive routing to those customers. Further, even under the standard-rates based single-market model, a particular zero-rated site may be accessible for free from one network, but not across all networks: unlike the situation with a toll-free number in which no such distinction exists.

To resolve this, the regulator may propose that if an OTT wishes to engage in paid zero-rating, it will need to do so across all networks, since if it doesn't there is risk of providing an unfair advantage to one network over another and increasing the gatekeeper effect rather than decreasing it.

However, all forms of competitive Internet service-paid zero-priced zero-rating, even when they don't harm competition, innovation amongst content providers, or consumers, will necessarily harm openness and diversity of the Internet. For instance, while richer companies with a strong presence in India may pay to zero-rate traffic for their Indian customers, decentralized technologies such as XMPP and WebRTC, having no central company behind them, would not, leading to customers preferring proprietary networks and solutions to such open technologies, which in turn, thanks to the network effect, leads to a vicious cycle. These harms to openness and diversity have to be weighed against the benefit in terms of increase in access when deciding whether to allow for competitive OTT-paid zero-priced zero-rating, as such competition doesn't exist in a truly level playing field . Further, it must be kept in mind that there are forms of zero-priced zero-rating that decrease the harm to openness / diversity, or completely remove that harm altogether: that there are other options available must be acknowledged by the regulator when considering the benefit to access from competitive OTT-paid zero-priced zero-rating.

3.3.3.1.6 Other options for zero-rating

There are other models of zero-priced zero-rating that either minimize the harm is that of ensuring free Internet access for every person. This can take the form of:^{^[26]}

● A mandatorily "leaky" 'walled garden':

○ The first-degree of all hyperlinks from the zero-rated OTT service are also free.

○ The zero-rated OTT service provider has to mandatorily provide free access to the whole of the World Wide Web to all its customers during specified hours.

○ The zero-rated OTT service provider has to mandatorily provide free access to the whole of the World Wide Web to all its customers based on amount on usage of the OTT service.^{^[27]}

● Zero-rating of all Web traffic

○ In exchange for viewing of advertisements

○ In exchange for using a particular Web browser

○ At low speeds on 3G, or on 2G.

3.3.3.2. What kinds of zero-rating are good

The majority of the forms of zero-rating covered in this section are content or source/destination-based zero-rating. Only some of the options covered in the "other options for zero-rating" section cover content-agnostic zero-rating models. Content-agnostic zero-rating models are not harmful, while content-based zero-rating models always harm, though to varying degrees, the openness of the Internet / diversity of OTTs, and to varying degrees increase access to Internet-based services. Accordingly, here is an hierarchy of desirability of zero-priced zero-rating, from most desirable to most harmful:

1. Content- & source/destination-agnostic zero-priced zero-rating.^{^[28]}

2. Content- & source/destination-based non-zero-priced zero-rating, without any commercial deals, chosen freely & paid for by users. ^{^[29]}

3. Content- & source/destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, without any commercial deals, with full transparency. ^{^[30]}

4. Content- & source/destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, on the basis of commercial deal with partial zero-priced access to all content, with non-discriminatory access to the same deal by all with full transparency.^{^[31]}

5. Content- & source/destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, on the basis of a non-commercial deal, without any benefits monetary or otherwise, flowing directly or indirectly from the provider of the zero-rated content to the ISP, with full transparency. ^{^[32]}

6. Content- & source-destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, across all telecom networks, with standard pricing, non-discriminatory access, and full transparency.

7. Content- & source-destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, with standard pricing, non-discriminatory access, and full transparency.

8. Content- & source-destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, with non-discriminatory access, and full transparency.

9. Content- & source-destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, with non-discriminatory access, and transparency to the regulator.

10. Content- & source-destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, without any regulatory framework in place.

3.3.4 Cartels and Oligopoly

While cartels and oligopolies may have an impact on Net Neutrality, they are not problems that any set of anti-discrimination rules imposed on gatekeepers can fix. Further, cartels and oligopolies don't directly enhance the ability of gatekeepers to unjustly discriminate if there are firm rules against negative discrimination and price ceilings and floors on data caps are present for data plans. Given this, TRAI should recommend that this issue be investigated and the Competition Commission of India should take this issue up.

