Centre for Internet and Society

RBI and Regulation of Digital Financial Services in India, 2012-2016

Shivalik Chandan — 2016-07-11T06:27:23Z

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) published its first guideline on mobile banking in 2008, and the conversation on integrating Aadhaar numbers with bank account numbers on one hand and mobile numbers on the other started as soon as UIDAI was established. However, it is the post-2010 period, with rapid growth of the e-commerce sector in India, that saw rise of digital financial services and intermediaries, and hence the demand for regulatory intervention in the sector. This essay by Shivalik Chandan tracks RBI policies and guidelines responding to and shaping the regulatory framework of the digital financial sector in India, including both mobile banking and online transactions.

1. Introduction

2. Mobile Banking in India

2.1. Customer Enrolment Issues identified by the RBI

2.2. Technical Issues identified by the RBI

2.3. The Way Forward

3. Online Payments in India

3.1. Regulatory Response to Online Payment Instruments

3.2. Infrastructure for Online Payments between Private Parties

3.3. Infrastructure for Online Payments involving the Government

3.4. The Way Forward

4. Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Lending

5. Conclusion

6. Endnotes

7. Author Profile

1. Introduction

The advent of new technology usually leads to innovation in industry. Regardless of the sector, new technology is almost always adopted to make tasks easier and more efficient, and this applies to the financial sector as well. Advancements such as credit cards and ATMs have fundamentally changed the process of banking and finance. The past few years have seen some major innovation in the sector, leading to a shift in the way people interact with the financial system of the country. Pursuant to the same, the Reserve Bank of India has responded to these advancements to make sure that they do not go unchecked.

The e-commerce industry in India has seen unprecedented growth over the last few years, largely because of a higher level of internet penetration among the population. From a worth of $3.9 billion in 2009, the worth of the Indian e-commerce market went up to $12.6 billion in 2013 [1]. The number of online shoppers was 35 billion in 2014, and is now expected to cross 100 million by the end of this year [2]. The newfound presence of the e-commerce industry in the country has led to a new form of payment: the online wallet. A more convenient method than using a credit card for every transaction, it is expected to achieve a compound annual growth rate of 68% this year [3].

A priority of the RBI since the mid-2000s has been financial inclusion. The term is usually defined with respect to financial exclusion, which is construed as the inability to access necessary financial services in an appropriate form due to problems associated with access, conditions, prices, markets, or self-exclusion. In contrast, financial inclusion is the delivery of financial services at affordable costs to disadvantaged sections of society. There is no single metric that can determine the amount of financial inclusion, and specific indicators such as number of bank accounts and number of bank branches only provide a partial picture [4].

In 2013, CRISIL launched an index (Inclusix) to measure the status of financial inclusion in India. The index combines branch penetration, deposit penetration, and credit penetration into one metric. The report was the first regional, state-wise, and district-wise assessments of financial inclusion ever measured, and the first analysis of inclusion trends over a three-year period. Some key conclusions found in the report were [5]:

The all-India CRISIL Inclusix score of 40.1 is low, though there were clear signs of progress – this score had improved from 35.4 in 2009.
Deposit penetration is the key driver of financial inclusion – the number of savings accounts (624 million), is almost four times the number of loan accounts (160 million).

2. Mobile Banking in India

Perhaps the biggest change in banking in recent times has been the introduction of mobile banking. The RBI issued its first set of regulatory guidelines to do with mobile banking in 2008, where banks were permitted to transfer funds from one bank account to another through the mobile platform. From 2010 to 2012, the number of users of mobile banking services grew 277.68% (from 5.96 million to 22.51 million) and the value grew a whopping 875.6% (from Rs. 6.14 billion to Rs. 59.90 billion). These figures clearly indicate that mobile banking in the country is growing at a very high rate. Yet, as of 2014, there were 350 to 500 million unique mobile subscribers and only 22 million mobile banking customers [6].

The RBI clearly recognised the potential for a widespread increase in mobile banking as well as the opportunity of increasing financial inclusion in the country, and made recommendations for “addressing the consumer acquisition challenges as well as the technical aspects” [7]. Recommendations such as alternate channels for mobile registration such as ATMs, uniformity in the mobile registration process across banks, and standardisation and simplification of the MPIN generation process were made by the RBI. Despite the potential in mobile banking as a channel for financial services, and financial inclusion, the RBI identified several challenges with the platform, which were of two types – customer enrolment related issues, and technical issues.

2.1. Customer Enrolment Issues identified by the RBI

The following customer enrolment issues were identified by the RBI:

Mobile Number Registration: In order to avail mobile banking services, the customer needs to go to a branch of the bank or an ATM of that bank to register their mobile number. The RBI recommended that registration be made possible through other channels as well, and that registration forms be made uniform to ease the customer experience.
MPIN Generation: The process for MPIN generation is different across banks, and requires a visit to the bank branch in some cases. The RBI recommended that the process be standardised and that the MPIN be intimated to the customer through their handset without necessitating a visit to the bank.

These recommendations were implemented by the RBI in its Master Circular issued in December 2014 [8].

2.2. Technical Issues identified by the RBI

One of the major technical issues identified by the RBI was the fact that there is a large disparity in the type of mobile handset, and consequentially, the technology most customers have. The majority of handsets in the country are GSM or CDMA enabled, and a comparatively small number have GPRS technology. The RBI identified three major ways of mobile banking utilised by most banks as SMS, USSD, and application based banking. The problems the RBI identified with the SMS method were that the service is not encrypted, and that it may become inconvenient for customers to remember the syntax required for the commands. The USSD system solves the complexity issue, as it presents an interactive menu and is much faster than SMS. However, it is still not a secure means of communication. A big step forward for the USSD system has been the implementation of the National Unified USSD Platform by the National Payments Corporation of India with a single short code (*99#) to utilise the common USSD channel for mobile banking for all banks [9].

The RBI conceded that application based mobile banking is the best way to offer the service both in terms of user friendliness as well as security, but stated that developing these applications requires a large amount of research and development due to the extremely high number of permutations and combinations of handsets and operating systems available on the market, and that smartphones are in the minority as far as type of handsets go. To resolve these issues, the RBI suggested that banks continue offering all three services, so that the largest number of people can take advantage of mobile banking services. The RBI also recommended that all banks implement a uniform mobile banking system across all three architectures (SMS, USSD, and applications) for the ease of consumers [10].

2.3. The Way Forward

In the two years since these recommendations were published, smartphones and GPRS connections (both required for application-based mobile banking) have become a lot cheaper and have permeated a larger section of the Indian society. Hopefully, this trend will gradually reflect in the banking sector and lead to a boom in application-based mobile banking. The next challenge that the RBI will face in the coming years in the field of mobile banking is the replacement of credit cards with smartphones. Both Apple and Google (with Apple Pay and Android Pay) are utilising NFC technology in smartphones to enable customers to store their credit card information on their smartphone and simply tap it onto a terminal to complete the transaction, and even though it is available in a small number of countries presently, it is only a matter of time before it is introduced in India, and this development has been addressed by the RBI in the ‘Vision 2012-2015’ document, where they have addressed the requirement of updating all PoS terminals at the merchant ends, as well as developing an open standard for all NFC transactions, regardless of the payment system operators [11].

The RBI has announced its intention to review the guidelines for mobile banking to address issues relating to customer registration, safety and security of transactions, risk mitigation, and customer grievance redressal measures, with the intention of promoting mobile phones as access channels to payment and banking services. The policy efforts will also focus on ensuing that mobile banking services are provided to non-smartphone users across the country as well [12].

3. Online Payments in India

The National Payments Corporation of India was set up in 2009 as an umbrella organisation for all retail payment systems (under section 25 of the Companies Act) with the core objective of consolidating and integrating the multiple systems with varying service levels into a nation-wide, uniform, and standard business process for all retail systems [13, 14]. In 2012, the RBI, in its Vision 2012-2015 document, recognised the development of new e-payment systems and the increasing proportion of transactions taking place through these systems. The introduction of technology such as cloud computing, mobile telephony, service oriented architecture, and an increasing popularity of the virtual world would, according to the RBI, lead to significant changes in the way payments would be processed in the future. The document elucidated the possibility of the movement away from cash transactions to electronic transactions, leading to their goal of a ‘less-cash economy’ [15]. The RBI set the objective of innovating towards the convergence of products and services which should be available across all delivery channels to all, in a low-cost, safe, and efficient manner. The RBI held that its regulatory stance would be to promote innovation to achieve the goals of inclusion, accessibility, and affordability, while remaining technology neutral [16].

3.1. Regulatory Response to Online Payment Instruments

The introduction of online wallets has provided consumers with a simpler and more efficient method to complete online transactions across a wide variety of merchants, and is growing at a considerable rate. A master circular was issued by the RBI in December 2014, outlining the guidelines that these wallets (which are considered a part of ‘pre-paid payment instruments’) must follow. In the circular, RBI defined three types of payment instruments or wallets.

Closed wallets can be issued by a company to a consumer for buying goods exclusively from that company, such as Flipkart or Amazon. They do not need any sort of permission or regulation from the RBI as they do not permit cash withdrawal or redemption, and hence are not classified as payment systems.
Semi-closed wallets can be used to purchase goods and services at clearly identified merchant locations which have a specific contract with the issuer to accept the payment instrument. NBFCs can issue semi-closed wallets which need to be authorised by the RBI. The most commonly known online wallets (such as Paytm and Mobikwik) fall under this category.
Open wallets can be used for the purchase of goods and services (including financial services) at any card accepting merchant terminal and can also be used for cash withdrawal at ATMs. However, these can only be issued by banks with approval from the RBI [17].

The RBI has classified three categories of pre-paid payment instruments that can be issued:

Up to Rs. 10,000, by accepting the minimum details of the customer, provided that the amount outstanding at any time does not exceed Rs. 10,000 and the total value of reloads per month does not exceed Rs. 10,000. These can only be issued in electronic form.
From Rs. 10,001 to Rs. 50,000, by accepting any ‘officially valid document’ defined under rule 2(d) of the PML Rules, 2005, which are amended from time to time. These are to be non-reloadable in nature.
Up to Rs. 1,00,000 with full KYC, and these can be reloadable in nature. The balance in the PPI should not exceed this amount at any time [18].

3.2. Infrastructure for Online Payments between Private Parties

Pursuant to the goal of enabling infrastructure for financial transactions between private parties, the NPCI implemented the Immediate Payment Service (IMPS) in 2010. The service offers an instantaneous, 24x7 interbank electronic fund transfer service, which can be utilised through mobile, internet, or an ATM. This service is superior to the previously used NEFT service, as NEFT transactions are settled in batches and hence are not in real time. Also, the NEFT service is only available during the working hours of the RTGS system, while the IMPS can be used at any time [19].

Building on the IMPS service, the NPCI has developed the Unified Payments Interface (UPI), which will allow customers to transfer money and make payments almost as easily as they send messages. Multiple bank accounts can be linked to one application, and the need for sharing sensitive information such as bank account numbers, OTPs, or mobile numbers has been eliminated. This interface has been touted to have a large impact on the payment space, and help the economy move closer to a ‘less-cash’ economy [20]. On launch of the Interface in April of this year, 29 banks concurred to provide UPI services to their customers, and 21 of those banks have already joined the UPI as payment service providers.

On downloading the UPI application of a bank, a ‘virtual identifier’ is generated by the application which works as a payment identifier for sending and collecting money, and is protected by a single click two-factor authentication. The virtual ID is an email ID-like format: for example, if a customer named ABC had an account in HDFC bank, his virtual ID would be ABC@hdfc. However, the customer has the choice to use his/her mobile number or Aadhar number in place of the name. In order to protect the customer’s privacy, there is no account number mapper anywhere except the customer’s bank. When a customer selects UPI as the payment mode for an online transaction and the request reaches the merchant’s server, it is immediately passed onto the acquiring bank’s server where a UPI collection transaction is initiated on the customer’s virtual identifier. This request reaches the customer’s phone through the UPI server on the basis of the virtual identifier, and the customer authenticates it using the MPIN to complete the transaction [21].

The UPI can be utilised for real-world transactions as well. Instead of handing over cash, the customer can simply tell the cashier his/her virtual ID. The cashier can then initiate a pay request through the UPI, and the customer can authenticate it on his/her phone, leading to the completion of the transaction [22].

3.3. Infrastructure for Online Payments involving the Government

In the ‘Vision 2012-2015’ document, the RBI outlined an opportunity of developing a bill payment system for payments toward insurance premiums, utility payments, taxes, school fees, etc. To this end, a committee was set up to analyse the potential for an electronic GIRO (General Interbank Recurring Order) payment system in India. Under the recommendation of the Committee, a Giro Advisory Group (GAG) was set up with the objective of defining a framework which enables the creation of pan India touch points for bill payments, which submitted its report in March 2014. The GAG recommended a tiered system for bill systems in the country – a central unit which would set the standards, and various operating bodies which would work in accordance with the standards set by the central body. Draft guidelines for the Bharat Bill Payment System (BBPS) were published on the RBI website in August 2014 for public comments. Based on recommendations, the RBI published guidelines for the implementation of the BBPS in November 2014.

The BBPS will consist of two types of bodies, which will carry out distinct functions:

Bharat Bill Payment Central Unit (BBPCU): The single authorised body which will set the necessary technical, operational, and technical standards for the entire system and its participants, and will also undertake clearing and settlement activities. The NPCI will serve as the BBPCU.
Bharat Bill Payment Operating Units (BBPOU): The authorised operational units, which will work in adherence to the standards set by the BBPCU.

The objective of the BBPS is to implement an integrated bill payment system which offers interoperable and accessible bill payment systems to customers through a network of agents, enabling multiple payment modes, and providing instant confirmations of the payments. Hence, the RBI decided that all existing players (both banks and non-banks) catering to the requirement of bill payments as well as the aggregation of payment services will be a part of the BBPS [23]. Initially, the BBPS is expected to cover repetitive payments for everyday utility services such as electricity, water, gas, telephone, and DTH. The plan is to gradually expand the scope to include other types of repetitive payments like school/university fees, municipal taxes, etc.

On 20 October, 2015, the RBI issued a press release inviting applications from entities engaged in bill payments, for authorisation to operate as BBPOUs, stating the function as “facilitating collection of repetitive payments for everyday utility services, such as, electricity, water, gas, telephone and Direct-to-Home (DTH)” [24].

As of May 2016, 33 companies were reportedly approved by the RBI to function as BBPOUs. PayU India, PayTm, Oxigen, SBI, ICICI bank, HDFC bank, Kotak Mahindra Bank, Bank of Baroda, Axis Bank and RBL Bank and TechProcess have confirmed their BBPOU license [25]. The system is expected to launch in July this year [26].

3.4. The Way Forward

The RBI, in its ‘Vision 2018’ document, has outlined the future plans relating to pre-paid instruments. With an increase in the number of entities authorised to issue PPIs, there has been a growth in their usage for the purchase of goods and services as well as transfer of funds. The RBI plans to review the provisions relating to PPIs about KYC requirements, customer-facing aspects such as safety and security, risk mitigation measures, complaint redressal mechanisms, forfeiture of unutilised balances, and fraud monitoring. The RBI also plans to monitor developments in technology which impact the financial services industry, such as distributed ledgers, blockchain, etc. and develop regulatory frameworks as required [27].

4. Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Lending

Another new development in the banking and finance sector is the introduction of peer to peer lending (hereinafter referred to as P2P lending). P2P lending is a form of crowdfunding which is essentially an online platform designed to bring together lenders and borrowers. A fee is charged from both and this fee goes to providing services such as collecting loan repayments and doing a preliminary assessment on the trustworthiness of the borrower. The RBI issued a consultation paper on this in April 2016 and invited responses from the various stakeholders.

The RBI identified that even though there is no credible data on the total lending through P2P platforms, close to 20 P2P lending platforms were launched in the last year, and there are presently around 30 such platforms in the country. After looking at the operational business model of these companies, the RBI found that the major regulatory concerns would relate to KYC and recovery practices.

After holding that regulation might lend credibility to P2P lending and therefore cause low-awareness lenders to make high-risk investments, and might stifle the growth of an innovative and efficient avenue for borrowers who either do not have access to or have been rejected by traditional loan mechanisms, the RBI argued for regulation in the following ways. Firstly, they held that in its nascent stage, the industry might disrupt the financial sector and it would be better to avoid such disruption. Secondly, the lower operational costs might lead to a softening of lending rates, and the RBI feels that it would benefit the P2P lending platforms if they were regulated. Thirdly, they identified the potential for unethical practices being adopted by any of the players in the market in the absence of regulation. Finally, the RBI held that borrows and lenders which are brought together by the P2P platform might be perpetrating an illegality under Section 45S of the RBI Act if they are unregulated.

Based on these considerations, the RBI recommended regulations on the P2P platforms in order to “facilitate the orderly growth of this sector so that its ability to provide an alternative avenue for credit for the right kind of borrowers is harnessed.” Some of the regulations proposed by the RBI were the limiting of P2P lending platforms to the role of an intermediary between lenders and borrowers, a requirement of a minimum capital of Rs. 2 crore and prudential limits on the maximum contribution by a lender (since they may include uninformed individuals), and the enforcement of adequate risk management systems to ensure smooth operations [28].

5. Conclusion

The RBI, setting out a goal of financial inclusion and a less-cash economy, has kept up with developing technology in the financial sector, in order to ensure that consumers can glean the benefits of these advancements, and the goals it set out can be achieved.

Mobile banking is one of the largest opportunities for financial inclusion in countries, and the RBI, through its policy efforts, is trying to ensure that it reaches maximum penetration in the country. E-commerce is growing in the country, leading to a new financial space being created, which the RBI is privy to. The NPCI has been a boon in this sector, achieving a considerable amount since it was launched. P2P lending, a new and relatively untested development is gaining momentum in the country, and the RBI has begun to take concrete steps to make sure it does not get out of hand.

Technological advancements will continue to change all industries, including the financial services industry, and it is the task of the RBI to make sure that these advancements are utilised to the best of their abilities, so as to benefit the customers in the country as best as possible.

6. Endnotes

[1] PwC, (2014). Evolution of E-commerce in India. [online] Available at: http://www.pwc.in/assets/pdfs/publications/2014/evolution-of-e-commerce-in-india.pdf [Accessed 6 Jul. 2016].

[2] The Times of India. (2014). "Online shoppers in India to cross 100 million by 2016: Study."[online] Available at: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/tech/tech-news/Online-shoppers-in-India-to-cross-100-million-by-2016-Study/articleshow/45217773.cms [Accessed 6 Jul. 2016].

[3] Singh, A. (n.d.). "Mobile Wallets – Market, Opportunities and Challenges." [online] Altimetrik.com. Available at: http://www.altimetrik.com/wisdometrik/mobile-wallets-market-opportunities-and-challenges/ [Accessed 6 Jul. 2016].

[4] Thorat, Usha. (2008). "Financial Inclusion and Information Technology". Keynote address by Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, at the "Vision 2020 – Indian Financial Services Sector" event hosted by NDTV, in Mumbai, September 12. Available at: http://www.bis.org/review/r080917d.pdf [Accessed 6 Jul. 2016].

[5] CRISIL, (2013). "Finance Minister launches ‘CRISIL Inclusix’." [online] Available at: http://www.crisil.com/Ratings/Brochureware/News/CRISIL-Inclusix-launch-pr_250613.pdf [Accessed 8 Jul. 2016].

[6] Reserve Bank of India, (2014). Mobile Banking - Report of the Technical Committee. [online] Available at: https://rbi.org.in/scripts/PublicationReportDetails.aspx?UrlPage=&ID=760 [Accessed 6 Jul. 2016].

[7] Ibid.

[8] Reserve Bank of India, (2014). Master Circular - Mobile Banking Transactions in India - Operative Guidelines. [online] Available at: https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/notification/PDFs/65MNF052B434ED3C4CE391590891B8F3BE66.PDF [Accessed 8 Jul. 2016].

[9] National Payments Corporation of India. (n.d.). "Overview of *99# Service." [online] Available at: http://www.npci.org.in/Product-Overview-NUUP.aspx [Accessed 8 Jul. 2016].

[10] Supra note [6].

[11] Reserve Bank of India, (2012). Payment Systems in India: Vision 2012-15. [online] Available at: https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/PublicationVisionDocuments.aspx?Id=678 [Accessed 6 Jul. 2016].

[12] Reserve Bank of India, (2015). Payment and Settlement Systems in India: Vision 2018. [online] Available at: https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/PublicationReport/Pdfs/VISION20181A8972F5582F4B2B8B46C5B669CE396A.PDF [Accessed 6 Jul. 2016].

[13] National Payments Corporation of India. (n.d.). "About Us - National Payments Corporation of India." [online] Available at: http://www.npci.org.in/aboutus.aspx. [Accessed 6 Jul. 2016].

[14] See also: Bihari, D. and Chandra, S. (2015). "The Electronic Banking Revolution in India." Journal of Internet Banking and Commerce, [online] (20), p.110. Available at: http://www.icommercecentral.com/open-access/the-electronic-banking-revolution-in-india.php?aid=59261#corr [Accessed 8 Jul. 2016].

[15] The term ‘less-cash economy’ was possibly first used in the context of national regulatory framework by the Bank Indonesia in 2006, and was implemented through the ‘Ayo ke Bank’ program [http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/156004/adbi-wp149.pdf]. Its usage by the European Payments Council in 2009 [http://www.sepaitalia.eu/uploads/making_sepa_a_reality_v.3.pdf], and the Aite Group in context of the USA [http://aitegroup.com/report/less-cash-society-forecasting-cash-usage-united-states] gave it international attention. RBI first used the term in its 'Payment Systems in India: Vision 2012-15' document.

