Centre for Internet and Society

Subhashish Panigrahi joins Open GLAM Working Group

praskrishna — 2014-05-27T09:40:40Z

Subhashish recently joined the OpenGLAM Working Group (a global network of people who work to open up cultural data and content.) as a member and OpenGLAM Local (a local affiliate of OKFN's OpenGLAM project) as an ambassador for India. Both the positions will be voluntary.

OpenGLAM Working Group

The OpenGLAM Working Group is a global network of people who work to open up cultural data and content. We run workshops and provide documentation for cultural institutions wanting to open up their data as well as organise events bringing together groups that are committed to building an open cultural commons. The Working Group Members act as a bridge between different organisations and initiatives, and the global network. We meet every month virtually to discuss relevant updates, pressing issues, and next steps to be taken. If you are interested in joining, please get in touch with openglam@okfn.org.

Read the full details on this page.

Open GLAM Local

OpenGLAM has established several local groups as well as OpenGLAM ambassadors to serve as the local point of contact in their area. They are closely connected to the Local Groups of the Open Knowledge Foundation and work on open culture in these local groups. Subhashish Panigrahi is the local contact in India.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/open-glam-working-group-members-subhashish-panigrahi

WIPO SCCR 27 (May 2, 2014)

praskrishna — 2014-05-25T04:50:21Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/wipo-sccr-27-discussions-transcripts-day-5.pdf

WIPO SCCR 27 (May 2, 2014)

praskrishna — 2014-05-25T04:48:54Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/2014-05-02-sccr-27.txt

WIP SCCR 27 (April 30, 2014)

praskrishna — 2014-05-25T04:06:04Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/wipo-sccr-27-discussion-transcripts-day-3.pdf

WIPO SCCR Text (April 30, 2014)

praskrishna — 2014-05-25T04:03:05Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/wipo-sccr-27-discussions-transcripts-day-3.txt

An Open House Session with George Abraham

praskrishna — 2014-05-19T01:45:58Z

Ashoka India and the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) welcome you to an open house session with George Abraham, CEO and Founder of the SCORE Foundation at Ashoka- Innovators for the Public in Domlur on Wednesday, May 21, 2014.

“Blindness or disability is not the real problem, it is the way we all think.” – Ashoka Fellow George Abraham

Made invisible in the public sphere, persons with disability are often overlooked by society as productive members of the community. Their families, friends and mainstream media too have done little to change the limited lens through which they, and ultimately individuals with disability see and define their role in their communities.

We believe that the time has come for us as a society, especially businesses, to break the barriers between different worlds. We need to create spaces that allow us to ‘step in’ to each other’s worlds and engage in meaningful dialogues that allow us to reflect, question and develop an empathetic lens to building a society that is more inclusive to persons with disability.

Join Ashoka India and the Center for Internet and Society (CIS) for an Open House Session on Wednesday, May 21, where we will be screening an episode of George Abraham’s new show on the visually impaired-“Nazar ya Nazariya”-followed by a Q&A with George, Ashoka and CIS on what it means to shift the perception and treatment of disability in society, media and big business.

Agenda

Time	Detail
15.00 15.30	Screening of Nazar Ya Nazariya
15.30 16.00	Q&A with George Abraham
16.00 17.00	An open dialogue with experts and audience members on Stepping into Disability: How can we begin to change the paradigm on the inclusion of persons with disability into mainstream society, with a special focus on corporates and business enterprise?
17.00 17.30	Connect and Share (Networking space)

RSVP

RSVP: Olina Banerji (9480826557) - obanerji@ashoka.org
Rajesh Varghese (9008998414) - rvarghese@ashoka.org
Anandhi Visvanathan (8197177080) - anandhi@cis-india.org

The Team

George Abraham

Based on his own experiences and those of hundreds of visually impaired people, George has developed a program whose combination of clinical and non-clinical components will help the seeing impaired stand on their own feet and realize their full potentials. George has designed the Vision Enhancement Center (VEC) to institutionalize comprehensive, non-medical eye care services. Like counseling, equipment, training, medical referrals, information, and rehabilitation services. George's goal is to build the first world-class institution for the visually impaired in the SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) region to be an example that will inspire widespread reform in the way the blind and other people with disabilities are treated, cared for, educated, and employed. To garner support for his work, George is partnering with civil society organizations, medical professionals, the government, and corporations. His latest venture has been a collaboration with Doordarshan to create a 13-episode television series called Nazar Ya Nazariya, that highlights and celebrates visually impaired individuals who have overcome both physical and mental barriers to integrate successfully into the mainstream.

CIS

The Centre for Internet and Society is a non-profit research organization that works on policy issues relating to freedom of expression, privacy, accessibility for persons with disabilities, access to knowledge and IPR reform, and openness (including open government, FOSS, open standards, etc.), and engages in academic research on digital natives and digital humanities.

Ashoka

Ashoka is the world’s leading network of social entrepreneurs — men and women who are creating new institutions to implement system-changing solutions for the world’s most urgent social problems. Since 1980, Ashoka has pioneered the field of social entrepreneurship, electing and connecting more than 3,000 Fellows with innovative, sustainable solutions in a variety of fields such as civic engagement, economic development, health, human rights, environment, and learning/education in over 70 countries. As the largest association of leading social entrepreneurs in the world, Ashoka has started and supported movements that have brought about widespread social change, and has developed a keen understanding of what individuals need to make change happen. Ashoka has been engaged in learning from and serving this historical movement across the globe for 25 years.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/events/open-house-session-with-george-abraham

Net Neutrality, Free Speech and the Indian Constitution – III: Conceptions of Free Speech and Democracy

gautam — 2014-05-27T10:21:24Z

In this 3 part series, Gautam Bhatia explores the concept of net neutrality in the context of Indian law and the Indian Constitution.

In the modern State, effective exercise of free speech rights is increasingly dependent upon an infrastructure that includes newspapers, television and the internet. Access to a significant part of this infrastructure is determined by money. Consequently, if what we value about free speech is the ability to communicate one’s message to a non-trivial audience, financial resources influence both who can speak and, consequently, what is spoken. The nature of the public discourse – what information and what ideas circulate in the public sphere – is contingent upon a distribution of resources that is arguably unjust and certainly unequal.

There are two opposing theories about how we should understand the right to free speech in this context. Call the first one of these the libertarian conception of free speech. The libertarian conception takes as given the existing distribution of income and resources, and consequently, the unequal speaking power that that engenders. It prohibits any intervention designed to remedy the situation. The most famous summary of this vision was provided by the American Supreme Court, when it first struck down campaign finance regulations, in Buckley v. Valeo: “the concept that government may restrict the speech of some [in] order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.” This theory is part of the broader libertarian worldview, which would restrict government’s role in a polity to enforcing property and criminal law, and views any government-imposed restriction on what people can do within the existing structure of these laws as presumptively wrong.

We can tentatively label the second theory as the social-democratic theory of free speech. This theory focuses not so much on the individual speaker’s right not to be restricted in using their resources to speak as much as they want, but upon the collective interest in maintaining a public discourse that is open, inclusive and home to a multiplicity of diverse and antagonistic ideas and viewpoints. Often, in order to achieve this goal, governments regulate access to the infrastructure of speech so as to ensure that participation is not entirely skewed by inequality in resources. When this is done, it is often justified in the name of democracy: a functioning democracy, it is argued, requires a thriving public sphere that is not closed off to some or most persons.

Surprisingly, one of the most powerful judicial statements for this vision also comes from the United States. In Red Lion v. FCC, while upholding the “fairness doctrine”, which required broadcasting stations to cover “both sides” of a political issue, and provide a right of reply in case of personal attacks, the Supreme Court noted:

“[Free speech requires] preserv[ing] an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee… it is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here.”

What of India? In the early days of the Supreme Court, it adopted something akin to the libertarian theory of free speech. In Sakal Papers v. Union of India, for example, it struck down certain newspaper regulations that the government was defending on grounds of opening up the market and allowing smaller players to compete, holding that Article 19(1)(a) – in language similar to what Buckley v. Valeo would hold, more than fifteen years later – did not permit the government to infringe the free speech rights of some in order to allow others to speak. The Court continued with this approach in its next major newspaper regulation case, Bennett Coleman v. Union of India, but this time, it had to contend with a strong dissent from Justice Mathew. After noting that “it is no use having a right to express your idea, unless you have got a medium for expressing it”, Justice Mathew went on to hold:

“What is, therefore, required is an interpretation of Article 19(1)(a) which focuses on the idea that restraining the hand of the government is quite useless in assuring free speech, if a restraint on access is effectively secured by private groups. A Constitutional prohibition against governmental restriction on the expression is effective only if the Constitution ensures an adequate opportunity for discussion… Any scheme of distribution of newsprint which would make the freedom of speech a reality by making it possible the dissemination of ideas as news with as many different facets and colours as possible would not violate the fundamental right of the freedom of speech of the petitioners. In other words, a scheme for distribution of a commodity like newsprint which will subserve the purpose of free flow of ideas to the market from as many different sources as possible would be a step to advance and enrich that freedom. If the scheme of distribution is calculated to prevent even an oligopoly ruling the market and thus check the tendency to monopoly in the market, that will not be open to any objection on the ground that the scheme involves a regulation of the press which would amount to an abridgment of the freedom of speech.”

In Justice Mathew’s view, therefore, freedom of speech is not only the speaker’s right (the libertarian view), but a complex balancing act between the listeners’ right to be exposed to a wide range of material, as well as the collective, societal right to have an open and inclusive public discourse, which can only be achieved by preventing the monopolization of the instruments, infrastructure and access-points of speech.

Over the years, the Court has moved away from the majority opinions in Sakal Papers and Bennett Coleman, and steadily come around to Justice Mathew’s view. This is particularly evident from two cases in the 1990s: in Union of India v. The Motion Picture Association, the Court upheld various provisions of the Cinematograph Act that imposed certain forms of compelled speech on moviemakers while exhibiting their movies, on the ground that “to earmark a small portion of time of this entertainment medium for the purpose of showing scientific, educational or documentary films, or for showing news films has to be looked at in this context of promoting dissemination of ideas, information and knowledge to the masses so that there may be an informed debate and decision making on public issues. Clearly, the impugned provisions are designed to further free speech and expression and not to curtail it.”

