Centre for Internet and Society

Call for Comments for Report on the Online Video Environment in India

pranesh — 2012-12-14T12:12:14Z

The Open Video Alliance, the Centre for Internet and Society and iCommons are pleased to announce a public call for comments on version 1 of "Online Video Environment in India: A Survey Report".

This report is an outcome of a research project that seeks to survey the online video environment in India and the opportunities this new medium presents for creative expression and civic engagement. This report by Siddharth Chadha, Ben Moskowitz, and Pranesh Prakash seeks to define key issues in the Indian context and begins to develop a short-term policy framework to address them.

The basic assumption of this paper is that the online video medium should support creative and technical innovation, competition, and public participation, and that open source technology can help develop these traits. These assumptions are not elaborated upon here. Instead, this report looks at questions of “openness” that are not strictly technological and legal; that are specific to video in India; and that provide points of entry to a simple policy framework.

Please do write in to Ben Moskowitz (ben at openvideoalliance.org) and Pranesh Prakash (pranesh at cis-india.org) with any suggestions, criticisms, or general comments that you have by January 20, 2011.

Download the paper.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/blog-old/comments-online-video-report

Breaking Down Section 66A of the IT Act

pranesh — 2012-12-14T09:51:17Z

Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, which prescribes 'punishment for sending offensive messages through communication service, etc.' is widely held by lawyers and legal academics to be unconstitutional. In this post Pranesh Prakash explores why that section is unconstitutional, how it came to be, the state of the law elsewhere, and how we can move forward.

Back in February 2009 (after the IT Amendment Act, 2008 was hurriedly passed on December 22, 2008 by the Lok Sabha, and a day after by the Rajya Sabha[1] but before it was notified on October 27, 2009) I had written that s.66A is "patently in violation of Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India":

Section 66A which punishes persons for sending offensive messages is overly broad, and is patently in violation of Art. 19(1)(a) of our Constitution. The fact that some information is "grossly offensive" (s.66A(a)) or that it causes "annoyance" or "inconvenience" while being known to be false (s.66A(c)) cannot be a reason for curbing the freedom of speech unless it is directly related to decency or morality, public order, or defamation (or any of the four other grounds listed in Art. 19(2)). It must be stated here that many argue that John Stuart Mill's harm principle provides a better framework for freedom of expression than Joel Feinberg's offence principle. The latter part of s.66A(c), which talks of deception, is sufficient to combat spam and phishing, and hence the first half, talking of annoyance or inconvenience is not required. Additionally, it would be beneficial if an explanation could be added to s.66A(c) to make clear what "origin" means in that section. Because depending on the construction of that word s.66A(c) can, for instance, unintentionally prevent organisations from using proxy servers, and may prevent a person from using a sender envelope different from the "from" address in an e-mail (a feature that many e-mail providers like Gmail implement to allow people to send mails from their work account while being logged in to their personal account). Furthermore, it may also prevent remailers, tunnelling, and other forms of ensuring anonymity online. This doesn't seem to be what is intended by the legislature, but the section might end up having that effect. This should hence be clarified.

I stand by that analysis. But given that it is quite sparse, in this post I will examine s.66A in detail.

Here's what s. 66A of the IT (Amendment) Act, 2008 states:

66A. Punishment for sending offensive messages through communication service, etc.,
Any person who sends, by means of a computer resource or a communication device,—
(a) any information that is grossly offensive or has menacing character;
(b) any information which he knows to be false, but for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred, or ill will, persistently by making use of such computer resource or a communication device,
(c) any electronic mail or electronic mail message for the purpose of causing annoyance or inconvenience or to deceive or to mislead the addressee or recipient about the origin of such messages

shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and with fine.

Explanation: For the purposes of this section, terms "electronic mail" and "electronic mail message" means a message or information created or transmitted or received on a computer, computer system, computer resource or communication device including attachments in text, images, audio, video and any other electronic record, which may be transmitted with the message.[2]

A large part of s.66A can be traced back to s.10(2) of the UK's Post Office (Amendment) Act, 1935:

If any person —
(a) sends any message by telephone which is grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene, or menacing character; or
(b) sends any message by telephone, or any telegram, which he knows to be false, for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, or needless anxiety to any other person; or
(c) persistently makes telephone calls without reasonable cause and for any such purposes as aforesaid;
he shall be liable upon summary conviction to a fine not exceeding ten pounds, or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month, or to both such fine and imprisonment.

Section 66A bears a striking resemblance to the three parts of this law from 1935, with clauses (b) and (c) being merged in the Indian law into a single clause (b) of s.66A, with a whole bunch of new "purposes" added. Interestingly, the Indian Post Office Act, 1898, was never amended to add this provision.

The differences between the two are worth exploring.

Term of Punishment

The first major difference is that the maximum term of imprisonment in the 1935 Act is only one month, compared to three years in s.66A of the IT Act. It seems the Indian government decided to subject the prison term to hyper-inflation to cover for the time. If this had happened for the punishment for, say, criminal defamation, then that would have a jail term of up to 72 years! The current equivalent laws in the UK are the Communications Act, 2003 (s. 127) and the Malicious Communications Act 1988 (s.1) for both of which the penalty is up to 6 months' imprisonment or to a maximum fine of £5000 or both. What's surprising is that in the Information Technology (Amendment) Bill of 2006, the penalty for section 66A was up to 2 years, and it was changed on December 16, 2008 through an amendment moved by Mr. A. Raja (the erstwhile Minister of Communications and IT) to 3 years. Given that parts of s.66A(c) resemble nuisance, it is instructive to note the term of punishment in the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for criminal nuisance: a fine of Rs. 200 with no prison term.

"Sending" vs. "Publishing"

J. Sai Deepak, a lawyer, has made an interesting point that the IT Act uses "send" as part of its wording, and not "publish". Given that, only messages specifically directed at another would be included. While this is an interesting proposition, it cannot be accepted because: (1) even blog posts are "sent", albeit to the blog servers — s.66A doesn't say who it has to be sent to; (2) in the UK the Communications Act 2003 uses similar language and that, unlike the Malicious Communication Act 1988 which says "sends to another person", has been applied to public posts to Twitter, etc.; (3) The explanation to s.66A(c) explicitly uses the word "transmitted", which is far broader than "send", and it would be difficult to reconcile them unless "send" can encompass sending to the publishing intermediary like Twitter.

Part of the narrowing down of s.66A should definitely focus on making it applicable only to directed communication (as is the case with telephones, and with the UK's Malicious Communication Act), and not be applicable to publishing.

Section 66A(c)

Section 66A(c) was also inserted through an amendment moved by Mr. Raja on December 16, 2008, which was passed by the Lok Sabha on December 22, 2008, and a day after by the Rajya Sabha. (The version introduced in Parliament in 2006 had only 66A(a) and (b).) This was done in response to the observation by the Standing Committee on Information Technology that there was no provision for spam. Hence it is clear that this is meant as an anti-spam provision. However, the careless phrasing makes it anything but an anti-spam provision. If instead of "for the purpose of causing annoyance or inconvenience or to deceive or to mislead the addressee or recipient about the origin of such messages" it was "for the purpose of causing annoyance and inconvenience and to deceive and to mislead the addressee or recipient about the origin of such messages", it would have been slightly closer to an anti-spam provision, but even then doesn't have the two core characteristics of spam: that it be unsolicited and that it be sent in bulk. (Whether only commercial messages should be regarded as spam is an open question.) That it arise from a duplicitous origin is not a requirement of spam (and in the UK, for instance, that is only an aggravating factor for what is already a fine-able activity).

Curiously, the definitional problems do not stop there, but extend to the definitions of "electronic mail" and "electronic mail message" in the 'explanation' as well. Those are so vast that more or less anything communicated electronically is counted as an e-mail, including forms of communication that aren't aimed at particular recipients the way e-mail is.

Hence, the anti-spam provision does not cover spam, but covers everything else. This provision is certainly unconstitutional.

Section 66A(b)

Section 66A(b) has three main elements: (1) that the communication be known to be false; (2) that it be for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will; (3) that it be communicated persistently. The main problem here is, of course, (2). "Annoyance" and "inconvenience", "insult", "ill will" and "hatred" are very different from "injury", "danger", and "criminal intimidation". That a lawmaker could feel that punishment for purposes this disparate belonged together in a single clause is quite astounding and without parallel (except in the rest of the IT Act). That's akin to having a single provision providing equal punishment for calling someone a moron ("insult") and threatening to kill someone ("criminal intimidation"). While persistent false communications for the purpose of annoying, insulting, inconveniencing, or causing ill will should not be criminalised (if need be, having it as a civil offence would more than suffice), doing so for the purpose of causing danger or criminal intimidation should. However, the question arises whether you need a separate provision in the IT Act for that. Criminal intimidation is already covered by ss. 503 and 506 of the IPC. Similarly, different kinds of causing danger are taken care of in ss.188, 268, 283, 285, 289, and other provisions. Similarly with the other "purposes" listed there, if, for instance, a provision is needed to penalise hoax bomb threats, then the provision clearly should not be mentioning words like "annoyance", and should not be made "persistent". (At any rate, s. 505(1) of the IPC suffices for hoax bomb threats, so you don't need a separate provision in the IT Act).

I would argue that in its current form this provision is unconstitutional, since there is no countervailing interest in criminalising false and persistent "insults", etc., that will allow those parts of this provision to survive the test of 'reasonableness' under Art.19(2). Furthermore, even bits that survive are largely redundant. While this unconstitutionality could be cured by better, narrower wording, even then one would need to ensure that there is no redundancy due to other provisions in other laws.

Section 66A(a)

In s.66A(a), the question immediately arises whether the information that is "grossly offensive" or "menacing" need to be addressed at someone specific and be seen as "grossly offensive" or "menacing" by that person, or be seen by a 'reasonable man' test.

Additionally, the term "grossly offensive" will have to be read in such a heightened manner as to not include merely causing offence. The one other place where this phrase is used in Indian law is in s.20(b) of the Indian Post Office Act (prohibiting the sending by post of materials of an indecent, obscene, seditious, scurrilous, threatening, or grossly offensive character). The big difference between s.20(b) of the IPO Act and s.66A of the IT Act is that the former is clearly restricted to one-to-one communication (the way the UK's Malicious Communication Act 1988 is). Reducing the scope of s.66A to direct communications would make it less prone to challenge.

Additionally, in order to ensure constitutionality, courts will have to ensure that "grossly offensive" does not simply end up meaning "offensive", and that the maximum punishment is not disproportionately high as it currently is. Even laws specifically aimed at online bullying, such as the UK's Protection from Harassment Act 1997, can have unintended effects. As George Monbiot notes, the "first three people to be prosecuted under [the Protection from Harassment Act] were all peaceful protesters".

Constitutional Arguments in Importing Laws from the UK

The plain fact is that the Indian Constitution is stronger on free speech grounds than the (unwritten) UK Constitution, and the judiciary has wide powers of judicial review of statutes (i.e., the ability of a court to strike down a law passed by Parliament as 'unconstitutional'). Judicial review of statutes does not exist in the UK (with review under its EU obligations being the exception) as they believe that Parliament is supreme, unlike India. Putting those two aspects together, a law that is valid in the UK might well be unconstitutional in India for failing to fall within the eight octagonal walls of the reasonable restrictions allowed under Art.19(2). That raises the question of how they deal with such broad wording in the UK.

Genealogy of UK Law on Sending 'Indecent', 'Menacing', 'Grossly Offensive' Messages

Quoting from the case of DPP v. Collins [2006] UKHL 40 [6]:

The genealogy of [s. 127(1) of the Communication Act] may be traced back to s.10(2)(a) of the Post Office (Amendment) Act, 1935, which made it an offence to send any message by telephone which is grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene or menacing character. That subsection was reproduced with no change save of punctuation in s.66(a) of the Post Office Act 1953. It was again reproduced in s.78 of the Post Office Act 1969, save that "by means of a public telecommunication service" was substituted for "by telephone" and "any message" was changed to "a message or other matter". Section 78 was elaborated but substantially repeated in s.49(1)(a) of the British Telecommunications Act 1981 and was re-enacted (save for the substitution of "system" for "service") in s.43(1)(a) of the Telecommunications Act 1984. Section 43(1)(a) was in the same terms as s.127(1)(a) of the 2003 Act, save that it referred to "a public telecommunication system" and not (as in s.127(1)(a)) to a "public electronic communications network". Sections 11(1)(b) of the Post Office Act 1953 and 85(3) of the Postal Services Act 2000 made it an offence to send certain proscribed articles by post.

While the above quotation talks about s.127(1) it is equally true about s.127(2) as well. In addition to that, in 1988, the Malicious Communications Act (s.1) was passed to prohibit one-to-one harassment along similar lines.

The UK's Post Office Act was eclipsed by the Telecommunications Act in 1984, which in turn was replaced in 2003 by the Communications Act. (By contrast, we still stick on to the colonial Indian Post Office Act, 1898.) Provisions from the 1935 Post Office Act were carried forward into the Telecommunications Act (s.43 on the "improper use of public telecommunication system"), and subsequently into s.127 of the Communications Act ("improper use of public electronic communications network"). Section 127 of the Communications Act states:

127. Improper use of public electronic communications network
(1) A person is guilty of an offence if he —
(a) sends by means of a public electronic communications network a message or other matter that is grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene or menacing character; or
(b) causes any such message or matter to be so sent.
(2) A person is guilty of an offence if, for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience or needless anxiety to another, he —
(a) sends by means of a public electronic communications network, a message that he knows to be false,
(b) causes such a message to be sent; or
(c) persistently makes use of a public electronic communications network.
(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable, on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, or to both.
(4) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to anything done in the course of providing a programme service (within the meaning of the Broadcasting Act 1990 (c. 42)).

Currently in the UK there are calls for repeal of s.127. In a separate blog post I will look at how the UK courts have 'read down' the provisions of s.127 and other similar laws in order to be compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights.

Comparison between S. 66A and Other Statutes

Section 144, IPC, 1860

Power to issue order in urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger

...obstruction, annoyance or injury to any person lawfully employed, or danger to human life, health or safety, or a disturbance of the public tranquillity

Babulal Parate v. State of Maharastra and Ors. [1961 AIR SC 884] (Magistrates order under s. 144 of the Cr. PC, 1973 was in violation of Art.19(1)(a) of the Constitution).

A special thanks is due to Snehashish Ghosh for compiling the below table.

Section	Term(s)/phrase(s) used in 66A	Term(s)/ phrase(s) used in similar sections
Section 66A (heading)	Punishment for sending offensive messages through communication service, etc	Section 127, CA, 2003, "Improper use of public electronic communications network"
Section 66A(a)	Any person who sends, by means of a computer resource or a communication device	Section 1(1), MCA 1988, "Any person who sends to another person..."
Section 66A(a)	Grossly offensive	Section 1(1)(a)(i), MCA 1988; Section 127(1)(a),CA, 2003; Section 10(2)(a), Post Office (Amendment) Act, 1935; Section 43(1)(a), Telecommunications Act 1984; Section 20, India Post Act 1898
Section 66A(a)	Menacing character	Section127(1)(a),CA, 2003
Section 66A(b)	Any information which he knows to be false	Section 1(1)(a)(iii), MCA 1988 "information which is false and known or believed to be false by the sender"; Section 127(2)(a), CA, 2003, "a message that he knows to be false"
Section 66A(b) “purpose of...”	Causing annoyance	Section127(2), CA, 2003
	Inconvenience	Section 127 (2), CA, 2003
	Danger
	Insult	Section 504, IPC, 1860
	Injury	Section 44 IPC, 1860, "The word 'injury' denotes any harm whatever illegally caused to any person, in body, mind, reputation or property."
	Criminal intimidation	Sections 503 and 505 (2), IPC, 1860
	Enmity, hatred or ill-will	Section 153A(1)(a), IPC, 1860
	Persistently by making use of such computer resource or a communication device	Section 127(2)(c), CA, 2003, "persistently makes use of a public electronic communications network."
Section 66A(c)	Deceive or to mislead	-

Notes
MCA 1988: Malicious Communications Act (s.1)
CA: Communications Act 2003 (s.127)
*Replaced by Communications Act 2003

[1]. The Information Technology (Amendment) Bill, 2008, was one amongst the eight bills that were passed in fifteen minutes on December 16, 2008.
[2]. Inserted vide Information Technology Amendment Act, 2008.

This was re-posted in Outlook (November 28, 2012)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/breaking-down-section-66-a-of-the-it-act

Ban on pornography temporary, says government

pranesh — 2015-09-13T08:46:24Z

The government has taken a dramatic U-turn from its stated position on internet pornography.

The article was published in Business Standard on August 4, 2015. Pranesh Prakash has been quoted.

A year after conveying to the Supreme Court that a blanket ban on internet pornography was not possible, through the department of electronics and information technology, it has asked internet providers to disable 857 websites that carry adult content. A senior official from the department of telecommunications (DoT) said the ban was a temporary measure, till the final order is announced by the apex court on August 10.

The government is looking at setting up an ombudsman to oversee cyber content, which will have representatives from NGOs, child activists and the government. The DoT official said, “There has to be some kind of regulatory oversight away from the government intervention… An ombudsman might be set up for overseeing cyber related content issues.”

