Centre for Internet and Society

CIS Welcomes Standing Committee Report on IT Rules

pranesh — 2013-04-03T10:54:52Z

The Centre for Internet and Society welcomes the report by the Standing Committee on Subordinate Legislation, in which it has lambasted the government and has recommended that the government amend the Rules it passed in April 2011 under section 79 of the Information Technology Act.

Click to read the Parliamentary Standing Committee Report on the IT Rules. A modified version was published in CiOL on March 27, 2013.

These rules have been noted by many, including CIS, Software Freedom Law Centre, and Society for Knowledge Commons, and many eminent lawyers, as being unconstitutional. The Standing Committee, noting this, has asked the government to make changes to the Rules to ensure that the fundamental rights to freedom of speech and privacy are safeguarded, and that the principles of natural justice are respected when a person’s freedom of speech or privacy are curtailed.

Ambiguous and Over-reaching Language

The Standing Committee has noted the inherent ambiguity of words like "blasphemy", "disparaging", etc., which are used in the Intermediary Guidelines Rules, and has pointed out that unclear language can lead to harassment of people as has happened with Section 66A of the IT Act, and can lead to legitimate speech being removed. Importantly, the Standing Committee recognizes that many categories of speech prohibited by the Intermediary Guidelines Rules are not prohibited by any statute, and hence cannot be prohibited by the government through these Rules. Accordingly, the Standing Committee has asked the government to ensure "no new category of crimes or offences is created" by these Rules.

Government Confused Whether Rules Are Mandatory or Advisory

The Standing Committee further notes that there is a discrepancy in the government’s stand that the Intermediary Guidelines Rules are not mandatory, and are only "of advisory nature and self-regulation", and that "it is not mandatory for the Intermediary to disable the information, the rule does not lead to any kind of censorship". The Standing Committee points out the flaw in this, and notes that the language used in the rules is mandatory language (“shall act” within 36 hours). Thus, it rightly notes that there is a "need for clarity on the aforesaid contradiction". Further, it also notes that there is "there should be safeguards to protect against any abuse", since this is a form of private censorship by intermediaries."

Evidence Needed Against Foreign Websites

The government has told the Standing Committee that "foreign websites repeatedly refused to honour our laws", however, it has not provided any proof for this assertion. The government should make public all evidence that foreign web services are refusing to honour Indian laws, and should encourage a public debate on how we should tackle this problem in light of the global nature of the Internet.

Cyber Cafes Rules Violate Citizens’ Privacy

The Standing Committee also pointed out that the Cyber Cafe Rules violated citizens’ right to privacy in requiring that "screens of the computers installed other than in partitions and cubicles should face open space of the cyber café". Unfortunately, the Standing Committee did not consider the privacy argument against retention of extensive and intrusive logs. Under the Cyber Cafe Rules, cyber cafes are required to retain (for a minimum of one year) extensive logs, including that of "history of websites accessed using computer resource at cyber café" in such a manner that each website accessed can be linked to a person. The Committee only considered the argument that this would impose financial burdens on small cybercafes, and rejected that argument. CIS wishes the Committee had examined the provision on log maintenance on grounds of privacy as well."

Government’s Half-Truths

In one response, the government notes that "rules under Section 79 in particular have undergone scrutiny by High Courts in the country. Based on the Rules, the courts have given reliefs to a number of individuals and organizations in the country. No provision of the Rules notified under Sections 43A and 79 of the IT Act, 2000 have been held ultra vires."

What the government says is a half-truth. So far, courts have not struck down any of the IT Rules. But that is because none of the High Court cases in which the vires of the Rules have been challenged has concluded. So it is disingenuous of the government to claim that the Rule have "undergone scrutiny by High Courts". And in those cases where relief has been granted under the Intermediary Guidelines, the cases have been ex-parte or have been cases where the vires of the Rules have not been challenged. The government, if it wants to defend the Rules, should point out to any case in which the vires of the Rules have been upheld. Not a single court till date has declared the Rules to be constitutional when that question was before it.

Lack of Representation of Stakeholders in Policy Formulation

Lastly, the Standing Committee noted that it is not clear whether the Cyber Regulatory Advisory Committee (CRAC), which is responsible for policy guidance on the IT Act, has "members representing the interests of principally affected or having special knowledge of the subject matter as expressly stipulated in Section 88(2) of the IT Act". This is a problem that we at CIS also noted in November 2012, when the CRAC was reconstituted after having been defunct for more than a decade.

CIS hopes that the government finally takes note of the view of legal experts, the Standing Committee on Delegated Legislation, the Parliamentary motion against the Rules, and numerous articles and editorials in the press, and withdraws the Intermediary Guidelines Rules and the Cyber Cafe Rules, and instead replaces them with rules that do not infringe our constitutional rights.

The Centre for Internet and Society is a non-profit research organization that works on policy issues relating to freedom of expression, privacy, accessibility for persons with disabilities, access to knowledge and IPR reform, and openness, and engages in academic research on digital natives and digital humanities. It was among the organizations that submitted evidence to the Standing Committee on Subordinate Legislation on the IT Rules.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-welcomes-standing-committee-report-on-it-rules

CIS Submission to TRAI on Differential Pricing

pranesh — 2016-02-09T08:52:31Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/net-neutrality/2016-01-07_cis_trai-submission_differential-pricing

CIS Submission to TRAI Consultation on Regulatory Framework for Over-the-Top Services

pranesh — 2016-03-25T17:59:56Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/net-neutrality/2015-03-27_cis_trai-submission_regulation-OTTs

CIS Submission to TRAI Consultation on Free Data

pranesh — 2016-07-01T16:04:27Z

The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) held a consultation on Free Data, for which CIS sent in the following comments.

The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) asked for public comments on free data. Below are the comments that CIS submitted to the four questions that it posed.

Question 1
Is there a need to have TSP agnostic platform to provide free data or suitable reimbursement to users, without violating the principles of Differential Pricing for Data laid down in TRAI Regulation? Please suggest the most suitable model to achieve the objective.

Is There a Need for Free Data?

No, there is no need for free data, just as there is no need for telephony or Internet. However, making provisions for free data would increase the amount of innovation in the Internet and telecom sector, and there is a good probability that it would lead to faster adoption of the Internet, and thus be beneficial in terms of commerce, freedom of expression, freedom of association, and many other ways.

Thus the question that a telecom regulator should ask is not whether there is a need for TSP agnostic platforms, but whether such platforms are harmful for competition, for consumers, and for innovation. The telecom regulator ought not undertake regulation unless there is evidence to show that harm has been caused or that harm is likely to be caused. In short, TRAI should not follow the precautionary principle, since the telecom and Internet sectors are greatly divergent from environmental protection: the burden of proof for showing that something ought to be prohibited ought to be on those calling for prohibition.

Goal: Regulating Gatekeeping

TRAI wouldn’t need to regulate price discrimination or Net neutrality if ISPs were not “gatekeepers” for last-mile access. “Gatekeeping” occurs when a single entity establishes itself as an exclusive route to reach a large number of people and businesses or, in network terms, nodes. It is not possible for Internet services to reach their end customers without passing through ISPs (generally telecom networks). The situation is very different in the middle-mile and for backhaul. Even though anti-competitive terms may exist in the middle-mile, especially given the opacity of terms in “transit agreements”, a packet is usually able to travel through multiple routes if one route is too expensive (even if that is not the shortest network path, and is thus inefficient in a way). However, this multiplicity of routes is generally not possible in the last mile.¹ This leaves last mile telecom operators (ISPs) in a position to unfairly discriminate between different Internet services or destinations or applications, while harming consumer choice.

