Centre for Internet and Society

Framing an Alternative Approach to the Jan Lokpal

pranesh — 2011-10-11T11:42:00Z

The National Campaign for Peoples' Right to Information (NCPRI) and the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) are organizing a public talk on "Framing an Alternative Approach to the Jan Lokpal" on Friday, August 5, 2011 at CIS, Bangalore. Shankar Singh, Nikhil Dey and Aruna Roy of MKSS and NCPRI will be speaking.

The drafts of both the Lokpal as well as the Jan Lokpal bill have been criticised extensively on multiple grounds, including that of lack of accountability and concentration of power in a singular body. This public talk seeks to provide a framework for an alternative conception of the Jan Lokpal that takes a multi-pronged approach to tackling corruption by moving towards concurrent anti-corruption and grievance redress measures.

Speakers

Shankar Singh, Aruna Roy and Nikhil Dey of the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) and the National Campaign for Peoples' Right to Information (NCPRI)

Date and Time

Friday, August 5, 2011
18:00-19:30

Venue

Centre for Internet and Society
(next to Domlur Club and close to TERI)
194, 2-C Cross,
Domlur Stage II,
Bangalore

Map: http://goo.gl/2UV5J

Background Reading

Nikhil Dey & Ruchi Gupta, Putting the "Jan" in Lokpal Bill
Aruna Roy & Nikhil Dey, Make Sure the Cure Isn't Worse than the Disease
Aruna Roy & Rakshita Swamy, Lokpal Must Lead by Example
NCPRI, Draft Concept Notes from Public Consultations on Collective and Concurrent Lokpal Anti-Corruption and Grievance Redress Measures
NCPRI, Background Documents on Jan Lok Pal Bill

== Contact ==
For more information, please contact:
Rakshita Swamy <rakshitaswamy at gmail dot com>, or
Pranesh Prakash <pranesh at cis-india dot org>

VIDEO

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/events/alternative-jan-lokpal

Fixing India’s anarchic IT Act

pranesh — 2012-11-30T06:33:58Z

Section 66A of the Information Technology (IT) Act criminalizes “causing annoyance or inconvenience” online, among other things. A conviction for such an offence can attract a prison sentence of as many as three years.

Pranesh Prakash's article was published in LiveMint on November 28, 2012.

How could the ministry of communications and information technology draft such a loosely-worded provision that’s clearly unconstitutional? How could the ministry of law allow such shoddy drafting with such disproportionate penalties to pass through? Were any senior governmental legal officers—such as the attorney general—consulted? If so, what advice did they tender, and did they consider this restriction “reasonable”? These are some of the questions that arise, and they raise issues both of substance and of process.

When the intermediary guidelines rules were passed last year, the government did not hold consultations in anything but name. Industry and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) sent in submissions warning against the rules, as can be seen from the submissions we retrieved under the Right to Information Act and posted on our website. However, almost none of our concerns, including the legality of the rules, were paid heed to.

Earlier this year, parliamentarians employed a little-used power to challenge the law passed by the government, leading communications minister Kapil Sibal to state that he would call a meeting with “all stakeholders”, and will revise the rules based on inputs. A meeting was called in August, where only select industry bodies and members of Parliament were present, and from which a promise emerged of larger public consultations. That promise hasn’t been fulfilled.

Substantively, there is much that is rotten in the IT Act and the various rules passed under it, and a few illustrations—a longer analysis of which is available on the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) website—should suffice to indicate the extent of the malaise.

Some of the secondary legislation (rules) cannot be passed under the section of the IT Act they claim as their authority. The intermediary guidelines violate all semblance of due process by not even requiring that a person whose content is removed is told about it and given a chance to defend herself. (Any content that is complained about under those rules is required to be removed within 36 hours, with no penalties for wilful abuse of the process. We even tested this by sending frivolous complaints, which resulted in removal.)

The definition of “cyber terrorism” in section 66F(1)(B) of the IT Act includes wrongfully accessing restricted information that one believes can be used for defamation, and this is punishable by imprisonment for life. Phone-tapping requires the existence of a “public emergency” or threat to “public safety”, but thanks to the IT Act, online surveillance doesn’t. The telecom licence prohibits “bulk encryption” over 40 bits without key escrow, but these are violated by all, including the Reserve Bank of India, which requires that 128-bit encryption be used by banks. These are but a few of the myriad examples of careless drafting present in the IT Act, which lead directly to wrongful impingement of our civil and political liberties. While we agree with the minister for communications, that the mere fact of a law being misused cannot be reason for throwing it out, we believe that many provisions of the IT Act are prone to misuse because they are badly drafted, not to mention the fact that some of them display constitutional infirmities. That should be the reason they are amended, not merely misuse.

