Centre for Internet and Society

CIS Intervention on the Treaty for the Visually Impaired at SCCR/SS/GE/2/13

pranesh — 2013-04-25T11:57:02Z

The informal session and special session of the Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights was organised by WIPO in Geneva from April 18 to April 20, 2013. Pranesh Prakash participated in the session and spoke about the rights of the visually impaired. An abridged version of this was read out during the meeting on Saturday, April 20, 2013, at 22:15 due to time restrictions.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I represent the Centre for Internet and Society, a policy research organization based in India. India, as everyone who has been attending these SCCR meetings since 2008 would know, has the world's largest population of blind and visually impaired persons. Two of my colleagues at CIS — Nirmita Narasimhan and Anandhi Viswanathan — are blind, and another one of my CIS colleagues who passed away recently (and whose tireless efforts were remembered here at WIPO recently with a minute of silence) — Rahul Cherian — spent many years working extensively on policy issues related to persons with disabilities, and in particular worked here in WIPO as part of Inclusive Planet, and with the World Blind Union. Hence, this issue is not an abstract one for us, but a very real one.

I commend the delegates here for taking some steps forward during this meeting. However, very disappointingly, with those few steps forward, we have seen a few things we had taken as settled being opened up again, and many steps being taken backward. The already-onerous requirements and procedures laid down in this treaty are seen by a few countries as not being onerous enough. Blind people, it is believed, might 'wrongly' take advantage of these provisions. Worse yet, there is a fear that sighted persons might take advantage of these provisions relating to the blind.

The absurdity of these fears somehow seems to have escaped the notice of many involved in these discussions. There is nothing in these provisions that would convert infringement by sighted people — even if under the pretence of this treaty — magically into lawful acts. And, indeed, there are multifarious ways of infringing copyright without such resort to this treaty. Yet, these very same onerous requirements (such as the "commercial availability" requirement) and bureaucratic processes will unrealistically increase transaction costs for the visually impaired and render infructuous the very purpose of this treaty. Those delegations who are unrelenting on these issues seem to living in a bizarre world where sighted infringers deviously use exceptions granted in an international copyright treaty to engage in piracy; a bizarre world where scanners and the Internet have not been invented. And by refusing to acknowledge these ground realities, they are merely forcing the blind into wearing eye-patches and being 'pirates'.

In particular, I would like to deplore the stand taken by the European Union, being represented here by the European Commission, whose actions run contrary to the call made in May 2011 by the European Parliament to "to address the ‘book famine’ experienced by visually impaired and print-disabled people". This is despite the European Parliament having reminded "the Commission and Member States of their obligations under the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to take all appropriate measures to ensure that people with disabilities enjoy access to cultural materials in accessible formats, and to ensure that laws protecting IPR do not constitute an unreasonable or discriminatory barrier to access by people with disabilities to cultural materials". The EU, and a few countries of Group B, including the United States, have been slowly bleeding this treaty to death through over-legislation and bureaucracy.

The United States' and EU's stand on technological protection measures, if accepted, would mean that publishers will technologically be able to prevent the blind from enjoying accessible works, even when they can't do so legally on the basis of copyright law. The European Union's stand on all issues has been extraordinarily harmful, and seems to have an aim to make this treaty as unwieldy and unworkable as possible. They seem to regard the Berne Appendix as their model in this regard: an international agreement that exists on paper for the benefit of developing countries, but because of its bureaucratic processes is little used, and is widely regarded as a failure.

Here is what it boils down to: when it comes to the economic rights of copyright owners, current international law insists that there be no formalities, yet when it comes to the human rights of visually impaired person to access information — a right specifically guaranteed to them under the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities — some delegates in this room wish to ensure as many formalities as possible.

The rights of the visually impaired are being buried under unnecessary and complicated requirements and bureaucratic practices. This injustice must stop: the delegates here have the power to do so. And if the EU does not wish to be viewed as villains by all persons with print disabilities and all persons with conscience, it should stop trying to make this an ineffectual treaty. Many have quipped that this is fast becoming "A Treaty for Rightholders Against Persons with Visual Impairments and Print Disabilities" or alternatively "A Treaty for Morally Impaired Persons and Persons with Ethical Disabilities". That is an international shame.

Having colonized much of the world into using English, French, and Spanish, these European countries along with the USA are now in a position to be both culturally dominant and to refuse to sign up to this treaty if it helps blind persons outside of the EU and the USA who seek access to texts in these languages. These remnants of colonialism must be stamped out.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-intervention-eu-blocking-wipo-treaty-for-blind

CIS Intervention on Future Work of the WIPO Advisory Committee on Enforcement

pranesh — 2011-12-01T15:30:38Z

The seventh session of the World Intellectual Property Organization's Advisory Committee on Enforcement (ACE) is being held in Geneva on November 30 and December 1, 2011. Pranesh Prakash intervened during the discussion of future work of the ACE with this comment.

Thank you, Chair.

I just wanted to point out that some of the proposals on future work could be worded better to reflect their true meaning. For instance, one of the proposal calls for control of the problem of "parallel import". However, "parallel importation" is actually allowed by both the TRIPS Agreement and by various other instruments such as the Berne Convention? Indeed, calling “parallel import” a problem is like calling "exceptions and limitations" a problem. This is a view that has been firmly rejected here at WIPO, especially post the adoption of the WIPO Development Agenda. This, quite obviously, could not have been the intention of the proposal framers.

Further, the link between some of the proposals and the Development Agenda could be made clearer. It has been established that the Development Agenda is not just something for the Committee on Development and Intellectual Property (CDIP) to consider, but for all committees to make an integral part of their work.

I would also like to underscore the importance of evidence-based policy-making.

Lastly, I would like to mention that a report has already been commissioned by WIPO on intermediary liability, which was written by Prof. Lilian Edwards and was released in a side-event during SCCR 22, in June 2011.

If the ACE is going ahead with a study or an event, I would suggest that the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Opinion, who in his report to the UN Human Rights Council dealt in some depth with intermediary liability, be involved or invited.

Thank you.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/ace-7-future-work-cis-intervention

CIS Funding 2008 - 2018

pranesh — 2018-07-07T01:17:05Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/cis-funding-2008-2018.xlsx

CIS Counter Comments on TRAI Consultation on Differential Pricing

pranesh — 2016-03-25T16:28:06Z

This counter-comment also includes: a) An appendix that charts regulations on zero-rating across the globe, and shows that the popular press have misunderstood and misrepresented regulations in foreign countries; b) An appendix that charts specialized services (including differential pricing of specialized services) across the globe.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/net-neutrality/2016-01-14_cis_trai-counter-comments_differential-pricing

CIS Comments on the Interoperability Framework for e-Governance (Phase I)

pranesh — 2013-05-22T10:48:52Z

In November 2010, the Central Government released the Draft 0.6 of the Technical Standards for the Interoperability Framework for e-Governance (Phase I), requesting comments by January 27, 2011. Here are the comments that CIS submitted.

General Review Comments

The present document is an excellent step in the right direction, following very ably the policy guidelines laid down in the National Policy on Open Standards for e-Governance.
The Expert Committee and other contributors have made excellent choices as to the 19 standards that have been laid down in the IFEG. It is praiseworthy that of these 18 are designated as mandatory, and only two are designated as interim standards. Furthermore, the system has been very transparent with the selection of standards, providing concise descriptions for each.
It is also important to note that while accessibility has been mentioned while talking of HTML, accessibility standards should preferably also be specifically mentioned in the presentation and archival domain.
However, many other governmental interoperability frameworks are going beyond merely listing technical standards. Some governments, such as Germany and the EU, go beyond technical interoperability, and also have documents dealing with organizational, informational, and legal interoperability. These are equally important components of an interoperability framework. Other governments also also lay down best practice guides, and other aids to implementation, sometimes even including application recommendations. Further, there are many which lay out standards for the the semantic layer, business services layer, etc.
We at the Centre for Internet and Society are currently advising the government of Iraq on development of their e-Governance Interoperability Framework, and would be glad to extend any support that the Department of IT may require of us, including comments on all further phases.

Specific Section-wise Review Comments

Section 5.2.7 - In the “additional remarks” row, it is stated that “If Adobe Systems Incorporated’s intent to make it royalty free is achieved then no further reviews will be necessary.”

This should be changed to indicate that (a) there might be entities other than Adobe that hold necessary patents over PDF v1.7, and (b) that a desirable feature—of there being multiple implementations of the standard—might not be fulfilled by PDF v1.7.

Adobe has in fact published a public patent licence that covers PDF v1.7 (ISO 32000-1:2008), and makes all of Adobe’s essential claims over PDF v1.7 available royalty-free.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/blog-old/comments-ifeg-phase-1

CIS Comments on the Draft National Policy on Electronics

pranesh — 2011-11-01T00:05:32Z

These were the comments submitted by CIS to the request for comments put out by the Department of Information Technology on its draft 'National Policy on Electronics'.

The Department of Information Technology must be commended for taking the initiative to create this policy which aims to reduce India’s dependence on other countries for crucial electronic hardware requirements, and to increase Indian production to such a capacity as to not only serve India’s increasing demand for electronics, but to fulfil foreign demand as well.

We have mainly focused our comments on the implications of the patent regime on this laudable goal.

Technology Transfer

An area that the policy is silent on is technology transfer. In relation to technology, the main bargain embedded in the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement of the WTO was the increase in the level of protection offered under patent laws of developing countries in exchange for increased transfer of technological know-how from the developed countries. While India has increased patent protection in accordance with the TRIPS Agreement, there has been no commensurate transfer of technology from countries which are currently hubs of electronics know-how.

One important example is China’s policy on transfer of technology along the whole value chain to enable domestic firms to gain technological expertise.

The Association of American Manufacturing notes, “One of the most potent weapons China has used to move up the value chain is forced technology transfer … It is only through the acquisition (rather than internal development) of sophisticated technologies that Chinese companies have been able to rapidly enter and expand in sophisticated industries ….”

This insistence on technology transfer as a national policy has served China well, and their experience should be incorporated into India’s National Policy on Electronics. This is not to say that India should not internally develop our own technological capabilities, but that the Indian government must use the policy space available to it to ensure that acquisition of technological capabilities happens alongside.

Outflow of Foreign Exchange as Royalties Creating Adverse Balance of Payments

The latest data from the World Bank shows that our balance of payments is increasing adversely at an alarming rate, and has now reached over USD 2.38 billion.

Our royalty and licence fee payments have kept on increasing at an astounding rate.

Table: India’s royalty and licence fees payments (current USD)

1991	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
49,565,208	845,949,436	1,159,824,391	1,528,826,913	1,860,283,808	2,437,500,663

Meanwhile India’s income is gaining slowly and erratically, and in 20100 reached USD 59.6 million.

Table: India’s royalty and licence fees, receipts (current USD)

1991	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
615,525	13,445,053	30,690,000	27,211,957	38,128,141	59,560,687

This bleeds the Indian economy through a very inefficient outflow of capital. Insisting on transfer of technology is an important component in slowing down this trend.

Linking of Value Chain and Preferential Treatment

One important clarification that is needed in the policy (specifically clause IV.1.3) is that “domestically manufactured electronic products” is intended to mean not those products for which the last part of value has been added in India. This way essentially non-Indian products with Indian branding can be seen to be “domestically manufactured electronic products”. The longer the Indian part of the value chain, the more preference it should be given, and holding by Indian companies of essential patent rights (or the availability of greater number of components of the product under royalty-free, FRAND and RAND licences) could be an important criteria. This will also encourage the transfer of technological know-how to Indian firms.

Preferential Treatment

Some may argue that the provision of preferential treatment to domestic manufacturers contravenes the GATT Agreement, however the GATT Agreement itself provides a usable exception in Article 3(8):

Article III: National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation

8 (a) The provisions of this Article shall not apply to laws, regulations or requirements governing the procurement by governmental agencies of products purchased for governmental purposes and not with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the production of goods for commercial sale.