[16] Supra note [8].

[17] Reserve Bank of India, (2014). Master Circular – Policy Guidelines on Issuance and Operation of Pre-paid Payment Instruments in India. [online] Available at: https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/notification/PDFs/116MCPPI20062014FL.pdf [Accessed 6 Jul. 2016].

[18] Supra note [9].

[19] National Payments Corporation of India. (n.d.). "IMPS - Background." [online] Available at: http://www.npci.org.in/aboutimps.aspx [Accessed 6 Jul. 2016].

[20] Nair, V. (2016). "NPCI’s unified payment interface to start in April." [online] Available at: http://www.livemint.com/Industry/ZA9pPkeGdY9wrChh1BDQhN/NPCIs-unified-payment-interface-to-start-in-April.html [Accessed 6 Jul. 2016].

[21] Mathew, G. (2016). "Unified Payments Interface system: Faster, easier and smoother."[online] The Indian Express. Available at: http://indianexpress.com/article/technology/tech-news-technology/unified-payments-interface-upi-payment-system-faster-easier-and-smoother-2754125/ [Accessed 7 Jul. 2016].

[22] The Hindu. (2016). "RBI's Unified Payments Interface makes payments easier than ever." [online] Available at: http://www.thehindu.com/business/Economy/unified-payments-interface/article8470746.ece [Accessed 7 Jul. 2016].

[23] Lakshminarasimhan, P. (2016). "Bharat Bill Payment System likely to be launched in July." [online] The Financial Express. Available at: http://www.financialexpress.com/article/industry/companies/bharat-bill-payment-system-likely-to-be-launched-in-july/257040/ [Accessed 7 Jul. 2016].

[24] Reserve Bank of India, (2015). "RBI invites Applications for authorising Bharat Bill Payment System Operating Units (BBPOUs)." [online] Available at: https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/FS_PressRelease.aspx?prid=35274&fn=9 [Accessed 7 Jul. 2016].

[25] Srivastava, V. (2016). "RBI Grants License to 33 Companies For Bharat Bill Payment System." [online] Thetechportal.com. Available at: http://thetechportal.com/2016/05/17/rbi-grants-license-33-companies-operate-bharat-bill-payment-system/ [Accessed 7 Jul. 2016].

[26] Supra note [23].

[27] Supra note [10].

[28] Reserve Bank of India, (2016). Consultation Paper on Peer to Peer Lending. [online] Available at: https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Content/PDFs/CPERR280420162D5F13C3A2204F4FB6A2BEA7363D0031.PDF [Accessed 6 Jul. 2016].

7. Author Profile

Shivalik Chandan is a student at National Law University, Delhi, who has completed two years of the B.A. LLB course. He enjoys watching movies, playing the drums, and listening to (almost all genres of) music in his spare time.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/rbi-regulation-digital-financial-services-in-india-2012-2016

Open source effort gives indigenous language an official typeface

subha — 2016-08-03T02:00:36Z

Santali, an aboriginal South Asian language, has a brand new freely licensed font and set of cross-platform open source input tools on the way.

The article was published by Opensource.com on July 8, 2016.

More than 6.2 million people in four South Asian countries (India, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Bhutan) speak Santali. In India, it is one of the 22 major languages as mentioned in the eighth schedule of the Indian constitution. However, Santali is not the official language in regions where it is largely spoken, nor is it widely taught in schools. A large segment of the native speakers are socially and economically disadvantaged, which doesn't help either.

When it comes to mainstream media and the Internet, use of the native Santali alphabet, Ol Chiki, is limited. Right now there exists no single, fully Unicode-compliant website with Santali content. The Indian government's Ministry of Tribal Affairs, which is set up for the development of many aboriginal groups in the country, does not have its web portal in Santali or any other indigenous language. However, the government announced last year that it would make native Indian language input mandatory in mobile phones.

The need for a typeface, especially in a universal encoding standard like Unicode, became apparent during a three-month digitization project on Odia Wikisource, an Odia-language online library and sister project of Wikipedia. Many of the students who were part of the digitization project were native speakers. The students shared how they couldn't opt for education in their own language, thus affecting their knowledge and understanding of the written language.

The question whether digital activism can help revive indigenous languages was discussed at the 2015 Global Voices Citizen Media Summit in Cebu City, Philippines. After the event, a pilot project was started within the Center for Internet and Society's Access to Knowledge program to create a freely licensed font and input methods so that anyone can easily type in their native language.

The typeface family was designed by type designer Pooja Saxena and went through several rounds of review by language experts. However, the typeface is still one step away from reality. Because of this, two input methods will be made available along with the typeface; Sarjom Baha, a phonetic input method so that every common user can easily type the they pronounce the words, and InScript, a keyboard layout standard for Indian scripts. Even though the original plan was to create a editor community to contribute to the Santali Wikipedia and bring it live from Incubator, outputs will just be distributed for the users to use them.

The input method will also be available on Mediawiki so that the input methods will be available on Wikipedia and all its sister projects. Hopefully in the future, a group of contributors will use the tools, contribute, and bring the Santali Wikipedia live!

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/opensource.com-subhashish-panigrahi-july-8-2016-open-source-effort-gives-indigenous-language-an-official-typeface

India No Haven For Net Freedom But It Did Not Oppose UN Move on Internet Rights

praskrishna — 2016-07-09T02:25:51Z

India hasn’t had the best record when it comes to Internet rights. The country regularly carries out Internet shutdowns under flimsy pretexts, is still fumbling when it comes to the drafting of a comprehensive privacy bill, and most recently came out with a geospatial information regulation bill that would establish ownership over all forms of location data.

The article by Anuj Srinivas was published in the Wire on July 6, 2016.

So, last week, when the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) passed a resolution on the “promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet”, it wasn’t surprising to see the wave of media criticism of the amendments that were proposed by countries such as China and Russia – and which were supported by India.

South Africa’s Mail & Guardian ran a story headlined “South Africa votes with China, Russia and India against Internet freedoms in UN resolution”. Private Internet Access’s headline was “These 17 Countries Don’t Believe that Freedom of Expression on the Internet is a Human Right”. Popular tech website The Verge noted that the resolution was opposed “by a minority of authoritarian regimes including Russia, China and Saudi Arabia, as well as democracies like South Africa and India. These nations called for the UN to delete a passage in the resolution that ‘condemns unequivocally measures to intentionally prevent or disrupt access to our dissemination of information online’.”

The Verge‘s report was followed up by a number of Indian publications including IndiaToday and Medianama – the latter incorrectly stating that the UNHRC resolution “recognised Internet usage as a basic human right – as well a host of other global publications.

The facts
There were two fundamental mistakes with some of these reports. Firstly, the resolution was adopted without vote (with oral revision) as noted by the UNHRC. Therefore, while there were a number of countries which co-sponsored the resolution and many that didn’t, it is completely wrong to state that India – as the Mail & Guardian reported – or any other country, voted against the resolution.

Secondly, as noted by the Centre for Internet and Society, none of the four amendments supported by India called for the deletion of a passage that condemned the prevention or disruption of Internet access and online information dissemination. Although it may fit neatly within India’s history of issuing Internet block orders, no country was opposed to this paragraph at the UNHRC forum (although many countries including India flout this clause in spirit back at home). No such amendment was proposed.

What then were these four amendments, which Article 19, an organisation that advocates freedom of expression, statedwould “substantially weaken the resolution”? Out of the four amendments (referred to as L85-88 in the UNHRC resolution), the first amendment (L85) – which sought to include a reference to fighting against the exploitation of children online – was withdrawn by Russia before it was considered by member states.

The other three amendments, while not completely endorsed by the countries that co-sponsored the resolution, do carry a certain level of nuance. Only one of the amendments (L86) can truly be described as diluting language regarding freedom of expression online, although this could have been potentially a result of procedural politics.

L88: Including Reference to Hate Speech
This amendment – proposed by Belarus, China, Iran and the Russian Federation – asks to introduce a new paragraph that states:

“Expresses its concern at the use of the Internet and information and communications technology to disseminate ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, and incitement to racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance.”

Article 19 says of this amendment that it would “undermine the intended focus of the draft resolution on protecting human rights online, in particular freedom of expression..” While it is true that a few paragraphs of the resolution’s preamble include a reference to hate speech, it is difficult to see what harm this amendment would have brought in and even more difficult to accept that it would dilute the focus of the overall resolution.

Using the Internet and other online media technologies for incitement and as a means of propagating intolerance and xenophobia is a very real problem in India and other Asian countries, the most notable example of which was the role that social media played in the exodus of north-east Indian migrants from Bangalore four years ago. While shutdowns are obviously not the best way of dealing with this, it is important to acknowledge the role of the Internet as a medium in this aspect. In sum, this amendment certainly would not have diluted the resolution’s aim of promoting freedom of expression online.

L87: Human-Rights Approach
The second amendment replaces the term “human rights-based approach” with “comprehensive and integrated approach” in two paragraphs on expanding Internet access:

PP17: Stressing the importance of applying a comprehensive and integrated (human rights-based approach) in providing and expanding access to the Internet and for the Internet to be open, accessible and nurtured by multistakeholder participation,

OP5: Affirms also the importance of applying a comprehensive and integrated (human rights-based approach) in providing and in expanding access to Internet and requests all States to make efforts to bridge the many forms of digital divides..

This amendment was a little trickier. According to people involved in the country stakeholder discussions, whom The Wirespoke with, the aversion to a ‘human-rights’ approach towards expanding Internet access came as a result of China and Russia playing procedural politics. The language that was proposed in the amendment – “comprehensive and integrated” – while certainly not the strongest possible language that could have been used, would not have legally diluted the proposal to expand Internet access while maintaining an open and multistakeholder approach towards Internet governance.

Stepping back, what would a human rights-based approach in expanding Internet access look like? Would it include legitimising the act of zero-rating and the approval of schemes such as Facebook’s Free Basics? Both of which, incidentally, have been banned in India. While the proposed amendment certainly does not speak well of the motivations of China, Russia and India, the term is also vague enough that its mere removal doesn’t indicate a lack of support towards Internet freedom.

L88 – Right to privacy and removal of UDHR reference
This amendment, proposed by China and the Russian Federation, was more straightforward. In two paragraphs, it sought to add the specific term ‘right to privacy’, while in another paragraph it proposed removing reference to language from, and articles in, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Had the amendment been passed, the changes in the following paragraphs would have been made:

PP7: Noting that the exercise of human rights, in particular the right to freedom of expression and the right to privacy, on the Internet is an issue of increasing interest and importance as the rapid pace of technological development enables individuals all over the world to use new information and communication technologies,

OP15: Decides to continue its consideration of the promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights, including the right to freedom of expression and the right to privacy, on the Internet and other information and communication technology, as well as of how the Internet can be an important tool for fostering citizen and civil society participation, for the realisation of development in every community and for exercising human rights, in accordance with its programme of work.

OP1: Affirms that the same rights that people have offline must also be protected online, in particular freedom of expression ~~which is applicable regardless of frontiers and through any media of one’s choice~~, and the right to privacy in accordance with articles 17 and 19 of the ~~Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the~~ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

On one hand, this amendment would have added specific reference to the right to privacy. That specific term doesn’t appear in the draft resolution, although there are a few references to privacy in general in the resolution’s preamble.

However, the addition of a ‘right to privacy’ is coupled with a watering down of clear references to the protection of freedom of expression. Cynical observers would rightly note that China and Russia are probably less concerned with online privacy and more irked with the clear support of freedom of expression “regardless of frontiers” and “in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”; which is probably why this particular proposed amendment combined both issues to improve its chances of passing. While there is little doubt that this amendment would have diluted the resolution’s focus on protecting freedom of expression, the alternative phrasing also doesn’t create legal loopholes that renders it useless. Moreover, it still contains reference to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, especially Article 19, which goes beyond Article 19 of the UDHR .

India, a guardian?
It would be naive and wrong to take a strong position either way. To state that the amendments supported by India are all antithetical to the spirit of the UNHRC resolution, as some have done, is simply incorrect. On the other hand, this doesn’t mean India, and even less, China and Russia, are guardians of Internet freedom.

The UNHRC resolution in its entirety is a fine document. While non-binding, it provides a foundation for claiming that the same rights people have offline “must also be protected online”. Other crucial sections state that governments “should ensure accountability for all human rights violations and abuses committed against persons for exercising their human rights online”, while condemning “measures to intentionally prevent or disrupt access to or dissemination of information online”.

While the amendments India supported may not wholly oppose this resolution, it is also true that successive Indian governments also do not have an admirable track-record of upholding the resolution’s aims. Freedom for online speech had to be reclaimed in the form of court judgements, with the current government still supporting regulations that would allow it clamp down on online freedom of expression. In certain states within the country, Internet shutdowns happen without public explanations or justifiable reasoning. Over the last four years, for instance, Jammu and Kashmir has lost 18 days of Internet access. While it may not have wholly opposed the UNHRC resolution, the country still has a ways to go in terms of Internet freedom.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-week-anuj-srinivas-july-6-2016-india-no-haven-for-net-freedom-but-did-not-oppose-un-move-on-internet-rights

FB & Google have already monopolised Indian cyberspace

praskrishna — 2016-07-08T15:59:46Z

In an interview with Catch, Sunil Abraham, executive director of Center for Internet & Society, puts the recent US-India cyber relationship framework into perspective. Abraham also talks about how Indian surveillance policies are outdated and why the country has failed to check the hegemonic tendencies of companies like Facebook and Google.

The interview was published by Catch News on July 3, 2016.

US-India signed a cyber relationship framework earlier this month. Could you explain some of the takeouts that may have important implications in the near future?

In the framework, both sides have made a "commitment to the multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance" - in immediate practical terms that means India will accept the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) transition proposed for the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). Unfortunately, as my colleague Pranesh Prakash points out "U.S. state control over the core of the internet's domain name system is not being removed by the transition that is currently underway."

India along with Brazil and other emerging powers should have insisted that the question of jurisdiction be addressed before the transition. We must remember, that the multi-stakeholder model is just a fancy name for open and participatory self-regulation by the private sector. While the multi-stakeholder model is useful as a complement to traditional state-led regulation, it cannot be used to protect human rights or ensure the security of a nation state.

[That is precisely why - the very next sentence in the announcement for the the framework for the US-India Cyber Relationship says "a recognition of the leading role for governments in cyber security matters relating to national security". This is because ICANN-style multistakeholderism requires all stakeholders to be on "equal footing" without "distinct roles and responsibilities". In other words, the governments are saying that the multistakeholder model is fine for all Internet Governance areas with the exception of Cyber Security. Given the limits of the multistakeholder model this is indeed the wise thing to do. Since American corporations dominate the Internet, US foreign policy has historically pushed for the multistakeholder model as fig leaf for forbearance and reduced foreign regulatory burden American corporations operating in other jurisdictions. Therefore India must not drink the multistakeholder cool-aid whole sale. It cannot afford a laissez-faire approach where it waits for corporations to self-regulate - it must regulate whenever public interest or human rights are harmed. In other words, it must go beyond the multistakeholder model and produce appropriate regulation where necessary. Needless to add - it must also deregulate in areas where harms don't exist. Apart from this many of the details of the announcement are positive steps that will increase security in India and the USA, and indeed the also across the world.]

What are some aspects of Intellectual Property Rights that should be looked at, in the context of the framework?

There is some language around Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) that should be examined carefully too. The US corporations benefit from a maximalist IP regime. But Make in India, Digital India and Startup India all depend on flexibilities to the IP regime and therefore India should refuse signing. Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) obligations like the "Digital 2 Dozen" which the US is actively proselytizing across the Pacific. If we make that mistake, we will make zero progress in indigenous security research and product development and also many other areas of our economy, health sector and education sector will be severely compromised. Therefore it would be best to keep IP rights expansion and enforcement out of the framework for the US-India Cyber Relationship.

The PIL seeking a ban on WhatsApp was refused by the SC recently. Encrypted messaging services like Telegram however, have been used in the past by terror groups. What's your take on such end-to-end encryption services?

Privacy and security are two sides of the same coin. You cannot have one without the other. End-to-end encryption is the basis for online privacy. End-to-end encryption is a pre-requisite for many legitimate actions of law abiding citizens online such as commerce, banking, tele-medicine, protection of intellectual property, witness/source protection, client confidentiality etc. Therefore, banning end-to-end encryption would mean the death of individual privacy and national security.

If the government wants to promote cyber security it should promote the use of end-to-end encryption amongst law abiding citizens.

Terrorist have to be stopped through targeted profiling, surveillance and interception. Big data analytics may be useful to watch for patterns in the meta data but there is no replacement for good old fashioned police work.

Once suspects have been identified the encrypted channels can be compromised by:

Placing trojans on the end-user devices
Performing man-in-the-middle attacks and
Using brute force attacks with super computers.

Snowden's revelations have made it very clear that blanket and mass surveillance does not help foil terror attacks or stop organised crime. So far, research and government reports from across the world indicate that only a minority of terrorists use encryption. However, this situation may change.

We don't have any proper encryption policy under the IT Act yet. What's taking so long and what are the key points that any policy in this matter must include in future?

We need many different types of encryption policies. We need a policy that mandates encryption and digital signature for all government personnel and also for all government transactions. We need policies that promote research and development in cryptography and mathematics. We need to update our criminal procedure code so that encrypted communications and data can be targeted by law enforcement and used effectively in the criminal justice process.

However, we should not have any broad encryption policy that tries to regulate encryption as a technology. That would be a highly regressive move and will be impossible to enforce. That would breed contempt for rule of law.

Surveillance and the tech around it has been contentious for various governments. Where do we stand vis-a-vis regulating surveillance measures by the state?

Our surveillance and interception laws are outdated. They need to be modernized to deal with advancements in technology and also global developments when it comes to data protection and privacy law.

In fact, our organisation was part of a global effort called Necessary and Proportionate which identified 13 principles to modernise surveillance which are connected to various aspects such as Legality, Legitimate aim, Competent judicial authority, Integrity of communications and systems and more. Some of these principles may have to be customised for the Indian context. [For example, given the load on courts perhaps India should stay with executive authorization of interceptions and data access requests. However, getting the law correct is only half the job. For the law cannot fix what the technology has broken. Some surveillance projects are well designed. For ex. the NATGRID - from what I understand it is a standard and platform that which will allow 12 security, intelligence and law enforcement agencies to temporarily make unions of sub-sets of 21 data sources. These automated temporary databases will be created under existing data access provisions of the law. I also hope the NATGRID is also using cryptography to ensure the maintenance of a non-repudiable log that will identify all officers involved in authorizing the each request and accessing the resultant data. Unfortunately, other surveillance projects are unmitigated disasters. For example, UID or Aadhaar. Many Indians don't realize that Aadhaar is a surveillance project. Biometrics is just a fancy name for remote, covert and non-consensual identification technology. Using the UID database the government can identify every single Indian without their consent. The so called "consent layer" in the India Stack is being developed by volunteers outside the UIDAI to avoid transparency under the Right to Information Act. Nothing in the current layer of the "consent layer" allows citizens to revoke consent. There is no facility in the UID Act to delete yourself from the database. Identity information aka the UID number and authentication information aka your biometrics for about a billion Indians have been collected and stored in a centralized location. It is as if our parliamentarians have written an open letter to criminals and foreign governments says "here is the information you need to wreck whole sale damage - come and get it". Hopefully the Supreme Court will save us from this impending disaster.]

With a sluggish US market, India has the biggest potential for companies like FB & Google, next only to China. Do you feel that in the quest to take over the Indian market, FB & Google are going to monopolise cyberspace in India?

I have news for you - they have already monopolised Indian cyberspace. They have completely wiped out competition in certain domains.

One of the many reasons they have done this is because we don't have laws and regulations to temper their hegemonic tendencies. For example, we could use data portability and interoperability mandates for social media to spark competition in markets where there are entrenched monopolies.

Competition law can be used to protect other firms from abuse of market power. Consumer protection law and privacy law could be used to ensure that user's rights are not compromised in the race for market share. In addition, a modern privacy law compliant with the best practices in the European Data Protection Regulation 2016, would allow emerging Indian companies to compete with giants like Facebook and Google on a level playing field. [Speaking of level playing field - only recently has the government introduced the "equalization levy". This was long overdue. Imagine the amount of tax that could have been collected so far and damage that has been done to competition. Regardless the current NDA government deserves our kudos for ensuring that Facebook and Google contribute their fair share of taxes. The new IPR Policy was also an opportunity to address the monopoly of Google and Facebook. There should have been a concerted attempt to use free/open source software, open standard and open content to bolster Indic language technologies. A billion dollars from every spectrum auction should be used to create incentives for Indian private sector, research and academic organisation who can contribute openly to the Indic cyberspace. This is the market where we can still build a highly competitive market. Today, given government inaction - millions of Indians are training Google's language platforms every time they use machine translation or speech to text technologies. This corpus of information will not be available for public interest research. Ideally we should also have Indians contributing to commons-based peer production projects like Wikipedia for their Indic language needs. Unfortunately the government totally missed this opportunity.]

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/catch-news-asad-ali-july-3-2016-fb-and-google-have-already-monopolised-indian-cyberspace

Studying Internet in India (2016): Selected Abstracts

sumandro — 2016-07-06T06:24:42Z

We received some great submissions and decided to select twelve abstracts, and not only ten as we planned earlier. Here are the abstracts.