What can be done? First, the IT Act and its rules need to be fixed. Either a court-appointed amicus curiae (who would be a respected senior lawyer) or a committee with adequate representation from senior lawyers, Internet policy organizations, government and industry must be constituted to review and suggest revisions to the IT Act. The IT Act (in section 88) has a provision for such a multi-stakeholder advisory committee, but it was filled with mainly government officials and became defunct soon after it was created, more than a decade ago. This ought to be reconstituted. Importantly, businesses cannot claim to represent ordinary users, since except when it comes to regulation of things such as e-commerce and copyright, industry has little to lose when its users’ rights to privacy and freedom of expression are curbed.

Second, there must be informal processes and platforms created for continual discussions and constructive dialogue among civil society, industry and government (states and central) about Internet regulation (even apart from the IT Act). The current antagonism does not benefit anyone, and in this regard it is very heartening to see Sibal pushing for greater openness and consultation with stakeholders. As he noted on the sidelines of the Internet Governance Forum in Baku, different stakeholders must work together to craft better policies and laws for everything from cyber security to accountability of international corporations to Indian laws. In his plenary note at the forum, he stated: “Issues of public policy related to the Internet have to be dealt with by adopting a multi-stakeholder, democratic and transparent approach” which is “collaborative, consultative, inclusive and consensual”. I could not have put it better myself. Now is the time to convert those most excellent intentions into action by engaging in an open reform of our laws.

Pranesh Prakash is policy director at the Centre for Internet and Society.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/livemint-opinion-november-28-2012-pranesh-prakash-fixing-indias-anarchic-it-act

Financial Express hosts #NetNeutralityDebate: ‘Price discrimination can be allowed, but not for the same packet of data’

pranesh — 2015-04-27T02:18:18Z

Trying to cut through the noise on Net Neutrality in India, FICCI in partnership with Financial Express is hosting a panel discussion titled ‘Decoding Net Neutrality’ in New Delhi on Wednesday.

This was published in the Financial Express on April 24, 2015. Pranesh Prakash participated in the discussion.

Moderated by Sunil Jain, the guests on the Net Neutrality debate panel are Rajya Sabha MP Rajeev Chandrasekhar, Lok Sabha MP Baijayant Jay Panda along with ICRIER chief executive Dr Rajat Kathuria, IAMAI president Dr Subho Ray, Facebook’s head of public policy for South and Central Asia Ankhi Das, COAI director general Rajan S Mathew, Com First director Dr Mahesh Uppal and Policy Director of the Centre for Internet and Society Pranesh Prakash.

Highlights of the debate:

Starting off the discussion, Rajeev Chandrasekhar said that this issue is all about market abuse and market power and not as utopian as it sounds. He said that this debate is nothing new as regulators identified the problem long ago. Chandarasekhar added, “TRAI had recognized in 2006 that there is an opportunity to abuse by access providers.”

Joining the conversation, COAI director general Rajan S Mathew said, “We have put the cart before the horse. What needs to be addressed first is online governance.”

Looking forward, ICRIER chief executive Rajat Kathuria said that we need to figure out the best way to use this privately funded public good. He added, “We still haven’t so far.”

Video

Com First director Dr Mahesh Uppal tries to find a common ground and said, “Everyone is against ‘arbitrary commercial’ prioritisation or throttling.”

Subho Ray agreed and said, “There should be no blocking, throttling and preferential treatment.”

Facebook India’s Ankhi Das said that Internet.org is not for people who are already on the Internet. She explained, “Our objective is that it should be free and non-exclusive.”

Watch video: It’s free, no one has to pay to join the app, says Ankhi Das, Facebook India, on internet.org

Pranesh Prakash, Policy Director of the Centre for Internet and Society intervened to add, “An universally affordable model is important. We must ensure that the diversity that Internet provides is not lost.”

Taking the conversation further, Rajeev Chandrasekhar said, “I don’t believe data packets can be discriminated except in terms of speed and bandwidth.

Rajan Mathews interjected, “We do not discriminate, we differentiate. And all businesses differentiate.”

On this point, Rajat Kathuria said, “Price discrimination is something that should be allowed within boundaries of regulation.”

The Indian Express New Media Editor Nandagopal Rajan said that, “#NetNeutralityDebate panel agrees that price discrimination can be allowed, but not for the same packet of data.”

Jay Panda, Lok Sabha MP now also joins the discussion and says, “I have come out in favour of net neutrality despite the fact that my family will be benefiting from the lack of it. Whether fragmentation is desirable on the Internet or not, it needs to be debated. I am not in favour of fragmented access to the Internet.”

Watch video: There should be no prioritisation of one brand over another, says Baijayant Jay Panda on Net Neutrality

Underlining his views, Jay Panda reiterated, “Spectrum may be limited but access won’t be in the future. I am against prioritizing packets over others.”

