Centre for Internet and Society

CIS joins the Christchurch Call Advisory Network

Admin — 2019-09-25T13:57:49Z

Centre for Internet & Society's application for membership of the Christchurch Call Advisory Network has been accepted! As a part of this network, we, along with other civil society groups based out of various jurisdictions, would be providing inputs on making the Call a robust, human rights-centred initiative.

The Christchurch Call Advisory Network membership has been drawn from interested civil society groups, who represent a range of perspectives, including human rights, freedom of expression, digital rights, counter-radicalization, victim support and public policy. Many of the Advisory Network members have been engaged on the Christchurch Call since its launch and are committed to continuing to share their expertise.

The Christchurch Call Advisory Network

Access Now
Africa Digital Policy Project
Annenberg Public Policy Center, University of Pennsylvania
Article 19
Association for Progressive Communications
Brookings Institution
Center for Humane Technology
Centre for Internet and Society, India
Chicago Project on Security and Threats, University of Chicago
Committee to Protect Journalists
Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)
Dangerous Speech Project
Data & Society
Electronic Frontier Foundation
French National Bar Council
Global Disinformation Index
Global Forum for Media Development (GFMD)
Global Partners Digital
Global Network Initiative
Hedayah Center
Human Rights Centre, UC, Berkeley School of Law
ICT for Peace Foundation
Institute for Strategic Dialogue
International Cyber Policy Centre (Australian Strategic Policy Institute)
Internet Governance Project, Georgia Tech
Internet NZ
Internet Sans Frontières
Islamic Women's Council of New Zealand
Life After Hate
Netsafe
New America's Open Technology Institute (New America Foundation)
NZ Council for Civil Liberties
Reporters Without Borders (RSF)
Social Media Governance Initiative, Yale Law School
Syrian Archive
Tech Against Terrorism
The International Muslim Association of New Zealand
The Internet Society
Tony Blair Institute for Global Change
Wellington Abrahamic Council of Jews, Christians, and Muslims (NZ)
WITNESS
Women’s Organisation of the Waikato Muslim Association
Elina Noor (Visiting Fellow, Institute of Strategic and International Studies Malaysia)
Matthew Shears (Internet and telecommunications policy consultant)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/cis-joins-the-christchurch-call-advisory-network

CIS Human DNA Profiling Bill 2015

praskrishna — 2015-09-02T17:04:31Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-human-dna-profiling-bill-2015

CIS Featured in 'Building Expertise to Support Digital Scholarship: A Global Perspective' Report

sneha-pp — 2015-10-16T07:43:18Z

This report, authored by Vivian Lewis, Lisa Spiro, Xuemao Wang, and Jon E. Cawthorne, sheds light on the expertise required to support a robust and sustainable digital scholarship (DS) program. It focuses first on defining and describing the key domain knowledge, skills, competencies, and mindsets at some of the world’s most prominent digital scholarship programs. It then identifies the main strategies used to build this expertise, both formally and informally. The work is set in a global context, examining leading digital scholarship organizations in China, India, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, Germany, Mexico, Canada, and the United States. The report team visited and spoke to us last year, as part of the study. Here are the Executive Summary and link to the final report.

Access the 'Building Expertise to Support Digital Scholarship: A Global Perspective' report here.

Executive Summary

As new production, researchers scholarship analysis, pursue using digital or digital publishing scholarship or computational and dissemination (the creation, techniques), of they are often challenged to develop new skill sets. What skills, competencies, knowledge, and mindsets should digital scholars possess? How are such attributes—which we group under the term expertise—best cultivated? Does the shape of expertise vary around the world? Such questions are being asked by institutions establishing or reshaping digital scholarship organizations (DSOs), instructors developing educational and training programs in digital scholarship, experienced and aspiring digital scholars defining what expertise they need to acquire, and researchers exploring the global nature of digital scholarship.

Through our pilot study, we sought to answer these questions with the broader aims of identifying the workforce-related factors important to the success of digital scholarship, helping training and educational programs define key goals, and contributing to the conversation about the global dimensions of digital scholarship. We focused on “best in class” DSOs, highlighting the human dimensions behind their success in areas such as research output, winning grants, international reputation, and innovative teaching or training programs. We conducted interviews with a range of people involved with leading DSOs, including directors, research staff, faculty, librarians, graduate students, and university administrators. We conducted site visits with all but one of the 16 institutions participating in our study, which enabled us to get a richer sense of the facilities, organizational context, and local culture. While most of our interviews focused on digital humanities, we also included several digital social science organizations to identify areas of commonality and contrast. We explored a variety of organizational structures, including research centers and institutes, an academic department, labs, a network, a nonprofit organization, and a company; these organizations were sponsored by academic schools, libraries, and information technology departments. To understand the global dimensions of digital scholarship, we examined organizations from Mexico, China, Taiwan, India, Germany, the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom.

Since digital scholarship projects often require specific technical skills (such as expertise in text analysis or geographic information systems [GIS]), it was difficult to generalize about what particular skill sets organizations should offer; in many ways that depends on the goals and focus of the organization. In addition, different skill sets were expected depending on one’s position and degree of experience. However, our interviews revealed in particular the importance of collaborative competencies, reflecting the ways in which digital scholarship typically takes place in teams dependent on diverse expertise. Since digital scholarship often involves developing new methods, tools, and theoretical approaches, successful digital scholars usually exhibit creativity, curiosity, and an enthusiasm for learning, which we term learning mindsets. Some level of general domain knowledge is useful so that team members can understand the research questions they are pursuing, while researchers draw upon methodological competencies (such as data science and GIS) and technical skills (such as database design and programming) to carry out their research. Finally, managerial skills—particularly project management—are needed to ensure that projects are completed.

While self-education and learning by doing are the predominant ways that digital scholars have traditionally acquired expertise, they also appreciate being part of a community of practice, so that they can turn to colleagues for help solving a problem and learning something new. Many organizations host workshops and visiting speakers and enable faculty and staff to attend conferences, although it can be challenging for staff to secure travel funding. A couple of organizations provide dedicated research time to staff, so that they can experiment, stay abreast of the state of the art, and contribute their own research. Along with formal support for professional development, we noted the importance of a “learning culture” in fostering continuous learning. Organizations most successful at building expertise among faculty, students, and staff tended to share characteristics such as an open and collaborative interdisciplinary culture in which each team member contributes expertise and is respected for it; global engagement, which includes participating in multi-institutional research projects; an entrepreneurial culture in which experimentation is valued; and a focus on teaching and learning as well as research. We noted variation in the kind of facilities these organizations occupied; collaborative space seemed to be more important than top-notch hardware.

Since we were able to visit only a small number of organizations in each country or region included in the study, we don’t feel comfortable making broad generalizations about the state of digital scholarship around the world. However, we did note some common factors that influenced the shape of digital scholarship expertise. These factors included a tradition of digital scholarship, as more established organizations could both build on existing structures and could be limited by them; funding; the degree of involvement of the institution’s library; and variations in academic career structures, such as paths to promotion and the recognition of alternative academic careers.

Digital scholarship organizations face a number of challenges, particularly in securing adequate funding for their work. We want to draw particular attention to the challenge of recruitment and retention. Typically, DSOs cannot compete with the private sector in offering high salaries or extensive opportunities for advancement; rather, they provide more flexible environments and an academic or intellectual atmosphere in which staff are encouraged to experiment and learn. Unfortunately, some staff at many organizations are hired on temporary contracts because of limited funding, so they often leave for more stable positions. We also noted a tension between research and service at some organizations, wherein these organizations viewed producing new knowledge as central to their mission but may also be expected to provide services to local researchers or to maintain existing projects. At a few organizations, we observed status differences between faculty and staff, particularly in the ability to be principal investigators on grants or to receive travel funding. Researchers whose first language is not English must often choose between reaching a smaller audience with work published in their native language and devoting significant time to translating their work into English.

We provide an extensive list of recommendations aimed at digital scholars, leaders of DSOs, universities and host organizations, funders, and the broader digital scholarship community. To highlight some of the most salient: We recommend that digital scholars take responsibility for their own learning, nurture their own curiosity, and actively pursue learning opportunities, including by participating in communities of practice and team projects. We advise the leaders of DSOs to encourage both structured and unstructured opportunities for learning by including dedicated staff research time in job descriptions, enabling staff to train and mentor, and hosting workshops, outside speakers, and other events. Host institutions such as universities should create more stable staff positions with paths to promotion and facilitate more stable funding for DSOs, while funders should support global digital scholarship exchanges. As for the digital scholarship community, we recommend heightening awareness of digital scholarship around the world through conference programs, funding initiatives, publications, and communities of practice, and promoting greater linguistic diversity. We hope that this report helps raise awareness of the range of expertise required for digital scholarship, the importance of a learning culture and active communities of practice in nurturing it, the challenges digital scholarship staff often face in finding stable careers, and the diversity of models for digital scholarship around the world.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/cis-featured-in-building-expertise-to-support-digital-scholarship-report

CIS Counter Comments on TRAI Consultation on Differential Pricing

pranesh — 2016-03-25T16:28:06Z

This counter-comment also includes: a) An appendix that charts regulations on zero-rating across the globe, and shows that the popular press have misunderstood and misrepresented regulations in foreign countries; b) An appendix that charts specialized services (including differential pricing of specialized services) across the globe.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/net-neutrality/2016-01-14_cis_trai-counter-comments_differential-pricing

CIS Comments to the Department of Biotechnology and Department of Science Open Access Policy

sinha — 2014-08-22T11:05:45Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/blog-old/cis-comments-to-the-department-of-biotechnology-and-department-of-science-open-access-policy

CIS Comments Revised NPD report

aman — 2021-03-22T05:39:03Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/cis-comments-revised-npd-report

CIS Comments PDP Bill 2019

pallavi — 2020-02-21T10:02:22Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/accessibility/blog/cis-comments-pdp-bill-2019

CIS Comments on TRAI Consultation Paper on Promoting Local Telecom Equipment Manufacturing

sinha — 2017-11-26T02:56:15Z

The Centre for Internet & Society (CIS) sent comments to the TRAI Consultation Paper on promoting telecom equipment manufacturing. CIS submission drew primarily from the research done in the Pervasive Technologies project.