(b) The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the payment of subsidies exclusively to domestic producers, including payments to domestic producers derived from the proceeds of internal taxes or charges applied consistently with the provisions of this Article and subsidies effected through governmental purchases of domestic products.

Thus, by crafting any further regulation under this policy to fit within this exception, India would not fall afoul of its obligations under GATT.

Cybersecurity and Source Code

An important aspect of the cybersecurity that is discussed in clause IV.5 is the ability to validate the lack of malicious code in the electronics used in strategically important infrastructure. For this, manufacturers must be required to provide the source code as part of government tenders in strategically important infrastructure.

Distinction between Innovation and Intellectual Property

The Electronic Development Fund must seek to promote innovation, research and development, and commercialization of products, and must be used to strategically acquire patents. Promotion of patents is not an end in itself, unlike promotion of innovation and ensuring that research and development reaches markets through commercialization. Patents are only a means to an end, and may sometimes be strategically useful, and often stand in way of gaining optimal use of technology by markets due to their monopolistic nature. Thus, it is recommended that “promotion of IP” be dropped from this clause, and instead “promotion of strategic acquirement and use of patents” be substituted in its place.

National Electronics Mission

The National Electronics Mission should not only have industry participation but also participation from academia and civil society.

Funding

The issue of funding for the initiatives outlined in this policy must be addressed as well.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/comments-draft-national-policy-on-electronics

CI IP Watch List 2009 - India Report

pranesh — 2009-12-09T10:09:52Z

The India Report of the Consumers International IP Watch List 2009, detailing ways in which Indian copyright laws are beneficial and harmful for creators and consumers.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/publications-automated/cis/pranesh/IP%20Watch%20List%20-%20India%20Report.pdf

CDT Provides Answers to Questions on Internet Neutrality

pranesh — 2012-06-04T05:56:46Z

Pranesh Prakash of CIS asked David Sohn of CDT a few pointed questions on the emerging hot topic of 'Internet neutrality', and received very useful responses. Those questions and Mr. Sohn's responses are documented in this blog post.

As part of the Centre for Democracy and Technology's (CDT's) excellent "Ask CDT" initiative, we were provided the opportunity to clear up some of our doubts around "net neutrality" (which CDT prefers referring to as Internet neutrality rather than network neutrality) by asking an expert: David Sohn, CDT's Senior Policy Counsel. Reproduced below are the questions that I asked (inset and in gray), and David's replies (provided below each question). Some of the questions I asked below were doubts that I had, while some others are instances of donning the roles of devil's advocate. We hope this will be helpful in clarifying doubts that some of the readers of this blog have had as well.

1a. "As far as I can understand, content distribution networks (CDNs) such as Akamai, don't really fall within your understanding of violations of Internet neutrality. Why not? In what cases is 'spending more to get faster speeds' permitted for content hosts? Since not only specialised companies like Akamai, but regular Tier 1 companies like Level3 and AT&T also engage in CDN-like behaviour, does it make it more liable to illicit/underhand/non-transparent service differentiation techniques?"

1a. That's correct, CDNs don't violate either Internet neutrality principles or the FCC's recent rules. I talked about this at some length in a blog post a couple years ago. The short answer is that Internet neutrality does not aim to guarantee that all online content and services will work equally well, but rather to prevent ISPs from exercising "gatekeeper" control with respect to their subscribers. Thus, content providers who have money can purchase various advantages -- for example, more or better servers, upgraded software, or caching services from a CDN such as Akamai. Significantly, things like servers and caching are available from competitive sources; no supplier has gatekeeper control. In contrast, priority treatment on the transmission facilities serving any given Internet user is an advantage that only that user's ISP could provide. Another difference is that when one content provider purchases caching, it doesn't slow anybody else's traffic (indeed, it could speed it up, since it may help reduce overall network congestion). By contrast, when an ISP designates favoured traffic for priority transmission, non-favoured traffic by definition is de-prioritized. Think about a line of "bits" waiting in a router queue -- if you let some bits "cut in line," it inevitably lengthens the wait for those who don't get to cut. Given CDT's general comfort level with CDNs and the existence of competitive offerings in the marketplace, I'm not too concerned about who provides the service (Akamai, Level3, AT&T, etc.). It doesn't seem to be a case of the ISP leveraging its unique control over access to subscribers.

1b. "A large part of the claims of Internet neutrality supporters are founded on the basis of 'dumb networks', which can also be seen as a reformulation of the end-to-end principle. A question arises, which is often posed by the likes of Dave Farber, Bob Kahn and Robert Pepper: why should we stick dogmatically to the end-to-end principle when embedding 'intelligence' in the core is/will soon be a viable option *without* jeopardising the simplicity of the Internet? If you are fine with CDNs, then are you fine with a partial supplanting of the dogmatism of the end-to-end principle (because, after all, CDNs are in a sense, intelligence in the core rather than in the edges)?"

1b. I don't think that supporting Internet neutrality requires a dogmatic opposition to any and all built-in "intelligence" in the network. Certainly a strong case can be made for handling certain network management matters, such as some cyber security issues, at the network level. I get concerned on neutrality grounds not by the mere existence of "intelligence" in the core, but by the use of that intelligence to make judgments and decisions about which applications and services are most important or most in need of special treatment -- as opposed to remaining application-agnositic or, in the alternative, leaving the decision to end users. Intelligence that is put in the service of end users, allowing the users themselves to make judgments about what to prioritize, does not concern me at all. But if the network-level intelligence results in broader reliance on centralized evaluation and categorization of the type or content of Internet communications, and centralized decisions about what to favor or disfavor, then I think it poses a neutrality problem. The bottom line is, the idea that networks could benefit from some built-in intelligence does not argue for giving ISPs unbounded discretion to discriminate among traffic. Indeed, a network that empowered users themselves to determine the relative priority levels of their traffic based on their individual needs would be far "smarter" than on in which ISPs make broad, across-the-board choices.

2. "What is the bright-line rule that separates some IP-based networks that are 'private' (and hence free to do as they please), and others that are part of the 'Internet' (and hence need to follow Internet neutrality)? Where does IPTV fall? (While answering that question, think not only of present-day IPTV, but keep in mind its potential applications.) Where do 'walled gardens' of the WWW fall?"

2. In CDT's view, Internet access service provides a general-purpose ability to send and receive data communications across the Internet. Other services could be exempt from neutrality rules if they serve specific and limited functional purposes and have limited impact on the technical performance of Internet traffic. CDT's comments to the FCC went into considerable detail -- see, for example, the comments we filed in October. The FCC rules took a similar but not identical tack, saying that Internet access services are services that provide the capability to send and receive data "from all or substantially all Internet endpoints" or that provide a functional equivalent of such a service. In any event, the question of how clear the line is between Internet access services that are subject to neutrality rules and other services that are not is an important one that will bear close watching over time. As for IPTV, it offers a specific function -- access to video programming -- rather than general purpose access to the entire Internet. So IPTV can be distinguished from Internet service. As for "walled gardens," it likely would depend how large the garden is. If the garden seeks to offer a wide enough variety of sites that it can be used as a substitute for Internet access, then the FCC could choose to apply neutrality rules. At some point, a garden can become big and general-purpose enough that it is effectively serving as a non-neutral version of an Internet access service. That kind of end-run around neutrality rules shouldn't be allowed.

3a. "Should Internet neutrality be kept at the level of non-enforceable (but still important) enunciation of principles, or should they be enforceable laws? In either case, who has the authority to regulate Internet neutrality, given the non-territoriality of the 'Internet' (and especially keeping in mind the direction that ICANN's been taking with things like the Affirmation of Commitments). Why should the FCC have such powers? Why should any American governmental body have such powers?"

3a. It is important to have some enforceable rules. The FCC enunciated principles back in its 2005 broadband Policy Statement -- but when the agency tried to act after Comcast violated those principles, a court ruled that the FCC had no ability to do so. Enunciated principles are of little value if ISPs are free to violate them without consequence. For U.S. Internet users, I think the FCC is an appropriate agency in which to lodge the authority to police neutrality violations; the FCC has a long history of working to ensure that providers of physical communications infrastructure do not abuse their position. And since the focus is on the provisions of physical communications connections, I don't the the territoriality issue you raise is a major problem. The United States has the authority to establish rules for companies providing last-mile communications links to U.S.-based subscribers. The Internet is of course a global medium, but the endpoint connections have a clear geographic location.

3b. "If Internet neutrality is really about ensuring fair competition (so an ISP doesn't promote one company's content), then why not just allow competition law / anti-trust law to ensure that fair competition? What are the lacunae in global competition laws that necessitate the separate articulation of 'Internet neutrality' principles/rules?"

3b. The ability of antitrust law to protect Internet openness is pretty limited. Absent a clear anticompetitive motive, network operators likely could curtail Internet openness in a variety of ways without running afoul of antitrust law. Antitrust’s prohibition against anticompetitive conduct is a far cry from any kind of affirmative policy to preserve the Internet’s uniquely open network structure. Nor can antitrust law take into account the major non-economic reasons for maintaining an open Internet, such as the impact on independent speech and civic empowerment. Finally, as a practical matter, antitrust cases tend to drag on for many years. Individual innovators and small startup companies – key beneficiaries of Internet openness – are unlikely to be in a position to bring antitrust cases against major network operators.

4a. "One of the strongest arguments of anti-Internet neutrality folks is that adoption of Internet neutrality principles/rules will ensure that it is only the consumers who foot the bill for bandwidth consumption, and bandwidth hogs (like NetFlix) don't ever pay. This, they say, is unfair on consumers. How do you respond to this?"

4a. First, I question the statement that "bandwidth hogs like NetFlix don't ever pay." For starters, NetFlix buys a huge amount of bandwidth connecting its servers to the Internet. Once on the Internet, its traffic is carried onward pursuant to peering agreements between the ISPs and backbone providers. When NetFlix traffic volume grows, it may trigger new payment demands between carriers, as we've seen in the recent dispute between Comcast and Level3. But the bottom line is, nobody is forced to carry any traffic they haven't contractually agreed to handle. Of course, it is true that NetFlix doesn't make payments to (for example) AT&T for delivering NetFlix traffic to AT&T's customers. That might seem unfair if you think of NetFlix as a "bandwidth hog" eating up AT&T's capacity. I believe that is the wrong way to think about it. NetFlix has no ability to forcefeed traffic onto AT&T's network. Every bit it sends was requested by an AT&T subscriber. So if there are "bandwidth hogs" here, they are the end users -- they are the ones that pull all those bits onto AT&T's network. And they have already paid AT&T for the ability to get those bits. I would add that when individual users choose to download huge volumes, I have no problem with the ISP charging them more. Second, you suggest that it may be unfair to ask consumers to foot the full bill for their connectivity. But the Internet is such an open and innovation-friendly platform precisely because it is so user-driven. This user-centric focus could change if ISPs start thinking of themselves as providing services not just to end user subscribers, but also to non-subscribers such as large online content providers to whom the ISPs do not directly provide bandwidth. The ISPs would then have divided loyalties; rather than just focusing on empowering users, they would be collecting fees to steer users in particular directions. Sure, in other contexts there are examples of "two-sided markets" in which end users foot only part of the bill. Newspapers are often cited. But including paid advertising in newspapers doesn't have much impact in how the overall product is perceived or presented to users. In contrast, ISPs charging content providers for special transmission priority would be akin to a newspaper in which advertisers pay not just to place ads, but also to influence where the substantive articles appear -- which ones go on the front page and which on the interior, for example. In turn, content providers of all stripes would need to think about striking deals with multiple ISPs -- something that is not necessary today. In the end, turning the Internet into a two-sided market would make the medium dramatically less open, less innovative, and less empowering of users.

4b. "If a consumer wants a faster connection (to access content faster), she can get that by paying the ISP more and getting more bandwidth. If a business wants a faster connection (to deliver content faster), it can get that by paying the ISP more bandwidth. However, certain kinds of paying for faster delivery of content are sought to be curbed. Where should we draw that line? And Why should we hold on so dearly to a certain model of accounting for costs?"