Pranesh Prakash gave an overarching view and said, “Everyone benefits from Internet. What we need to figure out is whether everyone is getting paid enough.”

Jay Panda said, “It is possible for access providers to make money.”

Rajan Mathews said, “I think it is not fair to say that telcos can influence the govt.”

On this Jay Panda quipped, “The govt has to chip in its share to make the Internet accessible to all.”

Jay Panda says govts have been behind the curve in #NetNeutralityDebate and telcos have benefitted from it.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/financial-express-april-24-2015-net-neutrality-debate

Feedback to Draft Copyright Rules, 2012

pranesh — 2012-10-04T04:53:47Z

The Centre for Internet & Society submitted its written comments on the Draft Copyright Rules, 2012 to Mr. G.R. Raghavender, Registrar of Copyrights & Director (BP&CR), Ministry of Human Resource Development.

G.R. Raghavender
Registrar of Copyrights & Director (BP&CR)
Copyright Office
Department of Higher Education
Ministry of Human Resource Development
4th floor, Jeevan Deep Building,
Parliament Street
New Delhi — 110001

Dear Sir,

This submission contains comments from the Centre for Internet and Society on the Draft Copyright Rules, 2012. I apologize for the slight delay in submitting these.

Yours sincerely,
Pranesh Prakash
Policy Director
Centre for Internet and Society

Relinquishment of Copyright

Analysis

The law in India allows anonymously and pseudonymously created works to be copyrighted as well, as is clear from section 23 of the Copyright Act. However, rule 8 as it currently is does not allow such authors to relinquish copyright. Relinquishment of copyright is a very different kind of act from registration of copyright, and hence it is not necessary to seek the same categories of information from both. Certain categories of information sought during registration of copyright ("class of work", "language of the work", "nationality of author") are required not because they help identify a work, but because they help in indexing the work ("class of work", "language of work") or in ensuring that the work is copyrightable in India ("nationality of author"). Such considerations do not matter when it comes to relinquishment of copyright, i.e., when a work is allowed to pass into the public domain. Further, technological progress has made it difficult to determine the answer to a question like "country of first publication", "nationality of the publisher", etc. If a work has been uploaded by an author on to his blog, is the publisher the author or the person hosting the blog? If an Indian author residing in India first publishes a work on the server located in Argentina, is the country of first publication India or Argentina? The answer to these questions does not make a difference to the issue of relinquishment of copyright. The only information that is required for relinquishment of rights is a) what work is being put in the public domain, b) by whom, c) from when.

Furthermore, the current requirements of rule 8 cannot easily be satisfied by using most of the popular means of relinquishing copyright (such as the CC0 — Creative Commons Zero — licence).

Recommendations

Rule 8 be modified to read: A public notice issued by an author relinquishing his or her rights as per subsection (1) of section 21 of the Copyright Act, shall include the following details: (a) Title of the work (b) Full name, or pseudonym, in case the work has not been created anonymously (c) Date of issuance of the notice (d) If copyright in the work is registered under section 45, the registration number.

Rule 9 be modified to read: Any one of the following shall constitute public notice of relinquishment of copyright: i. Mentioning of the notice on the work, or cover of the work, or in the metadata of the work if the work is electronic; or ii. Publication in a newspaper; or iii. Publication by the author on a publicly-accessible website

Rule 10 be modified to add the following sentence: The author shall forward a copy of the public notice to the Registrar of Copyright if copyright in the work has been registered under section 45 and on receiving such notice, the Registrar of Copyright shall post the same on the website of the Copyright Office.

Statutory Licence for Cover Versions

Analysis

Rule 34(2) is redundant and does not contain any detail not already present in the existing proviso to section 31C(1) of the Copyright Act. Additionally, Rule 35 also does not contain any detail not already present in the existing parent provision, section 31C of the Copyright Act.

Recommendations

Rules 34(2) and 35 be deleted.
Rule 37 should be modified to add a sub-rule requiring maintenance of records online.

Indexes

Analysis

In rule 71(3), it requires that the indexes be maintained in the form of cards. These are presumably physical cards. It is unclear why the rule should not require the maintenance of these indexes online to facilitate search by the public. Further entries 13 and 14 of Schedule II are from a time when the transaction costs incurred by the Registrar of Copyright for providing extracts from an Index were non-negligible, and hence it would have been necessary to charge a person for such services. With the capabilities of electronic systems, such retrievals are almost costless, and can be done without the intervention of the Registrar of Copyright. Hence entries 13 and 14 should not be made applicable to online retrievals. If copyright societies can be required to provide information free of costs on their websites (as per rule 65), the Registrar of Copyright should be required to do so too.

