Centre for Internet and Society

THE PORN ULTIMATUM?

praskrishna — 2013-06-05T09:56:24Z

Ravi Sharma (name changed), a 22-year old auto driver, watches adult-rated movie clips on his smartphone whenever he is on a tea break. Like most of his friends in New Delhi, Sharma has a flash drive reserved for sleazy movies. Sharma’s access to pornography could soon become a crime, much like assault or drunken driving, if Kamlesh Vaswani has his way.

This article by Adith Charlie, Rajesh Kurup and Priyanka Pani was published in the Hindu Business Line on May 21, 2013. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

Vaswani, an Indore-based lawyer had filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in Supreme Court, requesting to make watching porn a non-bailable offence. He also wants a complete ban on pornography. He says he has his reasons too.

In a recent incident in the capital, a five-year-old girl was allegedly raped by two men and left to die. According to media reports, the accused had watched porn on their mobile phones minutes before the crime. There has been a 7.1 per cent increase in crime against women nationwide since 2010, as per data from the National Crime Records Bureau. Vaswani believes that the free availability of porn is making the country unsafe for women.

Nirmala Samant Prabhavalkar, member of National Commission for Women (NCW), says that viewing porn, especially at an impressionable age, becomes “an addiction and trains the mind in an inhumane and sadist way”.

According to Google Trends, India ranks fourth in the world for searching the word ‘porn’, a testimony that pornography, mainly electronic, is available across the country. New Delhi has the dubious distinction of the highest-worldwide percentage of searches for “porn” in 2012.

As smartphones become ubiquitous and cheaper (price starts around Rs 3,000) they offer a perfect medium for viewing adult content. A 2011 study by IMRB found that one in every five Indian mobile users wants adult content on 3G-enabled phones.

A different view

Vaswani is not the only crusader against pornography, but is a representative of the minority. The majority favours another strand of thinking: that what an adult views in his private space should not be controlled by the establishment.

They feel that increased censorship of the web would clamp down on the constitutionally enshrined principles of the freedom of speech and expression.

But what is termed as pornography, or what degree of obscenity should be blocked?

Interestingly, the term pornography when used in relation to an offence is not defined in any statutes in India. It is obscenity that has been effectively explained in the Indian Penal Code and the Information Technology Act.

The section 67 of the Information Technology Act states that publishing or transmission of obscene and sexually explicit material in electronic form is punishable. Child pornography, is prohibited under Section 67B of IT Act.

According to the Indian Penal Code (Section 292) a person in mere possession of the obscene stuff for his personal use without any intention of producing or disseminating the material is not culpable.

However, obscenity means different things for different people.

“In countries such as Saudi Arabia, even showing cleavage falls under pornographic purview. So, who decides what is morally acceptable in the Indian society?” asks Rajesh Chharia, President of the Internet Service Providers Association of India.

Technologically possible

A blanket ban on porn Web sites, as is the case in Denmark and Australia (for extreme content), risks banning innocent Web sites too. In 2008, whistle blower WikiLeaks had released the names of sites which were blocked by Denmark’s regulators. Many regular sites were erroneously included in the list. Porn, available in India, is mainly hosted on overseas servers, making it difficult to monitor them, while those on domestic platforms can be easily restricted, according to Vishak Raman, Senior Regional Director of Fortinet, a network security provider. Yet, the technology exists for making a full-fledged ban on porn possible.

In case the Supreme Court upholds the PIL, the onus of implementation will be on the telecom regulator, the Department of Telecommunications and, the Department of Information Technology.

Raman says that companies like his can provide a ‘semi-inline’ solution, for a multi-million dollar fee, to block porn. It is unlikely that DIT and DoT will bear the cost of the entire exercise.

Thus, the ISPs would have to make the investments for a porn-free internet, says an industry official.

Sexual Behaviour

But then could pornography be solely responsible for aggressive sexual behaviour? Contemporary literature does provide some insights. Watching pornography does contribute to an increased risk of violent behaviour but only in men who have aggressive sexual tendencies, as per research by Neil Malamuth, a professor of psychology at the University of California, Los Angeles. In other words, porn does not turn all ordinary men into rapists.

“There has been definitely a spurt in sex-related crimes in the country. However, we can’t say that a total ban on porn will free the society from such evil, but yes there should be a restriction on content on Internet,” NCW’s Prabhavalkar said.

On a TV talk show, porn star and actress Sunny Leone had said: “It's complete nonsense to blame rape on adult material out there. Education starts at home. It's the moms and dads sitting with their children and teaching them what is right and wrong.”

When eWorld approached Leone to understand her outlook on the PIL, husband Daniel Webber said that they do not have any views on the matter. “Whatever is decided by the Supreme Court in this country is decided,” he said.

The Establishment

Pranesh Prakash, a policy director at the Centre for Internet and Society, says that the government cannot cite the IT Act and block content on grounds of it being immoral following the 2009 amendments to the Act.

In 2010, the Bombay High Court, had rejected a PIL filed by Janhit Manch. The NGO wanted the court to direct the government to block pornographic Web sites on the grounds that they have “an adverse influence, leading youth on a delinquent path”. The court held that it would be unconstitutional to do so as it would be infringing on the citizens’ freedom of expression.

Further, the Court observed said that the petitioner should file a complaint under the IT Act, if he feels aggrieved.

Says Nithianandan Balagopalan, a Mumbai-based lawyer: “Any law that falls foul of fundamental rights of a citizen of India is open to be challenged in a court of law and can be struck down as being ‘ultra fires’ if indeed found to be so.

Yet, Vaswani believes he has a strong case. “The court (in the 2010 Janhit Manch PIL) might have passed orders safeguarding the freedom of free speech and expression. What we are discussing here is not speech, but conduct. This cultural pollution has to stop,” he was quoted in the media.

Some experts believe that proper enforcement of existing laws are more important that enacting new ones. “There should be stringent punishment for those involved in organised production and distribution of pornographic material. The police must not be lenient with such people,” says Ramesh Vaidyanathan, Managing Partner of Advaya Legal.

Around the world

India is not the only democracy in the world to consider a ban on pornography. The latest to join the ranks is Iceland, which too wants a ban as part of its attempts to completely do away with the country’s sex industry. In 2009, it introduced fines and jail terms for those who patronise prostitutes, and later in 2010 it banned strip clubs.

A ban on porn would mean restrictions on the use of the Internet. A free Internet stimulates innovation. The world's largest democracy and a model for much of the developing world, India is set to become one of the most important test cases for the future of Internet freedom globally. Any decision by the Supreme Court on this front would be path-breaking, ramifications of which would be felt for a long time to come.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/hindu-businessline-adith-charlie-rajesh-kurup-priyanka-pani-may-21-2013-the-porn-ultimatum

The policy langurs

Shyam Ponappa — 2012-05-10T10:15:17Z

The comforts of civilised living for all Indians require dedicated collective effort. The article by Shyam Ponappa was published in the Business Standard on 6 January 2011.

At this difficult point in our hapless trajectory as we thread our way through the divine comedy, there is a sudden burst of light, cutting through the gloom of the new year: an uncharacteristic but effective bipartisan effort by a group of parliamentarians in dealing with a practical problem. This is the saga of the hapless and troublesome monkeys of Raisina Hill and its environs, booted out by the Brits to build the Rashtrapati Bhavan and the Central Secretariat, and the parliamentarians who live on Mahadev Road nearby. Press reports say that BJP Spokesman Prakash Javadekar adopted a problem-solving approach by suggesting to six of his neighbours (five Congress MPs and one Independent) that they collectively hire a langur patrol to shoo away the monkeys that have been marauding in their gardens. Five of the six responded positively, and so they have a langur patrol, as do a number of government buildings there. And the monkeys stay away.

Why is this important? Because of how powerfully it illustrates the obvious: that collective, goal-oriented action can be very effective in achieving results. Now, if this could be extended to bipartisan initiatives (in the sense of government and the Opposition in the context of our fragmented politics), e.g. in building national assets like infrastructure, then constructive, forward-looking policies can be framed, and we can start building on what has gone before. This will take us past the blight of being in a perpetual stall. One example is resource-sharing for countrywide broadband and communications services. Another is our approach to energy production and supply. And so on.

The bipartisan imperative

I have written earlier on the rationale for spectrum- and network-sharing for broadband and telecommunications.

The framework for this kind of resource-sharing and organisation cannot be done without bipartisan efforts at the policy formulation stage for conceptualisation and during implementation, because various state and local governments will be involved, as will many central government ministries and departments. A bipartisan approach is also essential for devising supportive tax policies, including the development and execution of uniform, inexpensive rights-of-way charges at the state level. Not least will be the question of spectrum pricing, a matter muddied by so much contention and confused thinking regarding the economics and the technology, aggravated by opportunists seeking to make a killing, together with the well-intentioned but ill-informed flailing of strident advocates urging counterproductive measures like cancelling licences without due process and/or holding more auctions, all supposedly in the national interest, oblivious of the consequences.(Click for OPTIC FIBRE CABLE NETWORK)

To appreciate the compelling logic, consider the network of an organisation like RailTel, with over 35,000 route km of optical fibre cable (OFC) network, or Gailtel with about 14,000 route km of OFC and planning close to 19,000 OFC in the next few years (interactive maps at: http://www.gailonline.com/gailnewsite/businesses/telecomnetwork.html).

BSNL has over 67,000 route km in the southern region alone, and other PSUs and private operators like Bharti Airtel and Reliance have their own extensive networks. Combining or integrating these will shift the focus to the tasks of last-mile access and spectrum deployment to achieve potential connectivity for most households and users.

Imagine the potential with some (three or four?) consortiums of wholesale service providers for the country having access to the combined networks of all or several such owners, including the collective capacity in terms of spectrum, access, aggregation and backhaul. These, in turn, could enable access to many retailers for local services to end users.

A second substantive aspect of such a bipartisan initiative is in structuring the national backbone facilities organisation, e.g. on the lines of Singapore’s OpenNet*. This may be an opportunity to capitalise on the BSNL and MTNL networks and revive them, perhaps as the anchor investors (possibly with other PSUs, such as RailTel, GAIL, and Powergrid). This anchor investor consortium could hold, for instance, 30 per cent of the equity in the venture. Other participants could include international companies like Axia, which design, build and operate next generation networks. Axia started out in Canada over 10 years ago and now has projects in France, Spain and Singapore, and has bid for a project in America. Other participants could be like Spectrum Bridge, a US company which runs centrally managed spectrum networks in America in the TV “white spaces”, the digital dividend from TV spectrum reallocated for telecom purposes. Their database-driven approach could be applied to the entire pooled spectrum of a large network with the participation of systems integrators like Infosys, TCS, Wipro, or IBM.

A third potential initiative is to encourage R&D and applications, perhaps seeking the development of local standards for wireless communications in the long term, even the Holy Grail of inexpensive “cognitive radio” (self-managing end-user equipment) with open spectrum. The size of our market offers the potential for such ambitious and potentially beneficial development. This will need policy support, especially for collaboration between defence and the private sector, with the creation of sustained support over a long period.

We know the apocryphal tales like that of the four bulls and the lion: the bulls are safe as long as they stay united, but when they squabble among themselves, the lion picks them off one by one. There is Aesop’s fable of the old man who shows his sons that while they can easily break one stick at a time, the same sticks bound together cannot be broken. Or the Mongolian story of the five siblings, the ancestors of the Mongolian clans, whose mother shows them that while each can easily break a single arrow, the five arrows tied together are unbreakable.

Despite this knowledge and evidence that the comforts of civilised living for all Indians require dedicated collective effort, we refuse to work to this truism of the need for collaborative effort. Suddenly, Mr Javadekar’s can-do Langur Initiative changes the game.

Even as the due process of law continues with regard to past wrongdoing, our parliamentarians should be grappling with substantive issues of nation-building such as those described above, instead of wasting time on tearing each other down.

Read the original in the Business Standard here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/telecom/blog/policy-langurs

The Phantom Public: The Role of Social Media in Democracy

Admin — 2019-05-01T05:09:19Z

Amber Sinha delivered an open lecture at Ambedkar University, New Delhi on 3 April 2019.

India has over 500 million internet users — over a third of its total population — making it the country with the second largest number of Internet users after China. For the world’s largest democracy, the Internet should be a boon. After all, Sir Tim Berners-Lee, the inventor of the world wide web, had envisioned the Internet to as an “open platform that allows anyone to share information, access opportunities and collaborate across geographical boundaries.” The democratization of information it facilitated should have led to a more informed citizenry, but instead what we have is the complete opposite. The average digital citizen in India maintains a near perpetual information illiteracy about where they receive news and information from, whether or not it is true and how it is intended to manipulate them. This is, in large part, because social media has become the primary source of information.

The problems of the public, how it may get access to meaningful information, how it organises itself, and how public opinion is shaped are now deeply impacted by the rise of social media and messaging platforms as political tools of targeting, gathering and organising. How this new media thwarts and enables the goals of the public in India at present is the primary subject matter of this talk. We will cover a range of issues such as fake news and hate speech on social media, the use Facebook by Cambridge Analytica in elections, and how online platforms are governed, particularly with a view towards elections.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-phantom-public-the-role-of-social-media-in-democracy

The Online Video Environment in India - A Survey Report

pranesh — 2011-10-03T09:31:30Z

iCOMMONS, the OPEN VIDEO ALLIANCE, and the CENTRE FOR INTERNET AND SOCIETY have initiated a research project which seeks to survey the online video environment in India and the opportunities this new medium presents for creative expression and civic engagement. This report seeks to define key issues in the Indian context and begins to develop a short-term policy framework to address them.