Read TRAI's Consultation Paper on Promoting Local Telecom Equipment Manufacturing

Preliminary

This submission presents comments by the Centre for Internet and Society, India ("CIS") on the Consultation Paper on Promoting Local Telecom Equipment Manufacturing dated 18.09. 2017, released by the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI), under Department of Telecom, Ministry of Communications and Information Technologies (“the TRAI Consultation Paper”).
We commend TRAI for its efforts at seeking inputs from various stakeholders on this important and timely issue and are thankful for the opportunity to put forth our views.
We have addressed questions 3 and 5 of the TRAI Consultation Paper. Question numbers referred to in our submission correspond to those in the TRAI Consultation Paper.
Further, the Department of Industrial Planning and Promotion (DIPP) invited comments on SEPs and their availability on FRAND terms on 01. 03. 2016.[1] CIS submitted a detailed response to the consultation, and our present submission will draw significantly from our earlier response[2], as well as new empirical research concluded in the since the time of the consultation.

About CIS

CIS[3] is a non-profit organisation that undertakes interdisciplinary research on internet and digital technologies from policy and academic perspectives. Our areas of focus include IP rights, openness, internet governance, telecommunication reform, free speech, intermediary liability, digital privacy, cyber-security, and accessibility for persons with diverse abilities.
We strive to maximise public benefit, useful innovation, vibrant competition and consumer welfare. This submission is consistent with our commitment to the domestic goals (as enumerated in Make in India and Digital India), and the protection of India's national interest at the international level.

Submission on the Issues for Resolution

“Q.3 Are the existing patent laws in India sufficient to address the issues of local manufacturers? If No, then suggest the measures to be adopted and amendments that need to be incorporated for supporting the local telecom manufacturing industry.”

We submit that amendments to the Patents Act, 1970 may not be preferred, presently. It may be noted that there have been no judgments concluded by Indian courts on disputes relating to licensing of SEPs, yet. Justice Bakhru’s landmark order in Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (Publ) v. Competition Commission of India (2016) provided valuable clarity on the issue of conflict between remedies under Patents Act, 1970 and Competition Act, 1970. As various other matters are yet to be conclusively decided, and given the complex legal questions involved around the interpretation of Patents Act, 1970 and Competition Act, 2002, and constitutional issues around the jurisdiction of regulators and the power of judicial review of the courts, we believe that it would be prudent to examine the ruling of the courts on these issues in some detail, before considering amendments.

However, to support the local telecom manufacturing industry the Government of India may adopt and implement the following measures:

Develop Model Guidelines to improve the working of Indian Standard Setting Organisations (SSOs): Given the increasing complexity and time-consuming nature of SEP litigation in India, there is a tangible threat of the abuse of the FRAND process, it might be useful for the government to make suggestions on the working of Indian SSOs. The functioning of Indian SSOs has not been satisfactory and it is suggested that the government develop Model Guidelines that may be adopted by Indian SSOs, taking into account India specific requirements. The India specific requirements include a large and exponentially growing mobile device market which has made it possible for manufacturers, patent owners and implementers alike to achieve financial gains even with a low margin. We believe that this measure will also enable the fulfillment of the objectives of the Make in India and Digital India initiatives.

We recommend that various stakeholders, including IP holders, potential licensees and users of IP, civil society organizations, academics, and, government bodies, including the Indian Patent Office, the Department of Telecommunications, the DIPP, TRAI, and, the CCI be consulted in the creation of these Model Guidelines.

In our opinion, the Model Guidelines may cover (a) the composition of the SSO; (b) the process of admitting members; (c) the process of the determination of a standard or technical specification; (d) the process of declassification of a standard or technical specification; (e) the IPR Policy; (f) resolution of disputes; (g) applicable law.
Initiate the formation of a patent pool of critical mobile technologies and cap royalty payments: In light of the observed inadequacies in the IPR policies of various SSOs in India, as well the spate of ongoing patent infringement lawsuits around mobile technologies, we recommend that the government intervene in the setting of royalties and FRAND terms by setting up a patent pool of critical mobile technologies and apply a compulsory license with a five per cent royalty. Further, patent pools should be required to offer FRAND licenses on the same terms to both members and nonmembers of the pool.

Our motivations for this proposal are manifold. In our opinion, it is nearly impossible for potential licensees to avoid inadvertent patent infringement. As a part of our research on technical standards applicable to mobile phones sold in India, we have found nearly 322 standards so far.[4] It is submitted that carrying out patent searches for all the standards would be extremely expensive for potential licensees. Further, even if such searches were to be carried out, different patent owners, SSOs and potential licensees disagree on valuation, essentiality, enforceability, validity, and coverage of patents. In addition, some patent owners are non-practising entities and may not be members of SSOs. The patents held by them are not likely to be disclosed. More importantly, homegrown manufacturers that have no patents to leverage and may be new entrants in the market would be especially disadvantaged by such a scenario. Budget phone manufacturers, standing to incur losses either as a result of heavy licensing fees, or, potential litigation, may close down. Alternatively, they may pass on their losses to consumers, driving the now affordable phones out of their financial reach. With the objectives of Make in India and Digital India in sight, it is essential that Indian consumers continue to have access to devices within their purchasing power.

Further, how did we arrive at a cap of 5 percent? The rationale for this figure is the royalty cap imposed by India in the early 1990s. As part of regulating foreign technology agreements, the (former) Department of Industrial Development (later merged with DIPP) capped royalty rates in the early 1990s. Payment of royalties was capped at either a lump sum payment of $2 million, or, 5 percent on the royalty rates charged for domestic sale, and, 8 percent for export of goods pertaining to “high priority industries”.[5] Royalties higher than 5 percent or 8 percent, as the case may be, required securing approval from the government. While the early 1990s (specifically, 1991) was too early for the mobile device manufacturing industry to be listed among high priority industries, the public announcement by the government covered computer software, consumer electronics, and electrical and electronic appliances for home use. The cap on royalty rates was lifted by the DIPP in 2009.[6] It is submitted in the case of mobile device technology, we are witnessing a situation similar to that of the 1990s. In this sphere, most of the patent holders are multinational corporations which results in large royalty amounts leaving India. At the same time, litigation over patent infringement in India has limited the manufacture and sale of mobile devices of homegrown brands. While SEP litigation in India is indeed comparable to international SEP litigation on broader issues raised, specifically competition law concerns, but differs crucially where the parties are concerned. International SEP litigation is largely between multinational corporations with substantial patent portfolios, capable of engaging in long drawn out litigations, or engaging in other strategies including setting off against each other’s patent portfolios. Dynamics in the Indian market differ – with a larger SEP holder litigating against smaller manufacturers, many of whom are indigenous, homegrown.

In June, 2013, we had recommended to the erstwhile Hon’ble Minister for Human Resource Development[7] that a patent pool of essential technologies be established, with the compulsory licensing mechanism. Subsequently, in February, 2015, we reiterated this request to the Hon’ble Prime Minister.[8] We propose that the Government of India initiate the formation of a patent pool of critical mobile technologies and mandate a five percent compulsory license.[9] As we have stated in our request to the Hon’ble Prime Minister, we believe that such a pool would “possibly avert patent disputes by ensuring that the owners' rights are not infringed on, that budget manufacturers are not put out of business owing to patent feuds, and that consumers continue to get access to inexpensive mobile devices. Several countries including the United States issue compulsory licenses on patents in the pharmaceutical, medical, defence, software, and engineering domains for reasons of public policy, or to thwart or correct anticompetitive practices.”[10] We believe that such a measure will not be in breach of our international obligations under the TRIPS Agreement.
Increase transparency in the patent system by making patentees comply with the law: The Patents Act, 1970 requires patentees and licensees to submit a statement on commercial working of the invention to the Controller every year.[11] Form 27 under section 146(2) of the Act lists the details necessary to be disclosed for compliance of the requirement of “working”. A jurisprudential analysis reveals the rationale and objective behind this mandatory requirement. Undeniably, the scheme of the Indian patent regime makes it amply clear that “working” is a very important requirement, and the public as well as competitors have a right to access this information in a timely manner, without undue hurdles. Indeed, as the decision[12] in Natco Pharma v. Bayer Corporation[13] reveals, the disclosures in Form 27 were crucial to determining the imposition of a compulsory license on the patentee. Thus, broadly, Form 27 disclosures can critically enable willing licensees to access patent “working” information in a timely manner.

However, there has been little compliance of this requirement by the patentees, despite the Indian Patent Office (IPO) reiterating the importance of compliance through the issuance of multiple public notices[14] (suo motu and in response to a public interest litigation filed in 2011[15]), and, reminding the patentees that noncompliance is punishable with a heavy fine.[16] Findings of research submitted by one of the parties[17] in the writ of the 2011 public interest litigation Shamnad Basheer v. Union of India and others[18] reveal as follows. First, a large number of Form 27s are unavailable for download from the website of the IPO. This possibly indicates that the forms have either not been filed by the patentees with the IPO, or have not been uploaded (yet) by the IPO. Second, a large number of filings in the telecom sector remain incomplete.