LIC v. Manubhai D. Shah is even more on point. In that case, the Court upheld a right of reply in an in-house magazine, “because fairness demanded that both view points were placed before the readers, however limited be their number, to enable them to draw their own conclusions and unreasonable because there was no logic or proper justification for refusing publication… the respondent’s fundamental right of speech and expression clearly entitled him to insist that his views on the subject should reach those who read the magazine so that they have a complete picture before them and not a one sided or distorted one…” This goes even further than Justice Mathew’s dissent in Bennett Coleman, and the opinion of the Court in Motion Picture Association, in holding that not merely is it permitted to structure the public sphere in an equal and inclusive manner, but that it is a requirement of Article 19(1)(a).

We can now bring the threads of the separate arguments in the three posts together. In the first post, we found that public law and constitutional obligations can be imposed upon private parties when they discharge public functions. In the second post, it was argued that the internet has replaced the park, the street and the public square as the quintessential forum for the circulation of speech. ISPs, in their role as gatekeepers, now play the role that government once did in controlling and keeping open these avenues of expression. Consequently, they can be subjected to public law free speech obligations. And lastly, we discussed how the constitutional conception of free speech in India, that the Court has gradually evolved over many years, is a social-democratic one, that requires the keeping open of a free and inclusive public sphere. And if there is one thing that fast-lanes over the internet threaten, it is certainly a free and inclusive (digital) public sphere. A combination of these arguments provides us with an arguable case for imposing obligations of net neutrality upon ISPs, even in the absence of a statutory or regulatory obligations, grounded within the constitutional guarantee of the freedom of speech and expression.

For the previous post, please see: http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/-neutrality-free-speech-and-the-indian-constitution-part-2.

_____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Gautam Bhatia — @gautambhatia88 on Twitter — is a graduate of the National Law School of India University (2011), and presently an LLM student at the Yale Law School. He blogs about the Indian Constitution at http://indconlawphil.wordpress.com. Here at CIS, he will be blogging on issues of online freedom of speech and expression.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/net-neutrality-free-speech-and-the-indian-constitution-2013-iii-conceptions-of-free-speech-and-democracy

Summary of Judgements on Disability Rights

CLPR — 2014-05-23T09:23:13Z

The following are some of the landmark judgments given by the Supreme Court and some of the high courts in India on disability rights.

Supreme Court Decisions

Deaf Employees Welfare Association v Union of India[1]
This petition was filed seeking a Writ of Mandamus directing the Central and state governments to grant equal transport allowance to its government employees suffering from hearing impairment as what was being given to blind and other disabled government employees. The allowance given to the hearing impaired employees was significantly lower than the allowance granted to other employees with disabilities.

The Supreme Court allowed the petition and directed the Respondents to grant transport allowance to speech and hearing impaired persons also on par with blind and orthopaedically disabled government employees. The court held that “there cannot be further discrimination between a person with disability of ‘blindness’ and a person with disability of ‘hearing impairment’. Such discrimination has not been envisaged under the Disabilities Act.” It held that equality of law and equal protection of law afforded to all persons with disabilities while participating in government functions. The court held that the dignity of persons with hearing impairments must be protected by the state. Even the assumption that a hearing or speech impaired person is suffering less than a blind person is, in effect, marginalizing them; and as such, the same benefits must be given to them, as are awarded to blind citizens. Any move made by the state to further this objective is in consonance with the principles enshrined in Articles 14. This case held that deaf and mute people should also be given transportation allowances on par with blind and orthopedically handicapped employees of the government.

Union of India v National Federation of the Blind[2]
This was an appeal from the decision of the Delhi High Court wherein a public interest petition had been filed which sought the implementation of Section 33 of the Act alleging that the appellants herein have failed to provide reservation to the blind and low vision persons and they are virtually excluded from the process of recruitment to the Government posts as stipulated under the said Act.

The court looked into the calculation of the 3% reservation –whether it refers to cadre strength, or number of vacancies. It was held that 3% refers to a part of the total vacancies in cadre strength. The court also observed, “It is clear that while section 33 provides for a minimum level of representation of 3 per cent in the establishments of appropriate government, the legislature intended to ensure 5 per cent of representation in the entire workforce both in public as well as private sector”.

Government of India v Ravi Prakash Gupta[3]
In this case, the respondent was a visually challenged person who appeared for the civil services examination conducted by the Union Public Service Commission and was declared successful. However, he was not given an appointment even though he was at Sl. No. 5 in the merit list of visually impaired candidates. The respondent approached the Central Administrative Tribunal which refused his application and thereafter the respondent approached the high court. The high court directed the government to accommodate the Respondent in the merit list, against which the state filed an appeal in the Supreme Court. The state contended that since the post for which the respondent was applying was not identified for persons with disabilities and therefore not reserved for them, the government could not make reservations in the same.

The Supreme Court refused the state government’s contention that identification of jobs was a pre-requisite for reservation and appointment under section 33 of the Act.[4] The court held,

"It is only logical that, as provided in section 32 of the aforesaid Act, posts have to be identified for reservation for the purposes of Section 33, but such identification was meant to be simultaneously undertaken with the coming into operation of the Act, to give effect to the provisions of Section 33. The legislature never intended the provisions of section 32 of the Act to be used as a tool to deny the benefits of Section 33 to these categories of disabled persons indicated therein. Such a submission strikes at the foundation of the provisions relating to the duty cast upon the appropriate government to make appointments in every establishment."[5]

Syed Bashir-ud-Din Qadri v. Nazir Ahmed Shah[6]
This was a decision by the Supreme Court. In this case, the Appellant was a B.Sc. graduate with cerebral palsy who had applied for a job as a ‘Rehbar-e-Taleem’ or ‘Teaching Guide’ in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The state government had initially objected to his appointment on the ground of his disability. The appellant however, with directions from the high court, was appointed under the Jammu and Kashmir Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1998.

The Respondent then filed a petition challenging the order of appointment and the appellant was re-examined by the head of the Department of Neurology. It was indicated in the report that as he had cerebral palsy, he had significant speech and writing difficulties, which would make it difficult for him to perform his duties as a teacher. The high court quashed his appointment and ordered that since the appellant was unfit to the post of the teacher he should be given an alternative employment. His appeal to the division bench of the high court was dismissed and he thereafter approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court observed that,

“This case involves a beneficial piece of social legislation to enable persons with certain forms of disability to live a life of purpose and human dignity. This is a case which has to be handled with sensitivity and not with bureaucratic apathy, as appears to have been done as far as the appellant is concerned... It is only to be expected that the movement of a person suffering from cerebral palsy would be jerky on account of locomotor disability and that his speech would be somewhat impaired but despite the same, the legislature thought it fit to provide for reservation of 1 per cent of the vacancies for such persons. So long as the same did not impede the person from discharging his duties efficiently and without causing prejudice to the children being taught, there could, therefore, be no reason for a rigid approach to be taken not to continue with the appellant's services as Rehbar-e-Taleem, particularly, when his students had themselves stated that they had got used to his manner of talking and did not have any difficulty in understanding the subject being taught by him... Coupled with the above is the fact that the results achieved by him in the different classes were extremely good; his appearance and demeanour in school had been highly appreciated by the committee which had been constituted pursuant to the orders of the high court to assess the appellant's ability in conducting his classes.”[7]

The court directed that in order to overcome the impediment of writing on the black board, an electronic external aid could be provided to the appellant, which could eliminate the need for drawing a diagram and the same could be substituted by a picture on a screen, which could be projected with minimum effort. With these directions for providing reasonable accommodation, the Supreme Court held that the disengagement of the appellant goes against the grain of the PWD Act and hence the order was set aside by the court.

Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration[8]
This case was with regard to the reproductive rights of a woman with mental retardation residing at a government run welfare institution in Chandigarh who became pregnant due to a rape by an in-house staff and who wanted to keep the baby and carry on the pregnancy to full term. The Chandigarh Administration filed a petition in the high court seeking permission to terminate her pregnancy under the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 (“MTP Act”) on the ground that she was not capable of carrying on with the pregnancy and would not be able to look after a child. Although the expert body found that the woman had expressed her wish to bear her child, the high court directed the termination of the pregnancy. The woman, through an amicus, appealed to the Supreme Court and one of the main issues before the Supreme Court was regarding the legal capacity of a woman with mental retardation to decide on her pregnancy.

The Supreme Court noted the provisions of the MTP Act, which provided that where pregnancy is a result of rape and termination of the same is contemplated, the consent of the pregnant woman is mandatory.[9] The court also noted the exception to this provision which provided that in case of a pregnant woman who is “mentally ill”, pregnancy can be terminated with the approval of the woman’s guardian.[10] Following this, the court proceeded to make a distinction between ‘mental illness’ and ‘mental retardation’. Upholding the legal capacity of the appellant, the court held:

“While a guardian can make decisions on behalf a ‘mentally ill person’ as per Section 3(4)(a) of the MTP Act, the same cannot be done on behalf of a person who is in a condition of ‘mental retardation’. The only reasonable conclusion that can be arrived at in this regard is that the State must respect the personal autonomy of a mentally retarded woman with regard to decisions about terminating a pregnancy. It can also be reasoned that while the explicit consent of the woman in question is not a necessary condition for continuing the pregnancy, the MTP Act clearly lays down that obtaining the consent of the pregnant woman is indeed an essential condition for proceeding with the termination of a pregnancy... We cannot permit a dilution of this requirement of consent since the same would amount to an arbitrary and unreasonable restriction on the reproductive rights of the victim.”[11]

Thus the Supreme Court clearly held that the MTP Act required the consent of a mentally retarded woman for termination of pregnancy. Following this, the Court concluded that the Appellant was mentally retarded, had not consented to the termination of her pregnancy and in fact, had expressed her willingness to bear the child. Therefore it could not permit the termination of her pregnancy. In arriving at this conclusion, the Court not only recognised the reproductive rights of a woman under the MTP Act, but also recognised international norms and principles on mentally retarded persons and persons with disabilities under the CRPD. In this context the Court specifically held:

"Our conclusions in this case are strengthened by some norms developed in the realm of international law... In respecting the personal autonomy of mentally retarded persons with regard to the reproductive choice of continuing or terminating a pregnancy, the MTP Act lays down such a procedure. We must also bear in mind that India has ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on October 1, 2007 and the contents of the same are binding on our legal system."[12]

The court clearly recognised the right to legal capacity of women with mental retardation to take independent decisions on her pregnancy. The Supreme Court held that “Her reproductive choice should be respected in spite of other factors such as the lack of understanding of the sexual act as well as apprehensions about her capacity to carry the pregnancy to its full term and the assumption of maternal responsibilities thereafter.[13]” Therefore, the Supreme Court laid out the specific right to legal capacity which was not subject to an understanding of one’s situation and capacities. This case clearly follows the spirit of protection of legal capacity under Article 12 of the CRPD.