The basic assumption of this paper is that the online video medium should support creative and technical innovation, competition, and public participation, and that open source technology can help develop these traits. These assumptions are not elaborated upon here. Instead, this report looks at questions of “openness” that are not strictly technological; that are specific to video in India; and that provide points of entry to a simple policy framework.

The paper is organized in the following parts:

The first chapter, THE NATIONAL CHARACTER OF INDIAN VIDEO, provides a brief historical timeline of events from the first screening of the Lumiere Brothers films in India in 1896, through the beginning of the twenty-first century. This chapter traces the traditional channels of dissemination of video content in India, and establishes the close and unique bond that the visual medium has formed with Indian society.
The second chapter, DIGITAL MEDIA AND NETWORK TRANSFORMATIONS, looks at recent media transformations like the rise of the Internet and peer-to-peer networking, the proliferation of telecommunications, and other developments which form the backbone of the emerging online video medium. Peer-to-peer and associative networking provides a new means of content circulation throughout the country.
The third chapter, MAPPING CONTENT ON THE INTERNET, traces the various types of visual content visible over these new networks, exploring case studies of videos circulating on the Internet which have raised new questions of censorship, freedom of speech, and the openness of the medium.
The fourth chapter, THE ‘OPEN VIDEO’ QUESTION, creates a judgment-based framework to assess the openness of the medium. This chapter lays out a series of questions around the broad spectrum of openness, viewed from various perspectives of access, participation, open source technology, and availability, with the intent of mapping the circumstances under which online video operates in India. Moreover, the chapter focuses on the structural limitations to video which can be addressed by policy, or even an absence of policy.

Whereas the report consciously makes an effort to explore not only transitory web videos but also films, the terms ‘video’ and ‘film’, in many parts are treated interchangeably. Although films and videos represent different traditional mediums of recording, the interest of this report in examining the ‘online video’ content in India, consists of both types of material—accessed perhaps with little distinction.

The scope of this paper is extremely broad and touches upon a wide variety of issues in India, where each area has a peculiar specificity of its situation—urban or rural, geographic, and so on. Links and references have been provided in the footnotes for background readings of these issues.

Click here to download the report. [PDF, 1.22 MB]

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/online-video-environment-in-india

The Newly Updated Indic Keyboard App Now Supports 22 Asian Languages

subha — 2016-06-18T18:21:03Z

This blog post was written in my personal capacity.

The blog post was published by Global Voices on June 12, 2015.

The Indic Project, which belongs to the Indian non-profit Swathanthra Malayalam Computing (SMC), has released a new and significantly upgraded version of its input app “Indic Keyboard” for the Android mobile operating system. This major update comes roughly one year after the app's initial release in March 2014.

Indic Keyboard now supports 22 Asian languages, including 18 Indian languages apart from English, and 54 input layouts. The 23 supported languages are Assamese, Arabic, Bengali, Burmese, English, Gujarati, Hindi, Kannada, Kashmiri, Malayalam, Manipuri, Maithili, Marathi, Mon, Nepali, Odia, Punjabi, Sanskrit, Santali, Sinhala, Tamil, Telugu, and Urdu. On its company blog, SMC lists the various features included in the new update:

Addition of 7 new languages and several new layouts.
We now support 23 languages and 54 layouts in total.
All new Setup wizard makes it simpler for you to get started.
Material design, ability to changes themes.
Material white, Material dark, Holo blue and Holo white themes are available.
Intelligent word suggestion for transliteration – type faster with fewer keystrokes.
For languages with complex letters we now have the ability to type ZWJ and ZWNJ characters directly.
Arabic keyboard – by popular demand.
Code base is updated to support Android Lollipop edition.
A number of bug fixes (e.g. 1 and 2).

So far, the updated keyboard is enjoying a warm response from users:

20,000 people upgraded Indic Keyboard in first 2 days after its new release.

— Jishnu (@jishnu7) May 30, 2015

Brilliant for #Android users interested in writing in their mother tongue. Indic Keyboard v 2.0 supports 23 languages http://t.co/ZVoWuMPFai

— Karthik Subramanian (@chennaikat) May 29, 2015

One commenter writes:

Vernacular computing is a blocker for the complete roll out of computers and Internet to the world. Projects like these are welcome patches to fix that issue.

Typing on touch-screens can be rethought. Especially when it comes to Indic languages which have about double the number of characters compared to English. We shouldn’t constrain our minds to think in traditional layouts. Transliteration is a very good idea. But it puts the dependency back on English. We need radicalize the input methods for non-English languages and avoid the dependence of English altogether.

Anivar Aravind, Executive Director of Indic Project at SMC, and Jishnu Mohan, a Project Administrator at SMC, recently sat down with Rising Voices to discuss the updated app.

Rising Voices (RV): What was the objective behind bringing this mobile app for Indian languages? What has been Indic Project's core motivation?

Anivar Aravind (AA): Indic project focuses on community powered Research and Development of free and open source Indian language information infrastructure for majority of India that does not speak English. “It is pretty clear that unlike most other countries, India will be a “mobile-first” country because the first computing device for most Indians will be the mobile and not the PC.

RV: Why you think language display and input are important for Indian users?

AA: Unavailability of Indian Language interfaces, keyboards and fonts limits freedom of expression of people in their native languages and prevents them from tapping the full potential offered by smart phones and Internet. We believe all mobile users must able to read and write in their native language using their choice of layout. Indic Keyboard is coming as a part of our effort for digital inclusion on the mobile frontier.

RV: What is the reach of the app at this moment?

AA: Indic Keyboard received good user base of 168K+ downloads so far, primarily based on user reviews, without any advertisements and promotions.

RV: Can you share how Indic Keyboard was conceived and has grown?

AA: Indic Keyboard was started as a personal project by Malayalam-language computing advocate and developer Jishnu Mohan in 2013, is later upscaled into a community project collecting Indian language layouts suitable for mobile devices, updated and maintained by the free and open source community.

RV: Jishnu, as the core developer on this project, can you tell us how you overcame major roadblocks while designing Indic Keyboard?

Jishnu Mohan (JM): Absence of fonts in Android operating system was the major roadblock in increasing the language coverage. Android 4.4 supported only few Indian scripts, but some vendors like Samsung included more Indian language scripts. So we decided to go with 16 language support in Indic Keyboard 1.0 version last year. Since Android 5.1 has increased script coverage, we were able to support more languages in this 2.0 release.

RV: What were the other major challenges you faced, Anivar?

AA: The initial challenges of bringing a mobile input layout were many; from building dictionaries to the user interface. Google's Android Open Source Project (AOS) was used as a base for building this app where the keyboards that were integrated came from various sources. Keyboard layouts are not copyrighted and this was very useful for us to use a popular layout like Tamil99 for Tamil or another popular layout like Lekhani that was developed by the Odia Wikimedia community.

Happy to see Script support for Odiya , Saurashtra , Meetri Mayek, Lepcha, Limbu, Ol chikki (Santhali), Sylheti Nagari In Android 5.1

— indicproject (@indicproject) March 15, 2015

RV: How was Indic Project started and what have been its major accomplishments, so far?

AA: During 2005-2008 major ground work was done for localization support in Indic languages and overall improvement of communication using Indian languages. By 2009 web based technology were became our focus which oriented towards building and improving mobile applications for more users reading and writing in their native Indian languages. The project upscaling and 1.0 release of project was part of with the SMC-ICFOSS collaboration as a part of Department of Telecommunications (DIT) Android R & D Project of the Government of India. The project also received another grant from ICFOSS via Government of Kerala's Malayalam Computing project.

RV: What can you tell us about your work in policy-level lobbying and negotiations?

AA: We have done some work in policy front and recently submitted a policy brief requesting the government to mandate the inclusion of at least one Indian language font and one keyboard layout of all 22 official languages recognized as per 8th schedule of the Indian constitution in all smart phones and tablets selling in India.

RV: How did you reach so many users? What are your future promotion plans?

AA: The most important reason why Indic Keyboard reached out to 200k users with over 100k downloads is because of it not bringing up new keyboard layouts where as almost all other mobile input apps have their own proprietary layouts that users take time to learn and use.

RV: What are the difficulties of reaching out to masses of people?

AA: Many of the layouts were already popular and it was an added benefit for the primarily targeting people who know about inputting in their languages. Partnerships with mobile manufacturers and integrators this year for adoption of these keyboards. So users can get Indian language experience via vendor firmware itself without any extra download. Indic Keyboard liberated Indian language input in mobile devices and we want to port the same experience to all emerging mobile platforms.

RV: Are there any final comments or bit of information you'd like to share?

AA: Continuing research and development in this domain including ability to download of dictionaries for user preferred languages, increasing coverage to all 22 official languages in India, developing an free software library for gesture typing and building support for predictive input will be our main focus in the future.

As a promoter and developer of free and open source language technology, SMC plans to focus more on cross-platform mobile input-library-building and policy-level adoption for language input and other language technology advancements in the near future. SMC says it's currently in talks with the Indian government about mandating native keyboards on smart phones.

The keyboard can be downloaded from the Google Play store at http://j.mp/indicmal and also from the software repository at Gitlab at https://gitlab.com/smc/indic-keyboard.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/blog-old/the-newly-updated-indic-keyboard-app-now-supports-22-asian-languages

The Narendra Modi app: The secret weapon in BJP’s elections arsenal

Admin — 2018-03-29T16:28:28Z

Narendra Modi app, BJP's secret weapon.

The article by Jayadevan PK and Pankaj Mishra was published by Factor Daily on March 29, 2018. Pranesh Prakash was quoted.

Story Highlights

Why is Rahul Gandhi beating the drums about the Narendra Modi app? Because he knows that the app – with over 10 million users already – will be crucial decider of a BJP victory or failure in the general elections.
The Narendra Modi app’s mission is two fold — mobilize and integrate some 100 million BJP members and use the app to deliver targeted messaging to voters. Party president Amit Shah has a target that each district should have 100,000 downloads.
In the coming general elections, there will be more than 180 million first-time voters – people who are relatively easy to target on social media. Of the 241 million Facebook users in India, about 54 million are between the age of 18 and 23 years.

Congress president Rahul Gandhi earlier this week got panned for his criticism of the Narendra Modi app. The app, Gandhi had said on Twitter, was leaking user data and added that Prime Minister Narendra Modi was “the Big Boss who likes to spy on Indians”. Much of what the Congress leaders said was hyperbole common at the hustings.

But as it turns out, Gandhi has good reason to beat the drums wildly: the Narendra Modi app is going to be, by all accounts, the Bharatiya Janata Party’s arrowhead as India pads up for its biggest general elections next year. The app is going to be the fulcrum of the BJP’s tech outreach and social media strategy in the months ahead of the elections, which may be held earlier than the scheduled early 2019 going by the buzz in political circles in capital New Delhi.

The usage of the state apparatus to promote an app owned by Modi personally and the way it plans to use data of its users is drawing criticism from political rivals and privacy activists. Critics have pointed out that the app asks for too many permissions, is less than ideally secure, and is run by the BJP while being positioned as the official application of the prime minister of India. These questions are now taking a serious tone after the Facebook-Cambridge Analytica scandal.

“Overall, Facebook’s fallout means even more focus and reliance on the Narendra Modi app by the BJP,” said a person familiar with BJP’s social and digital plans, adding the Facebook and WhatsApp platforms will be in the background and continue to be valuable. This person asked to remain anonymous.

By “Facebook’s fallout”, he is referring to the aftermath of the scandal that implicated political consulting firm Cambridge Analytica of misusing Facebook data of millions of users without consent. Questions are also being raised in the UK and US about the involvement of Russian actors using Facebook, Google and Twitter to influence key global events such as Britain’s exit from the European Union and the US presidential elections in 2016.

After a sting by British broadcaster Channel4 showed Cambridge Analytica used dubious means to influence elections, both the Congress party and the BJP have accused each other of using the services of the analytics company.

To be sure, it will be difficult for anyone to ignore Facebook and WhatsApp for the sheer reach they offer – Facebook has over 240 million users in India and WhatsApp has a similar number of users in India. But growing the Narendra Modi app’s user base will mean a channel that won’t need to be constantly paid for and in the BJP’s direct control with all the granular data and reach that such a platform can offer.

India has the largest number of Facebook users in the world.

“The game plan is to make Narendra Modi app the killer platform for the next elections and beyond,” said the person aware of the BJP’s plan. With estimated downloads of over 10 million already, the Narendra Modi app’s mission is two-fold — mobilize and integrate some 100 million BJP members across the party’s operations and use the app to deliver targeted messaging to existing and potential voters.

To that end, Prime Minister Modi himself and the BJP have been driving app downloads in ways that will put seasoned growth hackers to shame. For instance, Modi’s new book Exam Warriors. Readers can scan QR codes in the book and post responses to the Narendra Modi app. The target: more young users for the app who will soon vote for the first time. A student taking the 12th board exams this year is likely 18 years old, come the 2019 elections.