However, the aim of regulation by TRAI cannot be to prevent gatekeeping, since that is not possible as long as there are a limited number of ISPs. For instance, even by the very act of charging money for access to the Internet, ISPs are guilty of “gatekeeping” since they are controlling who can and cannot access an Internet service that way. Instead, the aim of regulation by TRAI should be to “regulate gatekeepers to ensure they do not use their gatekeeping power to unjustly discriminate between similarly situated persons, content or traffic”, as we proposed in our submission to TRAI (on OTTs) last year.

Models for Free Data

There are multiple models possible for free data, none of which TRAI should prohibit unless it would enable OTTs to abuse their gatekeeping powers.

Government Incentives For Non-Differentiated Free Data

The government may opt to require all ISPs to provide free Internet to all at a minimum QoS in exchange for exemption from paying part of their USO contributions, or the government may pay ISPs for such access using their USO contributions.

TRAI should recommend to DoT that it set up a committee to study the feasibility of this model.

ISP subsidies

ISP subsidies of Internet access only make economic sense for the ISP under the following ‘Goldilocks’ condition is met: the experience with the subsidised service is ‘good enough’ for the consumers to want to continue to use such services, but ‘bad enough’ for a large number of them to want to move to unsubsidised, paid access.

Providing free Internet to all at a low speed.
1. This naturally discriminates against services and applications such as video streaming, but does not technically bar access to them.
Providing free access to the Internet with other restrictions on quality that aren’t discriminatory with respect to content, services, or applications.

Rewards model

A TSP-agnostic rewards platform will only come within the scope of TRAI regulation if the platform has some form of agreement with the TSPs, even if it is collectively. If the rewards platform doesn’t have any agreement with any TSP, then TRAI does not have the power to regulate it. However, if the rewards platform has an agreement with any TSP, it is unclear whether it would be allowed under the Differential Data Tariff Regulation, since the clause 3(2) read with paragraph 30 of the Explanatory Memorandum might disallow such an agreement.

Assuming for the sake of argument that platforms with such agreements are not disallowed, such platforms can engage in either post-purchase credits or pre-purchase credits, or both. In other words, it could be a situation where a person has to purchase a data pack, engage in some activity relating to the platform (answer surveys, use particular apps, etc.) and thereupon get credit of some form transferred to one’s SIM, or it could be a situation where even without purchasing a data pack, a consumer can earn credits and thereupon use those credits towards data.

The former kind of rewards platform is not as useful when it comes to encouraging people to use the Internet, since only those who already see worth in using in the Internet (and can afford it) will purchase a data pack in the first place. The second form, on the other hand is quite useful, and could be encouraged. However, this second model is not as easily workable, economically, for fixed line connections, since there is a higher initial investment involved.

Recharge API

A recharge API could be fashioned in one of two ways: (1) via the operating system on the phone, allowing a TSP or third parties (whether OTTs or other intermediaries) to transfer credit to the SIM card on the phone which have been bought wholesale. Another model could be that of all TSPs providing a recharge API for the use of third parties. Only the second model is likely to result in a “toll-free” experience since in the first model, like in the case of a rewards platform that requires up-front purchase of data packs, there has to be a investment made first before that amount is recouped. This is likely to hamper the utility of such a model.

Further, in the first case, TRAI would probably not have the powers to regulate such transactions, as there would be no need for any involvement by the TSP. If anti-competitive agreements or abuse of dominant position seems to be taking place, it would be up to the Competition Commission of India to investigate.

However, the second model would have to be overseen by TRAI to ensure that the recharge APIs don’t impose additional costs on OTTs, or unduly harm competition and innovation. For instance, there ought to be an open specification for such an API, which all the TSPs should use in order to reduce the costs on OTTs. Further, there should be no exclusivity, and no preferential treatment provided for the TSPs sister concerns or partners.

“0.example” sites

Other forms of free data, for instance by TSPs choosing not to charge for low-bandwidth traffic should be allowed, as long as it is not discriminatory, nor does it impose increased barriers to entry for OTTs. For instance, if a website self-certifies that it is low-bandwidth and optimized for Internet-enabled feature phones and uses 0.example.tld to signal this (just as wap.* were used in for WAP sites and m.* are used for mobile-optimized versions of many sites), then there is no reason why TSPs should be prohibited from not charging for the data consumed by such websites, as long as the TSP does so uniformly without discrimination. In such cases, the TSP is not harming competition, harming consumers, nor abusing its gatekeeping powers.

OTT-agnostic free data

If a TSP decides not to charge for specific forms of traffic (for example, video, or for locally-peered traffic) regardless of the Internet service from which that traffic emanates, as as long as it does so with the end customer’s consent, then there is no question of the TSP harming competition, harming consumers, nor abusing its gatekeeping powers. There is no reason such schemes should be prohibited by TRAI unless they distort markets and harm innovation.

Unified marketplace

One other way to do what is proposed as the “recharge API” model is to create a highly-regulated market where the gatekeeping powers of the ISP are diminished, and the ISP’s ability to leverage its exclusive access over its customers are curtailed. A comparison may be drawn here to the rules that are often set by standard-setting bodies where patents are involved: given that these patents are essential inputs, access to them must be allowed through fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory licences. Access to the Internet and common carriers like telecom networks, being even more important (since alternatives exist to particular standards, but not to the Internet itself), must be placed at an even higher pedestal and thus even stricter regulation to ensure fair competition.

A marketplace of this sort would impose some regulatory burdens on TRAI and place burdens on innovations by the ISPs, but a regulated marketplace harms ISP innovation less than not allowing a market at all.

At a minimum, such a marketplace must ensure non-exclusivity, non-discrimination, and transparency. Thus, at a minimum, a telecom provider cannot discriminate between any OTTs who want similar access to zero-rating. Further, a telecom provider cannot prevent any OTT from zero-rating with any other telecom provider. To ensure that telecom providers are actually following this stipulation, transparency is needed, as a minimum.

Transparency can take one of two forms: transparency to the regulator alone and transparency to the public. Transparency to the regulator alone would enable OTTs and ISPs to keep the terms of their commercial transactions secret from their competitors, but enable the regulator, upon request, to ensure that this doesn’t lead to anti-competitive practices. This model would increase the burden on the regulator, but would be more palatable to OTTs and ISPs, and more comparable to the wholesale data market where the terms of such agreements are strictly-guarded commercial secrets. On the other hand, requiring transparency to the public would reduce the burden on the regulator, despite coming at a cost of secrecy of commercial terms, and is far more preferable.

Beyond transparency, a regulation could take the form of insisting on standard rates and terms for all OTT players, with differential usage tiers if need be, to ensure that access is truly non-discriminatory. This is how the market is structured on the retail side.

Since there are transaction costs in individually approaching each telecom provider for such zero-rating, the market would greatly benefit from a single marketplace where OTTs can come and enter into agreements with multiple telecom providers.

Even in this model, telecom networks will be charging based not only on the fact of the number of customers they have, but on the basis of them having exclusive routing to those customers. Further, even under the standard-rates based single-market model, a particular zero-rated site may be accessible for free from one network, but not across all networks: unlike the situation with a toll-free number in which no such distinction exists.