Recommendation

Modify sub-rule (3) of rule 71 to read: "Every Index shall be available online as a downloadable database, with an online search facility."

Modify the second sentence in rule 72 to read: "The online search or inspection of the Register of Copyrights and Indexes can be utilised free of cost."

Storage of Transient or Incidental Copies of a Work

Analysis

It is not clear enough from the language of rule 74 that it applies only to s.52(1)(c) and not to s.52(1)(b). Since only s.52(1)(c) has a complaints mechanism, this should be made clear.

Importantly, to protect the interest of the public, the intermediaries should be asked to give public notice regarding the alleged infringing copy to ensure that the take-down mechanism is not abused, and secondly to ensure that the public can independently verify that intermediaries are following the requirement in rule 74(4) of restoring storage of the work if no court order is forthcoming within 21 days.

Lastly, there is no clear precedent in India to treat a uniform resource identifier (URI) as 'place' for purposes of section 51(a)(ii) of the Copyright Act, 1957. Therefore it is necessary to further clarify the meaning of the term 'place' as used in current Rule 74(2)(d). This would be best served by using the correct technological term ("URI") instead of the word "place".

Recommendation

Modify sub-rule (1) of rule 74 to: "Any owner of copyright may give a written complaint as per clause (c) of subsection (1) of section 52 of the Copyright Act to a person who has facilitated..."

Add sub-rule (6) to rule 74: "The person responsible for storage shall put up a public notice thereby notifying all persons requesting access to the alleged infringing copy by stating reasons for restraining such access whether during the period of 21 days from the complaint from the copyright owner, or pursuant to an order from a competent court."

Modify rule 74(2) to read: "Details of the specific uniform resource identifier (URI) where transient or incidental storage of the work may be taking place."

Making or Adapting the Work by Organizations Working for the Benefit of Persons with Disabilities

Analysis

Rule 75 requires organizations making use of the exception granted under s.52(1)(zb) to maintain records. This could not have been the intention of the legislature in passing s.52(1)(zb), since that provision does not require any maintenance of records. Indeed, none of the exceptions ennume-rated in s.52(1) require the maintenance of records. This is in contrast with s.31B, which is also applicable to organizations working for the benefit of persons with disabilities, but only those that are doing so as a for-profit venture. Rule 29(6) already requires the Registrar of Copyright to notify the grant of a licence under s.31B in the Official Gazette. That provision may be modified to add that the Registrar of Copyright maintains these records in a centralized database that can be queried online.

Recommendations

Delete rule 75, and modify rule 29(6) to include a centralized database.

Technological Protection Measures

Analysis

Most experts seem to hold that s.65A of the Indian Copyright Act does not affect circumvention tools, as it only deals with the act of unauthorized circumvention and not with the tools, in sharp contrast with s.1201(a)(2) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in the US, which criminalises the "manufacture, import, offer to the public, provision, or otherwise trafficking in any [circumvention] technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof". The Indian law has conciously chosen not to emulate the DMCA in this respect, as the WIPO Copyright Treaty does not require it.

The broad understanding of "facilitation" contained the Copyright Rules unfortunately seem to undermine this clear distinction. If facilitation is understood to include offer to the public, provision, or distribution, as seems to be the case in Rule 79(3) and 79(4), then law becomes unworkable with each and every website that allows for the downloading of any software that can be used to play DVDs, etc., must specifically keep a register of downloaders from India. This is unnecessary, and goes beyond the intent of s.65A, which is to cover those who actively facilitate circumvention and not those who make available the tools to circumvent. This distinction should not be blurred.

Recommendation

Delete sub-rules (3) and (4) of rule 79.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/feedback-to-draft-copyright-rules-2012

Fallacies, Lies, and Video Pirates

pranesh — 2011-08-04T04:43:08Z

At a recent conference on counterfeiting and piracy, industry representatives variously pushed for stiffer laws for IP violation, more stringent enforcement of existing IP laws, and championed IP as the most important thing for businesses today. This blog post tries to show how their arguments are flawed.

The Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) organized its third annual conference on counterfeiting and piracy, with support from the United States Embassy and the Quality Brands Protection Committee of China (a body comprising more than 80 multinational companies). Last week we criticised the conference in an open letter. This week, we examine a few of the recurring themes that came up at the conference.

Something being substandard is not the same as something being counterfeit.