Abhimanyu Roy

The Curious Incidents on Matrimonial Websites in India

What is love? Philosophers have argued over it, biologists have researched it and in the age of the internet, innovators have disrupted it. In the west, dating websites such as OKCupid and eHarmony use all manner of algorithms to find its users their optimal match. In India’s conservative society though, dating is fast-tracked or skipped altogether in favor of marriage. This gives rise to a plethora of matrimonial sites such as Jeevansathi.com and Shaadi.com. This is where things get tricky.

Matrimonial websites are different from other internet-enabled services. The gravity of the decision and the major impact that it has on the lives of users brings in pressure and a range of emotions that are not there on casual transactions such as an Uber ride or a foodpanda order. From outright fraud to online harassment newspaper back pages are filled with nightmare stories that begin on a matrimonial website. So much so, that in November of last year, the Indian government decided to set up a panel to regulate matrimonial sites in order to curb abuse. The essay will analyze India’s social stand on marriage, the role of matrimonial websites in modern day India, the problems this awkward amalgamation of the internet and love gives rise to and the steps authorities and matrimonial companies are taking to prevent these issues from occurring.

Anita Gurumurthy, Nandini Chami, and Deepti Bharthur

Internet as Sutradhar: The Aesthetics and Politics of Digital Age Counter-power

The open Internet is now a feeble, wannabe, digital age meme. The despots have grabbed it and capitalism has colonised it. But the network that engulfs its users is also a multi-headed organism; the predictables have to make peace with the unpredictables, both arising as they do with the unruly affordances of the network. The much celebrated public domain of open government data, usually meant for geeks and software gurus dedicated to the brave new 'codeful' future, has meant little for marginal subjects of India's development project. Data on government websites have been critiqued worldwide for often being too clunky to catalyse civic use or too obscure to pin down government efficacy. However, as an instrument of accountable governance, data in the public domain can help hold the line, fuelling vanguard action to foster democracy. Activists engaged in the right to food movement in India had reason to rejoice recently when the Supreme Court of India pulled up the central government for delay in release of funds under the MGNREGA scheme and violating the food security law. The series of actions leading to this victory enjoins deeper examination of the MGNREGS website, the design principles of the MIS that generates reports based on the data, and the truth claims that arose in the contingent context marking this struggle. What were the ingredients of this happy irony; the deployment of the master's tools to disband the master's house? What aesthetics and principles made for a public data structure that allowed citizens to hack into state impunity? And what do such practices around the digital tell us about the performativity of the Internet - not as a grand, open, phenomenon for the network to access the multitude, but as the inane, local, Sutradhar (alchemist who produces the narrative), who allows truths to be told?

Aishwarya Panicker

How Green is the Internet? The Good, the Bad and the Ugly

Groceries at your doorstep, data on your fingertips, an Uber at the tap of a button and information overload- human negotiations with the internet have definitely changed drastically in the past few decades. Research in the area, too, has transformed to not just the supply of internet to the masses, but has evolved to include innovative and revolutionary ideas in terms of internet infrastructure and governance. With over 3.2 Billion internet users in the world, and over 400 million of these from India, this is no surprise.

However, while environmental sustainability remains at the forefront of many-a-government, there is little data / debate / analysis / examination of the environmental impact of the internet. This is true especially for India. In 2011, Joel Gombiner wrote an academic paper on the problem of the Internets carbon footprint, with a premise based on the lesser known fact that the ICT industry has been ‘responsible for two to four percent of the global greenhouse gas emissions’- an area that the Climate Group’s Smart 2020 report had focused on back in 2008 as well. Clearly this is a war on the environment that is yet to receive large-scale attention.

How can we move beyond particular fascinations with the internet and engage holistically with the internet? By moving towards a dimension of internet infrastructure studies, that has large policy and implementation benefits. This paper, then, will seek to elucidate four central issue areas: first, as the third highest country in terms of internet use, what is the current environmental impact of internet usage in India? Second, are there any regulatory provisions that give prescriptive measures to data centres and providers? Third, do any global standards exist in this regard and finally, what future steps can be taken (by the government, civil society and individuals) to address this?

Deepak Prince

One of the most important effects of increasing internet connectivity coupled with universal electronic display screens, multimedia digital objects and supple graphic interfaces, is the proliferation of systems of enunciation. The business letter, typewriter, electric telegraph and radio, each in its own time, transformed how humans make sense in different forms of writing. Some of these survive to this day (forms of address from letters, the abbreviations and ‘cablese’ from telegraph operators etc). Now, we find new spaces of networked sociality emerging at rapid speeds, and everyday, we forget many others that are now outdated, no longer ‘supported’ or desired. How does one study this supple flow of discourse? Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of tracing collective assemblages of enunciation (the structuring structures of discourse) and Gilbert Simondon’s Law of relaxation (where technical elements created by complex ensembles are released into a path of technological evolution where they may or may not crystallize the formation of new ensembles) are two philosophical notions that seek to address this problem. The anthropologist Ilana Gershon suggests that new social media platforms like Facebook have a detrimental effect on sociality because they impose a neo-liberal notion of personhood on its users, through the interface. I take this as my point of departure, and based on ethnographic fieldwork conducted at a new media marketing agency, I attempt to draw out how ‘posting’ is modulated on facebook, about how subjectivity is configured within the complex matrix comprising a constant flow of posts, the economy of ‘liking’, algorithmic sorting and affects that do not cross the threshold of the screen.

Maitrayee Mukerji

By some latest estimates, around 35% of the population access the Internet in India using multiple devices. As Indians browse, search, transact and interact online, one can observe the increasing intertwining of the Internet in their everyday lives. But, how much do we know about the influence and impact of the Internet on Indian and in India? Advances in big data technologies provide an exciting opportunity for social science researchers to study the Internet. So, trends can be detected, opinions and sentiments can be calibrated, social networks can be discovered by using technologies for collecting and mining data on people online. But are social science researchers in India equipped enough to do a rigorous and detailed study of the India? Leaving aside debates on epistemology, ontology and methodology of researching Internet using big data analytics, the very first challenge is limited access to data. A cursory scan of the available research would indicate that the data – tweets, trends, comments, memes etc. have generally been collected manually. The bulk of the data is collected by private companies and available either at a price or by writing programs to access them through APIs. The latter allows only limited extraction of data and more often than not has a learning curve. Access to raw data, through institutional repositories or special permission, if available is only to select few. Legal and ethical issues arise if one considers scrapping websites for data. The essay is an attempt to articulate the challenges in accessing data while making attempts to study the Internet using big data analytics.

Muhammed Afzal P

Internet Memes as Effective Means of Social and Political Criticism

By looking at the user-generated memes posted from the Malayalam Facebook pages “Troll Malayalam” and “International Chalu Union”, this essay argues that political memes function as effective means of social and political criticism in Kerala. In a society where conversations often tend to feature examples from popular films, memes from these pages use images from popular culture including television to respond to current affairs as well as contemporary social and political questions. Often described mistakenly as 'trolls' by the practitioners themselves, a major portion of the memes have a progressive content in terms of discussing questions related to religion, sexuality, nationalism, etc. It won’t be an exaggeration to state that many Malayalis see these memes as instant 'news analysis' of current affairs. The argument of this essay will be advanced through an analysis of the memes that were produced in relation to contemporary socio-political and cultural questions such as beef ban, the rise of right-wing politics in Kerala, the question of religious conservatism, etc. Through this the essay seeks to investigate how internet memes creatively contribute to social movements and also to see how critical questions in cultural criticism are translated into "the popular.'

Dr. Ravikant Kisana

Archetyping the 'Launda' Humor on the Desi Internet

Humor on the internet has proven a massive social unifying force for young, upper class Indian millennials. The humor is not just consumed via Western (mainly US) humor collectives such as 9GAG, Cracked, etc - the proliferation of 'Indian' humor pages on the Facebook and the countless YouTube comedy channels is testament to the localisation of this content. However, the humor which is seen as a unifying force is largely 'launda' aka. 'heteronormative-upper caste-male' in its sensibilities. Comedy collectives like TVF, with its popular channel 'Q-tiyapa' had to create a separate handle 'Girliyapa' to cater to feminist themes. The idea is that humor by default is male, and 'feminist humor' needs a separate space.

This essay seeks to study the 'launda'-cultural attributes of online Indian humor. It will seek to document and wean archetypes of comedy tropes which fit this mode. The area of the documentation will be YouTube comedy channels and Facebook humor pages—however, the same can be extended to Twitter handles and the suchlike.

Siddharth Rao and Kiran Kumar

Chota Recharge and the Chota Internet

Uniform and affordable Internet is emerging as one of the fundamental civil rights in developing countries. However in India, the connectivity is far from uniform across the regions, where the disparity is evident in the infrastructure, the cost of access and telecommunication services to provide Internet facilities among different economic classes. In spite of having a large mobile user base, the mobile Internet are still remarkably slower in some of the developing countries. Especially in India, it falls below 50% even in comparison with the performance of its developing counterparts!

This essay presents a study of connectivity and performance trends based on an exploratory analysis of mobile Internet measurement data from India. In order to assess the state of mobile networks and its readiness in adopting the different mobile standards (2G, 3G, and 4G) for commercial use, we discuss the spread, penetration, interoperability and the congestion trends.

Based on our analysis, we argue that the network operators have taken negligible measures to scale the mobile Internet. Affordable Internet is definitely for everyone. But, the affordability of the Internet in terms of cost does not necessarily imply the rightful access to Internet services. Chota recharge is possibly leading us to chota (shrunken) Internet!

Smarika Kumar

Why Mythologies are Crucial to Understand Governance on the Internet: The Case of Online Maps

How does one study internet in India? This essay proposes to provide one possible answer to this question through its central argument that internet, like other technologies, is very much a part of a “mythological” or “fictional” narrative of the history of this country, and without an understanding of these mythologies, the development of internet governance in the country cannot be hoped to be understood. This central argument is traced in the essay through the debates and discussions on law and policymaking around online maps. The essay, in its first part, explores what a “mythological” account of the history of India might mean, and what role technological developments play in it. It does so by tracing the narrative of mapmaking in medieval India and its deep ties with magic, secrecy and mythical stories. It then surveys how modern mapping surveys in the colonial period interacted with the idea of the “native”, and argues that such interactions created a dichotomy between “native” sciences, folklore on the one hand, and colonial achievements, national security on the other. It argues that it is this latter strand of a certain “national security” vision of technology which found dominant voice in the regulation of maps in India post-independence, yet the sense of the unknown, mystical, or “mythological” in such technological deployment as mapmaking requires, survived. The essay finally uses such evidence to trace how even in online interactions, and internet governance design in India- this aspect of the mystical and the fear of it often sustains, driven by a (repressed?) memory of mythology, through the use of analogies. And it is within this twilight zone, within this frontier between “mythology” and nation-building, that a governance design for online maps is being presently constructed in India. The essay then argues that it becomes crucial to understand such mythologies around technology generally and internet specifically and the manner they interact with law and policymaking in order to really get a sense of a 21st century India’s experience of the internet.

Sujeet George

Understanding Reddit: The Indian Context

Even as social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter seek to carve a niche within the Indian social media landscape, the presence and impact of news aggregator website reddit seems relatively unnoticed. Known for its excessive self-referentiality and inability to emerge from a restricted pool of informational flow, reddit nevertheless has come to be a major focal point of convergence of news and public opinion, especially in the United States. The web interface, which allows for users with overlapping interests to converge under a common platform namely the “subreddit,” allows the possibility of understanding questions of user taste and the directions in which information and user attention flow.

This paper seeks to offer a preliminary gesture towards understanding reddit’s usage and breadth in the Indian context. Through an analysis of the “India” subreddit and examining the manner and context in which information and ideas are shared, proposed, and debunked, the paper aspires to formulate a methodology for interrogating sites like reddit that offer the possibilities of social mediation, even as users maintain a limited amount of privacy. At the same time, to what extent can such news aggregator sites direct the ways in which opinions and news flows change course as a true marker of information generation responding to user inputs.

Supratim Pal

India, being a multilingual country, owes a lot to the Internet for adding words to the vocabulary of everyday use in different languages.

This paper would critically examine how Net words like "selfie", "wall", "profile" and others have changed the way Indians write or talk. For example, a word like "nijaswi" was not there in Bengali language five years back but is used across several platforms as a translation of "selfie".

On one hand, computer-mediated communication (CMC) has helped us to express in short messages and on the other, we all have picked up use of punctuation marks like colon or a semicolon to express our emotion - which have got another name, "emoticons".

The paper would be more practical in approach than theoretical. For example, it would feature chat (another example of CMC) conversations 10 years ago when hardly an emoticon was used, and that of today's when we cannot think of a chat without a "smiley" or a "sticker". Even the linguist, David Crystal, probably could not have thought that in 15 years, the language (not just lingua franca, English) would change worldwide since he first tried to theorize Internet language in 2001.

Today, a linguist need not to have a proper publication to introduce a word in any language but Netizens can re-invent words like "troll" or "roast" to criticize one or "superlike" to celebrate an achievement or even "unfriend" someone to just relax.

Surfatial

Surfatial is a trans-local collective that operates through the internet. We use conversations to aid learning outside established structures. We are concerned with enabling disinhibition through the internet, for expressing what may not be feasible in physical reality. What role does partial or complete anonymity play in this process of seeking “safe” zones of expression? Fake profiles on social media offer such zones, while perhaps also operating to propagate, mislead or troll.

Our essay would argue:

That there is a desire to participate in speculative fora in the Indian cultural context and the internet has created space for philosophical questioning among contemporary Indian participants which can develop further, despite common assertions that online spaces are largely uncivil and abusive.
That anonymous and pseudonymous content production offers a method for exploring and expressing with a certain degree of freedom.
Spam-like methods used in sub-cultural outreach efforts on social media have proved effective in puncturing filter bubbles.

Our essay would be drawn from experiments via Surfatial’s online engagement platforms (Surfatial’s Study groups and post_writer project) to examine:

Extent of participation.
Disinhibition facilitation and dialoguing.
Reach.
Emergence and development of ideas.
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Big Data Governance Frameworks for 'Data Revolution for Sustainable Development'

Meera Manoj — 2016-07-05T13:13:32Z

A key component of the process to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals is the call for a global 'data revolution' to better understand, monitor, and implement development interventions. Recently there has been several international proposals to use big data, along with reconfigured national statistical systems, to operationalise this 'data revolution for sustainable development.' This analysis by Meera Manoj highlights the different models of collection, management, sharing, and governance of global development data that are being discussed.

1. What are the Sustainable Development Goals?

2. The Need for a Data Revolution

3. Big Data: Characteristics and Use for Development

3.1. Characteristics of Big Data

3.2. Using Big Data for Development

4. Sustainable Development and Data Rights

5. Governance Frameworks Proposed

5.1. UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network

5.2. The UN DATA Revolution Group

5.3. Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development

5.4. The Global Partnership for Sustainable Development of Data

5.5. The World Economic Forum (WEF)

5.6. Dr. Julia Lane - A Quadruple Data Helix

5.7. Data Pop Alliance

6. Conclusion

7. Endnotes

8. Author Profile

Speaking on Big Data, Dan Ariely commented that, "Everyone talks about it, nobody really knows how to do it, and everyone thinks everyone else is doing it, so everyone claims they are doing it" [1]. This offers a useful insight into the lack of adequate discourse on the kind of governance and accountability frameworks that are needed to facilitate the developmental, sustainable, and responsible uses of big data.

In light of the recent international proposals to use big data to track the Sustainable Development Goals, this paper highlights the different models of management, sharing, and governance of data that are being discussed, and concurrently, how they conceptualise the various rights around big data and how are they to be protected.

1. What are the Sustainable Development Goals?

The Sustainable Development Goals, otherwise known as the Global Goals, build on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Adopted on 1 January 2016, these universally applicable 17 goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, seek to end all forms of poverty, fight inequalities, tackle climate change and address a range of social needs like education, health, social protection and job opportunities over the next 15 years [2].

Source: UN Data Revolution Group, A World that Counts, 2014, p.12.

2. The Need for a Data Revolution

An overwhelming cause of concern regarding the precursor to the SDGs, the MDGs, is the data unavailability to monitor their progress. For instance, the figure below indicates that there is no five-year period when the availability of MDG related data is more than 70% of what is required. Entire groups of people and key issues remain invisible [3]. Lack of data is not only a problem for global statisticians, but also for people whose needs and demands remain invisible due to lack of quantitative representation of the same. For instance, the incidences of gender related crimes when not recorded could lead to a misconception on the achievement of the MDG of gender equality.

Source: UN, Sustainable Development Goals.

As the new goals (SDGs) cover a wider range of issues it is clear that a far higher level of detail is required. To this effect the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the post-2015 agenda has called for a "data revolution for sustainable development" [4].

The world is experiencing a Data Revolution and a "data deluge." One estimate has it that 90% of the data in the world has been created in the last 2 years. As Eric Schmidt of Google in 2010 famously said, "There were 5 exabytes of information created between the dawn of civilization through 2003, but that much information is now created every 2 days [5].

In its report A World that Counts, the UN Data Revolution Group defines the data revolution as an explosion in the volume of data, the speed with which data are produced, the number of producers of data, the dissemination of data, and the range of things on which there is data, coming from new technologies such as mobile phones and the “internet of things”, and from other sources, such as qualitative data, citizen-generated data and perceptions data [6].

This data revolution in the context of sustainable development has been defined by the UN Secretary General’s Independent Expert Advisory Group (IEAG) as follows:

[T]he integration of data coming from new technologies with traditional data in order to produce relevant high‐quality information with more details and at higher frequencies to foster and monitor sustainable development. This revolution also entails the increase in accessibility to data through much more openness and transparency, and ultimately more empowered people for better policies, better decisions and greater participation and accountability, leading to better outcomes for the people and the planet [7].

The majority of such “data coming from new technologies” is what can be called big data. It is data being generated in real-time, in high velocity and volume, in a variety of forms and formats, and on an increasing range of phenomenon that are being mediated by digital technologies – from governance to human communication. Further, a good part of such big data is not about the content of the phenomenon concerned but about its process – for example, Call Detail Records are generated for each mobile phone call a person makes and it contains data about the process of the call (time, location, duration, recipient, etc.) but not about the content of the call. Big data about various governmental and human processes are becoming a crucial instrument for documenting and monitoring of the same.

3. Big Data: Characteristics and Use for Development

3.1. Characteristics of Big Data

The simplest definition of big data is that it is a dataset of more than 1 petabyte. The US Bureau of Labour Statistics terms it to be non-sampled data, characterized by the creation of databases from electronic sources whose primary purpose is something other than statistical inference [8].

The characteristics which broadly distinguish Big Data are sometimes called the “3 V’s”: more volume, more variety and higher rates of velocity [9]. Big data sources generally share some or all of these features [10]:

Digitally generated,
Passively produced,
Automatically collected,
Geographically or temporally trackable, and
Continuously analysed.

Increasingly, Big Data is recognised as creating "new possibilities for international development" [11]. It could provide faster, cheaper, more granular data and help meet growing and changing demands. It was claimed, for example, that "Google knows or is in a position to know more about France than INSEE" [12], its highly resourceful national statistical agency. To illustrate, Global Pulse gives the example of a hypothetical small household facing soaring commodity prices, particularly food and fuel [13]. They have the options of:

Getting part of their food at a nearby World Food Programme distribution centre,
Reducing mobile usage,
Temporarily taking their children out of school,
Calling a health hotline when children show signs of malnutrition related diseases, and
Venting about their frustration on social media.

Such a systemic shock of food insecurity will prompt thousands of households to react in roughly similar ways. These collective behavioural changes may show up in different digital data sources:

WFP might record that it serves twice as many meals a day,
The local mobile operator may see reduced usage,
UNICEF data may indicate that school attendance has dropped,
Health hotlines might see increased volumes of calls reporting malnutrition, and
Tweets mentioning the difficulty to “afford food” might begin to rise.

Thus the power of real-time, digital data to predict paths for development is immense. Amassing such a large volume of data which tracks practically every aspect of social behavious can revolutionize the field of official statistics and policy making.

Two points to be noted are: 1) all these data sources are not available for comparison in the real-time by default, so one task before using big data in developmental work is to make data from different sources available across agencies and make them comparable, and 2) finding repeating patterns within large data sets, sourced from varied origins, can not only allow for monitoring but also (statistically) predicting future possibilities and implications for development action.

3.2. Using Big Data for Development

There are several international organizations attempting to use such data.

Global Pulse, a United Nations initiative, launched by the Secretary-General in 2009, seeks to leverage innovations in digital data, rapid data collection and analysis to help decision-makers gain a real-time understanding of how crises impact vulnerable populations. To this end, Global Pulse is establishing an integrated, global network of Pulse Labs, anchored in Pulse Lab New York, to pilot the approach at country level [14].

The Global Working Group on Big Data for Official Statistics, created in May 2014, pursuant to Statistical Commission, makes an inventory of ongoing activities and examples regarding the use of big data, addresses concerns related to methodology, human resources, quality and confidentiality, and develops guidelines on classifying various types of big data sources [15].

There have been applications even on a national and individual level. For instance, in 2013, various sources reported that the CIA had admitted to the “full monitoring of Facebook, Twitter, and other social networks” to identify links between events and sequences or paths leading to national security threats, ultimately leading to forecasting future activities and events [16].

In the field of conflict prevention is the emerging applications to map and analyse unstructured data generated by politically active Internet use by academics, activists, civil society organizations, and even general citizens. In reference to Iran’s post-election crisis beginning in 2009, it is possible to detect web-based usage of terms that reflect a general shift from awareness towards mobilization, and eventually action within the population [17].