To resolve this, the regulator may propose that if an OTT wishes to engage in paid zero-rating, it will need to do so across all networks, since if it doesn’t there is risk of providing an unfair advantage to one network over another and increasing the gatekeeper effect rather than decreasing it.

Question 2

Whether such platforms need to be regulated by the TRAI or market be allowed to develop these platforms?

In many cases, TRAI would have no powers over such platforms, so the question of TRAI regulating does not arise. In all other cases, TRAI can allow the market to develop such platforms, and then see if any of them violates the Discriminatory Data Tariffs Regualation. For government-incentivised schemes that are proposed above, TRAI should take proactive measure in getting their feasibility evaluated.

Question 3

Whether free data or suitable reimbursement to users should be limited to mobile data users only or could it be extended through technical means to subscribers of fixed line broadband or leased line?

Spectrum is naturally a scarce resource, though technological advances (as dictated by Cooper’s Law) and more efficient management of spectrum make it less so. However, we have seen that fixed-line broadband has more or less stagnated for the past many years, while mobile access has increased. So the market distortionary power of fixed-line providers is far less than that of mobile providers. However, competition is far less in fixed-line Internet access services, while it is far higher in mobile Internet access. Switching costs in fixed-line Internet access services are also far higher than in mobile services. Given these differences, the regulation with regard to price discrimination might justifiably be different.

All in all, for this particular issue, it is unclear why different rules should apply to mobile users and fixed line users.

Question 4

Any other issue related to the matter of Consultation.

None.

In India’s mobile telecom sector, according to a Nielsen study, an estimated 15% of mobile users are multi-SIM users, meaning the “gatekeeping” effect is significantly reduced in both directions: Internet services can reach them via multiple ISPs, and conversely they can reach Internet services via multiple ISPs. See Nielsen, ‘Telecom Transitions: Tracking the Multi-SIM Phenomena in India’, http://www.nielsen.com/in/en/insights/reports/2015/telecom-transitions-tracking-the-multi-sim-phenomena-in-india.html↩

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-submission-trai-consultation-free-data

CIS Submission on Draft Patent Manual 2010

pranesh — 2014-05-29T06:47:32Z

The patent office has released a revised version of the Draft Manual of Patent Practice and Procedure. Section 8.03.06.10 of the Manual deals with patenting of computer programmes. CIS is happy to note the many improvements in this draft of the Manual from the previous version. CIS made its submission along with a few suggestions that it thinks would make the document even better.

The section has been entirely reformulated and a few of the changes made to the previous version are welcome.

Positive changes in the Manual

The provisions relating to making software with “technological features” and “technical applications” which were present in the previous version have been completely eliminated. Thus, the “technical applications”of a computer programme will not make an otherwise unpatentable computer programme patentable subject matter. This also eliminates the need to arrive at a definition of “technical applications” or “technological features”.
The term “computer implemented inventions” which found no place in the Patent Act, 1970 but was introduced in the previous version of the manual without proper explanation or definition has been eliminated.
The Manual expressly states that mathematical methods (8.03.06.10.b) and business methods (8.03.06.10.c) are not patentable irrespective of the language in which they claims are couched or the form in which they are claimed.
Computer programme products which were considered to be patentable subject matter in the previous version of the manual are considered to be unpatentable subject matter in the new version. The Manual clearly explains computer programme products to be nothing but computer programme per se stored in a computer readable medium. (8.03.06.10.d)
The Manual recognises that no computer programme can be functional without hardware to execute the programme. This means that any computer programme cannot become patentable subject matter merely because it is associated with some hardware. (8.03.06.10.g)
A computer programme which runs on a general purpose known computer is expressly held to be unpatentable subject matter. This is undoubtedly a welcome inclusion since it helps eliminate claims relating to a mere computer programme which may have been considered patentable simply because such computer programme is run using a general purpose computer. This is one of the common ways in which Section 3(k) is circumvented to obtain patent for claims which are for a computer programme per se.

Contentious provisions of the Manual which require amendment/explanation are as follows:

Clause 8.03.06.10.a

Under this provision, mathematical methods, business methods, computer programmes per se and algorithms are not considered as patentable inventions. In relation to computer programs, the law provides a qualification that what is not patentable is only computer program per se.

While this restates the statute correctly, it does so without offering any explanation, which would be preferable. The Manual should explain the scope of the term “per se” and clear the ambiguity surrounding it. The Manual should clearly provide reasons for any computer programme to fall in either category.

We suggest using the following definition of computer programme per se, which has previously been submitted to the Patent Office1:

Computer programme per se in the relevant clause means (a) any computer programme in the abstract, (b) any computer programme expressed in source code form, including source code recorded on an information storage medium, or (c) any computer programme that can be executed or executes on a general purpose computer,2 including computer programme object code designed for execution on a general purpose computer that is recorded on an information storage medium.3

Clause 8.03.06.10.e

If a claim in a patent application is not directed at a computer programme per se it could be patentable, if all other patentability conditions are met. This provision thus necessitates distinguishing computer programmes per se from other types of inventions that use or implement computer programmes.

The clause, while seeking to distinguish computer programmes per se from inventions which use or implement computer programmes, does make clear what “implement computer programmes” means, nor does it clarify what “computer programme per se” is. A relevant suggestion for a definition for “computer programme per se” has been provided above, which would address this problem.

Clause 8.03.06.10.f

The computer programmes are often claimed in the form of algorithms as method claims or system claims with some ‘means’ indicating the function of flow charts or process steps. The algorithm related claims may be even wider than the computer programme claimed by itself, for a programme represents a particular set, the algorithm expresses the principles .

We find that this clause has no relevance to explaining patentability of computer programmes and thus suggest that the same be deleted from the Manual. The Manual should however make it clear that in algorithm-related claims, if the function claimed to be performed by the invention can be done only by means of a computer programme, such claims are not patentable.

Clause 8.03.06.10.g

Essentially, all computer programmes need a combination with some hardware for their functionality. In an application for patent for a new hardware system, the possibility of a computer programme forming part of the claims cannot be ruled out. It has to be carefully considered as to how integrated is the novel hardware with the computer programme. Further, it is also to be considered whether the machine is programme specific or the programme is machine specific. A computer programme which may work on any general purpose known computer does not meet the requirement of patentability.

With regard to cases of computer programmes being combined with hardware, the Manual seems to suggest that the patentability of the combination is dependent on “how integrated the novel hardware [is] with the computer programme.” This language is very vague and ambiguous. In case of an application for patent for a new hardware system, the Manual should make it clear that such claim is eligible only if the inventive conribution resides entirely in the hardware. The Manual should also require the patent applicant to demonstrate exactly how the inventive step resides in the hardware separable from the computer programme.
We propose a new part to the above test to make the clause clearer. The Manual should specify that “the computer programme portions of any claimed invention should be treated as if it were covered by prior art and patentability should thus be determined with respect to the other features of the invention”. This way, we can ensure that an invention which merely uses or implements a computer programme is not granted patent on the basis of the inventiveness of the computer programme per se.
It is indeed laudable that the Manual makes it clear that a computer programme which may work on any general purpose known computer does not meet the requirement of patentability. This should make it clear that a computer programme cannot be patentable simply because it is executed by a special purpose computer as long as a general purpose computer can also execute the same. We suggest the following definition of a general purpose computer, which has already been proposed to the Patent Office, be used:4

A general-purpose computer here means a device capable of running multiple unrelated programs, often simultaneously for different purposes. It will comprise at least of: (1) one or more central processing units, (2) one or more input devices that are not specific to any one program, (3) memory, (4) one or more non volatile mass storage devices, and (5) one or more output devices. However, a general-purpose computer does not include a device that itself represents an inventive contribution to the art.