The genesis of the current notification lies in the public interest litigation (PIL) filed by advocate Vijay Panjwani in April 2013. The PIL has sought curbs on these websites on the internet, especially the ones showing child pornography. The senior DoT official conveyed that the blocking of 857 websites was in compliance with the SC directive asking for measures to block porn sites, particularly those dealing with child pornography.

The July 31 notification from DoT has advised internet service licensees to disable content on 857 websites, as the content "hosted on these websites relates to morality and decency as given in Article 19(2) of the Constitution of India". The government had stated last year that it was not technologically feasible to monitor such contents as it would require physical intervention, which would impact data speeds.

In December 2014, the government had approached telecom providers and internet service providers to help identify such sites, but the service providers did not cooperate. Consequently, the government has gone ahead and identified 857 websites. However, the government has not given any detail as what was the criterion to identify such websites.

Pranesh Prakash, policy director at the Centre for Internet and Society, says DoT has used the provision of 79 (3) (b) of the IT Act, which is a convoluted Section that the intermediatory (ISPs) may lose protection from liability. This section is very convulated, the provisions for website blocking does not allow blocking porn. In section 69 (a), the entire procedure is that it allows an opportunity for the blocked website to be heard. “I can't comment on the reasons that the government for doing this. I know the order says the ban relates to morality, decency," adds Prakash.

Last year, the government took a position that said blocking these websites was not feasible, given that these sites are hosted outside India. In case of any ban, these sites can be relocated within hours to bypass it. Pavan Duggal, an advocate who specialises in cyber laws, has called the disablement 'cosmetic,' as it will not have the requisite deterrent effect. Duggal says: "This is a lost battle from the word go, as it is impossible to disable access permanently."

Watching such content in India is currently not an offence and, thus, the government is invoking “morality and decency” while seeking a curb on a fundamental right — Freedom of Speech & Expression. Under Article 19 (2) of the Constitution, the state can curb a fundamental right in order to maintain public order, decency or morality.

TO BAN OR NOT TO BAN

2013

Advocate Vijay Panjwani & Kamlesh Vaswani file PIL seeking curbs on internet pornography

Aug 2014

Supreme Court bench under Chief Justice R M Lodha agreed with the PIL and sought strict laws to curb online content

8 Jul 2015

Chief Justice of India H L Dattu upholds personal liberty and refuses to pass an interim order. Asks government to take a stand on the issue
CJI, heading a three-judge Bench, asks government to a detailed affidavit within four weeks

Jul 31

DoT sends notification seeking ban on 857 websites
Currently, there are no laws banning internet pornography in India, other than those related to children
Government’s stated position has been that it is difficult to curb online content

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/business-standard-august-4-2015-ban-on-pornography-temporary-says-government

Arguments Against the PUPFIP Bill

pranesh — 2011-09-12T11:03:09Z

The Protection and Utilisation of Public Funded Intellectual Property Bill (PUPFIP Bill) is a new legislation being considered by Parliament, which was introduced in the 2008 winter session of the Rajya Sabha. It is modelled on the American Bayh-Dole Act (University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act) of 1980. On this page, we explore some of the reasons that the bill is unnecessary, and how it will be harmful if passed.

Summary

How is the legislation unnecessary?

The Indian government does not have vast reserves of underutilized patents, as the U.S. did in 1980.
Technology transfer is very important, but pushing IPRs aggressively is not the best way of ensuring technology transfer.

How is the legislation harmful?

Excessive patenting lead to gridlocks and retards innovation.
The legislation makes mandatory that which is optional now, and is anyway being followed in many institutions.
Copyright, trademark, etc., seem to be covered under the definition of “public funded IP”.
It will result in a form of double taxation for research, and will increase the consumer cost of all products based on publicly-funded research.
It could have unintended consequences of varied kinds, including discouraging fundamental research as well as discouraging industrial research.
Non-disclosure requirements in the Bill restricts the dissemination of research within the academic community, and curtails freedom of speech.
Exclusive licensing enables restriction on the dissemination of academic research in the marketplace, and increase in cost of products based on public-funded research.

Arguments

How is the legislation unnecessary?

1) The Indian government does not have vast reserves of underutilized patents, as the U.S. did in 1980.

The idea behind the Bayh-Dole Act was that the research funded by the government (and owned, in the US, by the government) was being underutilized. In 1980, over 28,000 unlicensed patents lay with the U.S. government.[1] The Act shifted the title of such works from the government to the University or small business that conducted the research, thus allowing them to take out patents on the research outputs. In India, under present laws, the researcher(s) own the rights over their research whether they be government-funded or not. Usually, due to employment contracts, the research institutes already have the right to patent their inventions. Thus, currently, there is no need for an enabling legislation in this regard, as there was in the U.S.

In fact, currently, the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) has over 5173 patents (counting both those in force and those under dispute), while only 222 patents are licensed (with 68 of them being under dispute). Thus, even with the IP being in the institute's hands, there is a "problem" situation similar to that which necessitated Bayh-Dole in the U.S. Thus, quite contrary to the aims of the Act, further patenting will only lead to a situation of even more underutilized patents.

2) Technology transfer is very important, but pushing IPRs aggressively is not the best way of ensuring technology transfer.

At a recent seminar held at NUJS Kolkata on the PUPFIP Bill, it was revealed that while IIT-Kharagpur’s TTO-equivalent (called the Sponsored Research & Industrial Consultancy division - SRIC) currently handles over Rs.300 crores through 850 projects, only around Rs. 5-15 crores (exact figures weren't available) are currently made through its patent portfolio.[2] Thus patents don't seem, on the face of things, to be the best way of ensuring technology transfer. Indeed, the oft-cited 28,0000 unlicensed patents held by the U.S. government were composed primarily of patents for which industry had refused to take exclusive licences.[3]

Many contend that one of the most important functions of a patent is to get inventors to disclose their inventions rather than keep them as secrets. This reason for awarding a patent is invalidated if stronger protection is granted to trade secrets (no term limit, for instance) than for patents. Secondly, this reason for granting patents is not valid in case of government-funded research in academia and research institutes. The culture of publication and the economy of reputation are sufficient to ensure disclosure. Even without these intrinsic factors, there grant requirements can necessitate publication. If mere publication is believed to be insufficient, then the government would do well to ask for technology dissemination plans before grants are made. At any rate, monopoly rights in the form of patents are thoroughly unnecessary.

How is the legislation harmful?

1) Excessive patenting lead to gridlocks and retard innovation.

It sees protection of IPR as the sole means of encouraging innovation and driving research to the doorstep of consumers. The trend around the world is that of exploring alternative forms of spurring innovation. Even in India, CSIR has gone for an innovative "Open Source Drug Discovery" project, which has proven very successful so far. Furthermore, recent literature shows that excessive patenting is harming research and innovation by creating gridlocks.[4] If platform technologies and basic research (such as SNP) gets mired in patents, then the transaction costs increase (not only in terms of money, but more importantly in administrative terms). This ends up in research clearances getting blocked, and thus retards innovation. It must be remembered that intellectual property is not only an output, but also an input. The more aggressively the outputs are guarded and prevented from being shared, the more the inputs will be affected. The study of patent thickets and gridlocks has reached such a stage that the U.S. law has been changed to reflect this. Firstly, the Bayh-Dole Act was amended in 2000 to state that the objectives of the Bayh-Dole Act were to be carried out "without unduly encumbering future research and discovery". Now, the courts (in the Bilski case) have increased the standard of obviousness in patent law (which means that less patents will be granted). Furthermore, the U.S.P.T.O. and the U.S. Senate are currently considering means of overhauling the U.S. patent system, which many fear is close to breaking down due to over-patenting. All these are signs that the footsteps we are seeking to follow are themselves turning back.

2) The legislation makes mandatory that which is optional now, and is anyway being followed in many institutions.

While the CSIR labs pursue patents aggressively, they also run the OSSD project. The latter might not be permissible if the Act is passed as it stands. Furthermore, this would increase the number of underutilized patents, which is a problem faced currently by CSIR, which has had an aggressive patent policy since the 1990s. Unlicensed patents constitute around 93% of CSIR's total patent portfolio. (In contrast, MIT averages around 50% licensing of patents.) If aggressive patenting is made mandatory, it adds substantially to administrative costs of all institutes which receive any grants from the government. These institutes might not be large enough to merit a dedicated team of professionals to handle

3) Copyright, trademark, etc., seem to be covered under the definition of "public funded IP".

This leads to a ridiculous need to attempt to commercialise all government-funded research literature (and the government funds science research, social sciences, arts, etc.). Furthermore, while the definition of "public funded IP" includes copyrights, trademarks, etc., yet the substantive provisions seem to only include those forms of IP which have to be registered compulsorily (copyright and trademark don't -- copyright comes into existence when an original work is expressed in a medium, and trademark can come into existence by use). Importantly, seeking to commercialise all copyrighted works of research would hamper the movement for open access to scholarly literature. The inititative towards open access to scholarly literature is something that National Knowledge Commission has recommended, and is a move that would result in increased dissemination of public-funded research, which seems to be an aim of the PUPFIP Bill as well.

4) It will result in a form of double taxation for research, and will increase the consumer cost of all products based on publicly-funded research.

This bill would increase the consumer cost of all products based on publicly-funded research, because of the additional burden of patent royalties.

Public funds research -> Institute patents research -> Pharma MNC gets exclusive license over research -> Drug reaches market.

Assuming an exclusive licence: Cost of the drug = cost of manufacturing, storage, etc. + mark-up (monopolistic) cost + cost of licence.

Thus, in effect, the public has to pay twice for the research: it pays once to enable the scientist to conduct the research, and once again in the form of royalties to have that research brought to the marketplace.

5) It could have unintended consequences of varied kinds, including discouraging fundamental research as well as discouraging industrial research.

The former could happen since institutions and individual scientists have a financial incentive to shift their focus away from fundamental research; the latter, conversely, because the filings and bureaucracy involved could drive scientists away from reporting or even engaging in industrial research [pdf]. Faculty and researcher involvement in the business of licensing is a sub-optimal usage of their talents, and there are scientists who would rather stay away from business (as is shown by the intake of former industry-researchers into government-funded labs such as those of CSIR).

6) Non-disclosure requirements in the Bill restricts the dissemination of research within the academic community, and curtails freedom of speech.

This will bring about a shift in science and research which is always done upon others' work. This is why in the U.S., the National Institute of Health (N.I.H.) has sought to ensure (without any legal authority) that it only finances that research that on single nucleotide polymorphism (S.N.P.) which is not patented, and is shared freely amongst scholars. Since this requirement of the N.I.H.'s does not have any legal backing (since it is contradictory to the Bayh-Dole Act), institutions are free to get the grant from N.I.H. and then go ahead and patent their inventions.

7) Exclusive licensing enables restriction on the dissemination of academic research in the marketplace, and increase in cost of products based on public-funded research.

The bill allows for both assignment of licences as well as exclusive licences. Both of these enable monopolistic pricing to be undertaken by the licensee/assignee. There are not even any mechanisms in the Act to ensure, for instance, that a public call is made to ascertain that no parties are willing to consider a non-exclusive licence. Patents are generally said to grant a monopoly right because of the opportunity to recover costs of research and development. When the research is being done by public-funded money, there is no justification for monopoly rights on that research, since there are no excessive costs to recover.

Footnotes:

[1] See So et al. and Thursby and Thursby, quoted in the National Knowledge Commission's letter to the Prime Minister.

[2] See Prof. Vivekanandans' presentation "Patenting and Technology Transfer-the IIT Khargpur Experience"

[3] See Anthony So et al., Is Bayh-Dole Good for Developing Countries, 6 PLoS Biol e262 (2008)

[4] See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Science 698 (1998)

Additional Resources

On the PUPFIP Bill

February 5, 2004: NIPER holds parallel session of Indian Science Congress (Express Pharma)
October 27, 2006: Susan Finston, India to Propose New Technology Transfer Legislation (Bayh-Dole 25)
January 16, 2007: National Knowledge Commision's Letter to Indian Prime Minister (National Knowledge Commission)
April 15, 2007: Archita Bhatta, Proposed IPR law raises concern (Down to Earth)
May 31, 2007: Science & Technology needs to be core of the economic development says Kapil Sibal (PIB Press Release)
November 13, 2007: Government Accords Approval to National Biotechnology Development Strategy (PIB Press Release)
February 1, 2008: Yudhijit Bhattacharjee, Indian Government Hopes Bill Will Stimulate Innovation (Science)
February 19, 2008: Shamnad Basheer, Exporting Bayh Dole to India: Whither Transparency? (Part 1) (Part 2) (SpicyIP)
March 17, 2008: Kalpana Pathak, Varsities may soon own patent rights (Business Standard)
March 17, 2008: P.T. Jyothi Datta, Public-funded research may pay dividends for scientists (Business Line)
March 17, 2008: Joff Wild, India considers Bayh-Dole style legislation (IAM Magazine)
April 30, 2008: M.K. Unnikrishnan and Pradeepti Nayak, Lessons from Bayh Dole Act and its relevance to India (PharmaBiz)
July 2008: Sean M. O'Connor, Historical Context of U.S. Bayh-Dole Act: Implications for Indian Government Funded Research Patent Policy (STEM Newsletter)
July 7, 2008: Shamnad Basheer, Mysterious Indian "Bayh Dole" Bill: SpicyIP Procures a Copy (SpicyIP)
July 09, 2008: Latha Jishnu, Does India need a Bayh-Dole Act? (Business Standard)
September 2008: V.C. Vivekanandan, Transplanting Bayh-Dole Act- Issues at Stake Authors (13 Journal of Intell. Prop. 480)
September 18, 2008: Shamnad Basheer, Indian Patent Bill: Let's not be too hasty (SciDev.net)
October 28, 2008: Anthony So et al., Is Bayh-Dole Good for Developing Countries, 6 PLoS Biol e262 (2008)
October 31, 2008: Cabinet gives approval for Protection and Utilization of Public Funded Intellectual Property Bill, 2008 (PIB Press Release)
November 2008: Annette Lin et al., The Bayh-Dole Act and Promoting the Transfer of Technology of Publicly Funded-Research (UAEM White Paper on the Proposed Indian Bayh-Dole Analogue)
November 1, 2008: Editorial: Not in Public Interest (Mint)
November 12, 2008: Ben Butkus, As India Mulls Bill Modeled on Bayh-Dole, Critics Claim It May Stifle Innovation (Biotech Transfer Weekly)
December 16, 2008: Pranesh Prakash, Indian "Bayh Dole" Bill before Parliament (Commons Law)
January 23, 2009: Editorial: Time to Rethink Intellectual Property Laws (SciDev.net)
March 12, 2009: Feroz Ali Khader, Does Patenting Research Change the Culture of Science? (The Hindu)
April 24, 2009: Sunil Abraham & Pranesh Prakash, Does India Need Its Own Bayh-Dole? (Indian Express)
September 21, 2009: C.H. Unnikrishnan, Proposed Patent Bill Is Flawed, Say Experts (Mint)
September 23, 2009: Editorial: An Idea That's A Patent Misfit (Mint)
October 2009: Bhaven N. Sampat, The Bayh-Dole Model in Developing Countries: Reflections on the Indian Bill on Publicly Funded Intellectual Property (UNCTAD - ICTSD Policy Brief No. 5)
January 2010: Amit Shovon Ray & Sabyasachi Saha, Patenting Public-Funded Research for Technology Transfer: A Conceptual-Empirical Synthesis of US Evidence and Lessons for India (ICRIER Working Paper No. 244)
January 2010: Mrinalini Kochupillai, The Protection and Utilization of Public Funded Intellectual Property Bill, 2008: A Critique in the Light of India's Innovation Environment, 15 J. Intell. Prop. Rights 19 (2010)
January 16, 2010: Amit Shovon Ray & Sabyasachi Saha, Intellectual Bottlenecks (Financial Express)
January 21, 2010: Latha Jishnu, Perils of the US Model (Business Standard)
January 22, 2010: Rema Nagarajan, Scientists Fume Over New Patent Bill (Times of India)
January 26, 2010: Shamnad Basheer, The Problem with Patents (Mint)
February 5, 2010: Shalini Butani, Public Research May Become More Private (Business Line)
February 8, 2010: Anika Gupta, Scientists Want Changes in Innovation Bill (Mint)
February 9, 2010: C.H. Unnikrishnan, Parliament Panel Wants Govt Review on Innovation Bill (Mint)
February 15, 2010: Leena Menghaney, A Bad Example from the U.S. (Down to Earth)
February 19, 2010: Pranesh Prakash, A Patent Conundrum (Indian Express)
SpicyIP coverage by tag 'Bayh Dole'
Presentations from NUJS, Kolkata conference on the PUPFIP Bill