The "Big Data, Small Credit" report proposes that financial inclusion can be promoted by allowing consumers with mobile phones to access credit formally as customers [18].

At a national level, the biggest challenge for most big data projects is the limited or restricted access the government agencies have to potential big data sets owned by the private sector [19]. The overall consensus is that Big Data to track SDGs must complement traditional data sources [20]. This is because big data may not always be available for the entire population, or include a diverse enough sample of the population. Moreover most big data projects measure development indicators through a correlation which may not always be correct unlike official data. For instance big data might help in predicting lowered household income through reducing mobile bills while traditional data directly collects income statistics.

In a survey by the Global Working Group on Big Data for Official Statistics [21], it was found that only a few countries have developed a long-term vision for the use of big data, while many are formulating a big data strategy. Most countries have not yet defined business processes for integrating big data sources and results into their work and do not have a defined structure for managing big data projects.

Thus there exists a need to identify a governance framework for big data for sustainable development, not only at national level, but also at the international level.

4. Sustainable Development and Data Rights

Any discussion on governance frameworks would be incomplete without defining the kind of data rights they must seek to protect.

In the famous parable of the six blind men and the elephant they conclude that the elephant is like a wall, snake, spear, tree, fan or rope, depending upon where they touch. Similarly Internet experiences of individual users (what they touch) often contrast drastically with different views (what they conclude) on what would constitute data rights.

The IEAG in its report has identified the following set of data related rights, but has not defined any actual framework or process for ensuring them (yet) [22]:

Right to be counted,
Right to an identity,
Right to privacy and to ownership of personal data,
Right to due process (for example when data is used as evidence in proceedings, or in administrative decisions),
Freedom of expression,
Right to participation,
Right to non-discrimination and equality, and
Principles of consent.

Personal data is broadly defined as "any information relating to an identified or identifiable individual" [23]. Often primary data producers (users of services and devices generating data) are unaware of individual privacy infringements [24].

A survey by the Global Working Group on Big Data for Official Statistics found that only a few countries have a specific privacy framework for big data, while most apply the privacy framework for traditional statistics to big data as well [25].

Conventionally, safeguards against the re-use of big data to protect data rights have involved the “anonymization” or “de-identification” of data, to conceal individual identities. Global Pulse, for instance, is putting forth the concept of Data Philanthropy, whereby "corporations take the initiative to anonymize (strip out all personal information) their data sets and provide this data to social innovators to mine the data for insights, patterns and trends in real-time or near real-time" [26]. There however exists a debate on whether data can actually be anonymized effectively. Several state that data can never be effectively de-anonymized due to technological challenges [27]. For instance, when the New York City government released de-anonymised data sets of New York cab drivers were made re-identifiable by approaching a separate method. Within less than 2 hours work, researchers knew which driver drove every single trip in this entire dataset. It would be even be easy to calculate drivers’ gross income, or infer where they live [28].

Even the OECD opines that the current model of limiting identifiability of individuals is unsustainable. It recommends moving towards one where the focus is on transparency around how data is being used, rather than preventing specific types of use, stating that - "research funding agencies and data protection authorities should collaborate to develop an internationally recognized framework code of conduct covering the use of new forms of personal data, particularly those generated via network communication. This framework, built on best practice procedures for consent from data subjects, data sharing and re-use, anonymization methods, etc., could be adapted as necessary for specific national circumstances" [29].

Thus, there is a push for the arguement that the historical approaches to protecting privacy and confidentiality — namely, informed consent and anonymity — no longer hold [30]. Some have even suggested using big data itself to keep track of user permissions for each piece of data to act as a legal contract [31].

There is an overall consensus that any legal or regulatory mechanisms set up to mobilise the 'data revolution for sustainable development' should protect the data rights of the people [32], without any clear agreement on what these rights may be.

5. Governance Frameworks Proposed

A largely unanswered question that is posed in light of the emerging consensus on the use of Big Data for monitoring SDGs is within what sort of governance frameworks these data collection and analysis methods will operate. Methods of collection and the key actors involved in data analysis, management, storage and coordination. The role of NGOs and CSOs, if any, within these systems must be delineated. Certain key global organizations and eminent researchers have suggested the following models.

5.1. UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network

In 2012, the UN Secretary-General launched the UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) to mobilize global scientific and technological expertise to promote practical problem solving for sustainable development, including the design and implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) [33]. It has proposed the following.

Collection

The Inter-Agency and Expert Group on Sustainable Development Goal Indicators (IAEGSDG) and the United Nations Statistical Commission are to establish roadmaps for strengthening specific data collection tools that enable the monitoring of SDG indicators.

Analysis

Based on discussions with a large number of statistical offices, including Eurostat, BPS Indonesia, the OECD, the Philippines, the UK, and many others, 100 is recommended to be the maximum number of global indicators to analyse data for which NSOs can report and communicate effectively in a harmonized manner. This conclusion was strongly endorsed during the 46th UN Statistical Commission and the Expert Group Meeting on SDG indicators [34].

Specialist indicators developed by thematic communities must be used for data analysis as they include input and process metrics that are helpful complements to official indicators, which tend to be more outcome-focused. For example, the UN Inter-Agency Group on Child Mortality Estimation has developed a specialist hub responsible for analysing, checking, and improving mortality estimation. This is a leading source for child morality information for both governments and non-governmental actors [35].

Research arms of private companies such as Microsoft Research, IBM research, SAS, and R&D arms of telecom companies could directly partner with official statistical systems to share sophisticated analysing techniques [36].

Management

Four levels of monitoring, national, regional, global, and thematic, should be "organized in an integrated architecture" [37].

Countries must decide individually whether official data must be complemented with non-official indicators from big data which can add richness to the monitoring of the SDGs.

Where possible, regional monitoring should build on existing regional mechanisms, such as the Regional Economic Commissions, the Africa Peer Review Mechanism, or the Asia-Pacific Forum on Sustainable Development [38].

To coordinate thematic monitoring under the SDGs, each thematic initiative may have one or more lead specialist agencies or “custodians” as per the IAEG-MDG monitoring processes. Lead agencies would be responsible for convening multi-stakeholder groups, compiling detailed thematic reports, and encouraging ongoing dialogues on innovation. These thematic groups can become testing grounds in launching a data revolution for the SDGs, trialling new measurements and metrics that in time can feed into the global monitoring process with annual reports [39].

Schematic illustration with explanation of the indicators for national, regional, global, and thematic monitoring.
Source: UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network, Indicators and a Monitoring Framework for the Sustainable Development Goals: Launching a Data Revolution for the SDGs, 2015, p.3.

Role of NSOs

Monitoring the SDG agenda will require substantive improvements in national statistical capacity. Assessments of existing capacity to fulfil SDG monitoring expectations must be undertaken and needs be integrated into National Strategies for the Development of Statistics (NSDSs) [40].

Coordination

A Global Partnership for Sustainable Development Data must be established and a World Forum on Sustainable Development Data be convened in 2016 to create mechanisms for ongoing collaboration and innovation.

A high-level, powerful group of businesses and states must convene the various data and transparency sustainable development initiatives under one umbrella.

To ensure comparability, Global Monitoring Indicators must be harmonized across countries by one lead technical or specialist agency which will additionally coordinate data standards and collection and provide technical support.

The following table indicates the suggested Lead Agencies for individual SDGs [41].

Number	Sustainable Development Goal	Lead Agencies
1.	No Poverty	World Bank, UNDP, UNSD, UNICEF, ILO, FAO, UN-Habitat, UNISDR, WHO, CRED, UNFPA, and UN Population Division
2.	No Hunger	FAO, WHO, UNICEF, and Internal Fertilizer Industry Associaton (IFA)
3.	Good Health	WHO, UN Population Division, UNICEF, World Bank, GAVI, UN AIDS, and UN-Habitat
4.	Quality Education	UNESCO, UNICEF, and World Bank
5.	Gender Equality	UNICEF, UN Women, WHO, UNSD, ILO, UN Population Division, and UNFPA
6.	Clean Water and Sanitation	WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP), FAO, UN Water, and UNEP
7.	Renewable Energy	Sustainable Energy for All, IEA, WHO, World Bank, and UNFCC
8.	Good Jobs and Economic Growth	IMF, World Bank, UNSD, and ILO
9.	Innovation and Infrastructure	World Bank, OECD, UNIDO, UNFCC, UNESCO, and ITU
10.	Reduced Inequalities	UNSD, World Bank, and OECD
11.	Sustainable Cities and Communities	UN-Habitat, Global City Indicators Facility, WHO, CRED, UNISDR, FAO, and UNEP
12.	Responsible Consumption	EITI, UNCTAD, UN Global Compact, FAO, UNEP Ozone Secretariat, WBCSD, GRI, IIRC, and Global Compact
13.	Climate Action	OECD DAC, UNFCCC, and IEA
14.	Life below Water	UNEP-WCMC, IUCN, and FMC
15.	Life on Land	FAO, UNEP, IUCN, and UNEP- WCMC
16.	Peace and Justice	UNODC, WHO, UNOCHA, UNCHR, IOM, OCHA, OECD, UN Global Compact, EITI, UNCTAD, UNICEF, UNESCO, and Transparency International
17.	Partnership for the Goals	BIS, IASB, IFRS, IMF, WIPO, WTO, UNSD, OECD, World Bank, OECD DAC, and SDSN

5.2. The UN DATA Revolution Group

The group constituted by the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in August 2014, is an Independent Expert Advisory Group with the aim of making concrete recommendations on bringing about a 'data revolution for sustainable development' [42]. In its report, A World that Counts, it makes the following recommendations [43].

Collection

Clear standards on data collection methods must be developed based on the UN Fundamental Principles of Official Statistics. Periodic audits must be conducted by professional and independent third parties to ensure data quality.

Governments, civil society, academia and the philanthropic sector must work together strengthening statistical literacy so that all people have capacity to input into and evaluate the quality of data.

Social entrepreneurs, private sector, academia, media, civil society and other individuals and institutions must be engaged globally with incentives (prizes, data challenges) to encourage data sharing.

Analysis

A SDGs Analysis and Visualisation Platform is to be set up for fostering private-public partnerships and community-led peer-production efforts for data analysis.

A dashboard on ”the state of the world” will engage the UN, think-tanks, academics and NGOs in analysing, and auditing data.

Academics and scientists are to analyse data to provide long-term perspectives, knowledge and data resources at all levels.

The “Global Forum of SDG-Data Users” will ensure feedback loops between data producers, processors and users to improve the usefulness of data and information produced.

A “SDGs data lab” to support the development of a first wave of SDG indicators is to be established mobilizing key public, private and civil society data providers, academics and stakeholders working with the Sustainable Development Solutions Network.

Storage

A “world statistics cloud” will store data and metadata produced by different institutions but according to common standards, rules and specifications.

Role of NSOs

Civil society organisations must share data and processing methods with private and public counterparts on the basis of agreements. They must hold governments and companies accountable using evidence on the impact of their actions, provide feedback to data producers, develop data literacy and help communities and individuals generate and use data.

NSOs are the central players of the Data Revolution. Their autonomy must be strengthened to maintain data quality. They must abandon expensive and cumbersome production processes, incorporate new data sources like big data that is human and machine-readable, compatible with geospatial information systems and available quickly enough to ensure that the data cycle matches the decision cycle. Collaborations with the private sector can boost technical and financial investments.

Coordination

Key stakeholders must create a “Global Consensus on Data”, to adopt principles concerning legal, technical, privacy, geospatial and statistical standards. Best practices related to public data such as the Open Government Partnership (OGP) and the G8 Open Data Charter are recommended foundations for such principles.

A UN-led “Global Partnership for Sustainable Development Data” is proposed, to coordinate and broker key global public-private partnerships for data sharing [44].

A “World Forum on Sustainable Development Data” and “Network of Data Innovation Networks” will be a converging point for the data ecosystem to share ideas and experiences for improvements, innovation and technology transfer.

5.3. Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD)

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is an inter-governmental organization that seeks to promote policies that will improve the economic and social well-being of people globally. It has made the following proposals [45].

Collection

Data is to be collected from National statistical agencies, national and international researchers and international organisations.

Role of NSOs

By leveraging the expertise of telecommunications companies and software developers, for instance, national statistical systems could potentially reduce costs and improve the availability of data to monitor development goals [46].

Coordination

National Data Forums for Social Science Data must be created for the development of social science data for improved coordination between social scientists, data producers (national statistical agencies, government departments, large private sector businesses and sources undertaking academic direction), and data curators.

Social science research communities must contribute to national plans of action after a needs assessment [47]. Research funding agencies must collaborate at the international level for a common system for referencing datasets in research publications [48].

5.4. The Global Partnership for Sustainable Development of Data

The partnership is a global network of governments, NGOs, and businesses working to strengthen the inclusivity, trust, and innovation in the way that data is used to address the world’s sustainable development efforts [49].

Analysis

There must be a common framework for information processing. At minimum, a simple lexicon must tag each datum specifying:

What: i.e. the type of information contained in the data,
Who: the observer or reporter,
How: the channel through which the data was acquired,
How much: whether the data is quantitative or qualitative, and
Where and when: the spatio-temporal granularity of the data.

Analysis of data involves filtering relevant information, summarising keywords and categorising into indicators. This intensive mining of socioeconomic data, known as “reality mining,” can be done by: (1) Continuous analysis of real time streaming data, (2) Digestion of semi-structured and unstructured data to determine perceptions, needs and wants. (3) Real-time correlation of streaming data with slowly accessible historical data repositories.

Use of big data for developmental goals can draw upon all three techniques to various degrees depending on availability of data and the specific needs.

Role of NSOs

NSOs have a pivotal part to play in the data revolution. Countries and organizations believe that big data cannot replace traditional official statistical data as it is based more on perception than facts. To quote Winston Churchill, "Do not trust any statistics that you did not fake yourself."

For instance, a study found that Google Flu Trends, to detect influenza epidemics, predicted nonspecific flu-like respiratory illnesses well but not actual flu. The mismatch was due to popular misconceptions on influenza symptoms. This has important policy implications. Doctors using Google Flu Trends may overstock on flu vaccines or be overly inclined to diagnose normal respiratory illnesses as influenza [50].

However Big Data if understood correctly, can inform where further targeted investigation is necessary and give immediate responses to favourably change outcomes.

5.5. The World Economic Forum (WEF)

The WEF is an International Organization for Public-Private Cooperation. It engages the foremost political, business and other leaders of society to shape global, regional and industry agendas [51]. In the report titled Big Data, Big Impact: New Possibilities for International Development, it makes the following recommendations [52].

Collection

Data production and development actors include individuals, public sector and the private sector. Each produce different kinds of data that have unique requirements. The private sector maintains vast troves of transactional data, much of which is "data exhaust," or data created as a by-product of other transactions. The public sector maintains enormous datasets in the form of census data, health indicators, and tax and expenditure information. The following figure highlights the different kinds of data that each sector collects and what incentives they have to share the data along with requirements to maintain such data.

World Economic Forum - Diagram on Data Commons.
Source: World Economic Forum, Big Data, Big Impact: New Possibilities for International Development, 2012, p.4.

Business models must be created to provide the appropriate incentives for private-sector actors to share data. Such models already exist in the Internet environment. For instance companies in search and social networking profit from products they offer at no charge to end users because the usage data these products generate is valuable to other ecosystem actors. Similar models could be created in garnering Big Data for SDGs. The following flowchart illustrates how different sectors must work together to incentivise data collection and sharing.

World Economic Forum - Diagram on Global Coordination.
Source: World Economic Forum, Big Data, Big Impact: New Possibilities for International Development, 2012, p.7.

5.6. Dr. Julia Lane - A Quadruple Data Helix

Dr. Julia Lane is a Professor in the Wagner School of Public Policy at New York University; and also a Provostial Fellow in Innovation Analytics and a Professor in the Center for Urban Science and Policy [53]. She has done extensive research on the uses of big data. In her paper titled "Big Data for Public Policy: A Quadruple Data Helix," she makes the following suggestions [54].

Collection

In the future there will exist a model of a quadruple data helix for data collection which will have four strands — state and city agencies, universities, private data providers, and federal agencies.i

A new set of institution, city/university data facilities, must be established. These institutions should form the backbone of the quadruple helix, with direct connections to the private sector and to the federal statistical agencies.

Analysis

There is a need for graduate training for non-traditional students, who need to understand how to use data science tools as part of their regular employment. They must identify and capture the appropriate data, understand how data science models and tools can be applied, and determine how associated errors and limitations can be identified from a social science perspective.i

Universities can act as a trusted independent third party to process, store, analyze, and disseminate data. ii

Management

The new infrastructure must ensure that data from disparate sources are collected managed and used in a manner that is informed by end users. There are many technical challenges: disparate data sets must be ingested, their provenance determined, and metadata documented. Researchers must be able to query data sets to know what data are available and how they can be used. And if data sets are to be joined, they must be joined in a scientific manner, which means that workflows need to be traced and managed in such a way that the research can be replicated.

Coordination

The role of State and City agencies is to address immediate policy issues, rather than to build long-term data infrastructures as their mandate is to work with city data than the full spectrum of available data.

5.7. Data-Pop Alliance

Data-Pop Alliance is a global coalition on Big Data and development created by the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, MIT Media Lab, and Overseas Development Institute that brings together researchers, experts, practitioners, and activists to promote a people-centred big data revolution through collaborative research, capacity building, and community engagement [55]. It makes the following suggestions.

Collection

The idea of shared responsibility between the public and private sector is a proposed operational principles to create a deliberative space. Mechanisms and legal frameworks must be devised for private companies to share their big data under formalized and stable arrangements instead of being compelled by ad hoc requests from researchers and policymakers.

The media too, could avoid publishing statistical data collected by unexplained methodologies by employing "statistical editors" and disseminate verified information.

Role of NSOs

For official statistics, engaging with Big Data is not a technical consideration but a political obligation. In a two tier system of official and non-official statistics, the public and investors tend to distrust official figures. For instance, the results of the 2010 census in the UK are being disputed on the basis of sewage data.

It is imperative for NSOs to retain, or regain, their primary role as the legitimate custodian of knowledge and creator of a deliberative public space to democratically drive human development [56].

6. Conclusion

The Big data frameworks provide some useful insights on monitoring mechanisms though some questions remain unanswered in each model. Key actors that have been proposed include city and state agencies like NSOs, private companies, social scientists, private individuals and international research agencies. Data analysis can be through public-private collaborations, data philanthropy, and using indicators by thematic communities.

Collection

There appears consensus across models that collection must be effected through public private partnerships while providing incentives.

Analysis

While several methods of analysis have been proposed by the Global Partnership it is unclear on who will be conducting the analysis. The UNSDSN has suggested that it be conducted by academics and scientists with Julia Lane stating it must be through public private partnerships which appear more feasible and transparent.

Role of NSOs

All frameworks agree on the pivotal role of NSOs and acknowledge them as the key players and coordinators at the national level. They must be strengthened financially, technologically and politically. Most frameworks seek to empower national agencies which will coordinate collaborations with the private sector through incentives while protecting personal data.

Coordination

Several international fora have been proposed to enable coordination while there is consensus that the NSOs. A Global Partnership for Sustainable Development Data, a Global Consensus on Data and a World Forum on Sustainable Development Data have been suggested. UN organizations appear to be suggesting more responsibility for those in the UN framework with UNSDSN giving an extensive list of lead agencies (UNDP, UN Women, Who etc) while the WEF emphasises on the private sector, Data Pop Alliance on NSOs, and Prof. Lane on State and City agencies.

On an international level countries can opt to join international organization that are being setup for the purpose. It remains to be seen whether all countries globally can achieve such a feat in a coordinated manner without infringing on data rights when unanswerable to any set international organization. The burden appears to fall on civil society and market forces within the private sector to regulate this process. For instance when a private sector company starts providing large un-anonymized data sets for government use, the privacy concerns of civil society that result in them opting for the company’s competitor’s more privacy friendly products will result in a regulation through market forces. However these forces may have disparate strengths in different contexts and countries depending on market practices and information asymmetry resulting in the lack of a uniform accountability mechanism.

7. Endnotes

[1] Dan Ariely, Facebook, January 06, 2013, https://www.facebook.com/dan.ariely/posts/904383595868.

[2] United Nations Organizations, 'Sustainable Development Goals' (United Nations Sustainable Development, 26 September 2015), http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/, accessed 6 June 2016.

[3] Data Revolution Group, 'A World that Counts: Mobilising the Data Revolution for Sustainable Development' (November 2014), http://www.undatarevolution.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/A-World-That-Counts2.pdf, accessed 8 June 2016.

[4] High level panel on the post-2015 development agenda , 'A New Global Partnership: Eradicate Poverty and Transform Economies through Sustainable Development'(Post2015hlp,0rg, July 2012), http://www.post2015hlp.org/, accessed 8 June 2016.

[5] Gary King, 'Ensuring the Data-Rich Future of the Social Sciences' [2011] 3(2) Science, http://gking.harvard.edu/files/datarich.pdf, accessed 8 June 2016.

[6] See [3].

[7] Ibid.

[8] Michael Horrigan, 'Big Data: A Perspective from the BLS' (Amstatorg, 1 January 2013) http://magazine.amstat.org/blog/2013/01/01/sci-policy-jan2013/, accessed 4 June 2016.