Clause 8.03.06.10.h

Method claims, whether independent or dependent, reciting computer programs without process limitations in the form of hardware features are not allowable. For a method reciting computer programme to be patentable, it must clearly recite into it limiting hardware integers that enable the program to function .

The Clause dilutes the standard set in the previous clauses. It seems to suggest that any method claim is patentable as long as it is connected to hardware which enable the program to function and define its limitations/scope. This position is untenable since no method claim can be purely a computer programme and use of computer programmes for any specific task would necessarily require hardware to implement the same. Therefore the requirement of hardware limitation to make a computer programme patentable is essentially allowing for any computer programme to be patentable. Not only is such a limitation redundant but it also renders the “per se” requirement in Section 3(k) meaningless. Further, the meaning of the term “hardware integers” in the Clause is unclear. For the purpose of this comment, we assume that it refers to hardware features. The Manual should ensure that the method claim has significant per or post processing activity and is not merely combined with hardware to be patent-eligible. This ensures that any computer programme is not granted patent merely because it has certain trivial pre or post processing activities associated with it.

Clause 8.03.06.10.i

Claims directed at computer programs coupled to hardware, enabling the hardware to perform a certain function may be allowable, if such an invention meets all other conditions of patentability.

The Clause is restating the content of Clause 8.03.06.10.e and our comments on this Clause remain the same as our comments for Clause 8.03.06.10.e.

Requirement of Disclosure

We suggest that the Manual require that an application claiming patent for a computer programme (which does not constitute computer programme per se) necessarily disclose the entire source code. This ensures that the invention can perform exactly all those functions that are described in the patent application. Since different computer programmes can be written (with each having different source code) to perform the same function, it is of utmost importance that the applicant demonstrate the workability of the invention described in the application and such proof can be provided only by disclosing the source code.

Purpose of the Manual

There is no clarity on the purpose and authority of the Manual. We do not know if the Manual attempts to explain the provisions of the Patent Act, 1970 to an applicant or is meant to provide guidance to patent examiners or be binding upon them. If a patent official acts in a manner contradictory to the Manual, the consequences of such action is unclear. The Manual should clarify these questions.

This definition was formulated and submitted by Knowledge Commons, Delhi to the Indian Patent Office in response to the earlier version of the draft manual. The definition was formulated through the collective efforts of Prabir Purkayastha, Richard Fontana of Red Hat, Venkatesh Hariharan, Tahir Amin, Mishi Chowdhury of Software Freedom Law Centre and Jaijit Bhattacharya. See http://osindia.blogspot.com/2009/04/computer-programme-per-se-conundrum.html
We propose the following definition of a general purpose computer - A general-purpose computer here means a device capable of running multiple unrelated programs, often simultaneously for different purposes. It will comprise at least of: (1) one or more central processing units, (2) one or more input devices that are not specific to any one program, (3) memory, (4) one or more non volatile mass storage devices, and (5) one or more output devices. However, a general-purpose computer does not include a device that itself represents an inventive contribution to the art. See also Infra n. 3.
An information storage medium means any disc, tape, perforated media or other information storage device, which, if fed into or located in a computer or computer based equipment is capable of reproducing any information, other than an information storage medium that itself represents an inventive contribution to the art.
This definition was formulated and submitted by Knowledge Commons, Delhi to the Indian Patent Office in response to the earlier version of the draft manual. See http://osindia.blogspot.com/2009/04/computer-programme-per-se-conundrum.html

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-submission-draft-patent-manual-2010

CIS Submission on CCWG-Accountability 2nd Draft Proposal on Work Stream 1 Recommendations

pranesh — 2015-11-23T14:58:58Z

The Centre for Internet & Society (CIS) submitted the below to ICANN's CCWG-Accountability.

The CCWG Accountability proposal is longer than many countries' constitutions. Given that, we will keep our comments brief, addressing a very limited set of the issues in very broad terms.

Human Rights

ICANN is unique in many ways. It is a global regulator that has powers of taxation to fund its own operation. ICANN is not a mere corporation. For such a regulator, ensuring fair process (what is often referred to as "natural justice") as well as substantive human rights (such as the freedom of expression, right against discrimination, right to privacy, and cultural diversity), are important. Given this, the narrow framing of "free expression and the free flow of information" in Option 1, we believe Option 2 is preferable.

Diversity

We are glad that diversity is being recognized as an important principle. As we noted during the open floor session at ICANN49: [We are] extremely concerned about the accountability of ICANN to the global community. Due to various decisions made by the US government relating to ICANN's birth, ICANN has had a troubled history with legitimacy. While it has managed to gain and retain the confidence of the technical community, it still lacks political legitimacy due to its history. The NTIA's decision has presented us an opportunity to correct this.

However, ICANN can't hope to do so without going beyond the current ICANN community, which while nominally being 'multistakeholder' and open to all, grossly under-represents those parts of the world that aren't North America and Western Europe.

Of the 1010 ICANN-accredited registrars, 624 are from the United States, and 7 from the 54 countries of Africa. In a session yesterday, a large number of the policies that favour entrenched incumbents from richer countries were discussed. But without adequate representation from poorer countries, and adequate representation from the rest of the world's Internet population, there is no hope of changing these policies.

This is true not just of the business sector, but of all the 'stakeholders' that are part of global Internet policymaking, whether they follow the ICANN multistakeholder model or another. A look at the board members of the Internet Architecture Board, for instance, would reveal how skewed the technical community can be, whether in terms of geographic or gender diversity.

Without greater diversity within the global Internet policymaking communities, there is no hope of equity, respect for human rights — civil, political, cultural, social and economic — and democratic functioning, no matter how 'open' the processes seem to be, and no hope of ICANN accountability either.

Meanwhile, there are those who are concerned that diversity should not prevail over skill and experience. Those who have the greatest skill and experience will be those who are insiders in the ICANN system. To believe that being an insider in the ICANN system ought to be privileged over diversity is wrong. A call for diversity isn't just political correctness. It is essential for legitimacy of ICANN as a globally-representative body, and not just one where the developed world (primarily US-based persons) makes policies for the whole globe, which is what it has so far been. Of course, this cannot be corrected overnight, but it is crucial that this be a central focus of the accountability initiative.

Jurisdiction, Membership Models and Voting Rights

The Sole-Member Community Mechanism (SMCM) that has been proposed seems in large part the best manner provided under Californian law relating to public benefit corporations of dealing with accountability issues, and is the lynchpin of the whole accountability mechanism under workstream.

However, the jurisdictional analysis laid down in 11.3 will only be completed post-transition, as part of workstream. Thus the SMCM may not necessarily be the best model under a different legal jurisdiction. It would be useful to discuss the dependency between these more clearly. In this vein, it is essential that the Article XVIII Section 1 not be designated a fundamental bylaw. Further, it would be useful to add that for some limited aspects of the transition (such as IANA functioning), ICANN should seek to enter into a host country agreement to provide legal immunity, thus providing a qualification to para 125 ("ICANN accountability requires compliance with applicable legislation, in jurisdictions where it operates.") since the IANA functions operator ought not be forced by a country not to honour requests made by, for example, North Korea.