High Court Decisions

Ranjit Kumar Rajak v. State Bank of India(2009) 5 Bom CR 227
The Petitioner in this case underwent a renal transplant in 2004. Subsequently, he applied to the post of a probationary officer in the State Bank of India. After a medical test, the bank rejected him on the ground that he was found medically unfit for the post. The petitioner approached the Bombay High Court by a writ petition claiming that despite medical reports that indicate his fitness to perform his duties, he was denied being considered for employment. The bank rejected him as the rules required the bank to reimburse medical expenses incurred by the officers of the bank and since the medical condition of the Petitioner required regular medical check-ups, the costs would be very high and could not be borne by the bank. The main question, according to the Court, was “whether a person who is fully qualified for a post because of his past or present medical condition which otherwise did not interfere with his fitness to dispense the duties of his post, be denied employment because of the financial burden that would be cast on the employer.”[14]

In an extremely significant ruling, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court[15] articulated and recognised for the first time the concept of “reasonable accommodation at the workplace” in India. The court relied on the CRPD to decide the duty of the employer in providing reasonable accommodation and the limits on such a duty. The court recognised that India had signed and ratified the CRPD and that Article 27 of the Convention recognises the right of persons with disability to be "accepted in the labour market and work environment that is open, inclusive and accessible to persons with disabilities."[16]

The court also discussed the definition of “reasonable accommodation” under Article 2 as “a necessary and appropriate modification and adjustments not imposing a disproportionate or undue burden, where needed in a particular case, to ensure to persons with disabilities the enjoyment or exercise on an equal basis with others of all human rights and fundamental freedoms.”[17]

In interpreting “reasonable accommodation” and “undue burden” the court relied on the CRPD and recognised the importance of India’s international obligations with respect to rights of disabled persons by stating that:

“The law is now well settled that though the United Nations Convention may not have been enacted into the Municipal Law, as long as the convention is not in conflict with the Municipal Law and can be read into Article 2 thus making it enforceable. Therefore, in the absence of any conflict it is possible to read the test of reasonable accommodation in employment contracts.”[18]

The Court further held:

“A duty is, therefore, cast on the State to provide reasonable accommodation in the matter of employment subject to the burden of hardship test being satisfied. In the absence of a statutory definition of reasonable accommodation, the reasonable accommodation as set out in the protocol in the first instance can be considered. It will have to have a nexus with the financial burden on the institution and/or undertaking which will have to bear the burden and further the extent to which reasonable accommodation can be provided for.”[19]

The court incorporated the right to reasonable accommodation by declaring that “Reasonable accommodation, if read into Article 21, based on the U.N Protocol, would not be in conflict with municipal law. It would give added life and dimension to the ever expanding concept of life and its true enjoyment.”[20] Following this, the court concluded that the bank has a duty to provide reasonable accommodation to the petitioner subject to any undue burden. The court observed that no evidence was presented on how the financial burden would actually be a caused to the bank in providing reasonable accommodation to the petitioner even if it meant meeting his medical expenses. Consequently, the court allowed the petition and directed that the Petitioner be offered appointment and allowed to join the post.

Lalit and Others v Govt. of NCT and Another[21]
This petition was filed by 12 inmates of the hostel attached to Andh Mahavidyalya, New Delhi, an institution for visually impaired students, seeking a direction that they may not be expelled or dispossessed from the hostel. Out of these 12 inmates, expulsion orders were issued by the Respondents against 5 inmates on the ground that the hostel was meant for only students up to Class VIII and the petitioners had overstayed beyond this class. Many of them were between 25-35 years old and it was alleged that there was a shortage of space for deserving younger visually impaired students and that they were also intimidating the younger students. One of the main issues before the Court was whether the hostel was obligated to accommodate the petitioners because of their disabled status even if it resulted in a disadvantage to the other disabled students.

Justice Muralidhar of the Delhi High Court noted that the facts illustrated the lack of decent accommodation for children with disabilities and recognised the associated problems of lack of resources, hygiene and accountability in the running of institutions with disabled children. The court held as follows:

“In the context of the inviolable human rights of the disabled, it is necessary to take note of the binding and mandatory provisions of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (specifically Sections 26 and 30) (`PDR Act’) and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (`CRPD’) which has been ratified by India. In particular, Article 7 which set out the obligations of the States towards children with disabilities, Article 9 which obliges the States to take appropriate measures to ensure access to “schools, housing, medical facilities’, and Article 24 which deals with the right to education are relevant.”

The court relied upon Article 24 of the CRPD which guaranteed the right to education and held that in the context of a disabled child housed in a state-run institution there are a cluster of laws all of which can be traced to the fundamental rights to liberty and a life with dignity. It held that in the context of a young person receiving education in a state-run institution as a resident scholar, the right to shelter and decent living is an inalienable facet of the right to education itself and when the State takes over the running of an educational institution that caters to the needs of the disabled, it has to account for the ‘cascading effect’ of multiple disadvantages that such children face.

In the context of the present case however, the court held that due to the limitation of resources, all the visually impaired persons at the Andh Mahavidhyalala, irrespective of their age cannot possibly expect to be allowed to live there as the primary purpose should be to cater to the needs of young children studying up to class VIII. If this primary object was not kept in view, then it may result in an unfair denial of the right to education of other deserving young students who are visually challenged.

The court thus directed the Respondent authorities to take every possible effort to see if all the 5 inmates who were given expulsion orders could be accommodated in any of the other institutions in Delhi. Sufficient time of 6 months should be given to them to make alternative arrangements and assistance should be given to help them find alternative accommodation. The court also observed that this case should act as a wakeup call for the government to monitor the functioning generally of all institutions under its control, particularly for the disabled. This case illustrates the incorporation of the CRPD principles with regard to reasonable accommodation and right to education of children. The court was called upon to balance the two rights, which it ultimately did by taking into account the level of disabilities faced by each group demanding accommodation.

The National Association for the Deaf v. Union of India [22]
This was a public interest petition filed by the National Association for the Deaf before the Delhi High Court on the non-availability of sign language interpreters in public services. The petition complained of the lack of availability of adequate number of sign language interpreters in various public places and sought for directions against the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment and other authorities to ensure access and better training of sign language interpreters.

While the court noted the lack of availability of sign language interpreters, it agreed with the Petitioner Association that due to non-availability of interpreters, the hearing impaired were unable to avail medical, transport and banking facilities and to also seek police help. With regard to the importance of ensuring the availability of support in the form of interpreters, the Court relied on the CRPD and held,

“The United Nations Convention on the Rights of persons with disabilities adopted by the General Assembly and ratified by the Govt. of India on 1st October, 2007 also provides for taking appropriate measures to provide forms of live assistance and intermediaries including guides, readers and professional Sign Language Interpreters to facilitate accessibility to buildings and other facilities open to the public. Needless to state that all the said rights are composite part of life enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India.”[23]

Based on this, the court issued specific directions to the respondent authorities which included undertaking a survey to assess the availability and requirements for sign language interpreters, appointing nodal officers to seek information from concerned authorities and prepare a report to be used for creation of new posts, creating courses and curricula for training of interpreters.

BhagwanDass and Anr v. Punjab State Electricity Board
In this case, the Appellant was an Assistant Lineman in the Respondent Board. During his service, he became totally blind and the Respondent failed to accommodate him in an alternative post as per Section 47 of the PWD Act and terminated his service. Therefore the appellant approached the High Court of Punjab and Haryana against the termination of his service. The high court dismissed the petition and the Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal relying on Section 47 of the PWD Act and observed that the Board had an obligation to follow this provision as the appellant had acquired disability during his service. On Section 47, the Court relied on a previous decision in Kunal Singh v. Union of India and Anr[24] which held that, “In construing a provision of a social beneficial enactment that too dealing with disabled persons intended to give them equal opportunities, protection of rights and full participation, the view that advances the object of the Act and serves its purpose must be preferred to the one which obstructs the object and paralyses the purpose of the Act”[25]

The court gave a broad interpretation to Section 47 and took a protective approach towards persons with disabilities by holding:

“From the narrow point of view the officers were duty bound to follow the law and it was not open to them to allow their bias to defeat the lawful rights of the disabled employee. From the larger point of view the officers failed to realise that the disabled too are equal citizens of the country and have as much share in its resources as any other citizen. The denial of their rights would not only be unjust and unfair to them and their families but would create larger and graver problems for the society at large. What the law permits to them is no charity or largess but their right as equal citizens of the country.”

Ritesh Sinha v. State of Haryana[26]
In this case, an important interim order was passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the matter is still pending. The petitioner was a person with locomotor disability and was appointed as a clerk by the District and Sessions Judge, Karnal in the post reserved for physically disabled persons. Thereafter his services were terminated due to his inability to perform the duties as a clerk who was expected to write the office notes and maintain records in his own hands.

The court held that as the petitioner was well conversant with computer operations and that there could be plenty of work done by him like preparation of daily cause lists of all courts, certified copies of judgments, etc., which could be assigned to a computer savvy person like him. The court directed that in the interim, his dismissal order would remain stayed, and the respondents were directed to reinstate the petitioner in service with all benefits. The court even directed the respondents to immediately construct a ramp / slope so that the petitioner could enter his office and a compliance report to be submitted to court about the same. Further, it directed the respondents to see that a congenial atmosphere is created at the workplace so that the Petitioner is made an integral part of the mainstream workforce.