[9] UN Global Pulse, 'Big Data for Development: Challenges & Opportunities' (6 May 2012) http://www.unglobalpulse.org/sites/default/files/BigDataforDevelopment-UNGlobalPulseJune2012.pdf, accessed 5 June 2016.

[10] Emmanuel Letouzé and Johannes Jütting, 'Official Statistics, Big Data and Human Development: Towards a New Conceptual and Operational Approach' (2014) 12(3), Data-Pop Alliance White papers Series, https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/events-documents/5161.pdf, accessed 4 June 2016.

[11] See [9].

[12] See [10].

[13] See [9].

[14] UN Global Pulse, 'About: United Nations Global Pulse' (2016) http://www.unglobalpulse.org/about-new, accessed 7 June 2016.

[15] UN Stats, 'Global Working Group' (2014) http://unstats.un.org/unsd/bigdata/, accessed 8 June 2016.

[16] New York City Press Release, ‘Mayor Bloomberg, Police Commissioner Kelly and Microsoft Unveil New, State-of-the-Art Law Enforcement Technology that Aggregates and Analyzes Existing Public Safety Data in Real Time to Provide a Comprehensive View of Potential Threats and Criminal Activity’ (New York City, 8 August 2012), http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/291-12/mayor-bloomberg-police-commissioner-kelly-microsoft-new-state-of-the-art-law, accessed 2 July 2016.

[17] Francesco Mancini, 'New Technology and the Prevention of Violence and Conflict' (Reliefwebint, April 2013), http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ipi-e-pub-nw-technology-conflict-prevention-advance.pdf, accessed 2 July 2016.

[18] Arjuna Costa, Anamitra Deb, and Michael Kubzansky, 'Big Data, Small Credit: The Digital Revolution and Its Impact on Emerging Market Consumers,' (Omidyar, 3 March 2013) https://www.omidyar.com/sites/default/files/file_archive/insights/Big%20Data,%20Small%20Credit%20Report%202015/BDSC_Digital%20Final_RV.pdf, accessed 2 July 2016.

[19] United Nations Economic and Social Council, 'Report of the Global Working Group on Big Data for Official Statistics' (UN Stats, 3 March 2015), http://unstats.un.org/unsd/statcom/doc15/2015-4-BigData-E.pdf, accessed 8 June 2016.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid.

[22] See [3].

[23] OECD, 'OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data' (23 September 1980), http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm, accessed 29 May 2016.

[24] Amir Efrati, ''Like' Button Follows Web Users' (WSJ, 18 May 2011) http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704281504576329441432995616, accessed 23 May 2016.

[25] See [15].

[26] Robert Kirkpatrick, 'Data Philanthropy: Public and Private Sector Data Sharing for Global Resilience' (UN Global Pulse, 16 September 2011), http://www.unglobalpulse.org/blog/data-philanthropy-public-private-sector-data-sharing-global-resilience, accessed 4 June 2016.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Arvind Narayanan, 'No silver bullet: De-identification still doesn't work' (1 April 2016), http://randomwalker.info/publications/no-silver-bullet-de-identification.pdf, accessed 3 July 2016.

[29] OECD Global Science Forum, 'New Data for Understanding the Human Condition: International Perspectives,' (February 2013) http://www.oecd.org/sti/sci-tech/new-data-for-understanding-the-human-condition.pdf, accessed 2 June 2016.

[30] S. Barocas, 'The Limits of Anonymity and Consent in the Big Data Age,' in Privacy, Big Data, and the public good: Frameworks for Engagement (Cambridge University Press, 2014).

[31] A. Pentland, 'Institutional Controls: The New Deal on Data,' in Privacy, Big Data, and the public good: Frameworks for Engagement (Cambridge University Press, 2014).

[32] See [3].

[33] UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network, 'About Us: Vision and Organization' (2012) http://unsdsn.org/about-us/vision-and-organization/, accessed 2 June 2016.

[34] UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network, 'Indicators and a Monitoring Framework for the Sustainable Development Goals: Launching a data revolution for the SDGs' (12 June 2015) http://unsdsn.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/150612-FINAL-SDSN-Indicator-Report1.pdf, accessed 4 June 2016.

[35] UNICEF, 'CME Info - Child Mortality Estimates' (2014) http://www.childmortality.org/, accessed 1 June 2016.

[36] See [10].

[37] UNESCO, 'Technical report by the Bureau of the United Nations Statistical Commission (UNSC) on the process of the development of an indicator framework for the goals and targets of the post-2015 development agenda' (6 March 2015) http://www.uis.unesco.org/ScienceTechnology/Documents/unsc-post-2015-draft-indicators.pdf, accessed 3 June 2016.

[38] UN, 'The Road to Dignity by 2030: Ending Poverty, Transforming All Lives and Protecting the Planet ' (4 December 2014) http://www.un.org/disabilities/documents/reports/SG_Synthesis_Report_Road_to_Dignity_by_2030.pdf, accessed 7 June 2016.

[39] Ibid.

[40] UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network, 'Data for Development: An Action Plan to Finance the Data Revolution for Sustainable Development' (10 July 2015) http://unsdsn.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Data-For-Development-An-Action-Plan-July-2015.pdf, accessed 3 June 2016.

[41] See [34].

[42] UN Data Revolution Group, 'About the Independent Expert Advisory Group' (6 November 2014) http://www.undatarevolution.org/about-ieag/, accessed 4 June 2016.

[43] See [3].

[44] The Partnership has already been established, and it is developing a further framework.

[45] Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development), 'The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): About' (2016) http://www.oecd.org/about/, accessed 2 June 2016.

[46] Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 'Strengthening National Statistical Systems to Monitor Global Goals' (2015) http://www.oecd.org/dac/POST-2015%20P21.pdf, accessed 1 June 2016.

[47] Ibid.

[48] OECD Global Science Forum, 'New Data for Understanding the Human Condition: International Perspectives' (February 2013) http://www.oecd.org/sti/sci-tech/new-data-for-understanding-the-human-condition.pdf, accessed 2 June 2016.

[49] The Global Partnership On Sustainable Development Data, 'Who We Are: The Data Ecosystem and the Global Partnership' (2016) http://www.data4sdgs.org/who-we-are/, accessed 5 June 2016.

[50] World Economic Forum, 'Big Data, Big Impact: New Possibilities for International Development' (22 January 2012) http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_TC_MFS_BigDataBigImpact_Briefing_2012.pdf, accessed 8 June 2016.

[51] World Economic Forum, 'Our Mission: The World Economic Forum' (12 January 2016) https://www.weforum.org/about/world-economic-forum/, accessed 7 June 2016.

[52] See [50].

[53] Julia Lane, Homepage, http://www.julialane.org/.

[54] Julia Lane, 'Big Data for Public Policy: The Quadruple Helix' (2016) 8(1) Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, DOI:10.1002/pam.21921, accessed 1 June 2016.

[55] Data-Pop Alliance, 'Data-Pop Alliance: Our Mission' (May 2014) http://datapopalliance.org/, accessed 1 June 2016.

[56] See [10].

8. Author Profile

Meera Manoj is a law student at the Gujarat National Law University, Gandhinagar and has completed her first year. She is passionate about civil rights, feminism, economics in law and anything involving paneer. She aspires to travel the world and build up a vast library, with unparalleled sections on International Law and Archie comics.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/big-data-governance-frameworks-for-data-revolution-for-sustainable-development

UNHRC Resolution A/HRC/32/L20 (with amendments (in track))

Japreet Grewal — 2016-07-06T08:07:48Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/unhrc-resolution-a-hrc-32-l20-with-amendments-in-track

UNHRC Resolution on The Promotion, Protection and Enjoyment of Human Rights on the Internet (A/HRC/32/L.20)

Japreet Grewal — 2016-07-05T11:51:38Z

Here, CIS has incorporated amendments (A/HRC/32/L.85, A/HRC/32/L.86, A/HRC/32/L.87 and A/HRC/32/L.88) to the original resolution A/HRC/32/L.20.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/unhrc-resolution-on-the-promotion-protection-and-enjoyment-of-human-rights-on-the-internet-a-hrc-32-l-20

Policy Shaping in the Indian IT Industry: Comparative Analysis of Recommendations by NASSCOM and iSPIRT, 2013-2016

Pavishka Mittal — 2016-07-04T09:34:43Z

This is the second of a series of three blog posts, authored by Pavishka Mittal, tracking the engagements by NASSCOM and iSPIRT in suggesting and shaping the IT industry policies in India during 2006-2016. This post conducts a detailed comparative analysis of NASSCOM’s and iSPIRT’s specific policy recommendations from 2013-2016. To facilitate comparison, the blog post is written thematically on the lines of major issues highlighted by market players in the IT industry.

1. Introduction

2. Taxation Issues in the Software Industry

2.1. Issue of Double Taxation in the Software Industry

2.2. NASSCOM's Tax Concerns

2.3. iSPIRT's Tax Concerns

3. Concerns with Respect to the Regulatory Mechanism for E-Commerce (B2B Commerce)

4. Other Policy Recommendations

5. Endnotes

6. Author Profile

1. Introduction

Indian Software Product Industry Roundtable, or iSPIRT, is a think tank formed in early 2013 by about 30 product companies and individuals to protect the interests of the Indian software product industry. The organization believes that the market for software products is bound to grow in the future, both globally and locally, whose benefits should be derived of through cost efficiencies and resource optimization through the mechanism of free markets. This blog post, second in a series on ‘policy shaping in the Indian IT industry’, conducts a detailed comparative analysis of NASSCOM’s and iSPIRT’s specific policy recommendations from 2013-2016. The author has examined the more contentious issues due to difficulties in stating all the policy recommendations of these organizations over a period of four years in a single post. The law is explained, wherever necessary. Further, in the absence of reliable data on a particular policy position of either organization, no assumptions regarding the same have been made. To facilitate comparison, the blog post is written thematically on the lines of major issues highlighted by market players in the IT industry. Transfer pricing issues will be examined in the next blog post.

2. Taxation Issues in the Software Industry

2.1. Issue of Double Taxation in the Software Industry

There has been a general practice of the payment of both VAT and Service Tax on sale of software, which involve the provision of maintenance services etc along with the product. The applicable law on taxation has been explained below for a better understanding of the policy positions of the deemed organizations. Section 65B(44) of the Finance Act 2012, which defines ‘services’ includes ‘declared services’ under section 66E [1] and excludes ‘deemed sales’ under Article 366(29-A)(b) [2] of the Constitution involving a transfer of title in goods. A combined reading of all the provisions reveal that every transfer of goods on lease, license, hire under section 66E(f) does not result in the transfer of right to use goods under Article 366. It has been held that the transfer of right to use the goods under Article 366 involves a transfer of possession and effective control over the goods [3]. Thus, a license to use software which does not transfer ‘the right to use software’ would not qualify to be a sale/ deemed sale under law and would be governed by section 66E(f). Thus, from a general reading of the law, it can be concluded that the terms of the agreement involving transfer of pre-packaged or canned software under a license to use the software would have to be examined to decide the applicability of article 366 of the Constitution, that is, to decide whether the license to use packaged software involves the ‘transfer of right to use’ the deemed software.

The Madras HC in Infotech Software Dealer Association v. Union of India [4] held that licensing agreements involving the transfer of rights to use software to a licensee who is not permitted to sell, license or distribute the software by the licensor who retains copyright and hence ownership rights in the goods will not be sale or ‘deemed sale’ transactions as per article 366(29A)(d) of the Constitution as no transfer of software is made out from the transaction. The test of effective control as to the transfer of right to use the goods has been followed by the Madras HC. In the present case, it was held that software owner while retaining copyright protection entered into master end use licensing agreements which enabled the petitioner association to market the software to individual end users, thus, Article 366(29A)(d) was not attracted in the absence of transfer of software. Restraints/ conditions on the free enjoyment of the software in the licensing agreement indicate service tax liability. Any imposition of service tax on ‘goods’ would not be deemed to be unconstitutional without examination of the transaction. The source of confusion remains in the fact that notwithstanding software are goods, the transaction involving its transfer would have to be examined for taxation purposes. Manner of delivery is also of consonance in the determination of character of the transaction. It has been held that delivery of online content would only be a service in contrast to transfer of software through media, or embodied in the computer itself.

To summarise, jurisprudence and legislations have recognized packaged or canned software as tradable goods for the purposes of VAT/Sales Tax. “IT Software’ has also been recognized as goods under the Indian Central Excise Tariff Act. Further, Packaged or canned software is recognized as a ‘packaged commodity’ for the purposes of the Legal Metrology Act, 2009 on the basis of which the manufacture of such is generally subject to Central Excise valuation on an MRP/Retail Sales Price basis in accordance with s 4A of the Central Excise Act, 1944. This is in contradiction to the premise that software supplied digitally is a service. The argument remains that basic operational character, marketability and commercial value of software remains unchanged, whether it is supplied over the counter in a shop or supplied digitally.

2.2. NASSCOM's Tax Concerns

NASSCOM in its pre budget recommendations for the year 2013-2014 suggested that deviations from the existing provisions should be allowed for matters that warrant the adoption of an alternative approach for tax reform. Consultative groups such as the Tax Administration Reform Commission (TARC) should continue to operate. The IT Industry possesses certain specific tax concerns due to its unique business models which aim to overcome geographical distances. Software product companies are practically SME’s which struggle to maintain cash flow due to imposition of additional tax. All firms, including SMEs are forced to hire a specific employee for tax compliance alone. Further, they prefer to pay the deemed penalty rather than opt for litigation due to added costs, which is not sustainable in the long run.

The CBEC’s Guidance Notes dated 20th June, 2012 clarified many issues arising out of the new provisions in the Service Tax law introduced on 1st July 2012. As laid down by the SC in TCS v. State of AP [5], ‘sale’ of prepackaged/ canned/shrink wrapped software would not be a provision of service. NASSCOM’s earlier request for a clarification as to the taxation of onsite services was fulfilled with the guidance notes treating development of onsite software under the category of development of Information Technology Software as a declared service under section 66(e)(d) of the Finance Act.

NASSCOM suggested clarity in the deemed provisions which allow for dual taxation and ambiguity in the characterization of the transaction. VAT should be levied on the product alone and the service tax should only be payable on the additional services rendered, if any. New business models involve the provision of services along with the product which further increase the possibility of dual taxation. Provision of standard software, including license to use such software, whether electronically or on a media, should not be subject to dual levies, and in case VAT is applied, it would not be liable to Service tax. For software transactions which involve both a product and associated services, the services component should be subject to service tax alone, and the product value should be subject to VAT only. Given the stand taken by the Central Government on the treatment of software supplied electronically, it may be clarified that service tax is applicable on sale of software which is downloaded electronically and Central Sales Tax is not applicable on the same if the transaction is interstate transaction. Other recommendations included:

The Finance Act 2012 introduced certain retrospective amendments which are unfair to the industry involving TDS and associated penalties arising out of royalty implications. The introduction of payment of royalty on Internet downloads of software, services of maintenance, upgrade and telephone services has to be aligned with International standards.
The 10% TDS payable by SMEs and startups in the IT Industry is high due to the low profitability of such ventures and the cash flow crunch faced subsequent to such payment due to the need for investment prior to the start of operations in the product development industry. Often, the actual tax liability is lower than the TDS liability, which results in income tax refunds later while reducing liquidity in operations before. NASSCOM suggested reduction of TDS liability and adjusting pending refunds to future TDS liability. Further, banks should offer loans to software companies by treating the pending TDS refunds as book debts taken by the state. The ideal approach would be the complete exemption of the software industry from TDS u/s s 194J of the Income Tax Act.
Section 194J of the Income Tax Act prescribes that TDS @10% has to be deposited on payment made for the acquisition of software for amount greater than Rs 30,000 in a financial year. NASSCOM recommended that the prescribed limit for the computation of the TDS liability is not indicative of the pricing trends in the current business environment and thus the minimum threshold limits be increased to 3 lakh in a financial year. Further, the relevant criteria of setting these limits should be released in the public domain which would enable the industry to share data for the timely updation of the prescribed limits.
Clause 4 of the second explanation to Sec 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 states that Royalty would include consideration for the rendering of services which include the imparting of any information concerning technical, industrial, commercial or scientific knowledge, experience or skill. Royalty indicates consideration for ‘user rights’ rather than ownership rights. NASSCOM in 2014 stated that Software Ancillary Services such as AMC’s, Upgrade Fees, Subscriptions, etc. which do not involve transfer of rights, or grant of license but involve only payments of consideration for services is deemed to be “Royalty” for the purposes of the Income Tax Act and demanded that a clarification be issued under this regard.
Abatement of 15% is allowed from Retail Sale Price (RSP) to arrive at the value of Packaged Software or Canned Software, for payment of excise duty [6]. This notified abatement of 15% does not take into account the incidence of taxes on the product [7]. The taxes on the product amount to ~22% of the RSP and the notified abatement of 15% is not adequate. NASSCOM recommended that the abatement of 15% allowed under the said notification be increased to 30%. High Packaged/Canned software products are sold through a multilayer dealer/distribution chain through which they are delivered to the ultimate consumer. High trade discounts are incurred due to the presence of multiple intermediaries in the supply chain.
The IT Act in recognition of the compulsions and limitations of the SME and start-ups have notified several thresholds below which provisions are not applicable. Unfortunately, these are not revised and lose their relevance in the evolving business environment. NASSCOM requested for the institutionalization of a periodic review mechanism, which would ensure that the thresholds are revisited at predefined frequencies and altered accordingly.
Review of the foreign tax credit provisions are necessary in light of emerging Indian MNCs. The existing tax treaties need to be reevaluated to delete differential tax treatment discouraging domestic investment and contributing to the increased round tripping in the economy.
A separate regulatory approach with respect to Angel Investments needs to be formulated as they serve as the key source of funding for IT firms in the absence of access to public financial institutions.
NASSCOM has also highlighted multiple procedural issues in its prebudget recommendations for the year 2015-16 [8].
NASSCOM expressed its disappointment over the manner of implementation of the Fringe Benefit Tax bringing a lot of legitimate business expenditure on employee welfare in the tax net, resulting in non-investment in the long term benefit of workers by businesses [9].

2.3. iSPIRT's Tax Concerns

iSPIRT stated that the Indian government by adopting a piecemeal approach to the taxation system in the country has contributed to its increased fragmentation. The present tax structure cannot deal with the evolution of the digital economy in India which is increasingly using innovation in its business models.

All prepackaged software are considered to be goods due to an associated tariff code (ITS/HS Code). All other categories of software, are to be treated as services by default through a logic of exclusion, (other than customized software) by virtue of not being included in the tariff code list. There is no recognition of other models of SaaS, PaaS etc. The central government has not given adequate remedies to the issue of the charging of VAT by the State governments. Even when software is defined as a service, its transfer is often held to be deemed sale as per Article 366(29A) of the constitution. ‘SaaS’ software is taxed only under the service tax component when procured through a service partner, as against service tax plus VAT when procured directly. Differential taxation treatment of the same product/service creates immense frictions for ease of doing business for digital goods and services.

iSPIRT identifies the root cause for such confusion to be the non-recognition of intangibles to be at par with tangibles. Technically, by treating them to be ‘goods’ and subjecting them to the Sale of Goods Act, they cannot be treated as services by definition. However, the result of the piecemeal approach is the non recognition of software products as products (effectively), due to their intangible nature. This can be seen by the imposition of royalty from income derived from the sale of software under the Finance Act 2012, which indicates that the transaction of sale of software is considered to be one of transfer of copyright rather than a sale of product.

iSPIRT gave arguments as to the inefficiency of the proposed GST bill to deal with the taxation issues in the software industry, the bill not taking cognizance of the root cause of absent definition of a digital good which treats intangibles at par with tangibles. Practical challenges will arise due to differences in the value chain of use and consumption of ‘goods’ and ‘services’. The tax structuring is not done exclusively for the either software or the digital business. The tax authorities are prone to provide for differential rates under pressure of lobbying in the presence of new sectors in the industry which leads to amendments of rules and increased confusion. With the non-deletion of Clause (29A) of Article 366 in the proposed constitutional amendment, the concept of sales and deemed sales may be misused or may not give way to the concept of supply as envisaged in the GST Bill. Further, the CBEC is expected to use the existing frameworks even if the GST bill is proposed to be passed to the detriment of the software industry.

iSPIRT’s solution involved the transfer of focus to ‘digital’ products and services. It formulated the COG-TRIP test which can be used to define software products as distinct from software services [10]. Software products would be pervasive in the future and would be an essential component of the ‘digital economy’. Software is not necessarily a standalone computer program and may work with either data, audio or video products. Hence software products, sounds, images, data, documents or combinations of them may exist as a ‘digital product/goods’. This ‘digital economy’, would be overwhelmed with trade of not only ‘digital goods’ and ‘digital services’, but also the trade of ‘right to use’ or ‘transfer of right to use’ just as there is ‘deemed sales’ or ‘transfer of right to use’ of tangible goods. Due to inevitable inseparability of software and digital products, the taxation issues of Software product industry should be dealt in a unified ‘digital economy’ domain to prevent the formulation of a temporary, patchwork solution. Focusing on ‘digital’ will provide strategic solution to the problem at policy formulation level.

iSPIRT thus proposed a ‘digital goods’ and ‘digital services’ definition in the tax system [11]. These “digital goods,” or intangible goods have to be awarded the status of “goods” as defined in Article 366(12) of the Constitution. The digital goods, though intangible in nature, exhibit all properties of tangible goods generally acceptable in legal parlance viz. durability (perpetual or time bound), countability (number of pieces, licenses or users etc.), identifiability (standardised), movability and storage, ownership (IP or right to use), reproducibility, and marketability/tradability using an MRP as per the proposed COG TRIP test formulated by ISPIRT. This would be further related to the Sale of Goods Act 1930 and related article 366(29A) aspects. This would also be beneficial for the SaaS Industry which can now be defined under the product (digital goods) category as an industry. Once SaaS is recognized as Product (intangible goods) the next issue to be solved is asking for one single clear tax on a transaction be it “goods” or “services” based on the transaction. Other recommendations included the inapplicability of ‘royalty income’ under the garb of attached ‘copyrights’ in the Income Tax act to digital goods. This binding of ‘royalty income’ on software and ‘intangible/digital’ goods is a bottleneck to trade in a digital economy. Also, the tax system has to be digital in all aspects, i.e., ability to track transactions, levy of a clear single tax and digital collection—including taxes on international online transactions. it also recommended the commencement of taxation of online B2C sales by foreign companies.

iSPIRT expressed its disappointment in its post budget response over no attention being given to easing taxation norms of software companies where there is significant friction, the confusion on “goods” verses “service” tax on online downloads, TDS on sale of Software products and competition from foreign selling B2C products without any tax in India. Tax relaxation should be provided to startups on the basis of profitability rather than exemption in the initial 3 years of operations, when startups may not possess tax liability anyway. Loss making startups should not have to part with liquidity in the form of TDS payments which get refunded later. Relaxation in capital gains tax should not be just confined to investment in government schemes.

iSPIRT in its article dated November 24, 2014 [12] briefly explained the problem of duality of taxes on services. The constitutional framework regarding Indirect Taxes specifies that the manufacturing and services should be taxed by the centre and anything that is traded should be taxed by the states. Services are not tradable in nature in contrast to ‘rights to services’ which are tradable commodities. An example would be a vendor selling a recharge coupon. The actual service would be provided by the Telco, he is just selling the right to service. This would be tradable until the service is consumed. This transaction qualifies for both Service tax, imposed by the centre and the tax on tradable commodities imposed by states. ISPIRT had not yet proposed the digital goods and services definition to resolve these issues and its budget recommendations were similar to those of NASSCOM. It proposed that clarity is needed on the issue of tradability of service as “goods” and “service delivery” as “service”. Only after such clarity is achieved, the GST would be able to resolve the issues of duality of taxes.