It should also be noted that accountability needs independence, which may be of two kinds: independence of financial source, and independence of appointment. From what one could gather from the CCWG proposal, the Independent Review Panel will be funded by the budget the ICANN Board prepares, while the appointment process is still unclear.

One of the most important accountability mechanisms with regard to the IANA functions is that of changing the IANA Functions Operator. As per the CWG Stewardship's current proposal, the "Post-Transition IANA" won't be an entity that is independent of ICANN. If the PTI's governance is permanently made part of ICANN's fundamental bylaws (as an affiliate controlled by ICANN), how is it proposed that the IFO be moved from PTI to some other entity if the IANA Functions Review Team so decides? Additionally, for such an important function, the composition of the IFRT should not be left unspecified.

While it is welcome that a separation is proposed between the IANA budget and budget for rest of ICANN's functioning, the current discussion around budgets seems to be based on the assumption that all IANA functions will be funded by ICANN, whereas if the IANA functions are separated, each community might fund it separately. That provides two levels of insulation to IANA functions operator(s): separate sources of operational revenue, as well as separate budgets within ICANN.

It should be noted that there have been some responses that express concern about the shifting of existing power structures within ICANN through some of the proposed alternative voting allocations in the SMCM. However, rather than present arguments as to why these shifts would be beneficial or harmful for ICANN's overall accountability, these responses seem to assume that shift from the current power structures are harmful. This is an unfounded assumption and cannot be a valid reason, nor can speculation of how the United States Congress will behave be a valid reason for rejecting an otherwise valid proposal. If there are harms, they ought to be clearly articulated: shifts from the status quo and fear of the US Congress aren't valid harms. Thus, while it is important to consider how different voting rights models might change the status quo while arriving at any judgments, that cannot be the sole criterion for judgment of its merits. Further, as the French government notes:

[T]he French Government still considers that linking Stress Test 18 to a risk of capture of ICANN by governments and NTIA’s requirement that no “government-led or intergovernmental organization solution would be acceptable”, makes no sense. . . . Logically, the risk of capture of ICANN by governments in the future is as low as it is now and in any case, it cannot lead to a “government-led or intergovernmental organization solution”.

While dealing with the question of relative voting proportions, the community must remembered that not all parts of the world are equally developed with regard to the domain name industry and with respect to civil society as those countries in North America, Western Europe, and other developed nations, and thus may not find adequate representation via the SOs. In many parts of the world, civil society organizations — especially those focussed on Internet governance and domain name policies — are non-existent. Thus a system that privileges the SOs to the exclusion of other components of a multistakeholder governance model would not be representative or diverse. A multistakeholder model cannot disproportionately represent business interests over all other interests.

In this regard, the comments of former ICANN Chairperson, Rod Beckstrom, at ICANN43 ought to be recalled:

ICANN must be able to act for the public good while placing commercial and financial interests in the appropriate context . . . How can it do this if all top leadership is from the very domain name industry it is supposed to coordinate independently?

As Kieren McCarthy points out about ICANN:

The Board does have too many conflicted members
The NomCom is full of conflicts
There are not enough independent voices within the organization

Reforms in these ought to be as crucial to accountability as the membership model.

The current mechanisms for ensuring transparency, such as the DIDP process, are wholly inadequate. We have summarized our experience with the DIDP process, and how often we were denied information on baseless grounds in this table.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-submission-on-ccwg-accountability-2nd-draft-proposal-on-work-stream-1-recommendations

CIS Statement on the WIPO Broadcast Treaty at SCCR 19

pranesh — 2012-02-01T09:07:41Z

This statement on the WIPO Broadcast Treaty was delivered on December 17, 2010 at the 19th session of the Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights by Nirmita Narasimhan on behalf of CIS.

CIS Statement on the WIPO Broadcast Treaty at SCCR 19

The Centre for Internet and Society believes that the protection that may be afforded to broadcasters under existing international treaties, including Article 14 of the TRIPS Convention, are sufficient to safeguard the interests of broadcasters, and that the Broadcast Treaty, which has been under discussion for more than a decade without any progress, is, as the WIPO Chair observed, an expenditure of "time, energy and resources to no avail" (SCCR/15/2/rev).

We believe that at any rate webcasting/netcasting should be kept out of the ambit of the broadcast treaty, even if only restricted to "retransmission" of broadcasts as in the current draft, since by its very nature webcasting is very different from broadcasting. Webcasting is currently quite vibrant, with a recent report by Arbor Networks estimating that around ten per cent of all Web traffic is streaming video, making webcasting the fastest growing application on the Internet. Given this situation, a strong case has to be made to show that an international treaty is required to protect and promote webcasting, which has not been done.

Specifically, we believe that Paragraph 16 of the WIPO Development Agenda, which relates to preservation of a vibrant public domain, will be endangered by a right being given to webcasters which is separate from the underlying content of the transmission.

Statements by other organizations on WIPO Broadcast Treaty at SCCR 19

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/sccr19-broadcast-treaty

CIS Statement at ICANN 49's Public Forum

pranesh — 2014-06-04T05:31:44Z

This was a statement made by Pranesh Prakash at the ICANN 49 meeting (on March 27, 2014), arguing that ICANN's bias towards the North America and Western Europe result in a lack of legitimacy, and hoping that the IANA transition process provides an opportunity to address this.

Good afternoon. My name is Pranesh Prakash, and I'm with the Yale Information Society Project and the Centre for Internet and Society.

I am extremely concerned about the accountability of ICANN to the global community. Due to various decisions made by the US government relating to ICANN's birth, ICANN has had a troubled history with legitimacy. While it has managed to gain and retain the confidence of the technical community, it still lacks political legitimacy due to its history. The NTIA's decision has presented us an opportunity to correct this.

This is true not just of the business sector, but of all the 'stakeholders' that are part of global Internet policymaking, whether they follow the ICANN multistakeholder model or another. A look at the boardmembers of the Internet Architecture Board, for instance, would reveal how skewed the technical community can be, whether in terms of geographic or gender diversity.

Without greater diversity within the global Internet policymaking communities, there is no hope of equity, respect for human rights -- civil, political, cultural, social and economic --, and democratic funtioning, no matter how 'open' the processes seem to be, and no hope of ICANN accountability either.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann49-public-forum-statement

CIS Position Paper on Net Neutrality in India (Background Submission to TRAI)

pranesh — 2016-03-25T16:35:12Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/net-neutrality/2015-06-29_PositionPaperonNetNeutralityinIndia

CIS Para-wise Comments on Intermediary Due Diligence Rules, 2011

pranesh — 2012-07-11T10:27:26Z

On February 7th 2011, the Department of Information Technology, MCIT published draft rules on its website (The Information Technology (Due diligence observed by intermediaries guidelines) Rules, 2011) in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 87(2)(zg), read with Section 79(2) of the Information Technology Act, 2000. Comments were invited from the public before February 25th 2011. Accordingly, Privacy India and Centre for Internet and Society, Bangalore have prepared the following para-wise comments for the Ministry’s consideration.