U.P. Vishesh Shikshak Association v. State of U.P.[27]
Here the Petitioner Association had filed a public interest petition before the Allahabad High Court contending that the pupil-teacher ratio so far as specialised teachers and children with disabilities was concerned was not adequate and claimed that the government circular on Integrated Education for Disabled Children Scheme mandated a pupil teacher ratio of 8:1. It also claimed that the Rehabilitation Council of India Act, 1992 imposed a statutory duty on the State to make arrangements for adequate number of teachers for persons with disabilities.

The Allahabad High Court recognised the statutory duty of the State to “provide all necessary help and assistance to physically disabled students.”[28] However, in response to an argument that orthopaedically handicapped children do not require specialised teachers, it held, “We are of the view that now, the right to education and right to livelihood being the fundamental rights enshrined under Articles 21 and 21-A of the Constitution, the State Government has to make all efforts to provide necessary assistance to all disabled persons. Taking into consideration the meagre strength of 1291 teachers, we cannot presume that State Government may be able to impart education to disabled students.”

Manjunatha v. Government of Karnataka and Ors[29]
In this case, the petitioner, who was completely blind sought to apply for the B. Ed. Course under the government quota of seats in Karnataka. However, he was denied admission by reason of the condition that persons with disability greater than 75 per cent would not be eligible for admission. The announcement issued by the respondent permitted applications from persons with disability but restricted it to such applicants who had a disability exceeding 40 per cent but below 75 per cent.

The Karnataka High Court allowed the petition by holding that such a provision in the announcement ran counter to the PWD Act. The respondent government argued that the upper limit in the announcement was based on a similar provision in Karnataka Selection of Candidates for Admission to Teachers Certificate Higher Course (TCH) and Bachelor of Education Course (B.Ed.) Rules 1999 and therefore such a notification could not be challenged. The bench however, rejected this contention and held that even the Rules run contrary to the PWD Act and the state government could not rely on the Rules to deny admission to candidates having more than 75 per cent disability. The court ruled in favour of the petitioner and held that he was entitled to take up CET for admission to B.Ed. course and further declared that he shall not be denied admission on the basis of his disability exceeding 75 per cent.

The observations of the court strengthened the protection for persons with disabilities as it effectively held that the disability legislations would take precedence over administrative rules of the government.

KritikaPurohit and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors.[30]
The petitioner was a visually impaired student who sought admission to the course in Bachelor of Physiotherapy but was not permitted to apply for the same. The petitioner contended that although the post of a physiotherapist was considered to be suitable for blind persons, the denial of courses in physiotherapy for blind persons ran counter to Section 39 of the PWD Act and that the respondents were obliged to make all accommodations for the Petitioner in conformity with Article 24(2) of the CRPD.

The respondents contended that it was not practical for the petitioner to be involved in the course. However, the court also noted the petitioner’s reliance on the circular of the Mumbai University in mandating that resources should be made available to visually impaired student to allow them to complete their courses. In view of these materials, the court observed that the respondents had shown a negative attitude towards persons with disabilities and “have not cared to consider the object underlying the provisions of Disabilities Act, 1995”. Therefore, by an interim order dated 2 August 2010, it directed the Commissioner of Disabilities to consider all the materials and make suitable instructions to the respondents for making necessary arrangements for admission of visually challenged students. It also directed that the petitioner should be provisionally admitted for the course and should be provided with resources for translation of the material to braille.

Subsequently the court found that the petitioner had completed the first exam and had secured 62 per cent in the same. Therefore, it held that she should be allowed to be admitted and complete the course. However, the court noted that the state government had accepted the guidelines of the Maharashtra State Council for Occupational Therapy and Physiotherapy that visually impaired candidates are not fit for the physiotherapy course. On this, it noted the contentions of the Petitioner and also Xavier’s Resource Centre for the Visually Challenged who claimed that a physiotherapist is not required to perform all the functions of physiotherapy and visually impaired physiotherapists can perform all functions with assistance if necessary. They also pointed out various physiotherapists who were working in Maharasthra successfully for many years. The court held that “We are, therefore, of the view that the stand of the respondent authorities is clearly discriminatory and adversely affects the Right to Life and equal opportunities of the petitioner as also other such students similarly situated. The fact that petitioner though being visually impaired not only passed her first year examination with 62% marks and is successfully studying in 2nd year, and several visually impaired persons have been working as professional physiotherapists in India as well as abroad appeals to us not to allow the petitioner as also others in the same position to be discriminated against or disqualified on that ground.[31]”

Thus, the court stayed the decision of the state government and directed the respondents to consider candidates with visual disability for admission to the course in physiotherapy.

[1]. Civil Petition 107 of 2011, decided on December 12, 2013.

[2]. (2013)2 SCC 772.

[3]. (2010) 7 SCC 626.

[4]. The Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995, section 33, available at http://www.socialjustice.nic.in/pwdact1995.php?format=print

[5]. Id at Para 16.

[6]. SLP(C)Nos.10669-70 of 2008 decided on 10 March 2010.

[7]. SLP(C)Nos.10669-70 of 2008 ¶28.

[8]. 2009 (9) SCC 1.

[9]. See Section 3(4)(b), Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971.

[10]. See Section 3(4)(a), Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971.

[11].Suchita Shrivastavav Chandigarh Administration, (2009) 9 SCC 1, at para 15.

[12]. See Id at Para 25, 26.

[13]. See SuchitaShrivastava (n 5) at Para 10.

[14]. Ranjit Kumar Rajak v. State Bank of India 2009 (5) BomCR 227 at Para 1.

[15]. With Justice Re

[16]. See Article 27(1), CRPD (n 1).

[17]. Reasonable accommodation is recognised under Article 2 of the CRPD and is defined as follows: ‘“Reasonable accommodation” means necessary and appropriate modification and adjustments not imposing a disproportionate or undue burden, where needed in a particular case, to ensure to persons with disabilities the enjoyment or exercise on an equal basis with others of all human rights and fundamental freedoms.”

[18]. Ranjit Kumar Rajak (n 9) at Para 17.

[19]. Id at Para 19.

[20]. Id at Para 21.

[21]. W.P. (C) No. 3444/2008, Judgment dated 7.5.2010 (Delhi High Court).

[22]. W.P.(C) No.6250/2010, Judgment dated 24.11.2011 (Delhi High Court).

[23]. The National Association of the Deaf v Union of India(n 20) at Para 7.

[24]. (2003) 4 SCC 524.

[25]. Id at Para 9.

[26].CWP NO. 3087 OF 2011 (Punjab and Haryana High Court).

[27]. Misc Bench No. 5622/ 2010, order dated 17 June 2010 (Allahabad High Court).

[28]. Id at Para 12.

[29]. W.P. 35969/2010, judgment dated 29-09-2011 (Karnataka High Court).

[30]. W.P. 979/2010, Bombay High Court.

[31]. KritikaPurohit and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., W.P. 979/2010, Bombay High Court, order dated 17 November 2011, para 7.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/accessibility/blog/summary-of-judgments-on-disability-rights

The Body in Cyberspace

nishant — 2014-05-13T10:13:22Z

Perhaps one of the most interesting histories of the cyberspace has been its relationship with the body. Beginning with the meatspace-cyberspace divide that Gibson introduces, the question of our bodies’ relationship with the internet has been hugely contested. There have been some very polarized debates around this question.

Where are we when we are online? Are we the person in the chair behind an interface? Are we the avatar in a social networking site interacting with somebody else? Are we a set of data running through the atmosphere? Are we us? Are we dogs? These are tantalising and teasing questions.

Early debates around the body-technology questions were polarized. There were people who offered that the cyberspace is a virtual space. What happens in that make-believe, performative space does not have any direct connections with who we are and how we live. They insisted that the cyberspace is essentially a performance space, and just like acting in a movie does not make us the character, all our interactions on the internet are also performances. The idea of a virtual body or a digital self were proposed, thinking of the digital as an extension of who we are – as a space that we occupy to perform different identities and then get on with our real lives.

Sherry Turkle, in her book Life on the Screen, was the first one to question this binary between the body and the digital self. Working closely with the first users of the online virtual reality worlds called Multiple User Dungeons, Turkle notes how being online started producing a different way of thinking about who we are and how we relate to the world around us. She indicates three different ways in which this re-thinking happens. The first, is at the level of language. She noticed how the users were beginning to think of their lives and their social relationships through the metaphors that they were using in the online world. So, for instance, people often thought of life through the metaphor of windows – being able to open multiple windows, performing multiple tasks and identities and ‘recycling’ them in their everyday life. Similarly, people saying that they are ‘low on bandwidth’ when they don’t have enough time and attention to devote to something, or thinking about the need to ‘upgrade’ our senses. We also are quite used to the idea that memory is something that resides on a chip and that computing is what machines do. These slippages in language, where we start attributing the machine characteristics to human beings are the first sign of understanding the human-technological relationship and history.

The second slippage is when the user start thinking of the avatars as human. We are quite used to, in our deep web lives, to think of machines as having agency. Our avatars act. Things that we do on the internet perform more actions than we have control of – a hashtag that we start on twitter gets used and responded to by others and takes on a life of its own. We live with sapient technologies – machines that care, artificial intelligence algorithms that customise search results for us, scripts and bots that protect us from malware and viruses. We haven’t attributed these kinds of human agencies to machines and technologies in the past. However, within the digital world, there is a complex network of actors, where all the actors are not always human. Bruno Latour, a philosopher of science and technology, posits in his ‘Actor Network Theory’ that the emergence of these non-human actors has helped us understand that we are not only dependent on machines and technologies for our everyday survival, but that many tasks that we had thought of as ‘human’ are actually performed, and performed better by these technologies. Hence, we have come to care for our machines and we also think of them as companions and have intimate relationships with them. And the machines, even as they make themselves invisible, start becoming more personal.

The third slippage that Turkle points out is the way in which the boundaries between the interior and the exterior were dissolved in the accounts of the users’ narratives of their digital adventures. There is a very simplistic understanding that what is human is inside us, it is sacred and organic and emotional. Earlier representational technology products like cinema, books, TV etc. have emphasised this distinction between real life and reel life. No actor is punished for the crime they commit in the narrative of a film. It is not very often that an author claims to be the character in a book. We have always had a very strong sense of distinction between the real person and the fictional person. But within the virtual reality worlds, these distinctions seem to dematerialize. The users not only thought of their avatars as human but also experienced the emotions, frustrations, excitement and joy that their characters were simulating for them. And what is more important, they claimed these experiences for themselves.