On Bayh-Dole

Newspapers and Magazines

Academic Journals

Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for University Innovation, 20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1031 (2005)
Anthony So et al., Is Bayh-Dole Good for Developing Countries, 6 PLoS Biol. e262 (2008)
Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 289 (2003)
David C. Mowery & Arvids A. Aiedonis, Numbers, Quality, and Entry: How Has the Bayh-Dole Act Affected U.S. University Patenting and Licensing?, 1 Innovation Pol'y Econ. 187 (2000)
David C. Mowery, et al., Learning to Patent: Institutional Experience, Learning, and the Characteristics of U.S. University Patents After the Bayh-Dole Act, 1981-1992, 48 Mgmt. Sci. 73 (2002)
Donald Kennedy, Editorial: Enclosing the Research Commons, 294 Science 2249 (2001)
F.M. Scherer, The Political Economy of Patent Policy Reform in the United States, 7 Colorado J. Telecomm. High Tech. L. 167 (2009)
Henry Steck, Corporatization of the University: Seeking Conceptual Clarity, 585 Annals of Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 66 (2003)
Jason Owen-Smith, Trends and Transitions in the Institutional Environment for Public and Private Science, 49 Higher Educ. 91 (2005)
Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, University Licensing and the Bayh-Dole Act, 301 Science 1052 (2003)
Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, Who is Selling the Ivory Tower? Sources of Growth in University Licensing, 48 Mgmt. Sci. 90 (2002)
Josh Lerner, Review of 'Ivory Tower', 43 J. Econ. Litt. 510 (2005)
Joshua B. Powers, R&D Funding Source and University Technology Transfer: What is Stimulating Universities to Be More Entrepreneurial?, 45 Research in Higher Educ. 1 (2004)
Lita Nelsen, The Rise of Intellectual Property Protection in the American University, 279 Science 1460 (1998)
Marcia Angell & Arnold S. Relman, Patents, Profits & American Medicine: Conflicts of Interest in the Testing & Marketing of New Drugs, 131 Daedalus 102 (2002)
Maria Jelenik, Review: Two Books on Technology Transfer, 50 Admin. Sci. Q. 131 (2005) (Review of 'Ivory Tower')
Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Science 698 (1998)
Rebecca Henderson, et al., Universities as a Source of Commercia Technology: A Detailed Analsis of University Patenting, 1965-1988, 80 Rev. Econ. Statistics 119 (1998)
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsorded Research, 82 Virginia L. Rev. 1663 (1996)
Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Richard R. Nelson, Public vs. Proprietary Science: A Fruitful Tension?, 131 Daedalus 89 (2002)
Richard Jensen & Marie Thursby, Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The Licensing of University Inventions, 91 Am. Econ. Rev. 240 (2001)
Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, Economic Theories about the Benefits and Costs of Patents, 32 J. Econ. Issues 1031 (1998)
Thomas A. Massaro, Innovation, Technology Transfer, and Patent Policy: The University Contribution, 82 Virginia L. Rev. 1729 (1996)
Walter W. Powell & Jason Owen-Smith, Universities and the Market for Intellectual Property in the Life Sciences, 17 J. Pol'y Analysis Mgmt. 253 (1998)
William M. Sage, Funding Fairness: Public Investment, Proprietary Rights and Access to Health Care Technology, 82 Virginia L. Rev. 1737 (1996)
Zach W. Hall & Christopher Scott, University-Industry Partnership, 291 Science 553 (2001)

Resources

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/publications/pupfip/why-no-pupfip

Arguments Against Software Patents in India

pranesh — 2012-03-13T10:43:12Z

CIS believes that software patents are harmful for the software industry and for consumers. In this post, Pranesh Prakash looks at the philosophical, legal and practical reasons for holding such a position in India. This is a slightly modified version of a presentation made by Pranesh Prakash at the iTechLaw conference in Bangalore on February 5, 2010, as part of a panel discussing software patents in India, the United States, and the European Union.

This blog post is based on a presentation made at the iTechLaw conference held on February 5, 2010. The audience consisted of lawyers from various corporations and corporate law firms. As is their wont, most lawyers when dealing with software patents get straight to an analysis of law governing the patenting of computer programmes in India and elsewhere, and seeing whether any loopholes exist and can be exploited to patent software. It was refreshing to see at least some lawyers actually going into questions of the need for patents to cover computer programs. In my presentation, I made a multi-pronged case against software patents: (1) philosophical justification against software patents based on the nature of software; (2) legal case against software patents; (3) practical reasons against software patents.

Preamble

Through these arguments, it is sought to be shown that patentability of software is not some arcane, technical question of law, but is a real issue that affect the continued production of new software and the everyday life of the coder/hacker/software programmer/engineer as well as consumers of software (which is, I may remind you, everywhere from your pacemaker to your phone). A preamble to the arguments would note that the main question to ask is: why should we allow for patenting of software? Answering this question will lead us to ask: who benefits from patenting of software. The conclusion that I come to is that patenting of software helps three categories of people: (1) those large software corporations that already have a large number of software patents; (2) those corporations that do not create software, but only trade in patents / sue on the basis of patents ("patent trolls"); (3) patent lawyers. How they don't help small and medium enterprises nor society at large (since they deter, rather than further invention) will be borne out by the rest of these arguments, especially the section on practical reasons against software patents.

What are Patents?

Patents are a twenty-year monopoly granted by the State on any invention. An invention has to have at least four characteristics: (0) patentable subject matter; (1) novelty (it has to be new); (2) inventive step / non-obviousness (even if new, it should not be obvious); (3) application to industry. A monopoly over that invention, thus means that if person X has invented something, then I may not use the core parts of that invention ("the essential claims") in my own invention. This prohibition applies even if I have come upon my invention without having known about X's invention. (Thus, independent creation is not a defence to patent infringement. This distinguishes it, for instance, from copyright law in which two people who created the same work independently of each other can both assert copyright.) Patents cover non-abstract ideas/functionality while copyright covers specific expressions of ideas. To clarify: imagine I make a drawing of a particular machine and describe the procedure of making it. Under patent law, no one else can make that particular machine, while under copyright law, no one can copy that drawing.

Philosophical Justification Against Software Patents

Even without going into the case against patents per se (lack of independent creation as a defence; lack of 'harm' as a criterion leading to internalization of all positive externalities; lack of effective disclosure and publication; etc.), which has been done much more ably by others like Bessen & Meurer (especially in their book Patent Failure) and Boldrin & Levine (in their book Against Intellectual Monopoly, the full text of which is available online).

But there is one essentially philosophical argument against software as subject matter of a patent. Software/computer programs ("instructions for a computer"), as any software engineer would tell you, are merely algorithms ("an effective method for solving a problem using a finite sequence of instructions") that are meant to be understood by a computer or a human who knows how to read that code.

Algorithms are not patentable subject matter, as they are mere expressions of abstract ideas, and not inventions in themselves. Computer programs, similarly, are abstract ideas. They only stop being abstract ideas when embodied in a machine or a process in which it is the machine/process that is the essential claim and not the software. That machine or process being patented would not grant protection to the software itself, but to the whole machine or process. Thus the abstract part of that machine/process (i.e., the computer program) could be used in any other machine/process, as it it is not the subject matter of the patent. Importantly, just because software is required to operate some machine would then not mean that the machine itself is not patentable, just that the software cannot be patented in guise of patenting a machine.

Legal Case Against Software Patents

In India, section 3(k) of the Patent Act reads:

(3) The following are not inventions within the meaning of this Act: (k) a mathematical or business method or computer programme (sic) per se or algorithms.

As one can see, computer programs are place in the same category as "mathematical methods", "algorithms", and "business methods", hence giving legal validity to the idea propounded in the previous section that computer programs are a kind of algorithms (just as algorithms are a kind of mathematical method).

Be that as it may, the best legal minds in India have had to work hard at understanding what exactly "computer programme per se" means. They have cited U.S. case law, U.K. case law, E.U. precedents, and sought to arrive at an understanding of how per se should be understood. While understanding what per se means might be a difficult job, it is much easier to see what it does not mean. For that, we can look at the 2004 Patent Ordinance that Parliament rejected in 2005. In that ordinance, sections 3(k) and (ka) read as follows:

(3) The following are not inventions within the meaning of this Act: (k) a computer programme per se other than its technical application to industry or a combination with hardware; (ka) a mathematical method or a business method or algorithms.

Thus, it is clear that the interpretation that "computer programme per se" excludes "a computer programme that has technical application to industry" and "a computer programme in combination with hardware" is wrong. By rejecting the 2004 Ordinance wording, Parliament has clearly shown that "technical application to industry" and "combination with hardware" do not make a computer programme patentable subject matter.

Indeed, what exactly is "technical application to industry"? "Technical" has various definitions, and a perusal through those definitions would show that barely any computer program can be said not to relate to a technique, not involve "specialized knowledge of applied arts and sciences" (it is code, after all; not everyone can write good algorithms), or not relate to "a practical subject that is organized according to scientific principles" or is "technological". Similarly, all software is, by definition, meant to be used in combination with hardware. Thus, it being used in combination with hardware must not, as argued above, give rise to patentability of otherwise unpatentable subject matter category.

In 2008, the Patent Office published a new 'Draft Manual Of Patent Practice And Procedure' in which it sought to allow patenting of certain method claims for software inventions (while earlier the Patent Office objected to method claims, allowing only device claims with hardware components). This Draft Manual was withdrawn from circulation, with Shri N.N. Prasad (then Joint Secretary of DIPP, the department administering the Patent Office) noting that the parts of the Manual on sections 3(d) and 3(k) had generated a lot of controversy, and were ultra vires the scope of the Manual (which could not override the Patent Act). He promised that those parts would be dropped and the Manual would be re-written. A revised draft of the Manual has not yet been released. Thus the interpretation provided in the Draft Manual (which was based heavily on the interpretation of the U.K. courts) cannot not be relied upon as a basis for arguments in favour of the patentability of software in India.

In October 2008, CIS helped organize a National Public Meeting on Software Patents in which Indian academics, industry, scientists, and FOSS enthusiasts all came to the conclusion that software patents are harmful for both the industry as well as consumers.

Practical Reasons Against Software Patents

This is going to be an attempt at distilling and simplifying some of the main practical arguments against patenting of software.

There are traditionally four incentives that the patent system caters to: (1) incentive to invent; (2) incentive to disclose; (3) incentive to commercialize; and (4) incentive to invent substitutes. Apart from the last, patenting of software does not really aid any of them.

Patent Landmines / Submarine Patents / Patent Gridlocks / No Exception for Independent Creation

Given that computer programs are algorithms, having monopolies over such abstract ideas is detrimental to innovation. Just the metaphors say a lot about software patents: landmines (they cannot be seen/predicted); submarines (they surface out of the blue); gridlocks (because there are so many software patents around the same area of computing, they prevent further innovation in that area, since no program can be written without violating one patent or the other).

Imagine the madness that would have ensued had patents been granted when computer programming was in its infancy. Imagine different methods of sorting (quick sort, bubble sort) that are part of Computer Science 101 had been patented. While those particular instances aren't, similar algorithms, such as data compression algorithms (including the infamous LZW compression method), have been granted patents. Most importantly, even if one codes certain functionality into software independently of the patent holder, that is still violative of the patent. Computer programs being granted patents makes it extremely difficult to create other computer programs that are based on the same abstract ideas. Thus incentives # (1) and (3) are not fulfilled, and indeed, they are harmed. There is no incentive to invent, as one would always be violating one patent or the other. Given that, there is no incentive to commercialize what one has invented, because of fear of patent infringement suits.

An apt illustration of this is the current difficulty of choosing a royalty-free video format for HTML 5, as it shows, in practical terms, how difficult it is to create a video format without violating one patent or the other. While the PNG image format was created to side-step the patent over the LZW compression method used in the GIF image format, bringing Ogg Theora or Dirac (both patent-free video format) to surpass the levels of H.264/MPEG-4 AVC or VC-1 will be very difficult without infringing dozens if not hundreds of software patents. Chris DiBona of Google, while talking about improving Ogg Theora as part of its inclusion in HTML 5 specifications said, "Here’s the challenge: Can Theora move forward without infringing on the other video compression patents?" Just the number of companies and organization that hold patents over H.264 is astounding, and includes: Columbia University, Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute of Korea (ETRI), France Télécom, Fujitsu, LG Electronics, Matsushita, Mitsubishi, Microsoft, Motorola, Nokia, Philips, Robert Bosch GmbH, Samsung, Sharp, Sony, Toshiba, and Victor Company of Japan (JVC). As is the amount of royalties to be paid ("[t]he maximum royalty for these rights payable by an Enterprise (company and greater than 50% owned subsidiaries) is $3.5 million per year in 2005-2006, $4.25 million per year in 2007-08 and $5 million per year in 2009-10"; with royalty per unit of a decoder-encoder costing upto USD 0.20.)

Indeed, even the most diligent companies cannot guard themselves against software patents. FFII estimates that a very simple online shopping website would violate twenty different patents at the very least. Microsoft recently lost a case against i4i when i4i surfaced with a patent covering custom XML as implemented in MS Office 2003 and MS Office 2007. As a result Microsoft had to ship patches to its millions of customers, to disable the functionality and bypass that patent. The manufacturers of BlackBerry, the Canadian company Research in Motion, had to shell out USD 617 million as settlement to NTP over wireless push e-mail, as it was otherwise faced with the possibility of the court shutting down the BlackBerry service in the U.S. This happened despite there being a well-known method of doing so pre-dating the NTP patents. NTP has also filed cases against AT&T, Sprint Nextel, T-Mobile, Verizon Wireless, and Palm Inc. Microsoft was also hit by Visto Corporation over those same NTP patents, which had been licensed to Visto (a startup).
- Don't These Cases Show How Software Patents Help Small Companies?
  
  The astute reader might be tempted to ask: are not all of these examples of small companies getting their dues from larger companies? Doesn't all of this show that software patents actually help small and medium enterprises (SMEs)? The answer to that is: no. To see why, we need to note the common thread binding i4i, NTP, and Visto. None of them were, at the time of their lawsuits, actually creating new software, and NTP was an out-and-out "non-practising entity"/"patent holding company" AKA, patent troll. i4i was in the process of closing shop, and Visto had just started up. None of these were actually practising the patent. None of these were producing any other software. Thus, none of these companies had anything to lose by going after big companies. In other words, the likes of Microsoft, RIM, Verizon, AT&T, etc., could not file counter-suits of patent infringement, which is normally what happens when SMEs try to assert patent rights against larger corporations. For every patent that the large corporation violates of the smaller corporation, the smaler corporation would be violating at least ten of the larger corporation's. Software patents are more helpful for software companies as a tool for cross-licensing rather than as a way of earning royalties. Even this does not work as a strategy against patent trolls.
Thus, the assertion that was made at the beginning is borne out: software patents help only patent trolls, large corporations that already have large software patent portfolios, and the lawyers who draft these patents and later argue them out in court.
Term of Patents

Twenty years of monopoly rights is outright ludicrous in an industry where the rate of turnover of technology is much faster -- anywhere between two years and five months.
Software Industry Progressed Greatly Without Patents

In India, software patents have never been asserted in courts (even though many have been illegally granted), yet the software industry in India is growing in leaps and bounds. Similarly, most of the big (American) giants of the software industry today grew to their stature by using copyright to "protect" their software, and not patents.
Copyright Exists for Software

As noted above, the code/expression of any software is internationally protected by copyright law. There is no reason to protect the ideas/functionality of that software as well.
Insufficient Disclosure

When ordinary computer programmers cannot understand what a particular software patent covers (which is the overwhelming case), then the patent is of no use. One of the main incentives of the patent system is to encourage gifted inventors to share their genius with the world. It is not about gifted inventors paying equally gifted lawyers to obfuscate their inventions into gobbledygook so that other gifted inventors can at best hazard a guess as to precisely what is and is not covered by that patent. Thus, this incentive (#2) is not fulfilled by the current system of patents either -- not unless there is a major overhaul of the system. This ties in with the impossibility of ensuring that one is not violating a software patent. If a reasonably smart software developer (who are often working as individuals, and as part of SMEs) cannot quickly ascertain whether one is violating patents, then there is a huge disincentive against developing software in that area at all.
Software Patents Work Against Free/Libre/Open Source Software

Software patents hinder the development of software and FOSS licences, as the licensee is not allowed to restrict the rights of the sub-licensees over and above the restrictions that the licensee has to observe. Thus, all patent clearances obtained by the licensee must be passed on to the sub-licensees. Thus, patented software, though most countries around the world do not recognize them, are generally not included in the default builds of many FOSS operating systems. This inhabits the general adoption of FOSS, since many of the software patents, even though not enforceable in India, are paid heed to by the software that Indians download, and the MP3 and DivX formats are not enabled by default in standard installations of a Linux OS such as Ubuntu.

Conclusion

Currently, the U.S. patent system is being reviewed at the administrative level, the legislative level, as well as the judicial level. At the judicial level, the question of business method patents (and, by extension, software patents) is before the Supreme Court of the United States of America in the form of Bilski v. Kappos. Judge Mayer of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC, which heard In re Bilksi) noted that "the patent system has run amok". The Free Software Foundation submitted a most extensive amicus curiae brief to the U.S. Supreme Court, filled with brilliant analysis of software patents and arguments against the patentability of software that is well worth a read.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/arguments-against-software-patents

Arbitrary Arrests for Comment on Bal Thackeray's Death

pranesh — 2013-01-02T03:42:37Z

Two girls have been arbitrarily and unlawfully arrested for making comments about the late Shiv Sena supremo Bal Thackeray's death. Pranesh Prakash explores the legal angles to the arrests.