As has been pointed out, targeting first-time voters in a country where 41% of the population is younger than 20 years is a no-brainer. Political scientist Oliver Heath posited in 2015 that the BJP’s 2014 victory came about more thanks to first-time voters rather the votes it weaned away from rival parties. There were 136 million new voters in 2014. This time there will be more than 180 million first-timers – people who are relatively easy to target on social media. Of the 241 million Facebook users in India, about 54 million are between the age of 18 and 23 years.

The BJP also has plans to co-opt educational institutions to distribute the book, said another source. The book, released in February 2018 is being translated into various languages starting with Hindi and Marathi. The BJP state government in Maharashtra is procuring nearly 150,000 books on Modi but it hasn’t said yet it would be Exam Warriors that it would buy and distribute to state schools.

The number of times Prime Minister Narendra Modi has plugged the app in his Mann Ki Baat speeches.

The prime minister also channels users to the app in his speeches and on his social media channels. A typical plug in his monthly Mann Ki Baat speech would call out a comment received on the app or ask “fellow countrymen” to share a photo or views on an issue on the app. Since October 2014, Modi has made 41 Mann Ki Baat speeches and he has mentioned the Narendra Modi app over 50 times, an analysis of his speeches shows (See graph).

Besides launching modules that enable the prime minister to talk to his council of ministers or run surveys and bundling the app with new phones to drive users, the BJP has also from time to time driven some hard app download targets to its rank and file. In September 2016, for instance, the Gujarat party chief said it will ensure at least 7 lakh downloads of the app as a birthday gift to Modi. BJP President Amit Shah wants nearly 50 million downloads for the app and has directed state officials to drive nearly 100,000 app installations in each district. “Do not take this as an information (or suggestion). Accountability will be ensured and it is the responsibility of each district unit to ensure downloading of one lakh of Narendra Modi App,” Shah reportedly said at the party’s national executive meeting in March 2016.

The app is already in play at the Karnataka elections scheduled for April. “As of now, the app has national content. Going forward we will be pumping lot of content related to Karnataka in Kannada. It will include voice, non-voice and lot of messages. He (Modi) will also be sharing through the app for Kannadigas,” says Amresh K, BJP Information Technology Cell State Convener.

“We will also be doing a Narendra Modi campaign to drive downloads,” said Amresh, who is helping create manifestos for 224 constituencies in Karnataka. “Earlier it used to be one state-level manifesto. This time we have it for 224 constituencies. We’re also engaging with 500-1000 influencers in these constituencies and about 100 sectors to compile their inputs,” he said. The 2013 manifesto of the BJP, a 40-page document, led with the development agenda focussed on specific sectors but also promised freebies such as 25-kilogram free rice to the poor and free laptop to high school goers.

Modi’s popularity as a leader in central to the app. “More than BJP today, Modi as a brand has become extremely strong. There’s a lot of mud sticking to political leaders but in comparison, he seems to be coming through as spotless,” says brand strategist and author M G Parameswaran, who helped create some of the biggest brands such as Santoor and Wipro. To appeal to the young voter, it’s important for Modi to stick to the “development narrative and not get derailed by the Hindutva narrative,” he adds.

So how does the app really help the BJP? The answer to this question really lies in the BJP’s earlier campaigns and the party’s learnings. FactorDaily interviewed people closely associated with BJP’s 2014 campaign to find out.

The ‘Golden Triple’

India could go to polls as early as the end of this year, as is being speculated by the political chatterati, or early next year. Nearly one billion Indians eligible to vote this time around (814 million in 2014) will decide the fate of 543 seats to which representatives are elected. As Rajesh Jain, a former advisor to the BJP campaign points out on his blog, “using data and analytics to identify supporters and then getting them out to vote on election day will be instrumental in determining the eventual winner”. He estimates that nearly 670 million people in India, comprising 330 million who don’t vote and 340 million who aren’t likely to support a mainstream party (or are undecided), are up for grabs.

Importantly, the dynamics at the hustings have changed. “Unlike 2015, this isn’t an election with a wave (the Narendra Modi wave). This isn’t a Facebook or a WhatsApp election in that sense. This is going to be about micro-targeting and use of Narendra Modi app. If BJP wins 2019, the app will become even more all-pervasive and a way to be free from platforms like WhatsApp and Facebook,” said the source familiar with the BJP’s plans quoted above.

Micro-targeting is the practice of crafting messages and advertising to small user cohorts. For this to work, the advertiser, will need to understand its target audience deeply and accurately. Having data from various sources, including the Modi app, will help target the electorate better.

The golden triple is a combination of booth level information, contact details and political leaning of a voter.

The lynchpin of the data strategy of the BJP is what number crunchers call the “Golden Triple”, which has three pieces to it: the details of the booth at which someone votes, the contact phone number and the political leaning of the voter. Voter details are public information in India. Collating that accurately with contact phone numbers is difficult but doable (and likely has already been done by political parties including the BJP).

The BJP, through its missed call-based membership drive back in November 2014, had amassed nearly 100 million registered members. At the time, the BJP had collected voter ID details of members as well. In other words, the party already has over 100 million ‘golden triples’. “If you have 10 crore golden triples, your target audience is sorted,” said the source who knows of BJP’s plans.

“There are four things on which the battles are won and lost—identifying those who already are your supporters, voter registration, pursue them, and finally ensuring that they turn out on the day when it all matters the most,” says the person. The Narendra Modi app becomes a tool to mobilize party workers and getting them to execute the game plan. It also doubles up as a channel to send targeted messages based on the data it has captured already.

Having data of its supporters in a constituency can help parties craft targeted messages and zone in on the audience better using social media platforms, says Ankit Lal, the author of India Social: How social media is leading the charge and changing the countryand a social media strategist for the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP). For instance, Facebook allows you to build a custom audience by uploading a list of email addresses or phone numbers.

The election commission’s Form 20 gives polling booth level data on which candidate got how many votes. “Now, this combined with more specific data sets, can make it far more impactful,” says the person quoted above. For instance, if the numbers aren’t looking good in a certain region, the Narendra Modi app can be used to mobilise party workers to campaign harder in those areas.

In 2014, the BJP used a market research and analytics agency Penn Schoen Berland (PSB) to firm up the key planks on which it would fight elections. The party built its campaign around issues of corruption, security of women, and inflation based on the firm’s inputs. For sure, there will be voter surveys done by the BJP (as also other parties) this time, too, but with the Narendra Modi app and its growing install base, the party’s understanding of local, district-level issues – even booth-level inputs – get strengthened through internal surveys and other mechanisms.

But, can the sophisticated combination of data analytics, micro-targeting, and bespoke messaging swing an election? The answer depends on how close the electoral fight in different constituencies will turn out to be.

When victory margins are thin, targeted campaigns (especially on social media) can win seats. Case in point: Gujarat assembly elections late last year. As this article points out, the victory margins in 57 out of 182 seats in Gujarat was less than 5% – in other words, just a few thousand votes could swing victory either which way. “The win or loss margin is very small, generally less than 5% of the electorate for a majority of constituencies,” says Lal, the AAP strategist. “For urban areas, it is easy to influence results using social media because the margins are so close.” In Karnataka, more than 30 of the 224 seats in the legislative assembly had wins with a margin of less than 3%.

What about the national elections? Here, too, the narrow wins are make or break in nature. Ninety-two seats were won with a winning margin of less than 5% in the 2014 elections. This despite the Modi wave that saw the BJP end with 282 seats in the Lok Sabha – the first time in 30 years a party won a simple majority in the lower house of Parliament.

In other words, social media has – and will continue to have – a definite sway in Indian electoral outcomes and the Narendra Modi app has its role cut out for itself.

The privacy question

On March 23, a security researcher who goes by the pseudonym Elliot Alderson, revealed that the data collected by Narendra Modi app is being passed on to analytics company Clevertap. The app also takes 22 permissions from the user, including the ability to access the user’s contacts, gallery and microphone. Privacy advocates warn that doing so without explicitly telling the user is a breach of trust. “Be careful when you enter personal data. It is often not needed and this data is often misuse (sic) after that,” Alderson messaged FactorDaily on Twitter in reply to a question. His tweets were what had the Congress Party’s Gandhi kicking up a minor storm accusing the BJP of spying on users. To be sure, it is common practice to integrate analytics and marketing tools like Clevertap into an app (also see: CleverTap’s Commitment to User Consent and Data Privacy).

Thejesh G N, founder of Datameet, a community of data scientists and open data enthusiasts, says that it’s okay for politicians to use websites or apps to string members together or talk to their constituents. But they should follow ground rules such as stating the purpose of data collection clearly, collecting minimum amount of data, sharing information about who is collecting the data, for what purpose and guaranteeing the security of personal data, and also stating how it will share data with third parties and for what purpose. This may have sounded like ideal principles of data use but less so in the aftermath of the Facebook-Cambridge Analytica scandal which has brought into focus the flagrant violation of privacy standards by almost every platform.

“People might be thinking they are giving data to the prime minister… in fact, it’s probably going to a campaign database. It’s important to make that clear.”

In the case of Narendra Modi app, some of these basic rules aren’t followed, points out Thejesh, a privacy activist from Bengaluru. “The app description on Play Store says ‘Official App of Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi. It brings to you latest information, instant updates & helps you contribute towards various tasks. It provides a unique opportunity to receive messages and emails directly from the Prime Minister.’ But the app is not owned by Government of India and so the statement is misleading,” he says. “People might be thinking they are giving data to the prime minister… in fact, it’s probably going to a campaign database. It’s important to make that clear.”

Lal of AAP minces no words when it comes to the question of ownership of data. “That’s the biggest question. How did a private app end up being used by the prime minister’s office? Either they were conned into it or they know about it. If they did it deliberately, they knowingly stole data which is no smaller than that of Cambridge Analytica. There it was between Cambridge Analytica and Facebook, here it is between citizen and their prime minister,” he says.

“There is a distinction to be drawn between providing one’s own data and providing the data of others that you happen to have.”

In 2015, privacy and tech policy expert Pranesh Prakash helped report a security vulnerability that exposed the data of Narendra Modi app users. “In 2016 again, the same set of security vulnerabilities blew up… this time, more than 5 million people’s personal profiles including their birthdates, phone numbers was available to the public,” Prakash told India Today TV. “There is a distinction to be drawn between providing one’s own data and providing the data of others that you happen to have. For instance, the Narendra Modi app asks for permissions for ‘Contacts’, which allows it to harvest your contacts. Are they using it (as you suggest they would) for the elections? If so, are they upfront about that as one of the purposes for the data collection? And are they collecting your details or details of your contacts as well,” Prakash later told FactorDaily in reply to a question on the use of data from the Narendra Modi app.

The BJP has responded to some of the criticism. Amit Malviya, the BJP IT Cell chief pointed FactorDaily to the party’s statement that said: “Narendra Modi App is a unique App, which unlike most Apps, gives access to users in ‘guest mode’ without even any permission or data. The permissions required are all contextual and cause-specific. Contrary to Rahul (Gandhi)’s lies, fact is that data is being used for only analytics using third-party service, similar to Google Analytics. Analytics on the user data is done for offering users the most contextual content. This ensures that a user gets the best experience by showing content in his language & interests. A person who looks up agri-related info will get agri related content easily. A person from TN will get updates in Tamil and get an update about an important initiative about TN.”

Will the Narendra Modi app prove to be the BJP’s Brahmastra – the mythical destructive weapon from ancient Hindu texts? The contextual content served on the app in the coming months will give the answer. If it is hyperlocal and raises issues at the booth level, you can be sure that the Brahmastra has been deployed.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/factor-daily-jayadevan-pk-and-pankaj-mishra-march-29-2018-narendra-modi-app-bjp-2019-election

The Making of an Asian City

nishant — 2012-08-10T08:33:48Z

Nishant Shah attended the conference on 'Pluralism in Asia: Asserting Transnational Identities, Politics, and Perspectives' organised by the Asia Scholarship Foundation, in Bangkok, where he presented the final paper based on his work in Shanghai. The paper, titled 'The Making of an Asian City', consolidates the different case studies and stories collected in this blog, in order to make a larger analyses about questions of cultural production, political interventions and the invisible processes that are a part of the IT Cities.

The Promise of Invisibility: The Making of an Asian IT City

Abstract: This paper understands that in emerging Asian contexts, the proliferation and adoption of Internet technologies leads to two distinct changes in the material (re)construction of the city:

1. Built Form of the City: The physical and material aspects of the city are restructured, redesigned and realigned to house the infrastructure of Internet Technology economies.

2. Governance and Administration: The technologies of governance (and also, the governance of technologies) that reconfigure the city for better control, regulation and containment of the subjects of the state.

These changes are articulated and understood, in contemporary scholarship and discourse, through the tropes of Access and Transparency, which propose Technology as neutral. These studies also locate technology as outside of the changing socio-political transformations that the city undergoes in its attempt to emerge as an IT City. The framework, by contextualising technology differently – in larger narratives of continuity and disruption – opens up a dialogue between cybercultures and social sciences to look at conditions of change It also shows how the It demonstrates how such an approach to technology studies enables new and nuanced forms of social sciences inquiry into processes like Dislocation and Migration, which have never addressed the technology question as central to the phenomena.