4b. Consumers and businesses should be able to pay their respective ISPs for more bandwidth. I think that is very different from paying other people's ISPs for preferential treatment. The latter arrangement turns ISPs into gatekeepers with respect to their subscribers -- because once the quality of delivery depends on which content providers have struck a deal with the subscribers' ISP, every content provider needs to negotiate with that ISP in order to keep up with its competitors. We hold on to the Internet's model of accounting for costs because it is part of what makes the Internet such an open, innovative environment: content providers and innovators don't face the hurdle of having to negotiate deals with all their users' ISPs.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cdt-internet-neutrality

Can India Trust Its Government on Privacy?

pranesh — 2013-07-15T10:35:33Z

In response to criticisms of the Centralized Monitoring System, India’s new surveillance program, the government could contend that merely having the capability to engage in mass surveillance won’t mean that it will. Officials will argue that they will still abide by the law and will ensure that each instance of interception will be authorized.

Pranesh Prakash's article was published in the New York Times on July 11, 2013.

In fact, they will argue that the program, known as C.M.S., will better safeguard citizens’ privacy: it will cut out the telecommunications companies, which can be sources of privacy leaks; it will ensure that each interception request is tracked and the recorded content duly destroyed within six months as is required under the law; and it will enable quicker interception, which will save more lives. But there are a host of reasons why the citizens of India should be skeptical of those official claims.

Cutting out telecoms will not help protect citizens from electronic snooping since these companies still have the requisite infrastructure to conduct surveillance. As long as the infrastructure exists, telecom employees will misuse it. In a 2010 report, the journalist M.A. Arun noted that “alarmingly, this correspondent also came across several instances of service providers’ employees accessing personal communication of subscribers without authorization.” Some years back, K.K. Paul, a top Delhi Police officer and now the Governor of Meghalaya, drafted a memo in which he noted mobile operators’ complaints that private individuals were misusing police contacts to tap phone calls of “opponents in trade or estranged spouses.”

India does not need to have centralized interception facilities to have centralized tracking of interception requests. To prevent unauthorized access to communications content that has been intercepted, at all points of time, the files should be encrypted using public key infrastructure. Mechanisms also exist to securely allow a chain of custody to be tracked, and to ensure the timely destruction of intercepted material after six months, as required by the law. Such technological means need to be made mandatory to prevent unauthorized access, rather than centralizing all interception capabilities.

At the moment, interception orders are given by the federal Home Secretary of India and by state home secretaries without adequate consideration. Every month at the federal level 7,000 to 9,000 phone taps are authorized or re-authorized. Even if it took just three minutes to evaluate each case, it would take 15 hours each day (without any weekends or holidays) to go through 9,000 requests. The numbers in Indian states could be worse, but one can’t be certain as statistics on surveillance across India are not available. It indicates bureaucratic callousness and indifference toward following the procedure laid down in the Telegraph Act.

In a 1975 case, the Supreme Court held that an “economic emergency” may not amount to a “public emergency.” Yet we find that of the nine central government agencies empowered to conduct interception in India, according to press reports — Central Board of Direct Taxes, Intelligence Bureau, Central Bureau of Investigation, Narcotics Control Bureau, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Enforcement Directorate, Research & Analysis Wing, National Investigation Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency — three are exclusively dedicated to economic offenses.

Suspicion of tax evasion cannot legally justify a wiretap, which is why the government said it had believed that Nira Radia, a corporate lobbyist, was a spy when it defended putting a wiretap on her phone in 2008 and 2009. A 2011 report by the cabinet secretary pointed out that economic offenses might not be counted as “public emergencies,” and that the Central Board of Direct Taxes should not be empowered to intercept communications. Yet the tax department continues to be on the list of agencies empowered to conduct interceptions.

India has arrived at a scary juncture, where the multiple departments of the Indian government don’t even trust each other. India’s Department of Information Technology recently complained to the National Security Advisor that the National Technical Research Organization had hacked into National Informatics Center infrastructure and extracted sensitive data connected to various ministries. The National Technical Research Organization denied it had hacked into the servers but said hundreds of e-mail accounts of top government officials were compromised in 2012, including those of “the home secretary, the naval attaché to Tehran, several Indian missions abroad, top investigators of the Central Bureau of Investigation and the armed forces,” The Mint newspaper reported. Such incidents aggravate the fear that the Indian government might not be willing and able to protect the enormous amounts of information it is about to collect through the C.M.S.

Simply put, government entities have engaged in unofficial and illegal surveillance, and the C.M.S. is not likely to change this. In a 2010 article in Outlook, the journalist Saikat Datta described how various central and state intelligence organizations across India are illegally using off-the-air interception devices. “These systems are frequently deployed in Muslim-dominated areas of cities like Delhi, Lucknow and Hyderabad,” Mr. Datta wrote. “The systems, mounted inside cars, are sent on ‘fishing expeditions,’ randomly tuning into conversations of citizens in a bid to track down terrorists.”

The National Technical Research Organization, which is not even on the list of entities authorized to conduct interception, is one of the largest surveillance organizations in India. The Mint reported last year that the organization’s surveillance devices, “contrary to norms, were deployed more often in the national capital than in border areas” and that under new standard operating procedures issued in early 2012, the organization can only intercept signals at the international borders. The organization runs multiple facilities in Mumbai, Bangalore, Delhi, Hyderabad, Lucknow and Kolkata, in which monumental amounts of Internet traffic are captured. In Mumbai, all the traffic passing through the undersea cables there is captured, Mr. Datta found.

In the western state of Gujarat, a recent investigation by Amitabh Pathak, the director general of police, revealed that in a period of less than six months, more than 90,000 requests were made for call detail records, including for the phones of senior police and civil service officers. This high a number could not possibly have been generated from criminal investigations alone. Again, these do not seem to have led to any criminal charges against any of the people whose records were obtained. The information seems to have been collected for purposes other than national security.

India is struggling to keep track of the location of its proliferating interception devices. More than 73,000 devices to intercept mobile phone calls have been imported into India since 2005. In 2011, the federal government asked various state governments, private corporations, the army and intelligence agencies to surrender these to the government, noting that usage of any such equipment for surveillance was illegal. We don’t know how many devices were actually turned in.

These kinds of violations of privacy can have very dangerous consequences. According to the former Intelligence Bureau head in the western state of Gujarat, R.B. Sreekumar, the call records of a mobile number used by Haren Pandya, the former Gujarat home minister, were used to confirm that it was he who had provided secret testimony to the Citizens’ Tribunal, which was conducting an independent investigation of the 2002 sectarian riots in the state. Mr. Pandya was murdered in 2003.

The limited efforts to make India’s intelligence agencies more accountable have gone nowhere. In 2012, the Planning Commission of India formed a group of experts under Justice A.P. Shah, a retired Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court, to look into existing projects of the government and to suggest principles to guide a privacy law in light of international experience. (Centre for Internet and Society, where I work was part of the group). However, the government has yet to introduce a bill to protect citizens’ privacy, even though the governmental and private sector violations of Indian citizens’ privacy is growing at an alarming rate.

In February, after frequent calls by privacy activists and lawyers for greater accountability and parliamentary oversight of intelligence agencies, the Centre for Public Interest Litigation filed a case in the Supreme Court. This would, one hopes, lead to reform.

Citizens must also demand that a strong Privacy Act be enacted. In 1991, the leak of a Central Bureau of Investigation report titled “Tapping of Politicians’ Phones” prompted the rights groups, People’s Union of Civil Liberties to file a writ petition, which eventually led to a Supreme Court of India ruling that recognized the right to privacy of communications for all citizens as part of the fundamental rights of freedom of speech and of life and personal liberty. However, through the 2008 amendments to the Information Technology Act, the IT Rules framed in 2011 and the telecom licenses, the government has greatly weakened the right to privacy as recognized by the Supreme Court. The damage must be undone through a strong privacy law that safeguards the privacy of Indian citizens against both the state and corporations. The law should not only provide legal procedures, but also ensure that the government should not employ technologies that erode legal procedures.

A strong privacy law should provide strong grounds on which to hold the National Security Advisor’s mass surveillance of Indians (over 12.1 billion pieces of intelligence in one month) as unlawful. The law should ensure that Parliament, and Indian citizens, are regularly provided information on the scale of surveillance across India, and the convictions resulting from that surveillance. Individuals whose communications metadata or content is monitored or intercepted should be told about it after the passage of a reasonable amount of time. After all, the data should only be gathered if it is to charge a person of committing a crime. If such charges are not being brought, the person should be told of the incursion into his or her privacy.

The privacy law should ensure that all surveillance follows the following principles: legitimacy (is the surveillance for a legitimate, democratic purpose?), necessity (is this necessary to further that purpose? does a less invasive means exist?), proportionality and harm minimization (is this the minimum level of intrusion into privacy?), specificity (is this surveillance order limited to a specific case?) transparency (is this intrusion into privacy recorded and also eventually revealed to the data subject?), purpose limitation (is the data collected only used for the stated purpose?), and independent oversight (is the surveillance reported to a legislative committee or a privacy commissioner, and are statistics kept on surveillance conducted and criminal prosecution filings?). Constitutional courts such as the Supreme Court of India or the High Courts in the Indian states should make such determinations. Citizens should have a right to civil and criminal remedies for violations of surveillance laws.

Indian citizens should also take greater care of their own privacy and safeguard the security of their communications. The solution is to minimize usage of mobile phones and to use anonymizing technologies and end-to-end encryption while communicating on the Internet. Free and open-source software like OpenPGP can make e-mails secure. Technologies like off-the-record messaging used in apps like ChatSecure and Pidgin chat conversations, TextSecure for text messages, HTTPS Everywhere and Virtual Private Networks can prevent Internet service providers from being able to snoop, and make Internet communications anonymous.

Indian government, and especially our intelligence agencies, violate Indian citizens’ privacy without legal authority on a routine basis. It is time India stops itself from sleepwalking into a surveillance state.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/new-york-times-july-11-2013-can-india-trust-its-government-on-piracy

Calling Out the BSA on Its BS

pranesh — 2011-09-14T18:16:51Z

The Business Software Alliance (BSA) is trying to pull wool over government officials' eyes by equating software piracy with tax losses. Pranesh Prakash points out how that argument lacks cogency, and that tax losses would be better averted if BSA's constituent companies just decided to pay full taxes in India.

In the past we have covered the Business Software Alliance's lack of rigour in their piracy statistics, and disconnect from their constituent members when it comes to opposing free and open source software. In reaction to the criticism they have received over the years, BSA has finally stopped equating lack of sales with losses. But now, they have started equating software piracy with tax losses.

How IDC thinks tax works

In a report prepared by International Data Corporation (IDC) for the Business Software Alliance (BSA), they note:

Substantial value in form of potential industry and tax revenues is lost to software piracy: The situation in India is not healthy with a software piracy rate of 65% in 2009 (more than six out of ten PC software programs installed in 2009 were not paid for). Only one-third of the overall PC software revenues are captured by the industry incumbents and the rest are lost to software piracy. Most of the unlicensed software use occurs in otherwise legal businesses installing the programs on more PCs than allowed by the licenses they have paid for. Consequently, in 2009, the state exchequer tax receipts loss was roughly US$866 million at the current piracy and employment levels, as the industry lost its otherwise legitimate share of revenues to piracy.

For this to be true, there must be two assumptions that are satisfied. First, those who are pirating software must not spend the money that they save by doing so on any other taxable activity. Second, the companies that would get the money if the software weren't pirated must pay the Indian government taxes. As we'll see, neither of these two assumptions are warranted.

The BSA-IDC report reasons as follows: Pirates don't pay taxes on the illegal software that they sell, so that is tax evasion and consequently a tax loss. It states:

Higher demand for legal software will result in higher flow of license volume through the supply chain, resulting in increase in volume of business transactions. Each transaction adds a certain percentage of the deal or value added to the state exchequer's coffers in the form of indirect tax revenue[...] Increase in demand will also result in increased employment. Consequently, revenues from direct taxes will be increased for the government, as employees join newly created high-paying jobs.