Namita Malhotra, who is a legal scholar and a visual artist, in her monograph on Pleasure, Porn and the Law, looks at the way in which we are in a process of data-stripping – constant revelation of our deepest darkest secrets and desires, within the user generated content rubric. Looking at the low-res, grainy videos on sites like YouTube and Vimeo, which have almost no narrative content and are often empty of sexual content, produce all of us in a global orgiastic setting, where our bodies are being extended beyond ourselves. In the monograph, Malhotra argues that the Internet is not merely an extension but almost like a third skin that we wear around ourselves – it is a wrapper, but it is tied, through ligaments and tendons, to the flesh and bone of our being, and often things that we do online, even when they are not sexual in nature, can become pornographic. Conversely, the physical connections that we have are now being made photographically and visually available in byte sized morsels, turned into a twitpic, available to be shared virally, and disseminated using mobile applications, thus making our bodies escape the biological containers that we occupy but also simultaneously marks our bodies through all these adventures that we have on the digital infobahn.

Case Study: A Rape in Cyberspace
A contemporary of Sherry Turkle, Julian Dibbell, in his celebrated account of ‘A Rape in Cyberspace’[1] describes a case-study that corroborates many of the observations that Turkle posits. Dibbell analyses a particular incident that occurred one night in a special kind of MUD – LambdaMOO (MUD, Object-Oriented) – which was run by the Xerox Research Corporations. A MUD, is a text-based virtual reality space of fluid dimensions and purposes, where users could create avatars of themselves in textual representations. Actions and interactions within the MUD are also in long running scripts of texts. Of course, technically all this means that a specially designed database gives users the vivid impression of their own presence and the impression of moving through physical spaces that actually exists as descriptive data on some remotely located servers. When users log into LambdaMoo, the program presents them with a brief textual description of one of the rooms (the coat closet) in the fictional database mansion. If the user wants to navigate, s/he can enter a command to move in a particular direction and the database replaces the original description with new ones, corresponding to the room located in the direction s/he chose. When the new description scrolls across the user’s screen, it lists not only the fixed features of the room but all its contents at that moment – including things (tools, toys, weapons), as well as other avatars (each character over which s/he has sole control). For the database program that powers the MOO, all of these entities are simply subprograms or data structures which are allowed to interact according to rules very roughly mimicking the laws of the physical world. Characters may leave the rooms in particular directions. If a character says or does something (as directed by its user), then the other users who are located in the same ‘geographical’ region within the MOO, see the output describing the utterance or action. As the different players create their own fantasy worlds, interacting and socialising, a steady script of text scrolls up a computer screen and narratives are produced. The avatars, as in Second Life or even on Social Networking Sites like Orkut, have the full freedom to define themselves, often declining the usual referents of gender, sexuality, and context to produce fantastical apparitions. It is in such an environment of free-floating fantasy and role-playing, of gaming and social interaction mediated by digital text-based avatars, that a ‘crime’ happened. Dibell goes on to give an account of events that unfolded that night. In the social lounge of LambdaMoo, which is generally the most populated of all the different nooks, corners, dimensions and rooms that users might have created for themselves, there appeared an avatar called Dr. Bungle. Dr. Bungle had created a particular program called Vodoo Doll, which allowed the creator to control avatars which were not his own, attributing to them involuntary actions for all the other players to watch, while the targeted avatars themselves remained helpless and unable to resist any of these moves. This Dr. Bungle, through his evil Vodoo Doll, took hold of two avatars – legba and Starsinger and started controlling them. He further proceeded to forcefully engage them in sexually violent, abusive, perverted and reluctant actions upon these two avatars. As the users behind both the avatars sent a series of invective and a desperate plea for help, even as other users in the room (# 17) watched, the Vodoo Doll made them enter into sexually degrading and extremely violent set of activities without their consent. The peals of his laughter were silenced only when a player with higher powers came and evicted Dr. Bungle from the Room # 17. As an eye-witness of the crime and a further interpolator with the different users then present, Dibbell affirms that most of the users were convinced that a crime had happened in the Virtual World of the digital Mansion. That a ‘virtual rape’ happened and was traumatic to the two users was not questioned. However, what this particular incident brought back into focus was the question of space. Dibbell suggests that what we had was a set of conflicting approaches to understand the particular phenomenon: Where virtual reality and its conventions would have us believe that legba and Starsinger were brutally raped in their own living room, here was the victim legba scolding Mr. Bungle for a breach of civility … [R]eal life, on the other hand, insists the incident was only an episode in a free-form version of Dungeons and Dragons, confined to the realm of the symbolic and at no point threatening any players life, limb, or material well-being…’ The meaning and the understanding of this particular incident and the responses that it elicited, lie in the ‘buzzing, dissonant gap’ between the perceived and experienced notion of Technosocial Space. The discussions that were initiated within the community asked many questions: If a crime had happened, where had the crime happened? Was the crime recognised by law? Are we responsible for our actions performed through a digital character on the cyberspaces? Is it an assault if it is just role playing? The lack of ‘whereness’ of the crime, or rather the placelessness of the crime made it especially more difficult to pin it to a particular body. The users who termed the event as rape had necessarily inverted the expected notion of digital space as predicated upon and imitative of physical space; they had in fact done the exact opposite and exposed digital spaces as not only ‘bleeding into reality’ but also a constitutive part of the physical spaces. Their Technosocial Space was not the space of the LambdaMoo Room # 17 but the physical locations (and thus the bodies, rather than the avatars) of the players involved. However, this blurring was not to make an easy resolution of complex metaphysical questions. This blurring was to demonstrate, more than ever, that the actions and pseudonymous performances or narratives which are produced in the digital world are not as dissociated from the ‘Real’ as we had always imagined. More importantly, the notional simulation of place or a reference to the physical place is not just a symbolic gesture but has material ramifications and practices. As Dibell notes in his lyrical style. ‘Months later, the woman in Seattle would confide to me that as she wrote those words posttraumatic tears were streaming down her face — a real-life fact that should suffice to prove that the words’ emotional content was no mere playacting. The precise tenor of that content, however, its mingling of murderous rage and eyeball-rolling annoyance, was a curious amalgam that neither the RL nor the VL facts alone can quite account for.’ The eventual decision to ‘toad’ Dr. Bungle – to condemn him to a digital death (a death only as notional as his crime) and his reappearance as another character take up the rest of Dibbell’s argument. Dibbell is more interested in looking at how a civil society emerged, formed its own ways of governance and established the space of LamdaMOO as more than just an emotional experience or extension; as a legitimate place which is almost as much, if not more real, than the physical places that we occupy in our daily material practices. Dibbell’s moving account of the entire incident and the following events leading the final ‘death’ and ‘reincarnation’ has now been extrapolated to make some very significant and insightful theorisations of the notions of the body and its representations online. Exercise: Based on this case-study, break into small groups to determine whether a rape happened on cyberspace and how we can understand the relationship of our online personas with our bodies.

Cyberspace and the State

The history of body and technology is one way of approaching the history of the internet. However, as we realise, that more than the management of identity or the projection of our interiority, it is a narrative about governance. How does the body get regulated on the internet? How does it become the structure through which communities, networks, societies and collective can be imagined? The actions and transactions between the internet and the body can also help us to look at the larger questions of state, governance and technology which are such an integral part of our everyday experience of the internet. Questions of privacy, security, piracy, sharing, access etc. are all part of the way in which our practices of cultural production and social interaction are regulated, by the different intermediaries of the internet, of which the State is one.

Asha Achuthan, in her landmark work Re:Wiring Bodies[2] that looks at the history of science and technology in India, shows that these are not new concerns. In fact, as early as the 1930s and 1940s, when the architects of India’s Independence movements were thinking about shaping what the country is going to look like in the future, they were already discussing these questions. It is more popularly known that Jawaharlal Nehru was looking to build a ‘scientific temperament’ for the country and hoping to build it through scientific institutions as well as infrastructure – he is famously credited to having said that ‘dams are the temples of modern science.’ Apart from Nehru’s vision of a modern India, there was a particular conversation between M.K. Gandhi and Rabindranath Tagore, that Achuthan analyses in great detail. Achuthan argues that the dialogue between Gandhi and Tagore is so couched in ideology, poetry and spirituality that we often forget that these were actually conversations about a technology – specifically, the charkha or the spinning wheel.

For both Gandhi and Tagore, the process of nation building was centred around this one particular charkha. The charkha was the mobile, portable, wearable device (much like our smart phones) that was supposed to provide spiritual salvation and modern resources to overcome the evils of both traditional and conservative values as well as unemployment and production. The difference in Gandhi and Tagore was not whether the charkha – as a metaphor of production and socio-economic organisation – should be at the centre of our discourse. The difference was that Gandhi thought that the usage of charka, complete immersion in the activity, and the devotion to it would help us weave a modern nation For Gandhi, the citizen was not somebody who used the charkha, but the citizen was somebody who becomes a citizen in the process of using the charkha. Tagore, meanwhile, was more concerned about whether we are building a people-centred nation or a technology-centred device. He was of the opinion that building a nation with the technology at its core, might lead to an apocalyptic future where the ‘danavayantra’ or demonic machine might take over and undermine the very human values and ideals that we are hoping to structure the nation through.

If you even cursorily look at this debate, you will realise that the way Gandhi was talking about the charkha is in resonance with how contemporary politicians talk about the powers of the internet and the way in which, through building IT Cities, through foreign investment, through building a new class of workers for the IT industry, and through different confluences of economic and global urbanisation, we are going to Imagine India[3] of the future. Similarly, the caution that Tagore had, of the charkha as superseding the human, finds its echoes in the sceptics who have been afraid that the human is being forgotten[4] in the e-governance systems that are being set up, which concentrate more on management of data and information rather than the rights and the welfare of people.