In 2015, CIS queried the IPO website for Form 27s of mobile device patents to arrive at a similar conclusion. We obtained 4,916 valid Form 27s, corresponding to 3,126 mobile device patents from public online records. These represented only 20.1% of all Forms 27 that should have been filed and corresponded to only 72.5% of all mobile device patents for which Forms 27 should have been filed. Forms 27 were missing for almost all patentees, and even among Forms 27 that were obtained, almost none contained useful information regarding the working of the subject patents or fully complying with the informational requirements of the Indian Patent Rules.[19]

Further, in our study, we observed that patentees adopted drastically different positions regarding the definition of patent working, some arguing that importation of products into India or licensing of Indian suppliers constituted working, while others even went so far as to argue that the granting of a worldwide license to a non-Indian firm constituted working in India. Several significant patentees claimed that they or their patent portfolios were simply too large to enable the provision of information relating to individual patents, and instead provided gross revenue and product sale figures, together with historical anecdotes about their long histories in India.

The Indian government has made little or no effort to monitor or police compliance with Form 27 filings, undoubtedly leading to significant non-compliance. We also propose the alteration of the Form 27 template[20] to include more disclosures.[21] Presently, patentees are required to declare number of licensees and sub-licensees. We specifically propose that the format of Form 27 filings be modified to include patent pool licenses, with an explicit declaration of the names of the licensees and not just the number.
Require royalty rates to be decided on the basis of the Smallest Saleable Patent Practicing Component: Most modern telecommunication and IT devices are complex with numerous technologies working in tandem. Different studies indicate that the number of patents in the US applicable to smartphones is between 200,000 and 250,000.[22] A comprehensive patent landscape of mobile device technologies conducted by CIS reveals that nearly 4,000 patents are applicable to mobile phones sold in India.[23] It is thus extremely difficult to quantify the exact extent of interaction and interdependence between technologies in any device, in such a way that the exact contribution of the patented technology to the entire device can be determined. Thus, we submit that royalty rates for SEPs should be based on the smallest saleable patent practising component, and not on the net price of the downstream product.

The net cost of the device is almost always several times that of the chipset that implements the patented technology. Armstrong et al[24] have found that the cost of a 4G baseband chip costs up to $20 including royalties in a hypothetical $400 phone sold in the US. One of the litigating parties in the ongoing patent infringement lawsuits in India has stated that one of the reasons for preferring to leverage its patents as downstream as possible in the value chain is that it will earn the company more royalties.[25] In instances where patent exhaustion occurs much earlier in the value chain, such as in the case of the company’s cross-licenses with Qualcomm (another company that owns patents to chip technologies), the company does not try to obtain royalties from the selling prices of devices for the cross-licensed technologies. It is submitted that such market practices could be detrimental to the government’s objectives such as providing a mobile handset to every Indian by 2020 as a part of the Digital India programme.[26] It is also worth noting in this context that the mobile device is the first and only medium of access to the Internet and telecom services for a large number of Indians, and, consequently, the only gateway to access to knowledge, information and critical services, including banking.[27]

“Q.5 Please suggest a dispute resolution mechanism for determination of royalty distribution on FRAND (Fair Reasonable and Non Discriminatory) basis.”

The licensing of SEPs on FRAND terms requires the parties to negotiate “reasonable” royalty rates in good faith, and apply the terms uniformly to all willing licensees. It is our submission that if the parties cannot agree to FRAND terms, they may enter into binding arbitration. Further, if all efforts fail, there exist remedies under the Patents Act and the Competition Act, 2002 to address the issues.

Section 115 of the Patents Act empowers the court to appoint an independent scientific adviser “to assist the court or to inquire and report upon any such question of fact or of opinion (not involving a question of interpretation of law) as it may formulate for the purpose.”[28] Such an independent adviser may inform the court on the technical nuances of the matter.

Further, under the Patents Act, pending the decision of infringement proceedings the Court may provide interim relief, if the plaintiff proves first, a prima facie case of infringement; second, that the balance of convenience tilts in plaintiff’s favour; and, third, that if an injunction is not granted the plaintiff shall suffer irreparable damage. However, it is our suggestion that courts adopt a more cautious stance towards granting injunctions in the field of SEP litigation. First, in our opinion, injunctions may prove to be a deterrent to arrive at a FRAND commitment, in particular, egregiously harming the willing licensee. Second, especially in the Indian scenario, where litigating parties operate in vastly different price segments (thereby targeting consumers with different purchasing power), it is difficult to establish that “irreparable damage” has been caused to the patent owner on account of infringement. Third, we note the approach of the European Court of Justice, which prohibited the patent holder from enforcing an injunction provided a willing licensee makes an offer for the price it wishes to pay to use a patent under the condition that it deposited an amount in the bank as a security for the patent holder.[29] Fourth, we also note the approach of the Federal Trade Commission in the USA, which only authorizes patent holders to seek injunctive relief against potential licensees who have either stated that they will not license a patent on any terms, or refuse to enter into a license agreement on terms that have been set in the final ruling of a court or arbitrator.[30] Further, as Contreras (2015)[31] observes, that the precise boundaries of what constitutes as an unwilling licensee remains to be seen. We observe a similar ambiguity in Indian jurisprudence, and accordingly submit that courts should carefully examine the conduct of the licensee to injunct them from the alleged infringement.

Concluding Remarks

We are thankful to TRAI for the opportunity to make these submissions. It would be our pleasure and privilege to discuss these comments with the TRAI; and, supplement these with further submissions if necessary. We also offer our assistance on other matters aimed at developing a suitable policy framework for SEPs and FRAND in India, and, working towards the sustained innovation, manufacture and availability of mobile technologies in India.

[1] Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion Discussion Paper on Standard Essential Patents and their Availability on Frand Terms, available at https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/discussion-paper-on-standard-essential-patents-and-their-availability-on-frand-terms (last accessed November 13, 2017)

[2] Anubha Sinha, Nehaa Chaudhari and Rohini Lakshane, “CIS’ Comments on Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion Discussion Paper on Standard Essential Patents and their Availability on Frand Terms” (April 23, 2016); available at https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/comments-on-department-of-industrial-policy-and-promotion-discussion-paper-on-standard-essential-patents-and-their-availability-on-frand-terms

[3] www.cis-india.org

[4] Rohini Lakshané, CIS, List of Technical Standards and IP Types (Working document), available at https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B8SgjShAjhbtaml5eW50bS01d2s/view?usp=sharing (last accessed 13 November, 2017).

[5] Kumkum Sen, News on Royalty Payments Brings Cheer in New Year, available at http://www.businessstandard.com/article/economypolicy/newsonroyaltypaymentbringscheerinnewyear11001 0400044_1.html (last accessed 13 November, 2017).

[6] See Sanjana Govil, Putting a Lid on Royalty Outflows How the RBI Can Help Reduce India’s IP Costs , available at http://cisindia.org/a2k/blogs/lidonroyaltyoutflows (last accessed 13 November, 2017) for a discussion on the introduction of royalty caps in the early 1990s, and its success in reducing the flow of money out of India.

[7] Nehaa Chaudhari, Letter for Establishment of Patent Pool for Low cost Access Devices through Compulsory

Licenses, available at http://cisindia.org/a2k/blogs/letterforestablishmentofpatentpoolforlowcostaccessdevices (last accessed 13 November, 2017).

[8] See Rohini Lakshané, Open Letter to PM Modi, available at http://cisindia.org/a2k/blogs/openlettertoprimeministermodi (last accessed 13 November, 2017) for further details of CIS’ proposal.

[9] Rohini Lakshané, FAQ: CIS’ proposal to form a patent pool of critical mobile technology, September 2015, available at http://cisindia.org/a2k/blogs/faqcisproposalforcompulsorylicensingofcriticalmobiletechnologies (last accessed 13 November, 2017).

[10] Id.

[11] Section 146(2) of the Patents Act, 1970.

[12] Sai Vinod, Patent Office Finally Takes Form 27s Seriously, available at http://spicyip.com/2013/02/patentofficefinallytakesform27s.html (last accessed 13 November, 2017).

[13] Order No. 45/2013 (Intellectual Property Appellate Board, Chennai), available at http://www.ipab.tn.nic.in/0452013.htm (last accessed 13 November, 2017).

[14] Intellectual Property India, Public Notice, available at

http://www.ipindia.nic.in/iponew/publicNotice_Form27_12Feb2013.pdf ((last accessed 13 November, 2017) and Intellectual Property India, Public Notice, available at http://ipindia.nic.in/iponew/publicNotice_24December2009.pdf (last accessed 13 November, 2017).

[15] Supra note 11.

[16] Id.

[17] See research findings available at http://spicyip.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/05/FORM27WP1Rcopy.pdf (last accessed 13 November, 2017).

[18] In the High Court of Delhi, W.P.(C) 5590/2015. This litigation is currently ongoing. See, illustratively, Mathews P. George, Patent Working in India: Delhi HC issues notice in Shamnad Basheer v. Union of India & Ors. – I , available at http://spicyip.com/2015/09/patentworkinginindiadelhihcissuesnoticeinshamnadbasheervunionofindiaorsi.html (last accessed 13 November, 2017).

[19] Contreras, Jorge L. and Lakshané, Rohini and Lewis, Paxton, Patent Working Requirements and Complex Products (October 1, 2017). NYU Journal of Intellectual Property & Entertainment Law, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3004283

[20] Form 27, The Patents Act, available at http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/manual/HTML%20AND%20PDF/Manual%20of%20Patent%20Office%20Practice%20and%20Procedure%20%20html/Forms/Form27.pdf (last accessed November 13, 10`7).

[21] However, we came across some complaints raised by patentees and industry observers regarding the structure of the Form 27 requirement - namely, patents covering complex, multi-component products that embody dozens of technical standards and thousands of patents are not necessarily amenable to the individual-level data requested by Form 27. See Contreras, Jorge L. and Lakshané, Rohini and Lewis, Paxton, Patent Working Requirements and Complex Products (October 1, 2017). NYU Journal of Intellectual Property & Entertainment Law, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3004283

[22] Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 Tex. L. Rev. at 2015 ; See also, for e.g.,

RPX Corporation, Amendment No. 3 to Form Sl,11 Apr. 2011, at 59, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1509432/000119312511101007/ds1a.htm (last accessed 22 April, 2016), quoting “Based on our research, we believe there are more than 250,000 active patents relevant to today’s

smartphones…” .; See further Steve Lohr, Apple Samsung Case Shows Smartphone as Legal Magnet, New York Times, 25 Aug. 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/26/technology/applesamsungcaseshowssmartphoneaslawsuitmagnet.html (last accessed November13, 2017).