How tax actually works

That reasoning is flawed. The majority of software piracy in India happens through two methods: violation of software licence terms by using the software on more computers than it is licensed for; and pre-loading of illegal software by computer sellers. Those 'computer seller' pirates do not sell the software separately, but bundle it with the computer as an additional service. In other words, they don't charge for it in the first place. So, quite clearly, there is no tax evasion.

Despite there being no tax evasion, there is the possibility of tax loss for the state. That would happen when instead of doing taxable activity A with with their money, they do non-taxable activity B. Putting money in special government bonds instead of spending it on software, for instance, is one such instance. However, that is a strange, unwarranted assumption. People don't always put the money that they don't spend on software into government bonds. It is a much more reasonable assumption that people would spend that money on other consumables, like food or other such tangible commodities.

Lastly, there is the unwarranted assumption that increase in demand for legal software increases employment. In fact, it is a much more reasonable assumption that increase in piracy increases employment in case of developing countries. Printing ("DTP") shops use pirated versions of Photoshop, CorelDraw and InDesign, computer education centres use pirated versions of Microsoft Windows, offices use pirated versions of Microsoft Word and Excel. If these didn't teach their employees the use of pirated software, millions of people would lose their jobs. All of these employees pay direct taxes. There is no analysis in the BSA-IDC report that accounts for this, treating all these millions of people as non-existent for purposes of their analysis.

Increasing tax: Make MNC software companies pay full taxes

Thus, there is no real tax loss to the government if the money that would have been spent on commercial software was instead spent on some other commodity. Indeed, there might even be an increase in tax collection because software companies, including leading ones such as Microsoft, are much more likely to avoid taxes than companies that deal in tangible commodities. There are well-known routes of decreasing tax liability for intangible goods such as software. Software companies normally state that they license software instead of selling it (as this suits them on issues such as customs duties), but when it comes to income tax, they try to paint the transaction as a sale of a product. (Microsoft, for instance claims that its earnings in India are 'business income' and not 'royalties' and hence is exempt under the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement between India and the USA.) A company that deals with tangible commodities has no such 'licensing vs. sale' loop-hole that they can try to exploit. Further, many software companies are located in special economic zones that are "software exporting zones", and hence get large tax deductions.

In India, for instance, Microsoft is resisting payment of income tax for by routing all licensing to distributors in India through a shell company in Singapore and holding that Microsoft India had no income tax liabilities. Microsoft has been fined Rs. 2 crore because it tried to separate the importing of software into India from the (more valuable) granting of licences to customers and pay only nominal customs duties on the former and under-declaring the value of the latter as zero. From nine Microsoft dealers a total of Rs 255 crore was collected as tax. Of the roughly Rs. 4000 crores loss that the BSA-IDC report claims, around 6% is realizable from just a single tax (customs duties) from 9 companies dealing in the products of one company. If we multiply this by all taxes (income tax included) amongst all the dealers of all the constituent companies of BSA, then the Indian government might recover more from taxes than is supposedly lost to piracy!

Elsewhere around the globe, the 'Double Irish' arrangement, the 'Dutch Sandwich' route and other such are used by MNC software companies to evade taxes. Just as there are tax havens, there are some IPR havens that cater to companies selling/licensing software and other such intangible commodities.

If only these software companies were to stop evading taxes in the countries in which they sell software, then the government's tax collections would automatically increase.

Final idiocies, and conclusion

In the BSA-IDC report, they write: "Assessing the relationship between software piracy rates and UN Human Development Index (a measure of average achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of human development) suggests that countries with greater rates of software piracy tend to have lower levels of economic development. This further strengthens the hypothesis that IP rights (IPR) enforcement increases economic activity.".

This is as sensible as saying "countries with greater rates of industrial espionage (such as France, Germany, and USA) tend to have higher levels of economic development" strengthens the hypothesis that industrial espionage increases economic development. While it is empirically true that most countries with greater rates of software piracy have lower levels of economic development, it is equally true that countries with lower levels of economic development (being countries with poorer populations) have more software piracy. It is equally true that software piracy decreases if the cost of software decreases, as shown by the more carefully-conducted analysis in the Media Piracy in Emerging Economies report.

To use greater software piracy and lower economic development as evidence of the causal link between IPR enforcement and economic activity is to betray absolute ignorance about both economics and logic.

The startlingly poor level of analysis of the BSA-IDC report leaves no question that the conclusions were arrived at independently of the analysis. Such misleading analysis is worse than trash: it is downright dangerous as an instrument of policy setting.

To increase tax receipts, the government may as well start by making BSA's constituent companies pay all the taxes they owe.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/calling-out-the-bsa-on-bs

Call for Comments for Report on the Online Video Environment in India

pranesh — 2012-12-14T12:12:14Z

The Open Video Alliance, the Centre for Internet and Society and iCommons are pleased to announce a public call for comments on version 1 of "Online Video Environment in India: A Survey Report".

This report is an outcome of a research project that seeks to survey the online video environment in India and the opportunities this new medium presents for creative expression and civic engagement. This report by Siddharth Chadha, Ben Moskowitz, and Pranesh Prakash seeks to define key issues in the Indian context and begins to develop a short-term policy framework to address them.

The basic assumption of this paper is that the online video medium should support creative and technical innovation, competition, and public participation, and that open source technology can help develop these traits. These assumptions are not elaborated upon here. Instead, this report looks at questions of “openness” that are not strictly technological and legal; that are specific to video in India; and that provide points of entry to a simple policy framework.

Please do write in to Ben Moskowitz (ben at openvideoalliance.org) and Pranesh Prakash (pranesh at cis-india.org) with any suggestions, criticisms, or general comments that you have by January 20, 2011.

Download the paper.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/blog-old/comments-online-video-report

Breaking Down Section 66A of the IT Act

pranesh — 2012-12-14T09:51:17Z

Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, which prescribes 'punishment for sending offensive messages through communication service, etc.' is widely held by lawyers and legal academics to be unconstitutional. In this post Pranesh Prakash explores why that section is unconstitutional, how it came to be, the state of the law elsewhere, and how we can move forward.

Back in February 2009 (after the IT Amendment Act, 2008 was hurriedly passed on December 22, 2008 by the Lok Sabha, and a day after by the Rajya Sabha[1] but before it was notified on October 27, 2009) I had written that s.66A is "patently in violation of Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India":

Section 66A which punishes persons for sending offensive messages is overly broad, and is patently in violation of Art. 19(1)(a) of our Constitution. The fact that some information is "grossly offensive" (s.66A(a)) or that it causes "annoyance" or "inconvenience" while being known to be false (s.66A(c)) cannot be a reason for curbing the freedom of speech unless it is directly related to decency or morality, public order, or defamation (or any of the four other grounds listed in Art. 19(2)). It must be stated here that many argue that John Stuart Mill's harm principle provides a better framework for freedom of expression than Joel Feinberg's offence principle. The latter part of s.66A(c), which talks of deception, is sufficient to combat spam and phishing, and hence the first half, talking of annoyance or inconvenience is not required. Additionally, it would be beneficial if an explanation could be added to s.66A(c) to make clear what "origin" means in that section. Because depending on the construction of that word s.66A(c) can, for instance, unintentionally prevent organisations from using proxy servers, and may prevent a person from using a sender envelope different from the "from" address in an e-mail (a feature that many e-mail providers like Gmail implement to allow people to send mails from their work account while being logged in to their personal account). Furthermore, it may also prevent remailers, tunnelling, and other forms of ensuring anonymity online. This doesn't seem to be what is intended by the legislature, but the section might end up having that effect. This should hence be clarified.

I stand by that analysis. But given that it is quite sparse, in this post I will examine s.66A in detail.

Here's what s. 66A of the IT (Amendment) Act, 2008 states:

66A. Punishment for sending offensive messages through communication service, etc.,
Any person who sends, by means of a computer resource or a communication device,—
(a) any information that is grossly offensive or has menacing character;
(b) any information which he knows to be false, but for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred, or ill will, persistently by making use of such computer resource or a communication device,
(c) any electronic mail or electronic mail message for the purpose of causing annoyance or inconvenience or to deceive or to mislead the addressee or recipient about the origin of such messages

shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and with fine.

Explanation: For the purposes of this section, terms "electronic mail" and "electronic mail message" means a message or information created or transmitted or received on a computer, computer system, computer resource or communication device including attachments in text, images, audio, video and any other electronic record, which may be transmitted with the message.[2]

A large part of s.66A can be traced back to s.10(2) of the UK's Post Office (Amendment) Act, 1935:

If any person —
(a) sends any message by telephone which is grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene, or menacing character; or
(b) sends any message by telephone, or any telegram, which he knows to be false, for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, or needless anxiety to any other person; or
(c) persistently makes telephone calls without reasonable cause and for any such purposes as aforesaid;
he shall be liable upon summary conviction to a fine not exceeding ten pounds, or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month, or to both such fine and imprisonment.

Section 66A bears a striking resemblance to the three parts of this law from 1935, with clauses (b) and (c) being merged in the Indian law into a single clause (b) of s.66A, with a whole bunch of new "purposes" added. Interestingly, the Indian Post Office Act, 1898, was never amended to add this provision.

The differences between the two are worth exploring.

Term of Punishment

The first major difference is that the maximum term of imprisonment in the 1935 Act is only one month, compared to three years in s.66A of the IT Act. It seems the Indian government decided to subject the prison term to hyper-inflation to cover for the time. If this had happened for the punishment for, say, criminal defamation, then that would have a jail term of up to 72 years! The current equivalent laws in the UK are the Communications Act, 2003 (s. 127) and the Malicious Communications Act 1988 (s.1) for both of which the penalty is up to 6 months' imprisonment or to a maximum fine of £5000 or both. What's surprising is that in the Information Technology (Amendment) Bill of 2006, the penalty for section 66A was up to 2 years, and it was changed on December 16, 2008 through an amendment moved by Mr. A. Raja (the erstwhile Minister of Communications and IT) to 3 years. Given that parts of s.66A(c) resemble nuisance, it is instructive to note the term of punishment in the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for criminal nuisance: a fine of Rs. 200 with no prison term.

"Sending" vs. "Publishing"

J. Sai Deepak, a lawyer, has made an interesting point that the IT Act uses "send" as part of its wording, and not "publish". Given that, only messages specifically directed at another would be included. While this is an interesting proposition, it cannot be accepted because: (1) even blog posts are "sent", albeit to the blog servers — s.66A doesn't say who it has to be sent to; (2) in the UK the Communications Act 2003 uses similar language and that, unlike the Malicious Communication Act 1988 which says "sends to another person", has been applied to public posts to Twitter, etc.; (3) The explanation to s.66A(c) explicitly uses the word "transmitted", which is far broader than "send", and it would be difficult to reconcile them unless "send" can encompass sending to the publishing intermediary like Twitter.

Part of the narrowing down of s.66A should definitely focus on making it applicable only to directed communication (as is the case with telephones, and with the UK's Malicious Communication Act), and not be applicable to publishing.

Section 66A(c)

Section 66A(c) was also inserted through an amendment moved by Mr. Raja on December 16, 2008, which was passed by the Lok Sabha on December 22, 2008, and a day after by the Rajya Sabha. (The version introduced in Parliament in 2006 had only 66A(a) and (b).) This was done in response to the observation by the Standing Committee on Information Technology that there was no provision for spam. Hence it is clear that this is meant as an anti-spam provision. However, the careless phrasing makes it anything but an anti-spam provision. If instead of "for the purpose of causing annoyance or inconvenience or to deceive or to mislead the addressee or recipient about the origin of such messages" it was "for the purpose of causing annoyance and inconvenience and to deceive and to mislead the addressee or recipient about the origin of such messages", it would have been slightly closer to an anti-spam provision, but even then doesn't have the two core characteristics of spam: that it be unsolicited and that it be sent in bulk. (Whether only commercial messages should be regarded as spam is an open question.) That it arise from a duplicitous origin is not a requirement of spam (and in the UK, for instance, that is only an aggravating factor for what is already a fine-able activity).