Context

The 21^st Century has seen accelerated urbanisation and spatial restructuration of cities in emerging information societies around the world. These cities are created as global hubs that shall not only house the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) infrastructure, but also embody the aesthetics, politics, practices and lifestyles that the global cultural revolutions are bringing in. The technologies are significantly involved in the production of the dominant, the hegemonic and the coercive, all under the rubric of economic growth and development, and have affected domains of life, labour and language (Foucault,1998) in different contexts. It is easy to trace the ways in which lifestyle, cultural expression (Bagga, 2005), texture of social interaction and mobilisation, and political and administrative reorganisation (Roy, 2005) have changed in emerging contexts like India and China.

The efforts at creating ‘global countries’ (Kalam, 2004) that can harness the powers of ICT, have lead to three distinct forms of changes. These changes can be seen in the built form of the city, in structures of governance and administration, and in attitudes and Imagination of technologies as they emerge in popular discourse and cultural production. Each of these changes is articulated and explained through the tropes of Transparency and Access. The paper has a specific interest in looking at sites of dislocation and migration, to illustrate the arguments it seeks to make. The paper relies on secondary and tertiary literature (often in translation), unstructured interviews and participant observation to make an argument about how the aesthetics, mechanics and political [i] imaginaries of technology are a part of the physically changing and transforming IT cities in Asia. In order to make the argument, however, a brief context that explains the material signification of these three kinds of changes, is necessary to be explicated.

Beyond the Blogosphere

There has been an equal amount of optimism and scepticism when it comes to talking about the new public spheres that emerge with the Internet. Clubbed under the short-hand ‘Blogosphere’, both the evangelists and the critics of the blogosphere, have explored the Habermassian notion of the engaging public that is crafted with the emergence of new technologies of literacy, expression and participation. In many ways, the governance structures that have been discussed earlier, also endorse the positions taken by these interlocutors. However, much of the discourse, understands the blogosphere as contained in the digital domains. While a cause-and-effect model is often posited, the chief interest and focus remains on the new public, new voices and new spaces within the virtualities of the World Wide Web. This paper challenges such narrow definitions of the public sphere, and in fact, goes back to Habermass to locate technologies and public spaces within a certain historical context. In fact, this paper proposes that the increasing need for the faith in the blogosphere and the clamour that surrounds it is symptomatic of how the physical and built public spaces, in most Asian IT cities, is slowly diminishing.

In Shanghai, it is the loss of a political public space of socialist capital and industry that marks the beginning of this disappearance. 20 years ago, the announcer on every passenger train entering Shanghai would introduce the city as “the largest industrial city in China.” When W. E. B. Du Bois, an African-American writer, visited Shanghai in 1959, he was particularly invited to visit the balcony of Shanghai Mansion, which sits at the mouth of the Suzhou River and was the tallest building of its time, to catch a bird’s eye view of the new urban socialist landscape and the innumerable factory chimneys that speared the sky (Zhang, 2002).[ii] Indeed, an abundant number of factories, warehouses and dockyards cropped up in the three decades after 1950, and, together with the existing industrial constructions, made Shanghai a “new metropolis.” Some of them were clustered in suburban areas, more were scattered in the city area. Some were even squeezed into Longtangs (the narrow alleyways of old Shanghai). The industrial constructions include not only factory buildings but also workers’ residential buildings in factory-concentrated areas. The workers’ residential buildings were targeted primarily at the senior or skilled workers among the industrial population. Life in the residential buildings became an extension of factory life since neighbours were most probably co-workers in the same factory. It is precisely the great number of old and new industrial constructions and the rhythmic life going on in them that composed the socialist industrial space of Shanghai. Needless to say, it was the fastest growing space in the forty years after 1949.

However, nine out of ten such spaces have been wiped out during the fifteen-year urban renewal project, which is perhaps embodied in the restructuring of the Bund as a space of tourist attraction, and eventually the building of the Pudong skyline that has now become the iconic face of the city (Yatsko, 1996, pp 59).[iii] Factories—let alone warehouses—within the Inner Ring Road have either closed down or been removed. With the closing of the factories, the workers also have no place to work anymore. Dr. Wang XiaoMing, in his essay on the changing public space mentions how, once the factory he worked in “had its signboard removed in 1997, the workers have no place to work anymore. The inhabitants of Caoyang New Village have thrown away the signboard off the gate a long time ago and could barely remember that the place was once called the “Workers New Village.” Large factories located on the outskirts of the city are mostly shut down and the places are as quiet as cemeteries” (forthcoming, 2010).

As Americanised industrial parks sprout up in places such as the Pudong District of Shanghai, and Kunshan and Suzhou to the north of Shanghai, the socialist industrial space is shrinking rapidly both within and without Shanghai. Another space that has significantly diminished is the public political space. One of the most important requirements socialism places on urban space is to be able to facilitate large-scale political rallies and parades (Kewen 2006 and Liang 1959).[iv]

Therefore, apart from industrial constructions, the most eye-catching constructions in Shanghai’s new urban constructions from the 1950s to the 1960s were squares and large meeting halls, which include the People’s Square, the Sino-Russian Friendship Building, the Cultural Plaza, and so on.[v] Moreover, government agencies of all levels and factories endeavoured to build conference halls of various sizes for political meetings by transforming theatre halls or building new ones. In the past, tens of thousands of people have paraded down the People’s Square to pay tribute to the officials perched high above on reviewing stands. People rallying in various meeting halls, changing slogans to express joy, and echoing the instructions from the speakers on stage, were frequent occurrences. During the Cultural Revolution, the Rebels staged the final resistance here; in the late 1980s, fervent university students had swarmed into People’s Square to turn it into a place of revelry (Feuchtwang, 2004).

In the blink of an eye, these histories have faded from the public memory and been completely erased from the city’s architectural space. Sino-Russia Friendship Building is renamed Shanghai Exhibition Center, which hosts a constant blur of Expos. After repeated segmentation, People’s Square is now only a nominal square with a long and narrow driveway and most of its space has been occupied by new buildings such as the majestic Shanghai Grand Theatre, the Shanghai Museum, the sunken commercial street and a parking lot. Cultural Plaza was first transformed into a large flower market which was later torn down and pushed to a corner to make way for the new “Music Plaza.” With mass meetings completely eradicated from the life of Shanghai’s residents, the numerous assembly halls and meeting places of various sizes have naturally been restructures for other purposes. People participate with zeal in large assemblies such as concerts, performance competitions, and so on, which have nothing to do with public politics. It is even possible to say that the audience’s shrieks in the stadium symbolize the massive decrease of the public political space in both architectural and spiritual sense (Tang, 2009, pp 327).

Another cluster of spaces that have significantly disappeared are the gossip centres concentrated in areas such as the mouth of NongTang, Lao Hu Zhao [vi], variety store and lane. It is a cultural given that the Shanghainese like to strike up a conversation with strangers and to engage in gossip; this is indeed one of the city’s hallmarks. The Shanghainese can always spare time for gossip: no matter how busy the atmosphere is, there are always some people who loiter around with hands in pockets; even the working class who work from dawn to dusk like to exchange a few words with their neighbours after work. It so happened that the living space was very cramped for the Shanghainese after the 1950s.[vii] The rich can idle away their time in places such as cinemas whereas the low-income people can only manage to find a free space of leisure near their residences. The first choice is the mouth of NongTang adjacent to the footpath, from which all the comings and goings of residents and the traffics on the streets could be perceived. There will always be a Lao Hu Zhao near the mouth of a big NongTang, where you can sit for a whole afternoon and exchange hearsays with neighbours coming for hot water over a cup of tea; or there is a family-run variety store whose female boss is quite fond of trading rumours and gossip with customers across the narrow counter. In times of local or national crises, this is always the first place where the news is spread and gets distorted.

Things have now changed. Lao Huo Zhaos are gone. Variety stores are quickly replaced by different kinds of convenience stores (Huang, 2004, pp 49-50). Although many similar or even smaller family-run variety stores are opened at the newly-formed district bordering the city, a stable communication space cannot form in these stores since the male or female boss is mostly “non-native population”[viii], who not only is unable to blend in with the local residents but also may move away at any time. Although being one of the hallmarks of old Shanghai houses, the nongtangs have been pulled down in large numbers. Those narrow, winding streets have been either diverted, or straightened and widened. Shabby houses on both sides of the streets have disappeared. Also gone are the hustle and bustle, the interfusion of public and private space, and street gossips, which have been replaced by heavy traffic with exhaust gas and noise. With the increasingly neat arrangement of construction space within the city, the influx of transient population, residents increasingly accustomed to shutting doors to the world and to their neighbours, the overwhelming clamour in the media, and the young people’s addiction to internet and game bars, the space where rumours and gossips are spread via mouths and pointing fingers is naturally contracted (Yeung, 1996, pp. 78-84).

These old spaces of early Shanghainese modernity are quickly replaced by three new built forms. The first are the various above-ground, underground, and overhead expressways. Intersecting and intertwining together, they make the whole city look as if it were trapped in a python’s nest. The second thing that comes to the mind is commercial space.[ix] Shopping malls[x] line both the sides of the streets in downtown Shanghai, whereas hypermarkets cluster at the periphery of the city (Diao, 2006)[xi]. With the speedy expansion of space (Li, 2006)[xii], the style of constructions are increasingly uniform: nearly all of them name themselves “squares”; shopping malls are lined with chain stores on every level; chain supermarkets create mazes of different sizes with dense goods shelves; in office buildings, glass doors and plastic boards partition the office into many honeycomb-like cubicles, making the people working in them increasingly look like worker bees; the hospitality industry is overwhelmed with chain hotels of similar facilities and styles, even customers often forget which hotel they stay in last time (Fulong, 1999). The accelerated standardization process in Shanghai’s space highlights a tendency to obtain the standard outlook of the imagined “international metropolis” and an urgency to erase the distinct features inherited from the past.

Thirdly, the office space of governments and state monopolies expands in a unique sense: although the floor area has increased significantly[xiii], it is the upgrading and the move towards luxury that marks the change. Since the early 1990s, luxurious office buildings with halls paved with marble floor, central air conditioning system, shiny wood floors, CEO office suite with separate bathroom, were built first by banks, then revenue departments, telecommunication agencies, newspapers offices, television stations, courts, and police stations of different levels, and at last governments of municipal, district and even lower levels.[xiv] Not only the connotation of “work” has been enriched, but also other business spaces outside the office have expanded with restaurants, coffee bars, official reception hotels, training centers and vacation centers located in the office buildings or on the outskirts of town or other cities (Leaf, 1997, pp. 156-159).

The changes in the built form of the new IT City that has emerged, are particularly important because they signal the ways in which certain kinds of populations are made redundant in the city as it grows physically more hostile to their life in it. The erasure of histories, of public spaces, of spaces of political negotiation is symptomatic of the new ideologies, policies and dreams that Shanghai-Pudong embody. Most of the studies that look at these changes, concentrate only on the physical and material aspects of it, and ignore the aesthetics, politics, and changes that Internet technologies are bringing in, not only in the imagination of what constitutes a city, but also in the material and lived practices of the people in it (Appadurai, 1990). Government policies that ignore technologies, come to dead-ends in their intervention, as they fail to recognise the new geographies and terrains that the technology users navigate through. Interventions by the Development Sector or the Civil Society Movements often fail to recognise the structures of governance as informed by internet technologies, thus perpetrating the very evils that they fight against. Dislocation and Migration, which are complex issues, get reduced to only geography and physical places – leading to a simplified structure of rehabilitation, largely propelled by the vocabulary of the market and the state. Remunerations, economic rights and livelihood are the only questions addressed. In the process Community rights, structures of communication and networking, relationships within families and societies, ineffable ties and bonds that keep the communities coherent – these affective categories which are dislocated and forced to migrate because of the presence of technologies, fail to register either in the scholarship or in the practices in these areas.

This is where the blogosphere needs to be located – as not merely producing a new space of engagement, but helping in recovering the lost spaces of public participation and community communication. The blogosphere is not merely the invention of a technology marked digital native or the discovery of groups seeking alternative narratives. It is recognition of the fact that the regular mainstream public discourse, interacts with the social transformations and politics of our time and depend on the sustenance of public spheres for the socio-cultural categories like communities, neighbourhoods, public space, etc. to survive. The blogosphere, in the quickly changing, hyper-real landscape of Shanghai-Pudong’s geography is the new variety store, the new location for the Lao Hu Zhao and the space that the labyrinthine networks of nongtangs are mapped on.

e-Governance and its discontents

The change in the physical reorganisation of the city is not only a pragmatic decision. This disappearance of the public space of gossip, information dissemination and distortion, of informal conversations and deliberations tied in closely to the three levels of government in Shanghai – district government, street office and alley office – being able to increasingly control the leisure life of the Shanghainese through administrative planning and organisation (Zhang, 2004). There is a clear link between the government’s imagination of its own territory, the notion of the citizen who is to occupy these spaces, and the material practices that happen in these technology marked spaces (Feuchtwang, 2004). While it is an acknowledged fact that the Chinese government does not follow the structures and paradigms that a North-Western Democratic Liberal ideology that has produced the category of Nation-State in most contemporary discourse, there are still two specific forms of technology inflected governance structures which China seems to share with other contexts which might be geo-politically different.

The e-Governance models, which find resonances in most emerging contexts in the Global South, seem to develop two simultaneous and often ironically related approaches towards citizenship and administration, especially in the context of China. With its already forked governance policies, which treat HongKong – its colonial success story – differently from the rest of Mainland China (and the added complication of Taiwan) the governance structures are marked by technology in significant ways. These structures are suffused with irony, because of the tropes of transparency and invisibility that they use to articulate their rationale and processes.

