Centre for Internet and Society

The Government’s Increased Focus on Regulating Non-Personal Data: A Look at the Draft National Data Governance Framework Policy

Digvijay Chaudhary and Anamika Kundu — 2022-06-30T13:24:35Z

Digvijay Chaudhary and Anamika Kundu wrote an article on the National Data Governance Framework Policy. It was edited by Shweta Mohandas.

Introduction

Non Personal Data (‘NPD’) can be understood as any information not relating to an identified or identifiable natural person. The origin of such data can be both human and non-human. Human NPD would be such data which has been anonymised in such a way that the person to whom the data relates cannot be re-identified. Non-human NPD would mean any such data that did not relate to a human being in the first place, for example, weather data. There has been a gradual demonstrated interest in NPD by the government in recent times. This new focus on regulating non personal data can be owed to the economic incentive it provides. In its report, the Sri Krishna committee, released in 2018 agreed that NPD holds considerable strategic or economic interest for the nation, however, it left the questions surrounding NPD to a future committee.

History of NPD Regulation

In 2020, the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (‘MEITY’) constituted an expert committee (‘NPD Committee’) to study various issues relating to NPD and to make suggestions on the regulation of non-personal data. The NPD Committee differentiated NPD into human and non-human NPD, based on the data’s origin. Human NPD would include all information that has been stripped of any personally identifiable information and non-human NPD meant any information that did not contain any personally identifiable information in the first place (eg. weather data). The final report of the NPD Committee is awaited but the Committee came out with a revised draft of its recommendations in December 2020. In its December 2020 report, the NPD Committee proposed the creation of a National Data Protection Authority (‘NPDA’) as it felt this is a new and emerging area of regulation. Thereafter, the Joint Parliamentary Committee on the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019 (‘JPC’) came out with its version of the Data Protection Bill where it amended the short title of the PDP Bill 2019 to Data Protection Bill, 2021 widening the ambit of the Bill to include all types of data. The JPC report focuses only on human NPD, noting that non-personal data is essentially derived from one of the three sets of data - personal data, sensitive personal data, critical personal data - which is either anonymized or is in some way converted into non-re-identifiable data.

On February 21, 2022, the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (‘MEITY’) came out with the Draft India Data Accessibility and Use Policy, 2022 (‘Draft Policy’). The Draft Policy was strongly criticised mainly due to its aims to monetise data through its sale and licensing to body corporates. The Draft Policy had stated that anonymised and non-personal data collected by the State that has “undergone value addition” could be sold for an “appropriate price”. During the Draft Policy’s consultation process, it had been withdrawn several times and then finally removed from the website. The National Data Governance Framework Policy (‘NDGF Policy’) is a successor to this Draft Policy. There is a change in the language put forth in the NDGF Policy from the Draft Policy, where the latter mainly focused on monetary growth. The new NDGF Policy aims to regulate anonymised non-personal data (‘NPD’) kept with governmental authorities and make it accessible for research and improving governance. It wishes to create an ‘India Datasets programme’ which will consist of the aforementioned datasets. While MEITY has opened the draft for public comments, is a need to spell out the procedure in some ways for stakeholders to draft recommendations for the NDGF policies in an informed manner. Through this piece, we discuss the NDGF Policy in terms of issues related to the absence of a comprehensive Data Protection Framework in India and the jurisdictional overlap of authorities under the NDGF Policy and DPB.

What the National Data Governance Framework Policy Says

Presently in India, NPD is stored in a variety of governmental departments and bodies. It is difficult to access and use this stored data for governmental functions without modernising collection and management of governmental data. Through the NDGF Policy, the government aims to build an Indian data storehouse of anonymised non-personal datasets and make it accessible for both improving governance and encouraging research. It imagines the establishment of an Indian Data Office (‘IDO’) set up by MEITY , which shall be responsible for consolidating data access and sharing of non-personal data across the government. In addition, it also mandates a Data Management Unit for every Ministry/department that would work closely with the IDO. IDO will also be responsible for issuing protocols for sharing NPD. The policy further imagines an Indian Data Council (‘IDC’) whose function would be to define frameworks for important datasets, finalise data standards, and Metadata standards and also review the implementation of the policy. The NDGF Policy has provided a broad structure concerning the setting up of anonymisation standards, data retention policies, data quality, and data sharing toolkit. The NDGF Policy states that these standards shall be developed and notified by the IDO or MEITY or the Ministry in question and need to be adhered to by all entities.

The Data Protection Framework in India

The report adopted by the JPC, felt that it is simpler to enact a single law and a single regulator to oversee all the data that originates from any data principal and is in the custody of any data fiduciary. According to the JPC, the draft Bill deals with various kinds of data at various levels of security. The JPC also recommended that since the Data Protection Bill (‘DPB’) will handle both personal and non-personal data, any further policy / legal framework on non-personal data may be made a part of the same enactment instead of any separate legislation. The draft DPB states that what is to be done with the NDP shall be decided by the government from time to time according to its policy. As such, neither the DPB, 2021 nor the NDGF Policy go into details of regulating NPD but only provide a broad structure of facilitating free-flow of NPD, without taking into account the specific concerns that have been raised since the NPD committee came out with its draft report on regulating NPD dated December 2020.

Jurisdictional overlaps among authorities and other concerns

Under the NDGF policy, all guidelines and rules shall be published by a body known as the Indian Data Management Office (‘IDMO’). The IDMO is set to function under the MEITY and work with the Central government, state governments and other stakeholders to set standards. Currently, there is no sign of when the DPB will be passed as law. According to the JPC, the reason for including NPD within the DPB was because of the impossibility to differentiate between PD and NPD. There are also certain overlaps between the DPB and the NDGF which are not discussed by the NDGF. NDGF does not discuss the overlap between the IDMO and Data Protection Authority (‘DPA’) established under the DPB 2021.

Under the DPB, the DPA is tasked with specifying codes of practice under clause 49. On the other hand, the NDGF has imagined the setting up of IDO, IDMO, and the IDC, which shall be responsible for issuing codes of practice such as data retention, and data anonymisation, and data quality standards. As such, there appears to be some overlap in the functions of the to-be-constituted DPA and the NDGF Policy.

Furthermore, while the NDGF Policy aims to promote openness with respect to government data, there is a conflict with open government data (‘OGD’) principles when there is a price attached to such data. OGD is data which is collected and processed by the government for free use, reuse and distribution. Any database created by the government must be publicly accessible to ensure compliance with the OGD principles.

Conclusion

Streamlining datasets across different authorities is a huge challenge for the government and hence the NGDF policy in its current draft requires a lot of clarification. The government can take inspiration from the European Union which in 2018, came out with a principles-based approach coupled with self-regulation on the framework of the free flow of non-personal data. The guidance on the free-flow of non-personal data defines non-personal data based on the origin of data - data which originally did not relate to any personal data (non-human NPD) and data which originated from personal data but was subsequently anonymised (human NPD). The regulation further realises the reality of mixed data sets and regulates only the non-personal part of such datasets and where the datasets are inextricably linked, the GDPR would apply to such datasets. Moreover, any policy that seeks to govern the free flow of NPD ought to make it clear that in case of re-identification of anonymised data, such re-identified data would be considered personal data. The DPB, 2021 and the NGDF, both fail to take into account this difference.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/national-data-governance-framework-policy

WIPO SCCR 42: Statement by CIS on the Limitations and Exceptions Agenda Item

sinha — 2022-05-12T08:41:01Z

Anubha Sinha delivered a statement on behalf of CIS, on day 3 of the 42nd WIPO SCCR session on the Limitations and Exceptions Agenda Item.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I’m speaking on behalf of the Centre for Internet and Society, India.

The Proposal by the African Group for a Draft work program on Exceptions and Limitations has the potential to address issues faced in the domains of access to information, culture and education, keeping in mind that there have been systemic shifts in the knowledge ecosystem since pandemic, which will endure in the long term as well.

In India, researchers at public and private institutions in both in science and social science disciplines over the period of 2020-2021, submitted to a court of law that they faced serious challenges in remotely accessing research, especially journal articles during the pandemic.In the same vein, a study by the Confederation of Open Access Repositories found that copyright and licensing were an impediment to discovery of, and access to, COVID-19 research outputs, inhibiting research collaborations.

At WIPO, in the past few years, numerous exercises such as action plans and regional seminars implemented by this committee recognised limitations and exceptions for education and research as a priority. Digital Preservation emerged as a consensual solution that could be acted on - as identified in the regional seminar report as well.

We believe that the Proposal by the African Group for a Draft work program on Exceptions and Limitations effectively prioritises these actionable aspects without prejudging the outcome of the negotiations on the limitations and exceptions agenda. Hence, we look forward to member states making progress by constructively considering and acting on the way forward laid in the Proposal.

Thank you.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/wipo-sccr-42-statement-by-cis-on-the-limitations-and-exceptions-agenda-item

Studying Platform Work in Mumbai & New Delhi

Anushree Gupta, Rajendra Jadhav, Sarah Zia, Simiran Lalvani and Noopur Raval — 2022-05-05T17:13:10Z

A report by Centre for Internet & Society (CIS) and Azim Premji University (APU) maps platform work in India and notes from four studies of workers driving taxis and delivering food for platform companies.

Introduction

With the arrival and rapid spread of gig platforms in India and across the world, scholars across fields – from economics and sociology to digital and new media studies – started to investigate how app-based gig platforms are affecting large and small-scale social and economic transformations. In the ‘first wave’ of gig economy research, scholars questioned the nomenclature itself, debating whether it should be called the ‘sharing economy’, gig economy, or rental economy. The impetus for these debates was, perhaps, that we already had some existing models for the sharing economy that largely drew on the idea of ‘the commons’ – or the general understanding that highly networked environments would offer people the opportunity to share their knowledge and spare resources freely, without charge, thus bypassing established corporate oligopolies as well as national and international laws that restricted free movement and access to knowledge and resources – especially for people from the so-called ‘developing’ world. To that effect, there exists valuable research now that bridges the moment of the sharing economy with the gig economy. For instance, Lampinen and colleagues studied older platforms and communities, like Couch Surfing, which allowed people to host and live on other people’s couches (or in their spare rooms) for no cost. The same set of scholars also studied Air Bnb and offered comparative understandings of how norms and expectations around partaking in (someone’s) idle resources change when the ‘gig logic’ enters the frame and platforms become real-time marketplaces for the exchange of goods and services, as against a temporally slower and more altruistic community-based model of sharing.