This historical continuity between technology and governance, also finds theorisation in Ashish Rajadhyaksha’s book The Cultural Last Mile[5] that looks at the critical turns in India’s governance and policy history and how the technological paradigm has been established. Rajadhyaksha opens up the State-technology-governance triad to more concrete examples and looks at how through the setting up of community science centres, the building of India’s space and nuclear programmes, and through on-the-ground inventions like radio and chicken-mesh wire-loops, we have tried to reinforce a broadcast based model of governance. Rajadhyaksha proposes that the earlier technologies of governance which were at our disposal, helped us think of the nation state through the metaphor of broadcast. So we had the State at the Centre, receiving and transmitting information, and in fact managing all our conversation and communication by being the central broadcasting agency. And hence, because the state was responsible for the message of the state reaching every single person, but also responsible that every single person can hypothetically communicate with every other single person, the last mile became important. The ability to reach that last person became important. And the history of technology and governance has been a history of innovations to breach that last mile and make the message reach without noise, without disturbance, and in as clean and effective a way as possible.

With the emergence of the digital governance set up, especially with the building of the Unique Identity Project,[6] we now have the first time when the government is not concerned about breaching the last mile. The p2p networks that are supposed to manage the different flows of information mean that the State is not a central addressee of our communication but one of the actors. It produces new managers – internet service providers, telecom infrastructure, individual hubs and connectors, traditional media agencies – that help us think of governance in a new way. Which is why, for instance, with the UID authorities, we are no longer concerned about the relay of state information from the centre to the subject. Hence, we have many anecdotal stories of people enrolling for the Aadhaar card without actually knowing what benefits it might accrue them. We also have stories coming in about how there are people with Aadhaar numbers which have flawed information but these are not concerns. Because for once, the last mile has to reach the Government. The State is a collector but there are also other registrars. And there is a new regime here, where the government is now going to become one of the actors in the field of governance and it is more interested in managing data and information rather than directly governing the people.

This historical turn is interesting, because it means that we are being subjected to different kinds of governance structures and institutions, without necessarily realising how to negotiate with them to protect us. One of the most obvious examples is the Terms of Services[7] that we almost blindly sign off when using online platforms and services and what happens when they violate rights that we think are constitutionally given. What happens when Facebook removes some content from your profile without your permission because it thinks that it is problematic? Who do you complain to? Are your rights as a user or a citizen? Which jurisdiction will it fall under? Conversely, what happens when you live in a country that does not grant you certain freedoms (of speech and expression, for instance) and you commit an infraction using a social media platform. What happens when your private utterances on your social networks make you vulnerable [8]. to persecution and prosecution in your country?

These are all questions of the human, the technological, and the governmental which have been discussed differently and severally historically, in India and also at the global level. Asking these questions, unpacking the historical concerns and how they have leap-frogged in the contemporary governmental debates is important because it helps us realise that the focus of what is at stake, what it means to be human, what we recognise as fair, just and equal are also changing in the process. Instead of thinking of e-governance as just a digitization of state resources, we have to realise that there is a certain primacy that the technologies have had in the state’s formation and manifestation, and that the digital is reshaping these formulations in new and exciting, and sometimes, precarious ways.

Cyberspace and Criminality

The history of the internet in India, but also around the world, is bookended between pornography and terrorism. While there has been an incredible promise of equity, equality, fairness, and representation of alternative voices on the internet, there is no doubt that what the internet has essentially done is turn us all into criminals – pornographers, pirates, terrorists, hackers, lurkers… If you have been online, let us just take for granted that you have broken some law or the other, no matter how safe you have been online, and where you live. The ways in which the internet has facilitated peer-2-peer connections and the one-one access means that almost everything that was governed in the public has suddenly exploded in one large grey zone of illegality.

Ravi Sundaram calls this grey zone of illegal or semi-legal practices the new ‘cyberpublics’. For Sundaram, the new public sphere created by the internet is not only in the gentrified, middle-class, educated people who have access to the cyberspaces and are using social media and user generated content sites to bring about active social and political change. More often than not, the real interesting users of the internet are hidden. They access the internet from cybercafés, in shared names. They have limited access to the web through apps and services on their pirated phones. They share music, watch porn, gamble, engage in illicit and surreptitious social and sexual engagements and they are able to do this by circumventing the authority and the gaze of the law.

On the other side are the more tech savvy individuals who create alternative currencies like Bitcoin, trade for weapons, drugs and sex on SilkRoute, form guerrilla resistance groups like Anonymous, and create viruses and malware that can take over the world. These cyberpublics are not just digital in nature. They erupt regularly in the form of pirate bazaars, data swaps, and the promiscuous USB drive that moves around the machines, capturing information and passing it on further. These criminalities are often the defining point of internet policy and politics – they serve as the subjects that need to be governed, as well as the danger that lurks in the digital ether, from which we need to be protected. For Sundaram, the real contours and borders of the digital world are to be tested in an examination of these figures. Because, as Lawrence Liang suggests, the normative has already been assimilated in the system. The normative or the good subject is no longer a threat and has developed an ethical compass of what is desirable and not. However, this ethical subject also engages in illicit activities, while still producing itself as a good person. This contradiction makes for interesting stories.

DPS MMS: Case Study
One of the most fascinating cases of criminality that captured both public and legal attention was the notoriously cases where the ideas of Access were complicated in the Indian context, was the legal and public furore over the distribution of an MMS (Multi-Media Message) video that captured two underage young adults in a sexual act. The clip, which was dubbed in popular media as ‘DPS Dhamaka’ became viral on the internet. The video clip was listed on an auction (peer-2-peer) website as an e-book and as ‘Item 27877408 – DPS Girl having fun!!! Full video + Bazee points’ for Rs. 125. This visibility of the clip on the auction site Bazee.com, brought it to the eyes of the State where its earlier circulation through private circuits and P2P networks had gone unnoticed. Indeed, the newspapers and TV channels had created frenzy around it, this video clip would have gone unnoticed. However, the attention that Bazee.com drew led to legal intervention. Following the visibility of the video clip, there was an attempt to find somebody responsible for the crime and be held liable for the ‘crime’ that had happened. Originally, Ravi Raj, a student at IIT Kharagpur, who had put up the clip on Bazee was arrested for possessing and selling pornography. He was arrested and kept in police custody for at least three days and so was the male student who made the clip. They were both made to go through proceedings in juvenile court (though he was the last to be arrested). Both the students in the video were suspended from school after the incident. Eventually, the most high profile arrest and follow up from the DPS MMS incident was the arrest of the CEO of Bazee.com – Avnish Bajaj. However, Bajaj was released soon because as the host of the platform and not its content, he had no liability. This is the beginning of a series of slippages where a punishable body in the face of public outcry had to be identified. We witnessed a witch-hunt that sought to hold the boy who made the video clip responsible, the student of IIT who attempted to circulate the clip and eventually the CEO of Bazee. The string of failed prosecutions seems to indicate that the pornographer-as-a-person was slipping through the cracks of the legal system. As NamitaMalhotra argues, it is not the pornographic object which is ‘eluding the grasp of the court’ but that it seems to be an inescapable condition of the age of the internet -that the all transactions are the same transactions, and all users are pornographers. We can see in the case that the earlier positions that were easily criminalised when it came to objects in mass media – producer, consumer, distributor of obscenity, were vacated rapidly in the DPS MMS case. We have a case where the bodies, when looked at through simplified ideas of Access, could not be regulated. The girl in the clip could not be punished because she was the victim in the case that could be read as statutory rape. In the case of the boy, a stranger argument was posed – ‘that in our fast urbanising societies where parents don’t have time for children, they buy off their love by giving them gadgets – which makes possible certain kinds of technological conditions...thus the blame if it is on the boy, is on the larger society’ (Malhotra, 2011). Eventually, the court held that the description of the object and the context of its presence indicates that the said obscene object is just a click away and such a ‘listing which informed the potential buyer that such a video clip that is pornographic can be procured for a price’. There is a suggestion that there was nobody in particular that could be fixed with the blame. What was at blame was access to technology and conditions of technology within which the different actors in this case were embedded. Malhotra points out that in earlier cases around pornography, judgements have held pornography responsible for itself. In the case of the DPS MMS, it seemed that technology – especially access to technology by unsupervised persons – has taken that role. The eventual directive that came out of this case was a blanket warning issued to the public that ‘anyone found in possession of the clip would be fined and prosecuted’. It is as if the attention of the court was on the ways in which the video clip was produced, circulated and disseminated, rather than the content. There was an anxiety around peoples’ unsupervised access to digital technologies, the networks that facilitated access to content without the permission of the state, and modes of circulation and dissemination that generated high access to audiences which cannot be controlled or regulated. The State’s interest in this case, is not in the sexual content of the material but in the way it sidesteps the State’s authorial positions and produces mutable, transmittable, and transferable products as well as conditions of access. Such a focus on practices and behaviours around the obscene object, rather than the content itself, seems not to disrupt the law’s neat sidestepping of the force of the image itself. These different tropes of access to technology informed the State’ attempt at control and containment of techno-social practices in the country, giving rise to imaginations of the User as being in conditions of technology which make him/her a potential criminal. This idea of access as transgression or overriding the legal regulatory framework does not get accounted for in the larger technology discourse. However, it does shape and inform the Information Technology regulations which are made manifest in the IT Act. The DPS MMS case complicated the notion of access and posited a potentially criminal techno-social subject who, because of access to the digital, will be able to consume information and images beyond the sanction of the law. The DPS MMS case shows how the ways in which public discourse can accuse, blame and literally hang technology seems to diverge from how the court attempts to pin down an offence or crime and prosecute by constructing a techno-social subject as the pervert, while also accusing pornography as a phenomenon. The court is unable to hold technology to blame but the accused is technology-at-large and modernity, which subsumes practices around technology and separates out the good and ethical ways in which a citizen should access and use technologies to rise from the potentially criminal conditions of technology within which their Techno-social identity is formed.

Summary

We started by making a distinction between Internet and Cyberspace to see how the two are separate objects of focus and have a relationship that needs to be examined in greater detail. It was argued that while the Internet – in material, infrastructural and technological forms – is important to understand the different policies and politics at the local, regional and global level, it has an account that is easier to follow. Cyberspace, on the other hand, because it deals with human interactions and experiences, allows for a more complex set of approaches into understanding our engagement with the digital domain. We began with the original definitions and imaginations of cyberspace and the ways in which it founded and resolved debates about the real-virtual, the physical-digital, and the brain-mind divides which have been historically part of the cybercultures discourse.