Facts of the case

This morning, there was a short report in the Mumbai Mirror about two girls having been arrested for comments one of them made, and the other 'liked', on Facebook about Bal Thackeray:

Police on Sunday arrested a 21-year-old girl for questioning the total shutdown in the city for Bal Thackeray’s funeral on her Facebook account. Another girl who ‘liked’ the comment was also arrested.

The duo were booked under Section 295 (a) of the IPC (for hurting religious sentiments) and Section 64 (a) of the Information Technology Act, 2000. Though the girl withdrew her comment and apologised, a mob of some 2,000 Shiv Sena workers attacked and ransacked her uncle’s orthopaedic clinic at Palghar.

“Her comment said people like Thackeray are born and die daily and one should not observe a bandh for that,” said PI Uttam Sonawane.

What provisions of law were used?

There's a small mistake in Mumbai Mirror's reportage as there is no section "64(a)"¹ in the Information Technology (IT) Act, nor a section "295(a)" in the Indian Penal Code (IPC). They must have meant section 295A of the IPC ("outraging religious feelings of any class") and section 66A of the IT Act ("sending offensive messages through communication service, etc."). (Update: The Wall Street Journal's Shreya Shah has confirmed that the second provision was section 66A of the IT Act.)

Section 295A of the IPC is cognizable and non-bailable, and hence the police have the powers to arrest a person accused of this without a warrant.² Section 66A of the IT Act is cognizable and bailable.

Update: Some news sources claim that section 505(2) of the IPC ("Statements creating or promoting enmity, hatred or ill-will between classes") has also been invoked.

Was the law misapplied?

This is clearly a case of misapplication of s.295A of the IPC.³ This provision has been frivolously used numerous times in Maharashtra. Even the banning of James Laine's book Shivaji: Hindu King in Islamic India happened under s.295A, and the ban was subsequently held to have been unlawful by both the Bombay High Court as well as the Supreme Court. Indeed, s.295A has not been applied in cases where it is more apparent, making this seem like a parody news report.

Interestingly, the question arises of the law under which the friend who 'liked' the Facebook status update was arrested. It would take a highly clever lawyer and a highly credulous judge to make 'liking' of a Facebook status update an act capable of being charged with electronically "sending ... any information that is grossly offensive or has menacing character" or "causing annoyance or inconvenience", or under any other provision of the IT Act (or, for that matter, the IPC).⁴ That 'liking' is protected speech under Article 19(1)(a) is not under question in India (unlike in the USA where that issue had to be adjudicated by a court), since unlike the wording present in the American Constitution, the Indian Constitution clearly protects the 'freedom of speech and expression', so even non-verbal expression is protection.

Role of bad law and the police

In this case the blame has to be shared between bad law (s.66A of the IT Act) and an abuse of powers by police. The police were derelict in their duty, as they failed to provide protection to the Dhada Orthopaedic Hospital, run by the uncle of the girl who made the Facebook posting. Then they added insult to injury by arresting Shaheen Dhada and the friend who 'liked' her post. This should not be written off as a harmless case of the police goofing up. Justice Katju is absolutely correct in demanding that such police officers should be punished.

Rule of law

Rule of law demands that laws are not applied in an arbitrary manner. When tens of thousands were making similar comments in print (Justice Katju's article in the Hindu, for instance), over the Internet (countless comments on Facebook, Rediff, Orkut, Twitter, etc.), and in person, how did the police single out Shaheen Dhada and her friend for arrest?⁵

This should not be seen merely as "social media regulation", but as a restriction on freedom of speech and expression by both the law and the police. Section 66A makes certain kinds of speech-activities ("causing annoyance") illegal if communicated online, but legal if that same speech-activity is published in a newspaper. Finally, this is similar to the Aseem Trivedi case where the police wrongly decided to press charges and to arrest.

This distinction is important as it being a Facebook status update should not grant Shaheen Dhada any special immunity; the fact of that particular update not being punishable under s.295 or s.66A (or any other law) should.

Section 64 of the IT Act is about "recovery of penalty" and the ability to suspend one's digital signature if one doesn't pay up a penalty that's been imposed.↩
The police generally cannot, without a warrant, arrest a person accused of a bailable offence unless it is a cognizable offence. A non-bailable offence is one for which a judicial magistrate needs to grant bail, and it isn't an automatic right to be enjoyed by paying a bond-surety amount set by the police.↩
Section 295A of the IPC has been held not to be unconstitutional. The first case to challenge the constitutionality of section 66A of the IT Act was filed recently in front of the Madurai bench the Madras High Court.)↩
One can imagine an exceptional case where such an act could potentially be defamatory, but that is clearly exceptional.↩
This is entirely apart from the question of how the Shiv Sena singled in on Shaheen Dhada's Facebook comment.↩

This blog entry has been re-posted in the following places

Outlook (November 19, 2012).
KAFILA (November 19, 2012).

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/bal-thackeray-comment-arbitrary-arrest-295A-66A

Analysis of the Copyright (Amendment) Bill, 2010

pranesh — 2011-09-21T06:01:54Z

CIS analyses the Copyright (Amendment) Bill, 2010, from a public interest perspective to sift the good from the bad, and importantly to point out what crucial amendments should be considered but have not been so far.

The full submission that CIS and 21 other civil society organizations made to the Rajya Sabha Standing Committee on HRD (which is studying the Bill) is available here. Given below is the summary of our submissions:

Existing Copyright Act

The Indian Copyright Act, 1957 has been designed from the perspective of a developing country. It has always attempted a balance between various kinds of interests. It has always sought to ensure that rights of authors of creative works is carefully promoted alongside the public interest served by wide availability and usability of that material. For instance, our Copyright Act has provisions for:

compulsory and statutory licensing: recognizing its importance in making works available, especially making them available at an affordable rate.
cover versions: recognizing that more players lead to a more vibrant music industry.
widely-worded right of fair dealing for private use: recognizing that individual use and large-scale commercial misuse are different.

These provisions of our Act have been lauded, and India has been rated as the most balanced copyright system in a global survey conducted of over 34 countries by Consumers International.

The Indian Parliament has always sought to be responsive to changing technologies by paying heed to both the democratisation of access as well as the securing of the interests of copyright holders. This approach needs to be lauded, and importantly, needs to be maintained.

Proposed Amendments

Some positive amendments

Fair Dealings, Parallel Importation, Non-commercial Rental: All works (including sound recordings and cinematograph films) are now covered the fair dealings clause (except computer programmes), and a few other exceptions; parallel importation is now clearly allowed; and non-commercial rental has become a limitation in some cases.
Persons with disabilities: There is finally an attempt at addressing the concerns of persons with disabilities. But the provisions are completely useless the way they are currently worded.
Public Libraries: They can now make electronic copies of works they own, and some other beneficial changes relating to public libraries.
Education: Some exceptions related to education have been broadened (scope of works, & scope of use).
Statutory and compulsory licensing: Some new statutory licensing provisions (including for radio broadcasting) and some streamlining of existing compulsory licensing provisions.
Copyright societies: These are now responsible to authors and not owners of works.
Open licences: Free and Open Source Software and Open Content licensing is now simpler.
Partial exemption of online intermediaries: Transient and incidental storage of copyrighted works has been excepted, mostly for the benefit of online intermediaries.
Performer’s rights: The general, and confusing, exclusive right that performers had to communicate their performance to the public has been removed, and instead only the exclusive right to communicate sound/video recordings remains.
Enforcement: Provisions on border measures have been made better, and less prone to abuse and prevention of legitimate trade.

Some negative amendments

WCT and WPPT compliance: India has not signed either of these two treaties, which impose TRIPS-plus copyright protection, but without any corresponding increase in fair dealing / fair use rights.
Increase in duration of copyright: This will significantly reduce the public domain, which India has been arguing for internationally.
Technological Protection Measures: TPMs, which have been shown to be anti-consumer in all countries in which they have been introduced, are sought to be brought into Indian law.
Version recordings: The amendments make cover version much more difficult to produce.
Moral rights: Changes have been made to author’s moral rights (and performer’s moral rights have been introduced) but these have been made without requisite safeguards.

Missed opportunities

Government-funded works: Taxpayers are still not free to use works that were paid for by them. This goes against the direction that India has elected to march towards with the Right to Information Act.
Copyright terms: The duration of all copyrights are above the minimum required by our international obligations, thus decreasing the public domain which is crucial for all scientific and cultural progress.
Criminal provisions: Our law still criminalises individual, non-commercial copyright infringement.
Libraries and archives: The exceptions for ‘public libraries’ are still too narrow in what they perceive as ‘public libraries’.
Educational exceptions: The exceptions for education still do not fully embrace distance and digital education.
Communication to the public: No clear definition is given of what constitute a ‘public’, and no distinction is drawn between commercial and non-commercial ‘public’ communication.
Internet intermediaries: More protections are required to be granted to Internet intermediaries to ensure that non-market based peer-production projects such as Wikipedia, and other forms of social media and grassroots innovation are not stifled.
Fair dealing and fair use: We would benefit greatly if, apart from the specific exceptions provided for in the Act, more general guidelines were also provided as to what do not constitute infringement. This would not take away from the existing exceptions.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/copyright-bill-analysis

Analysis of the Copyright (Amendment) Bill 2012

pranesh — 2013-11-12T14:13:04Z

There are some welcome provisions in the Copyright (Amendment) Bill 2012, and some worrisome provisions. Pranesh Prakash examines five positive changes, four negative ones, and notes the several missed opportunities. The larger concern, though, is that many important issues have not been addressed by these amendments, and how copyright policy is made without evidence and often out of touch with contemporary realities of the digital era.

The Copyright (Amendment) Bill 2012 has been passed by both Houses of Parliament, and will become law as soon as the President gives her assent and it is published in the Gazette of India. While we celebrate the passage of some progressive amendments to the Copyright Act, 1957 — including an excellent exception for persons with disabilities — we must keep in mind that there are some regressive amendments as well. In this blog post, I will try to highlight those provisions of the amendment that have not received much public attention (unlike the issue of lyricists’ and composers’ ‘right to royalty’).

Welcome Changes

Provisions for Persons with Disabilities

India now has amongst the most progressive exception for persons with disabilities, alongside countries like Chile. Under the amendments, sections 51(1)(zb) and 31B carve out exceptions and limitations for persons with disabilities. Earlier s.52(1)(zb) dealt only with formats that were “special designed only for the use of persons suffering from visual, aural, or other disabilities”. Thanks to a campaign mounted by disability rights groups and public interest groups such as CIS, it now covers “any accessible format”. Section 52(1)(zb) allows any person to facilitate access by persons with disabilities to copyrighted works without any payment of compensation to the copyright holder, and any organization working the benefit of persons with disabilities to do so as long as it is done on a non-profit basis and with reasonable steps being taken to prevent entry of reproductions of the copyrighted work into the mainstream. Even for-profit businesses are allowed to do so if they obtain a compulsory licence on a work-by-work basis, and pay the royalties fixed by the Copyright Board. The onerousness of this provision puts its utility into question, and this won’t disappear unless the expression “work” in s.31B is read to include a class of works.

Given that the Delhi High Court has — wrongly and per incuriam, since it did not refer to s.14(a)(ii) as it was amended in 1994 — held parallel importation to be barred by the Copyright Act, it was important for Parliament to clarify that the Copyright Act in fact follows international exhaustion. Without this, even if any person can facilitate access for persons with disabilities to copyrighted works, those works are restricted to those that are circulated in India. Given that not many books are converted into accessible formats in India (not to mention the costs of doing so), and given the much larger budgets for book conversion in the developed world, this is truly restrictive.

Extension of Fair Dealing to All Works

The law earlier dealt with fair dealing rights with regard to “literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works”. Now it covers all works (except software), in effect covering sound recordings and video as well. This will help make personal copies of songs and films, to make copies for research, to use film clips in classrooms, etc.

Creative Commons, Open Licensing Get a Boost

The little-known s.21 of the Copyright Act, which deals with the right of authors to relinquish copyright, has been amended. While earlier one could only relinquish parts of one’s copyright by submitting a form to the Registrar of Copyrights, now a simple public notice suffices. Additionally, s.30 of the Act, which required licences to be in writing and signed, now only requires it to be in writing. This puts Creative Commons, the GNU Public Licence, and other open licensing models, on a much surer footing in India.

Physical Libraries Should Celebrate, Perhaps Virtual Libraries Too

Everywhere that the word “hire” occurs (except s.51, curiously), the word “commercial rental” has been substituted. This has been done, seemingly, to bring India in conformance with the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT). The welcome side-effect of this is that the legality of lending by non-profit public libraries has been clarified. The amendment states:

"2(1)(fa) “commercial rental” does not include the rental, lease or lending of a lawfully acquired copy of a computer programme, sound recording, visual recording or cinematograph film for non-profit purposes by a non-profit library or non-profit educational institution."

Even after this, the overwhelming majority of the ‘video lending libraries’ that you see in Indian cities and towns continue to remain illegal.

Another welcome provision is the amended s.52(1)(n), which now allows “non-commercial public libraries” to store an electronic copy of a work if it already has a physical copy of the work. However, given that this provision says that the storage shall be “for preservation”, it seems limited. However, libraries might be able to use this — in conjunction with the fact that under s.14 of the Copyright Act lending rights of authors is limited to “commercial rental” and s.51(b) only covers lending of “infringing copies” — to argue that they can legally scan and lend electronic copies of works in the same manner that they lend physical copies. Whether this argument would succeed is unclear. Thus, India has not boldly gone where the European Commission is treading with talks of a European Digital Library Project, or where scholars in the US are headed with the Digital Public Library of America. But we might have gone there quietly. Thus, this amendment might help foster an Indian Internet Archive, or help spread the idea of the Open Library in India.

On a final note, different phrases are used to refer to libraries in the amendment. In s.2(1)(fa), it talks about "non-profit library"; in s.52(1)(n) and (o), it refers to "non-commercial public library"; and in s.52(1)(zb), it talks of "library or archives", but s.52(1)(zb) also requires that the works be made available on a "non-profit basis". The differentiation, if any, that is sought to be drawn between these is unclear.

Limited Protection to Some Internet Intermediaries

There are two new provisions, s.52(1)(b) and 52(1)(c), which provide some degree of protection to 'transient or incidental' storage of a work or performance. Section 52(1)(b) allows for "the transient or incidental storage of a work or performance purely in the technical process of electronic transmission or communication to the public", hence applying primarily to Internet Service Providers (ISPs), VPN providers, etc. Section 52(1)(c) allows for "transient or incidental storage of a work or performance for the purpose of providing electronic links, access or integration, where such links, access or integration has not been expressly prohibited by the right holder, unless the person responsible is aware or has reasonable grounds for believing that such storage is of an infringing copy". This seems to make it applicable primarily to search engines, with other kinds of online services being covered or not covered depending on one’s interpretation of the word 'incidental'.

Compulsory Licensing Now Applies to Foreign Works Also

Sections 31 ("compulsory licence in works withheld from public") and 31A ("compulsory licence in unpublished Indian works") used to apply to Indian works. Now they apply to all works, whether Indian or not (and now s.31A is about "compulsory licence in unpublished or published works", mainly orphan works). This is a welcome amendment, making foreign works capable of being licensed compulsorily in case it is published elsewhere but withheld in India. Given how onerous our compulsory licensing sections are, especially sections 32 and 32A (which deal with translations, and with literary, scientific or artistic works), it is not a surprise that they have not been used even once. However, given the modifications to s.31 and s.31A, we might just see those starting to be used by publishers, and not just radio broadcasters.

Worrisome Changes

Term of Copyright for Photographs Nearly Doubled

The term of copyright for photographs has now gone from sixty years from publication to sixty years from the death of the photographer. This would mean that copyright in a photograph clicked today (2012) by a 20 year old who dies at the 80 will only expire on January 1, 2133. This applies not only to artistic photographs, to all photographs because copyright is an opt-out system, not an opt-in system. Quite obviously, most photoshopping is illegal under copyright law.

This has two problems. First, there was no case made out for why this term needed to be increased. No socio-economic report was commissioned on the effects of such a term increase. This clause was not even examined by the Parliamentary Standing Committee. While the WCT requires a ‘life + 50′ years term for photographs, we are not signatories to the WCT, and hence have no obligation to enforce this. We are signatories to the Berne Convention and the TRIPS Agreement, which require a copyright term of 25 years for photographs. Instead, we have gone even above the WCT requirement and provide a life + 60 years term.

The second problem is that it is easier to say when a photograph was published than to say who the photographer was and when that photographer died. Even when you are the subject of a photograph, the copyright in the photograph belongs to the photographer. Unless a photograph was made under commission or the photographer assigned copyright to you, you do not own the copyright in the photographs. (Thanks to Bipin Aspatwar, for pointing out a mistake in an earlier version, with "employment" and "commission" being treated differently.) This will most definitely harm projects like Wikipedia, and other projects that aim at archiving and making historical photographs available publicly, since it is difficult to say whether the copyright in a photograph still persists.