The ‘second wave’ of gig economy research, mostly originating in and responding to technological,social, and economic developments in North America and Western Europe, has focused on the disruptive effects of gig platforms on employment trends and the future of work. To elaborate, these scholars argue that gig platforms, by offering the promise of flexible work and quick earnings, but not the benefits of full-time, standard employment,are contributing to the ongoing casualisation and precaritisation of work at large. As marketplaces powered by algorithmic decision-making,platforms often argue that the resultant prices as well as earnings are not a product of human or organisational decisions but rather a result of algorithmic decisions and data points. Since these algorithmic systems are ‘black boxed’ or treated as highly confidential intellectual property, there is little scope to audit or ‘peek’ into their workings to understand how or why ‘real-time dynamic surge pricing’ works the way it does. A related host of issues concerns over the employment status of gig platform workers. As critics of platforms have noted, while platform companies classify workers as ‘independent contractors’ or‘vendors’, gig workers satisfy all the requirements of the employment test and thus deserve tobe recognised and compensated as full-time employees. In a landmark case brought forth by gig worker representatives in the UK, the court did recognise platform workers as employees and called for companies to reclassify them as such. Underlying debates around employment classification, compensation, and job security are united by a centralised theme that resonates with labour scholars globally – the (in)formalisation of work.

Reclassifying gig workers as full-time employees would further make them eligible for paid sick leave, maternity leave, and other health benefits, and would possibly make them eligible for minimum wage as well, thus leading to the formalisation and increased regulation of gig work.As scholars of platform work (including crowdwork) outside of industrialised countries have noted, even reclassification or simply recognising these jobs as a part of the formal sector may not necessarily translate to similar benefits or increased salaries in the longer term. Juxtaposed against a landscape of ubiquitous informality, as in the case of India, gig work does offer some features and affordances of formal work, such as financialisation, formal contracts, and the ability to at least appeal unfair practices, albeit to a limited degree. However, formalisation for its own sake in traditional legal and economistic terms may neither be possible nor entirely in response to the unique moment of precarity in the global South, where youth unemployment and skill and job misalignment, among other structural issues, inform the horizon of what kinds of futures are possible and how to attain them.

However, investigating questions of work, futures, and digital participation are not merely about finding answers to challenges in structural economic development and long- and short-term policy-making. The present, so to speak, is far from being determined by, or lived out in, the service of state or corporate visions; it is not the result of what happens between people as they participate on digital platforms. What happens to urban spaces; notions of kinship, publicity, social relationships, and hierarchies; and quotidian understandings of money, desire, aspirations, respect, morals, and justice is equally rich and important when understanding social transformation and the contribution of digital media to social change. Further, rather than approach economic, social, and cultural encounters as separate, we find it valuable to unpack platform encounters and exchanges, as we describe them in this report, as socio-technical and digital-cultural texts that hold within them the working out of macro and micro phenomena. Why and how rural, urban, migrant, and local workers take up gig work and invest in certain kinds of smartphones, cars, scooters, friendships, relationships, and uniforms cannot be attributed only to economic rationality or macro-sociological factors. But, simultaneously, in addition to these material cues, the conversations between gig workers, the norms they hold, and the norms that are in the process of being worked out as they go through their daily motions and emotions, their changing fashioning of the self, the perplexity resulting from daily work within an environment where they get very little information beforehand – all these are important forms of evidence to understand the human-machine encounter within a global South context and the resultant transformation of the self and society. Class, gender, and caste power in urban India are constantly being asserted, challenged, and reworked, not just through visible, large-scale social movements, but also through habits of consumption, intimate conversation, and encounters with the ‘other’. In the field reports that follow, researchers have tried to mine and attend to these daily intimate platform encounters to produce traces of what is ongoing and still being worked out: the process of platformisation and its social, cultural, and digital effects.

When we imagined this project, we were responding to some of the gaps as well as the disciplinary orthodoxy of scholarship that dictates platform studies and digital labour scholarship. We deliberately wanted to follow and replicate more generative approaches to the study of capitalisms and platform capitalism in this case. To that effect, we wanted to focus on the life worlds and laboring practices of gig workers, looking beyond the money they make through apps, how they are treated by platform companies, and how they resist their algorithmic management. As we succeeded in some measure through each field report, our aim was to recentre gig platform scholarship around who these workers are as urban dwellers, as gendered, caste, and class-ed bodies navigating Indian city spaces, and how their aspirations, constraints, and understandings of success, money, safety, and respect inform their encounters with the platform company, customers, police personnel, and the app itself.

We, the team at the Centre for Internet and Society, Bangalore, as well as co-principal investigator (PI), Noopur Raval, and field researchers, Anushree Gupta, Rajendra Jadhav, Sarah Zia, and Simiran Lalvani, are grateful to the Azim Premji University Research Grants Programme for their generous sponsorship and support for the project. This project contributes to thinking about the Future(s) of Work theme that is an active area of inquiry within the university and beyond. To reiterate, digital labour and platform studies scholarship in India and the global South is still at a nascent stage. Since the time we conceptualised, conducted, and analysed this gig work research, more studies have emerged (including studies by other researchers at CIS), and our report adds to this growing field of inquiry. The insights we present far from foreclose the questions or even the lines of inquiry that we open here. The report is structured as follows: we begin by reflecting on the changes in the gig work landscape after the COVID-19 pandemic, specifically in terms of how the pandemic has affected working-class communities, and, by extension, those who work in the platform economy. Subsequently, we present individual field reports by three field researchers, Sarah Zia, Simiran Lalvani, and Anushree Gupta, who reflect on their studies of gig work in Mumbai and Delhi, respectively. The report ends with a short conclusion and some methodological reflections that we gathered during the project.

Access the full report here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/cis-and-apu-studying-platform-work-in-mumbai-and-new-delhi

Decoding India’s Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC)

Vipul Kharbanda — 2022-04-06T09:13:48Z

In her budget speech presented in the Parliament on 1 February 2022, the Finance Minister of India – Nirmala Sitharaman – announced that India will launch its own Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) from the financial year 2022–23. The lack of information regarding the Indian CBDC project has resulted in limited discussions in the public sphere. This article is an attempt to briefly discuss the basics of CBDCs such as the definition, necessity, risks, models, and associated technologies so as to shed more light on India’s CBDC project.

1. What is a CBDC?

Before delving into the various aspects of a CBDC, we must first define it. A CBDC in its simplest form has been described by the RBI as “the same as currency issued by a central bank but [which] takes a different form than paper (or polymer). It is sovereign currency in an electronic form and it would appear as liability (currency in circulation) on a central bank’s balance sheet. The underlying technology, form and use of a CBDC can be moulded for specific requirements. CBDCs should be exchangeable at par with cash.”

2. Policy Goals

Launching any CBDC involves the setting up of infrastructure, which comes with notable costs. It is therefore imperative that the CBDC provides significant advantages that can justify the investment it entails. Some of the major arguments in favour of CBDCs and their relevance in the Indian context are as follows.

Financial Inclusion: In countries with underdeveloped banking and payment systems, proponents believe that CBDCs can boost financial inclusion through the provision of basic accounts and an electronic payment system operated by the central bank. However, financial inclusion may not be a powerful motive in India, where at least one member in 99% of rural and urban households have a bank account, according to some surveys. Even the US Federal Reserve recognises that further research is needed to assess the potential of CBDCs to expand financial inclusion, especially among underserved and lower-income households.

Access to Payments: – It is claimed that CBDCs provide scope for improving the existing payments landscape by offering fast and efficient payment services to users. Further, supporters claim that a well-designed, robust, open CBDC platform could enable a wide variety of firms to compete to offer payment services. It could also enable them to innovate and generate new capabilities to meet the evolving needs of an increasingly digitalised economy. However, it is not yet clear exactly how CBDCs would achieve this objective and whether there would be any noticeable improvements in the payment systems space in India, which already boasts of a fairly advanced and well-developed payment systems market.

Increased System Resilience: Countries with a highly developed digital payments landscape are aware of their reliance on electronic payment systems. The operational resilience of these systems is of critical importance to the entire payments landscape. The CBDC would not only act as a backup to existing payment systems in case of an emergency but also reduce the credit risk and liquidity risk, i.e., the risk that payment system providers will turn insolvent and run out of liquidity. Such risks can also be mitigated through robust regulatory supervision of the entities in the payment systems space.

Increasing Competition: A CBDC has the potential to increase competition in the country’s payments sector in two main ways, (i) directly – by providing an alternative payment system that competes with existing private players, and (ii) by providing an open platform for private players, thereby reducing entry barriers for newer players offering more innovative services at lower costs.

Addressing Illicit Transactions: Cash offers a level of anonymity that is not always available with existing payment systems. If a CBDC offers the same level of anonymity as cash then it would pose a greater CFT/AML (Combating Financial Terrorism/ Anti-Money Laundering) risk. However, if appropriate CFT/AML requirements are built into the design of the CBDC, it could address some of the concerns regarding its usage in illegal transactions. Such CFT/AML requirements are already being followed by existing banks and payment systems providers.

Reduced Costs: If a CBDC is adopted to the extent that it begins to act as a substitute for cash, it could allow the central bank to print lesser currency, thereby saving costs on printing, transporting, storing, and distributing currency. Such a cost reduction is not exclusive to only CBDTs but can also be achieved through the widespread adoption of existing payment systems.

Reduction in Private Virtual Currencies (VCs): Central banks are of the view that a widely used CBDC will provide users with an alternative toexisting private cryptocurrencies and thereby limit various risks including credit risks, volatility risks, risk of fraud, etc. However if a CBDC does not offer the same level of anonymity or potential for high return on investment that is available with existing VCs, it may not be considered an attractive alternative.