This was a mistake made by many whenever they invoked 'counterfeit' in the sense of something that is violative of one's patent and trademark rights. The Indian Drugs and Cosmetics Act itself distinguishes between 'misbranded', 'adulterated', and 'spurious' drugs, thus recognizing that something that is made without proper authorization from rights owners isn't necessarily of a bad quality. Indeed, this was substantiated by an audience member, a lawyer from Dr. Reddy's Lab. She spoke of a mandi in Agra where they seized medicines being sold under the Dr. Reddy's name, but produced by local manufacturers. Upon lab testing, it turned out, much to their surprise, that the medicines were of the highest quality and were not substandard. Similarly, many large companies including trusted FMCG companies like Hindustan Unilever and ITC are upbraided by authorities for violations of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act (for the cosmetics they produce) as well as the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Thus, even legitimate businesses can produce substandard products. Thus, a product can be unauthorized but not substandard, just as a product can be substandard but not counterfeit.

This distinction becomes very important when we talk about patents, and especially drug patents. A generic drug is by definition identical or within an acceptable bio-equivalent range to the brand name counterpart with respect to pharmacokinetic and pharmacodynamic properties. Thus, this entire category of high-quality drugs is often sought to be made illegal or counterfeit by large pharma companies. Some countries like Kenya have capitulated. But so far the World Health Assembly has been forced by developing countries to keep the issue of substandard medicines separate from patent-bypassing medicines.

The industry, for all their talk about "out of the box" thinking on the issue, still only consider metrics such the number of piracy raids conducted as measures of success. A question was put forth by Manisha Shridhar of the Intellectual Property & Trade Unit of the World Health Organization upon learning of the quality of the drugs seized at the Agra mandi: Why not cut a licensing deal with those manufacturers, who obviously have excellent production facilities? That kind of thinking, which helped HMV in India in the 1980s, and copying innovative features from video pirates and pricing their products competitively has helped an Indian company, Moserbaer, do extremely well.

Counterfeiters and pirates are not always seeking to fool consumers.

Only lawyers hired by the industry would think that a consumer aspiring towards a Rolex watch would actually think that the one he purchased off the streets for one-hundredth the original's price was in fact original. Street-side DVD hawkers are not thought by the general public to be selling original wares. Still, despite knowing the difference between the original and the fake, consumers many times opt for the latter.

Having said that, counterfeiting, by using someone else's trademark and trying to pass off fake goods as real ones, is quite obviously wrong. It harms customers, and it harms the manufacturers. Thus, a distinction deserves to be made here between the counterfeiters who try to deceive consumers (for instance by copying authenticity marks, like holograms, etc.) and those who are just providing them with highly cheaper alternatives (pirated DVDs, etc.). In this light, it is also important here to distinguish between counterfeiting, traditionally taken to be trademark violation, and piracy, traditionally taken to be a violation of international law, but now generally meaning a large-scale violation of copyright law. While the former can lead to consumer confusion, the latter scarcely ever does. This is ignored by industry people who evoke the image of the consumer quite often, but only when it helps them, and not in any meaningful manner. They negate consumer choice when it comes to consciously purchasing pirated goods, and consumer freedoms when it comes to usage of copyrighted materials.

While commercial film piracy funds terrorists, so does pretty much every business activity.

A favourite of the MPAA (and by association, the MPA) is the RAND report on Film Piracy and its Connection to Organized Crime and Terrorism. This report, which was funded by the MPAA, predictably concludes that film piracy funds organized crime and terrorism. Even if we are to believe its findings wholesale, it leaves us wondering whether all business activities from which terrorists derive funds should be banned.

In India, there is a substantiated link between organized crime and film and music production, and terrorists have been said to make money off the stock market. If the MPA's arguments are taken to their logical conclusions, then film production and equity trading should also be prosecuted. Furthermore, while the mafia and terrorists are the ostensible targets, the laws that are brought about to tackle it affect poor roadside vendors and non-commercial online file sharers. To tackle the funding of terrorists, roadside piracy shouldn't become the target just as film production per se shouldn't. The invocation of the RAND report is thus only meant for rhetorical effect, as it is hard to find logic in there.

"To copy without authorization is to steal", the death penalty, and drug peddling.

At the conference, Dominic Keating of the US Embassy pointed out that "to copy without authorization is to steal" and David Brener of US Customs and Border Protection kept emphasising, on at least two occasions, that "drug peddling merits an automatic death sentence in many countries". There are numerous arguments one can make to show the lack of thought in the former. One could point out that 'stealing' and 'theft' are things that happen to tangible property, and that not only is copyright not tangible, but it is barely property. Copying without authorization creates one more of what existed, without depriving the authorizer (usually a corporation) of its original. This goes against our notion of 'stealing'. If the argument is to be shifted to the terrain of control over one's property/copyright, Mark Lemley in an illuminative article shows how the economic theories behind externalities in property and copyright are vastly different, and that complete control over either has never been, nor should it ever be, an aim of the law. Simply put, someone free riding on your property leaves you worse off than earlier, while someone free riding on your copyright usually doesn't.