Curiously, the definitional problems do not stop there, but extend to the definitions of "electronic mail" and "electronic mail message" in the 'explanation' as well. Those are so vast that more or less anything communicated electronically is counted as an e-mail, including forms of communication that aren't aimed at particular recipients the way e-mail is.

Hence, the anti-spam provision does not cover spam, but covers everything else. This provision is certainly unconstitutional.

Section 66A(b)

Section 66A(b) has three main elements: (1) that the communication be known to be false; (2) that it be for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will; (3) that it be communicated persistently. The main problem here is, of course, (2). "Annoyance" and "inconvenience", "insult", "ill will" and "hatred" are very different from "injury", "danger", and "criminal intimidation". That a lawmaker could feel that punishment for purposes this disparate belonged together in a single clause is quite astounding and without parallel (except in the rest of the IT Act). That's akin to having a single provision providing equal punishment for calling someone a moron ("insult") and threatening to kill someone ("criminal intimidation"). While persistent false communications for the purpose of annoying, insulting, inconveniencing, or causing ill will should not be criminalised (if need be, having it as a civil offence would more than suffice), doing so for the purpose of causing danger or criminal intimidation should. However, the question arises whether you need a separate provision in the IT Act for that. Criminal intimidation is already covered by ss. 503 and 506 of the IPC. Similarly, different kinds of causing danger are taken care of in ss.188, 268, 283, 285, 289, and other provisions. Similarly with the other "purposes" listed there, if, for instance, a provision is needed to penalise hoax bomb threats, then the provision clearly should not be mentioning words like "annoyance", and should not be made "persistent". (At any rate, s. 505(1) of the IPC suffices for hoax bomb threats, so you don't need a separate provision in the IT Act).

I would argue that in its current form this provision is unconstitutional, since there is no countervailing interest in criminalising false and persistent "insults", etc., that will allow those parts of this provision to survive the test of 'reasonableness' under Art.19(2). Furthermore, even bits that survive are largely redundant. While this unconstitutionality could be cured by better, narrower wording, even then one would need to ensure that there is no redundancy due to other provisions in other laws.

Section 66A(a)

In s.66A(a), the question immediately arises whether the information that is "grossly offensive" or "menacing" need to be addressed at someone specific and be seen as "grossly offensive" or "menacing" by that person, or be seen by a 'reasonable man' test.

Additionally, the term "grossly offensive" will have to be read in such a heightened manner as to not include merely causing offence. The one other place where this phrase is used in Indian law is in s.20(b) of the Indian Post Office Act (prohibiting the sending by post of materials of an indecent, obscene, seditious, scurrilous, threatening, or grossly offensive character). The big difference between s.20(b) of the IPO Act and s.66A of the IT Act is that the former is clearly restricted to one-to-one communication (the way the UK's Malicious Communication Act 1988 is). Reducing the scope of s.66A to direct communications would make it less prone to challenge.

Additionally, in order to ensure constitutionality, courts will have to ensure that "grossly offensive" does not simply end up meaning "offensive", and that the maximum punishment is not disproportionately high as it currently is. Even laws specifically aimed at online bullying, such as the UK's Protection from Harassment Act 1997, can have unintended effects. As George Monbiot notes, the "first three people to be prosecuted under [the Protection from Harassment Act] were all peaceful protesters".

Constitutional Arguments in Importing Laws from the UK

The plain fact is that the Indian Constitution is stronger on free speech grounds than the (unwritten) UK Constitution, and the judiciary has wide powers of judicial review of statutes (i.e., the ability of a court to strike down a law passed by Parliament as 'unconstitutional'). Judicial review of statutes does not exist in the UK (with review under its EU obligations being the exception) as they believe that Parliament is supreme, unlike India. Putting those two aspects together, a law that is valid in the UK might well be unconstitutional in India for failing to fall within the eight octagonal walls of the reasonable restrictions allowed under Art.19(2). That raises the question of how they deal with such broad wording in the UK.

Genealogy of UK Law on Sending 'Indecent', 'Menacing', 'Grossly Offensive' Messages

Quoting from the case of DPP v. Collins [2006] UKHL 40 [6]:

The genealogy of [s. 127(1) of the Communication Act] may be traced back to s.10(2)(a) of the Post Office (Amendment) Act, 1935, which made it an offence to send any message by telephone which is grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene or menacing character. That subsection was reproduced with no change save of punctuation in s.66(a) of the Post Office Act 1953. It was again reproduced in s.78 of the Post Office Act 1969, save that "by means of a public telecommunication service" was substituted for "by telephone" and "any message" was changed to "a message or other matter". Section 78 was elaborated but substantially repeated in s.49(1)(a) of the British Telecommunications Act 1981 and was re-enacted (save for the substitution of "system" for "service") in s.43(1)(a) of the Telecommunications Act 1984. Section 43(1)(a) was in the same terms as s.127(1)(a) of the 2003 Act, save that it referred to "a public telecommunication system" and not (as in s.127(1)(a)) to a "public electronic communications network". Sections 11(1)(b) of the Post Office Act 1953 and 85(3) of the Postal Services Act 2000 made it an offence to send certain proscribed articles by post.

While the above quotation talks about s.127(1) it is equally true about s.127(2) as well. In addition to that, in 1988, the Malicious Communications Act (s.1) was passed to prohibit one-to-one harassment along similar lines.

The UK's Post Office Act was eclipsed by the Telecommunications Act in 1984, which in turn was replaced in 2003 by the Communications Act. (By contrast, we still stick on to the colonial Indian Post Office Act, 1898.) Provisions from the 1935 Post Office Act were carried forward into the Telecommunications Act (s.43 on the "improper use of public telecommunication system"), and subsequently into s.127 of the Communications Act ("improper use of public electronic communications network"). Section 127 of the Communications Act states:

127. Improper use of public electronic communications network
(1) A person is guilty of an offence if he —
(a) sends by means of a public electronic communications network a message or other matter that is grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene or menacing character; or
(b) causes any such message or matter to be so sent.
(2) A person is guilty of an offence if, for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience or needless anxiety to another, he —
(a) sends by means of a public electronic communications network, a message that he knows to be false,
(b) causes such a message to be sent; or
(c) persistently makes use of a public electronic communications network.
(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable, on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, or to both.
(4) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to anything done in the course of providing a programme service (within the meaning of the Broadcasting Act 1990 (c. 42)).

Currently in the UK there are calls for repeal of s.127. In a separate blog post I will look at how the UK courts have 'read down' the provisions of s.127 and other similar laws in order to be compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights.

Comparison between S. 66A and Other Statutes

Section 144, IPC, 1860

Power to issue order in urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger

...obstruction, annoyance or injury to any person lawfully employed, or danger to human life, health or safety, or a disturbance of the public tranquillity

Babulal Parate v. State of Maharastra and Ors. [1961 AIR SC 884] (Magistrates order under s. 144 of the Cr. PC, 1973 was in violation of Art.19(1)(a) of the Constitution).

A special thanks is due to Snehashish Ghosh for compiling the below table.

Section	Term(s)/phrase(s) used in 66A	Term(s)/ phrase(s) used in similar sections
Section 66A (heading)	Punishment for sending offensive messages through communication service, etc	Section 127, CA, 2003, "Improper use of public electronic communications network"
Section 66A(a)	Any person who sends, by means of a computer resource or a communication device	Section 1(1), MCA 1988, "Any person who sends to another person..."
Section 66A(a)	Grossly offensive	Section 1(1)(a)(i), MCA 1988; Section 127(1)(a),CA, 2003; Section 10(2)(a), Post Office (Amendment) Act, 1935; Section 43(1)(a), Telecommunications Act 1984; Section 20, India Post Act 1898
Section 66A(a)	Menacing character	Section127(1)(a),CA, 2003
Section 66A(b)	Any information which he knows to be false	Section 1(1)(a)(iii), MCA 1988 "information which is false and known or believed to be false by the sender"; Section 127(2)(a), CA, 2003, "a message that he knows to be false"
Section 66A(b) “purpose of...”	Causing annoyance	Section127(2), CA, 2003
	Inconvenience	Section 127 (2), CA, 2003
	Danger
	Insult	Section 504, IPC, 1860
	Injury	Section 44 IPC, 1860, "The word 'injury' denotes any harm whatever illegally caused to any person, in body, mind, reputation or property."
	Criminal intimidation	Sections 503 and 505 (2), IPC, 1860
	Enmity, hatred or ill-will	Section 153A(1)(a), IPC, 1860
	Persistently by making use of such computer resource or a communication device	Section 127(2)(c), CA, 2003, "persistently makes use of a public electronic communications network."
Section 66A(c)	Deceive or to mislead	-

Notes
MCA 1988: Malicious Communications Act (s.1)
CA: Communications Act 2003 (s.127)
*Replaced by Communications Act 2003

[1]. The Information Technology (Amendment) Bill, 2008, was one amongst the eight bills that were passed in fifteen minutes on December 16, 2008.
[2]. Inserted vide Information Technology Amendment Act, 2008.

This was re-posted in Outlook (November 28, 2012)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/breaking-down-section-66-a-of-the-it-act

Ban on pornography temporary, says government

pranesh — 2015-09-13T08:46:24Z

The government has taken a dramatic U-turn from its stated position on internet pornography.

The article was published in Business Standard on August 4, 2015. Pranesh Prakash has been quoted.

A year after conveying to the Supreme Court that a blanket ban on internet pornography was not possible, through the department of electronics and information technology, it has asked internet providers to disable 857 websites that carry adult content. A senior official from the department of telecommunications (DoT) said the ban was a temporary measure, till the final order is announced by the apex court on August 10.

The government is looking at setting up an ombudsman to oversee cyber content, which will have representatives from NGOs, child activists and the government. The DoT official said, “There has to be some kind of regulatory oversight away from the government intervention… An ombudsman might be set up for overseeing cyber related content issues.”

The genesis of the current notification lies in the public interest litigation (PIL) filed by advocate Vijay Panjwani in April 2013. The PIL has sought curbs on these websites on the internet, especially the ones showing child pornography. The senior DoT official conveyed that the blocking of 857 websites was in compliance with the SC directive asking for measures to block porn sites, particularly those dealing with child pornography.

The July 31 notification from DoT has advised internet service licensees to disable content on 857 websites, as the content "hosted on these websites relates to morality and decency as given in Article 19(2) of the Constitution of India". The government had stated last year that it was not technologically feasible to monitor such contents as it would require physical intervention, which would impact data speeds.

In December 2014, the government had approached telecom providers and internet service providers to help identify such sites, but the service providers did not cooperate. Consequently, the government has gone ahead and identified 857 websites. However, the government has not given any detail as what was the criterion to identify such websites.

Pranesh Prakash, policy director at the Centre for Internet and Society, says DoT has used the provision of 79 (3) (b) of the IT Act, which is a convoluted Section that the intermediatory (ISPs) may lose protection from liability. This section is very convulated, the provisions for website blocking does not allow blocking porn. In section 69 (a), the entire procedure is that it allows an opportunity for the blocked website to be heard. “I can't comment on the reasons that the government for doing this. I know the order says the ban relates to morality, decency," adds Prakash.

Last year, the government took a position that said blocking these websites was not feasible, given that these sites are hosted outside India. In case of any ban, these sites can be relocated within hours to bypass it. Pavan Duggal, an advocate who specialises in cyber laws, has called the disablement 'cosmetic,' as it will not have the requisite deterrent effect. Duggal says: "This is a lost battle from the word go, as it is impossible to disable access permanently."