It was proposed, hence, that instead of looking at the history of the Internet, we will look at the history of cyberspace, and see if we can move away from a straight forward historical narrative of the Internet which focuses largely on the institutions, numbers, names and technological advances. The ambition was not to just produce a similar history of cyberspace but think of conceptual frameworks through which cyberspace can be studied. The proposition was that instead of just looking at history as a neutral and objective account of events and facts, we can examine how and why we need to create histories. Also, that it is fruitful to look at the aspirations and ambitions we have in creating historical narratives. It was then suggested that instead of trying to create a definitive history, or even a personal history of the internet, it might be more fruitful to look at the intersections that cyberspace has with different questions and concerns that have historically defined the relationship between technologies and society. 3 different conceptual frameworks were introduced as methods or modes by which this historical mode of inquiry can be initiated.

The first framework examined how we can understand the boundaries and contours of the internet and cyberspace by looking at its relationship with our bodies. The ways in which we understand our bodies, the mediation by technologies, and the extensions and simulations that we live with, help us to understand the human-technology relationship in more nuanced fashions. Looking at the case-study of a rape that happened in cyberspace, we mapped out the different ways in which we can think of a technosocial relationship.

The second framework drew from historical debates around technology and governance to see how the current concerns of e-governance and digital subjectivity are informed by older debates about technology and nation building. Looking at the dialogues between Gandhi and Tagore, and then the imagination of a nation through the broadcast technologies, we further saw how the new modes of networked governance are creating new actors, new conditions and new contexts within which to locate and operate technologies.

The third framework showed how the technological is not merely at the service of the human. In fact, the presence of the technological creates new identities and modes of governance that create potential criminals of all of us. Through the case-study of the DPS MMS, and in an attempt to look at the grey zone of illegal cyberpublics, we saw how at new technosocial identities are created at the intersection of law, technology, governance and everyday practices of the web. The fact that the very condition of technology access can create us as potential criminals, in need to be governed and regulated, reflects in the development of internet policy and governance.

It was the intention of this module to complicate three sets of presumptions and common knowledge that exist in the discourse around Internet and Cyberspace. The first was to move away from thinking of the Internet merely as infrastructure and networks. The second was to suggest that entering the debates around human-technology everyday relationships would offer more interesting ways of looking at accounts of the technological. The third was to propose that the history of the internet does not begin only with the digital, but it needs larger geographical and techno-science contexts in order to understand how the contemporary landscape of internet policy and governance is shaped.

The module was not designed to give a comprehensive history and account of the internet. Instead, it built a methodological and conceptual framework that would allow us to examine the ways in which we approach Internet and Society questions – in the process, it would also help us reflect on our own engagement, intentions and expectations from the Internet and how we create the different narratives and accounts for it.

Additional Readings

Johnny Ryan,“A History of the Internet and the Digital Future”, University of Chicago Press, http://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/distributed/H/bo10546731.html
John Naughton,“A Brief History of the Future”, Overlook, https://www.kirkusreviews.com/book-reviews/john-naughton/a-brief-history-of-the-future/
Christos J.P. Moschovitis et al.,“History of the Internet”, Barnes & Noble, http://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/history-of-the-internet-christos-j-p-moschovitis/1100883985?ean=9781576071182
Katie Hafner and Matthew Lyon, “Where Wizards Stay up Late”, Barnes & Noble, http://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/where-wizards-stay-up-late-katie-hafner/1113244151?ean=9780684812014
Janet Abbate,“Inventing the Internet”, MIT Press, http://mitpress.mit.edu/books/inventing-internet
Tim Berners-Lee,“Weaving the Web: The Original Design and Ultimate Destiny of the World Wide Web”,http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weaving_the_Web:_The_Original_Design_and_UltimateDestiny_of_the_World_Wide_Web_by_its_inventor
Peter Salus,“Casting the Net: From ARPANET to INTERNET and Beyond”, Pearson, http://www.pearson.ch/1471/9780201876741/Casting-the-Net-From-ARPANET-to-INTERNET.aspx

[1]. Julian Dibbell “A Rape in Cyberspace”, available at http://www.juliandibbell.com/articles/a-rape-in-cyberspace/, last accessed on January 24, 2014.

[2]. Asha Achuthan, “Re:Wiring Bodies”, Centre for Internet and Society, available at http://cis-india.org/raw/histories-of-the-internet/rewiring-bodies.pdf, last accessed on January 25, 2014.

[3]. Nandan Nilekani, “Imagining India: The Idea of a Renewed Nation”, Penguin, available at http://www.penguin.ca/nf/Book/BookDisplay/0,,9780670068449,00.html, last accessed on January 24, 2014.

[4]. Jahnavi Phalkey, “Focus: Science, History, and Modern India”, The University of Chicago Press, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/670950, last accessed on January 24, 2014.

[5]. Ashish Rajadhyaksha, “The Last Cultural Mile”, The Centre for Internet and Society, available at http://cis-india.org/raw/histories-of-the-internet/last-cultural-mile.pdf, last accessed on January 24, 2014.

[6]. Ashish Rajadhyaksha, “In the Wake of Aadhar: The Digital Ecosystem of Governance in India”, Centre for Study of Culture and Society, available at http://eprints.cscsarchive.org/532/, last accessed on January 23, 2014.

[7]. Terms of Service, Didn’t Read, available at http://tosdr.org/, last accessed on January 26, 2014.

[8]. Siva Vaidyanathan, “The Googlization of Everything: (And Why Should We Worry)”, University of California Press, available at http://www.ucpress.edu/book.php?isbn=9780520258822

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/telecom/knowledge-repository-on-internet-access/body-in-cyberspace

The Road to Financial Inclusion

salelkar — 2014-06-03T06:46:18Z

It is increasingly frustrating to hear about wonderful steps being taken for financial inclusion within the private sector which completely ignores the question of inclusion of persons with disabilities.

Those of us working in the disabilities sector and those who live with the reality of disability know how difficult it is for persons with disabilities to even open bank accounts independently, and for those who are allowed to open bank accounts on their own, access to added services like ATM cards, chequebooks, internet banking — facilities which many of us take for granted — becomes a matter of discretion of bank managerial staff. The CIS Report on Banking Accessibility is a seminal document on the problems being faced on accessibility to banking, and it was hoped that the Reserve Bank of India would take cognizance of the numerous issued raised within it.

On May 21, 2014, the Reserve Bank of India issued a notification mandating all scheduled banks to take necessary steps to provide all existing ATMs / future ATMs with ramps for the same to be accessible for persons with disabilities, and provided further that the height of the ATMs should not create an impediment in their use by wheelchair users. The onus is on banks to provide this, and in cases where such changes are not practicable, this requirement may be dispensed with, for reasons recorded and displayed in branches or ATMs concerned. The requirements for ramps at entrances is also extended to bank branches (wherever feasible). The notification also notes the failure of Banks to ensure that at least 1/3rd of all their ATMs are "talking" ATMs with Braille keypads as per the 2009 Circular and now mandates that all ATMs installed from July 1, 2014 shall be talking ATMs with Braille Keypads.

The 2014 Notification goes one step forward and makes special provisions for providing magnifying glasses for persons with low vision in order to assist them in the carrying out of banking transactions. Banks should maintain a list of facilities for persons with disabilities and make this information available for customers prominently. On the May 27, a similar Notification, extending similar provisions to Regional Rural Banks, was published.

What does this mean for accessibility and banking? Definitely, the circulars come as a big boost to accessibility, particularly with regard to ATM facilities. ATM Machines which are designed to accommodate persons with disabilities do make a huge difference, though many, many persons have reported not even being given access to these facilities on account of their disabilities which has not been addressed in these circulars.

Additionally, it does not appear that non compliance is actionable, as Banks are merely advised to report the progress made in this regard periodically to their respective Customer Service Committee of the Board and ensure compliance. As pointed out above, reasons for non compliance are merely to be recorded and displayed. The procedures to approach the Ombudsman do not include accessible measures, and this continues to allow bank staff to act with impunity in denying banking facilities for persons with disabilities.

Despite actively intervening in the eventual Report of the Technical Committee on Banking of the RBI, disability rights activists have found that the banking industry has not been receptive to the needs of persons with disabilities. From this background, the RBI Notifications are a welcome start, though slightly premature — what is of utmost urgency on the part of the RBI is a categorical statement that no person with disability who comes to the bank to open a bank account will be denied access to the same. Additional tools which can be extremely beneficial to persons with disabilities, including mobile and internet banking, must be made accessible and available to persons with disabilities. It is also important for basic training on disability and communication be made part of syllabus for training of banking officials, and that regular interactions and training is encouraged for bank officials. It would be useful for all bank branches, and all departments of the RBI, to have an accessibility officer, a bank official given the additional responsibility of ensuring accessibility of the bank branch or the Department as the case may be, who is given specialized training in matters relating to accessibility. This would go a long way in ensuring that financial inclusion leaves no one behind.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/accessibility/blog/the-road-to-financial-inclusion

Net Freedom Campaign Loses its Way

sunil — 2014-05-27T11:07:04Z

A recent global meet was a victory for governments and the private sector over civil society interests.

The article was published in the Hindu Businessline on May 10, 2014.

One word to describe NetMundial: Disappointing! Why? Because despite the promise, human rights on the Internet are still insufficiently protected. Snowden’s revelations starting last June threw the global Internet governance processes into crisis.

Things came to a head in October, when Brazil’s President Dilma Rousseff, horrified to learn that she was under NSA surveillance for economic reasons, called for the organisation of a global conference called NetMundial to accelerate Internet governance reform.

The NetMundial was held in São Paulo on April 23-24 this year. The result was a statement described as “the non-binding outcome of a bottom-up, open, and participatory process involving … governments, private sector, civil society, technical community, and academia from around the world.” In other words — it is international soft law with no enforcement mechanisms.

The statement emerges from “broad consensus”, meaning governments such as India, Cuba and Russia and civil society representatives expressed deep dissatisfaction at the closing plenary. Unlike an international binding law, only time will tell whether each member of the different stakeholder groups will regulate itself.