Serving Future Needs: Several central banks see the potential for “programmable money” that can be used to conduct transactions automatically on the fulfilment of certain conditions, rules, or events. Such a feature may be used for automatic routing of tax payments to authorities at the point of sale, shares programmed to pay dividends directly to shareholders, etc. Specific programmable CBDCs can also be issued for certain types of payments such as toward subway fees, shared bike fees, or bus fares. This characteristic of CBDCs has huge potential in India in terms of delivery of various subsidies.

3. Potential Risks

As with most things, CBDCs have certain drawbacks and risks that need to be considered and mitigated in the designing phase itself. A successful and widely adopted CBDC could change the structure and functions of various stakeholders and institutions in the economy.

Both private and public sector banks rely on bank deposits to fund their loan activities. Since bank deposits offer a safe and risk-freeway to park one’s savings, a large number of people utilise this facility, thereby providing banks with a large pool of funds that is utilised for lending activities. A CBDC could offer the public a safer alternative to bank deposits since it eradicates even the minute risk of the bank becoming insolvent making it more secure than regular bank deposits. A widely accepted CBDC could adversely affect bank deposits, thereby reducing the availability of funds for lending by banks and adversely affecting credit facilities in the economy. Further, since a CBDC is a safer form of money, in times of stress, people may opt to convert funds stored in banks into safer CBDCs, which might cause a bank run. However, these issues can be mitigated by making the CBDC deposits non-interest-bearing, thus reducing their attractiveness as an alternative to bank deposits. Further, in times of monetary stress, the central bank could impose restrictions on the amount of bank money that can be converted into the CBDC, just as it has done in the case of cash withdrawals from specific banks when it finds that such banks are undergoing extreme financial stress.

If a significantly large portion of a country’s population adopts a private digital currency, it could seriously hamper the ability of the central bank to carry out several crucial functions, such as implementing the monetary policy, controlling inflation, etc.

It may be safe to say that the question of how CBDCs may affect the economy in general and more specifically, the central bank’s ability to implement monetary policy, seigniorage, financial stability, etc. requires further research and widespread consultation to mitigate any potential risk factors.

4. The Role of the Central Bank in a CBDC

The next issue that requires attention when dealing with CBDCs is the role and level of involvement of the central bank. This would depend not only on the number of additional functions that the central bank is comfortable adopting but also on the maturity of the fintech ecosystem in the country. Broadly speaking, there are three basic models concerning the role of the central bank in CBDCs:

(i) Unilateral CBDCs: Where the central bank performs all the functions right from issuing the CBDC to carrying out and verifying transactions and also dealing with the users by maintaining their accounts.

(ii) Hybrid or Intermediate Model: In this model, the CBDCs are issued by the central bank, but private firms carry out some of the other functions such as providing wallets to end users, verifying transactions, updating ledgers, etc. These private entities will be regulated by the central bank to ensure that there is sufficient supervision.

(iii) Synthetic CBDCs: In this model, the CBDC itself is not issued by the central bank but by private players. However, these CBDCs are backed by central bank liabilities, thus providing the sovereign stability that is the hallmark of a CBDC.

The mentioned models could also be modified to suit the needs of the economy; e.g., the second model could be modified by not only allowing private players to perform the user-facing functions, but also offering the same functions either by the central bank or even some other public sector enterprise. Such a scenario has the potential to offer services at a reduced price (perhaps with reduced functionalities) thereby fulfilling the financial inclusion and cost reduction policy goals mentioned above.

5. Role of Blockchain Technology

While it is true that the entire concept of a CBDC evolved from cryptocurrencies and that popular cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and Ether are based on blockchain technology, recent research seems to suggest that blockchain may not necessarily be the default technology for a CBDC. Additionally, different jurisdictions have their own views on the merits and demerits of this technology, for example, the Bahamas and the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank have DLT-based systems; however, China has decided that DLT-based systems do not have adequate capacity to process transactions and store data to meet its system requirements.

Similarly, a project by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Currency Initiative and the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston titled “Project Hamilton” to explore the CBDC design space and its technical challenges and opportunities has surmised that a distributed ledger operating under the jurisdiction of different actors is not necessarily crucial. It was found that even if controlled by a single actor, the DLT architecture has downsides such as performance bottlenecks and significantly reduced transaction throughput scalability compared to other options.

6. Conclusion

Although a CBDC potentially offers some advantages, launching one is an expensive and complicated proposition, requiring in-depth research and detailed analyses of a large number of issues, only some of which have been highlighted here. Therefore, before launching a CBDC, central banks issue white papers and consult with the public in addition to major stakeholders, conduct pilot projects, etc. to ensure that the issue is analysed from all possible angles. Although the Reserve Bank of India is examining various issues such as whether the CBDC would be retail or wholesale, the validation mechanism, the underlying technology to be used, distribution architecture, degree of anonymity, etc., it has not yet released any consultation papers or confirmed the completion of any pilot programmes for the CBDC project.

It is, therefore, unclear whether there has been any detailed cost–benefit analysis by the government or the RBI regarding its feasibility and benefits over existing payment systems and whether such benefits justify the costs of investing in a CBDC. For example, several of the potential advantages discussed here, such as financial inclusion and improved payment systems may not be relevant in the Indian context, while others such as reduced costs and a reduction in illegal transactions may be achieved by improving the existing systems. It must be noted that the current system of distribution of central bank money has worked well over the years, and any systemic changes should be made only if the potential upside justifies such fundamental changes.

The Government of India has already announced the launch of the Indian CBDC in early 2023, but the lack of public consultation on such an important project is a matter of concern. The last time the RBI took a major decision in the crypto space without consulting stakeholders was when it banned financial institutions from having any dealings with crypto entities. On that occasion, the circular imposing the ban was struck down by the Supreme Court as violating the fundamental right to trade and profession. It is, therefore, imperative that the government and the Reserve Bank conduct wide-ranging consultations with experts and the public to conduct a detailed and thorough cost–benefit analysis to determine the feasibility of such a project before deciding on the launch of an Indian CBDC.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/decoding-india2019s-central-bank-digital-currency-cbdc

Comments on InDEA 2.0

divyank — 2022-03-22T06:26:39Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/comments-on-indea-2.0

IRC 22 - Proposed Session - #COVID19VaccineDiscourse

Admin — 2022-03-18T10:16:55Z

Details of a session proposed for the Internet Researchers' Conference 2022 - #Home.

Internet Researchers' Conference 2022 - # Home - Call for Sessions

Session Type: Panel Discussion

Session Plan

This panel discusses vaccine hesitancy in the Global North and the Global South as is evident through social media. It is common to talk about the differences between the Global North and the Global South regarding vaccine hesitancy (Makau, 2021). Past studies have looked at economic, social, technological and power gaps regarding the impact of COVID-19 (Makau, 2021). However, our preliminary research suggests there are several similar factors affecting public perceptions of the COVID-19 attitude to vaccines across contexts such as religious beliefs, education, age, lack of trust on public health systems, influence of opinion and religious leaders among others (ECDC, 2022; Kanozia & Arya, 2021; Arce, J.S.S. et. al., 2021).

With the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic the notion of “home” has become a key space for individuals to feel safe and protected from the COVID-19 virus. Playing a vital role in the creation of this space is the use of social media and the ways in which it influences vaccine discourse in online spaces. The availability and effectiveness of the COVID-19 vaccines provides people with the opportunity to return to the public space and embrace their communities outside of the physical space of home. Our concept of “home” encompasses the whole world. Though we will be discussing the similarities of the Global North and the Global South, we will be talking here of the “home” as a community space that makes us feel “home”, inclusive of the divisions that exist between the Global North and the Global South.

World Health Organization has emphasized the significant role of vaccines for ending the pandemic (Dror et al., 2020). Despite the availability of various vaccines globally, vaccine hesitancy has led to visible protests and resistance against vaccine mandates internationally (Kelly, 2022; Ngo, M., Bednar & Ray 2022). There is a gap in understanding how vaccines are a universal need. Questions we raise are the following: If online communication opens dialogue about vaccine hesitancy or further polarizes it, how does it open access to information regarding COVID-19 vaccine availability? Do digital spaces provide a place for discourse and discussion about these topics?

The reasons behind vaccine hesitancy may vary from place to place. Even though geographical borders seem to blur due to the interconnections in the world by the arrival of internet technology and communication, the world order is still often viewed as being dichotomous Global North and Global South to point to the global socio-economic gaps (Roberts et. al., 2015).

This panel plans to study relevant twitter hashtags to understand how social media has been used to drive people towards/against vaccine hesitancy. The data is scraped using computational tools such as Gephi and Netlytic to identify trends such as #antivaksin, #vaccineSideEffects and #pfizer. We will do close readings of the textual data scraped along with an examination of visible networks and clusters within to see what discursive connections emerge across contexts. We therefore identify common and/or contrasting themes across the specific regional contexts from the global south and global north.

References:

Dror et al. (2020). Vaccine hesitancy: the next challenge in the fight against COVID‑19.European Journal of Epidemiology, pp. 775-779.

Carpentier, N. (2017). Discourse. In Keywords for Media Studies. Laurie Ouellette and Jonathan Gray. Ed., New York: NYU Press, pp. 59-62.

Kanozia, R., & Arya, R. (2021). Fake news, religion, and covid-19 vaccine hesitancy in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Media Asia, 48(4), https://doi.org/10.1080/01296612.2021.1921963, pp. 313–321.

Kelly, L. (2022, February 12). NZ, Australia vaccination mandates protests gain in numbers. Reuters. Retrieved March 7, 2022, from https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/new-zealand-australia-vaccination-mandates-protests-gain-numbers-2022-02-12/

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Ngo, M., Bednar, A., & Ray, E. (2022). Trucker Convoy Protesting Covid Mandates Slow Traffic Around Washington. The New York Times. Retrieved March 7, 2022, from https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/06/us/trucker-convoy-dc-beltway.html.

Arce, J.S.S. et. al. (2021). COVID-19 vaccine acceptance and hesitancy in low-andmiddle-income countries, Nature Medicine, VOL 27 1386, 1385–1394, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41591-021-01454-y.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/irc22-proposed-session-covid19vaccinediscourse

Clause 12 Of The Data Protection Bill And Digital Healthcare: A Case Study

amber — 2022-03-01T15:07:44Z

In light of the state’s emerging digital healthcare apparatus, how does Clause 12 alter the consent and purpose limitation model?