The first is the approach of Rural Development through ICT networks, positing an access based model of participatory citizenship (Tarlo, 2003) and continuing the Development rhetoric of uplift and reform of the deprived citizen. This particular kind of governance structure re-imagines the beneficiary of state/government processes as existing in a condition of invisibility, and outside of the folds of technology. The particular emphasis on e-government, while it is located in the urban settings, is actually intended for reaching the citizen in the remote parts of the country, who does not have any engagement or direct interaction with processes of governance. Despite China’s three tiered government structure, the imagination of e-governance hold a strong currency because it makes visible, the people, practices and communities which otherwise exist in the subliminal and grey areas which were hitherto not in the focus of the government. Fuelling the rhetoric of e-government is the premium on information dissemination and transparent administration in order to enhance the domains of life and labour in the rural parts of the country.

This approach draws its strength from the Development agenda of reform and uplift as it markedly emphasises the distance between the ‘haves and the have-nots’. However, the valourisation of transparency goes hand-in-glove with the production of the invisible (but cognisable) citizen who needs to be reproduced within the paradigms of technology. The peasant, who has been at the back-bone of China’s socialist political ideology, under this new articulation of transparency, becomes invisible – robbed of the historicity, the cultural iconoclasms and the empowerment that such policies earlier provided. Instead, the peasant becomes a worker who needs to be rehabilitated into the changing geographies of Pudong, the new IT city that requires a worker equipped with new skills and lifestyles. This approach draws its strength from the Developmental agenda of reform and uplift as it markedly emphasises the distance between the ‘haves and the have-nots’ (Jaswal, 2005) and offers ICT enabled development as the panacea for the problems of unemployment, illiteracy, chronic poverty, etc. This approach is made manifest in the establishment of Telecentre kiosks, rural BPOs, e-literacy schools and mobile vans, setting up of mobile and internet technology centres, digitisation of the state’s resources, digital access centres to important data-sets, initiation of projects like ‘One Home One Computer’, the e-literacy campaigns, and the building of special economic zones (SEZ) and IT Corridors under the aegis of e-governance (Hawks, 2009).

The second approach is invested in the massive restructuration of the urban spaces to create infrastructure that attracts foreign investment and ICT enabled multinational corporations. This approach uses the language of creating a S.M.A.R.T. (Smart, Moral, Accountable, Responsive, Transparent) State, modelling the new spaces and politics around the new models of capital modernity (Appadurai, 1996) like Singapore, Shanghai, Tokyo and Taipei. This model is nuanced by a vocabulary of ‘global citizenship and globalised economy’ (Abbas, 1997), glorifying the new economic opportunities, flows of foreign capital, enhancement of lifestyle, and the promise of hypervisibility in the globalisation networks. The building up of network-neighbourhoods (Doheny-Farina, 1996), spaces of incessant commercial consumption, post modern digitalised aesthetics of living and housing, (Mitchell, 1996) infrastructure for ICT augmented lifestyles, spaces for sculpting hyperspatial bodies, and recreational zones that offer apolitical aesthetics of living (Chua, 2000), are all a part of this restructuration.

Contemporary analyses that deploy both these approaches are often contained within the language and the universes created by these approaches. Studies on e-governance concentrate on the processes of infrastructure development, the economic parameters of efficient administration, questions of rights and transparency and impact analyses of the public private partnership which is at the basis of most e-governance projects in India. Urban restructuration has found critique from disciplines that focus largely upon the promissory implementation of State policies, on the imbalance in the urban eco-systems, the new patterns of migration in the city, the cultural and class mobility that the new economies offer, and the emergence of the new middle class that becomes the figurehead of the IT revolution (Huang, 2005). Most studies look upon technology as incidental or instrumental; a tool towards an end. The relationship between ICTs and the State, and the kind of technosocial evolution they produce are generally zones of silence in most discourse. Both these discourses produce a certain hyper-visual citizen subject who is either the champion of the new Information societies or the victim of the digital divide that has ensued.

ICTs are often posited as neutral and transparent because they allow us to look at these two kinds of citizenships on the opposite end of the digital spectrum. It can be argued that the divides of ICTs are transparent and hence it offers clearly defined spaces of intervention and uplift. The development sector around the world has accepted this as a given and hence, along with the Governments, they have also been urging a blanket development of infrastructure of access to technology for a particular section of the society, in an attempt to ‘cure’ certain long standing problems. As in the case of India, China is also fuelled by this transparency rhetoric, which allows for the production of the power-user versus the un-networked and has pinned its hopes on the transformative powers of Internet Technologies. With more than two decades of ICT development in the country, and especially in spaces like Shanghai-Pudong, behind them, China seems to be facing a moment of crisis. On the one hand is its promotion and adoption of internet and digital technologies, which encourages younger users entering in “schools, colleges, universities and workforces to transform the economic conditions” (Heng, 2006). On the other hand is the imagination of these IT forces as transgressive, uncontrollable and in need of constant supervision in order to retain existing government-citizenship relationships and power structures. In the middle of this crisis, is another factor that the obvious suspects and users of technology, who are more under the radar, are not the people who are deploying technologies for political negotiation and using technology platforms for political mobilisation. Despite the efforts at green-washing its technologies and the production of the infamous Great Fire-wall of China, there has been a sustained use of internet technologies for resistance and subversion.

The spaces for subversion rises from the fact that with the making of the IT city, there has been a complex phenomenon of dislocation and migration, as several communities were made redundant in the logic of the IT City and were removed from the city. Many people from these communities re-entered the city as the new IT workforce after going through a ‘rehabilitation’ and ‘skill building’ to not only be a part of the IT labour groups but also to support the IT industry in the construction of the physical infrastructure. Moreover, there has been a steady flow of anonymous ‘outsiders’ who have found homes in the older nontangs and factories, and are in the subliminal zones of regulation. As the city is re-formed to make these people invisible (Abbas, 1997), their leisure space and time shrink and they find themselves increasingly forming the new prosumers of internet in Shanghai. However, in the transparency discourse that unfolds, these populations remain invisible and find spaces of resistance and political negotiation that their invisible status provides them. The promise of Invisibility that treats them as Wetware (the biological combination of a network consisting of Software and Hardware), allows for hope in the otherwise diminishing spaces of political articulation in a growing authoritarian regime in China.

Invisibility, Transparency and the Internet

The paper ends by re-formulating the relationship between the making of an IT City and the way in which transparency as a rhetoric and technology-as-instrumental method fail to account for the different kinds of changes that accompany the restructuring of these cities. On the one hand, there is shrinkage of physical space and built form, as new forms of technology infrastructure, global lifestyle and late capitalistic economies expand to fill up the spaces which were earlier available for political mobilisation, organisation and inhabitation. On the other, there is a diminishing political landscape, where, with the integration of the government with the market, there is a tendency to establish larger regulation and censorship in order to retain the status quo relationship between the government and the citizen, in the face of massive governance transition. Both these conditions are produced by the rise and spread of Information Technologies.

In the process, there are also only two kinds of citizenships that are addressed by the e-governance structures which work on a double edge: Firstly, they make the direct access (defined either by abundance or lack of access) citizenships hyper-visual, robbing them of nuances and looking upon them as implicated only in the discursive practices of Internet technologies. Second, they render invisible, the other supporting structures in order to highlight and focus on the economic development and growth propelled by the rise of the IT industries. In other words, they make the citizens who are central to the discourse, invisible, by treating them as embodiments of the new economic markets and aspirations, removing them from their traditional contexts, histories and spaces. Moreover, they make invisible/transparent, populations who are not marked by the aura of the Internet technologies, in order to bring into focus, the extraordinary changes – both in the physical built form as well as in the realms of governance – that have been initiated and accomplished with the making of the IT City Shanghai-Pudong.

References:

Abbas, Ackbar. 1997. Hong Kong: Culture and the Politics of Disappearance. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University press.

Appadurai, Arjun. 1990. "The Coming Community." In Global Culture, edited by Michael Featherstone. London: Sage.

Feuchtwang, Stephen. 2004. Making Place: State Projects, Globalisation and Local Responses in China. New York: Routledge Cavendish

Hawks, F.L. 2009. A Short History of Shanghai: Being an account of the growth and development of the international settlement. Beijing: China Intercontinental Press.

Hiibbard, Peter. 2008. The Bund Shanghai : China Faces the West. Odyssey Books and Guides.

Huang, Tsung-yi Michelle. 2004. Walking Between Slums and Skyscrapers : Illusions of open space in HK, Tokyo and Shanghai. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.

Leaf, Michael. 1998. ‘Urban planning and urban reality under Chinese economic reforms’, Journal of Planning Education and Research. 18(2): 145–153.

Li, Heng. 2006. “Behind the Spectacle of Commercial Real Estate,” Xinmin Weekly, 3rd issue (2006)

Mirsky, Jonathan. 2008. The Britannica Guide to Modern China : A comprehensive introduction to the world’s new economic giant. London: Constable and Robinson Ltd.

Diao Wenjun, “Analysis of the Present situation and Development Trend of Hypermarkets in Shanghai,” Shanghai Articles, 3rd issue (2006)

(STSN) Shanghai Times Square Newsletter. 2008. Issue No. 4. Shanghai.

Shu, Kewen. 2006. “the dynastic History of Tiananmen Square”, Life Week, Issue 11. 27^th March.

Sicheng, Liang. 1959. “Tiananmen Square”, Architectural Journal Issue 9-10. pp. 12.

SSY (Shanghai Statistical Yearbook) 1986, Shanghai Statistics Bureau, (September, 1986), p18, p412.

SSY(a) (shanghai Statistical Yearbook) 2005. Shanghai Statistics Bureau. China Statistics Press. August 2005.

Stanat, Michael. 2005. China’s Generation Y: Understanding the Future Leaders of the World’s Next Superpower. NY: Homa and Sekey Books.

Tang, Shih-che. 2009. ‘The club and the carrot of China’s globalization.’ Inter-Asia Cultural Studies. Volume 10, Number 2. Delhi: Routledge Journals.

Wu, Fulong. 1999. ‘The global and local dimensions of place-making: remaking Shanghai as a world city’. Urban Studies, 37(8): 1359–1377.

Xixian, Xu and Xu JianRong. 2004. A Changing Shanghai. Shangai: Shanghai People’s Fine Arts Publishing House.

Yeung, Yue-man. 1996. Shanghai: Transformation and Modernization Under China's Open Policy. Shanghai: Chinese University Press.

Zhang, Jishun. , “The Linong of Shanghai: the political mobilization of grass-roots and the trend of national social integration (1950-1955),” Chinese Social Sciences Today, 2nd issue, 2004

Zhang, Xudong. 2002. “The Construct of Shanghai: Criticism of Urban Idols, Non-mainstream Writing and the Diminishment of Modern Myths” Literary Review, the 5th edition

[i] The project wants to emphasize that it is not attempting a historiography of the building of the IT City of Shanghai-Pudong. Instead, by drawing selectively, different ways in which the technology imaginaries (technopolises, intellectual labour, globally homogenous geographies and time-lines, bodies marked by technology in their material practices, etc ) of the Internet, find structure and form in the emerging IT cities in Asia.

[ii] Zhang Chunqiao, Secretary of the Culture and Education Department of the Shanghai Municipal Committee who accompanied DuBois to Shanghai Mansion, specially mentioned DuBois’ visit in an article entitled “To Climb the New Summit of Victory.”.

[iii] In 1994, one Shanghai government officer stated, “the government plans to remove or close down two thirds of the factories located within [the range of] 106 square kilometers from the city centre, namely, within the Inner Ring Road.”. Due to different reasons (one of the main reasons is the increase of transferee cost because unsolved problems, such as the proper placement of a large number of former workers, have been bundled with the factory buildings and factory land), some factories still remain in their original places, although most of them have already stopped manufacturing and the workers dismissed. The industrial life/space has disappeared with the disappearance of the factories. Ruins of this life/space become some sort of commodity only because the land under the ruins still has some value.

[iv] On the day (1 October 1949) of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, Mao Zedong suggested rebuilding Tiananmen Square and making it a “grand and magnificent square.” See (Kewen, 2006). Liang Sicheng, who always insisted on preserving the old Beijing and opposed massive makeover, finally realized that the makeover was never about architecture but about politics: “As for the scale of Tiananmen Square … apart from considering the scale of man as a biological being and the scale of construction appropriate to the man’s physiology, we should also take into account the scale for the great collective requested by the political men in the new society.” Liang, 1959, pp 12).

[v] The People’s Square, transformed in 1953 from the original racecourse (which was nationalized in 1951 by the Municipal Military Control Commission), surrounded by woods, and paved with tiled and cemented floor, is the largest public space in Shanghai and can accommodate over one million people. The Sino-Russian Friendship Building, which was built in 1955 and was covering an area of 80,000 square meters, was the city’s largest building after the liberation of Shanghai and still ranks top in terms of its indoor space in today’s Shanghai. The Cultural Plaza, transformed in 1952 from the Greyhound Racecourse, had 12,500 seats and was the largest indoor hall in Shanghai.

[vi] It is a unique store that sells boiled water in Shanghai.