One could also point out that 'stealing' is endemic in activities involving human creativity. T.S. Eliot notes that "Immature poets imitate; mature poets steal; bad poets deface what they take, and good poets make it into something better, or at least something different". He does not even consider the possibility that artistic borrowing, whether by imitation or by 'stealing' does not happen. Even Y.S. Rajan, Principal Adviser to CII recognized this when during the conference he noted that "imitation and innovation have an interesting and intertwining philosophical history". If we are to take Mr. Keating's admonishment seriously, we would indeed have a very illustrious list of thieves on our hands, including the Walt Disney Corporation, William Shakespeare, Vladamir Nabokov, Public Enemy, and pretty much every creative person who has ever lived. Books can be written about this (and indeed, numerous books have been), so we shall not dwell on this issue.

Mr. Brener's repeatedly spoke of how drug peddling attracts death penalty in many countries (though in neither the US nor in India has anyone ever received capital punishment for drug peddling), but he also clarified that he is not advocating for the death penalty for copyright violations. That made one wonder why he was bringing up the death penalty at all. He also made the dubious, non-substantiated claim (noting it as "true fact") that pirating movies is more profitable than selling heroin. This claim appears in an article about a report produced by the Australian Federation Against Counterfeit Theft (AFACT), but the original report is nowhere to be found. The article about the AFACT report also claims that the pirates are using their illicit profits promote drug smuggling. The seeming contradiction of film pirates investing in something that is riskier and less profitable doesn't seem to have caught the eye of the writers. One version of the 'drugs are less profitable than pirated DVDs' claim (with marijuana taking heroin's place) was debunked on the Commons Law mailing list. Pirated DVDs are sold for a fraction of the cost of the original. It would be obvious to anyone that DVDs that are typically sold for Rs.30-50, where the cost of manufacture alone may be estimable to be around Rs. 10, cannot be more profitable than heroin peddling. That apart, most online file sharing (deemed to be "piracy") is non-commercial. Thus the question of profit does not really arise. Still, for the industry, absence of a profit is equal to a loss.

Thus, the rhetoric of crime, and that too heinous crime, is continually used, despite its being completely inapposite. Why does used to try to make IP enforcement a matter of state concern, rather than a matter of private, and civil, interest. This way, illegitimate statistics and factoids are used to make individual file-sharers who earn no money get lengthy prison sentences. This and other ways in which IP enforcement has expanded are carefully documented in this paper by Susan Sell.

Repeating false 'statistics' does not make them true.

Again, we were subjected to a number of dubious claims during the conference: If only counterfeiting and piracy were eliminated, India's fiscal deficit would disappear; the Indian entertainment industry loses 16000 crore (USD 4 billion) yearly to piracy; 820,000 direct jobs are lost due to film piracy; software piracy costs the industry USD 2.7 billion annually, etc. These reports' methodologies have been thorougly discredited. Even The Economist, a very conservative and pro-industry newspaper, believes that the BSA-IDC annual reports on software piracy are utterly distorted. Similarly, in the U.S., the figure of 750,000 jobs (around 8% of the U.S. unemployed in 2008) being lost due to piracy were touted by everyone from the Department of Commerce, the Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Border and Customs Protection, and the MPAA, RIAA, and BSA. The amount of money lost each year in the U.S. due to IP infringement has been estimated to be between USD 200-250 billion (that's more than the combined 2005 gross domestic revenues of the movie, music, software, and video game industries). In a lengthy piece in Ars Technica, Julian Sanchez traces back the history of both these figures, and shows how they are just large numbers used for lobbying, and are not based on actual studies. The industry-commissioned Ernst & Young report ("The Effects of Counterfeiting and Piracy on India's Entertainment Industry") was never made available to the public at large, thereby making it impossible to judge the methodological soundness of the survey and the veracity of the figures.

IP expansion and more stringent enforcement is counter-productive.

Chander Mohan Lall, copyright lawyer to various film studios (including Warner Bros.) in India, used a number of short film clips in presentation during the conference. Upon being questioned about it, he admitted that he did not have permissions of the copyright holders, but claimed that his use fell under "the education exception" in Indian copyright law. While I wish he were correct (because what he was doing was indeed educational use), as per the law he is wrong. Section 52(1)(i) of the Copyright Act only exempts educational usage of cinematograph film recordings when "audience is limited to such staff and students [of an educational institution], the parents and guardians of the students and persons directly connected with the activities of the institution". While there are other arguments he could seek to use to make his usage of the film clilps non-infringing, being excepted by the educational fair dealings clauses isn't one of them. Thus, more stringent enforcement of IP rights actually engenders such unauthorized, but perfectly legitimate copying and communication to the public such as that done by Mr. Lall.