[23] Jorge L. Contreras and Rohini Lakshané, Patents and Mobile Devices in India: An Empirical Survey, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2756486 (last accessed 13 November, 2017).

[24] Ann Armstrong, Joseph J. Mueller and Timothy D. Syrett, The SmartphoneRoyalty Stack:Surveying Royalty Demands for the Components Within Modern Smartphones, available at https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/Publications/Documents/TheSmartphoneRoyaltyStackArmstrongMuellerSyrett.pdf (last accessed 13 November, 2017)

[25] Florian Mueller, Ericsson Explained Publicly why it Collects Patent Royalties from Device (Not Chipset) Makers, available at http://www.fosspatents.com/2014/01/ericssonexplainedpubliclywhyits.Html (last accessed 13 November, 2017).

[26] Romit Guha and Anandita Singh Masinkotia, PM Modi’s Digital India Project:Government to Ensure that Every Indian has a Smartphone by 2019, available at http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/20140825/news/53205445_1_digitalindiaindiatodayfinancialservices (last accessed 13 November, 2017).

[27] Nehaa Chaudhari, Standard Essential Patents on Low Cost Mobile Phones in India: A Case to Strengthen Competition Regulation? available at http://www.manupatra.co.in/newsline/articles/Upload/08483340C1B94BA4B6A9D6B6494391B8.pdf (last accessed 13 November, 2017).

[28] Section 115 of the Patents Act, 1970.

[29] Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v. ZTE Corp. and ZTE Deutschland , Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 16 July 2015 in GmbH C170/13.

[30] Third Party United States Fed. Trade Commission’s Statement on the Public Interest, In re Certain Wireless Communication Devices, Portable Music and Data Processing Devices, Computers and Components Thereof, U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, Inv. No. 337TA745 (Jun. 6, 2012).

[31] Jorge L. Contreras, A Brief History of FRAND: Analyzing Current Debates in Standard Setting and Antitrust Through a Historical Lens , 80 Antitrust Law Journal 39 (2015), available at h ttp://ssrn.com/abstract=2374983 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2374983 (last accessed 13 November, 2017).

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/telecom/blog/cis-comments-on-promoting-local-telecom-equipment-manufacturing

CIS comments on the Revised Non Personal Governance Framework Report

Pallavi Bedi, Anubha Sinha and Aman Nair — 2021-03-22T05:39:45Z

This submission presents a response by researchers at the Centre for Internet and Society, India (CIS) to the second version of the Report on Non-Personal Data Governance Framework prepared by the Committee of Experts (hereafter “Report”). CIS had also provided inputs to 1 the draft version of the Report published in July 2020.

Executive Summary

It is beyond doubt that there must exist a regulatory frameowrk that governs the rights accorded to individual, businesses and the state in the context of the use of non personal data. However, based on the recommendations in the Report, we have found that the following areas require greater clarity and deliberation before being enacted.

General Comments

1. Examining the economic considerations underpinning the non-personal data governance framework

a. Open Data access is not enough to offset network effects and existing power imbalances in key digital sectors

b. Increased Data collection leads to Data Appropriation

2. Addressing the societal concerns that arise with sharing Non Personal Data sharing

a. De-anonymization and harm linked with sharing Non Personal Data

b. ● Sharing non-personal data could result in a culture of data maximisation

Section Specific Comments

1. Section 7.2-Non-Personal Data Roles- Community

a. Vague and very wide definition of Community

2. Section 7.7- Data Trustee

a. Need for greater clarity on the defining harmful activities and the appropriateness of Data Trustees

3. Section 7.4(iv)- ‘Duty of care’ of data custodian

a. Lack of clarity on terms including active misuse and harm

4. Section 7.10 -Non-Personal Data Authority

a.Composition of the Authority

b.Roles and Responsibility of the Authority

5. Section 9.3 - Copyright Law

a. Failure to recognise copyright in underlying data of datasets

b. Consider advocating use of limitations and exceptions in copyright law to limit ownership in datasets and underlying data

The full version of the submission can be found at: http://www.cis-india.org/internet-governance/cis-comments-revised-npd-report

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-comments-on-the-revised-non-personal-governance-framework-report

CIS Comments on NDHB

Admin — 2019-08-07T13:11:55Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/cis-comments-on-ndhb

CIS Comments on Finance Committee Statements to Open Letters on Unique Identity

praskrishna — 2011-11-13T02:39:16Z

We from the Centre for Internet and Society had sent six open letters to the Parliamentary Finance Committee on the UID. The Committee responded through an email on 12 October 2011. Our response to the points raised is reproduced below.

Dear Members of the Finance Committee,

Since January 2011, we have sent six open letters on the Unique Identity (UID) project to the Members of the Finance Committee. The Committee has responded through an email dated 12 October 2011. This letter is in reply to the points that were raised.

Finance Committee: "Comparison between SCOSTA and the UID project are not valid since SCOSTA is fundamentally a standard for smart card based authentication and does not work for the objectives of the UID project."

CIS: We disagree with this statement. The UID Bill states that the aim of the project is to provide identification and authentication services. Biometric technology may be useful for identification. The seventh open letter [1] that we sent to the Committee last week uses basic statistical analysis to demonstrate that the FPIR has to be 10−6 or a thousand-fold greater than the current level mandated by UIDAI procurement policy in order to achieve the project goal of building a national database of unique ID's. SCOSTA based smart card technology is more appropriate for the authentication of individuals because:[2]

Authentication will be based on asymmetric keys and perhaps pass-phrase or pin. This is known as public key infrastructure, and will allow a person to protect their authentication factor, and easily replace it if compromised.
Authentication through public key infrastructure does not depend on connectivity to a centralized network. This will allow for inclusion of unconnected populations.
Authentication through public key infrastructure establishes mutual trust between citizen and state. Instead of only the citizen being made transparent to the state – the state is also made transparent to the citizens. This will lower the presence of fraudulent institutions and corrupt transactions.
Connection to a centralized server is not required for only the authentication of an individual in a transaction. This will lower the cost of transactions and lower the IT overhead costs.

Finance committee: "The UID project follows a different approach and has multiple objectives like providing identity to the residents of India, and ensuring inclusion of poor and marginalized residents in order to enable access to benefits and services."

CIS: We disagree with this statement. Biometrics do not ensure the delivery of benefits. As mentioned in our third open letter,[3] in every transaction that requires the use of the biometric based UID number, there are four points where corruption is possible and delivery of services will not take place:

The technology fails, and does not perform authentication. Lack of connectivity, electricity and non-lab conditions for biometric technology.
The authority fails and delivers a false positive or false negative.
The local agency fails to deliver the service after authentication.
The biometric fails due to biological changes, and thus the individual is denied benefits.

Finance Committee: "Eliminating the fakes, duplicates and ghost identities prevalent in other databases."

CIS: We disagree with this statement. Biometrics cannot eliminate fakes, duplicates and ghost identities. The deduplication algorithm only checks for uniqueness of biometric information. This can easily be defeated by a.) presenting a combination of two persons biometrics, b.) presenting the biometrics of foreign nationals collected remotely using the Internet, and c.) modifying biometric information using software tools like image editors. This is not a remote technological possibility since many registrars like banks have financial incentives for creating ghost identities for benami bank accounts. The deduplication algorithm and technology is completely black-box and has not been subject to any independent audit. Ideally research organisations like CIS should be provided legal immunity so that we can conduct independent audits of the deduplication technology and provide evidence for policy-makers. Since the deduplication technology has such a direct impact on the quality of citizenship – we recommend that the Finance Committee include proper independent audit provisions in the draft bill.

Finance Committee: "Provide a platform for authentication in a cost effective and accessible manner."

CIS: We disagree with this statement. As our first open letter[4] to the Finance Committee notes, biometrics are not appropriate authentication factors. In our opinion the dependency of biometrics on connectivity, deduplication, and centralized storage causes them to be more expensive than smart cards. The onus is upon the UIDAI to demonstrate that biometrics are cheaper than existing systems like magnetic cards used by credit card and debit card companies. If it was truly technologically and economically the better option, surely banks driven by such considerations would have adopted them many years ago.

Finance Committee: "UIDAI is not issuing cards or smart cards."

CIS: We agree with the statement made and that is why it would be possible to defeat the UIDAI authentication system using fevicol and wax as demonstrated by security expert, Jude Terence D'Souza.[5]

Finance Committee: "Cards can be issued by agencies that are providing services."

CIS: We agree with the statement made and that is why the UIDAI cannot claim the benefits of secure authentication. In other words, agencies providing smart cards will have a more secure authentication based on smart cards and sooner or later citizens will stop using the weaker authentication based on biometrics provided by the UIDAI.

Finance Committee: "UID authentication does not exclude smart cards – service providers can still choose to issue smart cards to their beneficiaries or customers if they want to."

CIS: We agree with this statement but that makes the whole project redundant. If service providers are forced to issue smart cards to their customers, they will have to create separate databases of pins and keys for authentication. The service provider will not be able to authenticate users through the UID system.

We are grateful to have received a response from the Finance Committee and look forward to more correspondence with the Committee. We would also be very grateful if the Committee could give us an opportunity to come to Delhi on our expense and testify before the committee on legal, technology and privacy related aspects of the project.