[vii] Shanghai’s housing shortage started in the early 20th century instead of the 1950s. The living space within Shanghai city is 16,100,000 square meters in total but 3.9 square meters per capita. During the 32 years from 1952 to 1985, 21,720,000 square meters of housing were built within the city and the registered population increased from 5,300,000 to 6,980,000. The housing shortage was still serious since by 1985, the living space had only reached 5.4 square meters per capita. (SSY, 1986). What needs to be clarified is that the statics of 1949 does not include the shabby slum houses commonly referred to as “gun di long.”

[viii] This is an increasingly popular new word in Shanghai over the last 20 years, which refers to the people who come from other provinces, especially the rural areas, and live in Shanghai but do not have permanent residence in Shanghai. According to the Shanghai Statistics Bureau’s report on March 2006, the immigrating labor population in Shanghai was 3,750,000. 2,840,000 of this population is in the manufacturing, construction, retail, and catering industry and engaged in low-income manual work. The immigrating population should be over 4 million if the large number of people (such as those in the household service business) and their children be taken into calculation.

[ix] In Shanghai, the floor area of shops has increased seven-fold from 4,030,000 square meters in 1990 to 2,857,000 square meters in 2004 and that of hotels has increased three-fold from 6,580,000 square meters in 1990 to 2,204,000 square meters in 2004. The increase of commercial space is even greater if that of commercial office buildings is calculated as well. (SSY(a), 2005, pp. 198)

[x] Take the area around Zhongshan Park for example, although it was one of the earliest developed leisure areas in Shanghai, there was only one small department store in the mid-1980s and the retail business developed slowly. However, within these ten years, with the completion of Zhongshan Park Station along the subway line 2 and light rail line 3, five multi-story shopping malls have been built, all within a radius of 500 meters. The newest among them is a 58-storey building with four levels of basement and nine levels of shopping mall.

[xi] By the end of 2005, hypermarkets measuring over 5000 square meters within Shanghai have reached 97 and 28 more have chosen their locations and would be opened soon. Because of a large number of hypermarkets and the intense competition brought about, a considerable number of them mainly profit from land appreciation rather than from retail.

[xii] By the end of 2005, the commercial real estate in Shanghai has reached a total of 2,900,000 square meters with 2.6 square meters per capita, far exceeding Hong Kong’s 1.2 square meters per capita.

[xiii] Barely 6 million square meters in 1990, the floor area of office buildings in Shanghai reached a total of 4,012,000 square meters in 2004. See Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 2005. Edited by Shanghai Statistics Bureau, published by China Statistics Press in August 2005, p 198. The statistical material on the increase of floor area of commercial office building cannot be found for the present. Even if the material were obtained, it would not be enough since a large area of commercial office building has been rented by many state-owned monopoly agencies. However, the expansion of government office space is great even if it take up only one tenth of the space of office buildings.

[xiv] Such phenomenon exists not only in Shanghai but all over the country, especially in cities and towns of low economic level. The towering and luxurious government, bank, taxation, and police buildings create an ironic contrast with the low and shabby constructions close by.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/research/grants/the-promise-of-invisibility-technology-and-the-city/finalpaper

The Localisation Gambit: Unpacking policy moves for the sovereign control of data in India

Arindrajit Basu, Elonnai Hickok and Aditya Singh Chawla — 2019-05-21T15:24:58Z

Edited by: Pranav M.B., Vipul Kharbanda and Amber Sinha Research Assistance: Anjanaa Aravindan

The full paper can be accessed here.

Executive Summary

The vision of a borderless internet that functions as an open distributed network is slowly ceding ground to a space that is greatly political, and at risk of fragmentation due to cultural, economic, and geo-political differences. A variety of measures for asserting sovereign control over data within national territories is a manifestation of this trend. Over the past year, the Indian government has drafted and introduced multiple policy instruments which dictate that certain types of data must be stored in servers located physically within the territory of India. These localization gambits have triggered virulent debate among corporations, civil society actors, foreign stakeholders, business guilds, politicians, and governments. This White Paper seeks to serve as a resource for stakeholders attempting to intervene in this debate and arrive at a workable solution where the objectives of data localisation are met through measures that have the least negative impact on India’s economic, political, and legal interests. We begin this paper by studying the pro-localisation policies in India. We have defined data localisation as 'any legal limitation on the ability for data to move globally and remain locally.' These policies can take a variety of forms. This could include a specific requirement to locally store copies of data, local content production requirements, or imposing conditions on cross border data transfers that in effect act as a localization mandate.Presently, India has four sectoral policies that deal with localization requirements based on type of data, for sectors including banking, telecom, and health - these include the RBI Notification on ‘Storage of Payment System Data’, the FDI Policy 2017, the Unified Access License, and the Companies Act, 2013 and its Rules, The IRDAI (Outsourcing of Activities by Indian Insurers) Regulations, 2017, and the National M2M Roadmap.

At the same time, 2017 and 2018 has seen three separate proposals for comprehensive and sectoral localization requirements based on type of data across sectors including the draft Personal Data Protection Bill 2018, draft e-commerce policy, and the draft e-pharmacy regulations. The policies discussed reflect objectives such as enabling innovation, improving cyber security and privacy, enhancing national security, and protecting against foreign surveillance. The subsequent section reflects on the objectives of such policy measures, and the challenges and implications for individual rights, markets, and international relations. We then go on to discuss the impacts of these policies on India’s global and regional trade agreements. We look at the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and its implications for digital trade and point out the significance of localisation as a point of concern in bilateral trade negotiations with the US and the EU. We then analyse the responses of fifty-two stakeholders on India’s data localisation provisions using publicly available statements and submissions. Most civil society groups - both in India and abroad are ostensibly against blanket data localisation, the form which is mandated by the Srikrishna Bill. Foreign stakeholders including companies such as Google and Facebook, politicians including US Senators, and transnational advocacy groups such as the US-India Strategic Partnership Forum, were against localisation citing it as a grave trade restriction and an impediment to a global digital economy which relies on the cross-border flow of data. The stance taken by companies such as Google and Facebook comes as no surprise, since they would likely incur huge costs in setting up data centres in India if the localisation mandate was implemented.

Stakeholders arguing for data localisation included politicians and some academic and civil society voices that view this measure as a remedy for ‘data colonialism’ by western companies and governments. Large Indian corporations, such as Reliance, that have the capacity to build their own data centres or pay for their consumer data to be stored on data servers support this measure citing the importance of ‘information sovereignty.’ However, industry associations such as NASSCOM and Internet and Mobile Association of Indian (IAMAI) are against the mandate citing a negative impact on start-ups that may not have the financial capacity to fulfil the compliance costs required. Leading private players in the digital economy, such as Phone Pe and Paytm support the mandate on locally storing payments data as they believe it might improve the condition of financial security services. As noted earlier, various countries have begun to implement restrictions on the cross-border flow of data. We studied 18 countries that have such mandates and found that models can differ on the basis of the strength and type of mandate, as well as the type of data to which the restriction applies, and sectors to which the mandate extends to. These models can be used by india to think think through potential means of pushing through a localisation mandate. Our research suggests that the various proposed data localization measures, serve the primary objective of ensuring sovereign control over Indian data. Various stakeholders have argued that data localisation is a way of asserting Indian sovereignty over citizens’ data and that the data generated by Indian individuals must be owned by Indian corporations. It has been argued that Indian citizens’ data must be governed my Indian laws, security standards and protocols.

However, given the complexity of technology, the interconnectedness of global data flows, and the potential economic and political implications of localization requirements - approaches to data sovereignty and localization should be nuanced. In this section we seek to posit the building blocks which can propel research around these crucial issues. We have organized these questions into the broader headings of prerequisites, considerations, and approaches:

PRE-REQUISITES

From our research, we find that any thinking on data localisation requirements must be preceded with the following prerequisites, in order to protect fundamental rights, and promote innovation.

Is the national, legal infrastructure and security safeguards adequate to support localization requirements?

Are human rights, including privacy and freedom of expression online and offline, adequately protected and upheld in practice?

Do domestic surveillance regimes have adequate safeguards and checks and balances?

Does the private and public sector adhere to robust privacy and security standards and what should be the measure to ensure protection of data?

CONSIDERATIONS

What are the objectives of localization?

Innovation and Local ecosystem

The Srikrishna Committee Report specifically refers to the value in developing an indigenous Artificial Intelligence ecosystem. Much like the other AI strategies produced by the NITI Aayog and the Task Force set up by the Commerce Department, it states that AI can be a key driver in all areas of economic growth, and cites developments in China and the USA as instances of reference.

National Security, Law Enforcement and Protection from Foreign Surveillance

As recognised by the Srikrishna White Paper, a disproportionate amount of data belonging to Indian citizens is stored in the United States, and the presently existing Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties process (MLATs) through which Indian law enforcement authorities gain access to data stored in the US is excessively slow and cumbersome.
The Srikrishna Committee report also states that undersea cable networks that transmit data from one country to another are vulnerable to attack.
The report suggests that localisation might help protect Indian citizens against foreign surveillance.

What are the potential spill-overs and risks of a localisation mandate?

Diplomatic and political: Localisation could impact India’s trade relationships with its partners.
Security risks (“Regulatory stretching of the attack surface”): Storing data in multiple physical centres naturally increases the physical exposure to exploitation by individuals physically obtaining data or accessing the data remotely. So, the infrastructure needs to be backed up with robust security safeguards and significant costs to that effect.
Economic impact: Restrictions on cross-border data flow may harm overall economic growth by increasing compliance costs and entry barriers for foreign service providers and thereby reducing investment or passing on these costs to the consumers. The major compliance issue is the significant cost of setting up a data centre in India combined with the unsuitability of weather conditions. Further, for start-ups looking to attain global stature, reciprocal restrictions slapped by other countries may prevent access to the data in several other jurisdictions.

What are the existing alternatives to attain the same objectives?

The objective and potential alternatives are listed below:

OBJECTIVE	ALTERNATE
Law enforcement access to data	Pursuing international consensus through negotiations rooted in international law
Widening tax base by taxing entities that do not have an economic presence in India	Equalisation levy/Taxing entities with a Significant Economic Presence in India (although an enforcement mechanism still needs to be considered).
Threat to fibre-optic cables	Building of strong defense alliances with partners to protect key choke points from adversaries and threats
Boost to US based advertisement revenue driven companies like Facebook and Google (‘data colonisation’)	Developing robust standards and paradigms of enforcement for competition law

APPROACH

What data might be beneficial to store locally for ensuring national interest? What data could be mandated to stay within the borders of the country? What are the various models that can be adopted?

Mandatory Sectoral Localisation: Instead of imposing a generalized mandate, it may be more useful to first identify sectors or categories of data that may benefit most from local storage.

b. ‘Conditional (‘Soft’) Localisation: For all data not covered within the localisation mandate, India should look to develop conditional prerequisites for transfer of all kinds of data to any jurisdiction, like the Latin American countries, or the EU. This could be conditional on two key factors:

Equivalent privacy and security safeguards: Transfers should only be allowed to countries which uphold the same standards. In order to do this, India must first develop and incorporate robust privacy and security protections.
Agreement to share data with law enforcement officials when needed: India should allow cross-border transfer only to countries that agree toshare data with Indian authorities based on standards set by Indian law.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-localisation-gambit-unpacking-policy-moves-for-the-sovereign-control-of-data-in-india

The Localisation Gambit.pdf

karan — 2019-05-21T15:23:09Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/the-localisation-gambit.pdf

The Legal Framework for Enforcement of Rights of Persons with Disabilities

CLPR — 2014-11-06T15:56:46Z

In order to get a complete understanding of the legal framework governing the rights of persons with disabilities, we need to understand the several legislations that cover the field. The Constitution of India is the founding legal document guaranteeing fundamental rights to all persons which includes persons with disabilities. The main legislation on disability rights is the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 ("PWD Act") which this chapter will be providing a detailed overview of.

Other legislations which also cover some specialized aspects of disability issues are the National Trusts Act, the Rehabilitiation Council of India Act and the Mental Health Act 1987. This chapter will not be dealing with these legislations and will focus mainly on the PWD Act as this is the main legislation covering all rights of perosns with disabilities in the country.

The Constitution of India
The Constitution of India under Chapter III guarantees fundamental human rights to all persons. The right to equality is enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution and recognizes that all persons are equal before the law. Persons with disabilities are entitled to this guarantee to not be discriminated against in any manner and to be treated equally, which includes the requirement for special treatment where required. Similarly, Article 15 and 16 prohibits discrimination on the grounds of "religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them and guarantees equal opportunity in matters of public employment. Article 16 (3) & (4) provides that the State can make provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services. It is on the basis of Article 16, that the guarantees to reservation and equal opportunity in public employment are made under the PWD Act. The right to equality has been upheld for persons with disabilities not to be discriminated and to be provided equal opportunity in recruitment to the civil services.[1] Article 21 of the Constitution guarantees the right to life to all persons, which has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to include the right to live with dignity,[2] , the right to livelihood,[3] and the right to education.[4] Article 21A guarantees the right to fre and compulsoy education for all children between the ages of 6-14 years.