Cover Versions Made More Difficult: Kolaveri Di Singers Remain Criminals

The present amendments have brought about the following changes, which make it more difficult to produce cover versions:

Time period after which a cover version can be made has increased from 2 years to 5 years.
Requirement of same medium as the original. So if the original is on a cassette, the cover cannot be released on a CD.
Payment has to be made in advance, and for a minimum of 50000 copies. This can be lowered by Copyright Board having regard to unpopular dialects.
While earlier it was prohibited to mislead the public (i.e., pretend the cover was the original, or endorsed by the original artists), now cover versions are not allowed to "contain the name or depict in any way any performer of an earlier sound recording of the same work or any cinematograph film in which such sound recording was incorporated".
All cover versions must state that they are cover versions.
No alterations are allowed from the original song, and alteration is qualified as ‘alteration in the literary or musical work’. So no imaginative covers in which the lyrics are changed or in which the music is reworked are allowed without the copyright owners’ permission. Only note-for-note and word-for-word covers are allowed.
Alterations were allowed if they were "reasonably necessary for the adaptation of the work" now they are only allowed if it is "technically necessary for the purpose of making of the sound recording".

This ignores present-day realities. Kolaveri Di was covered numerous times without permission, and each one of those illegal acts helped spread its popularity. The singers and producers of those unlicensed versions could be jailed under the current India Copyright Act, which allows even non-commercial copyright infringers to be put behind bars. Film producers and music companies want both the audience reach that comes from less stringent copyright laws (and things like cover versions), as well as the ability to prosecute that same behaviour at will. It is indeed ironic that T-Series, the company that broke HMV’s stranglehold over the Indian recording market thanks to cover versions, is itself one of the main movers behind ever-more stringent copyright laws.

Digital Locks Now Provided Legal Protection Without Accountability

As I have covered the issue of Technological Protection Measures (TPM) and Rights Management Information (RMI), which are ‘digital locks’ also known as Digital Rights Management (DRM), in great detail earlier, I won’t repeat the arguments at length. Very briefly:

It is unclear that anyone has been demanding the grant of legal protection to DRMs in India, and We have no obligation under any international treaties to do so. It is not clear how DRM will help authors and artists, but it is clear how it will harm users.
While the TPM and RMI provisions are much more balanced than the equivalent provisions in laws like the US’s Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMC), that isn’t saying much. Importantly, while users are given certain rights to break the digital locks, they are helpless if they aren’t also provided the technological means of doing so. Simply put: music and movie companies have rights to place digital locks, and under some limited circumstances users have the right to break them. But if the locks are difficult to break, the users have no choice but to live with the lock, despite having a legal right.

Removal of Parallel Importation

In past blog posts I have covered why allowing parallel imports makes sense in India. And as explained above, the Delhi High Court acted per incuriam when holding that the Copyright Act does not allow parallel importation. The Copyright Act only prohibits import of infringing copies of a work, and a copy of a book that has been legally sold in a foreign country is not an “infringing copy”. The government was set to introduce a provision making it clear that parallel importation was allowed. The Parliamentary Standing Committee heard objections to this proposal from a foreign publishers’ association, but decided to recommend the retention of the clause. Still, due to pressure from a few publishing companies whose business relies on monopolies over importation of works into India, the government has decided to delete the provision. However, thankfully, the HRD Minister, Kapil Sibal, has assured both houses of Parliament that he will move a further amendment if an NCAER report he has commissioned (which will be out by August or September) recommends the introduction of parallel imports.

Expansion of Moral Rights Without Safeguards

Changes have been made to author’s moral rights (and performer’s moral rights have been introduced) but these have been made without adequate safeguards. The changes might allow the legal heir of an author, artist, etc., to object to ‘distortion, mutilation, modification, or other act’ of her ancestors work even when the ancestor might not have. By this amendment, this right continues in perpetuity, even after the original creator dies and even after the work enters into the public domain. It seems Indian policymakers had not heard of Stephen Joyce, the grandson of James Joyce, who has “brought numerous lawsuits or threats of legal action against scholars, biographers and artists attempting to quote from Joyce’s literary work or personal correspondence”. Quoting from his Wikipedia page:

In 2004, Stephen threatened legal action against the Irish government when the Rejoyce Dublin 2004 festival proposed public reading of excerpts of Ulysses on Bloomsday. In 1988 Stephen Joyce burnt a collection of letters written by Lucia Joyce, his aunt. In 1989 he forced Brenda Maddox to delete a postscript concerning Lucia from her biography Nora: The Real Life of Molly Bloom. After 1995 Stephen announced no permissions would be granted to quote from his grandfather’s work. Libraries holding letters by Joyce were unable to show them without permission. Versions of his work online were disallowed. Stephen claimed to be protecting his grandfather’s and families reputation, but would sometimes grant permission to use material in exchange for fees that were often "extortionate".

Because in countries like the UK and Canada the works of James Joyce are now in the public domain, Stephen Joyce can no longer restrict apply such conditions. However now, in India, despite James Joyce’s works being in the public domain, Stephen Joyce’s indefensible demands may well carry legal weight.

Backdoor Censorship

As noted above, the provision that safeguard Internet intermediaries (like search engines) is very limited. However, that provision has an extensive removal provision:

Provided that if the person responsible for the storage of the copy has received a written complaint from the owner of copyright in the work, complaining that such transient or incidental storage is an infringement, such person responsible for the storage shall refrain from facilitating such access for a period of twenty-one days or till he receives an order from the competent court refraining from facilitating access and in case no such order is received before the expiry of such period of twenty-one days, he may continue to provide the facility of such access;

There are two things to be noted here. First, that without proof (or negative consequences for false complaints) the service provider is mandated to prevent access to the copy for 21 day. Second, after the elapsing of 21 days, the service provider may 'put back' the content, but is not mandated to do so. This would allow people to file multiple frivolous complaints against any kind of material, even falsely (since there is no penalty for false compalaints), and keep some material permanently censored.

Missed Opportunities

Fair Dealing Guidelines, Criminal Provisions, Government Works, and Other Missed Opportunities

The following important changes should have been made by the government, but haven’t. While on some issues the Standing Committee has gone beyond the proposed amendments, it has not touched upon any of the following, which we believe are very important changes that are required to be made.

Criminal provisions: Our law still criminalises individual, non-commercial copyright infringement. This has now been extended to the proposal for circumvention of Technological Protection Measures and removal of Rights Management Information also.
Fair dealing guidelines: We would benefit greatly if, apart from the specific exceptions provided for in the Act, more general guidelines were also provided as to what do not constitute infringement. This would not take away from the existing exceptions, but would act as a more general framework for those cases which are not covered by the specific exceptions.
Government works: Taxpayers are still not free to use works that were paid for by them. This goes against the direction that India has elected to march towards with the Right to Information Act. A simple amendment of s.52(1)(q) would suffice. The amended subsection could simply allow for “the reproduction, communication to the public, or publication of any government work” as being non-infringing uses.
Copyright terms: The duration of all copyrights are above the minimum required by our international obligations, thus decreasing the public domain which is crucial for all scientific and cultural progress.
Educational exceptions: The exceptions for education still do not fully embrace distance and digital education.
Communication to the public: No clear definition is given of what constitute a ‘public’, and no distinction is drawn between commercial and non-commercial ‘public’ communication.
Internet intermediaries: More protections are required to be granted to Internet intermediaries to ensure that non-market based peer-production projects such as Wikipedia, and other forms of social media and grassroots innovation are not stifled. Importantly, after the terrible judgment passed by Justice Manmohan Singh of the Delhi High Court in the Super Cassettes v. Myspace case, any website hosting user-generated content is vulnerable to payment of hefty damages even if it removes content speedily on the basis of complaints.

Amendments Not Examined

For the sake of brevity, I have not examined the major changes that have been made with regard to copyright societies, lyricists and composers, and statutory licensing for broadcasters, all of which have received considerable attention by copyright experts elsewhere, nor have I examined many minor amendments.

A Note on the Parliamentary Process

Much of the discussions around the Copyright Act have been around the rights of composers and lyricists vis-à-vis producers. As this has been covered elsewhere, I won’t comment much on it, other than to say that it is quite unfortunate that the trees are lost for the forest. It is indeed a good thing that lyricists and composers are being provided additional protection against producers who are usually in a more advantageous bargaining position. This fact came out well in both houses of Parliament during the debate on the Copyright Bill.

However, the mechanism of providing this protection — by preventing assignment of “the right to receive royalties”, though the “right to receive royalties” is never mentioned as a separate right anywhere else in the Copyright Act — was not critically examined by any of the MPs who spoke. What about the unintended consequences of such an amendment? Might this not lead to new contracts where instead of lump-sums, lyricists and music composers might instead be asked to bear the risk of not earning anything at all unless the film is profitable? What about a situation where a producer asks a lyricist to first assign all rights (including royalty rights) to her heirs and then enters into a contract with those heirs? The law, unfortunately at times, revolves around words used by the legislature and not just the intent of the legislature. While one cannot predict which way the amendment will go, one would have expected better discussions around this in Parliament.

Much of the discussion (in both the Rajya Sabha and the Lok Sabha) was rhetoric about the wonders of famous Indian songwriters and music composers and the abject penury in which some not-so-famous ones live, and there was very little discussion about the actual merits of the content of the Bill in terms of how this problem will be overcome. A few MPs did deal with issues of substance. Some asked the HRD Minister tough questions about the Statement of Objects and Reasons noting that amendments have been brought about to comply with the WCT and WPPT which were “adopted … by consensus”, even though this is false as India is not a signatory to the WCT and WPPT. MP P. Rajeeve further raised the issue of parallel imports and that of there being no public demand for including TPM in the Act, but that being a reaction to the US’s flawed Special 301 reports. Many, however, spoke about issues such as the non-award of the Bharat Ratna to Bhupen Hazarika, about the need to tackle plagiarism, and how the real wealth of a country is not material wealth but intellectual wealth.

This preponderance of rhetoric over content is not new when it comes to copyright policy in India. In 1991, when an amendment was presented to increase term of copyright in all works by ten years (from expiring 50 years from the author’s death to 60 years post-mortem), the vast majority of the Parliamentarians who stood up to speak on the issue waxed eloquent about the greatness of Rabindranath Tagore (whose works were about to lapse into the public domain), and how we must protect his works. Little did they reflect that extending copyright — for all works, whether by Tagore or not — will not help ‘protect’ the great Bengali artist, but would only make his (and all) works costlier for 10 additional years. Good-quality and cheaper editions of Tagore’s works are more easily available post-2001 (when his copyright finally lapsed) than before, since companies like Rupa could produce cheap editions without seeking a licence from Visva Bharati. And last I checked Tagore’s works have not been sullied by them having passed into the public domain in 2001.

Further, one could find outright mistakes in the assertions of Parliamentarians. In both Houses, DMK MPs raised objections with regard to parallel importation being allowed in the Bill — only in the version of the Bill they were debating, parallel importation was not being allowed. One MP stated that “statutory licensing provisions like these are not found anywhere else in the world”. This is incorrect, given that there are extensive statutory licensing provision in countries like the United States, covering a variety of situations, from transmission of sound recordings over Internet radio to secondary transmission of the over-the-air programming.

Unfortunately, though that MP did not raise this issue, there is a larger problem that underlies copyright policymaking in India, and that is the fact that there is no impartial evidence gathered and no proper studies that are done before making of policies. We have no equivalent of the Hargreaves Report or the Gowers Report, or the studies by the Productivity Council in Australia or the New Zealand government study of parallel importation.

There was no economic analysis conducted of the effect of the increase in copyright term for photographs. We have evidence from elsewhere that copyright terms are already too long, and all increases in term are what economists refer to as deadweight losses. There is no justification whatsoever for increasing term of copyright for photographs, since India is not even a signatory to the WCT (which requires this term increase). In fact, we have lost precious negotiation space internationally since in bilateral trade agreements we have been asked to bring our laws in compliance with the WCT, and we have asked for other conditions in return. By unilaterally bringing ourselves in compliance with WCT, we have lost important bargaining power.

Users and Smaller Creators Left Out of Discussions

Thankfully, the Parliamentary Standing Committee went into these minutiae in greater detail. Though, as I have noted elsewhere, the Parliamentary Standing Committee did not invite any non-industry groups for deposition before it, other than the disability rights groups which had campaigned really hard. So while changes that would affect libraries were included, not a single librarian was called by the Standing Committee. Despite comments having been submitted to the Standing Committee on behalf of 22 civil society organizations, none of those organizations were asked to depose. Importantly, non-industry users of copyrighted materials — consumers, historians, teachers, students, documentary film-makers, RTI activists, independent publishers, and people like you and I — are not seen as legitimate interested parties in the copyright debate. This is amply clear from the the fact that only one MP each in the two houses of Parliament raised the issue of users’ rights at all.

Concluding Thoughts

What stands out most from this process of amendment of the copyright law, which has been going on since 2006, is how out-of-touch the law is with current cultural practices. Most instances of photoshopping are illegal. Goodbye Lolcats. Cover versions (for which payments have to be made) have to wait for five years. Goodbye Kolaveri Di. Do you own the jokes you e-mail to others, and have you taken licences for quoting older e-mails in your replies? Goodbye e-mail. The strict laws of copyright, with a limited set of exceptions, just do not fit the digital era where everything digital transaction results in a bytes being copied. We need to take a much more thoughtful approach to rationalizing copyright: introduction of general fair dealing guidelines, reduction of copyright term, decriminalization of non-commercial infringement, and other such measures. If we don’t take such measures soon, we will all have to be prepared to be treated as criminals for all our lives. Breaking copyright law shouldn’t be as easy as breathing, yet thanks to outdated laws, it is.

This was reposted in infojustice.org on May 25, 2012

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/analysis-copyright-amendment-bill-2012

Analysis of DIT's Response to Second RTI on Website Blocking

pranesh — 2011-12-02T09:26:11Z

In this blog post, Pranesh Prakash briefly analyses the DIT's response to an RTI request on website blocking alongside the most recent edition of Google's Transparency Report, and what it tells us about the online censorship regime in India.

What the DIT's Response Tells Us, and What It Doesn't

We at the Centre for Internet and Society had sent in a right to information request to the Department of Information Technology (DIT) asking for more information about website blocking in India. The response we got from the DIT was illuminating in many ways. The following are the noteworthy points, in brief:

Six government officials, and one politician have so far made requests for 'disabling access' to certain online content under s.69A of the Information Technology (IT) Act.
68 individual items have been requested to be blocked, those being 64 websites (domain-level blocking), 1 sub-domain, and 3 specific web pages. Seemingly, none of these requests have been accepted.
The data provided by the government seemingly conflicts with the data released by the likes of Google (via its Transparency Report).
India's law enforcement agencies are circumventing the IT Act, the Indian Penal Code (IPC), and ultimately the Constitution, by not following proper procedure for removal of online content.
Either the DIT is not providing us all the relevant information on blocking, or is not following the law.

Conflicting Data on Censorship Requests

The latest Google Transparency Report, released on October 25, 2011, shows that there were 68 written requests (imaginably taking the form of forceful requests/orders) from Indian law enforcement agencies for removal of 358 items from Google's various. If you take the figures since January 2010, it adds up to over 765.

However, the official government statistics show only eight separate requests having been made to the DIT (which, under the IT Act, is the only authority that can order the blocking of online content), adding up to a total of 64 websites (domain-level), 1 sub-domain, and 3 specific web pages. Of these only 3 are for Google's services (2 for Blogger, and 1 for YouTube).

If classified according to presumable reason for seeking of the block, that would be 61 domains hosting adult content; 1 domain (tamil.net.in), 1 sub-domain (ulaginazhagiyamuthalpenn.blogspot.com), and 2 specific pages (video of a speech by Bal Thackeray on YouTube and Wikipedia page for Sukhbir Singh Badal) for political content; 1 for religious content (a blog post titled "Insults against Islam" in Malay); and 1 domain hosting online gambling (betfair.com). It is unclear for why one of the requests was made (topix.net).¹

Content Removal vs. Content Blocking

Section 69A of the IT Act provides the Central Government the power to "direct any agency of the Government or intermediary to block for access by the public or cause to be blocked for access by the public any information generated, transmitted, received, stored or hosted in any computer resource". The only person through whom this power can be exercised is the 'Designated Officer' (currently Dr. Gulshan Rai of the DIT), who in turn has to follow the procedure laid down in the rules drafted under s.69A ("Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguard for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009", the 'Blocking Rules').

Because of this, we see everyone from the Secretary of the Public Law and Order Department of Tamil Nadu to the Joint Commissioner of Police of Mumbai and the State President of the Bharatiya Janata Minority Morcha approaching the Designated Officer for blocking of websites.

However, as the data from Google shows, there are many times more requests being sent to remove content. The only explanation for this is that an order to 'block for access... or cause to be blocked for access by the public' is taken to be different from an order for removal of content. Nothing in the IT Act, nor in the Blocking Rules actually address this issue.²

Thus, there is a possibility that the forcible removal of content is treated separately from blocking of content. That would mean that while blocking is regulated by the IT Act, forcible removal of content is not. Thus, it would seem that forcible removal of online content is happening without clear regulation or limits.³

Role of the Indian Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure

There are existing provisions in the Indian Penal Code that provide the government the power to censor book, pamphlets, and other material on varied grounds, including obscenity, causing of enmity between communities, etc. The police is provided powers to enforce such governmental orders. Section 95 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows the State Government to declare (through an official notification) certain publications which seem to violate the Indian Penal Code as 'forfeited to the Government' and to issue search warrants for the same. After this the police can enforce that notification.

It is clear that this is not the case for any of the content removal requests that were sent to Google.