Yours sincerely,

Elonnai Hickok

[1].http://goo.gl/93sl2

[2].http://goo.gl/ZrEQr,http://goo.gl/jHRvq

[3].http://goo.gl/pW3Wi

[4].http://goo.gl/ZrEQr

[5].http://goo.gl/0z22h

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/comments-on-finance-committee-statements

CIS Comments and Recommendations to the Human DNA Profiling Bill, June 2015

Elonnai Hickok, Vipul Kharbanda and Vanya Rakesh — 2015-09-02T17:09:04Z

The Centre for Internet & Society (CIS) submitted a clause-by-clause comments on the Human DNA Profiling Bill that was circulated by the Department of Biotechnology on June 9, 2015.

The Centre for Internet and Society is a non-profit research organisation that works on policy issues relating to privacy, freedom of expression, accessibility for persons with diverse abilities, access to knowledge, intellectual property rights and openness. It engages in academic research to explore and affect the shape and form of Internet, along with its relationship with the Society, with particular emphasis on South-South dialogues and exchange. The Centre for Internet and Society was also a member of the Expert Committee which was constituted in the year 2013 by the Department of Biotechnology to discuss the draft Human DNA Profiling Bill.

Missing aspects from the Bill

The Human DNA Profiling Bill, 2015 has overlooked and has not touched upon the following crucial factors :

Objects Clause

An ‘objects clause,’ detailing the intention of the legislature and containing principles to inform the application of a statute, in the main body of the statute is an enforceable mechanism to give directions to a statute and can be a formidable primary aid in statutory interpretation. [See, for example, section 83 of the Patents Act, 1970 that directly informed the Order of the Controller of Patents, Mumbai, in the matter of NATCO Pharma and Bayer Corporation in Compulsory Licence Application No. 1 of 2011.] Therefore, the Bill should incorporate an objects clause that makes clear that

“DNA profiles merely estimate the identity of persons, they do not conclusively establish unique identity, therefore forensic DNA profiling should only have probative value and not be considered as conclusive proof.

The Act recognises that all individuals have a right to privacy that must be continuously weighed against efforts to collect and retain DNA and in order to protect this right to privacy the principles of notice, confidentiality, collection limitation, personal autonomy, purpose limitation and data minimization must be adhered to at all times.”

Collection and Consent

The Bill does not contain provisions regarding instances when the DNA samples can be collected from the individuals without consent (nor does the Bill establish or refer to an authorization procedure for such collection), when DNA samples can be collected from individuals only with informed consent, and how and in what instances individuals can withdraw their consent. The issue of whether DNA samples can be collected without the consent of the individual is a vexed one and requires complex questions relating to individual privacy as well as the right against self incrimination. While the question of whether an accused can be made to give samples of blood, semen, etc. which had been in issue in a wide gamut of decisions in India has finally been settled by section 53 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which allows collection of medical evidence from an accused, thus laying to rest any claims based on the right against self incrimination. However there are still issues dealing with the right to privacy and the violation thereof due to the non-consensual collection of DNA samples. This is an issue which needs to be addressed in this Act itself and should not be left unaddressed as this would only lead to a lack of clarity and protracted court cases to determine this issue. An illustration of this problem is where the Bill allows for collection of intimate body samples. There is a need for inclusion of stringent safeguard measures regarding the same since without such safeguards, the collection of intimate body samples would be an outright infringement of privacy. Further, maintaining a database for convicts and suspects is one thing, however collecting and storing intimate samples of individuals is a gross violation of the citizens’ right to privacy, and without adequate mechanisms regarding consent and security, stands at a huge risk of being misused.

Privacy Safeguards

Presently, the Bill is being introduced without comprehensive privacy safeguards in place on issues such as consent, collection, retention, etc. as is evident from the comments made below. Though the DNA Board is given the responsibility of recommending best practices pertaining to privacy (clause 13 (l)) – this is not adequate given the fact that India does not have a comprehensive privacy legislation. Though section 43A and associated Rules of the Information Technology Act would apply to the collection, use, and sharing of DNA data by DNA laboratories (as they would fall under the definition of ‘body corporate’ under the IT Act), the National and State Data Banks and the DNA Board would not clearly be body corporate as per the IT Act and would not fall under the ambit of the provision or Rules. Safeguards are needed to protect against the invasion of informational privacy and physical privacy at the level of these State controlled bodies. The fact that the Bill is to be introduced into Parliament prior to the enactment of a privacy legislation in India is significant as according to discussions in the Record Notes of the 4h Meeting of the Expert Committee - “the Expert Committee also discussed and emphasized that the Privacy Bill is being piloted by the Government. That Bill will over-ride all the other provisions on privacy issues in the DNA Bill.”

Lack of restriction on type of analysis to be performed

The Bill currently does not provide any restriction on the types of analysis that can be performed on a DNA sample or profile. This could allow for DNA samples to be analyzed for purposes beyond basic identification of an individual – such as for health, genetic, or racial purposes. As a form of purpose limitation the Bill should define narrowly the types of analysis that can be performed on a DNA sample.

Purpose Limitation

The Bill does not explicitly restrict the use of a DNA sample or DNA profile to the purpose it was originally collected and created for. This could allow for the re-use of samples and profiles for unintended purposes.

Annual Public Reporting

The Bill does not require the DNA Board to disclose publicly available information on an annual basis regarding the functioning and financial aspects of matters contained within the Bill. Such disclosure is crucial in ensuring that the public is able to make informed decisions. Categories that could be included in such reports include: Number of DNA profiles added to each indice within the databank, total number of DNA profiles contained in the database, number of DNA profiles deleted from the database, the number of matches between crime scene DNA profiles and DNA profiles, the number of cases in which DNA profiles were used in and the percentage in which DNA profiles assisted in the final conclusion of the case, and the number and categories of DNA profiles shared with international entities.

Elimination Indice

An elimination indice containing the profiles of medical professionals, police, laboratory personnel etc. working on a case is necessary in case they contaminate collected samples by accident.

Clause by Clause Recommendations

As stated the Human DNA Profiling Bill 2015 is to regulate the use of DNA analysis of human body substances profiles and to establish the DNA Profiling Board for laying down the standards for laboratories, collection of human body substances, custody trail from collection to reporting and also to establish a National DNA Data Bank.

Comment:

As stated, the purpose of the DNA Human Profiling Bill is to broadly regulate the of DNA analysis and establish a DNA Data Bank. Despite this, the majority of provisions in the Bill pertain to the collection, use, access etc. of DNA samples and profiles for civil and criminal purposes. The result of this is an 'unbalanced Bill' - with the majority of provisions focusing on issues related to forensic use. At the same time the Bill is not a comprehensive forensic bill – resulting in legislative gaps.
Additionally, the Bill contains provisions beyond the stated purpose. These include:

Facilitating the creation of a Data Bank for statistical purposes (Clause 33(e))
Establishing state and regional level databanks in addition to a national level databank (Clause 24)
Developing procedure and providing for the international sharing of DNA profiles with foreign Governments, organizations, institutions, or agencies. (Clause 29)

Recommendation:

The Bill should ideally be limited to regulating the use of DNA samples and profiles for criminal purposes. If the scope remains broad, all purposes should be equally and comprehensively regulated.
The stated purpose of the Bill should address all aspects of the Bill. Provisions beyond the scope of the Bill should be removed.

Chapter 1: Preliminary

Clause 2: This clause defines the terms used in the Bill.

Comment: A number of terms are incomplete and some terms used in the Bill have not been included in the list of definitions.

Recommendation:

The definition of DNA Data bank manager - clause 2 (1)(g) - must be renamed as National DNA Data bank manager.
The definition of “DNA laboratory” in clause 2(1)(h) should refer to the specific clauses that empower the Central Government and State Governments to license and recognise DNA laboratories. This is a drafting error.

The definition of “DNA profile” in clause 2(1)(i) is too vague. Merely the results of an analysis of a DNA sample may not be sufficient to create an actual DNA profile. Further, the results of the analysis may yield DNA information that, because of incompleteness or lack of information, is inconclusive. These incomplete bits of information should not be recognised as DNA profiles. This definition should be amended to clearly specify the contents of a complete and valid DNA profile that contains, at least, numerical representations of 17 or more loci of short tandem repeats that are sufficient to estimate biometric individuality of a person. The definition of “DNA profile” does not restrict the analysis to forensic DNA profiles: this means additional information, such as health-related information could be analyzed and stored against the wishes of the individual, even though such information plays no role in solving crimes.

The term “known sample” that is defined in clause 2(1)(m) is not used anywhere outside the definitions clause and should be removed.

The definition of “offender” in clause 2(1)(q) is vague because it does not specify the offenses for which an “offender” needs to be convicted. It is also linked to an unclear definition of the term “under trial”, which does not specify the nature of pending criminal proceedings and, therefore, could be used to describe simple offenses such as, for example, failure to pay an electricity bill, which also attracts criminal penalties.

The term “proficiency testing” that is defined in clause 2(1)(t) is not used anywhere in the text of the DNA Bill and should be removed.

The definitions of “quality assurance”, “quality manual” and “quality system” serve no enforceable purpose since they are used only in relation to the DNA Profiling Board’s rule making powers under Chapter IX, clause 58. Their inclusion in the definitions clause is redundant. Accordingly, these definitions should be removed.

The term “suspect” defined in clause 2(1)(za) is vague and imprecise. The standard by which suspicion is to be measured, and by whom suspicion may be entertained – whether police or others, has not been specified. The term “suspect” is not defined in either the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ("CrPC") or the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ("IPC").

The term volunteer defined in clause 2(zf) only addresses consent from the parent or guardian of a child or an incapable person. This term should be amended to include informed consent from any volunteer.

Chapter II: DNA Profiling Board

Clause 4: This clause addresses the composition of the DNA Profiling Board.

Comment: The size and composition of the Board that is staffed under clause 4 is extremely large. The number of members remains to be 15, as it was in the 2012 Bill.