Watching such content in India is currently not an offence and, thus, the government is invoking “morality and decency” while seeking a curb on a fundamental right — Freedom of Speech & Expression. Under Article 19 (2) of the Constitution, the state can curb a fundamental right in order to maintain public order, decency or morality.

TO BAN OR NOT TO BAN

2013

Advocate Vijay Panjwani & Kamlesh Vaswani file PIL seeking curbs on internet pornography

Aug 2014

Supreme Court bench under Chief Justice R M Lodha agreed with the PIL and sought strict laws to curb online content

8 Jul 2015

Chief Justice of India H L Dattu upholds personal liberty and refuses to pass an interim order. Asks government to take a stand on the issue
CJI, heading a three-judge Bench, asks government to a detailed affidavit within four weeks

Jul 31

DoT sends notification seeking ban on 857 websites
Currently, there are no laws banning internet pornography in India, other than those related to children
Government’s stated position has been that it is difficult to curb online content

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/business-standard-august-4-2015-ban-on-pornography-temporary-says-government

Arguments Against the PUPFIP Bill

pranesh — 2011-09-12T11:03:09Z

The Protection and Utilisation of Public Funded Intellectual Property Bill (PUPFIP Bill) is a new legislation being considered by Parliament, which was introduced in the 2008 winter session of the Rajya Sabha. It is modelled on the American Bayh-Dole Act (University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act) of 1980. On this page, we explore some of the reasons that the bill is unnecessary, and how it will be harmful if passed.

Summary

How is the legislation unnecessary?

The Indian government does not have vast reserves of underutilized patents, as the U.S. did in 1980.
Technology transfer is very important, but pushing IPRs aggressively is not the best way of ensuring technology transfer.

How is the legislation harmful?

Excessive patenting lead to gridlocks and retards innovation.
The legislation makes mandatory that which is optional now, and is anyway being followed in many institutions.
Copyright, trademark, etc., seem to be covered under the definition of “public funded IP”.
It will result in a form of double taxation for research, and will increase the consumer cost of all products based on publicly-funded research.
It could have unintended consequences of varied kinds, including discouraging fundamental research as well as discouraging industrial research.
Non-disclosure requirements in the Bill restricts the dissemination of research within the academic community, and curtails freedom of speech.
Exclusive licensing enables restriction on the dissemination of academic research in the marketplace, and increase in cost of products based on public-funded research.

Arguments

How is the legislation unnecessary?

1) The Indian government does not have vast reserves of underutilized patents, as the U.S. did in 1980.

The idea behind the Bayh-Dole Act was that the research funded by the government (and owned, in the US, by the government) was being underutilized. In 1980, over 28,000 unlicensed patents lay with the U.S. government.[1] The Act shifted the title of such works from the government to the University or small business that conducted the research, thus allowing them to take out patents on the research outputs. In India, under present laws, the researcher(s) own the rights over their research whether they be government-funded or not. Usually, due to employment contracts, the research institutes already have the right to patent their inventions. Thus, currently, there is no need for an enabling legislation in this regard, as there was in the U.S.

In fact, currently, the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) has over 5173 patents (counting both those in force and those under dispute), while only 222 patents are licensed (with 68 of them being under dispute). Thus, even with the IP being in the institute's hands, there is a "problem" situation similar to that which necessitated Bayh-Dole in the U.S. Thus, quite contrary to the aims of the Act, further patenting will only lead to a situation of even more underutilized patents.

2) Technology transfer is very important, but pushing IPRs aggressively is not the best way of ensuring technology transfer.

At a recent seminar held at NUJS Kolkata on the PUPFIP Bill, it was revealed that while IIT-Kharagpur’s TTO-equivalent (called the Sponsored Research & Industrial Consultancy division - SRIC) currently handles over Rs.300 crores through 850 projects, only around Rs. 5-15 crores (exact figures weren't available) are currently made through its patent portfolio.[2] Thus patents don't seem, on the face of things, to be the best way of ensuring technology transfer. Indeed, the oft-cited 28,0000 unlicensed patents held by the U.S. government were composed primarily of patents for which industry had refused to take exclusive licences.[3]

Many contend that one of the most important functions of a patent is to get inventors to disclose their inventions rather than keep them as secrets. This reason for awarding a patent is invalidated if stronger protection is granted to trade secrets (no term limit, for instance) than for patents. Secondly, this reason for granting patents is not valid in case of government-funded research in academia and research institutes. The culture of publication and the economy of reputation are sufficient to ensure disclosure. Even without these intrinsic factors, there grant requirements can necessitate publication. If mere publication is believed to be insufficient, then the government would do well to ask for technology dissemination plans before grants are made. At any rate, monopoly rights in the form of patents are thoroughly unnecessary.

How is the legislation harmful?

1) Excessive patenting lead to gridlocks and retard innovation.

It sees protection of IPR as the sole means of encouraging innovation and driving research to the doorstep of consumers. The trend around the world is that of exploring alternative forms of spurring innovation. Even in India, CSIR has gone for an innovative "Open Source Drug Discovery" project, which has proven very successful so far. Furthermore, recent literature shows that excessive patenting is harming research and innovation by creating gridlocks.[4] If platform technologies and basic research (such as SNP) gets mired in patents, then the transaction costs increase (not only in terms of money, but more importantly in administrative terms). This ends up in research clearances getting blocked, and thus retards innovation. It must be remembered that intellectual property is not only an output, but also an input. The more aggressively the outputs are guarded and prevented from being shared, the more the inputs will be affected. The study of patent thickets and gridlocks has reached such a stage that the U.S. law has been changed to reflect this. Firstly, the Bayh-Dole Act was amended in 2000 to state that the objectives of the Bayh-Dole Act were to be carried out "without unduly encumbering future research and discovery". Now, the courts (in the Bilski case) have increased the standard of obviousness in patent law (which means that less patents will be granted). Furthermore, the U.S.P.T.O. and the U.S. Senate are currently considering means of overhauling the U.S. patent system, which many fear is close to breaking down due to over-patenting. All these are signs that the footsteps we are seeking to follow are themselves turning back.

2) The legislation makes mandatory that which is optional now, and is anyway being followed in many institutions.

While the CSIR labs pursue patents aggressively, they also run the OSSD project. The latter might not be permissible if the Act is passed as it stands. Furthermore, this would increase the number of underutilized patents, which is a problem faced currently by CSIR, which has had an aggressive patent policy since the 1990s. Unlicensed patents constitute around 93% of CSIR's total patent portfolio. (In contrast, MIT averages around 50% licensing of patents.) If aggressive patenting is made mandatory, it adds substantially to administrative costs of all institutes which receive any grants from the government. These institutes might not be large enough to merit a dedicated team of professionals to handle

3) Copyright, trademark, etc., seem to be covered under the definition of "public funded IP".

This leads to a ridiculous need to attempt to commercialise all government-funded research literature (and the government funds science research, social sciences, arts, etc.). Furthermore, while the definition of "public funded IP" includes copyrights, trademarks, etc., yet the substantive provisions seem to only include those forms of IP which have to be registered compulsorily (copyright and trademark don't -- copyright comes into existence when an original work is expressed in a medium, and trademark can come into existence by use). Importantly, seeking to commercialise all copyrighted works of research would hamper the movement for open access to scholarly literature. The inititative towards open access to scholarly literature is something that National Knowledge Commission has recommended, and is a move that would result in increased dissemination of public-funded research, which seems to be an aim of the PUPFIP Bill as well.

4) It will result in a form of double taxation for research, and will increase the consumer cost of all products based on publicly-funded research.

This bill would increase the consumer cost of all products based on publicly-funded research, because of the additional burden of patent royalties.

Public funds research -> Institute patents research -> Pharma MNC gets exclusive license over research -> Drug reaches market.

Assuming an exclusive licence: Cost of the drug = cost of manufacturing, storage, etc. + mark-up (monopolistic) cost + cost of licence.

Thus, in effect, the public has to pay twice for the research: it pays once to enable the scientist to conduct the research, and once again in the form of royalties to have that research brought to the marketplace.

5) It could have unintended consequences of varied kinds, including discouraging fundamental research as well as discouraging industrial research.

The former could happen since institutions and individual scientists have a financial incentive to shift their focus away from fundamental research; the latter, conversely, because the filings and bureaucracy involved could drive scientists away from reporting or even engaging in industrial research [pdf]. Faculty and researcher involvement in the business of licensing is a sub-optimal usage of their talents, and there are scientists who would rather stay away from business (as is shown by the intake of former industry-researchers into government-funded labs such as those of CSIR).

6) Non-disclosure requirements in the Bill restricts the dissemination of research within the academic community, and curtails freedom of speech.

This will bring about a shift in science and research which is always done upon others' work. This is why in the U.S., the National Institute of Health (N.I.H.) has sought to ensure (without any legal authority) that it only finances that research that on single nucleotide polymorphism (S.N.P.) which is not patented, and is shared freely amongst scholars. Since this requirement of the N.I.H.'s does not have any legal backing (since it is contradictory to the Bayh-Dole Act), institutions are free to get the grant from N.I.H. and then go ahead and patent their inventions.

7) Exclusive licensing enables restriction on the dissemination of academic research in the marketplace, and increase in cost of products based on public-funded research.

The bill allows for both assignment of licences as well as exclusive licences. Both of these enable monopolistic pricing to be undertaken by the licensee/assignee. There are not even any mechanisms in the Act to ensure, for instance, that a public call is made to ascertain that no parties are willing to consider a non-exclusive licence. Patents are generally said to grant a monopoly right because of the opportunity to recover costs of research and development. When the research is being done by public-funded money, there is no justification for monopoly rights on that research, since there are no excessive costs to recover.

Footnotes:

[1] See So et al. and Thursby and Thursby, quoted in the National Knowledge Commission's letter to the Prime Minister.

[2] See Prof. Vivekanandans' presentation "Patenting and Technology Transfer-the IIT Khargpur Experience"

[3] See Anthony So et al., Is Bayh-Dole Good for Developing Countries, 6 PLoS Biol e262 (2008)

[4] See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Science 698 (1998)