Another way in which IP enforcement is being sought to be increased is by way of the so-called Goonda Acts. These are generally statutes aimed at criminals and lumpen elements in society. The Maharastra version, the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug-Offenders and Dangerous Persons Act, 1981, just became the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug-Offenders, Dangerous Persons and Video Pirates Act. The term "video pirate" is very widely defined, to include any copyright infringement-chargesheeter who is "engaged or is making preparations for engaging in any of his activities as a video pirates, which affect adversely or likely to affect adversely, the maintenance of public order". Public order is deemed to be disturbed by "producing and distributing pirated copies of music or film products, thereby resulting in a loss of confidence in administration". Thus video pirates can possibly be interpreted to include individual sitting at home and using P2P networks to share films. The only requirement is that they should have had a chargesheet lodged against them previously -- they needn't even have been convicted; being chargesheeted suffices. Thus, non-commercial activities of file-sharing are equated to bootleggers and drug smugglers, and preventive detention (an anti-civil rights relic of India's colonial past) is applicable to them.

IP expansion is happening without the ostensible justifications for IP being kept in mind. That Tirupathi ladoos are going to get GI (geographical indicator) protection was announced at the conference with great pride. Geographical indicators are used to protect consumer interests, to ensure that no one outside a particular region (Champagne) can lay claim to be producing that product (Champagne) if the production of that product is intrinsically linked to special features found in that region (climate, etc.). However, no devout person would want to purchase anything advertised as "Tirupathi ladoo" if it were produced outside the Venkateswara temple at Tirupathi, thus the question of consumer confusion does not arise. What if someone malignantly advertises something as Tirupathi ladoo and claims it was made in Tirupathi (and not just that it tastes like the ladoo made there)? Such a person can be taken to task for deceptive advertising, and there is no need for something to have IP protection to do so. This represents a senseless expansionism of IP. It is now IP for IP's sake.

One of the speakers, Mr. V.N. Deshmukh, who though pro-stringent IP enforcement, astutely noted that, "When local demand is not met, they [consumers] turn to counterfeiters and pirates." Local demand can be unsatisfied because of lack of supply, or because the supply is overpriced, or because the supply is not easy to access, or because what is supplied is inferior to what is demanded. At the end of the day, as William Patry, Google's lead counsel, has noted, what companies sell to the public are products and services, and not IP. It would thus be wise for businesses to be innovative and compete rather than trying to extend their monopolies and engaging in rent-seeking behaviour that is economical harmful to consumers. They would also do well to remember that IP is not only a product but an input as well, so they are ultimately consumers themselves. All the harsher laws and enforcement mechanisms that they push for right now will have unintended consequences, and come to affect them adversely.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/fallacies-lies-and-video-pirates

Exhaustion: Imports, Exports and the Doctrine of First Sale in Indian Copyright Law

pranesh — 2014-05-29T06:18:31Z

This article by Pranesh Prakash was published in the Manupatra Intellectual Property Reports, February 2011, Volume 1, Part 2, pp. 149-160. In this short note, the author argues that Indian courts have fundamentally misunderstood the doctrine of first sale, and consequently have wrongly held that parallel importation is disallowed by Indian law. He further looks at the ingenuity displayed by a court in prohibiting export of low-priced editions from India, and comes to the conclusion that this is also wrong in law. He believes there is a way out of this quagmire that we find ourselves in due to judicial inventions: that of accepting a proposed amendment to the Copyright Act.

Can foreign works be copyrighted works?

Section 13(2) of the Indian Copyright Act states that insofar as published works go, copyright only subsists if the work is first published in India or if the work is by an Indian citizen. It does except the application of this section to all those works to which sections 40 and 41 of the Act apply. Section 40 allows for the provisions of the Act to be extended to foreign works and foreign authors by special order of the government. The government is required to do so, being a member of the Berne Convention, the Universal Copyright Convention as well as the TRIPS Agreement, and has fulfilled its requirement via International Copyright Order, the latest such order having been issued in 1999.

Thus, for purposes of our law, we protect not only Indian works, but foreign works as well. It expressly places foreign authors and works published in a foreign country in the same shoes as Indian authors and works published in India, respectively.

Import of copyrighted works

Thus having established that foreign books enjoy protection under Indian law, we now turn to the question of whether import of foreign works into India is permissible under Indian law. There is no provision of the Copyright Act by which the owner or licensee of copyright given the exclusive right to import a copyrighted work into India. Section 51(b)(iv) does, however, makes it illegal to import infringing copies of a work.[1];It is clear that illegally published copies are infringing copies, and thus cannot be imported. But are legally published copies that are legally purchased outside of India also ‘infringing copies’ and is their import also prohibited by the section 51?