The blog post was published in Medianama on February 21, 2022. This is the second in a two-part series by Amber Sinha.

In the previous post, I looked at provisions on non-consensual data processing for state functions under the most recent version of recommendations by the Joint Parliamentary Committee on India’s Data Protection Bill (DPB). The true impact of these provisions can only be appreciated in light of ongoing policy developments and real-life implications.

To appreciate the significance of the dilutions in Clause 12, let us consider the Indian state’s range of schemes promoting digital healthcare. In July 2018, NITI Aayog, a central government policy think tank in India released a strategy and approach paper (Strategy Paper) on the formulation of the National Health Stack which envisions the creation of a federated application programming interface (API)-enabled health information ecosystem. While the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare has focused on the creation of Electronic Health Records (EHR) Standards for India during the last few years and also identified a contractor for the creation of a centralised health information platform (IHIP), this Strategy Paper advocates a completely different approach, which is described as a Personal Health Records (PHR) framework. In 2021, the National Digital Health Mission (NDHM) was launched under which a citizen shall have the option to obtain a digital health ID. A digital health ID is a unique ID and will carry all health records of a person.

A Stack Model for Big Data Ecosystem in Healthcare

A stack model as envisaged in the Strategy Paper, consists of several layers of open APIs connected to each other, often tied together by a unique health identifier. The open nature of APIs has the advantage that it allows public and private actors to build solutions on top of it, which are interoperable with all parts of the stack. It is however worth considering both the ‘openness’ and the role that the state plays in it.

Even though the APIs are themselves open, they are a part of a pre-decided technological paradigm, built by private actors and blessed by the state. Even though innovators can build on it, the options available to them are limited by the information architecture created by the stack model. When such a technological paradigm is created for healthcare reform and health data, the stack model poses additional challenges. By tying the stack model to the unique identity, without appropriate processes in place for access control, siloed information, and encrypted communication, the stack model poses tremendous privacy and security concerns. The broad language under Clause 12 of the DPB needs to be looked at in this context.

Clause 12 allows non-consensual processing of personal data where it is necessary “for the performance of any function of the state authorised by law” in order to provide a service or benefit from the State. In the previous post, I had highlighted the import of the use of only ‘necessity’ to the exclusion of ‘proportionality’. Now, we need to consider its significance in light of the emerging digital healthcare apparatus being created by the state.

The National Health Stack and National Digital Health Mission together envision an intricate system of data collection and exchange which in a regulatory vacuum would ensure unfettered access to sensitive healthcare data for both the state and private actors registered with the platforms. The Stack framework relies on repositories where data may be accessed from multiple nodes within the system. Importantly, the Strategy Paper also envisions health data fiduciaries to facilitate consent-driven interaction between entities that generate the health data and entities that want to consume the health records for delivering services to the individual. The cast of characters involve the National Health Authority, health care providers and insurers who access the National Health Electronic Registries, unified data from different programmes such as National Health Resource Repository (NHRR), NIN database, NIC and the Registry of Hospitals in Network of Insurance (ROHINI), private actors such as Swasth, iSpirt who assist the Mission as volunteers. The currency that government and private actors are interested in is data.

The promised benefits of healthcare data in an anonymised and aggregate form range from Disease Surveillance to Pharmacovigilance as well as Health Schemes Management Systems and Nutrition Management, benefits which have only been more acutely emphasised during the pandemic. However, the pandemic has also normalised the sharing of sensitive healthcare data with a variety of actors, without much thinking on much-needed data minimisation practises.

The potential misuses of healthcare data include greater state surveillance and control, predatory and discriminatory practices by private actors which rely on Clause 12 to do away with even the pretense of informed consent so long as the processing of data is deemed necessary by the state and its private sector partners to provide any service or benefit.

Subclause (e) in Clause 12, which was added in the last version of the Bill drafted by MeitY and has been retained by the JPC, allows processing wherever it is necessary for ‘any measures’ to provide medical treatment or health services during an epidemic, outbreak or threat to public health. Yet again, the overly-broad language used here is designed to ensure that any annoyances of informed consent can be easily brushed aside wherever the state intends to take any measures under any scheme related to public health.

Effectively, how does the framework under Clause 12 alter the consent and purpose limitation model? Data protection laws introduce an element of control by tying purpose limitation to consent. Individuals provide consent to specified purposes, and data processors are required to respect that choice. Where there is no consent, the purposes of data processing are sought to be limited by the necessity principle in Clause 12. The state (or authorised parties) must be able to demonstrate necessity to the exercise of state function, and data must only be processed for those purposes which flow out of this necessity. However, unlike the consent model, this provides an opportunity to keep reinventing purposes for different state functions.

In the absence of a data protection law, data collected by one agency is shared indiscriminately with other agencies and used for multiple purposes beyond the purpose for which it was collected. The consent and purpose limitation model would have addressed this issue. But, by having a low threshold for non-consensual processing under Clause 12, this form of data processing is effectively being legitimised.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/medianama-february-21-2022-amber-sinha-data-protection-bill-digital-healthcare-case-study

General Comments on Data Protection Bill

Pallavi Bedi and Shweta Mohandas — 2022-02-14T15:55:10Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/general-comments-data-protection-bill.pdf

Submission to the Facebook Oversight Board: Policy on Cross-checks

2022-02-09T05:31:32Z

The Centre for Internet & Society (CIS) submitted public comments to the Facebook Oversight Board on a policy consultation.

Whether a cross-check system is needed?

Recommendation for the Board: The Board should investigate the cross-check system as part of Meta’s larger problems with algorithmically amplified speech, and how such speech gets moderated.

Explanation: The issues surrounding Meta’s cross-check system are not an isolated phenomena, but rather a reflection of the problems of algorithmically amplified speech, as well the lack of transparency in the company’s content moderation processes at large. At the outset, it must be stated that the majority of information on the cross-check system only became available after the media reports published by the Wall Street Journal. While these reports have been extensive in documenting various aspects of the system, there is no guarantee that the disclosures obtained by them provides the complete picture regarding the system. Further, given that Meta has been found to purposely mislead the Board and the public on how the cross-check system operates, it is worth investigating the incentives that necessitate the cross-check system in the first place.

Meta claims that the cross-check system works as a check for false positives: they “employ additional reviews for high-visibility content that may violate our policies.” Essentially they want to make sure that content that stays up on the platform and reaches a large audience, is following their content guidelines. However, previous disclosures have proven policy executives have prioritized the company’s ‘business interests’ over removing content that violates their policies; and have waited to act on known problematic content until significant external pressure was built up, including in India. In this context, the cross-check system seems less like a measure designed to protect users who might be exposed to problematic content, and more as a measure for managing public perception of the company.

Thus the Board should investigate both how content gains an audience on the platform, and how it gets moderated. Previous whistleblower disclosures have shown that the mechanics of algorithmically amplified speech, which prioritizes engagement and growth over safety, are easily taken advantage of by bad actors to promote their viewpoints through artificially induced virality. The cross-check system and other measures of content moderation at scale would not be needed if it was harder to spread problematic content on the platform in the first place. Instead of focusing only on one specific system, the Board needs to urge Meta to re-evaluate the incentives that drive content sharing on the platform and come up with ways that make the platform safer.

Meta’s Obligations under Human Rights Law

Recommendation for the Board: The Board must consider the cross-check system to be violative of Meta’s obligations under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Additionally, the cross-check ranker must be incorporated with Meta’s commitments towards human rights, as outlined in its Corporate Human Rights Policy.

Explanation: Meta’s content moderation, and by extension, its cross-check system, is bound by both international human rights law as well as the Board’s past decisions. At the outset, The system fails the three-pronged test of legality, legitimacy and necessity and proportionality, as delineated under Article 19(3) of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Firstly, this system has been “scattered throughout the company, without clear governance or ownership”, which violates the legality principle, since there is no clear guidance on what sort of speech, or which classes of users, would deserve the treatment of this system. Secondly, there is no understanding about the legitimacy of aims with which this system had been set up in the first place, beyond Meta’s own assertions, which have been countered by evidence to the contrary. Thirdly, the necessity and proportionality of the restriction has to be read along with the Rabat Plan of Action, which requires that for a statement to become a criminal offense, a six-pronged test of threshold is to be applied: a) the social and political context, b) the speaker’s position or status in the society, c) intent to incite the audience against a target group, d) content and form of the speech, e) extent of its dissemination and f) likelihood of harm. As news reports have indicated, Meta has been utilizing the cross-check system to privilege speech from influential users, and in the process, have shielded inflammatory, inciting speech that would have otherwise qualified the Rabat threshold. As such, the third requirement is not fulfilled either.

Additionally, Meta’s own Corporate Human Rights Policy commits to respecting human rights in line with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs). Therefore, the cross-check ranker must incorporate these existing commitments to human rights, including:

The right to freedom of expression:, UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression report A/HRC/38/35 (2018); Joint Statement of international freedom of expression monitors on COVID-19 (March, 2020).

The Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression addresses the regulation of user-generated online content.

The Joint Statement issued regarding Governmental promotion and protection of access to and free flow of information during the pandemic.

The right to non-discrimination: International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), Articles 1 and 4.

Article 1 of the ICERD defines racial discrimination.

Article 4 of the ICERD condemns propaganda and organisations that attempt to justify discrimination or are based on the idea of racial supremacism.

Participation in public affairs and the right to vote: ICCPR Article 25.
The right to remedy: General Comment No. 31, Human Rights Committee (2004) (General Comment 31); UNGPs, Principle 22.

The General Comment discusses the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on State Parties to the Covenant.

Guiding Principle 22 states that where business enterprises identify that they have caused or contributed to adverse impacts, they should provide for or cooperate in their remediation through legitimate processes.

Meta’s obligations to avoid political bias and false positives in its cross-check system

Recommendation for the Board: The Board must urge Meta to adopt and implement the Santa Clara Principles on Transparency and Accountability to ensure that it is open about risks to user rights when there is involvement from the State in content moderation. Additionally, the Board must ask Meta to undertake a diversity and human rights audit of its existing policy teams, and commit to regular cultural training for its staff. Finally, the Board must investigate the potential conflicts of interest that arise when Meta’s policy team has any sort of nexus with political parties, and how that might impact content moderation.