Additional Resources

On the PUPFIP Bill

February 5, 2004: NIPER holds parallel session of Indian Science Congress (Express Pharma)
October 27, 2006: Susan Finston, India to Propose New Technology Transfer Legislation (Bayh-Dole 25)
January 16, 2007: National Knowledge Commision's Letter to Indian Prime Minister (National Knowledge Commission)
April 15, 2007: Archita Bhatta, Proposed IPR law raises concern (Down to Earth)
May 31, 2007: Science & Technology needs to be core of the economic development says Kapil Sibal (PIB Press Release)
November 13, 2007: Government Accords Approval to National Biotechnology Development Strategy (PIB Press Release)
February 1, 2008: Yudhijit Bhattacharjee, Indian Government Hopes Bill Will Stimulate Innovation (Science)
February 19, 2008: Shamnad Basheer, Exporting Bayh Dole to India: Whither Transparency? (Part 1) (Part 2) (SpicyIP)
March 17, 2008: Kalpana Pathak, Varsities may soon own patent rights (Business Standard)
March 17, 2008: P.T. Jyothi Datta, Public-funded research may pay dividends for scientists (Business Line)
March 17, 2008: Joff Wild, India considers Bayh-Dole style legislation (IAM Magazine)
April 30, 2008: M.K. Unnikrishnan and Pradeepti Nayak, Lessons from Bayh Dole Act and its relevance to India (PharmaBiz)
July 2008: Sean M. O'Connor, Historical Context of U.S. Bayh-Dole Act: Implications for Indian Government Funded Research Patent Policy (STEM Newsletter)
July 7, 2008: Shamnad Basheer, Mysterious Indian "Bayh Dole" Bill: SpicyIP Procures a Copy (SpicyIP)
July 09, 2008: Latha Jishnu, Does India need a Bayh-Dole Act? (Business Standard)
September 2008: V.C. Vivekanandan, Transplanting Bayh-Dole Act- Issues at Stake Authors (13 Journal of Intell. Prop. 480)
September 18, 2008: Shamnad Basheer, Indian Patent Bill: Let's not be too hasty (SciDev.net)
October 28, 2008: Anthony So et al., Is Bayh-Dole Good for Developing Countries, 6 PLoS Biol e262 (2008)
October 31, 2008: Cabinet gives approval for Protection and Utilization of Public Funded Intellectual Property Bill, 2008 (PIB Press Release)
November 2008: Annette Lin et al., The Bayh-Dole Act and Promoting the Transfer of Technology of Publicly Funded-Research (UAEM White Paper on the Proposed Indian Bayh-Dole Analogue)
November 1, 2008: Editorial: Not in Public Interest (Mint)
November 12, 2008: Ben Butkus, As India Mulls Bill Modeled on Bayh-Dole, Critics Claim It May Stifle Innovation (Biotech Transfer Weekly)
December 16, 2008: Pranesh Prakash, Indian "Bayh Dole" Bill before Parliament (Commons Law)
January 23, 2009: Editorial: Time to Rethink Intellectual Property Laws (SciDev.net)
March 12, 2009: Feroz Ali Khader, Does Patenting Research Change the Culture of Science? (The Hindu)
April 24, 2009: Sunil Abraham & Pranesh Prakash, Does India Need Its Own Bayh-Dole? (Indian Express)
September 21, 2009: C.H. Unnikrishnan, Proposed Patent Bill Is Flawed, Say Experts (Mint)
September 23, 2009: Editorial: An Idea That's A Patent Misfit (Mint)
October 2009: Bhaven N. Sampat, The Bayh-Dole Model in Developing Countries: Reflections on the Indian Bill on Publicly Funded Intellectual Property (UNCTAD - ICTSD Policy Brief No. 5)
January 2010: Amit Shovon Ray & Sabyasachi Saha, Patenting Public-Funded Research for Technology Transfer: A Conceptual-Empirical Synthesis of US Evidence and Lessons for India (ICRIER Working Paper No. 244)
January 2010: Mrinalini Kochupillai, The Protection and Utilization of Public Funded Intellectual Property Bill, 2008: A Critique in the Light of India's Innovation Environment, 15 J. Intell. Prop. Rights 19 (2010)
January 16, 2010: Amit Shovon Ray & Sabyasachi Saha, Intellectual Bottlenecks (Financial Express)
January 21, 2010: Latha Jishnu, Perils of the US Model (Business Standard)
January 22, 2010: Rema Nagarajan, Scientists Fume Over New Patent Bill (Times of India)
January 26, 2010: Shamnad Basheer, The Problem with Patents (Mint)
February 5, 2010: Shalini Butani, Public Research May Become More Private (Business Line)
February 8, 2010: Anika Gupta, Scientists Want Changes in Innovation Bill (Mint)
February 9, 2010: C.H. Unnikrishnan, Parliament Panel Wants Govt Review on Innovation Bill (Mint)
February 15, 2010: Leena Menghaney, A Bad Example from the U.S. (Down to Earth)
February 19, 2010: Pranesh Prakash, A Patent Conundrum (Indian Express)
SpicyIP coverage by tag 'Bayh Dole'
Presentations from NUJS, Kolkata conference on the PUPFIP Bill

On Bayh-Dole

Newspapers and Magazines

Academic Journals

Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for University Innovation, 20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1031 (2005)
Anthony So et al., Is Bayh-Dole Good for Developing Countries, 6 PLoS Biol. e262 (2008)
Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 289 (2003)
David C. Mowery & Arvids A. Aiedonis, Numbers, Quality, and Entry: How Has the Bayh-Dole Act Affected U.S. University Patenting and Licensing?, 1 Innovation Pol'y Econ. 187 (2000)
David C. Mowery, et al., Learning to Patent: Institutional Experience, Learning, and the Characteristics of U.S. University Patents After the Bayh-Dole Act, 1981-1992, 48 Mgmt. Sci. 73 (2002)
Donald Kennedy, Editorial: Enclosing the Research Commons, 294 Science 2249 (2001)
F.M. Scherer, The Political Economy of Patent Policy Reform in the United States, 7 Colorado J. Telecomm. High Tech. L. 167 (2009)
Henry Steck, Corporatization of the University: Seeking Conceptual Clarity, 585 Annals of Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 66 (2003)
Jason Owen-Smith, Trends and Transitions in the Institutional Environment for Public and Private Science, 49 Higher Educ. 91 (2005)
Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, University Licensing and the Bayh-Dole Act, 301 Science 1052 (2003)
Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, Who is Selling the Ivory Tower? Sources of Growth in University Licensing, 48 Mgmt. Sci. 90 (2002)
Josh Lerner, Review of 'Ivory Tower', 43 J. Econ. Litt. 510 (2005)
Joshua B. Powers, R&D Funding Source and University Technology Transfer: What is Stimulating Universities to Be More Entrepreneurial?, 45 Research in Higher Educ. 1 (2004)
Lita Nelsen, The Rise of Intellectual Property Protection in the American University, 279 Science 1460 (1998)
Marcia Angell & Arnold S. Relman, Patents, Profits & American Medicine: Conflicts of Interest in the Testing & Marketing of New Drugs, 131 Daedalus 102 (2002)
Maria Jelenik, Review: Two Books on Technology Transfer, 50 Admin. Sci. Q. 131 (2005) (Review of 'Ivory Tower')
Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Science 698 (1998)
Rebecca Henderson, et al., Universities as a Source of Commercia Technology: A Detailed Analsis of University Patenting, 1965-1988, 80 Rev. Econ. Statistics 119 (1998)
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsorded Research, 82 Virginia L. Rev. 1663 (1996)
Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Richard R. Nelson, Public vs. Proprietary Science: A Fruitful Tension?, 131 Daedalus 89 (2002)
Richard Jensen & Marie Thursby, Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The Licensing of University Inventions, 91 Am. Econ. Rev. 240 (2001)
Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, Economic Theories about the Benefits and Costs of Patents, 32 J. Econ. Issues 1031 (1998)
Thomas A. Massaro, Innovation, Technology Transfer, and Patent Policy: The University Contribution, 82 Virginia L. Rev. 1729 (1996)
Walter W. Powell & Jason Owen-Smith, Universities and the Market for Intellectual Property in the Life Sciences, 17 J. Pol'y Analysis Mgmt. 253 (1998)
William M. Sage, Funding Fairness: Public Investment, Proprietary Rights and Access to Health Care Technology, 82 Virginia L. Rev. 1737 (1996)
Zach W. Hall & Christopher Scott, University-Industry Partnership, 291 Science 553 (2001)

Resources

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/publications/pupfip/why-no-pupfip

Arguments Against Software Patents in India

pranesh — 2012-03-13T10:43:12Z

CIS believes that software patents are harmful for the software industry and for consumers. In this post, Pranesh Prakash looks at the philosophical, legal and practical reasons for holding such a position in India. This is a slightly modified version of a presentation made by Pranesh Prakash at the iTechLaw conference in Bangalore on February 5, 2010, as part of a panel discussing software patents in India, the United States, and the European Union.

This blog post is based on a presentation made at the iTechLaw conference held on February 5, 2010. The audience consisted of lawyers from various corporations and corporate law firms. As is their wont, most lawyers when dealing with software patents get straight to an analysis of law governing the patenting of computer programmes in India and elsewhere, and seeing whether any loopholes exist and can be exploited to patent software. It was refreshing to see at least some lawyers actually going into questions of the need for patents to cover computer programs. In my presentation, I made a multi-pronged case against software patents: (1) philosophical justification against software patents based on the nature of software; (2) legal case against software patents; (3) practical reasons against software patents.

Preamble

Through these arguments, it is sought to be shown that patentability of software is not some arcane, technical question of law, but is a real issue that affect the continued production of new software and the everyday life of the coder/hacker/software programmer/engineer as well as consumers of software (which is, I may remind you, everywhere from your pacemaker to your phone). A preamble to the arguments would note that the main question to ask is: why should we allow for patenting of software? Answering this question will lead us to ask: who benefits from patenting of software. The conclusion that I come to is that patenting of software helps three categories of people: (1) those large software corporations that already have a large number of software patents; (2) those corporations that do not create software, but only trade in patents / sue on the basis of patents ("patent trolls"); (3) patent lawyers. How they don't help small and medium enterprises nor society at large (since they deter, rather than further invention) will be borne out by the rest of these arguments, especially the section on practical reasons against software patents.

What are Patents?

Patents are a twenty-year monopoly granted by the State on any invention. An invention has to have at least four characteristics: (0) patentable subject matter; (1) novelty (it has to be new); (2) inventive step / non-obviousness (even if new, it should not be obvious); (3) application to industry. A monopoly over that invention, thus means that if person X has invented something, then I may not use the core parts of that invention ("the essential claims") in my own invention. This prohibition applies even if I have come upon my invention without having known about X's invention. (Thus, independent creation is not a defence to patent infringement. This distinguishes it, for instance, from copyright law in which two people who created the same work independently of each other can both assert copyright.) Patents cover non-abstract ideas/functionality while copyright covers specific expressions of ideas. To clarify: imagine I make a drawing of a particular machine and describe the procedure of making it. Under patent law, no one else can make that particular machine, while under copyright law, no one can copy that drawing.

Philosophical Justification Against Software Patents

Even without going into the case against patents per se (lack of independent creation as a defence; lack of 'harm' as a criterion leading to internalization of all positive externalities; lack of effective disclosure and publication; etc.), which has been done much more ably by others like Bessen & Meurer (especially in their book Patent Failure) and Boldrin & Levine (in their book Against Intellectual Monopoly, the full text of which is available online).

But there is one essentially philosophical argument against software as subject matter of a patent. Software/computer programs ("instructions for a computer"), as any software engineer would tell you, are merely algorithms ("an effective method for solving a problem using a finite sequence of instructions") that are meant to be understood by a computer or a human who knows how to read that code.

Algorithms are not patentable subject matter, as they are mere expressions of abstract ideas, and not inventions in themselves. Computer programs, similarly, are abstract ideas. They only stop being abstract ideas when embodied in a machine or a process in which it is the machine/process that is the essential claim and not the software. That machine or process being patented would not grant protection to the software itself, but to the whole machine or process. Thus the abstract part of that machine/process (i.e., the computer program) could be used in any other machine/process, as it it is not the subject matter of the patent. Importantly, just because software is required to operate some machine would then not mean that the machine itself is not patentable, just that the software cannot be patented in guise of patenting a machine.

Legal Case Against Software Patents

In India, section 3(k) of the Patent Act reads:

(3) The following are not inventions within the meaning of this Act: (k) a mathematical or business method or computer programme (sic) per se or algorithms.

As one can see, computer programs are place in the same category as "mathematical methods", "algorithms", and "business methods", hence giving legal validity to the idea propounded in the previous section that computer programs are a kind of algorithms (just as algorithms are a kind of mathematical method).

Be that as it may, the best legal minds in India have had to work hard at understanding what exactly "computer programme per se" means. They have cited U.S. case law, U.K. case law, E.U. precedents, and sought to arrive at an understanding of how per se should be understood. While understanding what per se means might be a difficult job, it is much easier to see what it does not mean. For that, we can look at the 2004 Patent Ordinance that Parliament rejected in 2005. In that ordinance, sections 3(k) and (ka) read as follows:

(3) The following are not inventions within the meaning of this Act: (k) a computer programme per se other than its technical application to industry or a combination with hardware; (ka) a mathematical method or a business method or algorithms.

Thus, it is clear that the interpretation that "computer programme per se" excludes "a computer programme that has technical application to industry" and "a computer programme in combination with hardware" is wrong. By rejecting the 2004 Ordinance wording, Parliament has clearly shown that "technical application to industry" and "combination with hardware" do not make a computer programme patentable subject matter.