A. General Objections

A number of the provisions under these Rules have no nexus with their parent provision, namely s.79(2). Section 79(1) provides for exemption from liability for intermediaries. Section 79(2) thereupon states:

79. Intermediaries not to be liable in certain cases—

(2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply if—

(a) the function of the intermediary is limited to providing access to a communication system over which information made available by third parties is transmitted or temporarily stored or hasted; or

(b) the intermediary does not—

(i) initiate the transmission,

(ii) select the receiver of the transmission, and

(iii) select or modify the information contained in the transmission;

(c) the intermediary observes due diligence while discharging his duties under this Act and also observes such other guidelines as the Central Government may prescribe in this behalf.

Therefore, by not observing any of the provisions of the Rules, the intermediary opens itself up for liability for actions of its users. However, many of the provisions of the Rules have no rational nexus with due diligence to be observed by the intermediary to absolve itself from liability.

B. Specific Objections

Rule 2(b), (c), and (k)

(b) “Blog” means a type of website, usually maintained by an individual with regular entries of commentary, descriptions of events, or other material such as graphics or video. Usually blog is a shared on-line journal where users can post diary entries about their personal experiences and hobbies;

(c) “Blogger” means a person who keeps and updates a blog;

(k) “User” means any person including blogger who uses any computer resource for the purpose of sharing information, views or otherwise and includes other persons jointly participating in using the computer resource of intermediary

Comments

It is unclear why it is necessary to specifically target bloggers as users, leaving out other users such as blog commenters, social network users, microbloggers, podcasters, etc. It makes the rules technologically non-neutral.

Recommendation

We recommend that these 3 sub-rules be deleted.

Rule 3(2)

3. Due Diligence observed by intermediary.— The intermediary shall observe following due diligence while discharging its duties.

(2) The intermediary shall notify users of computer resource not to use, display, upload, modify, publish, transmit, update, share or store any information that : —

(a) belongs to another person;

(b) is harmful, threatening, abusive, harassing, blasphemous, objectionable, defamatory, vulgar, obscene, pornographic, paedophilic, libellous, invasive of another’s privacy, hateful, or racially, ethnically or otherwise objectionable, disparaging, relating or encouraging money laundering or gambling, or otherwise unlawful in any manner whatever;

(c) harm minors in any way;

(d) infringes any patent, trademark, copyright or other proprietary rights;

(e) violates any law for the time being in force;

(f) discloses sensitive personal information of other person or to which the user does not have any right to;

(g) causes annoyance or inconvenience or deceives or misleads the addressee about the origin of such messages or communicates any information which is grossly offensive or menacing in nature;

(h) impersonate another person;

(i) contains software viruses or any other computer code, files or programs designed to interrupt, destroy or limit the functionality of any computer resource;

(j) threatens the unity, integrity, defence, security or sovereignty of India, friendly relations with foreign states, or or public order or causes incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence or prevents investigation of any offence or is insulting any other nation.

Comments

Firstly, such ‘standard’ terms of use [1] might make sense for one intermediary, but not for all. For instance, an intermediary such as site with user-generated content (e.g., Wikipedia) would need different terms of use from an intermediary such as an e-mail provider (e.g., Hotmail), because the kind of liability they accrue are different. This is similar to how the liability that a newspaper publisher accrues is different from that accrued by the post office. However, forcing standard terms of use negates this difference. Thus, these are impractical.

Secondly, read with the legal obligation of the intermediary to remove such information (contained in rule 3(3)), they vest an extraordinary power of censorship in the hands of the intermediary, which could easily lead to the stifling of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech online. Analogous restrictions do not exist in other fields, e.g., against the press in India or against courier companies, and there is no justification to impose them on content posted online. Taken together, these provisions make it impossible to publish critical views about anything without the risk of being summarily censored.

Thirdly, while it is possible to apply Indian law to intermediaries, it is impracticable to require all intermediaries (whether in India or not) to have in their terms of use India-specific clauses such as rule 3(2)(j). Instead, it is better to merely require them to ask their users to follow all relevant laws.

Individual instances of how these rules are overly broad are contained in an appendix to this submission.

Recommendation

We strongly recommend the deletion of this sub-rule, except clause (e).

Rule 3(3)

(3) The intermediary shall not itself host or publish or edit or store any information or shall not initiate the transmission, select the receiver of transmission, and select or modify the information contained in the transmission as specified in sub-rule (2).

Comments

This sub-rule is ultra vires s.79 of the IT Act, which does not require intermediaries not to “host or publish or edit or store any information”. If fact, s.79(2) merely states that by violating the provisions of s.79(2), the intermediary loses the protection of s.79(1). It does not however make it unlawful to violate s.79(2), as rule 3(3) does. This makes rule 3(3) ultra vires the Act.

Recommendation

This sub-rule should be deleted.

Rule 3(4)

(4) The intermediary upon obtaining actual knowledge by itself or been brought to actual knowledge by an authority mandated under the law for the time being in force in writing or through email signed with electronic signature about any such information as mentioned in sub-rule (2) above, shall act expeditiously to work with user or owner of such information to remove access to such information that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity. Further the intermediary shall inform the police about such information and preserve the records for 90 days

Comments

This rule is also ultra vires s.69A of the IT Act as well as the Constitution of India. Section 69A states all the grounds on which an intermediary may be required to restrict access to information [2]. It does not allow for expansion of those grounds, because it has been carefully worded to maintains its constitutional validity vis-a-vis Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(2) of the Constitution of India. The rules framed under s.69A prescribe an elaborate procedure before such censorship may be ordered. The rules under s.69A will be rendered nugatory if any person could get content removed or blocked under s.79(2).

This rule requires an intermediary to immediately take steps to remove access to information merely upon receiving a written request from “any authority mandated under the law”. Thus, for example, any authority can easily immunize itself from criticism on the internet by simply sending a written notice to the intermediary concerned. This is directly contrary to, and completely subverts the legislative intent expressed in Section 69B which lays down an elaborate procedure to be followed before any information can be lawfully blocked.

If any person is aggrieved by information posted online, they may seek their remedies—including the relief of injunction—from courts of law, under generally applicable civil and criminal law. Inserting a rule such as this one would take away the powers of the judiciary in India to define the line dividing permissible and impermissible speech, and vest it instead in the whims of each intermediary. This can only have a chilling effect on debates in the public domain (of which the Internet is a part) which is the foundation of any democracy.

Recommendation

This rule should modified so that an intermediary is obliged to take steps towards removal of content only when (a) backed by an order from a court or (b) a direction issued following the procedure prescribed by the rules framed under Section 69A.

Rule 3(5) & (7) & (8) & (10)

(5) The Intermediary shall inform its users that in case of non-compliance with terms of use of the services and privacy policy provided by the Intermediary, the Intermediary has the right to immediately terminate the access rights of the users to the site of Intermediary;

(7) The intermediary shall not disclose sensitive personal information;

(8) Disclosure of information by intermediary to any third party shall require prior permission or consent from the provider of such information, who has provided such information under lawful contract or otherwise;

(10) The information collected by the intermediary shall be used for the purpose for which it has been collected.