Explanation: For the cross-check system to be free from biases, it is important for Meta to come clear to the Board regarding the rationale, standards and processes of the cross check review, and report on the relative error rates of determinations made through cross check compared with ordinary enforcement procedures. It also needs to disclose to the Board in which particular situations it uses the system and in which it does not. Principle 4 under the Foundational Principles of the Santa Clara Principles on Transparency and Accountability in Content Moderation encourage companies to realize the risk to user rights when there is involvement from the State in processes of content moderation and asks companies to makes users aware that: a) a state actor has requested/participated in an action on their content/account, and b) the company believes that the action was needed as per the relevant law. Users should be allowed access to any rules or policies, formal or informal work relationships that the company holds with state actors in terms of content regulation, the process of flagging accounts/content and state requests to action.

The Board must consider that erroneous lack of action (false positives) might not always be a system's flaw, but a larger, structural issue regarding how policy teams at Meta functions. As previous disclosures have proven, the contours of what sort of violating content gets to stay up on the platform has been ideologically and politically coloured, as policy executives have prioritized the company’s ‘business interests’ over social harmony. In such light, it is not sufficient to simply propose better transparency and accountability measures for Meta to adopt within its content moderation processes to avoid political bias. Rather, the Board’s recommendations must focus on the structural aspect of the human moderator and policy team that is behind these processes. The Board must ask Meta to a) urgently undertake a diversity and human rights audit of its existing team and its hiring processes, b) commit to regular training to ensure that their policy staffs are culturally literate in the socio-political regions they work in. Further, the Board must seriously investigate the potential conflicts of interest that happen when regional policy teams of Meta, with nexus to political parties, are also tasked with regulating content from representatives of these parties, and how that impacts the moderation processes at large.

Finally, in case decision 2021-001-FB-FBR, the Board made a number of recommendations to Meta which must be implemented in the current situation, including: a) considering the political context while looking at potential risks, b) employment of specialized staff in content moderation while evaluating political speech from influential users, c) familiarity with the political and linguistic context d) absence of any interference and undue influence, e) public explanation regarding the rules Meta uses when imposing sanctions against influential users and f) the sanctions being time-bound.

Transparency of the cross-check system

Recommendation for the Board: The Board must urge Meta to adopt and implement the Santa Clara Principles on Transparency and Accountability to increase the transparency of its cross-check system.

Explanation: There are ways in which Meta can increase the transparency of not only the cross-check system, but the content moderation process in general. The following recommendations draw from The Santa Clara Principles and the Board’s own previous decisions:

Considering Principle 2 of the Santa Clara Principles: Understandable Rules and Policies, Meta should ensure that the policies and rules governing moderation of content and user behaviors on Facebook are clear, easily understandable, and available in the languages in which the user operates.

Drawing from Principle 5 on Integrity and Explainability and from the Board’s recommendations in case decision 2021-001-FB-FBR which advises Meta to“Provide users with accessible information on how many violations, strikes and penalties have been assessed against them, and the consequences that will follow future violations”, Meta should be able to explain the content moderation decisions to users in all cases: when under review, when the decision has been made to leave the content up, or take it down. We recommend that Meta keeps a publicly accessible running tally of the number of moderation decisions made on a piece of content till date with their explanations. This would allow third parties (like journalists, activists, researchers and the OSB) to keep Facebook accountable when it does not follow its own policies, as has previously been the case.

In the same case decision, the Board has also previously recommended that Meta “Produce more information to help users understand and evaluate the process and criteria for applying the newsworthiness allowance, including how it applies to influential accounts. The company should also clearly explain the rationale, standards and processes of the cross-check review, and report on the relative error rates of determinations made through cross-checking compared with ordinary enforcement procedures.” Thus, Meta should publicly explain the cross check system in detail with examples, and make public the list of attributes that qualify a piece of content for secondary review.

The Operational Principles further provide actionable steps that Meta can take to improve the transparency of their content moderation systems. Drawing from Principle 2: Notice and Principle 3: Appeals, Meta should make a satisfactory appeals process available to users - whether they be decisions to leave up or takedown content. The appeals process should be handled by context aware teams. Meta should then publish the results of the cross check system and the appeals processes as part of their transparency reports including data like total content actioned, rate of success in appeals and cross check process, decisions overturned and preserved etc, which would also satisfy the first Operational Principle: Numbers.

Resources needed to improve the system for users and entities who do not post in English

Recommendations for the Board: The Board must urge Meta to urgently invest in resources to expand Meta’s content moderation services into the local contexts in which the company operates and invest in training data for local languages.

Explanation: The cross-check system is not a fundamentally different problem than content moderation. It has been shown time and time again that Meta’s handling of content from non-Western, non-English language contexts is severely lacking. It has been shown how content hosted on the platform has been used to inflame existing tensions in developing countries, promote religious hatred in India, genocide in Mynmar, and continue to support human traffickers and drug cartels on the platform even when these issues have been identified.

There is an urgent need to invest resources to expand Meta’s content moderation services into the local contexts in which the company operates. The company should make all policies and rule documents available in the languages of its users; invest in creating automated tools that are capable of flagging content that is not posted in English; and add people familiar with the local contexts to provide context aware second level reviews. The Facebook Files show that even according to company engineering, automated content moderation is still not very effective in identifying hate speech and other harmful content. Meta should focus on hiring, training and retaining human moderators who have knowledge of local contexts. Bias training of all content moderators, but especially those who will participate in the second level reviews in the cross check system is also extremely important to ensure acceptable decisions.

Additionally, in keeping with Meta’s human rights commitments, the company should develop and publish a policy for responding to human rights violations when they are pointed out by activists, researchers, journalists and employees as a matter of due process. It should not wait for a negative news cycle to stir them into action as it seems to have done in previous cases.

Benefits and limitations of automated technologies

Meta recently changed its moderation practice wherein it uses technology to prioritize content for human reviewers based on their severity index. Facebook has not specified the technology it uses to prioritize high-severity content but its research record shows that it uses a host of automated frameworks and tools to detect violating content, including image recognition tools, object detection tools, natural language processing models, speech models and reasoning models. One such model is the Whole Post Integrity Embeddings (“WPIE”) which can judge various elements in a given post (caption, comments, OCR, image etc.) to work out the context and the content of the post. Facebook also uses image matching models (SimSearchNet++) that are trained to match variations of an image with a high degree of precision and improved recall; multi-lingual masked language models on cross-lingual understanding such as XLM-R that can accurately identify hate-speech and other policy-violating content across a wide range of languages. More recently, Facebook introduced its machine translation model called the M2M-100 whose goal is to perform bidirectional translation between 7000 languages.

Despite the advances in this field, there are inherent limitations of such automated tools. Experts have repeatedly maintained that AI will get better at understanding context but it will not replace human moderators for the foreseeable future. One such instance where these limitations were exposed was during the COVID-19 pandemic, when Facebook sent its human moderators home - the number of removals flagged as hate speech on its platform more than doubled to 22.5 million in the second quarter of 2020 but the number of successful content appeals was dropped to 12,600 from the 2.3 million figure for the first three months of 2020.

The Facebook Files show that Meta’s AI cannot consistently identify first-person shooting videos, racist rants and even the difference between cockfighting and car crashes. Its automated systems are only capable of removing posts that generate just 3% to 5% of the views of hate speech on the platform and 0.6% of all content that violates Meta’s policies against violence and incitement. As such, it is difficult to accept the company’s claim that nearly all of the hate speech it takes down was discovered by AI before it was reported by users.

However, the benefits of such technology cannot be discounted, especially when one considers automated technology as a way of reducing trauma for human moderators. Using AI for prioritizing content for review can turn out to be effective for human moderators as it can increase their efficiency and reduce harmful effects of content moderation on them. Additionally, it can also limit the exposure of harmful content to internet users. Moreover, AI can also reduce the impact of harmful content on human moderators by allocating content to moderators on the basis of their exposure history. Theoretically, if the company’s claims are to be believed, using automated technology for prioritizing content for review can help to improve the mental health of Facebook’s human moderators.

Click to download the file here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/submission-to-the-facebook-oversight-board-policy-on-cross-checks

CIS report on Regulation of Private Crypto-Assets in India

aman — 2022-01-27T09:02:52Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/cis-report-on-regulation-of-private-crypto-assets-in-india

Call for respondents: the implementation of government-ordered censorship

Gurshabad Grover and Divyansha Sehgal — 2022-01-04T08:10:25Z

The Centre for Internet and Society is conducting interviews with people whose content has been affected by blocking orders from the Indian Government.

Call for respondents

To study the implementation of online censorship and the experience of content creators, the Centre for Internet and Society is conducting interviews with people whose content has been affected by blocking orders from the Indian Government. We aim to empirically record the extent of government notice and opportunity for hearing made available to content creators.

If you, or someone you know, has had their content blocked or withheld by a blocking order, please reach out to us via email (divyansha[at]cis-india.org) or DM us on Twitter.

The type of content that can includes (but is not limited to):

blocking or withholding access of posts or accounts on social media
blocking or withholding access of websites by ISPs
search results that have been delisted by blocking orders

Please read below for a brief legal background on the powers of the Central Government to issue content takedown orders. If you have any concerns about the nature of attribution of your responses, please reach out: we are confident we will be able to find a solution that works for you.

Background

The rate of online censorship in India is increasing at an alarming rate, with the Government of India ordering around 10,000 webpages/social media accounts to be blocked just in 2020. The legal powers and procedures that enable such censorship thus deserve closer scrutiny. In particular, Section 69A of the Information Technology (IT) Act permits the Central Government to ask intermediaries (ranging from internet service providers to social media platforms) to block certain content for their users. Among other grounds, these powers can be used by the government in the interest of Indian sovereignty, national security, and public order.

The regulations (‘blocking rules’) issued under the Act lay down the procedure for the government to exercise such powers, and have long been criticised for enabling an opaque regime of online censorship. Such orders are passed by a committee comprising only government officials. There is no judicial or parliamentary oversight over such orders. The government does in certain instances have an obligation to find the content creator to give them a notice or hearing, but this has rarely been implemented.