3.4 Reasonable Network Management Principles

Reasonable network management has to be allowed to enable the ISPs to manage performance and costs on their network. However, ISPs may not indulge in acts that are harmful to consumers in the name of reasonable network management. Below are a set of guidelines for when discrimination against classes of traffic in the name of network management are justified.

● Discrimination between classes of traffic for the sake of network management should only be permissible if:

○ there is an intelligible differentia between the classes which are to be treated differently, and

○ there is a rational nexus between the differential treatment and the aim of such differentiation, and

○ the aim sought to be furthered is legitimate, and is related to the security, stability, or efficient functioning of the network, or is a technical limitation outside the control of the ISP^{^[33]}, and

○ the network management practice is the least harmful manner in which to achieve the aim.

● Provision of specialized services (i.e., "fast lanes") is permitted if and only if it is shown that

○ The service is available to the user only upon request, and not without their active choice, and

○ The service cannot be reasonably provided with "best efforts" delivery guarantee that is available over the Internet, and hence requires discriminatory treatment, or

○ The discriminatory treatment does not unduly harm the provision of the rest of the Internet to other customers.

These principles are only applicable at the level of ISPs, and not on access gateways for institutions that may in some cases be run by ISPs (such as a university network, free municipal WiFi, at a work place, etc.), which are not to be regulated as common carriers.

These principles may be applied on a case-by-case basis by a regulator, either suo motu or upon complaint by customers.

^{^[1]} Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, (19 May 2011), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/A.HRC.17.27_en.pdf.

^{^[2]} Available at http://www.trai.gov.in/WriteReadData/userfiles/file/NTP%202012.pdf.

^{^[3]} IAMAI, India to Cross 300 million internet users by Dec 14, (19 November, 2014), http://www.iamai.in/PRelease_detail.aspx?nid=3498&NMonth=11&NYear=2014.

^{^[4]} World Economic Forum, The Global Information Technology Report 2015, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global_IT_Report_2015.pdf.

^{^[5]} http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/4.1#s4.1.1

^{^[6]} See R.U.S. Prasad, The Impact of Policy and Regulatory Decisions on Telecom Growth in India (July 2008), http://web.stanford.edu/group/siepr/cgi-bin/siepr/?q=system/files/shared/pubs/papers/pdf/SCID361.pdf.

^{^[7]} 1973 AIR 106

^{^[8]} 1962 AIR 305

^{^[9]} "When ISPs go beyond their traditional use of IP headers to route packets, privacy risks begin to emerge." Alissa Cooper, How deep must DPI be to incur privacy risk? http://www.alissacooper.com/2010/01/25/how-deep-must-dpi-be-to-incur-privacy-risk/

^{^[10]} Richard T.B. Ma & Vishal Misra, The Public Option: A Non-Regulatory Alternative to Network Neutrality, http://dna-pubs.cs.columbia.edu/citation/paperfile/200/netneutrality.pdf

^{^[11]} Mobile number portability was launched in India on January 20, 2011 in the Haryana circle. See http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/pm-launches-nationwide-mobile-number-portability/1/127176.html . Accessed on April 24, 2015.

^{^[12]} For a comprehensive list of all TRAI interconnection regulations & subsequent amendments, see http://www.trai.gov.in/Content/Regulation/0_1_REGULATIONS.aspx.

^{^[13]} See Telecommunication Interconnection Usage Charges (Eleventh Amendment) Regulations, 2015 (1 of 2015), available at http://www.trai.gov.in/Content/Regulation/0_1_REGULATIONS.aspx.

^{^[14]} Article 30 of the Universal Service Directive, Directive 2002/22/EC.

^{^[15]} See Telecommunication Mobile Number Portability (Sixth Amendment) Regulations, 2015 (3 of 2015), available at http://www.trai.gov.in/Content/Regulation/0_1_REGULATIONS.aspx.

^{^[16]} The Telecommunication (Broadcasting and Cable) Services (Seventh) (The Direct to Home Services) Tariff Order, 2015 (2 of 2015).

^{^[17]} Section 8, Cable Television Networks Act, 1995.