Recommendation: Drawing from the experiences of other administrative and regulatory bodies in India, the size of the Board should be reduced to no more than five members. The Board must contain at least:

One ex-Judge or senior lawyer
Civil society – both institutional and non-institutional
Privacy advocates

Note: The reduction of the size of the Board was agreed upon by the Expert Committee from 16 members (2012 Bill) to 11 members. This recommendation has not been incorporated.

Clause 5(1): The clause specifies the term of the Chairperson of the DNA Profiling Board to be five years and also states that the person shall not be eligible for re-appointment or extension of the term so specified.

Comment: The Chairperson of the Board, who is first mentioned in clause 5(1), has not been duly and properly appointed.

Recommendation: Clause 4 should be amended to mention the appointment of the Chairperson and other Members.

Clause 7: The clause requires members to react on a case-by-case basis to the business of the Board by excusing themselves from deliberations and voting where necessary.

Comment: This clause addresses the issue of conflict of interest only in narrow cases and does not provide penalty if a member fails to adhere to the laid out procedure.

Recommendation: The Bill should require members to make full and public disclosures of their real and potential conflicts of interest and the Chairperson must have the power to prevent such members from voting on interested matters. Failure to follow such anti-collusion and anti-corruption safeguards should attract criminal penalties.

Clause 12(5): The clause states that the board shall have the power to co-opt such number of persons as it may deem necessary to attend the meetings of the Board and take part in the proceedings of the board, but such persons will not have the right to vote.

Comment: While serving on the Expert Committee, CIS provided language regarding how the Board could consult with the public. This language has not been fully incorporated.

Recommendation: As per the recommendation of CIS, the following language should be adopted in the Bill: The Board, in carrying out its functions and activities, shall be required to consult with all persons and groups of persons whose rights and related interests may be affected or impacted by any DNA collection, storage, or profiling activity. The Board shall, while considering any matter under its purview, co-opt or include any person, group of persons, or organisation, in its meetings and activities if it is satisfied that that person, group of persons, or organisation, has a substantial interest in the matter and that it is necessary in the public interest to allow such participation. The Board shall, while consulting or co-opting persons, ensure that meetings, workshops, and events are conducted at different places in India to ensure equal regional participation and activities.

Clause 13: The clause lays down the functions to be performed by the DNA Profiling Board, which includes it’s role in regulation of the DNA Data Banks, DNA Laboratories and techniques to be adopted for collection of the DNA samples.

Comment: While serving on the Expert Committee, CIS recommended that the functions of the DNA Profiling Board should be limited to licensing, developing standards and norms, safeguarding privacy and other rights, ensuring public transparency, promoting information and debate and a few other limited functions necessary for a regulatory authority.

Furthermore, this clause delegates a number of functions to the Board that places the Board in the role of a manager and regulator for issues pertaining to DNA Profiling including functions of the DNA Databases, DNA Laboratories, ethical concerns, privacy concerns etc.

Recommendation: As per CIS’s recommendations the functions of the Board should be limited to licensing, developing standards and norms, safeguarding privacy and other rights, ensuring public transparency, promoting information and debate and a few other limited functions necessary for a regulatory authority.

Towards this, the Board should be comprised of separate Committees to address these different functions. At the minimum, there should be a Committee addressing regulatory issues pertaining to the functioning of Data Banks and Laboratories and an Ethics Committee to provide independent scrutiny of ethical issues. Additionally:

Clause 13(j) allows the Board to disseminate best practices concerning the collection and analysis of DNA samples to ensure quality and consistency. The process for collection of DNA samples and analysis should be established in the Bill itself or by regulations. Best practices are not enforceable and do not formalize a procedure.
Clause 13(q) allows the Board to establish procedure for cooperation in criminal investigation between various investigation agencies within the country and with international agencies. This procedure, at the minimum, should be subject to oversight by the Ministry of External Affairs.

Chapter III: Approval of DNA Laboratories

Clause 15: This clause states that every DNA Laboratory has to make an application before the Board for the purpose of undertaking DNA profiling and also for renewal.

Comment: Though the Bill requires DNA Laboratories to make an application for the undertaking DNA Profiling, it does not clarify that the Lab must receive approval before collection and analysis of DNA samples and profiles.

Recommendation: The Bill should clarify that all DNA Laboratories must receive approval for functioning prior to the collection or analysis of any DNA samples and profiles.

Chapter IV: Standards, Quality Control and Quality Assurance Obligations of DNA Laboratory and Infrastructure and Training

Clause 19: This clause defines the obligations of a DNA laboratory. Sub-section (d) maintains that one such obligation is the sharing of the 'DNA data' prepared and maintained by the laboratory with the State DNA Data Bank and the National DNA Data Bank.

Comment: ‘DNA Data’ is a new term that has not been defined under Clause 2 of the Bill. It is thus unclear what data would be shared between State DNA data banks and the National DNA data bank - DNA samples? DNA profiles? associated records? It is also unclear in what manner and on what basis the information would be shared.

Recommendation: The term ‘DNA Data’ should be defined to clarify what information will be shared between State and National DNA Data Banks. The flow of and access to data between the State DNA Data Bank and National DNA Data Bank should also be established in the Bill.

Clause 22: The clause lays down the measures to be adopted by a DNA Laboratory and 22(h) includes a provision requiring the conducting of annual audits according to prescribed standards.

Comment:

The definition of “audit” under Chapter VI in clause 22 under ‘Explanation’ is relevant for measuring the training programmes and laboratory conditions. However, the term “audit” is subsequently used in an entirely different manner in Chapter VII which relates to financial information and transparency.
The standards for the destruction of DNA samples have not been included within the list of measures that DNA laboratories must take.

Recommendation:

The definition of ‘audit’ must be amended or removed as it is being used in different contexts. The term “audit” has a well established use for financial information that does not require a definition.
Standards for the destruction of DNA samples should be developed and included as a measure DNA laboratories must take.
Clause 23: This clause lays down the sources for collection of samples for the purpose of DNA profiling. 23(1)(a) includes collection from bodily substances and 23(1)(c) includes clothing and other objects. Explanation (b) provides a definition of 'intimate body sample'.

Comment:

Permitting the collection of DNA samples from bodily substances and clothing and other objects allows for the broad collection of DNA samples without contextualizing such collection. In contrast 23(b) Scene of occurrence or scene of crime limits the collection of samples to a specific context.
This clause also raises the issue of consent and invasion of privacy of an individual. If “intimate body samples” are to be taken of individuals, then this would be an invasion of the person’s right to bodily privacy if such collection is done without the person’s consent (except in the specific instance when it is done in pursuance of section 53 of the Criminal Procedure Code).

Recommendation:

Sources for the collection of DNA samples should be contextualized to prevent broad, unaccounted for, or unregulated collection. Clause (a) and (c) should be deleted and replaced with contexts in which the collection DNA collection would be permitted.
The Bill should specify circumstances on which non-intimate samples can be collected and the process for the same.
The Bill should specify that intimate body samples can only be taken with informed consent except as per section 53 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
The Bill should require that any individual that has a sample taken (intimate and non-intimate) is provided with notice of their rights and the future uses of their DNA sample and profile.

Chapter V: DNA Data Bank

Clause 24:This clause addresses establishment of DNA Data Banks at the State and National Level. 24(5) establishes that the National DNA Data Bank will receive data from State DNA Data Banks and store the approved DNA Profiles as per regulations.

Comment:

As noted previously, ‘DNA Data’ is a new term that has not been defined in the Bill. It is thus unclear what data would be shared between State DNA data banks and the National DNA data bank - DNA samples? DNA profiles? associated records?
The process for sharing Data between the State and National Data Banks is not defined.

Recommendation:

The term ‘DNA Data’ should be defined to clarify what information will be shared between State and National DNA Data Banks.
The process for the National DNA Data Bank receiving DNA data from State DNA Data Banks and DNA laboratories needs to be defined in the Bill or by regulation. This includes specifying how frequently information will be shared etc.

Clause 25: This clause establishes standards for the maintenance of indices by DNA databanks. 25(1) states that every DNA Data Bank needs to maintain the prescribed indices for various categories of data including an index for a crime scene, suspects, offenders, missing persons, unknown deceased persons, volunteers, and other indices as may be specified by regulation. 25(2) states that in addition to the indices, the DNA Data Bank should contain information regarding each of the DNA profiles. It can either be the identity of the person from whose bodily substance the profile was derived in case of a suspect or an offender, or the case reference number of the investigation associated with such bodily substances in other cases. 25(3) states that the indices maintained shall include information regarding the data which is based on the DNA profiling and the relevant records.

Comment:

25(1): The creation of multiple indices cannot be justified and must be limited since collection of biological source material is an invasion of privacy that must be conducted only in strict conditions when the potential harm to individuals is outweighed by the public good. This balance may only be struck when dealing with the collection and profiling of samples from certain categories of offenders. The implications of collecting and profiling DNA samples from corpses, suspects, missing persons and others are vast. Specifically a 'volunteer' index could possibly be used for racial/community/religious profiling.
25(2): This clause requires the names of individuals to be connected to their profiles, and hence accessible to persons having access to the databank.
25(3) The clause states that only information related to DNA profiling and will be stored in an indice. Yet, it is unclear what such information might be. This could allow inconsistencies in data stored in an indice and could allow for unnecessary information to be stored on an indice.

Recommendation:

25(1) Ideally, DNA databanks should be created for dedicated purposes. This would mean that a databank for forensic purposes should contain only an offenders’ index and a crime scene index while a databank for missing persons would contain only a missing persons indice etc. If numerous indices are going to be contained in one databank, the Bill needs to recognize the sensitivity of each indice as well as the difference between each indice and lay down appropriate and strict conditions for collection of data for such indice, addition of data into the indice, as well as use, access, and retention of data within the indice.
25(2) DNA profiles, once developed, should be maintained with complete anonymity and retained separate from the names of their owners. This amendment becomes even more important if we consider the fact that an “offender” may be convicted by a lower court and have his profile included in the data bank, but may get acquitted later. However, till the time that such person is acquitted, his/her profile with the identifying information would still be in the data bank, which is an invasion of privacy.
25(3) What information will be stored in indices should be clearly defined in the Bill and should be tailored appropriately to each category of indice.