To exacerbate this unaccountable form of censorship, there is a rule mandating the confidentiality of content takedown orders. This means that these orders are not public, severely impeding the ability to challenge broad censorship in courts. There are also cases where even individuals who created the affected content were not able to access the orders! Journalists, civil society organisations and activists are also hindered from probing how widespread India’s online censorship is, since the Government routinely rejects Right to Information (RTI) requests about these orders based on the confidentiality provision or national security grounds.

When this censorship regime was challenged in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, the Supreme Court Court stated that the procedural safeguards were adequate, but such content takedown orders must always be open to challenge in court. Specifically, multiple legal scholars have read the judgment to mean a pre-decisional hearing must be afforded to the affected content creators.

Our forthcoming research project (described above) seeks to empirically investigate whether the Central Government is following this obligation.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/call-for-respondents-the-implementation-of-government-ordered-censorship

Opinion: Delicensing 6 GHz, 60 GHz bands is crucial to improve Wi-Fi scenario in India

abhishek — 2022-01-03T15:30:43Z

Recently, there has been growing demand from industry bodies and associations to delicense 6 GHz and 60 GHz bands in India.

The article by Abhishek Raj was published by the News Minute on December 21, 2021.

The Wi-Fi space has become a lot more exciting with the emergence of new Wi-Fi standards such as Wi-Fi 6E (the latest generation of Wi-Fi) and WiGig (that uses the V-band and offers advantages such as faster gigabit speeds). These standards require airwaves in 6 GHz and 60 GHz frequency bands to operate. As a consequence, governments and telecom regulators across the globe are deliberating on policy options for spectrum allocation in the aforementioned bands.

Stakeholders are divided on the issue of allocating 6 GHz and 60 GHz bands in India. For instance, there are certain telcos who strongly oppose delicensing these bands and demand a licensed framework with the use of auctions for allocation. As per their argument, delicensing the said bands will put their investments at risk and upset a level playing field. Whereas, on the other side, US tech majors Cisco and Intel, alongside industry bodies and forums such as the ITU-APT Foundation of India and Broadband India Forum, are in favor of delicensing. Notably, the delicensed/ unlicensed frequency bands are “free to use” by anyone, and the users need not pay any fees or obtain a license (right to use) from the government. On the contrary, licensed bands come with a “right to exclusive use” and are usually allocated through auction. They have associated costs including auction amount, license fees, usage charges, etc.

In this article, I argue that the government should consider delicensing the 6 GHz band and 60 GHz range in the V-band, simply known as the 60 GHz band, to meet the increasing data demand, provide a better connection experience, and, more importantly, unlock the economic value and potential of these bands.

Evolution of Wi-Fi Standards

Let us begin by understanding the fundamentals of Wi-Fi and its evolution over the years. Wi-Fi is a wireless networking technology based on the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) standard 802.11. To keep things simple, consider ‘Wi-Fi’ a user-friendly name for IEEE 802.11 standard. Since its advent in 1997, Wi-Fi has become an indispensable wireless technology alongside mobile technology. The term ‘Wi-Fi’ is used synonymously with the internet by many users as a result of its widespread use in providing an interface with the internet.

IEEE 802.11 standards have evolved over the years, from 802.11a to 802.11ax. Again, these terms don’t sound so user-friendly, and for this reason, Wi-Fi alliance, a non-profit organisation that owns Wi-Fi trademark, came up with simplified generational names such as Wi-Fi 4, Wi-Fi 5, Wi-Fi 6, etc. The most recent Wi-Fi 6E [read Wi-Fi 6th generation- extended] is a simplified name for IEEE 802.11 ax standard. Needless to say, every new generation of Wi-Fi brings greater speed, lower latency, and a better user experience.

Benefits of Wi-Fi 6E & WiGig: Case for Delicensing

In addition to the pre-existing growth in demand for data, the COVID-19 pandemic has escalated data requirements due to the radical shift to work-from-home, online classes, etc. Dependence on Wi-Fi has increased in parallel to meet this increase in demand. On the other hand, India has only around 700 MHz of spectrum available for unlicensed use, concentrated majorly in 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz bands which are currently used for Wi-Fi services in India. The 2.4 GHz band is already crowded, and the same is anticipated for the latter. In order to support the growing data demand, policymakers in India need to explore the option of opening up more unlicensed spectrum. Notably, the quantum of unlicensed spectrum in India is significantly lower than in other countries such as the USA, UK, China, Japan, and Brazil, all of which have approximately 15,000 MHz of unlicensed spectrum.

The policy reluctance of DoT to delicense more spectrum is partly because of fear of losing out on revenues which licensed spectrum generates, and partly because of a narrow interpretation of Supreme Court’s 2012 judgement. However, considering the recent developments in Wi-Fi, 6 GHz and 60 GHz bands appear to be ideal candidates for creating more unlicensed spectrum. Let us explore this further.

Unlike its previous versions, which operated in either the 2.4 GHz or the 5 GHz band, Wi-Fi 6E operates in the 6 GHz band. The 6 GHz band contains radio frequencies between 5.925 and 7.125 GHz, and is much wider than the 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz bands. The wide channels, along with other distinct features such as lesser interference, enable Wi-Fi 6E to perform with better speeds, even in multi-user connected, congested, and dense networks.

Furthermore, Wi-Fi 6E is a new and niche technology, whose market will undoubtedly develop in the coming years. Indian telecom hardware and software companies have the opportunity to capture a chunk of this market in India as well as globally. We know that service provision in unlicensed bands is less expensive, and thus attracts a lot of innovations. We need to open up the 6 GHz band very soon to foster innovations by indigenous companies. We took a late call on delicensing the 5 GHz band which affected the prospects of Indian innovators and companies. We can’t afford to repeat this.

Similarly, we have WiGig – another exciting Wi-Fi technology. WiGig uses the V-band’s 60 GHz range (i.e., airwaves between 57-71 GHz frequency) to operate. The V-band offers advantages such as faster gigabit speeds and lack of interference due to oxygen absorption within its frequency range, making this band ideal for shared unlicensed use. The government launched a public Wi-Fi initiative of India known as PM-WANI in December 2020. PM-WANI aims to promote broadband in the country through the deployment of public Wi-Fi access points. Supporting such a dense deployment of Wi-Fi access points would require a “fiber speed” backbone. However, cost structure and right-of-way hurdles may be prohibitive for the deployment of fiber backhaul in dense urban environments. WiGig offers a cost-efficient wireless backhaul solution as an alternative to fiber backhaul, with multigigabit speeds and reliability similar to fiber. Delicensing the 60 GHz band can thus especially benefit PM-WANI, because of its potential to provide alternative backhaul solutions.

It is important to remember that unlicensed bands for Wi-Fi access have significant economic value. Although unlicensed bands do not generate direct revenue for the government through auctions, spectrum usage charges, etc., the economic value of unlicensed Wi-Fi is huge. According to a report by Wi-Fi Alliance, the global economic value of Wi-Fi will reach Rs 362 lakh crore (USD 4.9 trillion) by 2025. A BIF (Broadband India Forum) report authored by Prof. Rekha Jain estimates the economic value of Wi-Fi in unlicensed spectrum bands (2.4 GHz, 5GHz, 6 GHz, and 60 GHz) for 2025 to be INR 12.7 lakh crore in India. A major concern raised by telcos recently is that the government might lose out on revenue if 6 GHz and 60 GHz bands are delicensed instead of licensing and sold through auction. However, this concern seems to be evidently misplaced due to the huge economic potential of these bands, as also pointed out by other experts.

Several other jurisdictions have already started delicensing these bands. Almost 35 countries, including the USA, UK, Brazil, UAE, and Korea have delicensed the 6 GHz band, and several others are considering the same. Similarly, around 70 countries across the globe have delicensed the V-band in the 60 GHz range.

Conclusion

Wi-Fi 6E and WiGig are exciting technologies with numerous benefits and will play a crucial role in improving the Wi-Fi scenario in India. Had the 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz bands not been delicensed in the past, could we have even imagined a Wi-Fi revolution? The government must consider delicensing the 6 GHz and 60 GHz bands to bring in the next Wi-Fi revolution.

(The author is thankful to Arindrajit Basu and Isha Suri for their review and suggestions.)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/telecom/blog/the-news-minute-december-21-2021-abhishek-raj-opinion-delicensing-6-ghz-60-ghz-bands-crucial-improve-wi-fi-scenario-india

Gender and gig work: Perspectives from domestic work in India

ambika — 2021-12-07T02:11:49Z

Platforms have the potential to be instrumental in protecting workers rights, but the current platform design is not optimised to protect workers’ interests especially those of women in the gig economy, argues Ambika Tandon, a senior researcher at the Centre for Internet and Society in India and an author of the report on ‘Platforms, Power and Politics: Perspectives from Domestic and Care Work in India’.

Digital labour platforms, broadly defined as digital interfaces that enable the exchange of goods or services, have grown exponentially in cities across the world. In sectors such as transportation and delivery, Uber and similar platforms have achieved dominant status, while in other sectors platforms are still making inroads to transform consumption patterns. Researchers at India’s Centre for Internet and Society, sought to understand the impact platforms have had on the paid domestic and care work sector in India, given its importance for women workers. The workforce in this sector is largely constituted of women from Dalit, Bahujan and Adivasi (or caste-oppressed) and low-income groups, with a long history of socioeconomic and legal devaluation and lack of recognition. In this context, platforms have positioned themselves as intermediaries that will improve wages and conditions of work, pushing the sector towards formalisation.

To assess the impact of digital platforms on processes of recruitment and placement and on organisation and conditions of work, we undertook 60 in-depth interviews between June and November 2019. We chose two metropolitan cities, New Delhi in north India and Bengaluru in south India, as our field sites. These are key nodes in the migration corridors of domestic workers in the country. We spoke to workers who were searching for hourly or regular work through platforms, representatives of platform companies and state and central governments, as well as domestic workers unions. We found that platform design breeds and amplifies exclusion and discrimination along the lines of gender and caste, among other social characteristics.