Its article classified the taxation issues into direct and indirect.

Direct Tax Issues:

According to the Finance Act 2012, any income arising out of the sale of software amounts to royalty, irrespective of the medium of sale making the said transaction liable for TDS deduction under s 194J. All software sold carries a license for end use without transfer of copyright in the software. The software product and the associated license is sold as a tradable commodity and not as a copyright. International practice treats the sale of software depending on how the rights/copyrights are transferred. This rights based approach shall distinguish between the nature of rights transferred in exchange for consideration.
A transfer of “copyright” would indicate that the payer is permitted to commercially exploit the copyright that would otherwise be the sole privilege of the copyright holder and would constitute infringement of copyright without such transfer. The payer, now the copyright holder, is permitted to reproduce, copy, modify, adapt or prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted software for sale or profit. This transaction is subject to payment of royalty in contrast to a transaction which only involves the transfer of a “copyrighted article”. The payer in this case is only permitted to operate the software product for personal consumption or for use within his business operations. Such payment should be treated as business income and not as royalty.
iSPIRT proposed the repeal of the said amendment and introduction of provisions which differentiate between ‘copyright’ and ‘copyrighted articles’ for the purposes of determination of royalty impositions. Further, it proposed specific exclusion through the addition of an explanation to the deemed provision for income arising from the sale of ‘copyrighted articles’ including shrink wrap software, software licenses, downloadable software, software bundled with hardware. It also recommended that the term copyright be defined in the IT Act for royalty purposes to remove dependency on sections 14 and 52 of the Indian Copyright Act, with the exception of the applicability of the Indian Copyright Act in case of copyright infringement. If software product companies are being subject to a TDS there should be Tax credits available on service tax. It also stressed on the need for a mechanism to speed up the process of TDS refunds.

Indirect Tax Issues:

iSPIRT demanded the amendment of the Mega Notification No. 25/2012 dated June 6, 2012 to provide that electronic delivery of packaged software through telecommunication networks are excluded from the ambit of service tax. Alternatively, an explanation could be attached to s 66E of the Finance Act to provide that the development of software under subclause (d) is “only in relation to customized software and any packaged software delivered online or downloaded on the Internet is specifically excluded from the provisions of section 66E and should not be chargeable to service tax.” Additionally, the “Taxation of Services: an Educational Guide” dated June 20, 2012 issued by the Central Board of Excise and Customs needs to be amended along with the addition of an explanation to chapter 85 of schedule I of the Central Excise Tariff Act stating that packaged software delivered online or downloaded from the internet is also included in the meaning of ‘IT Software’ for the purposes of heading 8523.
iSPIRT made the same recommendation as NASSCOM as to the inadequate rate of abatement from RSP to arrive at the value of packaged/canned software, falling under the Central Excise Tariff Heading, 85239020 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985, for payment of excise duty under s 4A of the Central Excise Act, 1944. It recommended that serial No. 93A in Notification No. 49/2008 dated December 24, 2008 be amended to increase the abatement from the existing 15% to 35%.

3. Concerns with Respect to the Regulatory Mechanism for E-Commerce (B2B Commerce)

The existing FDI norms in India do not permit FDI in multi-brand retail companies. The new rules indicate that 100% FDI is permitted in online retail of goods and services under the ‘market place model’ through the automatic route, rendering legality to the many present e-commerce businesses in India. Since the business entity in focus is only an intermediary which provides the sellers of the goods with a platform for the sale of their products, online retail in the form of the inventory model remains illegal, excepting single brand retail [13]. The present FDI policy aims to convenience sellers who can take advantage of the services of e-commerce giants including, but not confined to, warehousing, logistics, order fulfillment, call centre and payment collection [14].

NASSCOM has suggested keeping the FDI norms for B2C Commerce at par with B2B Commerce. Further, the stipulations in the circular issued in 2015 by the DIPP which provided for the same conditions on SBRT applicable to brick and mortar stores be applicable to online stores which provided for 30% sourcing from local sources for retailers which had more than 51% FDI was opposed by NASSCOM, which reiterated that unviable regulations only restrict trade and development. It stated that e-commerce can be aligned to the objectives of national development by providing impetus to manufacturing sector, order consolidation and distribution, facilitating and supporting SMEs, improving outreach and access to buyers/sellers, bringing traceability and transparency in transactions, empowering consumers with information and data and finally creating new job opportunities. E-commerce has only enabled the creation of unique businesses which has created demand resulting in greater private consumption and market demand in inaccessible areas in consonance with the ruling governments ‘Make in India’ scheme. Further, a transparent audit trail and the resulting efficient tax collection can be better ensured through the medium of online banking and credit cards.

As companies have no control on consumer buying behaviour and will have no say in the choices made by them, there should be no mandate to conclude sale of products sourced from India. Instead, companies will continue to offer local products on their website, but linking it to buying behaviour would be unfair and difficult to comply with. Hence, the policy should stipulate that companies should offer 30% locally sourced products, without any criteria related to sourcing from SMEs.

The government should recognize and support the growth of e-commerce companies who are dedicated to Indian ethnic products, helping MSMEs and artisans to expand their outreach. Presently, the FDI in retail policy gives power to the states to decide. In the context of e-commerce, any geographical limitations will go against the basic tenet of outreach and market access that e-commerce promises. Further any restrictions imposed by states will serve to deprive it from the inherently efficient processes and infrastructure development opportunities, contributing to employment and revenue generation opportunities. Market development is an important priority for the Internet economy and is akin to infrastructure development in the physical world. NASSCOM has been actively engaging with the government to evolve a policy concerning Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in e-Commerce that encourages smaller technology players to foray into the market.

It recommended:

Allowing 100 per cent FDI in B2C e-Commerce, as in the case of B2B e-Commerce.
Removing the ‘minimum investment threshold’ and conditions of investment in the back-end since e-Commerce requires investment in technology and supply chain for promised efficiencies. Since there is no investment required in creating physical store fronts, there is no need for such a stipulation.
Allowing existing e-Commerce firms to raise capital, in addition to permitting investment in greenfield projects.
Removing geographical limitations that go against the basic tenet of outreach and market access that e-Commerce promises.

NASSCOM also suggested the following restrictions to exclude organisations that are:

Receiving orders on the telephone, facsimile or conventional email.
Are not complying with the rules on FDI in retail in toto.
Pure play e-Commerce ventures that are foraying into physical retail, but not complying by the rules on FDI in retail.

4. Other Policy Recommendations

iSPIRT stated that the complex procedures for share allotment etc should be revised to enable the software companies to concentrate on core business functions.
In May 2016, ISPIRT cautioned the use of patents in India, citing the overuse of patents in USA with corporations whose sole purpose of existence is to register patents and demand royalty payments from unsuspecting users. If India allows software patents under the Patent Cooperation Treaty, it would have to give priority to the existing patents filed in other countries and would enable MNCs to exclude Indian companies from using their ‘inventions’. To enable the Indian software industry to innovate without worrying about patent lawsuits, software patents should not be permitted. iSPIRT lauded the revised guidelines issued by the Indian Patents Office in 2016 which prevent the digital colonization of India by MNCs. order issued by the Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks dated February 19, 2016 finalising the guidelines for Examination of Computer Related Inventions lays down clear tests for recognizing patents.
India has to build a favourable business environment to retain the software products business and its intellectual property, which is highly mobile, within its domestic territory. Among the solutions are liberalized ownership rules with exemptions from regulatory filings and specific regimes (FDI/VCI/FII, etc.), specific exemptions from capital gains and dividend taxes for investors and tax exemption on foreign income of Indian software product companies. The idea of a fully liberalized virtual special economic zone for ownership and operation of software product companies, with India signing an iron-clad double-taxation avoidance agreement should not be rejected.
As was the case with Flipkart, larger buyers and clients withhold payment intentionally until suppliers are forced to grant unreasonable discounts. Large buyers are aware that suppliers would not act upon their rights to preserve business relationships and to avoid unnecessary time consuming and expensive litigation. According to iSPIRT, 98% of Indian SMBs extended goods and services on credit to their clients in 2015 leading to a situation wherein the most exclusive businesses can demand payments upfront. Giving the example of IMAI, which has proposed the establishment of a payment recovery mechanism for the digital communication service industry which would enforce meaningful out of court payment protections, iSPIRT has asked for solutions to the problem at hand in its article dated May 18 2016.
iSPIRT formulated a Stay-in-India checklist as a part of its Startups Bridge India campaign which identifies 34 key issues to be resolved to prevent startups from relocating abroad [15]. The Checklist includes requests for favourable IP tax regime, harmony in taxation of listed and unlisted securities, relaxed external commercial borrowing norms, faster incorporation and liquidation processes, and permitting convertible notes, indemnity escrows, and deferred consideration in foreign investment transactions.
NASSCOM applauded the National Intellectual Property Rights policy, approved by the cabinet on 13 May 2016 [16]for comprehensively covering all aspects of the domain including IPR awareness, generation, legislative framework, administration, commercialization, enforcement and adjudication, human capital and incorporating the suggestions of the associations on IPR policy made last year. According to the policy, the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) would become the nodal point department for all IPR related developments in India, while respective ministries or departments will be responsible for actual implementation. NASSCOM commented that this single umbrella approach will help leverage linkages between various IP offices. The proposal for a simple loan guarantee scheme to encourage start-ups based on IPRs as mortgage-able assets; financial support and securitization of IP rights for commercialization by enabling valuation of IP rights as intangible assets, the promotion of free and open source software and the support for IPR generation for information and communications technology , including those relating to cyber security for India are welcome. NASSCOM stated that it would partner with DIPP in the modernization efforts support an innovation led Industry in India.
NASSCOM in 2016 urged the SC to reconsider the ban on diesel taxis in the capital highlighting unresolved issues of the safety of the women workforce working in the IT industry and the lack of an adequate CNG infrastructure. Stating that the ban may cost the industry $1 billion, it suggested a deferred timeline for shifting diesel cabs to CNG or a phased implementation.

5. Endnotes

[1] The following activities are ‘declared services’ under section 66E of the Finance Act:

Section 66E (c) of the Finance Act, 1994 - Temporary transfer or permitting the use or enjoyment of an intellectual property right.
Section 66E(d) - Development, design, programming, customization, adaption, upgradation, enhancement, implementation of information technology software. (IT software has been defined in section 65B of the Act as “any representation of instructions, data, sound or image, including source code and object code, recorded in machine readable form, and capable of being manipulated or providing interactivity to a user, by means of a computer or an automatic data processing machine or any other device or equipment.)
Section 66E(f)- Transfer of goods by way of hiring, leasing, licensing or in any such manner without transfer of right to use such goods.

[2] Article 366(29-A) (b) of the Constitution states that a tax on the sale or purchase of goods includes a) a tax on the transfer of property in goods, b) a tax on the delivery of goods on hire purchase or any system of payment by installments, c) a tax on the transfer of the right to use any goods for any purpose, and d) a tax on the supply of goods. Such transfer, delivery or supply of any goods shall be deemed to be a sale of those goods by the person making the transfer, delivery or supply and a purchase of those goods by the person to whom such transfer, delivery or supply is made.

[3] State of A.P. v. Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. MANU/SC/0163/2002, BSNL v. UOI, MANU/SC/1091/2006: 2006 2 STR 161 S.C.

[4] The petitioner in the above case relied on TCS v State of Andhra Pradesh, (2005) 1 SCC 308 which held that software are goods, whether customized or non-customized, to argue that the Finance Act 2012 was unconstitutional to the extent that it imposed service tax on software. Since the states were imposing VAT on such transactions, the consequent levy of service tax by the Central government was unconstitutional. The dominant intention of the parties, as laid down in the BSNL case, would not have to be examined in such a situation. The Madras HC agreed with the contention that software is a ‘good’, as it is an article of value having regard to its utility and is capable of transmission, delivery, storage, possession and of being brought and sold and did not deviate from the position of law as laid down in the TCS case, its own earlier decision in the case of Infosys Technologies Vs. CTO (2008) TIOL 509 as well as the decision of the Karnataka High Court in Antrix Corporation Ltd. Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (2010) TIOL 515.

[5] On making and marketing copies of software, the transaction would be subject to sales tax despite the retention of the copyright with the originator of the programme. The sale is not just of the media, but of the Intellectual Property stored on the media. As it is impossible to separate the transaction, the sale of software would be governed by the Sale of Goods Act 1930, being a ‘good’ under law. Goods sold can be both tangible, intangible/incorporeal. The test is whether they are capable of abstraction, consumption, use, transfer, transmission, delivery, storage, possession etc, fulfilled in the case of software.

[6] This was notified in 2008, Serial No 93A of Notification No 49/2008-CE (NT) dated 24.12.2008, for valuation under Section 4A of the CEA, 1944.

[7] VAT/CST rates ranging from 5.5% to 6.6%; Octroi/Entry Tax of 5.5% in State of Maharashtra; excise duty from 10% ad valorem and Education Cess.

[8] See: http://www.nasscom.in/sites/default/files/policy_update/NASSCOM%20pre-budget%20recommendations%20-%20Procedural%20issues.pdf.

[9] See: http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2005-09-05/news/27476122_1_fbt-nasscom-kiran-karnik.

[10] Given below is the framework of COG-TRIP:

1. Countability - Number of licenses/users/subscribers
2. Ownership and intellectual property rights
3. Qualification as an intangible good
4. Tradability: The software products (goods) can be sold through different delivery modes
5. Right of service / Right of Use
6. Identifiability
7. Production/development cost: All software production costs are capitalized and subsequently reported at the lower of unamortized cost or net realizable value

[11] DIGITAL GOOD: The term 'digital good' means any software or other good that is delivered or transferred electronically, including sounds, images, data, facts, or combinations thereof, stored and maintained in digital format, where such good is the true object of the transaction, rather than the activity or service performed to create such good.

DIGITAL SERVICE: The term 'digital service' means any service that is provided electronically, including the provision of remote access to or use of a digital good.

For purpose of above definitions, the term:

'Digital Goods' means 'Goods' as defined in 366(12) of the Constitution,
'Digital service' means a 'service' and that which is not a 'Digital Good,'
'Delivered or transferred electronically' means the delivery or transfer by means other than tangible storage media,
'Provided electronically' means the provision remotely via electronic means,
'Software' is a representation of instructions, data, sound or image, including source code and object code, recorded in a machine readable form, and capable of being manipulated or providing interactivity to a user, by means of a computer or an automatic data processing machine or any other device or equipment, and
'Software Product” is a standardised set of such software bundled together as a single program or a Module that directs computer's processor to perform specific operations, exhibiting the properties of an intangible good that can be traded.

EXPLANATORY NOTE: In legal parlance, the 'goods' exhibit the following properties as established under the COG TRIP test: 1) Durability - perpetual or time bound, 2) Countability – traded commodity can be counted as number of pieces, number of licenses used, number of users etc., 3) Identifiability – identified as a standardised product, 4) Movability and storage – can be delivered and stored and accounted as an inventory, 5) Ownership of the right to use, 6) Produced/reproduced through a process, and 7) Marketable/tradable - can be marketed and sold using standard marked price (except when volume discounts, bid pricing and market promotion offers are applicable).

[12] See: http://pn.ispirt.in/tax-challenges-of-the-spisoftware-product-industry-and-budget-recommendations-made-by-ispirt/.

[13] The guidelines issued in November 2015 permitting a select 15 categories in Single Brand retail to sell their products online were further altered in March 2016 by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion to allow single brand retail by brick and mortar stores operating in India and Indian manufacturers. The impact of FDI policy on businesses can be understood with cases of alteration of business structure and distancing of e-commerce companies with their subsidiary sellers on allegations of violation of existing norms. The DIPP submitted to the Delhi HC that the ‘market place’ business models adopted by Amazon, Flipkart and Snapdeal etc were not recognized under law as they had resorted to direct sales to customers. Further, the legality of promotional funding would also be questioned on the ground that an intermediary cannot facilitate any scheme of discounts by bearing the difference in the price of the goods sold as to that extent, it is acting as the seller. This would not be in the interests of the consumers, who could earlier take advantage of the various discounts offered in the form of marketing cost reimbursement, bonus schemes etc. With such strong policies, the possibility of equality of prices between online and brick and mortar stores cannot be discarded.

[14] http://www.livemint.com/Politics/hglep85yZOQzChj6KRrrCK/Govt-allows-100-FDI-in-ecommerce-marketplace-model.html.

[15] See: http://pn.ispirt.in/sign-startup-bridge-petition-and-promote-stay-in-india-checklist/.

[16] See: http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2016-05-14/news/73083932_1_nasscom-software-industry-body-ip-rights.

6. Author Profile

Pavishka Mittal is a law student at West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences, Kolkata and has completed her second year. She takes contemporary dance very seriously and hopes to contribute to the dance community in India. Other than dancing, she indulges in binge-watching in her spare time.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/policy-shaping-in-the-indian-it-industry-recommendations-by-nasscom-and-ispirt-2013-2016

Data for Governance, Governance of Data, and Data Anxieties

sumandro — 2016-07-03T05:59:48Z

The Center for International Media Assistance (CIMA) organised a panel discussion on 'The Data Explosion – How the Internet of Things will Affect Media Freedom and Communication Systems?' at Deutsche Welle's Global Media Forum 2016, held in Bonn, Germany during June 13-15, 2016. Sumandro Chattapadhyay was invited as one of the panelists.

Introduction to the Panel

The emerging Internet of Things (IoT) will result in a vast network of Internet-connected devices that generate enormous volumes of data about human behavior and interactions. This data explosion will potentially reshape how media organizations both collect and report news, while at the same time fundamentally shifting how communications networks are organized worldwide. Yet currently most of the discussion about the IoT has focused on its spread in developed countries via the popularization of Internet-connected consumer devices.

In this panel we will discuss how the IoT may develop differently in the Global South and how it could present either a threat to open access to data and information, or an opportunity to improve media systems worldwide. We will also examine the impact of the data explosion in developing countries and what mechanisms need to be created in order to ensure the huge new mountain of data is used and governed responsibly.

The discussants were Carlos Affonso Souza (Director, Institute for Technology and Society of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil), Lorena Jaume-Palasi (Director for Communications, European Dialogue on Internet Governance, or EuroDIG, Switzerland), and Sumandro Chattapadhyay (Research Director, the Centre for Internet and Society, India); and the conversation was led by Mark Nelson (Senior Director, Center for International Media Assistance, or CIMA, USA).

Source: Deutsche Welle.

Audio Recording

Things/Writings I have Mentioned

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/data-for-governance-governance-of-data-and-data-anxieties

CIS Submission to TRAI Consultation on Free Data

pranesh — 2016-07-01T16:04:27Z

The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) held a consultation on Free Data, for which CIS sent in the following comments.

The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) asked for public comments on free data. Below are the comments that CIS submitted to the four questions that it posed.

Question 1
Is there a need to have TSP agnostic platform to provide free data or suitable reimbursement to users, without violating the principles of Differential Pricing for Data laid down in TRAI Regulation? Please suggest the most suitable model to achieve the objective.

Is There a Need for Free Data?

No, there is no need for free data, just as there is no need for telephony or Internet. However, making provisions for free data would increase the amount of innovation in the Internet and telecom sector, and there is a good probability that it would lead to faster adoption of the Internet, and thus be beneficial in terms of commerce, freedom of expression, freedom of association, and many other ways.