Chapter IV of the constitution contains the Directive Principles of State Policy, which are also aims for the State to comply with. The DPSPs provide in Article 38 that the State Policy has to be directed to minimize inequalities, secure right to an adequate means of livelihood and also secure that the operation of legal system promotes justice. Under Article 41, the State shall make provisions for ensuring the right to work, education and public assistance in case of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement and in other cases of undeserved want. The State shall endeavour to provide for free and compulsory education for all children until they complete the age of 14 years and under Article 46 the State has also the responsibility of promoting with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people. All these provisions are equally applicable to the persons with disabilities.

The denial or violation of any of these rights would entitle any person to approach the High Courts or the Supreme Court in their writ jurisdictions under Articles 226 and 32, respectively, if there is no other alternative or equally efficacious remedy available.

The PWD Act
The PWD Act came into force on 1^st January 1996, and was enacted in pursuance of India's obligation under the Proclamation on the Full Participation and Equality of People with Disabilities in the Asian and Pacific Region, which it adopted in December 1992. The Act provides for various measures for persons with disabilities to facilitate their access to education, employment, basic infrastructure and social welfare measures.

Under the PWD Act, a 'person with disability' has been defined as any person having 40% or more of any of the following disabilities: (i) Blindness; (ii) Low vision; (iii) Leprosy cured; (iv) Hearing impairment; (v) Locomotor disability; (vi) Mental retardation; and (vii) Mental illness. This is a limited definition, as only perosns who fall within this definition as having 40% or more of the above 7 disabilities would be categorized as perosns with disabiltiies and would be entitled to get the benefits of the rights and schemes under the PWD Act.

The main rights available to persons with disabiltiies are in the field of education in public schools, public employment, infrastructure on the roads and in public transport and access to public buildings and a greiavance redressal procedure for protection of their rights.

Education
Under the PWD Act, all children with disabilities below the age of 18 have the riht to free and compulsory eduication that is accessible. This goes even beyond the mandate of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 that calls for free education to be provided to children up to the age of 14. The further obligations placed on the government by the PWD Act with respect to formal education are that efforts must be made to see that these children with disabilities are integrated into regular schools that they attend, and that the setting up of special schools with vocational training facilities should be encouraged at the local level in the Government and private sectors, so that children across the country who require special education have access to such schools in their areas. Section 39 of the PWD Act also requires that 3% of all seats in Government and Government-aided educational institutions be earmarked for children or students with disabilities. The PWD Act also requires that the government formulate and implement schemes pertaining to non-formal, functional education, in respect of the following matters:

(a) Conducting part-time classes in respect of children with disabilities who have completed the fifth grade and could not continue full-time studies thereafter;

(b) Conducting special part-time classes to provide functional literacy for children with disabilities in the age group of sixteen and above;

(d) Imparting education through open schools or open universities;

(e) Conducting class and discussions through interactive electronic or other media; and

(f) Providing every child with disability the requisite books and equipments, at no cost.

Additionally, to facilitate equal opportunities in education for children with disabilities, the government is obligated to promote research on assistive devices, teaching aids and special teaching materials, and establish and assist special teachers' training institutions. Educational institutions are required to ensure that children with visual disabilities are provided with scribes when required. To further facilitate the mainstreaming of children with disabilities, the government is required to prepare a comprehensive scheme providing for facilities or financial support for transport to and from school, making school supplies available, scholarships, grievance redressal fora, modification of examinations and restructuring of the curriculum.

Employment
Chapter VI of the PWD Act, containing Sections 32 to 40, addresses the affirmative action measures with respect to the employment of persons with disabilities. It requires that at least 3% of all posts in all jobs under the government are required to be reserved for persons with disabilities, with 1% each being reserved for persons with blindness / low vision, persons with hearing disabilities and persons with locomotor disabilities / cerebral palsy.

To ensure that reservations have meaning, the government is required to identify posts in all public establishments that shall be reserved for persons with disability, based on the suitability of such posts to each category of disability. The list of identified posts so prepared is required to be revised in light of technological developments, at regular intervals of a maximum of 3 years.

Under Section 34, vacancies are required to be advertised, with the details of the reservations for the persons with disabilities, in the Special Employment Exchange and, if not filled, shall be carried forward to the next recruitment year.

There are also many requirements of reasonable accommodations to be provided by the Government uder Article 38 of the PWD Act and to formulate schemes for the following:

(a) relaxations of age limit,

(b) training,

(d) The government is also required to frame an insurance scheme for its employees with disabilities, and is expressly prohibited from discriminating against employees who acquire disabilities over the course of their employment as well as employees with disabilities in the matter of promotions.

(e) Finally, for those persons with disabilities who are registered with the Special Employment Exchange and have not been able to find gainful employment for over 2 years, the government is required to frame a reasonable scheme for unemployment allowance.

Accessibility
Accessing public spaces and infrastructure are addressed in Sections 44 to 47 of the PWD Act. Such measures include adapting public transport facilities for easy access to persons with disabilities, installing auditory and tactile indicators on public roads and pavements to aid those with auditory and visual disabilities, and installing ramps, Braille symbols and auditory signals in facilities in public buildings and medical institutions.

Statutory Authorities and Grievance Redressal
The PWD Act provides for the appointment of a Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities at the central level under section 57 and Commissioners for Persons with Disabilities at the state level under Section 60 of the PWD Act. The Commissioners have the powers to

(i) Co-ordinate with the departments of the State Government for the programmes and schemes for the benefit of persons with disabilities;

(ii) Monitor the utilization of funds disbursed by the State Government;

(iii) Take steps to safeguard the rights and facilities made available to persons with disabilities;

(iv) Submit reports to the State Government on the implementation of the Act at such intervals as that Government may prescribe and forward a copy thereof to the Chief Commissioner.

In addition to these powers, the Chief Commissioner and Commissioners may of their own motion or on the application of any aggrieved person or otherwise look into complaints relating to deprivation of rights of persons with disabilities or the non-implementation of laws, rules, bye-laws, regulations, executive orders, guidelines or instructions made or issued by the appropriate Governments and the local authorities for the welfare and protection of rights of persons with disabilities, and take up the matter with the appropriate authorities. In order to enquire and adjudicate into these complaints, the Chief Commissioner and the State Commissioners have certain powers of civil court such as summoning of documents, etc.

Thus any matter of discrimination or denial by public authorities in matters of recruitment, promotion, benefits that perosns with disabilities are entitled to may be brought before the Commissioners for adjudication and under Section 62 of the PWD Act, , and they can recommend appropriate action to be taken by the offending body.

The central government and many State governments have enacted rules under the PWD Act which include rules on the procedure for filing complaints before the Commisisoners. The complainants do not require legal representation during the proceedings, and generally, they may institute a complaint by submitting complete details of their complaint and facts to the relevant Commissioner. In accordance with the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Rules, 1996, complaints are ideally to be disposed of within 3 months from the date of notifying the opposite party.

In the event that any party is not satusfied with the decision of the Chief Commisisoner or the State Commissioner, the said decision can be challenged in a writ petition in the respective state Hogh Court by the aggrieved party.

[1] NFB vs. UPSC (1993) 2 SCC 411, Amita vs. Union of India (2005) 13 SCC 721

[2] Francis Coralie Mullin vs. Union Territory of Delhi , (1981) 1 SCC 608

[3] Olga Tellis and Ors. vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Ors., (1985) 3 SCC 545

[4] Unnikrishnan J.P. and Ors. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors., (1993) 1 SCC 645

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/accessibility/blog/the-legal-framework-for-enforcement-of-rights-of-persons-with-disabilities

The Last Cultural Mile

praskrishna — 2011-09-28T05:40:51Z

Ashish’s research inquiry is informed by the ‘last mile’ which has emerged as a central area of discussion in the domains of technology and governance from the 1940s in India. Starting from mapping technology onto developmentalist–democratic priorities which propelled communication technologies beginning with the invention of radio in India, the monograph conceives of the ‘last mile’ as a mode of techno-democracy, where connectivity has been directly translated into democratic citizenship.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/histories-of-the-internet/last-cultural-mile.pdf

The largest Wikipedia gathering in South Asia kicks off

subha — 2016-08-06T17:11:39Z

Wikimedia Conference 2016Wiki Conference India 2016 (WCI), the largest gathering of contributors to Wikipedia and its sister projects in South Asia, will be held during August 5-7 this year in Chandigarh, India.

This was published Opensource.com on August 5, 2016

The first iteration of this event was five years ago in 2011. The event is focused around South Asian language Wikipedias and Wikimedia projects. Hundreds of participants, including over 100 scholarship holders from India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, will participate in this three-day event. A team of volunteers representing several Wikimedia communities across the country and three Wikimedia affiliates—Wikimedia India, Punjabi Wikimedians and Centre for Internet and Society's Access to Knowledge program—are working together to make this event a success.

Several Wikimedia project and program-related talks, meetups and thematic workshops, focused on technology, program design, volunteer leadership building and engagement, gender gap in Wikipedia, global reach, and education, will keep the participants occupied. There will be separate technical tracks, which were chosen from the results of a pre-event needs assessment survey to ensure that community needs are met. Prior to the conference, a month-long edit-a-thon has been running in twelve South Asian language Wikipedias, and one European language Wikipedia (Ukrainian Wikipedia). The focus of this sprint was to expand the content reach of Wikipedia on Punjab, Punjabi people, and their language and culture as the event is happening in Punjab. So far, more than 1900 articles have been created by about 150 Wikipedians, and the edit-a-thon will be also running during the conference to keep the option of creating more articles open to the participants. Some of the guests includes Wikimedia Foundation's board member Nataliia Tymkiv, the organization's newly promoted executive director Catherine Maher, Punjabi-language poet Surjit Patar and Internet freedom advocate and Centre for Internet and Society's Executive Director Sunil Abraham.

As compared to the last WikiConference India, this conference has more thematic focus, especially on challenges like the gender bias on Wikipedia, and emerging projects like the Wikipedia Education Program. There are as many as six presentations related to gender gap, and six more related to education program.

There has been constant engagement on both on Facebook and Twitter with the hashtag #WCI2016. Some of the most-used basic phrases in the Punjabi language have been recorded and shared to the participants from outside the region to communicate with the locals.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/opensource.com-subhashish-panigrahi-august-5-2016-largest-wikipedia-gathering-in-south-asia-kicks-off

The Knowledge Base is Liberated

Subodh Kulkarni and Madhav Gadgil — 2019-08-05T23:04:33Z

The article published in Sunday supplement of Loksatta newspaper of Express group, written jointly by Madhav Gadgil & Subodh Kulkarni summarises - the status of searchable open knowledge available on web, eagerness of youth generation across the social strata to access knowledge on new gadgets and the approaches to build resources in Marathi on web harnessing potential of Wikimedia projects. It also elaborates major three breakthroughs – Free & open source software movement, Unicode revolution and development of collaborative knowledge building and sharing free platforms like Wikimedia projects easily accessible to people in their own languages.

The article by Subodh Kulkarni and Madhav Gadgil titled ज्ञानभांडार मुक्त झाले.. in Marathi was published by Loksatta on August 3, 2019.

In 2020, Maharashtra state is celebrating its 60th anniversary, it is also 100th death anniversary of Lokmanya Tilak while the state has recently celebrated 100th birth anniversaries of Lokkavi Annabhau Sathe and Lokshahir Amar Shekh. These three social reformers and prolific writers had shaped the socio-political history of Maharashtra. On this occasion, appeal is made to the Marathi community for bringing the complete works of these three reformers in Wikimedia projects in searchable & freely accessible form. It is also mentioned that these efforts are being facilitated by Centre for Internet & Society and other like-minded organisations. The aim is to complete this project before Marathi language day in February 2020.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/loksatta-august-3-2019-subodh-kulkarni-and-madhav-gadgil-the-knowledge-base-is-liberated

The joys of being a Wikipedian

praskrishna — 2014-07-30T05:19:16Z

Radha Krishna, an engineer, had always wanted to share information online so that people who wanted to learn more could just log in and benefit by reading his articles. Eight years ago he started his own website for this very purpose. But he found it hard to maintain the site. He then chanced upon Wikipedia, the largest open-source encyclopedia, which was then just becoming popular in the country.

The article by Svetlana Lasrado was published in the New Indian Express on July 29, 2014. T. Vishnu Vardhan gave his inputs.

He registered an account on the website and started contributing to it by editing articles and adding references. Krishna, who has contributed over 4000 articles so far, prides himself on being one of the first few Wiki editors from Bangalore.

Komal Khatokar, on the other hand, has not spent as much time on the site as Krishna.

This 19-year-old B Com student of Christ University had to contribute one article to the Indian language Wikipedia last year as part of her assignment in a language of her choice, Sanskrit. She says, “I wrote an article on G V Iyer, who was the first person to direct a movie in Sanskrit.”

But it did not stop there. Last May, she took up an internship project with The Centre for Internet & Society (CIS), which acts as a catalyst for the Wikipedia movement in India. She wanted to explore the world of Wiki writing.

“I took part in a project to add articles from the Kannada encyclopedia online. We uploaded over 1200 articles, which will go live on the main website in October.” Komal now edits copies on the site and despite her hectic college schedule, wants to continue contributing to Wikipedia in any way that she can.

Anybody with an Internet access can edit an article on Wikipedia. Globally, the English Wikipedia has over 4 million articles and there are over a million registered users.

And in Bangalore, from just 10 members five years ago, there are now over 100 registered volunteers who contribute to the website on a daily basis, says Vishnu Vardhan, from CIS and adds, “Now, the maximum number of Wikipedians from India are from Bangalore and majority of the founding members of the Wikimedia India Chapter are also from here.”