Uber for domestic work

We found that the function of digital platforms in the sector is contingent on the historical organisation of domestic work, rather than any fundamental re-organisation of the supply chain. Unlike in the global North, platforms in India have thus far been unable to ‘gig-ify’, that is, break up most tasks that constitute domestic work – including child and elderly care and cooking – into short-term granular services that have been standardised. Domestic workers continue to find regular term full-time placements through marketplace platforms, which only connect employers to workers with no other role in determining work conditions. HelpersNearMe and Helper4u are examples of platforms that play this role by listing profiles of workers and making these available to employers. These placements are no different from work in the ‘offline’ sector, with complete informality and very little standardisation around hours, wages, and task constitution. As compared to this, on-demand platforms that offer short-term gigs (similar to the Uber model) have grown exponentially in the ‘deep’ cleaning segment by marketing it as a professional service with higher value than ‘regular’ cleaning services.

The function of digital platforms in the sector is contingent on the historical organisation of domestic work, rather than any fundamental re-organisation of the supply chain.

Cleaning gigs provided by on-demand companies have higher hourly wages than ‘regular’ cleaning services in the traditional sector. But accessing these opportunities requires workers to have regular access to a smartphone throughout the day, to be able to accept or reject tasks and receive payments through a mobile application or web-portal. Women workers from low income families have very low levels of digital access, with most phones being shared between families and controlled by male members. Also, the use of technical equipment such as vacuum cleaners and chemicals has led to deep cleaning being viewed as a masculine task. As a result, almost all cleaning workers we identified in the on-demand sector were men, even though cleaning is a feminised job role in the traditional economy. Some cleaning workers we spoke to did not identify as domestic workers at all, but rather viewed their work as holding a higher status than traditional cleaning. This trend of masculinisation of a job role coinciding with higher wages and social status has also been seen in other sectors globally, such as software programming.

Promises and risks of low-tech platforms

One of the reasons that women workers are more likely to find work through marketplace platforms rather than on-demand agencies is because they only require workers to have a basic or feature phone for one-time registration, and subsequently to answer calls from potential employers or the platform. Most platforms in this category do not intervene in task allocation or terms of work, which are negotiated directly between workers and employers. Algorithms and digital interfaces then only facilitate matching, as opposed to on-demand work where all aspects of the job are determined by the platform. This allows women workers to register using shared family phones, or those of their friends, neighbours, and in the case of one of our respondents, her landlady’s phone number. These platforms then may be able to provide placement opportunities to workers who are unable to find work through word-of-mouth networks. This is especially crucial as a result of the unemployment crisis triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. However, unlike with the on-demand model, these platforms do not offer increased wages or provide better conditions of work.

Although marketplace platforms provide an additional route into finding opportunities in the sector, they also codify employers’ biases through their design. All marketplace platforms and digital placement agencies we reviewed – upwards of 20 companies – provide demographic filters to employers for filtering workers’ profiles. These include information on workers’ gender, age, religion, state of origin, and in one case, even caste. While practices of employing workers based on demographic characteristics are rampant in the sector historically, platforms build them in by design and market them as a key feature of what they are able to offer employers. These open up direct avenues for employers to discriminate against workers from minority religions and oppressed castes. It also reinforces gendered occupational segregation, as employers seek out women workers for feminised roles such as cleaning and care work, and men for tasks such as gardening and plumbing.

Power structures endemic to the domestic work sector continue to thrive in the platform economy, as do gender and caste-based occupational segregation.

Platforms have been making claims of formalising the informal sector, especially in global South economies, through increasing efficiency in matching workers to employers. Despite having the potential to be instrumental in protecting workers rights, currently platform design is not optimised to protect workers’ interests. Power structures endemic to the domestic work sector continue to thrive in the platform economy, as do gender and caste-based occupational segregation. To be able to nudge the sector towards formalisation, platforms need to directly intervene in power structures and co-design with workers, rather than merely functioning as digital recruiters. This could imply adopting practices such as removing demographic details where not relevant, introducing written contracts and minimum wage floors for placements, and addressing gender gaps in some segments of the digital economy.

This work forms part of a project on ‘Platforms, Power and Politics: Perspectives from Domestic and Care Work in India’, supported by the Association for Progressive Communications. You can read more about the project here, and find the full project report here.

This article gives the views of the author and does not represent the position of the Media@LSE blog, nor of the London School of Economics and Political Science.

The blog first published on LSE website can be accessed here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/lse-ambika-tandon-october-21-2021-ambika-tandon-gender-and-gig-work

Facial Recognition Technology in India

Elonnai Hickok, Pallavi Bedi, Aman Nair and Amber Sinha — 2021-09-02T16:17:44Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/facial-recognition-technology-in-india.pdf

Wikimedia Wikimeet India 2021/Report

Nitesh Gill and Tito Dutta — 2021-08-20T14:01:55Z

In March 2020, the whole world came to a standstill. What many deemed as a regular ‘flu’ turned out to be the pandemic that brought everyone to their knees. The things that we always did, we could no longer do them. We were all confined to our homes with no choice but to work online. Hanging out with friends, attending weddings, and being a part of the conferences and seminars suddenly became a part of the past. We started using the word unprecedented a lot.

“If you change the way you look at things, the things you look at change!”

- Wayne Dyer

For the last many months, we have been getting used to this new ‘normal’. Students and teachers are getting accustomed to the classes and tests happening online. What people thought was impossible, has now become possible. No one could have guessed that birthday parties, gatherings, even marriages would be conducted online. We have now got used to being part of webinars, sessions, and conferences online. A2K is not an exception to this. We planned and conducted a national meet named ‘Wikimedia Wikimeet India 2021’.

“Coming together is a beginning; keeping together is progress; working together is success!”

- Henry Ford

Background: We, at A2K, have organised many such training sessions and conferences like Train the Trainer, Media Wiki Training, Advanced Wiki Training. But due to COVID restrictions it was not possible to organise such an event offline this year. So this year, we decided to organise a virtual meet for the Wikimedians of India. This meet was planned and conducted especially for the Wikimedians who are already working or are interested in working on Wikimedia projects that deal with Indian content.

Our main objectives behind organising this meet were to celebrate the work done by Wikimedians of India, to provide an online platform for wiki-learning and skill-share, to support discussions and interactions, to give training on important and relevant topics, and explore the medium of online training and wiki-event for future use.

After all the planning, our three-day event of Wikimedia Wikimeet took place from 19 February to 21 February, 2021.

Community Engagement: We decided to organise this meet as there seemed to be a scarcity in volunteer’s and user’s contribution. Moreover, we have always believed in giving back to the community. So, we took an initiative to keep the community engaged. Our goal was to encourage volunteers and users to come forward and take lead in Wikimedia activities. To make it easy for our volunteers and the users to select their area of interest, we started Request for Comments and Community Engagement. It is a forum where open discussions can take place about and where participants can share their knowledge, expertise, and experience. The tasks that were conducted under this were Logo Design, Translation, and Knowledge on Hybrid / Blended Learning Model.

Modes of Promotion: This event would not have been a success if not for our participants. We began promoting the event by using our India Mailing list. Our next step was to publicise the event on our social media channels and pages and also in messenger groups. We sent bulk messages on Indic Village Pumps announcing that the Wikimedia Wikimeet was about to take place. Our next step was to start a fortnightly newsletter about the event. It was started to notify the people of updates. We encouraged our users to sign up for the newsletter so they would get immediate updates. This way, our volunteers and users knew what was happening with regard to the event and they also came to know what was about to happen in the coming 15 days.

Another thing we did was to put up a blogpost on Diff about our event. Our blogpost stated the importance of organising such an event. We have also discussed the background ideas in the same post. Our next blogpost dealt with the ‘how’ of our event. In it, we discussed the ideas of designing the event. Total 5 blogposts were written and put up. Another article named Wikimedia Wikimeet and Beyond: Ideas and Opinions was written and posted a few months later.

Organisation Methodology: Every great journey begins with one step. With that in mind, we first decided on the organisation methodology. The team tried its best to maintain transparency from planning and organisation till the execution and the end of the meet. This was the first ever large scale meet that we were planning to organise. Thus, some of the resources came in handy in our planning stage. To mention a few, we took inspiration and guidance from Celtic Knot Conference, LD4 Conference, Wikimedia CEE Online Meeting, Creative Commons Global Summit, Italy Wiki Conference, Wikicite Virtual Conference, and Wikimedia Strategy Global Conversation.

Next step the core team took was to appoint a program committee. The main function of this program committee was to select important submissions and presentations. Following are the 5 members of our program committee:

Kiril Simeonovski: He is the founding member of Wikimedia Macedonia and Shared Knowledge and has been the president of Shared Knowledge since 2014.

Netha Hussain: She has been a volunteer in the Wikimedia Movement since 2010. Nowadays she mostly works in English WIkipedia and Wikidata, but she is also active in Commons, Metawiki, and Malayalam Wikipedia.

Shyamal: He is interested in the natural history of India, environmental consciousness in general, and history of science, especially biology.

Mahir256: He is an administrator on Wikidata, an administrator on Bengali Wikisource, and has a native understanding of English language.

Bodhisattwa: He has been a volunteer editor in different Wikimedia projects since 2012. He is mostly active on Bengali Wikisource, Wikimedia Commons, and Wikidata. He is also a part-time coordinator at the Center for Internet and Society - Access to Knowledge.

It was necessary for the participants of this event to register prior to the event. A registration form was open and made available for the duration of a month. After the deadline of this registration form, another special registration form with criteria was given to the participants. The participants were then selected according to the criteria.

The event took place on Zoom. We used the official Zoom account of the Center for Internet and Society. The main reason behind registrations was to avoid zoom-bombing. The eligible participants were given the link to join the event.

Wikimedia Wikimeet was a three - day long event. We tried our best to accommodate all the presenters, moderators, attendees, and participants. Time was set according to them. This was a national level event but we were able to involve a few experienced international experts. So we had to take the Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) as well as the Indian Standard Time (IST) into consideration so that the volunteers, participants, and experts could all attend all the sessions and could engage in fruitful discussions.