Thus the question that a telecom regulator should ask is not whether there is a need for TSP agnostic platforms, but whether such platforms are harmful for competition, for consumers, and for innovation. The telecom regulator ought not undertake regulation unless there is evidence to show that harm has been caused or that harm is likely to be caused. In short, TRAI should not follow the precautionary principle, since the telecom and Internet sectors are greatly divergent from environmental protection: the burden of proof for showing that something ought to be prohibited ought to be on those calling for prohibition.

Goal: Regulating Gatekeeping

TRAI wouldn’t need to regulate price discrimination or Net neutrality if ISPs were not “gatekeepers” for last-mile access. “Gatekeeping” occurs when a single entity establishes itself as an exclusive route to reach a large number of people and businesses or, in network terms, nodes. It is not possible for Internet services to reach their end customers without passing through ISPs (generally telecom networks). The situation is very different in the middle-mile and for backhaul. Even though anti-competitive terms may exist in the middle-mile, especially given the opacity of terms in “transit agreements”, a packet is usually able to travel through multiple routes if one route is too expensive (even if that is not the shortest network path, and is thus inefficient in a way). However, this multiplicity of routes is generally not possible in the last mile.¹ This leaves last mile telecom operators (ISPs) in a position to unfairly discriminate between different Internet services or destinations or applications, while harming consumer choice.

However, the aim of regulation by TRAI cannot be to prevent gatekeeping, since that is not possible as long as there are a limited number of ISPs. For instance, even by the very act of charging money for access to the Internet, ISPs are guilty of “gatekeeping” since they are controlling who can and cannot access an Internet service that way. Instead, the aim of regulation by TRAI should be to “regulate gatekeepers to ensure they do not use their gatekeeping power to unjustly discriminate between similarly situated persons, content or traffic”, as we proposed in our submission to TRAI (on OTTs) last year.

Models for Free Data

There are multiple models possible for free data, none of which TRAI should prohibit unless it would enable OTTs to abuse their gatekeeping powers.

Government Incentives For Non-Differentiated Free Data

The government may opt to require all ISPs to provide free Internet to all at a minimum QoS in exchange for exemption from paying part of their USO contributions, or the government may pay ISPs for such access using their USO contributions.

TRAI should recommend to DoT that it set up a committee to study the feasibility of this model.

ISP subsidies

ISP subsidies of Internet access only make economic sense for the ISP under the following ‘Goldilocks’ condition is met: the experience with the subsidised service is ‘good enough’ for the consumers to want to continue to use such services, but ‘bad enough’ for a large number of them to want to move to unsubsidised, paid access.

Providing free Internet to all at a low speed.
1. This naturally discriminates against services and applications such as video streaming, but does not technically bar access to them.
Providing free access to the Internet with other restrictions on quality that aren’t discriminatory with respect to content, services, or applications.

Rewards model

A TSP-agnostic rewards platform will only come within the scope of TRAI regulation if the platform has some form of agreement with the TSPs, even if it is collectively. If the rewards platform doesn’t have any agreement with any TSP, then TRAI does not have the power to regulate it. However, if the rewards platform has an agreement with any TSP, it is unclear whether it would be allowed under the Differential Data Tariff Regulation, since the clause 3(2) read with paragraph 30 of the Explanatory Memorandum might disallow such an agreement.

Assuming for the sake of argument that platforms with such agreements are not disallowed, such platforms can engage in either post-purchase credits or pre-purchase credits, or both. In other words, it could be a situation where a person has to purchase a data pack, engage in some activity relating to the platform (answer surveys, use particular apps, etc.) and thereupon get credit of some form transferred to one’s SIM, or it could be a situation where even without purchasing a data pack, a consumer can earn credits and thereupon use those credits towards data.

The former kind of rewards platform is not as useful when it comes to encouraging people to use the Internet, since only those who already see worth in using in the Internet (and can afford it) will purchase a data pack in the first place. The second form, on the other hand is quite useful, and could be encouraged. However, this second model is not as easily workable, economically, for fixed line connections, since there is a higher initial investment involved.

Recharge API

A recharge API could be fashioned in one of two ways: (1) via the operating system on the phone, allowing a TSP or third parties (whether OTTs or other intermediaries) to transfer credit to the SIM card on the phone which have been bought wholesale. Another model could be that of all TSPs providing a recharge API for the use of third parties. Only the second model is likely to result in a “toll-free” experience since in the first model, like in the case of a rewards platform that requires up-front purchase of data packs, there has to be a investment made first before that amount is recouped. This is likely to hamper the utility of such a model.

Further, in the first case, TRAI would probably not have the powers to regulate such transactions, as there would be no need for any involvement by the TSP. If anti-competitive agreements or abuse of dominant position seems to be taking place, it would be up to the Competition Commission of India to investigate.

However, the second model would have to be overseen by TRAI to ensure that the recharge APIs don’t impose additional costs on OTTs, or unduly harm competition and innovation. For instance, there ought to be an open specification for such an API, which all the TSPs should use in order to reduce the costs on OTTs. Further, there should be no exclusivity, and no preferential treatment provided for the TSPs sister concerns or partners.

“0.example” sites

Other forms of free data, for instance by TSPs choosing not to charge for low-bandwidth traffic should be allowed, as long as it is not discriminatory, nor does it impose increased barriers to entry for OTTs. For instance, if a website self-certifies that it is low-bandwidth and optimized for Internet-enabled feature phones and uses 0.example.tld to signal this (just as wap.* were used in for WAP sites and m.* are used for mobile-optimized versions of many sites), then there is no reason why TSPs should be prohibited from not charging for the data consumed by such websites, as long as the TSP does so uniformly without discrimination. In such cases, the TSP is not harming competition, harming consumers, nor abusing its gatekeeping powers.

OTT-agnostic free data

If a TSP decides not to charge for specific forms of traffic (for example, video, or for locally-peered traffic) regardless of the Internet service from which that traffic emanates, as as long as it does so with the end customer’s consent, then there is no question of the TSP harming competition, harming consumers, nor abusing its gatekeeping powers. There is no reason such schemes should be prohibited by TRAI unless they distort markets and harm innovation.

Unified marketplace

One other way to do what is proposed as the “recharge API” model is to create a highly-regulated market where the gatekeeping powers of the ISP are diminished, and the ISP’s ability to leverage its exclusive access over its customers are curtailed. A comparison may be drawn here to the rules that are often set by standard-setting bodies where patents are involved: given that these patents are essential inputs, access to them must be allowed through fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory licences. Access to the Internet and common carriers like telecom networks, being even more important (since alternatives exist to particular standards, but not to the Internet itself), must be placed at an even higher pedestal and thus even stricter regulation to ensure fair competition.

A marketplace of this sort would impose some regulatory burdens on TRAI and place burdens on innovations by the ISPs, but a regulated marketplace harms ISP innovation less than not allowing a market at all.

At a minimum, such a marketplace must ensure non-exclusivity, non-discrimination, and transparency. Thus, at a minimum, a telecom provider cannot discriminate between any OTTs who want similar access to zero-rating. Further, a telecom provider cannot prevent any OTT from zero-rating with any other telecom provider. To ensure that telecom providers are actually following this stipulation, transparency is needed, as a minimum.

Transparency can take one of two forms: transparency to the regulator alone and transparency to the public. Transparency to the regulator alone would enable OTTs and ISPs to keep the terms of their commercial transactions secret from their competitors, but enable the regulator, upon request, to ensure that this doesn’t lead to anti-competitive practices. This model would increase the burden on the regulator, but would be more palatable to OTTs and ISPs, and more comparable to the wholesale data market where the terms of such agreements are strictly-guarded commercial secrets. On the other hand, requiring transparency to the public would reduce the burden on the regulator, despite coming at a cost of secrecy of commercial terms, and is far more preferable.

Beyond transparency, a regulation could take the form of insisting on standard rates and terms for all OTT players, with differential usage tiers if need be, to ensure that access is truly non-discriminatory. This is how the market is structured on the retail side.

Since there are transaction costs in individually approaching each telecom provider for such zero-rating, the market would greatly benefit from a single marketplace where OTTs can come and enter into agreements with multiple telecom providers.

Even in this model, telecom networks will be charging based not only on the fact of the number of customers they have, but on the basis of them having exclusive routing to those customers. Further, even under the standard-rates based single-market model, a particular zero-rated site may be accessible for free from one network, but not across all networks: unlike the situation with a toll-free number in which no such distinction exists.

To resolve this, the regulator may propose that if an OTT wishes to engage in paid zero-rating, it will need to do so across all networks, since if it doesn’t there is risk of providing an unfair advantage to one network over another and increasing the gatekeeper effect rather than decreasing it.

Question 2

Whether such platforms need to be regulated by the TRAI or market be allowed to develop these platforms?

In many cases, TRAI would have no powers over such platforms, so the question of TRAI regulating does not arise. In all other cases, TRAI can allow the market to develop such platforms, and then see if any of them violates the Discriminatory Data Tariffs Regualation. For government-incentivised schemes that are proposed above, TRAI should take proactive measure in getting their feasibility evaluated.

Question 3

Whether free data or suitable reimbursement to users should be limited to mobile data users only or could it be extended through technical means to subscribers of fixed line broadband or leased line?

Spectrum is naturally a scarce resource, though technological advances (as dictated by Cooper’s Law) and more efficient management of spectrum make it less so. However, we have seen that fixed-line broadband has more or less stagnated for the past many years, while mobile access has increased. So the market distortionary power of fixed-line providers is far less than that of mobile providers. However, competition is far less in fixed-line Internet access services, while it is far higher in mobile Internet access. Switching costs in fixed-line Internet access services are also far higher than in mobile services. Given these differences, the regulation with regard to price discrimination might justifiably be different.

All in all, for this particular issue, it is unclear why different rules should apply to mobile users and fixed line users.

Question 4

Any other issue related to the matter of Consultation.

None.

In India’s mobile telecom sector, according to a Nielsen study, an estimated 15% of mobile users are multi-SIM users, meaning the “gatekeeping” effect is significantly reduced in both directions: Internet services can reach them via multiple ISPs, and conversely they can reach Internet services via multiple ISPs. See Nielsen, ‘Telecom Transitions: Tracking the Multi-SIM Phenomena in India’, http://www.nielsen.com/in/en/insights/reports/2015/telecom-transitions-tracking-the-multi-sim-phenomena-in-india.html↩

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-submission-trai-consultation-free-data

Public Consultation for the First Draft of 'Government Open Data Use License - India' Announced

sinha — 2016-06-30T09:41:07Z

The first public draft of the open data license to be used by Government of India was released by the Department of Legal Affairs earlier this week. Comments are invited from general public and stakeholders. These are to be submitted via the MyGov portal by July 25, 2016. CIS was a member of the committee constituted to develop the license concerned, and we contributed substantially to the drafting process.

Please read the call for comments here.

The PDF version of the draft license document can be accessed here.

Comments are to be submitted by July 25, 2016.

Government Open Data Use License - India

National Data Sharing and Accessibility Policy

Government of India

1. Preamble

Structured data available in open format and open license for public access and use, usually termed as “Open Data,” is of prime importance in the contemporary world. Data also is one of the most valuable resources of modern governance, sharing of which enables various and non-exclusive usages for both commercial and non-commercial purposes. Licenses, however, are crucial to ensure that such data is not misused or misinterpreted (for example, by insisting on proper attribution), and that all users have the same and permanent right to use the data.

The open government data initiative started in India with the notification of the National Data Sharing and Accessibility Policy (NDSAP), submitted to the Union Cabinet by the Department of Science and Technology, on 17th March 2012 [1]. The NDSAP identified the Department of Electronics & Information Technology (DeitY) as the nodal department for the implementation of the policy through National Informatics Centre, while the Department of Science and Technology continues to be the nodal department on policy matters. In pursuance of the Policy, the Open Government Data Platform India [2] was launched in 2012.

While, the appropriate open formats and related aspects for implementation of the Policy has been defined in the “NDSAP Implementation Guidelines” prepared by an inter- ministerial Task Force constituted by the National Informatics Centre [3], the open license for data sets published under NDSAP and through the OGD Platform remained unspecified till now.

2. Definitions

a. “Data” means a representation of Information, numerical compilations and observations, documents, facts, maps, images, charts, tables and figures, concepts in digital and/or analog form, and includes metadata [4], that is all information about data, and/or clarificatory notes provided by data provider(s), without which the data concerned cannot be interpreted or used [5].

b. “Information” means processed data [6].

c. “Data Provider(s)” means person(s) publishing and providing the data under this license.

d. “License” means this document.

e. “Licensor”means any data provider(s) that has the authority to offer the data concerned under the terms of this licence.

f. “User” means natural or legal persons, or body of persons corporate or incorporate, acquiring rights in the data (whether the data is obtained directly from the licensor or otherwise) under this licence.

g. “Use” includes lawful distribution, making copies, adaptation, and all modification and representation of the data, subject to the provisions of this License.

h. “Adapt” means to transform, build upon, or to make any use of the data by itsre-arrangement or alteration [7].

i. “Redistribute” means sharing of the data by the user, either in original or in adapted form (including a subset of the original data), accompanied by appropriate attribute statement, under the same or other suitable license.

j. “Attribution Statement” means a standard notice to be published by all users of data published under this license, that contains the details of the provider, source, and license of the data concerned [8].

k. “Personal Information” means any Information that relates to a natural person,which, either directly or indirectly, in combination with other Information available or likely to be available with a body corporate, is capable of identifying such person [9].

3. Permissible Use of Data

Subject to the conditions listed under section 7, the user may:

a. Access, use, adapt, and redistribute data published under this license for all lawful and non-exclusive purposes, without payment of any royalty or fee;

b. Apply this license worldwide, and in perpetuity;

c. Access, study, copy, share, adapt, publish, redistribute and transmit the data in any medium or format; and

d. Use, adapt, and redistribute the data, either in itself, or by combining it with other data, or by including it within a product/application/service, for all commercial and/or non-commercial purposes.

4. Terms and Conditions of Use of Data

a. Attribution: The user must acknowledge the provider, source, and license of data by explicitly publishing the attribution statement, including the DOI (Digital Object Identifier), or the URL (Uniform Resource Locator), or the URI (Uniform Resource Identifier) of the data concerned.

b. Attribution of Multiple Data: If the user is using multiple data together and/or listing of sources of multiple data is not possible, the user may provide a link to a separate page/list that includes the attribution statements and specific URL/URI of all data used.

c. Non-endorsement: The User must not indicate or suggest in any manner that the data provider(s) endorses their use and/or the user.

d. No Warranty: The data provider(s) are not liable for any errors or omissions, and will not under any circumstances be liable for any direct, indirect, special, incidental, consequential, or other loss, injury or damage caused by its use or otherwise arising in connection with this license or the data, even if specifically advised of the possibility of such loss, injury or damage. Under any circumstances, the user may not hold the data provider(s) responsible for: i) any error, omission or loss of data, and/or ii) any undesirable consequences due to the use of the data as part of an application/product/service (including violation of any prevalent law).

e. Permanent Disclosure and Versioning: The data provider(s) will ensure that a data package once published under this license will always remain publicly available for reference and use. If an already published data is updated by the provider, then the earlier appropriate version(s) must also be kept publicly available with accordance with the archival policy of the National Informatics Centre.

f. Continuity of Provision:The data provider(s) will strive for continuously updating the data concerned, as new data regarding the same becomes available. However, the data provider(s) do not guarantee the continued supply of updated or up-to-date versions of the data, and will not be held liable in case the continued supply of updated data is not provided.

5. Template for Attribution Statement

Unless the user is citing the data using an internationally accepted data citation format [10], an attribution notice in the following format must be explicitly included:

“Data has been published by [Name of Data Provider] and sourced from Open Government Data (OGD) Platform of India: [Name of Data]. ([date of Publication: dd/mm/yyyy]) .[DOI / URL / URI]. Published under Open Government Data License - India: [URL of Open Data License – India].”

For example, “Data has been published by Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation and sourced from Open Government Data (OGD) Platform of India: Overall Balance of Payments. (08/09/2015). https://data.gov.in/catalog/overall-balance-payments. Published under Open Government Data License - India: [URL of Open Data License - India].”

6. Exemptions

The license does not grant the right to access, use, adapt, and redistribute the following kinds of data:

a. Personal information;

b. Data that the data provider(s) is not authorised to licence;

c. Names, crests, logos and other official symbols of the data provider(s);

d. Data subject to other intellectual property rights, including patents, trade-marks and official marks;

e. Military insignia;

f. Identity documents; and

g. Any data publication of which may violate section 8 of the Right to Information Act, 2005 11.

7. Termination

a. Failure to comply with stipulated terms and conditions will cause the user’s rights under this license to end automatically.

b. Where the user’s rights to use data have terminated under the aforementioned clauses or any other Indian law, it reinstates:

i. automatically, as of the date the violation is cured, provided it is cured within 30 days of the discovery of the violation; or

ii. upon express reinstatement by the Licensor.

c. For avoidance of doubt, this section does not affect any rights the licensor may have to seek remedies for violation of this license.

8. Dispute Redressal Mechanism

This license is governed by Indian law, and the copyright of any data shared under this license vests with the licensor, under the Indian Copyright Act.

9. Endnotes

[1] Ministry of Science and Technology. 2012. National Data Sharing and Accessibility Policy (NDSAP) 2012. Gazette of India. March 17. http://data.gov.in/sites/default/files/NDSAP.pdf.

[2] See: https://data.gov.in/.

[3] See section 3.2 of the Implementation Guidelines for National Data Sharing and Accessibility Policy (NDSAP) Version 2.2. https://data.gov.in/sites/default/files/NDSAP_Implementation_Guidelines_2.2.pdf.

[4] See section 2.1 of NDSAP 2012.

[5] See section 2.6 of NDSAP 2012.

[6] See section 2.7 of NDSAP 2012.

[7] See section 2 (a) of Indian Copyright Act 1957. http://copyright.gov.in/Documents/CopyrightRules1957.pdf.

[8] The template of the attribution statement is given in section 5 of the license.

[9] See section 2 (i) of Information Technology (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data or Information) Rules, 2011. http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/GSR313E_10511%281%29.pdf.

[10]For example, those listed in the DOI Citation Formatter tool developed by DataCite, CrossRef and others: http://crosscite.org/citeproc/.

[11] See: http://rti.gov.in/webactrti.htm.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/public-consultation-for-the-first-draft-of-government-open-data-use-license-india-announced

Digital Humanities in India – Concluding Thoughts

sneha-pp — 2016-06-30T04:48:27Z

An extended survey of digital initiatives in arts and humanities practices in India was undertaken during the last year. Provocatively called 'mapping digital humanities in India', this enquiry began with the term 'digital humanities' itself, as a 'found' name for which one needs to excavate some meaning, context, and location in India at the present moment. Instead of importing this term to describe practices taking place in this country - especially when the term itself is relatively unstable and undefined even in the Anglo-American context - what I chose to do was to take a few steps back, and outline a few questions/conflicts that the digital practitioners in arts and humanities disciplines are grappling with. The final report of this study will be published serially. This is the final section.

Sections

01. Digital Humanities in India?

02. A Question of Digital Humanities

03. Reading from a Distance – Data as Text

04. The Infrastructure Turn in the Humanities

05. Living in the Archival Moment

06. New Modes and Sites of Humanities Practice

07. Digital Humanities in India – Concluding Thoughts

Concluding Thoughts

This exercise in mapping ‘digital humanities’ in India has brought to the fore several learnings and challenges, especially in trying to locate the domain of enquiry even as our understanding of what constitutes new objects, methods and forms of research and pedagogy constantly undergo change and redefinition. As some of the people interviewed in the course of this study remarked, DH, with its interdisciplinary approach and porous boundaries is like a moving target that becomes increasingly difficult to define as it is constantly evolving into something new, which then adds another dimension to what is already understood about the field. This is not to say that there is a consensus on what is DH, globally or in India, but just to emphasise that the object or domain of enquiry is not fixed, or demarcated clearly.

Even as I wrap up this study, some of the key questions or problems of definition, ontology and method remain with us, as the ‘field’ – if there is such a thing – is incipient in India, as with other parts of the world. What it does for us immediately is throw open several questions about how we understand the idea of the ‘digital’, and what may be new areas of enquiry for the humanities at large, post the advent of the digital. This study therefore is not interested in the question of whether there is a field called DH in India, but rather in what questions are raised by and for DH and DH-like projects by a range of practices and scholarship in the humanities post the digital.

We began with the understanding that DH is a new space of interdisciplinary research, scholarship and practice with several possibilities for thinking about the nature of the intersection of the humanities and technology. The term was a little more than a found term of sorts, in the context of this study, which since then has taken on various meanings and undergone some form of creative re-appropriation. The history of the term in the context of “humanities computing” in the Anglo-American context has helped in locating and defining the field globally within the ambit of certain kinds of practices and scholarship in the contemporary moment. In India, this has been relatively complex endeavour, given that DH, or engagements with humanities-after-digital and/or with digital-through-humanities come out of a different chequered history of humanities and technology. As most of the literature around DH even globally has pointed out, the problem with arriving at a definition is ontological, more than epistemological. The conditions of its emergence and existence are yet to be completely understood, although if one is to take into account the larger history of science and technology studies or the more recent cyber culture and digital culture studies, these ‘epistemic shifts’ have been in the making for some time now. In India particularly, where a clear picture of the ‘field’ as such is still to emerge in the form of a theorisation of its key concerns, it is only through a practice-mapping that one may locate what are at best certain discursive shifts in the way we understand content, structures and methods in the humanities, within the context of the digital. These changes may be visible across only a few domains – particularly in the multi-layered technological landscape in India, and lack a wider consensus in terms of whether they really constitute a larger epistemic shift or new direction of thought. The first couple of chapters in this report tried to lay out ways of understanding the current state of ‘digitality’ that India is in, and the lack of an indigenous framework to theorise or understand it better. The layered technological and media landscape that we inhabit today, where both the analogue and digital co-exist serving various purposes, and access and usage are still contentious points of debate, provides an interesting and dynamic context to understand what are new practices of humanities research and scholarship today.