Police Are Defeating the Constitution and the IT Act

Therefore, it would seem that law enforcement agencies are operating outside the bounds set up under the Indian Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure, as also the Information Technology Act, when they send requests for removal of content to companies like Google. While a company might comply with it because it appears to them to violate their own terms of service (which generally include a wide clause about content being in accordance with all local laws), community guidelines, etc., it would appear that it is not required under the law to do so if the order itself is not legal.

However, anecdotal evidence has it that most companies comply with such 'requests' even when they are not under any legal obligation to do so.

This way the intention of Parliament in enacting s.69A of the IT Act—to regulate government censorship of the Internet and bring it within the bounds laid down in the Constitution—is defeated.

DIT Either Evasive or Not Following Rules

The DIT did not provide answers on:

Whether any block ordered by the DIT has ever been revoked
On what basis DIT decides which intermediary (web host, ISP, etc.) to send the order of blocking to

It also provided the minutes for only one meeting⁴ of the committee that decides whether to carry out a block, when we had requested for minutes of all the meetings it has ever held. That committee (the Committee for Examination of Requests, constituted under Rule 8(4) of the Blocking Rules) has to consider every single item in every single request forwarded to the Designated Officer, and 68 items were sent to the Designated Officer in 6 requests. Quite clearly something doesn't add up. Either the Committee is not following the Blocking Rules or the DIT is not providing a full reply under the RTI Act.

A request was made to block http://www.topix.net, by the 'Commmissioner, Maharashtra State, Colaba, Mumbai—400001', presumably the Commissioner of State Intelligence Department of Maharashtra, whose office is located in Colaba. ↩
However, the Blocking Rules require the person or the hosting intermediary being contacted for a response. This provides the person/intermediary the opportunity to remove the content voluntarily or to oppose the request for blocking.

"Rule 8. Examination of request: (1) On receipt of request under rule 6, the Designated Officer shall make all reasonable efforts to identify the person or intermediary who has hosted the information or part thereof as well as the computer resource on which such information or part thereof is being hosted and where he is able to identify such person or intermediary and the computer resource hosting the information or part thereof which have been requested to be blocked for public access, he shall issue a notice by way of letters or fax or e-mail signed with electronic signatures to such person or intermediary in control of such computer resource to appear and submit their reply and clarifications if any, before the committee referred to in rule 7, at a specified date and time, which shall not be less than forty-eight hours from the time of receipt of such notice by such person or intermediary." ↩
While it is possible to imagine that the Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure lay down limits, it is clear from the Google Transparency Report that the requests from removal are not coming based only on court orders, but from the executive and the police. The police have no powers under the IPC or the CrPC to request removal of content without either a public notification issued by the State Government or a court order. ↩
The minutes of the meeting held on August 24, 2010, on the request for blocking of www.betfair.com were sent as 'Annexure III' of the DIT response. This request was not granted. ↩

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/analysis-dit-response-2nd-rti-blocking

Analysing Latest List of Blocked Sites (Communalism & Rioting Edition)

pranesh — 2012-09-06T11:52:47Z

Pranesh Prakash does preliminary analysis on a leaked list of the websites blocked from August 18, 2012 till August 21, 2012 by the Indian government.

Note: This post will be updated as more analysis is done. Last update: 23:59 on August 22, 2012. This is being shared under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial licence.

How many items have been blocked?

There are a total of 309 specific items (those being URLs, Twitter accounts, img tags, blog posts, blogs, and a handful of websites) that have been blocked. This number is meaningless at one level, given that it doesn't differentiate between the blocking of an entire website (with dozens or hundreds of web pages) from the blocking of a single webpage. However, given that very few websites have been blocked at the domain-level, that number is still reasonably useful.

Please also note, we currently only have information related to what telecom companies and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) were asked to block till August 21, 2012. We do not have information on what individual web services have been asked to remove. That might take the total count much higher.

Why have these been blocked?

As far as I could determine, all of the blocked items have content (mostly videos and images have been targeted, but also some writings) that are related to communal issues and rioting. (Please note: I am not calling the content itself "communal" or "incitement to rioting", just that the content relates to communal issues and rioting.) This has been done in the context of the recent riots in Assam, Mumbai, UP, and the mass movement of people from Bangalore.

There were reports of parody Twitter accounts having been blocked. Preliminary analysis on the basis of available data show that parody Twitter accounts and satire sites have not been targetted solely for being satirical. For instance, very popular parody Twitter accounts, such as @DrYumYumSingh are not on any of the four orders circulated by the Department of Telecom. (I have no information on whether such parody accounts are being taken up directly with Twitter or not: just that they aren't being blocked at the ISP-level. Media reports indicate six accounts have been taken up with Twitter for being similar to the Prime Minister's Office's account.)

Are the blocks legitimate?

The goodness of the government's intentions seem, quite clearly in my estimation, to be unquestionable. Yet, even with the best intentions, there might be procedural illegalities and over-censorship.

There are circumstances in which freedom of speech and expression may legitimately be limited. The circumstances that existed in Bangalore could justifiably result in legitimate limitations on freedom of speech. For instance, I believe that temporary curbs — such as temporarily limiting SMSes & MMSes to a maximum of five each fifteen minutes for a period of two days — would have been helpful.

However it is unclear whether the government has exercised its powers responsibly in this circumstance. The blocking of many of the items on that list are legally questionable and morally indefensible, even while a some of the items ought, in my estimation, to be removed.

If the government has blocked these sites under s.69A of the Information Technology Act ("Power to Issue Directions for Blocking for Public Access of Any Information through any Computer Resource"), the persons and intermediaries hosting the content should have been notified provided 48 hours to respond (under Rule 8 of the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules 2009). Even if the emergency provision (Rule 9) was used, the block issued on August 18, 2012, should have been introduced before the "Committee for Examination of Request" by August 20, 2012 (i.e., within 48 hours), and that committee should have notified the persons and intermediaries hosting the content.

Importantly, even though many of the items on that list are repugnant and do deserve (in my opinion) to be removed, ordering ISPs to block them is largely ineffectual. The people and companies hosting the material should have been asked to remove it, instead of ordering Internet service providers (ISPs) to block them. All larger sites have clear content removal policies, and encouraging communal tensions and hate speech generally wouldn't be tolerated. That this can be done without resort to the dreadful Intermediary Guidelines Rules (which were passed last year) shows that those Rules are unnecessary. It is our belief that those Rules are also unconstitutional.

Are there any egregious mistakes?

Yes, there are numerous such examples of egregious mistakes.

Most importantly, some even people and posts debunking rumours have been blocked.
Some of the Twitter accounts are of prominent people who write for the mainstream media, and who have written similar content offline. If their online content is being complained about, their offline content should be complained about too.
Quite a number of the links include articles published and reports broadcast in the mainstream media (including a Times Now report, a Telegraph picture gallery, etc.), and in print, making the blocks suspect. Only the online content seems to have been targeted for censorship.

There are numerous mistakes and inconsistencies that make blocking pointless and ineffectual.

Some of the items are not even web addresses (e.g., a few HTML img tags were included).
Some of the items they have tried to block do not even exist (e.g., one of the Wikipedia URLs).
An entire domain was blocked on Sunday, and a single post on that domain was blocked on Monday.
For some Facebook pages, the secure version (https://facebook.com/...) is listed, for others the non-secure version (http://facebook.com/...) is listed.
For some YouTube videos, the 'base' URL of YouTube videos is blocked, but for other the URL with various parameters (like the "&related=" parameter) is blocked. That means that even nominally 'blocked' videos will be freely accessible.

All in all, it is clear that the list was not compiled with sufficient care.

Despite a clear warning by the DIT that "above URLs only" should be blocked, and not "the main websites like www.facebook.com, www.youtube.com, www.twitter.com, etc.", it has been seen that some ISPs (like Airtel) have gone overboard in their blocking.

Why haven't you put up the whole list?

Given the sensitivity of the issue, we felt it would be premature to share the whole list. However, we strongly believe that transparency should be an integral part of all censorship. Hence, this analysis is an attempt to provide some much-needed transparency. We intend to make the entire list public soon, though. (Given how porous such information is, it is likely that someone else will procure the list, and release it sooner than us.)

Why can I still access many items that are supposed to be blocked?

One must keep in mind that fresh orders have been issued on a day-by-day basis, that there are numerous mistakes in the list making it difficult to apply (some of these mistakes have been mentioned above), and the fact that that this order has to be implemented by hundreds of ISPs.

Your ISP probably has not have got around to enforcing the blocks yet. At the time of this writing, most ISPs don't seem to be blocking yet. This analysis is based on the orders sent around to ISPs, and not on the basis of actual testing of how many of these have actually been blocked by Airtel, BSNL, Tata, etc.

Additionally, if you are using Twitter through a client (on your desktop, mobile, etc.) instead of the web interface, you will not notice any of the Twitter-related blocks.

So you are fine with censorship?

No. I believe that in some cases, the government has the legal authority to censor. Yet, exercising that legal authority is usually not productive, and in fact there are other, better ways of limiting the harms caused by speech and information than censorship. Limiting speech might even prove harmful in situations like these, if it ends up restricting people's ability to debunk false rumours. In a separate blog post (to be put up soon), I am examining how all of the government's responses have been flawed both legally and from the perspective of achieving the desired end.

So what should the government have done?

Given that the majority of the information it is targeting is on Facebook, Youtube, and Twitter, the government could have chosen to fight alongside those services to get content removed expeditiously, rather than fight against them. (There are some indications that the government might be working with these services, but it certainly isn't doing enough.)

For instance, it could have asked all of them to expedite their complaints mechanism for a few days, by ensuring that the complaints mechanism is run 24x7 and that they respond quickly to any complaint submitted about communal incitement, spreading of panic, etc. This does not need the passing of an order under any law, but requires good public relations skills and a desire not to treat internet services as enemies. The government could have encouraged regular users to flag false rumours and hate speech on these sites. On such occasions, social networking sites should step up and provide all lawful assistance that the government may require. They should also be more communicative in terms of the help they are providing to the government to curtail panic-inducing rumours and hate speech. (Such measures should largely be reactive, not proactive, to ensure legitimate speech doesn't get curtailed.)

The best antidote for the rumours that spread far and wide and caused a mass movement of people from Bangalore to the North-Eastern states would have been clear debunking of those rumours. Mass outreach to people in the North-East (very often the worried parents) and in Bangalore using SMSes and social media, debunking the very specific allegations and rumours that were floating around, would have been welcome. However, almost no government officials actually used social media platforms to reach out to people to debunk false information and reassure them. Even a Canadian interning in our organization got a reassuring SMS from the Canadian government.

It is indeed a pity that the government notified a social media engagement policy today, when the need for it was so very apparent all of the past week.

And what of all this talk of cybersecurity failure and cyber-wars?

Cybersecurity is indeed a cause of concern for India, but only charlatans and the ignorant would make any connection between India's cybersecurity and recent events. The role of Pakistan deserves a few words. Not many Pakistani websites / webpages have been blocked by the Indian government. Two of the Pakistani webpages that have been blocked are actually pages that debunk the fake images that have been doing the rounds in Pakistan for at least the past month. Even Indian websites like Kafila have noted these fake images long ago, and Ayesha Siddiqa wrote about this on August 5, 2012, and Yousuf Saeed wrote about it on August 13, 2012. Even while material that may have been uploaded from Pakistan, it seems highly unlikely they were targeted at an Indian audience, rather than a Pakistani or global one.

Domain	Total Number of Entries	Tuesday, August 21, 2012	Monday, August 20, 2012	Sunday, August 19, 2012	Saturday, August 18, 2012
ABC.net.au	1				1
AlJazeera.com	4		4
AllVoices.com	1				1
WN.com	1				1
AtjehCyber.net	1				1
BDCBurma.org	1	1
Bhaskar.com	1			1
Blogspot.com	4			3	1
Blogspot.in	7	1	3		3
Catholic.org	1			1
CentreRight.in	2	2
ColumnPK.com	1			1
Defence.pk	4		2	1	1
EthioMuslimsMedia.com	1				1
Facebook.com (HTTP)	75	36	7	18	14
Facebook.com (HTTPS)	27		3	23	1
Farazahmed.com	5	1			4
Firstpost.com	2		1	1
HaindavaKerelam.com	1			1
HiddenHarmonies.org	1		1
HinduJagruti.org	2		1	1
Hotklix.com	1			1
HumanRights-Iran.ir	2				2
Intichat.com	1	1
Irrawady.org	1			1
IslamabadTimesOnline.com	1				1
Issuu.com	1				1
JafriaNews.com	1				1
JihadWatch.org	2		2
KavkazCenter	1			1
MwmJawan.com	1				1
My.Opera.com	1	1
Njuice.com	1		1
OnIslam.net	1				1
PakAlertPress.com	1	1
Plus.Google.com	4				4
Reddit.com	1		1
Rina.in	1				1
SandeepWeb.com	1		1
SEAYouthSaySo.com	1				1
Sheikyermami.com	1				1
StormFront.org	1				1
Telegraph.co.uk	1				1
TheDailyNewsEgypt.com	1				1
TheFaultLines.com	1				1
ThePetitionSite.com	1	1
TheUnity.org	1				1
TimesofIndia.Indiatimes.com	1		1
TimesOfUmmah.com	1				1
Tribune.com.pk	1	1
Twitter.com (HTTP)	1			1
Twitter.com (HTTPS)	11			1	10
Twitter account	18		16	2
TwoCircles.net	2			2
Typepad.com	1		1
Vidiov.info	1		1
Wikipedia.org	3			3
Wordpress.com	8	1	3	2	2
YouTube.com	85	18	39	14	14
YouTu.be	1			1
Totals	309	65	88	80	75

The analysis has been cross-posted/quoted in the following places:

LiveMint (September 4, 2012)
The Hindu (August 26, 2012)
Wall Street Journal (August 25, 2012)
tech 2 (August 25, 2012)
China Post (August 25, 2012)
The Hindu (August 24, 2012)
LiveMint (August 24, 2012)
Global Voices (August 24, 2012)
Reuters (August 24, 2012)
Outlook (August 23, 2012)
FirstPost.India (August 23, 2012)
IBN Live (August 23, 2012)
News Click (August 23, 2012)
Medianama (August 23, 2012)
KAFILA (August 23, 2012)
CIOL (August 23, 2012)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/analysing-blocked-sites-riots-communalism

An Introduction to the Chinese Wikipedia

pranesh — 2011-04-05T04:32:09Z

A talk at CIS by Ting Chen, a Trustee on the Wikimedia Board, about the Chinese edition of Wikipedia

Ting Chen was born in Shanghai, China in 1968. He grew up in Harbin, China, in the northeast corner of the country, where he attended elementary school and middle school. In 1989 he went to Braunschweig, Germany and began his study of Electrical engineering. He was especially interested in semiconductors and their physics. He graduated in 1993 with a diploma and now he works as an IT specialist in Mainz, Germany.

His first experience with a virtual community were during his university time in the German Fido-Net, where he moderated a forum about science and knowledge for many years. He learned of Wikipedia and other Wikimedia projects through a news article about the German Wikipedia achieving a milestone in 2003. From then on Wikipedia became a new hobby of his. He started on the German Wikipedia and changed soon to the young Chinese Wikipedia, which was at that time still starting. Ting Chen attended the first Wikimania (Wikimania 2005) in Frankfurt, where he took part on a panel discussion and introduced the Chinese community. He also helped organize the third Wikimania (Wikimania 2007) in Taipei.

Ting Chen was elected a Trustee by the Wikimedia Community in June 2008 and his term started officially in July 2008. He was re-elected in August 2009. His term on the board would end at July 2011.

Vidoes

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/events/chinese-wikipedia

ALF's Position Paper on Draft Patent Manual

admin — 2008-09-21T14:40:56Z

ALF's draft position paper on the draft patent manual.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/publications/software-patents/ALF%20Position%20Paper%20Draft%20Patent%20Manual.pdf

ALF's Note before 2005 Amendment

pranesh — 2008-09-30T15:19:30Z

Briefing note on the impact of software patents on the software industry in India

Prepared by

Lawrence Liang

Anuranjan Sethi

Prashant Iyengar

Background

While there has been a lot of discussion on the impact that the latest amendment to the Indian Patent Act will have on public health and the pharmaceutical sector in India, there has been a disturbing silence about the impact that the amendment has on the software industry.

After the patents (second amendment) in 2002, the scope of non patentable subject matter in the Act was amended to include the following: “a mathematical method or a business method or a computer programme per se or algorithms”.

The important phrase that was added was ‘per se’, and with the amendment we effectively included Software patents into Indian Law. The latest amendment seeks to expand the scope of software patents, and states “a computer programme per se other than its technical application to industry or a combination with hardware; a mathematical method or a business method or algorithms”.

This briefing note will not address the technical and legal implication of this amendment but instead pose the larger question of why we should be concerned about software patents, and the impact that it will have on the software industry in India.

I. Conceptual difference between Copyright and Patent

The first thing to note is that software is already protected under Copyright law, so what then is the motivation and the implication of a move from copyright protection to patent protection?

Software has traditionally been protected under copyright law since code fits quite easily into the description of a literary work. Software Patenting has recently emerged (if only in the US, Japan and Europe) as an alternative that software companies are increasingly employing to, in order to protect their products.