Comments

These sub-rules have no nexus with intermediary liability or non-liability under s.79(2). For instance, it is unreasonable to say that an intermediary may be held liable for the actions of its users if it does not inform its users about its right to terminate access by the user to its services. Furthermore, not all intermediaries need be websites, as sub-rule 5 assumes. An intermediary can even be an “internet service provider” or a “cyber cafe” or a “telecom service provider”, as per rule 2(j) read with s.2(1)(w) of the IT Act.

The requirements under sub-rules (7), (8), and (10) are rightfully the domain of s.43A and the rules made thereunder, and not s.79(2) nor these rules.

Recommendation

These sub-rules should be deleted, and sub-rules (7), (8), and (10) may placed instead in the rules made under s.43A.

Rule 3(9)

(9) Intermediary shall provide information to government agencies who are lawfully authorised for investigative, protective, cyber security or intelligence activity. The information shall be provided for the purpose of verification of identity, or for prevention, detection, investigation, prosecution, cyber security incidents and punishment of offences under any law for the time being in force, on a written request stating clearly the purpose of seeking such information.

Comments

This provision is ultra vires ss.69 and 69B. Rules have already been issued under ss.69 and 69B which stipulate the mechanism and procedure to be followed by the government for interception, monitoring or decrypting information in the hands of intermediaries. Thus under the Interception Rules 2009 framed under Section 69, permission must first be obtained from a “competent authority” before an intermediary can be directed to provide access to its records and facilities. The current rule completely removes the safeguards contained in s.69 and its rules, and would make intermediaries answerable to virtually any request from any government agency. This is contrary to the legislative intent expressed in Section 69.

Recommendation

We recommend this sub-rule be deleted.

Rule 3(12)

(12) The intermediary shall report cyber security incidents and also share cyber security incidents related information with the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team.

Comments

The rules relating to how and when the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team may request for information from intermediaries is rightfully the subject matter of s.70B(5) [3] and the rules made thereunder by virtue of the rule making power granted by s.87(2)(yd). The subject matter of rule 3(12) is not liability of intermediaries for third-party actions, hence there is no nexus between the rule-making power, and the rule.

Recommendations

We recommend that this sub-rule be deleted.

Rule 3(14)

(14) The intermediary shall publish on its website the designated agent to receive notification of claimed infringements.

Comments

It is unclear what “infringements” are being referred to in this sub-rule. Neither s.79 nor these rules provide for “infringements”. The same reasoning applied for rule 3(4) would also apply here. It would be better to require the intermediary to publish on its website a method of providing judicial notice.

Recommendations

Delete, and replace with a requirement for the intermediary to publish on its website a method of providing judicial notice.

Footnotes

For instance, the Section B(1) of the World of Warcraft Code of Conduct “When engaging in Chat, you may not: (i) Transmit or post any content or language which, in the sole and absolute discretion of Blizzard, is deemed to be offensive, including without limitation content or language that is unlawful, harmful, threatening, abusive, harassing, defamatory, vulgar, obscene, hateful, sexually explicit, or racially, ethnically or otherwise objectionable.
It is only “in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India. defence of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to above” that intermediaries may be issued directions to block access to information.
70B(5) sates that the The manner of performing functions and duties of the agency referred to in sub-section (1) shall be such as may be prescribed.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/intermediary-due-diligence

CIS Intervention on the Treaty for the Visually Impaired at SCCR/SS/GE/2/13

pranesh — 2013-04-25T11:57:02Z

The informal session and special session of the Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights was organised by WIPO in Geneva from April 18 to April 20, 2013. Pranesh Prakash participated in the session and spoke about the rights of the visually impaired. An abridged version of this was read out during the meeting on Saturday, April 20, 2013, at 22:15 due to time restrictions.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I represent the Centre for Internet and Society, a policy research organization based in India. India, as everyone who has been attending these SCCR meetings since 2008 would know, has the world's largest population of blind and visually impaired persons. Two of my colleagues at CIS — Nirmita Narasimhan and Anandhi Viswanathan — are blind, and another one of my CIS colleagues who passed away recently (and whose tireless efforts were remembered here at WIPO recently with a minute of silence) — Rahul Cherian — spent many years working extensively on policy issues related to persons with disabilities, and in particular worked here in WIPO as part of Inclusive Planet, and with the World Blind Union. Hence, this issue is not an abstract one for us, but a very real one.

I commend the delegates here for taking some steps forward during this meeting. However, very disappointingly, with those few steps forward, we have seen a few things we had taken as settled being opened up again, and many steps being taken backward. The already-onerous requirements and procedures laid down in this treaty are seen by a few countries as not being onerous enough. Blind people, it is believed, might 'wrongly' take advantage of these provisions. Worse yet, there is a fear that sighted persons might take advantage of these provisions relating to the blind.

The absurdity of these fears somehow seems to have escaped the notice of many involved in these discussions. There is nothing in these provisions that would convert infringement by sighted people — even if under the pretence of this treaty — magically into lawful acts. And, indeed, there are multifarious ways of infringing copyright without such resort to this treaty. Yet, these very same onerous requirements (such as the "commercial availability" requirement) and bureaucratic processes will unrealistically increase transaction costs for the visually impaired and render infructuous the very purpose of this treaty. Those delegations who are unrelenting on these issues seem to living in a bizarre world where sighted infringers deviously use exceptions granted in an international copyright treaty to engage in piracy; a bizarre world where scanners and the Internet have not been invented. And by refusing to acknowledge these ground realities, they are merely forcing the blind into wearing eye-patches and being 'pirates'.

In particular, I would like to deplore the stand taken by the European Union, being represented here by the European Commission, whose actions run contrary to the call made in May 2011 by the European Parliament to "to address the ‘book famine’ experienced by visually impaired and print-disabled people". This is despite the European Parliament having reminded "the Commission and Member States of their obligations under the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to take all appropriate measures to ensure that people with disabilities enjoy access to cultural materials in accessible formats, and to ensure that laws protecting IPR do not constitute an unreasonable or discriminatory barrier to access by people with disabilities to cultural materials". The EU, and a few countries of Group B, including the United States, have been slowly bleeding this treaty to death through over-legislation and bureaucracy.

The United States' and EU's stand on technological protection measures, if accepted, would mean that publishers will technologically be able to prevent the blind from enjoying accessible works, even when they can't do so legally on the basis of copyright law. The European Union's stand on all issues has been extraordinarily harmful, and seems to have an aim to make this treaty as unwieldy and unworkable as possible. They seem to regard the Berne Appendix as their model in this regard: an international agreement that exists on paper for the benefit of developing countries, but because of its bureaucratic processes is little used, and is widely regarded as a failure.

Here is what it boils down to: when it comes to the economic rights of copyright owners, current international law insists that there be no formalities, yet when it comes to the human rights of visually impaired person to access information — a right specifically guaranteed to them under the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities — some delegates in this room wish to ensure as many formalities as possible.

The rights of the visually impaired are being buried under unnecessary and complicated requirements and bureaucratic practices. This injustice must stop: the delegates here have the power to do so. And if the EU does not wish to be viewed as villains by all persons with print disabilities and all persons with conscience, it should stop trying to make this an ineffectual treaty. Many have quipped that this is fast becoming "A Treaty for Rightholders Against Persons with Visual Impairments and Print Disabilities" or alternatively "A Treaty for Morally Impaired Persons and Persons with Ethical Disabilities". That is an international shame.