^{^[18]} TRAI writes new rules for Cable TV, Channels, Consumers, REAL TIME NEWS, (August 11, 2014), http://rtn.asia/rtn/233/1220_trai-writes-new-rules-cable-tv-channels-consumers.

^{^[19]} An initial requirement for all multi system operators to have a minimum capacity of 500 channels was revoked by the TDSAT in 2012. For more details, see http://www.televisionpost.com/cable/msos-not-required-to-have-500-channel-headends-tdsat/.

^{^[20]} Aparna Ghosh, Bharti SoftBank Invests $14 million in Hike, LIVE MINT, (April 2, 2014), http://www.livemint.com/Companies/nI38YwQL2eBgE6j93lRChM/Bharti-SoftBank-invests-14-million-in-mobile-messaging-app.html.

^{^[21]} Mike Masnick, Can We Kill This Ridiculous Shill-Spread Myth That CDNs Violate Net Neutrality? They Don't, https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140812/04314528184/can-we-kill-this-ridiculous-shill-spread-myth-that-cdns-violate-net-neutrality-they-dont.shtml.

^{^[22]} Mathew Carley, What is Hayai's stance on "Net Neutrality"?, https://www.hayai.in/faq/hayais-stance-net-neutrality?c=mgc20150419

^{^[23]} Helani Galpaya & Shazna Zuhyle, South Asian Broadband Service Quality: Diagnosing the Bottlenecks, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1979928

^{^[24]} DTH players told to offer pay channels on la carte basis, HINDU BUSINESS LINE (July 22, 2010), http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/todays-paper/dth-players-told-to-offer-pay-channels-on-la-carte-basis/article999298.ece.

^{^[25]} The Telecommunication (Broadcasting and Cable) Services (Fourth) (Addressable Systems) Tariff Order, 2010.

^{^[26]} These suggestions were provided by Helani Galpaya and Sunil Abraham, based in some cases on existing practices.

^{^[27]} This is what is being followed by the Jana Loyalty Program: http://www.betaboston.com/news/2015/05/06/with-a-new-loyalty-program-mobile-app-marketplace-jana-pushes-deeper-into-the-developing-world/

^{^[28]} Example: free Internet access at low speeds, with data caps.

^{^[29]} Example: special "packs" for specific services like WhatsApp.

^{^[30]} Example: zero-rating of all locally-peered settlement-free traffic.

^{^[31]} Example: "leaky" walled gardens, such as the Jana Loyalty Program that provide limited access to all of the Web alongside access to the zero-rated content.

^{^[32]} Example: Wikipedia Zero.

^{^[33]} A CGNAT would be an instance of such a technology that poses network limitations.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/regulatory-perspectives-on-net-neutrality

India’s digital check

sunil — 2015-09-15T14:55:47Z

All nine pillars of Digital India directly correlate with policy research conducted at the Centre for Internet and Society, where I have worked for the last seven years. This allows our research outputs to speak directly to the priorities of the government when it comes to digital transformation.

The article was originally published by DNA on July 8, 2015.

Broadband Highways and Universal Access to Mobile Connectivity: The first two pillars have been combined in this paragraph because they both require spectrum policy and governance fixes. Shyam Ponappa, a distinguished fellow at our Centre calls for the leveraging of shared spectrum and also shared backhaul infrastructure. Plurality in spectrum management, for eg, unlicensed spectrum should be promoted for accelerating backhaul or last mile connectivity, and also for community or local government broadband efforts. Other ideas that have been considered by Ponappa include getting state owned telcos to exit completely from the last mile and only focus on running an open access backhaul through Bharat Broadband Limited. Network neutrality regulations are also required to mitigate free speech, diversity and competition harms as ISPs and TSPs innovate with business models such as zero-rating.