Indeed, what exactly is "technical application to industry"? "Technical" has various definitions, and a perusal through those definitions would show that barely any computer program can be said not to relate to a technique, not involve "specialized knowledge of applied arts and sciences" (it is code, after all; not everyone can write good algorithms), or not relate to "a practical subject that is organized according to scientific principles" or is "technological". Similarly, all software is, by definition, meant to be used in combination with hardware. Thus, it being used in combination with hardware must not, as argued above, give rise to patentability of otherwise unpatentable subject matter category.

In 2008, the Patent Office published a new 'Draft Manual Of Patent Practice And Procedure' in which it sought to allow patenting of certain method claims for software inventions (while earlier the Patent Office objected to method claims, allowing only device claims with hardware components). This Draft Manual was withdrawn from circulation, with Shri N.N. Prasad (then Joint Secretary of DIPP, the department administering the Patent Office) noting that the parts of the Manual on sections 3(d) and 3(k) had generated a lot of controversy, and were ultra vires the scope of the Manual (which could not override the Patent Act). He promised that those parts would be dropped and the Manual would be re-written. A revised draft of the Manual has not yet been released. Thus the interpretation provided in the Draft Manual (which was based heavily on the interpretation of the U.K. courts) cannot not be relied upon as a basis for arguments in favour of the patentability of software in India.

In October 2008, CIS helped organize a National Public Meeting on Software Patents in which Indian academics, industry, scientists, and FOSS enthusiasts all came to the conclusion that software patents are harmful for both the industry as well as consumers.

Practical Reasons Against Software Patents

This is going to be an attempt at distilling and simplifying some of the main practical arguments against patenting of software.

There are traditionally four incentives that the patent system caters to: (1) incentive to invent; (2) incentive to disclose; (3) incentive to commercialize; and (4) incentive to invent substitutes. Apart from the last, patenting of software does not really aid any of them.

Patent Landmines / Submarine Patents / Patent Gridlocks / No Exception for Independent Creation

Given that computer programs are algorithms, having monopolies over such abstract ideas is detrimental to innovation. Just the metaphors say a lot about software patents: landmines (they cannot be seen/predicted); submarines (they surface out of the blue); gridlocks (because there are so many software patents around the same area of computing, they prevent further innovation in that area, since no program can be written without violating one patent or the other).

Imagine the madness that would have ensued had patents been granted when computer programming was in its infancy. Imagine different methods of sorting (quick sort, bubble sort) that are part of Computer Science 101 had been patented. While those particular instances aren't, similar algorithms, such as data compression algorithms (including the infamous LZW compression method), have been granted patents. Most importantly, even if one codes certain functionality into software independently of the patent holder, that is still violative of the patent. Computer programs being granted patents makes it extremely difficult to create other computer programs that are based on the same abstract ideas. Thus incentives # (1) and (3) are not fulfilled, and indeed, they are harmed. There is no incentive to invent, as one would always be violating one patent or the other. Given that, there is no incentive to commercialize what one has invented, because of fear of patent infringement suits.

An apt illustration of this is the current difficulty of choosing a royalty-free video format for HTML 5, as it shows, in practical terms, how difficult it is to create a video format without violating one patent or the other. While the PNG image format was created to side-step the patent over the LZW compression method used in the GIF image format, bringing Ogg Theora or Dirac (both patent-free video format) to surpass the levels of H.264/MPEG-4 AVC or VC-1 will be very difficult without infringing dozens if not hundreds of software patents. Chris DiBona of Google, while talking about improving Ogg Theora as part of its inclusion in HTML 5 specifications said, "Here’s the challenge: Can Theora move forward without infringing on the other video compression patents?" Just the number of companies and organization that hold patents over H.264 is astounding, and includes: Columbia University, Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute of Korea (ETRI), France Télécom, Fujitsu, LG Electronics, Matsushita, Mitsubishi, Microsoft, Motorola, Nokia, Philips, Robert Bosch GmbH, Samsung, Sharp, Sony, Toshiba, and Victor Company of Japan (JVC). As is the amount of royalties to be paid ("[t]he maximum royalty for these rights payable by an Enterprise (company and greater than 50% owned subsidiaries) is $3.5 million per year in 2005-2006, $4.25 million per year in 2007-08 and $5 million per year in 2009-10"; with royalty per unit of a decoder-encoder costing upto USD 0.20.)

Indeed, even the most diligent companies cannot guard themselves against software patents. FFII estimates that a very simple online shopping website would violate twenty different patents at the very least. Microsoft recently lost a case against i4i when i4i surfaced with a patent covering custom XML as implemented in MS Office 2003 and MS Office 2007. As a result Microsoft had to ship patches to its millions of customers, to disable the functionality and bypass that patent. The manufacturers of BlackBerry, the Canadian company Research in Motion, had to shell out USD 617 million as settlement to NTP over wireless push e-mail, as it was otherwise faced with the possibility of the court shutting down the BlackBerry service in the U.S. This happened despite there being a well-known method of doing so pre-dating the NTP patents. NTP has also filed cases against AT&T, Sprint Nextel, T-Mobile, Verizon Wireless, and Palm Inc. Microsoft was also hit by Visto Corporation over those same NTP patents, which had been licensed to Visto (a startup).
- Don't These Cases Show How Software Patents Help Small Companies?
  
  The astute reader might be tempted to ask: are not all of these examples of small companies getting their dues from larger companies? Doesn't all of this show that software patents actually help small and medium enterprises (SMEs)? The answer to that is: no. To see why, we need to note the common thread binding i4i, NTP, and Visto. None of them were, at the time of their lawsuits, actually creating new software, and NTP was an out-and-out "non-practising entity"/"patent holding company" AKA, patent troll. i4i was in the process of closing shop, and Visto had just started up. None of these were actually practising the patent. None of these were producing any other software. Thus, none of these companies had anything to lose by going after big companies. In other words, the likes of Microsoft, RIM, Verizon, AT&T, etc., could not file counter-suits of patent infringement, which is normally what happens when SMEs try to assert patent rights against larger corporations. For every patent that the large corporation violates of the smaller corporation, the smaler corporation would be violating at least ten of the larger corporation's. Software patents are more helpful for software companies as a tool for cross-licensing rather than as a way of earning royalties. Even this does not work as a strategy against patent trolls.
Thus, the assertion that was made at the beginning is borne out: software patents help only patent trolls, large corporations that already have large software patent portfolios, and the lawyers who draft these patents and later argue them out in court.
Term of Patents

Twenty years of monopoly rights is outright ludicrous in an industry where the rate of turnover of technology is much faster -- anywhere between two years and five months.
Software Industry Progressed Greatly Without Patents

In India, software patents have never been asserted in courts (even though many have been illegally granted), yet the software industry in India is growing in leaps and bounds. Similarly, most of the big (American) giants of the software industry today grew to their stature by using copyright to "protect" their software, and not patents.
Copyright Exists for Software

As noted above, the code/expression of any software is internationally protected by copyright law. There is no reason to protect the ideas/functionality of that software as well.
Insufficient Disclosure

When ordinary computer programmers cannot understand what a particular software patent covers (which is the overwhelming case), then the patent is of no use. One of the main incentives of the patent system is to encourage gifted inventors to share their genius with the world. It is not about gifted inventors paying equally gifted lawyers to obfuscate their inventions into gobbledygook so that other gifted inventors can at best hazard a guess as to precisely what is and is not covered by that patent. Thus, this incentive (#2) is not fulfilled by the current system of patents either -- not unless there is a major overhaul of the system. This ties in with the impossibility of ensuring that one is not violating a software patent. If a reasonably smart software developer (who are often working as individuals, and as part of SMEs) cannot quickly ascertain whether one is violating patents, then there is a huge disincentive against developing software in that area at all.
Software Patents Work Against Free/Libre/Open Source Software

Software patents hinder the development of software and FOSS licences, as the licensee is not allowed to restrict the rights of the sub-licensees over and above the restrictions that the licensee has to observe. Thus, all patent clearances obtained by the licensee must be passed on to the sub-licensees. Thus, patented software, though most countries around the world do not recognize them, are generally not included in the default builds of many FOSS operating systems. This inhabits the general adoption of FOSS, since many of the software patents, even though not enforceable in India, are paid heed to by the software that Indians download, and the MP3 and DivX formats are not enabled by default in standard installations of a Linux OS such as Ubuntu.

Conclusion

Currently, the U.S. patent system is being reviewed at the administrative level, the legislative level, as well as the judicial level. At the judicial level, the question of business method patents (and, by extension, software patents) is before the Supreme Court of the United States of America in the form of Bilski v. Kappos. Judge Mayer of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC, which heard In re Bilksi) noted that "the patent system has run amok". The Free Software Foundation submitted a most extensive amicus curiae brief to the U.S. Supreme Court, filled with brilliant analysis of software patents and arguments against the patentability of software that is well worth a read.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/arguments-against-software-patents

Centre for Internet and Society

CIS Intervention on the Treaty for the Visually Impaired at SCCR/SS/GE/2/13

CIS Intervention on Future Work of the WIPO Advisory Committee on Enforcement

CIS Funding 2008 - 2018

CIS Counter Comments on TRAI Consultation on Differential Pricing

CIS Comments on the Interoperability Framework for e-Governance (Phase I)

General Review Comments

Specific Section-wise Review Comments

CIS Comments on the Draft National Policy on Electronics

Technology Transfer

Outflow of Foreign Exchange as Royalties Creating Adverse Balance of Payments

Table: India’s royalty and licence fees payments (current USD)

Table: India’s royalty and licence fees, receipts (current USD)

Linking of Value Chain and Preferential Treatment

Preferential Treatment

Cybersecurity and Source Code

Distinction between Innovation and Intellectual Property

National Electronics Mission

Funding

CI IP Watch List 2009 - India Report

CDT Provides Answers to Questions on Internet Neutrality

Can India Trust Its Government on Privacy?

Calling Out the BSA on Its BS

How IDC thinks tax works

How tax actually works

Increasing tax: Make MNC software companies pay full taxes

Final idiocies, and conclusion

Call for Comments for Report on the Online Video Environment in India

Breaking Down Section 66A of the IT Act

Term of Punishment

"Sending" vs. "Publishing"

Section 66A(c)

Section 66A(b)

Section 66A(a)

Constitutional Arguments in Importing Laws from the UK

Genealogy of UK Law on Sending 'Indecent', 'Menacing', 'Grossly Offensive' Messages

Comparison between S. 66A and Other Statutes

Ban on pornography temporary, says government

Arguments Against the PUPFIP Bill

Summary

How is the legislation unnecessary?

How is the legislation harmful?

Additional resources

Arguments

How is the legislation unnecessary?

1) The Indian government does not have vast reserves of underutilized patents, as the U.S. did in 1980.

2) Technology transfer is very important, but pushing IPRs aggressively is not the best way of ensuring technology transfer.

How is the legislation harmful?

1) Excessive patenting lead to gridlocks and retard innovation.

2) The legislation makes mandatory that which is optional now, and is anyway being followed in many institutions.

3) Copyright, trademark, etc., seem to be covered under the definition of "public funded IP".

4) It will result in a form of double taxation for research, and will increase the consumer cost of all products based on publicly-funded research.

5) It could have unintended consequences of varied kinds, including discouraging fundamental research as well as discouraging industrial research.

6) Non-disclosure requirements in the Bill restricts the dissemination of research within the academic community, and curtails freedom of speech.

7) Exclusive licensing enables restriction on the dissemination of academic research in the marketplace, and increase in cost of products based on public-funded research.

Additional Resources

On the PUPFIP Bill

On Bayh-Dole

Arguments Against Software Patents in India

Preamble

What are Patents?

Philosophical Justification Against Software Patents

Legal Case Against Software Patents

Practical Reasons Against Software Patents

Patent Landmines / Submarine Patents / Patent Gridlocks / No Exception for Independent Creation

Don't These Cases Show How Software Patents Help Small Companies?

Term of Patents

Software Industry Progressed Greatly Without Patents

Copyright Exists for Software

Insufficient Disclosure

Software Patents Work Against Free/Libre/Open Source Software

Conclusion