Clause 28: This clause addresses the comparison and communication of DNA profiles. 28(1) states that the DNA profile entered in the offenders or crime scene index shall be compared by the DNA Data Bank Manger against profiles contained in the DNA Data Bank and the DNA Data Bank Manager will communicate such information with any court, tribunal, law enforcement agency, or approved DNA laboratory which he may consider appropriate for the purpose of investigation. 28(2) allows for any information relating to a person's DNA profile contained in the suspect's index or offenders' index to be communicated to authorised persons.

Comment:

28(1) (a-c) allows for the DNA Bank Manager to communicate the following: 1.) if the DNA profile is not contained in the Data Bank and what information is not contained, 2.) if the DNA profile is contained in the data bank and what information is contained, and if in the opinion of the Manager, 3.) the DNA profile is similar to one stored in the Databank. These options of communication are problematic as they 1. allow for all associated information to be communicated – even if such information is not necessary, 2.) Allows for the DNA Databank Manager to communicate that a profile is 'similar' without defining what 'similar' would constitute.
28(1) only addresses the comparison of DNA profiles entered into the offenders index or the crime scene index against all other profiles entered into the DNA Data Bank.
28(1) gives the DNA Data Bank manager broad discretion in determining if information should be communicated and requires no accountability for such a decision.
28(2) only addresses information in the suspect's and offender's index and does not address information in any other index.

Recommendation:

Rather than allowing for broad searches across the entire database, the Bill should be clear about which profiles can be compared against which indices. Such distinctions must take into consideration if a profile was taken on consent and what was consented to.
Ideally, the response from the DNA Databank Manager should be limited to a 'yes' or 'no' response and only further information should be revealed on receipt of a court order.
The Bill should define what constitutes 'similar'
A process for determining if information should be communicated should be established in the Bill and followed by the DNA Data Bank Manager. The Manager should also be held accountable through oversight mechanisms for such decisions. This is particularly important, as a DNA laboratory would be a private body.
Information stored in any index should be disclosed to only authorized parties.

Clause 29: This clause provides for comparison and sharing of DNA profiles with foreign Government, organisations, institutions or agencies. 29(1) allows the DNA Bank Manager to run a comparison of the received profile against all indices in the databank and communicate specified responses through the Central Bureau of Investigation.

Comment: This clause allows for international disclosures of DNA profiles of Indians through a procedure that is to be established by the Board (see clause 13(q))

Recommendation: The disclosure of DNA profiles of Indians with international entities should be done via the MLAT process as it is the typical process followed when sharing information with international entities for law enforcement purposes.

Clause 30: This clause provides for the permanent retention of information pertaining to a convict in the offenders’ index and the expunging of such information in case of a court order establishing acquittal of a person, or the conviction being set aside.

Comment: This clause addresses only the retention and expunging of records of a convict stored in the offenders index upon the receipt of a court order or the conviction being set aside. This implies that records in all other indices - including volunteers - can be retained permanently. This clause also does not address situations where an individuals DNA profile is added to the databank, but the case never goes to court.

Recommendation: The Bill should establish retention standards and deletion standards for each indice that it creates. Furthermore, the Bill should require the immediate destruction of DNA samples once a DNA profile for identification purposes has been created. An exception to this should be the destruction of samples stored in the crime scene index.

Chapter VI: Confidentiality of and Access to DNA Profiles, Samples, and Records

Clause 33: This provision lays down the cases and the persons to which information pertaining to DNA profiles, samples and records stored in the DNA Data Bank shall be made available. Specifically, 33(e) permits disclosure for the creation and maintenance of a population statistics Data Bank.

Comment:

This clause addresses disclosure of information in the DNA Data Bank, but does not directly address the use of DNA samples or DNA profiles. This allows for the possibility of re-use of samples and profiles.
There is no limitation on the information that can be disclosed. The clause allows for any information stored in the Data Bank to be disclosed for a number of circumstances/to a variety of people.
There is no authorization process for the disclosure of such information. Of the circumstances listed – an authorization process is mentioned only for the disclosure of information in the case of investigations relating to civil disputes or other civil matters with the concurrence of the court. This implies that there is no procedure for authorizing the disclosure of information for identification purposes in criminal cases, in judicial proceedings, for facilitating prosecution and adjudication of criminal cases, for the purpose of taking defence by an accused in a criminal case, and for the creation and maintenance of a population statistics Data Bank.

Recommendation:

The Bill should establish an authorization process for the disclosure of information stored in a data bank. This process must limit the disclosure of information to what is necessary and proportionate for achieving the requested purpose.
Clause 33(e) should be deleted as the non-consensual disclosure of DNA profiles for the study of population genetics is specifically illegal. The use of the database for statistical purposes should be limited to purposes pertaining to understanding effectiveness of the databank.
Clause 33(f) should be deleted as it is not necessary for DNA profiles to be stored in a database to be useful for civil purposes. Instead samples for civil purposes are only needed as per the relevant case and specified persons.
Clause 33(g) should be deleted as it allows for the scope of cases in which DNA can be disclosed to by expanded as prescribed.

Clause 34: This clause allows for access to information for operation maintenance and training.
Comment: This clause would allow individuals in training access to data stored on the database for training purposes. This places the security of the databank and the data stored in the databank at risk.
Recommendation: Training of individuals should be conducted via simulation only.

Clause 35: This clause allows for access to information in the DNA Data Bank for the purpose of a one time keyboard search. A one time keyboard search allows for information from a DNA sample to be compared with information in the index without the information from the DNA sample being included in the index. The clause allows for an authorized individual to carry out such a search on information obtained from an DNA sample lawfully collected for the purpose of criminal investigation, except if the DNA sample was submitted for elimination purposes.
Comment: The purpose of this clause is unclear as is the scope. The clause allows for the sample to be compared against 'the index' without specifying which index. The clause also allows for 'information obtained from a DNA sample' rather than a profile. Thus, the clause appears to allow for any information derived from a DNA sample collected for a criminal investigation to be compared against all data within the databank – without recording such information. Such a comparison is vast in scope and open to abuse.
Recommendation: To ensure that this provision is not used for conducting searches outside of the scope of the original purpose, only DNA profiles, rather than 'information derived from a sample' should be allowed to be compared, only the indices relevant to the sample should be compared, and the search should be authorized and justified.
Clause 36 : This clause addresses the restriction of access to information in the crime scene index if the individual is a victim of a specified offense or if the person has been eliminated as a suspect of an investigation.

Comment:

This clause only addresses restriction of access to the crime scene index and does not address restriction of access to other indices.
This clause only restricts access to the indice for certain category of individual and for a specific status of a person. Oddly, the clause does not include authorization or rank as a means for determining or restricting access.

Recommendation:

This clause should be amended to lay down standards for restriction of access for all indices.
Access to all information in the databank should be restricted by default and permission should be based on authorization rather than category or status of individual.

Clause 38: This clause sets out a post-conviction right related to criminal procedure and evidence.

Comment: This clause would fundamentally alter the nature of India’s criminal justice system, which currently does not contain specific provisions for post-conviction testing rights.

Recommendation: This clause should be deleted and the issue of post conviction rights related to criminal procedure and evidence referenced to the appropriate legislation. Clause 38 is implicated by Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India and by section 300 of the CrPC. The principle of autrefois acquit that informs section 300 of the CrPC specifically deals with exceptions to the rule against double jeopardy that permit re-trials. [See, for instance, Sangeeta Mahendrabhai Patel (2012) 7 SCC 721.] The person must be duly accorded with a right to know rules may provide for- the authorized persons to whom information relating to a person’s DNA profile contained in the offenders’ index shall be communicated. Alternatively, this right could be limited only to accused persons who’s trial is still at the stage of production of evidence in the Trial Court. This suggestion is being made because unless the right as it currently stands, is limited in some manner, every convict with the means to engage a lawyer would ask for DNA analysis of the evidence in his/her case thereby flooding the system with useless requests risking a breakdown of the entire machinery.

Chapter VII: Finance, Accounts, and Audit

Clause 39: This clause allows the Central Government to make grants and loans to the DNA Board after due appropriation by Parliament.

Comment: This clause allows the Central Government to grant and loan money to the DNA Board, but does not require any proof or justification for the sum of money being given.

Recommendation: This clause should require a formal cost benefit analysis, and financial assessment prior to the giving of any grants or loans.

Chapter VIII: Offences and Penalties

Chapter IX: Miscellaneous

Clause 53: This clause allows protects the Central Government and the Members of the Board from suit, prosecution, or other legal proceedings for actions that they have taken in good faith.

Comment: Though it is important to take into consideration if an action has been taken in good faith, absolving the Government and Board from accountability for actions leaves little course of redress for the individual. This is particularly true as the Central Government and the Board are given broad powers under the Bill.

Recommended: If the Central Government and the Board will be protected for actions taken in good faith, their powers should be limited. Specifically, they should not have the ability to widen the scope of the Bill.

Clause 57: This clause states that the Central Government will have the powers to make Rules for a number of defined issues.

Comment: 57(d) allows for the regulations to be created regarding the use of population statistics Data Bank created and maintained for the purposes of identification research and protocol development or quality control.

Recommendation: 57(d) should be deleted as any use for the creation of a population statistics Data Bank created and maintained for the purposes of identification research and protocol development or quality control is beyond the scope of the Bill.