Again, not easy, because the outcome document does not specifically prescribe what each stakeholder can or cannot do — it only says what internet governance (IG) should or should not be. And finally, there’s no global consensus yet on the scope of IG. The substantive consensus was disappointing in four important ways:

Mass surveillance : Civil society was hoping that the statement would make mass surveillance illegal. After all, global violation of the right to privacy by the US was the raison d'être of the conference.

Instead, the statement legitimised “mass surveillance, interception and collection” as long as it was done in compliance with international human rights law. This was clearly the most disastrous outcome.

Access to knowledge: The conference was not supposed to expand intellectual property rights (IPR) or enforcement of these rights. After all, a multilateral forum, WIPO, was meant to address these concerns. But in the days before the conference the rights-holders lobby went into overdrive and civil society was caught unprepared.

The end result — “freedom of information and access to information” or right to information in India was qualified “with rights of authors and creators”. The right to information laws across the world, including in India, contains almost a dozen exemptions, including IPR. The only thing to be grateful for is that this limitation did not find its way into the language for freedom of expression.

Intermediary liability: The language that limits liability for intermediaries basically provides for a private censorship regime without judicial oversight, and without explicit language protecting the rights to freedom of expression and privacy. Even though the private sector chants Hillary Clinton's Internet freedom mantra — they only care for their own bottomlines.

Net neutrality: Even though there was little global consensus, some optimistic sections of civil society were hoping that domestic best practice on network neutrality in Brazil’s Internet Bill of Right — also known as Marco Civil, that was signed into law during the inaugural ceremony of NetMundial — would make it to the statement. Unfortunately, this did not happen.

For almost a decade since the debate between the multi-stakeholder and multilateral model started, the multi-stakeholder model had produced absolutely nothing outside ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, a non-profit body), its technical fraternity and the standard-setting bodies.

The multi-stakeholder model is governance with the participation (and consent — depending on who you ask) of those stakeholders who are governed. In contrast, in the multilateral system, participation is limited to nation-states.

Civil society divisions

The inability of multi-stakeholderism to deliver also resulted in the fragmentation of global civil society regulars at Internet Governance Forums.

But in the run-up to NetMundial more divisions began to appear. If we ignore nuances — we could divide them into three groups. One, the ‘outsiders’ who are best exemplified by Jérémie Zimmermann of the La Quadrature du Net. Jérémie ran an online campaign, organised a protest during the conference and did everything he could to prevent NetMundial from being sanctified by civil society consensus.

Two, the ‘process geeks’ — for these individuals and organisations process was more important than principles. Most of them were as deeply invested in the multi-stakeholder model as ICANN and the US government and some who have been riding the ICANN gravy train for years.

Even worse, some were suspected of being astroturfers bootstrapped by the private sector and the technical community. None of them were willing to rock the boat. For the ‘process geeks’, seeing politicians and bureaucrats queue up like civil society to speak at the mike was the crowning achievement.

Three, the ‘principles geeks’ perhaps best exemplified by the Just Net Coalition who privileged principles over process. Divisions were also beginning to sharpen within the private sector. For example, Neville Roy Singham, CEO of Thoughtworks, agreed more with civil society than he did with other members of the private sector in his interventions.

In short, the ‘outsiders’ couldn't care less about the outcome and will do everything to discredit it, the ‘process geeks’ stood in ovation when the outcome document was read at the closing plenary and the ‘principles geeks’ returned devastated.

For the multi-stakeholder model to survive it must advance democratic values, not undermine them.

This will only happen if there is greater transparency and accountability. Individuals, organisations and consortia that participate in Internet governance processes need to disclose lists of donors including those that sponsor travel to these meetings.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-hindu-business-line-may-10-2014-sunil-abraham-net-freedom-campaign-loses-its-way

Pushing the Boundaries in Open Governance: Insights from OGP Asia Pacific Regional Conference in Bali, Indonesia (Day 1)

praskrishna — 2014-05-27T11:16:06Z

Sunil Abraham is quoted. He said that open governance is more about citizens checking on what government leaders are doing than on government coding its citizens to exercise surveillance.

This post originally appeared on the Open Data Research Network and has been republished with permission from the author. For the republished post on OGP website, see here.

The plenary room of Bali Nusa Dua Convention Center was jam-packed at 845 in the morning, with representatives from different countries in the Asia-Pacific region and all over the globe joining the first regional conference on open data hosted by the Government of Indonesia. The conference stage backdrop depicts a million colourful cranes moving in one direction towards the OGP logo, perhaps signalling an unprecedented wave of aspirations, commitments, plans, and actions towards a more ‘open’ governance within the region. Then a few minutes later, President Yudhoyono arrived and the two-day gathering (6-7 May 2014) of roughly 500 people started.

The program was impressive. It tried to cater to the different voices of what ideally should make an open government community – government leaders, journalists, right-to-information activists, business representatives, academia, researchers, civil-society groups, funding agencies, programmers, among others. The over-arching theme of the conference “Unlocking Innovative Openness: Impetus to Greater Citizen Engagement” speaks to both the supply side and the demand side of open data where governments can make openness more innovative to which citizens can proactively engage. The people in attendance reflected this multi-dimensionality and the kind of discussions on open governance that happened in Day 1 reflects the several, differentiated, yet somehow united view and interests of the many people that were there.

The first day of the conference brings me to four main realisations, prompted by the excellent presentations of the speakers and the lively discussion at the break-out session that I attended.

Openness is not an option but an imperative. Aruna Roy, founder of Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathanaof India, and considered one of the most influential thinkers of this decade put it more vividly using her organization’s slogan – “right to know, right to live”. While bureaucrats, like Minister Francis Maude of the UK argued that openness improve transparency, enhance public service, and stimulate growth, civil society groups claimed that openness is not something the government can do, but must do, to benefit right holders by ensuring that they are not only aware of what the government is doing but by ensuring that government leaders, to whom citizens entrust sovereignty, execute the will of the governed.
Open governance is about relations, about people, not just about technology, transparency, or data provision. Ms. Nwe Zin Win, of Myanmar National NGOs Network emphasized that as Myanmar moves towards Open Government Partnership (OGP) membership, the process should create a space for civil society groups to proactively participate. In his remarks, Director General Yoon Soon-Gu of the Republic of Korea emphasized that when his government embarked on the process of crafting Gov 3.0 as a development agenda, with the end-goal of making Koreans live a happy life, citizen consultations were conducted all across government to ensure that this plan is responsive and relevant and reflects the people’s aspirations. Anne Jellema, CEO of World Wide Web Foundation highlighted the fact that open governance is not only good for vertical accountability (government-governed) but also about horizontal accountability (agencies within the same government) and ensures that systems are working with government – judiciary, legislative, audit, executing agencies – for the common good. Open governance then, is about building that relationship of trust between government and citizens, between business and government, and between agencies in the government.
Open government has many challenges, but these are not insurmountable. Malou Mangahas of the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism emphasized five “I”s in her plenary speech that she said are the main challenges to the open government story in the Philippines and in the region – implementation, inclusiveness, information, institutionalisation, and interconnectedness. In the area of inclusiveness, one of the challenges is on how to ensure that people can participate in a context when there is a large digital divide, where internet penetration is low, and broadband speed is slow to a crawl. Mr. Samadhi of the Government of Indonesia emphasized that there are many examples in his country where government information is translated to accessible formats by infomediaries so that citizens without internet connection became aware, informed, and knowledgeable. In one of the coffee breaks, Redempto Parafina of the Affiliated Network for Social Accountability in East Asia and the Pacific shared to me that non-government organizations, concerned individuals, and universities translate information in the CheckmySchool portal to information materials for distribution and use by communities without internet.
Open governance narrative should focus on making governments more responsive and accountable. President Yudhoyono uses Facebook and Twitter, apart from the traditional media as text and snail mail, to listen to the demands of his constituents. The Government of New Zealand, according to Minister Peter Dunne, sets goals on basic public services as health, education, and employment and demands regular public reporting on these goals; reports that can be accessed and challenged by the people to whom the services are intended. Sunil Abraham of the Centre for Internet and Society argued that open governance should not veer away from this narrative. He made an example regarding India’s Unique Identification System, where the implementation is couched within the open data narrative. He believed that open governance is more about citizens checking on what government leaders are doing than on government coding its citizens to exercise surveillance.

It was a productive day. I am thankful that I was afforded the opportunity to attend the conference. One message that profoundly affected me was Aruna Roy’s exhortation at the end of her presentation – that we should make truth powerful, and that we should make power truthful.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/open-government-partnership-michael-canares-may-6-2014-pushing-the-boundaries-in-open-governance

WIP SCCR 27 (May 1, 2014)

praskrishna — 2014-05-05T00:07:10Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/wipo-sccr-27-day-4-may-1-2014.pdf

WIPO SCCR 27 (April 29, 2014)

praskrishna — 2014-05-05T00:02:08Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/wipo-sccr-day-2-april-29-2014.pdf

WIPO SCCR 27 (April 28, 2014)

praskrishna — 2014-05-04T23:54:18Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/wipo-sccr-27-day-1-april-28-2014.pdf

Centre for Internet and Society

Subhashish Panigrahi joins Open GLAM Working Group

OpenGLAM Working Group

Open GLAM Local

WIPO SCCR 27 (May 2, 2014)

WIPO SCCR 27 (May 2, 2014)

WIP SCCR 27 (April 30, 2014)

WIPO SCCR Text (April 30, 2014)

An Open House Session with George Abraham

Agenda

RSVP

The Team

George Abraham

CIS

Ashoka

Net Neutrality, Free Speech and the Indian Constitution – III: Conceptions of Free Speech and Democracy

Summary of Judgements on Disability Rights

Supreme Court Decisions

High Court Decisions

The Body in Cyberspace

Case Study: A Rape in Cyberspace

Cyberspace and the State

Cyberspace and Criminality

DPS MMS: Case Study

Summary

Additional Readings

The Road to Financial Inclusion

Net Freedom Campaign Loses its Way

Pushing the Boundaries in Open Governance: Insights from OGP Asia Pacific Regional Conference in Bali, Indonesia (Day 1)

WIP SCCR 27 (May 1, 2014)

WIPO SCCR 27 (April 29, 2014)

WIPO SCCR 27 (April 28, 2014)