The issues involved in conferring patent rights to software are, however, a lot more complex than taking out copyrights on them. Specifically, there are two challenges that one encounters when dealing with software patents. The first is about the instrument of patent itself and whether the manner of protection it confers is suited to the software industry. The second is the nature of software, and whether it should be subject to patenting.

a) Different Subject Matters

Copyright protection extends to all original literary works (among them, computer programs), dramatic, musical and artistic works, including films. Under copyright, protection is given only to the particular expression of an idea that was adopted and not the idea itself. (For instance, a program to add numbers written in two different computer languages would count as two different expressions of one idea) Effectively, independent rendering of a copyrighted work by a third party would not infringe the copyright.

Generally patents are conferred on any ‘new’ and ‘useful’ art, process, method or manner of manufacture, machines, appliances or other articles or substances produced by manufacture. Worldwide, the attitude towards patentability of software has been skeptical. The Indian Patent Act, as modified in 2002 had made non-patentable the following:

“…a mathematical method or a business method or a computer programme per se or algorithms”.

However, the recent amendment ordnance states instead:

“…a computer programme per se other than its technical application to industry or a combination with hardware;

a mathematical method or a business method or algorithms.”

b) Who may claim the right to a patent/copyright?

Generally, the author of a literary, artistic, musical or dramatic work automatically becomes the owner of its copyright.

Software developers are perfectly protected without patents. Everyone who writes a computer program automatically owns the copyright in it. It's copyright law that made Microsoft, Oracle, SAP and the entire software industry so very big. It's the same legal concept that also protects books, music, movies, paintings, even architecture.

Many of the world's richest people owe their wealth to copyright law. Some examples are: Bill Gates, Paul Allen and Steve Ballmer (Microsoft); Larry Ellison (Oracle); Hasso Plattner and the other founders of SAP; Paul McCartney (Beatles); JK Rowling (Harry Potter).

The patent, on the other hand is granted to the first to apply for it, regardless of who the first to invent it was. Patents cost a lot of money. They cost even more paying the lawyers to write the application than they cost to actually apply. It takes typically some years for the application to get considered, even though patent offices do an extremely sloppy job of considering.

c) Rights conferred

Copyright law gives the owner the exclusive right to reproduce the material, issue copies, perform, adapt and translate the work. However, these rights are tempered by the rights of fair use which are available to the public. Under “fair use”, certain uses of copyright material would not be infringing, such as use for academic purposes, news reporting etc. Further, independent recreation of a copyrighted work would not constitute infringement. Thus if the same piece of code were independently developed by two different companies, neither would have a claim against the other.

A patent confers on the owner an absoulte monopoly which is the the right to prevent others from marking, using, offering for sale without his/her consent. In general, patent protection is a far stronger method of protection than copyright because the protection extends to the level of the idea embodied by a software and injuncts ancillary uses of an invention as well. It would weaken copyright in software that is the base of all European software development, because independent creations protected by copyright would be attackable by patents

Many patent applications cover very small and specific algorithms or techniques that are used in a wide variety of programs. Frequently the "inventions" mentioned in a patent application have been independently formulated and are already in use by other programmers when the application is filed.

d) Duration of protection

The TRIPS agreement mandates a period of at least 20 years for a product patent and 15 years in the case of a process patent.

For Copyright, the agreement prescribes a minimum period of the lifetime of the author plus seventy years.

II. Nature of Software and Indian Software Industry

Software is complex: The complexity of computer programs makes it difficult to be understood by any one person. This capacity for complexity allows for the creation of highly sophisticated products but also means that they are dependent on a vast range of technologies.

Software is free from the constraints of the real world that ensure a product does not become too complex. Major software may comprise up to 10 million lines of code - potentially thousands of inventions, any of which might be patented

For example, Apple was sued because its HyperCard program allegedly violates patent number 4,736,308, which covers a specific technique that, in simplified terms, entails scrolling through a database displaying selected parts of each line of text. Separately, the scrolling and display functions are ubiquitous fixtures of computer programming, but combining them without a license from the holder of patent 4,736,308 is now apparently illegal.

In its complexity, software is different from other engineering and mechanical inventions for which patent protection was devised. The latter are often characterized by large "building block" inventions that can revolutionize a given mechanical process. Software, especially a complex program, seldom includes substantial leaps in technology, but rather consists of adept combinations of many ideas. Whether a software program is a good one does not generally depend as much on the newness of a specific technique, but instead depends on the unique combination of known algorithms and methods. Patents should not protect such methods of innovation.

Software Technology evolves rapidly: Software technology is evolving much faster than other industries, even with its own hardware industry. Against this light, a patent that lasts upto 17 years is extremely alarming. Microprocessors double in speed every 2 years.

Research in software is galloping ahead of developments. In most industries, researching new ideas often costs more money than bringing them to the market. The software industry is, on the other hand, loaded with ideas.

The idea behind most software patents can be coded in just 20 lines of code, but any program incorporating that idea - along with many others - will be a thousand times larger. It is the writing of a program that takes all the time, not coming up with ideas.

What this means is that on an average of every two years, a product will have to be replaced in the market. The idea underlying it will remain the same although the particular means and variants of its applications may have changed radically.

Coming out with a full-featured product, every two years is costly especially in relation to the inexpensive idea that backs it. There’s more novelty in the development and application of the same idea to new technology than with coming up with the original raw idea.

The objective of granting patent rights should be to foster the growth and evolution of the industry. Granting a patent at this stage would be akin to unreasonably prolonging the life of a product.

It is generally found that those who are investing time creating and lodging patents are vastly outpacing those who are investing effort bringing such ideas to market. By the time an immature technology develops to the point where it can be incorporated into products, it has a dozen or more patents on it that render it commercially intractable.

Software doesn't wear out: In other industries, research continues up to a point where further research costs too much to be feasible. At this stage, the industry's output merely consists of replacing parts that have worn out.

However, in the software sector, a computer program that is fully debugged will perform its function forever without requiring maintenance or modification. “What this means is that unlike socks that wear out, and breakfast cereal that is eaten, a particular software product can be sold to a particular customer at most once. If it is to be sold to that customer again, it must be enhanced with new features and functionality.” This inevitably means that even if the industry were to approach maturity, any software company that does not produce new and innovative products will simply run out of customers! Thus, the industry will remain innovative whether or not software patents exist.

Software has different economics: Most other major industries have medium to high research and development costs and very high production costs. Most often, the production costs dwarf the other two areas (because of the physicality that they involve) so that these costs can be added on to the cost of the final product without any relatively major difference in the price.

Software is unique in this aspect because

-The research costs very little because “ideas are as abundant as air”

-The development of an idea into a marketable product costs far more than the research.

-The production costs are minimal, often just a little more than the price of the medium, which is typically a floppy or a CDROM.

Patents affect the ‘development’ stage of the process of ‘manufacture’ of software. Thus the threat exists that the price of software could be singularly determined by the number of patented innovations that it incorporates.

III. Patent and Innovation in Software Industry

As argued before the process of software development by its very nature is ‘incremental’ i.e. developing of new software majorly consists of building upon existing ideas and rearranging the processes devised by others, and hence has an inbuilt need for using existing algorithms and mathematical formulae. Patent protection over software or over a set of algorithms within patented software would inevitably create a thicket of patents which the subsequent software developer might need to obtain clearance from before he can begin to work on it. The costs involved in obtaining these clearances and those involved in case one finds oneself having infringed a patent are usually very high, as in the case of biomedical patents. This would act as a disincentive for an aspiring software developer and would adversely affect the growth of the Indian software industry. Introduction of two bills- ‘Genomic Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Bill, 2002’ and ‘Genomic Science and Technology Innovation Act of 2002’ though still pending before the US Congress show the real concerns involved for a ‘patent and innovation policy’ within genomics. Similar concerns are exist in the software and innovation policy and need to be addressed adequately by the each national legislature.

Further there are substantial costs involved in verifying which patents one must obtain clearance for as skimming through the huge patent databases has become a very costly exercise. Unfortunately, conducting a patent search is a slow, deliberative process that, when harnessed to software development, could stop innovation in its tracks. And because patent applications are confidential, there is simply no way for computer programmers to ensure that what they write will not violate some patent that is yet to be issued making survival a very important issue for smaller player in the market.

Various large companies in US have obtained exemptions from going through patent searches for standard work due to huge costs. In such a scenario in a small player software industry like India, it would be unwise to allow ‘software patents’ as they may have negative impact upon the innovation within the industry.

By its nature software industry is ‘innovation driven’ i.e. the only way a software company can compete and improve its sales or grip over market is by making better and more useful features available. This innovation which is the driving force behind the Indian software industry is bound to get affected if a patent protection is provided to software patents. If a company can easily sustain itself on its ‘invention’ (by obtaining patents upon its software) and need not remain innovation driven, which would mean that a patent monopoly would inversely impact innovation and competition in software industry. It would further give rise to monopolistic tendencies and a practice of quoting arbitrary price for the grant of ‘voluntary license’. This lesson can be learnt by looking west where the idea of Public Key Encryption was patented in the US. The patent expired in 1997 and until then, it largely blocked the use of Public Key Encryption in the US. Similar instances can be found w.r.t. ‘data compression software’ and ‘single click software’ patented by Amazon.com. A number of programs that people started to develop got crushed. They were never really available because the patent holders threatened them. This led to a lot of unrest in the software community which culminated into the public outrage against software patents. Similar pressures have prevailed in European community where software patents found public opposition too immense to mount for a long time.

A look at India's own development of its software industry would be of immense help as India started its software industry only after IBM was driven out of country. Before that, there was no software industry worth the name, with software and hardware being imported from IBM. Once IBM left, Indian computer companies developed computers using the UNIX operating system, which was in the public domain. This led to the presence of a large number of skilled software professionals with experience of UNIX were also writing high-level applications for making the entire computer system work.

IV. Political economy of software patents

While understanding the issue of software patents, it’s important to look at its political economy and the implications involved for India. If one were to study the trends of software patenting in US and Europe one would witness that the IBM owns a majority of patents along with other giant software companies and has been topping the list of maximum patents granted in US in the private sector. This fact must be seen in the light of the opposition faced from small business organisations, leading scientists and economists in Europe and the unprecedented delay in passing the Software Patent Directive of 2002 by the European parliament. It should be noted that the directive does not aim to make it possible to patent pure computer programs: it would only apply to computer software integrated into an appliance. This makes it much more restrictive than the amended Indian Patent Act, which opens out any technical application of a programme to industry or its realisation in hardware for patenting. Even with this restriction, the critics of the EU directive have pointed out that a patent on software is in effect a patent on an idea, while traditionally patents have been restricted to concrete physical inventions only. By making this amendment, it is possible to implement algorithms in hardware and then claim patent protection for this. Once an idea can be patented if it is burnt in to hardware, the argument for extending it to a software implementation gains ground. In fact, the first breach in the US for making software patentable came through this route. If one were to study the trends in the scope of patentable subject matter granted in software patents by US courts, one would observe that from Diamond v. Diehr onwards court has been granting patents on much more abstract components, which has slowly transformed into patenting the central idea underlying the software. This trend indicates the easy malleability of legal terminology which has brought US courts’ stand on software patents to a full circle from Gottschalk v. Benson where the court found a patent upon software as a patent upon the underlying algorithms which is nothing more than a mathematical formula, unpatentable by its very definition.

The concerns regarding the weaker relative position of these small players is much more relevant in India. Among the primary reasons for large corporations like IBM lobbying for software patents is due to their stronger hold over the software market and ownership of the largest number of patents in this market. Large corporations use their patents, apart from making royalty upon them, to getting access benefit to the patents of other companies. This would close the option of cross-licensing for a majority of Indian companies which have no patents upon software. License though may be obtained are usually available at exorbitantly high prices which would most likely be unaffordable for Indian companies which operate on a small scale and have restricted budget options. The multinational corporations would use software patents as a defensive strategy for preventing smaller Indian companies from gaining any grounds in the market, which would eventually drive them out of business hence destroying the existing Indian software industry.

Software industry has a very characteristic nature which makes it extremely vulnerable to being easily monopolized. Among these characteristics are Network effects (the fact that a program becomes more useful if more people use it), interoperability and compatibility problems, the low cost of massive reproduction of software, the difficulty of inspecting software distributed without the source code, the learning curve and the rapid evolution of the market. Taking the instance of Microsoft Windows (the most popular operating system in use in India today) which enjoys a perpetual monopoly over the operating system market in India, many a larger institutions find Windows extremely costly and desperately needed an alternative to it in order to do business profitably. The recent success of Linux operating systems is demonstrative of this, but this must be understood in the light that India follows a copyright regime for software which allows many of the above mentioned characteristics of compatibility and interoperability to be resolved which would be totally impossible in a software patent regime. This then means that software patents have a potential to hamper the growth of open software movement in India which has begun to play central role in Indian Government’s ‘e-governance’ initiative. Hence it’s extremely urgent to ensure that patents in software do not cause any harm to the fine balance that copyright has achieved.

While understanding a political economy argument of software patents the adverse impact of monopolization upon public interest which has been held to be of utmost importance by the apex court in India, even above one’s legitimate commercial interests.

V. Procedural Issues

There are a certain procedural issues involved which are of determinative nature as to the allowance of a software patent regime in India. India doesn’t have a well laid out or even a well practiced software patent practice to guide Indian patent office. In the absence of any such policy, examining software patent application becomes a very daunting task, coupled with which the complicated and highly technical nature of software, Indian patent office is quite incapable to evaluate complicated and technically trivial claims which software patent often present. Imposing a software patent regime in such a scenario would impact the quality of such patents which might then prove counter-productive in the development of Indian software industry.

To be able to tackle this situation more personnel and experts would have to be employed in the patent office that can then ensure maintenance of a certain quality standards while granting software patents. But this in turn may not produce increased innovation in the software industry for the human capital which would be invested into processing the claims and preventing and tackling with the patent infringements rather than being invested in developing new software and hence benefit the software industry and economy of the country in general.

The difficulty in reaching a policy to grant software patents and the impacts of granting these patents in the absence of policy are indeed far reaching. In the absence of a policy which classifies patents on algorithms, techniques etc. it would take an awfully long time for the patent office to process a claim, searching the ‘prior art’ which makes the system inefficient and unworkable. Long delays in processing patent applications and subsequent challenge procedure often makes filing for a patent an unwise option for small companies and individual software developer, which form the backbone of Indian software industry. For instance, IBM was granted a patent on the same data-compression algorithm that Unisys supposedly owned. Such an error which could prove lethal for a developing company which has planned its budget meticulously and in consequence of this error would be greatly disincentivized to develop new software. The Patent Office was probably not aware of granting two patents for the same algorithm because the descriptions in the patents themselves are quite different even though the formulas are mathematically equivalent. Even when patents are known in advance, software publishers have generally not licensed the algorithms or techniques; instead, they try to rewrite their programs to avoid using the particular procedure that the patent describes. Sometimes this isn't possible, in which case companies have often chosen to avoid implementing new features altogether. It seems clear from the evidence of the last few years that software patents are actually preventing the adoption of new technology, rather than encouraging it.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/publications/software-patents/alfs-note-before-2005-amendment

Agreement on Procurement

pranesh — 2008-12-08T06:08:19Z

On December 6, 2008, at the closing of the third Internet Governance Forum in Hyderabad, India, the Dynamic Coalition on Open Standards (DCOS) released an agreement entitled the "Dynamic Coalition on Open Standards (DCOS) Agreement on Procurement in Support of Interoperability and Open Standards".

Dynamic Coalition on Open Standards (DCOS) Agreement on Procurement in Support of Interoperability and Open Standards

Third Internet Governance Forum (IGF)

Hyderabad, India

6 December 2008

Preamble

The Contracting Parties,

Recalling the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) Declaration of Principles which states that "[i]nternational standards aim to create an environment where consumers can access services worldwide regardless of underlying technology,"

Recognizing that standards are increasingly global concerns, involving goods and services that move in international trade across borders,

Aware that current competition and legal remedies may not be enough to solve the inherent tensions that routinely arise in the realm of patents and standards,

Desirous of encouraging procurement policies that require evaluation of multiple, competing products based on open ICT standards in order to ensure a level playing field for vendors, governments and consumers,

Cognizant of the need for procurement policies for software programs that are predicated upon an open standard,

Open Standards

Given the multiplicity of interpretations of the term open standards, for the purpose of this document we endorse as an acceptable definition the position contained in the European Union's draft European Interoperability Framework:

1) The open standard is adopted and will be maintained by a not-for-profit organisation, and its ongoing development occurs on the basis of an open decision-making procedure available to all interested parties (consensus or majority decision etc.).
2) The open standard has been published and the standard specification document is available either freely or at a nominal charge. It must be permissible to all to copy, distribute and use it for no fee or at a nominal fee.
3) The intellectual property - i.e. patents possibly present - of (parts of) the open standard is made irrevocably available on a royalty free basis.
4) There are no constraints on the re-use of the standard.

(IDABC EIF v2 draft (http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/en/document/7728))

As noted in the European Interoperability Framework cited above, open standards or technical specifications must allow all interested parties to implement the standards and to compete on quality and price. The goal is to have a competitive and innovative industry, not to protect market shares by raising obstacles to newcomers. Thus, open standards or technical specifications must be possible to implement in software distributed under the most commonly used open source licences, with no limitations arising from IPR associated with the standard in question.