Apart from English content, world over Wikipedia has many regional chapters covering over 200 languages to increase representation of region-specific content. In India, the Access to Knowledge programme developed by CIS works towards the growth of Indian language Wikipedias. In this regard, Vishnu states that Bangalore has a majority of active Kannada Wikipedia volunteers and is the single largest location for active Malayalam Wikipedians. Bangalore is also the second largest location for Telugu Wikipedia community after Hyderabad, he observes. The strong volunteer community is involved in the Wiki movement in ways more than one.

Different ways to contribute

Jeph Paul is not a Wikipedian in the traditional sense of the word. Why? Because he doesn't contribute or edit articles on the website. What he does is very technical. He develops tools and gadgets for Wikipedia in India to enhance user experience. Jeph got involved when Wikipedia started providing grants of up to $30000 to people who wanted to improve the usability and functionality of the website. Jeph applied and received $500 for his project. His project was simple -- he created a visual representation of how an article evolved. He explains, “There are over 100 editors who pore over just one article and modify it — the edits can be a sentence that is rewritten, a reference link added or citations made. But the changes are a lot and minute. I created a tool where people could see what changes are made and how the article evolves over a period of time.”

Besides developing tools and software, Jeph points out that users can generate visual content. For instance, there are some topics such as historical monuments which require visual documentation. Users can submit their visual repository to Wikipedia to enhance text content.

Wikipedia Caveats

Wikipedia, globally ranked sixth among all the websites based on web traffic, has laid down a list of rules and guidelines which users are required to follow. For instance, when one edits articles, one should avoid personal opinions. Komal cites a recent furore when there were slanderous remarks made against actor Ambarish.

“Such personal opinions should be reserved for blogs. Wikipedia is a public domain website. Hence, when you become a contributor, you have a certain responsibility. You should refrain from portraying biased sentiments through your articles,” she observes. Contemplating on this, Komal adds that Wikipedians should not fabricate content. "They should only include what’s already published and authenticate it using a credible source," she adds.

Another rule that is of utmost importance is compliance with copyright. Radha Krishna explains, “If you want to include information from a website or article, you can't copy the text verbatim. You have to analyse the content and paraphrase it based on your own understanding, citing legitimate references.”

When in doubt, the Wikipedians assert, it is always best to take help from other editors and collaborators through the ‘Talk’ option on the website or through monthly meetings.

It's easy to be a Wikipedia contributor:

Register: Although a visitor can edit articles, it is good to register to keep a record of your edits. You will also get an access to Wikipedia’s enhanced editing features.

Start with editing: Click the ‘Edit’ tab on the article’s page to modify the copy -- check typos, grammar, sentence structure and add an explanation. For example, if it is a spelling correction, add 'Typo'.

Preview: After editing, see a preview of the modifications by clicking ‘Show Preview’.

Save: Then save the changes by clicking the ‘Save Page’ tab.

Format: Wiki uses a markup language called wikitext to format text. Acquaint yourself with this language by reading the online tutorial. For instance, you can change a text to bold or italics by surrounding a word or phrase with multiple apostrophes.

Link: You can add inline citations by linking a word to another Wikipedia page. To do so, put the word in double square brackets. You can also change the display text.

Categorise: Add categories near the bottom of the article by typing the topic using Category:

Add footnotes: You can add reference tags around your source using <ref>Your Source</ref>.

Add external links: To add a link to an external credible website, type the URL inside a single set of brackets, followed by a space and the text to be displayed.

Talk to other editors: Use talk pages to discuss articles or any issues with other Wikipedians.

For a detailed tutorial on how to edit an article, visit http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Tutorial

Wiki meets and awareness programmes: Since 2010, the Bangalore Wikipedia community has conducted over 40 meet-ups, according to Vishnu. “This helps increase participation among all volunteers, improves engagement and understanding of the work that is being done on an ongoing basis,” he opines.

Apart from this, their main focus is to get more people to join the fray through ‘Wiki Academy’ which travels to different organisations in the country to get people acquainted to the website and give them hands-on training on editing articles. Radha Krishna explains, “We recently conducted a workshop at C-DOT and Don Bosco Engineering College.” He adds, “Wikipedia has a lot of sister projects too like Wikiversity, Wikiquote, Wikisource, Wiktionary, which people are not aware of. We want people to make use of these tools too.”

Rules every Wikipedian should follow:

Don't share unpublished results

Don't expound your personal theories or start debates

Respect other editors

If you spot an error, correct it

Write without using jargons

Do not violate copyright and attribute statements

Do not promote yourself

Do not be biased in your tone of writing. Always cover significant point of views

Don't be afraid to ask for help

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/new-indian-express-july-29-2014-svetlana-lasrado

The Internet Has a New Standard for Censorship

jyoti — 2016-01-30T09:17:54Z

The introduction of the new 451 HTTP Error Status Code for blocked websites is a big step forward in cataloguing online censorship, especially in a country like India where access to information is routinely restricted.

The article was published in the Wire on January 29, 2016. The original can be read here.

Ray Bradbury’s dystopian novel Fahrenheit 451 opens with the declaration, “It was a pleasure to burn.” The six unassuming words offer a glimpse into the mindset of the novel’s protagonist, ‘the fireman’ Guy Montag, who burns books. Montag occupies a world of totalitarian state control over the media where learning is suppressed and censorship prevails. The title alludes to the ‘temperature at which book paper catches fire and burns,’ an apt reference to the act of violence committed against citizens through the systematic destruction of literature. It is tempting to think about the novel solely as a story of censorship. It certainly is. But it is also a story about the value of intellectual freedom and the importance of information.

Published in 1953, Bradbury’s story predates home computers, the Internet, Twitter and Facebook, and yet it anticipates the evolution of these technologies as tools for censorship. When the state seeks to censor speech, they use the most effective and easiest mechanisms available. In Bradbury’s dystopian world, burning books did the trick; in today’s world, governments achieve this by blocking access to information online. The majority of the world’s Internet users encounter censorship even if the contours of control vary depending on the country’s policies and infrastructure.

Online censorship in India

In India, information access blockades have become commonplace and are increasingly enforced across the country for maintaining political stability, for economic reasons, in defence of national security or preserving social values. Last week, the Maharashtra Anti-terror Squad blocked 94 websites that were allegedly radicalising the youth to join the militant group ISIS. Memorably, in 2015 the NDA government’s ham-fisted attempts at enforcing a ban on online pornography resulted in widespread public outrage. Instead of revoking the ban, the government issued yet another vaguely worded and in many senses astonishing order. As reported by Medianama, the revised order delegates the responsibility of determining whether banned websites should remain unavailable to private intermediaries.

The state’s shifting reasons for blocking access to information is reflective of its tendentious attitude towards speech and expression. Free speech in India is messily contested and normally, the role of the judiciary acts as a check on the executive’s proclivity for banning. For instance, in 2010 the Supreme Court upheld the Maharashtra High Court’s decision to revoke the ban on the book on Shivaji by American author James Laine, which, according to the state government, contained material promoting social enmity. However, in the context of communications technology the traditional role of courts is increasingly being passed on to private intermediaries.

The delegation of authority is evident in the government notifying intermediaries to proactively filter content for ‘child pornography’ in the revised order issued to deal with websites blocked as result of its crackdown on pornography. Such screening and filtering requires intermediaries to make a determination on the legality of content in order to avoid direct liability. As international best practices such as the Manila Principles on Intermediary Liability point out, such screening is a slow process and costly and intermediaries are incentivised to simply limit access to information.

Blocking procedures and secrecy

The constitutional validity of Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2008 which grants power to the executive to block access to information unchecked, and in secrecy was challenged in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India. Curiously, the Supreme Court upheld S69A reasoning that the provisions were narrowly-drawn with adequate safeguards and noted that any procedural inconsistencies may be challenged through writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution. Unfortunately as past instances of blocking under S69A reveal the provisions are littered with procedural deficiencies, amplified manifold by the authorities responsible for interpreting and implementing the orders.

Problematically, an opaque confidentiality criteria built into the blocking rules mandates secrecy in requests and recommendations for blocking and places written orders outside the purview of public scrutiny. As there are no comprehensive list of blocked websites or of the legal orders, the public has to rely on ISPs leaking orders, or media reports to understand the censorship regime in India. RTI applications requesting further information on the implementation of these safeguards have at best provided incomplete information.

Historically, the courts in India have held that Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India is as much about the right to receive information as it is to disseminate, and when there is a chilling effect on speech, it also violates the right to receive information. Therefore, if a website is blocked citizens have a constitutional right to know the legal grounds on which access is being restricted. Just like the government announces and clarifies the grounds when banning a book, users have a right to know the grounds for restrictions on their speech online.

Unfortunately, under the present blocking regime in India there is no easy way for a service provider to comply with a blocking order while also notifying users that censorship has taken place. The ‘Blocking Rules’ require notice “person or intermediary” thus implying that notice may be sent to either the originator or the intermediary. Further, the confidentiality clause raises the presumption that nobody beyond the intermediaries ought to know about a block.

Naturally, intermediaries interested in self-preservation and avoiding conflict with the government become complicit in maintaining secrecy in blocking orders. As a result, it is often difficult to determine why content is inaccessible and users often mistake censorship for technical problem in accessing content. Consequently, pursuing legal recourse or trying to hold the government accountable for their censorious activity becomes a challenge. In failing to consider the constitutional merits of the confidentiality clause, the Supreme Court has shied away from addressing the over-broad reach of the executive.

Secrecy in removing or blocking access is a global problem that places limits on the transparency expected from ISPs. Across many jurisdictions intermediaries are legally prohibited from publicising filtering orders as well as information relating to content or service restrictions. For example in United Kingdom, ISPs are prohibited from revealing blocking orders related to terrorism and surveillance. In South Korea, the Korean Communications Standards Commission holds public meetings that are open to the public. However, the sheer volume of censorship (i.e. close to 10,000 URLs a month) makes it unwieldy for public oversight.

As the Manila Principles note, providing users with an explanation and reasons for placing restrictions on their speech and expression increases civic engagement. Transparency standards will empower citizens to demand that companies and governments they interact with are more accountable when it comes to content regulation. It is worth noting, for conduits as opposed to content hosts, it may not always be technically feasible for to provide a notice when content is unavailable due to filtering. A new standard helps improve transparency standards for network level intermediaries and for websites bound by confidentiality requirements. The recently introduced HTTP code for errors is a critical step forward in cataloguing censorship on the Internet.

A standardised code for censorship

On December 21, 2015, the Internet Engineering Standards Group (IESG) which is the organisation responsible for reviewing and updating the internet’s operating standards approved the publication of 451-’An HTTP Status Code to Report Legal Obstacles’. The code provides intermediaries a standardised way to notify users know when a website is unavailable following a legal order. Publishing the code allows intermediaries to be transparent about their compliance with court and executive orders across jurisdictions and is a huge step forward for capturing online censorship. HTTP code 451 was introduced by software engineer Tim Bray and the code’s name is an homage to Bradbury’s novel Fahrenheit 451.

Bray began developing the code after being inspired by a blog post by Terence Eden calling for a censorship error code. The code’s official status comes after two years of discussions within the technical community and is a result of campaigning from transparency and civil society advocates who have been pushing for clearer labelling of internet censorship. Initially, the code received pushback from within the technical community for reasons enumerated by Mark Nottingham, Chair of the IETF HTTP Working Group in his blog. However, soon sites began using the code on an experimental and unsanctioned basis and faced with increasing demand for and feedback, the code was accepted.

The HTTP code 451 works as a machine-readable flag and has immense potential as a tool for organisations and users who want to quantify and understand censorship on the internet. Cataloguing online censorship is a challenging, time-consuming and expensive task. The HTTP code 451 circumvents confidentiality obligations built into blocking or licensing regimes and reduces the cost of accessing blocking orders.

The code creates a distinction between websites blocked following a court or an executive order, and when information is inaccessible due to technical errors. If implemented widely, Bray’s new code will help prevent confusion around blocked sites. The code addresses the issue of the ISP’s misleading and inaccurate usage of Error 403 ‘Forbidden’ (to indicate that the server can be reached and understood the request, but refuses to take any further action) or 404 ‘Not Found’ (to indicate that the requested resource could not be found but may be available again in the future).

Adoption of the new standard is optional, though at present there are no laws in India that prevent intermediaries doing so. Implementing a standardised machine-readable flag for censorship will go a long way in bolstering the accountability of ISPs that have in the past targeted an entire domain instead of the specified URL. Adoption of the standard by ISPs will also improve the understanding of the burden imposed on intermediaries for censoring and filtering content as presently, there is no clarity on what constitutes compliance. Of course, censorious governments may prohibit the use of the code, for example by issuing an order that specifies not only that a page be blocked, but also precisely which HTTP return code should be used. Though such sanctions should be viewed as evidence of systematic rights violation and totalitarian regimes.

In India where access to software code repositories such as Github and Sourceforge are routinely restricted, the need for such code is obvious. The use of the code will improve confidence in blocking practices, allowing users to understand the grounds on which their right to information is being restricted. Improving transparency around censorship is the only way to build trust between the government and its citizens about the laws and policies applicable to internet content.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-wire-jyoti-panday-january-29-2016-internet-has-a-new-standard-for-censorship