Public Internet Access Programme: Continuing investments into Common Service Centres (CSCs) for almost a decade may be questionable and therefore a citizen’s audit should be undertaken to determine how the programme may be redesigned. The reinventing of post offices is very welcome, however public libraries are also in need urgent reinventing. CSCs, post offices and public libraries should all leverage long range WiFi for Internet and intranet, empowering BYOD [Bring Your Own Device] users. Applications will take time to develop and therefore immediate emphasis should be on locally caching Indic language content. State Public Library Acts need to be amended to allow for borrowing of digital content. Flat-fee licensing regimes must be explored to increase access to knowledge and culture. Commons-based peer production efforts like Wikipedia and Wikisource need to be encouraged.

e-Governance: Reforming Government through Technology: DeitY, under the leadership of free software advocate Secretary RS Sharma, has accelerated adoption and implementation of policies supporting non-proprietary approaches to intellectual property in e-governance. Policies exist and are being implemented for free and open source software, open standards and electronic accessibility for the disabled. The proprietary software lobby headed by Microsoft and industry associations like NASSCOM have tried to undermine these policies but have failed so far.

The government should continue to resist such pressures. Universal adoption of electronic signatures within government so that there is a proper audit trail for all communications and transactions should be made an immediate priority. Adherence to globally accepted data protection principles such as minimisation via “form simplification and field reduction” for Digital India should be applauded. But on the other hand the mandatory requirement of Aadhaar for DigiLocker and eSign amounts to contempt of the Supreme Court order in this regard.

e-Kranti — Electronic Delivery of Services: The 41 mission mode projects listed are within the top-down planning paradigm with a high risk of failure — the funds reserved for these projects should instead be converted into incentives for those public, private and public private partnerships that accelerate adoption of e-governance. The dependency on the National Informatics Centre (NIC) for implementation of e-governance needs to be reduced, SMEs need to be able to participate in the development of e-governance applications. The funds allocated for this area to DeitY have also produced a draft bill for Electronic Services Delivery. This bill was supposed to give RTI-like teeth to e-governance service by requiring each government department and ministry to publish service level agreements [SLAs] for each of their services and prescribing punitive action for responsible institutions and individuals when there was no compliance with the SLAs.

Information for All: The open data community and the Right to Information movement in India are not happy with the rate of implementation of National Data Sharing and Accessibility Policy (NDSAP). Many of the datasets on the Open Data Portal are of low value to citizens and cannot be leveraged commercially by enterprise. Publication of high-value datasets needs to be expedited by amending the proactive disclosure section of the Right to Information Act 2005.

Electronics Manufacturing: Mobile patent wars have begun in India with seven big ticket cases filed at the Delhi High Court. Our Centre has written an open letter to the previous minister for HRD and the current PM requesting them to establish a device level patent pool with a compulsory license of 5%. Thereby replicating India’s success at becoming the pharmacy of the developing world and becoming the lead provider of generic medicines through enabling patent policy established in the 1970s. In a forthcoming paper with Prof Jorge Contreras, my colleague Rohini Lakshané will map around fifty thousand patents associated with mobile technologies. We estimate around a billion USD being collected in royalties for the rights-holders whilst eliminating legal uncertainties for manufacturers of mobile technologies.

IT for Jobs: Centralised, top-down, government run human resource development programmes are not useful. Instead the government needs to focus on curriculum reform and restructuring of the education system. Mandatory introduction of free and open source software will give Indian students the opportunity to learn by reading world-class software. They will then grow up to become computer scientists rather than computer operators. All projects at academic institutions should be contributions to existing free software projects — these projects could be global or national, for eg, a local government’s e-governance application. The budget allocated for this pillar should instead be used to incentivise research by giving micro-grants and prizes to those students who make key software contributions or publish in peer-reviewed academic journals or participate in competitions. This would be a more systemic approach to dealing with the skills and knowledge deficit amongst Indian software professionals.

Early Harvest Programmes: Many of the ideas here are very important. For example, secure email for government officials — if this was developed and deployed in a decentralised manner it would prevent future surveillance of the Indian government by the NSA. But a few of the other low-hanging fruit identified here don’t really contribute to governance. For example, biometric attendance for bureaucrats is just glorified bean-counting — it does not really contribute to more accountability, transparency or better governance.

The author works for the Centre for Internet and Society which receives funds from Wikimedia Foundation that has zero-rating alliances with telecom operators in many countries across the world

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/dna-sunil-abraham-july-8-2015-india-digital-check