Selection of Presentations and Sessions: We received 44 submissions for this event and eventually after discussions 29 were selected to be featured in the event. A committee was given the task to select the submissions based on the topics that are crucial to Indic editors. We also had willing participants from the Wikimedia Foundation as presenters to acquaint the members of Indian community and volunteers with the important topics and issues.

We also invited international guests and experts to speak to our Indian Wikimedian community about the topics that are relevant currently and would be crucial for Indic writers and editors in future. We invited the experts from France to talk about their Lingua Libre project. We also invited the team to talk about Strategy. Our keynote speakers were also invited for this event.

Event: After taking all the submissions into consideration, our program committee made a program schedule for the three-day event. The tracks that were selected by the program committee for the presentations were: Growth of Wikimedia communities and partnerships, Information on technical Aspects and tools, Strategy of Wikimedia movement, GLAM & Content copyrights, etc.

Other than that, we tried to follow the Friendly Space Policy completely. All the rules of the said policy were cleared before the event. The team tried its best to remove the language barrier for our Non-English speakers. We urged the Wikimedians to translate their content in their language for their respective communities. This practice was followed by quite a few Indic Wikimedians.

30 sessions were planned in all. Every session had a separate Etherpad link. As this was a virtual event, this facility was provided for the participants as well as the experts to interact during and after the session. Due to shortage of time, the notes and questions were made on the Etherpad. Experts and presenters wrote their answers on the Etherpad as well. All the sessions and presentations were recorded and are now available to everyone on the Commons under the name Wikimedia Wikimeet India 2021.

During this three-day event, around 200 participants joined in at different times. Out of the 30 presentations, 18 presenters were from India and the remaining were international presenters.

Day 1 (Friday, 19 February, 2021):

There were 9 presentations on Day 1 of the event. After the introduction by Tito Dutta, the keynote speech was delivered by Asaf Bartov (Ijon). This was attended by 86 participants.

After the keynote speech, Dipantshu Das shed a light on ‘Attracting experts to contribute to Wikimedia’. He highlighted that it was the need of the hour. And this work would greatly help communities in India. He talked about urging academicians to contribute to Wikipedia more openly.

Next presentation was made by Sudhanshu Gautam and Angie Muigai. They talked about ‘Growing Wikipedia’s reach in India with a new Wikipedia app’ in their presentation, they talked about the importance of making Wikipedia mobile friendly with the increase of internet users in India. They mentioned that there was an opportunity to provide ideas to increase the readership.

The next two presentations under the growth track were: ‘Help your community grow’ and ‘Introducing newcomers from Wikisource to Wikipedia: A case study from Hindi Wikipedia’. The first session was a 20 minutes long presentation followed by a conversation and it was beneficial to welcome and retain new users to Wikipedia and also increase the quality of new users’ edits. The second presentation shed some light on how to retain the new users and volunteers once they join the community after attending sessions and workshops.

On day 1, there were three presentations about the partnerships: ‘Engaging with partners in the movement! WMF's approach’, ‘GLAM Mapping leads to Wikimedian in Residence’, and ‘Discover Structured Data on Commons for you and your partners’.

In the first presentation, Praveen Das underlined the importance of working with various partners from different fields for mutual growth.

Next presenter Arya Joshi talked about the GLAM mapping research conducted by CIS - A2K and her work with Raja Dinkar Kelkar Museum, Pune. She talked about offline and online documentation of work and creating new opportunities for research.

The final presentation of the day was Discover Structured Data on Commons for you and your partners by Alicia Fagerving. In this session, the presenter gave recommendations to make optimum use of the Structured Data on Commons (SDC) to improve workflow. This presentation was followed by a workshop where the participants edited SDC and then there was a discussion.

Day 2 (Saturday, 20 February, 2021):

Day 2 began with a special morning session and keynote speech by Katherine Maher and Amanda Keton. In her speech, Katherine highlighted how Indian community is important to the Wikimedia movement. She also talked about the growth of emerging communities. Groups and Wikimedians who have been doing good work were also recognised. She talked about relaunching the Grant strategy. It was a fruitful session with comments and question - answers.

After the keynote address, there were 3 presentations that dealt with the technical aspect and issues.

The first talk was about Gadgets and tools for a Wikipedia Editor by Ranjith Siji. He introduced and explained different kinds of scripts and tools required to edit and browse Wikipedia.

The second session was a 60 minute long workshop followed by a conversation about Transforming Data from the Web with OpenRefine. It was conducted by Gnoeee and Ranjith Siji. This was a basic level training given to the new users of OpenRefine.

The last technical presentation was Writing UserScripts and gadgets by Jay Prakash. In his session, the presenter imparted basic to intermediate level training on writing user scripts and explaining how to use it as a gadget on Wiki.

The last 4 sessions of the day dealt with Strategy. The first presentation ‘An update from the Sustainability Initiative’ in this category was made by Gnom from Germany. He gave an update on the Sustainability Initiative. His talk consisted of an update on current developments around environmental sustainability in the Wikimedia movement.

Next presentation named ‘Grants in 2021 - What is the process?’ was by Tanveer Hasan. As a part of the Community Resources team, the presenter shared a process update and gathered feedback on how to improve the strategy relaunch process.

Next presentation titled ‘Movement Strategy and South Asia’ was done by Anna Torres, Hillun Vilayl Napis, Kayode Yussuf, Tanveer Hassan, Mehrdad Pourzaki, Ryan Merkley, and Kaarel Vaidla. In this session, all the presenters talked about the initiatives that are most relevant and important in 2021 in communities of South Asia.

The last session of the day was ‘Distributed leadership and global decision-making - the Interim Global Council’. It was delivered by Mehrdad Pourzaki, Ryan Merkley, and Kaarel Vaidla. They talked about global decision making and distributed leadership. Their aim was to acquaint the South Asian communities to the conversations, possibilities, and updates.

Day 3 (Sunday, 21 February, 2021):

The last day of the event was dedicated to ‘International Mother Language Day’. The day began with 2 consecutive sessions by Dipantshu Das named ‘Copyright, Copyleft, and Wikimedia movement’ and ‘Building a diamond open access journal on Wikimedia platform’. In the first session, the presenter talked about the importance of intellectual property rights and copyright to the Wikimedia movement. In the second session, the presenter talked about the importance of having diamond open access journals especially in India as the article processing charges for open access journals can be very high in India due to conversion rates.

Next session was a workshop conducted by Jayanta Nath on Wikisource. Another workshop was conducted at the same time by Rangan Datta on Wikivoyage.

Next 4 presentations on Day 3 were community based. The first presentation in this series was titled ‘Internship Program in Tamil Wiki Projects’ and was delivered by Neechalkaran. It was a knowledge sharing session on the internship program for college students.

The second presentation was made by Subodh Kulkarni and the title was ‘Re-licensing and Digitisation process in Maharashtra’. The presenter explained the relicensing process taking place in Maharashtra Marathi community, authors, copyright holders, and organisations.

The third session was conducted by Ziko and was named ‘Rules that every wiki needs’. In this session, the presenter introduced the topic ‘law and rules every wiki needs’.

The last session in the Community category was ‘100wikidays’ and it was conducted by Sangram Senapati. In this session, the presenter shared his story of writing an article for Wiki each and every day for 100 days.

The last four presentations of the day were dedicated to language. In the session titled ‘Servants Of Knowledge initiative for Digital Archiving Kannada & other Indic language content’, Omshivprakash talked about the impact of digitisation of art, history, and culture on language preservation. He primarily talked about the Kannada language.

Next session was on ‘Spell4Wiki - Audio upload tool for Wikimedia commons & Multilingual dictionary based on Wiktionary’ by Manimaran. In this presentation, he introduced the Spell4wiki app. He also described the features and benefits of using the said app.

Next session was conducted by invited guest experts from France. The session was about ‘Lingua Libre - record your language’ and ‘Lingua Libre bot and recording wizard’. It was conducted by Adélaïde Calais, Poslovitch, and Yug. Lingua Libre is a website created by Wikimedia France to record vocabulary. Its aim is to build a collaborative and multilingual bank. In the session, the two tools used in the Lingua Libre project, the Record Wizard and the Lingua Libre Bot, were also introduced.

The last session before the closing keynote speech was ‘Section Translation: New Ways to Contribute on Mobile Devices’. It was presented by Amir Aharoni, NGkountas, and Pau Giner. The presenters talked about the content translation extension. Further, they talked about two new features that are to be deployed that can be used by more people in many countries and languages.

The closing keynote speech was given by Tarunno. He spoke about ‘International Mother Language Day - The love for Language and a sound of silence’ The event ended with a closing session by Tito Dutta.

Hurdles we faced: At the beginning, we found it difficult to form a team to organise the event. Due to the pandemic, we were unsure about approaching the wikimedians and were also worried about the participation. As it was a virtual event, the internet was the most important factor in it. Many participants and volunteers faced problems due to low internet connectivity.

Our achievements: This was the first ever national level virtual event conducted in India by A2K. We were able to create a platform for the wikimedians to interact. Though it was initially a national event, we were able to get international guests as well.

We received positive feedback and precious suggestions from the participants. Following are some quotes:

“Productive, helpful sessions. Was very helpful to me personally. Good effort by all involved. If I were to suggest improvements, Would have liked slots for conversations, and networking sessions. A "state of nation" like updates by projects would have helped too. “

“Thanks a lot again, this was a very good event.

Online events are not the same as physical ones but it was still very interesting and useful.”

“I was a presenter and presented a workshop on Wikivoyage. It was a nice program and I'm looking forward to more such virtual and physical events.”

We also received some feedback videos that were an appreciation for A2K. Following are a couple of links:

Manavpreet Kaur

Mehrdad Pourzaki

We also received audio feedback from Ashwin Bandur.

What’s next?!: After all the stumbles and hurdles and achievements we had in Wikimedia Wikimeet India 2021, we have already started planning for Wikimedia Wikimeet India 2022. Tito Dutta has written about the planning for next year’s meet.

“It is not knowledge, but the act of learning, not possession but the act of getting there, which grants the greatest enjoyment.”

- Carl Friedrich Gauss

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/wikimedia-wikimeet-india-2021-report