Having colonized much of the world into using English, French, and Spanish, these European countries along with the USA are now in a position to be both culturally dominant and to refuse to sign up to this treaty if it helps blind persons outside of the EU and the USA who seek access to texts in these languages. These remnants of colonialism must be stamped out.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-intervention-eu-blocking-wipo-treaty-for-blind

CIS Intervention on Future Work of the WIPO Advisory Committee on Enforcement

pranesh — 2011-12-01T15:30:38Z

The seventh session of the World Intellectual Property Organization's Advisory Committee on Enforcement (ACE) is being held in Geneva on November 30 and December 1, 2011. Pranesh Prakash intervened during the discussion of future work of the ACE with this comment.

Thank you, Chair.

I just wanted to point out that some of the proposals on future work could be worded better to reflect their true meaning. For instance, one of the proposal calls for control of the problem of "parallel import". However, "parallel importation" is actually allowed by both the TRIPS Agreement and by various other instruments such as the Berne Convention? Indeed, calling “parallel import” a problem is like calling "exceptions and limitations" a problem. This is a view that has been firmly rejected here at WIPO, especially post the adoption of the WIPO Development Agenda. This, quite obviously, could not have been the intention of the proposal framers.

Further, the link between some of the proposals and the Development Agenda could be made clearer. It has been established that the Development Agenda is not just something for the Committee on Development and Intellectual Property (CDIP) to consider, but for all committees to make an integral part of their work.

I would also like to underscore the importance of evidence-based policy-making.

Lastly, I would like to mention that a report has already been commissioned by WIPO on intermediary liability, which was written by Prof. Lilian Edwards and was released in a side-event during SCCR 22, in June 2011.

If the ACE is going ahead with a study or an event, I would suggest that the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Opinion, who in his report to the UN Human Rights Council dealt in some depth with intermediary liability, be involved or invited.

Thank you.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/ace-7-future-work-cis-intervention

CIS Funding 2008 - 2018

pranesh — 2018-07-07T01:17:05Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/cis-funding-2008-2018.xlsx

CIS Counter Comments on TRAI Consultation on Differential Pricing

pranesh — 2016-03-25T16:28:06Z

This counter-comment also includes: a) An appendix that charts regulations on zero-rating across the globe, and shows that the popular press have misunderstood and misrepresented regulations in foreign countries; b) An appendix that charts specialized services (including differential pricing of specialized services) across the globe.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/net-neutrality/2016-01-14_cis_trai-counter-comments_differential-pricing

CIS Comments on the Interoperability Framework for e-Governance (Phase I)

pranesh — 2013-05-22T10:48:52Z

In November 2010, the Central Government released the Draft 0.6 of the Technical Standards for the Interoperability Framework for e-Governance (Phase I), requesting comments by January 27, 2011. Here are the comments that CIS submitted.

General Review Comments

The present document is an excellent step in the right direction, following very ably the policy guidelines laid down in the National Policy on Open Standards for e-Governance.
The Expert Committee and other contributors have made excellent choices as to the 19 standards that have been laid down in the IFEG. It is praiseworthy that of these 18 are designated as mandatory, and only two are designated as interim standards. Furthermore, the system has been very transparent with the selection of standards, providing concise descriptions for each.
It is also important to note that while accessibility has been mentioned while talking of HTML, accessibility standards should preferably also be specifically mentioned in the presentation and archival domain.
However, many other governmental interoperability frameworks are going beyond merely listing technical standards. Some governments, such as Germany and the EU, go beyond technical interoperability, and also have documents dealing with organizational, informational, and legal interoperability. These are equally important components of an interoperability framework. Other governments also also lay down best practice guides, and other aids to implementation, sometimes even including application recommendations. Further, there are many which lay out standards for the the semantic layer, business services layer, etc.
We at the Centre for Internet and Society are currently advising the government of Iraq on development of their e-Governance Interoperability Framework, and would be glad to extend any support that the Department of IT may require of us, including comments on all further phases.

Specific Section-wise Review Comments

Section 5.2.7 - In the “additional remarks” row, it is stated that “If Adobe Systems Incorporated’s intent to make it royalty free is achieved then no further reviews will be necessary.”

This should be changed to indicate that (a) there might be entities other than Adobe that hold necessary patents over PDF v1.7, and (b) that a desirable feature—of there being multiple implementations of the standard—might not be fulfilled by PDF v1.7.

Adobe has in fact published a public patent licence that covers PDF v1.7 (ISO 32000-1:2008), and makes all of Adobe’s essential claims over PDF v1.7 available royalty-free.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/blog-old/comments-ifeg-phase-1

Centre for Internet and Society

CIS Welcomes Standing Committee Report on IT Rules

Ambiguous and Over-reaching Language

Government Confused Whether Rules Are Mandatory or Advisory

Evidence Needed Against Foreign Websites

Cyber Cafes Rules Violate Citizens’ Privacy

Government’s Half-Truths

Lack of Representation of Stakeholders in Policy Formulation

CIS Submission to TRAI on Differential Pricing

CIS Submission to TRAI Consultation on Regulatory Framework for Over-the-Top Services

CIS Submission to TRAI Consultation on Free Data

Question 1 Is there a need to have TSP agnostic platform to provide free data or suitable reimbursement to users, without violating the principles of Differential Pricing for Data laid down in TRAI Regulation? Please suggest the most suitable model to achieve the objective.

Is There a Need for Free Data?

Goal: Regulating Gatekeeping

Models for Free Data

Government Incentives For Non-Differentiated Free Data

ISP subsidies

Rewards model

Recharge API

“0.example” sites

OTT-agnostic free data

Unified marketplace

Question 2

Question 3

Question 4

CIS Submission on Draft Patent Manual 2010

Positive changes in the Manual

CIS Submission on CCWG-Accountability 2nd Draft Proposal on Work Stream 1 Recommendations

Human Rights

Diversity

Jurisdiction, Membership Models and Voting Rights

CIS Statement on the WIPO Broadcast Treaty at SCCR 19

CIS Statement on the WIPO Broadcast Treaty at SCCR 19

Statements by other organizations on WIPO Broadcast Treaty at SCCR 19

CIS Statement at ICANN 49's Public Forum

CIS Position Paper on Net Neutrality in India (Background Submission to TRAI)

CIS Para-wise Comments on Intermediary Due Diligence Rules, 2011

A. General Objections

B. Specific Objections

Rule 2(b), (c), and (k)

Comments

Recommendation

Rule 3(2)

Comments

Recommendation

Rule 3(3)

Comments

Recommendation

Rule 3(4)

Comments

Recommendation

Rule 3(5) & (7) & (8) & (10)

Comments

Recommendation

Rule 3(9)

Comments

Recommendation

Rule 3(12)

Comments

Recommendations

Rule 3(14)

Comments

Recommendations

Footnotes

CIS Intervention on the Treaty for the Visually Impaired at SCCR/SS/GE/2/13

CIS Intervention on Future Work of the WIPO Advisory Committee on Enforcement

CIS Funding 2008 - 2018

CIS Counter Comments on TRAI Consultation on Differential Pricing

CIS Comments on the Interoperability Framework for e-Governance (Phase I)

General Review Comments

Specific Section-wise Review Comments

Question 1
Is there a need to have TSP agnostic platform to provide free data or suitable reimbursement to users, without violating the principles of Differential Pricing for Data laid down in TRAI Regulation? Please suggest the most suitable model to achieve the objective.