The fundamental premise of the nature of the digital and its relation to the human subject still lacks adequate exploration which would be required to define the contours of the field. The inherited separation of humanities and technology further makes this a complex space to negotiate, when the term may now actually indicate the need to decode the rather tenuous relationship between the two supposedly separate domains. If one may locate the question even earlier, the separation of the natural and social sciences lies above this segregation of disciplines, and needs further exploration. There is a need therefore to understand the growth of a ‘technologised’ history of humanities to examine whether this almost forced coming together of two historically separated domains may in itself be something novel, or create new and qualitatively different kinds of practices for humanities. Even so, the disciplinary contexts of the usage of the term DH in India open up certain questions of ontology and method more broadly for humanities research and practice in the digital space. These include changes in the nature of cultural artifacts brought about by digitisation, in a landscape where the analogue and digital co-exist but also are in a state of transition from the first to the second. One example is the digitisation of objects like film posters, lobby cards and other paraphernalia around a film text, which although analogue objects, can now be layered onto a digital film object in online archivel like Indiancine.ma, thus also changing the object or opening it up for more questions. The digital object or image, is a new object of study that also demands a different kind of analysis. The change in the nature of the archival object and the challenges to archival practice are some of the related questions stemming from this context. As mentioned by Dr. Indira Chowdhury in the chapter on archival practice, oral history archives and the practice of creating and maintaining them is fraught with many challenges because of a change in the archival object itself. A digital audio file has its own protocols of storage, retrieval and use, given the problems of format and technological obsolescence. Further the classification of such files, its copies in different formats, and their preservation also demands changes in archival practice. This points to some of the larger challenges that have emerged for archival practice in India today, which include – storage and preservation of materials, cross-referencing and meta-data standards, conditions and structures of access, roles and forms of curation, re-usage of archival materials in research and pedagogy, and the constraints to digitization of archival materials, particularly in terms of rare materials and those in Indian languages. The challenge of working with materials in Indian languages (see section on Data as Text) are several, and will form one of the significant areas of work in DH.

The question of methodology comes in as the next most important aspect here, as the method of DH is yet to be clearly defined. The proliferation of new disciplines and conflict over methodology is not new, the Gulbenkian Commission report published in 1996 titled ‘Open the Social Sciences’ documents some of these and other concerns with the growth and segregation of disciplines, and the debates it generated both internally, seen in the rise of cultural studies, and in the natural sciences as complexity studies as well (Wallerstein et al 1996). At present DH seems to be a combination and creative appropriation of methodologies drawn from different disciplines and creative practices. The change in the methodology of the humanities and social sciences itself as no longer remaining discipline-specific has been a contributory factor to the evolving methodology of DH as well. This has raised several methodological questions, as outlined by some of the people interviewed in the study. The foremost is the challenge in rethinking the notion of the text as a digitally mediated object, and the blurring of boundaries between film, audio and print and archival materials as they are transformed into digital objects. The existing methods of reading these texts then are inadequate. An example is the Bichitra variorum at Jadavpur University, or online archives like Indiancine.ma or Pad.ma, where you need new tools to navigate the vast corpus of material on these platforms, and to work with them. The notion of text and textual analysis also demands some rethinking in the light of new terms such as ‘distant reading’ that have come up in the DH discourse. Bichitra and Pad.ma or Indiancine.ma would facilitate some form of such ‘distant reading’ as they involve a method of reading the print or film text using a large number of texts, something possible only with a computer, but also with other kinds of ancillary material, like marginalia, errata, posters, pamphlets and lobby cards of a film. This brings up not just new ways of contextualizing the digital object, but also asking questions of it in terms of its material aspects. Working with collaborative online archives, while creating a new analytical and creative space for work using different kinds of film and film-related material, also pose questions of authorship and privacy. The lack of better transcription tools and other methods to work with sound in the digital space, has posed significant methodological challenges in oral history work as well, as outlined in earlier sections of this report.

The use of computational methods for humanities research is one of the important shifts that forms part of the growth of DH in India, although there is very little work being done in this area in academic spaces except for a few institutions. The Tagore variorum and the online film archives Indiacine.ma and Pad.ma are two examples in this study that have done some work with computational tools and a large corpus of material. The collation guide in Bichitra, and the use of different tools and filters in the film archives like Pad.ma and Indiancine.ma have been able to add another dimension to the analysis of humanities texts, but whether they help ask any qualitatively new questions still remains open to debate. The other spaces studied as part of this report, such as work on digitisation and archives at the School of Cultural Texts, Centre for Public History, or SPARROW, or media art work at CAMP, have been more engaged with exploring what the digital turn has meant for certain humanities research. Some of the more recent courses offered in DH, such as the master’s programme at Srishti School of Art Design and Technology, and the certificate course at University of Pune, do engage with some form of building or ‘material making’, by offering workshops and some practical sessions, as well as topics like data mining, and textual computing. As such the skills and infrastructure needed to work with large data sets and new technologised processes of interpretation and visualisation still remain outside the ambit of the mainstream humanities. Through an exploration of allied fields such as media, archival practice, design and education technology, the study tries to locate how certain practices in these areas inform what we understand of DH today.

The archive, media and now to a certain extent art and design have become the sites for most of the discussions around DH in India, primarily because of the nature of institutions and people who have engaged with the question so far. Archival practice has seen a vast change with the onset of digitisation, and the growth of more public and collaborative archival spaces will also bring forth new questions and concepts around the nature of the archive and its imagination as a dynamic space of knowledge production. The Centre for Public History at the Srishti School focuses on some of these questions, by trying to build more collaborative, online and public archival spaces, and involving in the process a rather diverse group of practitioners and researchers. The objective is also to make not only archives, but history, and oral histories as a discipline more accessible, and dynamic. he notion of the archive as a metaphor, and the possibility of looking at the archive as a database are some new questions which would inform the growth of DH in India. The growth of an open, distributive and collaborative archive, such as Indiancine.ma and Pad.ma also asks questions about the changes in film as an archival object, in its transition to the digital space. The availability of the film text for study, and the layering of different kinds of ancillary material around the film, such as posters, advertisements, literature and errata, opens up possibilities of reading the film text differently. At a more abstract level, the nature of the text as an unstable object itself, now increasingly being mediated and negotiated in different ways through digital spaces, tools and methods would be one way of locating an object of enquiry in DH and tracing its connection to the humanities, which are essentially still seen as ‘text-based disciplines’.

What has been a definite shift is the emphasis on process which has become an important point of enquiry, and one of the many axes around which DH is constructed. The rethinking of existing processes of knowledge production, including traditional methods of teaching-learning, and the emergence of new tools and methods such as visualisation, data mapping, distant reading and design-thinking at a larger level would be some of the interesting prospects of enquiry in the field. Though there is little conversation in the above areas in DH in India (even among the institutions and people mentioned in this study), and some work in other fields like the natural sciences, media and communication, its seems to not be part of the larger discourse developing around DH yet. The collation tool developed for the Tagore variorum, or the editing and annotation tools used in Indiancine.ma and Pad.ma are some examples of the tools and methods presently used in what could be DH or DH-like work in India. The method of DH is however, necessarily collaborative and distributed at the same time, as evidenced by its practice in these various areas and disciplines. A lot of the work done on both these platforms has been through collaboration among people across diverse domains of expertise, in the arts and humanities and technological fields. As the description of the variorum suggests, it needed the expertise of people from Computer Science, Library and Information Sciences, English and Bengali departments to set up such a platform. The method of using or working with Indiancine.ma and Pad.ma is necessarily collaborative and distributed, because everything from the primary film material to the annotations and editing is in some way user-generated, as the archive itself is open to different groups of people ranging from the film enthusiast to the film studies scholar.

The complex and somewhere problematic history of science and technology in India and the growth of the IT sector also forms part of this context, and will inform the manner in which DH grows as a concept, area of enquiry or even as a discipline. DH is yet another manifestation of changes that we have seen in the existing objects, processes, spaces and figures of learning, particularly the open, collaborative and participatory nature of knowledge production and dissemination that has come about with the advent of internet and digital technologies. More importantly, they also point towards the larger changes in what were earlier considered unifying notions for the university, and the humanities as disciplines founded on the ideas of reason and culture. The idea proposed by Bill Readings that the university is no longer concerned with the production of a radical or liberal subject is also an important one, as it points to a further question of the nature of the subject produced, and who the process of knowledge production is to be aimed at (Readings 1997). If one may extend this argument to DH, the subject of this new discourse around the digital is also now rather unclear.

One could explore the notion of the 'digital humanist,' or in a more abstract manner the digital subject as one example of this lack of clarity, which is also why it has been of much concern for several scholars, DH and otherwise. As Prof. Amlan Dasgupta says, it is difficult to identify such a category of scholars, although a person who is able to situate his work in the digital space with the same kind of ease and confidence that people of a different generation could do in manuscripts and books would perhaps fit this description, and he is sure that such a person may be found. For example someone who knows Shakespeare well and can write a programme, and he is sure a day will come when this is a possibility. It is a familiarity in which the inherent distance between these two pursuits becomes lesser – DH is at that moment - a composite of these two approaches rather than the difference. While many scholars concur with this explanation, others find the term misleading – humanities scholars do not call themselves ‘humanists’. Also, by virtue of being a digital subject, anybody engaged with some form of digital practice is already a digital humanist of some sort. The problem also is in the rather unclear nature of the practice, all of which is not unanimously identified as DH, as a result of which not many scholars would want to identify with the term. This poses another question about the skills required of a humanities scholar in the near future, will she have to learn how to code etc. Additionally there is also a concern, as pointed out by some scholars, about the loss of criticality as a result of a relying on algorithms to work with a corpus of texts, among other things.

However, many of these alternate or liminal spaces have always existed; they are perhaps becoming more visible and acknowledged now. This is also indicative of the larger changes in the landscape of work in the humanities, whether creative, academic or pedagogic. With the advent of the internet and new digital technologies, the nature of cultural artifacts has also been altered significantly, thus demanding a new mode of enquiry and analysis, which often goes beyond interpretation and representation. How these digital objects are constituted, are they ever complete or finished, such as the text in the variorum or the film in the archive which continue to take on layer upon layer of annotation to generate a plethora of meanings, are related questions. They pose a challenge to the existing methods of the humanities, and along with the distributed, collaborative, and networked structures of practice and research that the internet has engendered, they have opened up several possibilities for the humanities. DH, with its emphasis on interdisciplinarity and different kinds of knowledge drawn from a diverse set of practices definitely opens up space for a new mode of questioning; whether all of these different modes of questioning can coalesce as a new discipline or interdisciplinary field in itself will remain to be seen.

More importantly, it also indicates the changes taking place in the university system in India, which is trying to address multiple anxieties at a larger political and the every-day administrative levels, reflected in problems with quality, equity and access to education (Misra and Singh 2015; Academics for Creative Reforms 2015). The digital turn has been one of the sources of concern, as it has pushed for the need to rethink the role of technology, particularly internet, in teaching and learning practices, both within and outside the classroom. The internet, and the different challenges posed by it in terms of methods, objects and contexts of learning, has contributed greatly to the emergence of some of the digital practices discussed in this study, which also take some of the questions they pose about knowledge production, pedagogy or scholarship, outside the ambit of the classroom or university space. The emergence of DH can be seen as a coming together of these anxieties in some manner, and perhaps indicative of a distinct ontological basis for such a discipline or area of study in India. This is not to conflate the discourse with the narrative of a ‘crisis’ in the university (something that exists in the Anglo-American context of DH) but rather to highlight the changes that it is undergoing, where the internet and digital technologies continue to play a crucial role. In the absence of a history or established traditions for the growth of disciplines like media studies, software/internet studies or digital cultural studies in India, apart from the work done by research programmes like the Sarai programme at CSDS, it is imperative to ask if the emergence of DH is then a push to trace such a history, to understand better its ontological and political stake, and more importantly to explore what the ‘digital’ means not just for the humanities, but for a larger processes of knowledge production today.

References

Academics for Creative Reforms ‘What Is To Be Done About Indian Universities? In Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 50, Issue No. 24, 13 Jun, 2015.

Misra, Rajesh and Supriya Singh ‘Continuum of Ignorance in Indian Universities’ in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 50, Issue No. 48, 28 Nov, 2015

Readings, Bill. The University in Ruins. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997

Wallerstein, Immanuel et al. Open the Social Sciences: Report of the Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences. California: Stanford University Press, 1996, http://www.binghamton.edu/fbc/archive/iwstanfo.htm.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/digital-humanities-in-india-concluding-thoughts

Jurisdictional Analysis

praskrishna — 2016-06-17T02:31:44Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/jurisdictional-analysis

Airtel Open Network

Harsh Gupta and Aditya Tejas — 2016-06-17T11:58:31Z

Today, Airtel launched its Open Network platform. The web page displays visualization data on network coverage and signal strength across the country, as well as a detailed breakdown of cell tower placement, including towers that are shutdown or still being planned.

Airtel also reportedly promises that its call centres and physical stores have been upgraded with tools based on the new interface to allow for easy reporting of network coverage issues.[1] Users can report issues or request new cell towers directly through the platform.

This is part of Airtel’s wider ‘Project Leap’, a Rs. 60,000 crore overhaul of the operator’s network, which claims to include a bevy of technological solutions aimed at improving service. Airtel claims that these include smaller cells, indoor solutions, Wi-Fi hotspots and upgraded base stations.

This is a praiseworthy move on Airtel’s part. No other major telecoms company has undertaken a similar initiative. There exist private alternatives such as OpenSignal[2][3] that provide cell coverage map, among others. However, these services make use of crowdsourced data collection from users to create their maps.

While the portal is very convenient, it is worth pointing out that the website itself contains no links to any open data -- merely the visualization of data. At the time of writing, there was no indication of any way to request access to raw data on network coverage. While OpenSignal and other alternatives provide APIs[4] or direct access to their database, we saw no similar services on the Open Network website. Without access to raw data the Open Network initiative isn’t really open, as citizens cannot make use of data in any way other than what is provided in the visualization. Raw network coverage data would be immensely valuable to public and private actors, researchers, and the general public alike.

Furthermore, while the portal indicates the quality of coverage in an area (including separate indicators for voice and data quality) it gives no indications as to how these categories were arrived at, or what a ‘Moderate’ level of data quality means empirically. It is also unclear how often the visualization is refreshed, or how old the data currently on display are.

In addition, the provisions for reporting issues through the platform seem to be lacking, and it is unclear how open Airtel will be with these. Expressing interest in hosting a cell tower takes you to an online form and a promise that ‘we will get in touch with you.’ By contrast, trying to report an issue takes you to a ‘network troubleshooting guide’ with some basic tech support information and a number to call an advisor.

The Open Network website promises that “the more open questions you ask, the more open answers we can give.” But the platform contains no fundamentally new or different mechanisms for reporting issues which take advantage of the crowdsourced ethos that Airtel lays claim to. While this is a very promising first step for the company, we hope that they continue to refine their website and display a meaningful commitment to the principles they have espoused here.Furthermore, while the portal indicates the quality of coverage in an area (including separate indicators for voice and data quality) it gives no indications as to how these categories were arrived at, or what a ‘Moderate’ level of data quality means empirically. It is also unclear how often the visualization is refreshed, or how old the data currently on display are. In addition, the provisions for reporting issues through the platform seem to be lacking, and it is unclear how open Airtel will be with these.

Expressing interest in hosting a cell tower takes you to an online form and a promise that ‘we will get in touch with you.’ By contrast, trying to report an issue takes you to a ‘network troubleshooting guide’ with some basic tech support information and a number to call an advisor.

http://gadgets.ndtv.com/telecom/news/airtels-open-network-launched-on-app-to-show-coverage-quality-across-india-849280

opensignal.com

https://radiocells.org/

http://developer.opensignal.com/networkrank/

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/telecom/blog/airtel-open-network

Centre for Internet and Society

RBI and Regulation of Digital Financial Services in India, 2012-2016

1. Introduction

2. Mobile Banking in India

2.1. Customer Enrolment Issues identified by the RBI

2.2. Technical Issues identified by the RBI

2.3. The Way Forward

3. Online Payments in India

3.1. Regulatory Response to Online Payment Instruments

3.2. Infrastructure for Online Payments between Private Parties

3.3. Infrastructure for Online Payments involving the Government

3.4. The Way Forward

4. Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Lending

5. Conclusion

6. Endnotes

7. Author Profile

Open source effort gives indigenous language an official typeface

India No Haven For Net Freedom But It Did Not Oppose UN Move on Internet Rights

FB & Google have already monopolised Indian cyberspace

US-India signed a cyber relationship framework earlier this month. Could you explain some of the takeouts that may have important implications in the near future?

What are some aspects of Intellectual Property Rights that should be looked at, in the context of the framework?

The PIL seeking a ban on WhatsApp was refused by the SC recently. Encrypted messaging services like Telegram however, have been used in the past by terror groups. What's your take on such end-to-end encryption services?

We don't have any proper encryption policy under the IT Act yet. What's taking so long and what are the key points that any policy in this matter must include in future?

Surveillance and the tech around it has been contentious for various governments. Where do we stand vis-a-vis regulating surveillance measures by the state?

With a sluggish US market, India has the biggest potential for companies like FB & Google, next only to China. Do you feel that in the quest to take over the Indian market, FB & Google are going to monopolise cyberspace in India?

Studying Internet in India (2016): Selected Abstracts

Abhimanyu Roy

Anita Gurumurthy, Nandini Chami, and Deepti Bharthur

Aishwarya Panicker

Deepak Prince

Maitrayee Mukerji

Muhammed Afzal P

Dr. Ravikant Kisana

Siddharth Rao and Kiran Kumar

Smarika Kumar

Sujeet George

Supratim Pal

Surfatial

Big Data Governance Frameworks for 'Data Revolution for Sustainable Development'

1. What are the Sustainable Development Goals?

Source: UN Data Revolution Group, A World that Counts, 2014, p.12.

2. The Need for a Data Revolution

Source: UN, Sustainable Development Goals.

3. Big Data: Characteristics and Use for Development

3.1. Characteristics of Big Data

3.2. Using Big Data for Development

4. Sustainable Development and Data Rights

5. Governance Frameworks Proposed

5.1. UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network

Schematic illustration with explanation of the indicators for national, regional, global, and thematic monitoring.Source: UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network, Indicators and a Monitoring Framework for the Sustainable Development Goals: Launching a Data Revolution for the SDGs, 2015, p.3.

5.2. The UN DATA Revolution Group

5.3. Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD)

5.4. The Global Partnership for Sustainable Development of Data

5.5. The World Economic Forum (WEF)

World Economic Forum - Diagram on Data Commons. Source: World Economic Forum, Big Data, Big Impact: New Possibilities for International Development, 2012, p.4.

World Economic Forum - Diagram on Global Coordination. Source: World Economic Forum, Big Data, Big Impact: New Possibilities for International Development, 2012, p.7.

5.6. Dr. Julia Lane - A Quadruple Data Helix

5.7. Data-Pop Alliance

6. Conclusion

7. Endnotes

8. Author Profile

UNHRC Resolution A/HRC/32/L20 (with amendments (in track))

UNHRC Resolution on The Promotion, Protection and Enjoyment of Human Rights on the Internet (A/HRC/32/L.20)

Policy Shaping in the Indian IT Industry: Comparative Analysis of Recommendations by NASSCOM and iSPIRT, 2013-2016

1. Introduction

2. Taxation Issues in the Software Industry

2.1. Issue of Double Taxation in the Software Industry

2.2. NASSCOM's Tax Concerns

2.3. iSPIRT's Tax Concerns

3. Concerns with Respect to the Regulatory Mechanism for E-Commerce (B2B Commerce)

4. Other Policy Recommendations

5. Endnotes

6. Author Profile

Data for Governance, Governance of Data, and Data Anxieties

Introduction to the Panel

Audio Recording

Things/Writings I have Mentioned

CIS Submission to TRAI Consultation on Free Data

Question 1 Is there a need to have TSP agnostic platform to provide free data or suitable reimbursement to users, without violating the principles of Differential Pricing for Data laid down in TRAI Regulation? Please suggest the most suitable model to achieve the objective.

Is There a Need for Free Data?

Schematic illustration with explanation of the indicators for national, regional, global, and thematic monitoring.
Source: UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network, Indicators and a Monitoring Framework for the Sustainable Development Goals: Launching a Data Revolution for the SDGs, 2015, p.3.

World Economic Forum - Diagram on Data Commons.
Source: World Economic Forum, Big Data, Big Impact: New Possibilities for International Development, 2012, p.4.

World Economic Forum - Diagram on Global Coordination.
Source: World Economic Forum, Big Data, Big Impact: New Possibilities for International Development, 2012, p.7.

Question 1
Is there a need to have TSP agnostic platform to provide free data or suitable reimbursement to users, without violating the principles of Differential Pricing for Data laid down in TRAI Regulation? Please suggest the most suitable model to achieve the objective.