Clause 58: This clause empowers the Board to make regulations regarding a number of aspects related to the Bill.
Comment: There a number of functions that the Board can make regulations for that should be defined within the Bill itself to ensure that the scope of the Bill does not expand without Parliamentary oversight and approval.
Recommendation: 58(2)(g) should be deleted as it allows the Board to create regulations for other relevant uses of DNA techniques and technologies, 58(2)(u) should be deleted as it allows the Board to include new categories of indices to databanks, and 58(2) (aa) should be deleted as it allows the Board to decide which other indices a DNA profile may be compared with in the case of sharing of DNA profiles with foreign Governments, organizations, or institutions.

Clause 61: This clause states that no civil court will have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which the Board is empowered to determine and no injunction shall be granted.

Comment: This clause in practice will limit the recourse that individuals can take and will exclude the Board from the oversight of civil or criminal courts.

Recommendation: The power to collect, store and analyse human DNA samples has wide reaching consequences for people whose samples are being utilised for this purpose, specially if their samples are being labeled in specific indexes such as “index of offenders”, etc. The individual should therefore have a right to approach the court of law to safeguard his/her rights. Therefore this provision barring the jurisdiction of the courts should be deleted.

Schedule

Schedule A: The schedule refers to section 33(f) which allows for disclosure of information in relation to DNA profiles, DNA samples, and records in a DNA Data Bank to be communicated in cases of investigations relating to civil disputes or other civil matters or offenses or cases listed in the schedule with the concurrence of the court.

Comment: As 33(f) requires the concurrence of the court for disclosure of information, it is unclear what purpose the schedule serves. If the Schedule is meant to serve as a guide to the Court on appropriate instances for the disclosure of information stored in the DNA databank – the schedule is too general by listing entire Acts, while at the same time being too specific by naming specific Acts. Ideally, courts should use principles and the greater public interest to reach a decision as to whether or not disclosure of information in the DNA databank is appropriate. At a minimum these principles should include necessity (of the disclosure) and proportionality (of the type/amount of information disclosed).

Recommendation: As we recommended the deletion of clause 33(f) as it is not necessary to databank DNA profiles for civil purposes, the schedule should also be deleted.

Note: The schedule differs drastically from previous drafts and from discussions held in the Expert Committee and recommendations agreed upon. As per the Meeting Minutes of the Expert Committee meeting held on November 10th 2014 “The Committee recommended incorporation of the comments received from the members of the Expert Committee appropriately in the draft Bill...Point no. 1 suggested by Mr. Sunil Abraham in the Schedule of the draft Bill to define the cases in which DNA samples can be collected without consent by incorporating point no. 1 (I.e 'Any offence under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 if it is listed as a cognizable offence in Part I of the First Schedule of the code of Criminal Procedure, 1973)”

Download CIS submission here. See the cover letter here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-comments-and-recommendations-to-human-dna-profiling-bill-2015

CIS brings Nadustunna Charithra magazine under by CC BY SA licence

hasan — 2016-06-18T18:07:46Z

As a part of its content donation initiative, the Centre for Internet & Society's Access to Knowledge team (CIS-A2K) has brought all issues of Nadustunna Charithra magazine under Creative Common Licence.

CIS-A2K has received 74 issues as of now from the Telugu Jaati foundation. These issues shall be published by A2K on a blog site under CC BY SA licence to make it a reliable reference resource and adhere Wikipedia guidelines.

Nadustunna Charithra magazine has dealt extensively with Telugu semantics and Telugu Cultural history and we hope to upload all the issues to Telugu Wikisource. These magazines will also serve as handy reference guides for Telugu Wikipedians and shall act as a major referencing and citation resource.

CIS-A2K has also been successful in acquiring 250 song books (booklets that have the lyrics of songs featured in a film) of Telugu movies for content donation. These song books serve as introduction to the film itself. They contain lyrics of the songs, poster of the movie, details of the cast and crew, a short synopsis both in Telugu and English along with photographs of the lead actors. As of now CIS-A2K has been able to locate song books for most of the films produced between 1930-1954.

These resources shall also help the Telugu community in coming up with new/improved articles related to Telugu cinema. With most of the basic information regarding a film available in the song book, we expect that the Telugu community along with active cooperation from A2K shall create GA quality articles and this content donation will also help in improving stubs that were created earlier.

CIS-A2K is extremely grateful for the support received by the Telugu community during this content donation initiative and would like to thank in person Mr. Bhaskarnaidu, Mr. Gullapalli Nageshwara Rao who have been part of these conversations and helped us identify the resources to be re-licensed.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-brings-nadustunna-charithra-magazine-under-by-cc-by-sa-licence

CIS anniversary

praskrishna — 2013-05-06T07:28:07Z

The Centre for Internet and Society will celebrate five years of its existence with an exhibition showcasing its works and accomplishments.

This was published in Hindu Business Line on May 5, 2013

The exhibition will be held concurrently at both Bangalore and Delhi offices from May 20 to 24, 2013, said a press release.

“To promote transparency, we're getting the general public to be our auditors by throwing open our account books and contracts which show how we have spent the Rs 8.3 crore received from our donors.”

The exhibition will also see artists like Kiran Subbaiah, Tara Kelton, Navin Thomas, Abhishek Hazra, among others exhibiting their works, as well as lectures.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/the-hindu-business-line-may-5-2013-cis-anniversary

CIS and International Coalition Calls upon Governments to Protect Privacy

elonnai — 2013-09-25T07:21:09Z

The Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) along with the International Coalition has called upon governments across the globe to protect privacy.

On September 20 in Geneva, CIS joined a huge international coalition in calling upon countries across the globe, including India to assess whether national surveillance laws and activities are in line with their international human rights obligations.

The Centre for Internet and Society has endorsed a set of international principles against unchecked surveillance. The 13 Principles set out for the first time an evaluative framework for assessing surveillance practices in the context of international human rights obligations.

A group of civil society organizations officially presented the 13 Principles this past Friday in Geneva at a side event attended by Navi Pillay, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Opinion, Frank LaRue, during the 24th session of the Human Rights Council. The side event was hosted by the Permanent Missions of Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and Hungary.

Elonnai Hickok, Programme Manager at the Centre for Internet and Society has noted that "the 13 Principles are an important first step towards informing governments, corporates, and individuals across jurisdictions, including India, about needed safeguards for surveillance practices and related policies to ensure that they are necessary and proportionate."

Navi Pillay, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, speaking at the Human Rights Council stated in her opening statement on September 9:

"Laws and policies must be adopted to address the potential for dramatic intrusion on individuals’ privacy which have been made possible by modern communications technology."

Navi Pillay, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, speaking at the event, said that:

"technological advancements have been powerful tools for democracy by giving access to all to participate in society, but increasing use of data mining by intelligence agencies blurs lines between legitimate surveillance and arbitrary mass surveillance."

Frank La Rue, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Opinion made clear the case for a direct relationship between state surveillance, privacy and freedom of expression in this latest report to the Human Rights Council:

"The right to privacy is often understood as an essential requirement for the realization of the right to freedom of expression. Undue interference with individuals’ privacy can both directly and indirectly limit the free development and exchange of ideas. … An infringement upon one right can be both the cause and consequence of an infringement upon the other."

Speaking at the event, the UN Special Rapporteur remarked that:

"previously surveillance was carried out on targeted basis but the Internet has changed the context by providing the possibility for carrying out mass surveillance. This is the danger."

Representatives of the Centre for Internet and Society, Privacy International, the Electronic Frontier Foundation,Access,Human Rights Watch,Reporters Without Borders, Association for Progressive Communications, and theCenter for Democracy and Technology all are taking part in the event.

Find out more about the Principles at https://NecessaryandProportionate.org

Contacts

NGOs currently in Geneva for the 24^th Human Rights Council:

Access
Fabiola Carrion: fabiola@accessnow.org

Association for Progressive Communication
Shawna Finnegan: shawna@apc.org

Center for Democracy and Technology
Matthew Shears: mshears@cdt.org

Electronic Frontier Foundation
Katitza Rodriguez: katitza@eff.org - @txitua

Human Rights Watch
Cynthia Wong: wongc@hrw.org

Privacy International
Carly Nyst: carly@privacy.org

Reporters Without Borders
Lucie Morillon: lucie.morillon@rsf.org
Hélène Sackstein: helsack@gmail.com

Signatories

Argentina
Ramiro Alvarez: rugarte@adc.org.ar
Asociación por los Derechos Civiles

Argentina
Beatriz Busaniche: bea@vialibre.org.ar
Fundación Via Libre

Colombia
Carolina Botero: carobotero@gmail.com
Fundación Karisma

Egypt
Ahmed Ezzat: ahmed.ezzat@afteegypt.org
Afteegypt

Honduras
Hedme Sierra-Castro: hedme.sc@gmail.com
ACI-Participa

India
Elonnai Hickok: elonnai@cis-india.org
Center for Internet and Society

Korea
Prof. Park: kyungsinpark@korea.ac.kr
Open Net Korea

Macedonia
Bardhyl Jashari: info@metamorphosis.org.mk
Metamorphosis Foundation for Internet and Society

Mauritania, Senegal, Tanzania
Abadacar Diop: jonction_jonction@yahoo.fr
Jonction

Portugal
Andreia Martins: andreia@coolpolitics.pt
ASSOCIAÇÃO COOLPOLITICS

Peru
Miguel Morachimo: morachimo@gmail.com
Hiperderecho

Russia
Andrei Soldatov: soldatov@agentura.ru
Agentura.ru

Serbia
Djordje Krivokapic: krivokapic@gmail.com
SHARE Foundation

Western Balkans
Valentina Pellizer: valentina.pellizzer@oneworldsee.org
Oneworldsee

Brasil
Marcelo Saldanha: instituto@bemestarbrasil.org.br
IBEBrasil

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-and-international-coalition-calls-upon-governments-to-protect-privacy