In addition to the above requirements, it is recommended that there should be multiple independent implementations of the standard.

Governments, publicly funded and non-profit institutions agree to implement the following policies.

Governments, publicly funded and non-profit institutions

Hereby agree to the following measures in order to promote interoperability and accessibility through the use of open standards.

1. To create a policy statement on interoperability and open standards, to be available to employees and the public.

2. By 2010, procurement of all software should be vendor neutral and implement open standards

3. By 2010, tender specifications for hardware (including peripherals and mobile devices) should require that manufacturers provide the driver and interface information necessary to work with a reasonable range of proprietary and free operating system platforms.

4. By 2010, all public facing web pages should conform to W3C standards for structure, presentation and accessibility.

5. By 2010, tenders for the supply of web based services (for example, online reservations) must specify the requirements of point 4.

6. By 2010, agencies should implement policies regarding the storage and archiving of government data and records to ensure that data is stored in open data and document formats.

Signed by:

Aslam Raffee, Government IT Officers' Council, OSS Working Group, Republic of South Africa

Association for Progressive Communications (APC)

Bob Jolliffe, Freedom To Innovate, South Africa

Centre for Internet and Society, India

Hamid Rabiee, Sharif University of Technology, Iran

Knowledge Ecology International

Moving Republic, India

Shuttleworth Foundation, South Africa

Swathanthra Malayalam Computing, India

Endorsed by:

Bangladesh Friendship Education Society, Bangladesh

Indian Social Action Forum (INSAF), India

Foundation for Media Alternatives, Philippines

OpenForum Europe

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/publications/standards/dynamic-coalition-on-open-standards-dcos-agreement-on-procurement

Accessible ICT Procurement

pranesh — 2016-05-09T14:48:49Z

Today in India there is an excellent opportunity to address the needs of persons with disabilities through accessible ICT procurement. There is a growing body of evidence globally to demonstrate that governments are successfully using accessible procurement as a means of ensuring the human rights of persons with disabilities,. They are amongst the largest purchasers of IT in any country and by requiring accessible products and services, ensure that all citizens with disabilities and government employees who are disabled are able to access and use public infrastructure and communication. CIS along with 20 other organisations petition the Ministry of Social Justice & Empowerment, Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Information Technology to bring in accessibility considerations within the draft Procurement Bill.

To
The Secretary,
Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities (DEPwD)
Ministry of Social Justice & Empowerment,
Room No: 525, 5^th Floor,
Paryavaran Bhawan, CGO Complex, Lodhi Road,
New Delhi - 110003

The Secretary
Ministry of Finance
North Block, New Delhi- 110001

The Secretary
Ministry of Information Technology
Electronics Niketan, 6,
CGO Complex, Lodhi Road, New Delhi - 110003

Dear Sir/ Madam,

Subject: Urgent opportunity to address the needs of persons with disabilities through accessible ICT procurement in the draft procurement bill.

We are a group of organisations working to protect and promote the rights of persons with disabilities in India. You may be aware that persons with disabilities are the world’s largest minority, comprising over a billion persons of the world population as of 2011. We give below some important points which outline the need to consider accessible procurement for your consideration:

Demographic need: As per the census of India in 2011, there are 2.21 per cent or 26 million persons with disabilities living in India. However, there is an inconsistency between the estimates of the Census and the NSS surveys due to various reasons such as different definitions, different methodologies, traditional diagnostic techniques, varied reporting responses and even the 11^th five year plan opines that these numbers may be under representative and the actual number may be closer to approximately 5-6%. A World Bank report pegs the number at about 5-8% or approximately 55-90 million in India. Hence, there is a large constituency of persons with disabilities and possibly an equally large number of persons having special needs and requiring accommodations who are not necessarily identified within this group. The needs of these persons must be taken into account in order to achieve complete national development.
Need for accessible IT infrastructure: With the increasing emphasis and reliance on IT for administration, governance, communication and information through the ‘Digital India’ and ‘Smart Initiatives’, there is a need for the IT infrastructure to be accessible to enable use by all, i.e. a product or service should be usable to its maximum potential by all persons with ease and comfort irrespective of ability. For instance: Persons with disabilities cannot be given productive work in a bank if banking is not usable with the help of assistive technology; and Persons with special needs will not be able to pay bills or do banking or avail services rendered by e-governance platforms if ICT infrastructure is not usable with assistive technology. This need has already been recognized by the Government of India (GoI) through its ‘Accessible India Campaign’. Accessible ICT Procurement will be a vehicle to achieving this.
Legal imperative: India is strongly committed towards creating a barrier free world with equal opportunities and without discrimination, and facilitating enjoyment of all fundamental and human rights for persons with disabilities and complete digital inclusion. India has signed and ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) which identifies access to information and information and communication technologies as a human right and requires governments to facilitate enjoyment of these rights on an equal basis and without discrimination through various measures, such as encouraging private organisations to provide accessible services and information and provide other forms of assistance to facilitate access to information and adopting minimum standards of accessibility and design for accessibility at early stage of production to reduce cost.

Article 4(a)-(d) requires states parties to act in conformance with the convention. Accessibility is an underlying principle of the CRPD and integral for persons with disabilities to enjoy all the other human rights such as access to education, employment, assistive technologies, political participation, health, independent living and cultural materials.

India has also signed other national and international instruments in this regard, such as the Inchen strategy to make the rights real for persons with disabilities, the Marrakesh Treaty to facilitate access to published works for persons who are blind, visually impaired or otherwise reading disabled, the Biwako Millineum framework and the Biwako plus 5, enacting various legislations related to disability, including the upcoming Bill on the Rights of persons with disabilities, the National Universal Electronic Accessibility Policy and Guidelines for Indian Government Websites (GIGW) which prescribes accessibility requirements. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) – which were finalised in September 2015 and by which India is bound, also call for inclusiveness in all its goals such as education, inequality reduction, infrastructure building, economy, habitation, institutions, poverty reduction and sustainability. Hence there is a very strong legal case for implementing accessible ICT procurement, as the driver for achieving complete inclusion and participation of persons with disabilities.

Proven effective mechanism: Public procurement has been identified as a very effective tool in the hands of policy makers to implement accessibility and significant strides have been made by different countries such as USA, Australia and countries in the European Union. Statistics reveal that governments are amongst the largest purchasers of IT products and services and hence well positioned to leverage this power to ensure that all products and services developed, delivered and maintained out of public money and for the use of the public or government employees are accessible. The Government of India (GoI) is also one of the largest employers of persons with disabilities, hence the absence of accessible public infrastructure hinders efficient functioning of the government itself.
Standards for accessible ICT procurement: Today accessible procurement has proven a successful tool in the hands of policy makers and there are evolved standards in this domain. The two major standards are that of section 508 in USA and the En 301-549 (EN) in Europe. The latter is the most comprehensive and updated standard and there is a global move to develop a harmonized standard based on the EN. Hence, there is a readily available framework and standard in the form of the En for India to adopt and base its framework.

Key Global Initiatives

We’d like to draw your attention to the accessible public procurement initiative and charter launched by G3ict and to the arguments in the G3ict white paper for adoption of this policy. We strongly support the arguments made therein and recommend that GoI embrace accessible public procurement in the draft Procurement Bill of 2014. Some key points from the charter and initiative which argue strongly for the case of having an accessible ICT procurement policy in India are extracted and given below:

“Accessible procurement is relevant for the enjoyment of human rights as set out in the UNCRPD, which has been signed by 160 countries.
Public procurement accounts for 10-15% of a country’s GDP and up to 16 per cent in countries in the EU, In USA, the federal government alone purchases 25 per cent of ICTs and the purchase of the federal and state governments together account for 40 per cent of the total ICT purchases of the country.
Public procurement policy is a strong instrument to achieve digital inclusion and serves to incentivize accessible design from the start of the development process.
It strengthens the local technology industry of a country and creates positive ripple effects into the broader consumer ICT marketplace.
It develops the national accessibility ecosystem, capacity, and expertise to develop and deliver accessible products and services and lowers costs through harmonized standards & competition. It also drives the creation of new development tools for accessible technology and better accessibility training for technology professionals.”

Conclusion and Recommendations:

Access to public services and information are critical for citizens to participate in the nation building process. The development of India hinges on the progress and inclusion of all its citizens. India has already recognized the criticality of building smart cities and the need to create an accessible India. Hence, the adoption of accessible procurement falls directly within the mandate of the GoI as it is a fundamental step to achieving India’s goals. Accessible procurement is not an option, but a necessity. We hence request the GoI to take immediate steps to rectify the lapse and include accessibility as a key consideration within the procurement Bill. Accordingly, we propose the following approach for GoI’s consideration:

Preparation and circulation of a note explaining the need to include accessibility as a key component of the procurement process within the government, describing rationale, business case and best practices.
Inclusion of suitable provisions in the present draft Procurement Bill covering the following:

Identifying accessibility as a key requirement of procurement
Including definitions of accessibility and accessibility standard within the definition section. (We recommend that a national standard be adopted which is similar to or in line with the European standard EN 301-549 since it is extremely evolved and being widely adopted by countries within and outside Europe.
Requiring accessibility experts and persons with disabilities to be part of all committees set up towards implementation of the Act and procurement related processes at the central and state levels.
Including a distinct and comprehensive section in the procurement rules notified after enactment of the Act dealing with accessible procurement processes and communication which may include the following: identification of accessibility as a selection/ award criteria, inclusion of accessibility at different stages of the procurement process, such as preparatory study, pre-qualification documents, contracts for design, development, delivery and maintenance of products and services, purchase of off the shelf products, requirement of attestation and verification procedures, self-declaration by vendors, training requirements, exemption cases, transparent bidding processes to ensure inclusion of accessibility, accessible communication, and implementation and audit mechanisms.
Requiring procuring entities to include accessibility implementation within their reporting requirements.

GoI may undertake capacity building activities to raise awareness amongst procuring entities on accessibility.
GoI may draw up a plan with time lines for implementation which may be in two phases. Phase 1 may relate to setting in the process for all present and future procurement and phase 2 may relate to a plan for legacy systems which will not necessarily be replaced anew.

We would be happy to provide further inputs in this regard.

Thanking you

Yours sincerely

Mr. Pranesh Prakash
Policy Director
Centre for Internet and Society

List of Signatories

Sl. No	Name of the Person	Designation	Organisation	Email id
1	Dr. Nirmita Narasimhan	Policy Director	Centre for Internet and Society, Bangalore	nirmita@cis-india.org
2	Mr. Dipendra Manocha	President	Daisy Forum of India and President, National Association for the Blind(Delhi)	dipendra.manocha@gmail.com
3	Mr. Muralidharan	Convener	National Platform for the Rights of the Disabled (NPRD)	nprd.in@gmail.com
4	Mr. Praful Vyas	Secretary	Andhjan Kalyan Trust	aktrust.drj@gmail.com prafulnvyas@gmail.com
5	Mr. Nilesh Singit	Advocacy & Research Officer	Centre for Disability Studies, NALSAR
6	Ms. Charudatta Jadhav		Techenvision	charudatta.chess@gmail.com
7	Dr. Beula Christy	HOD-Vision	Rehabilitation Centres, L V Prasad Eye Institute	beula@lvpei.org
8	Dr. Ramesh C Gaur	University Librarian	Jawaharlal Nehru University(JNU)	1. rcgaur@mail.jnu.ac.in 2. rcgaur66@gmail.com
9	Dr. Homiyar Mobedji		Bookshare	dr.homiyar@gmail.com
10	Dr. Sam Taraporewala	Director	Xavier’s Resource Centre for the Visually Challenged	sam@xrcvc.org
11	Mr. Srinivasu Chakravarthula,	Hon. Joint Secretary	The National Association for the Blind, Karnataka	srinivasu@srinivasu.org
12	Mr. K Raghuraman		Karna Vidya Foundation	raghuram.mcc@gmail.com
13	Mr. Dhanajay Bhole	Coordinator	Acc Savitribai Phule Pune university
14	Mr. Prashant Ranjan Verma	Joint Secretary	National Association for the Blind – Delhi	Pr_verma@hotmail.com
15	Mr. N S Sastry		Samrita Trust	samritatrust2006@gmail.com, norisastry@gmail.com
16	Ms. Madhu Singhal		Mitrajyothi	admin.office@mitrajyothi.org
17	Mr. Bhushan Punani		Blind People’s Association (BPA)	blinabad1@bsnl.in
18	Mr. Anil Mudgal	Secretary	Arushi	arushiorg@gmail.com
19	Ms. Poonam Tyagi	General Secretary	National Association for the Blind, Meerut
20	Dr. Vimal Dengla		National Association for the Blind
21	Mr. V S Sunder	Member	DRA India	sunder@imsc.res.in
22	Mr. Mohith B P			Bpmohith.ckm@gmail.com

[1]. Available at http://censusindia.gov.in/Census_And_You/disabled_population.aspx
[2]. Please see
http://mospi.nic.in/Mospi_New/upload/disablity_india_statistical_data_11mar2011/Chapter%204-Dimension_Disability.pdf
[3]. Available at http://www.section508.gov/
[4]. Available at
https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_en/301500_301599/301549/01.00.00_20/en_301549v010000c.pdf
[5]. Global Charter: Promoting Global Digital Inclusion through ICT Procurement Policies & Accessibility Standards, G3ict; URL:
http://g3ict.org/resource_center/g3ict_global_charter
[6]. CRPD Implementation: Promoting Global Digital Inclusion through ICT Procurement Policies & Accessibility Standards, G3ict available at: http://g3ict.org/resource_center/publications_and_reports/p/productCategory_whitepapers/subCat_7/id_339/

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/accessibility/blog/accessible-ict-procurement

Centre for Internet and Society

Call for Comments for Report on the Online Video Environment in India

Breaking Down Section 66A of the IT Act

Term of Punishment

"Sending" vs. "Publishing"

Section 66A(c)

Section 66A(b)

Section 66A(a)

Constitutional Arguments in Importing Laws from the UK

Genealogy of UK Law on Sending 'Indecent', 'Menacing', 'Grossly Offensive' Messages

Comparison between S. 66A and Other Statutes

Ban on pornography temporary, says government

Arguments Against the PUPFIP Bill

Summary

How is the legislation unnecessary?

How is the legislation harmful?

Additional resources

Arguments

How is the legislation unnecessary?

1) The Indian government does not have vast reserves of underutilized patents, as the U.S. did in 1980.

2) Technology transfer is very important, but pushing IPRs aggressively is not the best way of ensuring technology transfer.

How is the legislation harmful?

1) Excessive patenting lead to gridlocks and retard innovation.

2) The legislation makes mandatory that which is optional now, and is anyway being followed in many institutions.

3) Copyright, trademark, etc., seem to be covered under the definition of "public funded IP".

4) It will result in a form of double taxation for research, and will increase the consumer cost of all products based on publicly-funded research.

5) It could have unintended consequences of varied kinds, including discouraging fundamental research as well as discouraging industrial research.

6) Non-disclosure requirements in the Bill restricts the dissemination of research within the academic community, and curtails freedom of speech.

7) Exclusive licensing enables restriction on the dissemination of academic research in the marketplace, and increase in cost of products based on public-funded research.

Additional Resources

On the PUPFIP Bill

On Bayh-Dole

Arguments Against Software Patents in India

Preamble

What are Patents?

Philosophical Justification Against Software Patents

Legal Case Against Software Patents

Practical Reasons Against Software Patents

Patent Landmines / Submarine Patents / Patent Gridlocks / No Exception for Independent Creation

Don't These Cases Show How Software Patents Help Small Companies?

Term of Patents

Software Industry Progressed Greatly Without Patents

Copyright Exists for Software

Insufficient Disclosure

Software Patents Work Against Free/Libre/Open Source Software

Conclusion

Arbitrary Arrests for Comment on Bal Thackeray's Death

Facts of the case

What provisions of law were used?

Was the law misapplied?

Role of bad law and the police

Rule of law

Social Media Regulation vs. Suppression of Freedom of Speech and Expression

Analysis of the Copyright (Amendment) Bill, 2010

Existing Copyright Act

Proposed Amendments

Some positive amendments

Some negative amendments

Missed opportunities

Analysis of the Copyright (Amendment) Bill 2012

Welcome Changes

Provisions for Persons with Disabilities

Extension of Fair Dealing to All Works

Creative Commons, Open Licensing Get a Boost

Physical Libraries Should Celebrate, Perhaps Virtual Libraries Too

Limited Protection to Some Internet Intermediaries

Compulsory Licensing Now Applies to Foreign Works Also

Worrisome Changes

Term of Copyright for Photographs Nearly Doubled

Cover Versions Made More Difficult: Kolaveri Di Singers Remain Criminals

Digital Locks Now Provided Legal Protection Without Accountability

Removal of Parallel Importation

Expansion of Moral Rights Without Safeguards

Backdoor Censorship

Missed Opportunities

Fair Dealing Guidelines, Criminal Provisions, Government Works, and Other Missed Opportunities

Amendments Not Examined

A Note on the Parliamentary Process

Users and Smaller Creators Left Out of Discussions

Concluding Thoughts