This question is laid out as:

We now arrive at one of the most difficult topics in copyright law. It is our ambition to expound this subject as clearly as possible but inevitably this involves exposing some troublesome problems which lurk not far beneath the surface. The basic idea is simple. It has long been the policy of copyright law in the UK and other countries which follow our system that as a rule, mere selling or other secondary dealings with articles manufactured in the home market shall not be treated as copyright infringement unless their marking was piratical in the first place. Further, it is policy that traders should be free to buy and sell goods without getting involved in copyright proceedings, so long as they do so in good faith. Do not deal in pirate copies where you can tell they are probably such” is a law anyone can understand. Dealing in pirate copies where you know or have reason to believe that they are such is called secondary infringement in contrast to primary infringement (e.g. manufacturing) where liability is strict.

This idea works fine as long as one does not need to examine too closely, what one means by pirate copies; it is usually pretty obvious. However, when it comes to parallel imports it is not so obvious, and one has to know precisely what is meant. It is plain that the test cannot be whether the copy was made piratically in its country of origin because the copyright laws of foreign states are irrelevant so far as rights in the UK are concerned, and in some cases these laws may not even exist. Since foreign copyrights are separate and distinct rights, and since it is commonplace for these to be assigned so as to be exploited by different hands, it cannot matter whether a copy imported from Britannia was lawfully made in its country of origin; this principle has been recognized from an early date.

According to section 2(m) of the Act, a reproduction of a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, a copy of a film or sound recording is an "infringing copy" if such reproduction, copy or sound recording is made or imported in contravention of the provisions of this Act. So section 2(m) does not clarify matters either, because it applies only to that importation that is “in contravention of the provisions of” the Copyright Act. So we look to section 14 which lays down the meaning of copyright and is read with section 51 when determining what does and does not constitute infringement. Nowhere, in section 14 of the Act is a right to import granted to the copyright owner. However, section 14 does clearly lays down that insofar as literary, dramatic or musical works go; it is the copyright owner’s exclusive right to issue copies of the work to the public not being copies already in circulation”. The explanation to this section goes to clarify that for the purposes of this section, a copy which has been sold once shall be deemed to be a copy already in circulation.”What this means and how this has been construed by various courts shall be seen in the following sections.

Judicial history on importation

The Penguin case [2]

The issue of parallel importation first reached the higher judiciary in 1984 when the Delhi High Court was called upon to pronounce judgment on whether import by a third party without the express authorisation of the copyright owner constitute infringement. The court, bizarrely, ruled that it constituted infringement because it constituted a violation of the owner’s right to publish:

While publication generally refers to issue to public, importation for the specified purpose may be a necessary step in the process of issuing to the public, and therefore of publishing. It appears to me that the exclusive right of the copyright owner to print, publish and sell these titles in India would extend to the exclusive right to import copies into India for the purpose of selling or by way of trade offering or exposing for sale the hooks in question. This is the true meaning of the word “publish” as used in section 14(1)(a)(4).

It is also an infringement of copyright knowingly to import into India for sale or hire infringing copies of a work without the consent of the owner of the copyright, though they may have been made by or with the consent of the owner of the copyright in the place where they were made.

It should be noted that prior to the 1994 amendment of the Copyright Act, the first two clauses of section 14 read: “(i) to reproduce the work in any material form; (ii) to publish the work”. Thus, this judgment extends the right to “publish the work” (or in the words of the judge, “print, publish and sell”) to include a right of importation out of thin air, simply by stating that it appears so. While the judge notes that “publication” under the Act (in 1984) was defined as meaning the issue of copies of the work, either in whole or in part, to the public in a manner sufficient to satisfy the reasonable requirements of the public having regard to the nature of the work”, he does not explain how importation is subsumed under that definition contrary to a plain reading of the law. Finally, the judge does note that, “It is true that India Distributors are not printing these books and are not guilty of what is called primary infringement”, but goes on to state however, that “when they issue copies of these titles for public distribution they are guilty of secondary infringement”. These categories are created, but neither explained nor explored in the judgment. One other legal nuance that was examined was the allowance granted to the Registrar of Copyright under section 53 to “order that copies made out of India of the work which if made in India would infringe copyright shall not be imported. The judge noted that the words infringing copy as contained in section 53 could not be different in meaning from the same words contained in section 51(b). The implication of this shall be demonstrated shortly.

Importantly, the judgment does not look into section 16 of the Act which states that there shall be no copyright except as provided by the Act, and how this should prevent a judge from expanding the rights provided in the law to include a new judicially created right to prevent imports.

Privity of contract

Nowhere in the judgment does the judge explain how an exclusive distribution contract between two parties can affect a third party in violation of the well-held principle of privity of contract. This is an important issue because in effect, the judgment makes a third party bound by the contract entered into by two private parties. The parties agree inter se (for example) to ensure that the India distributor does not sell the book outside of India and that the owner of rights will not give the right to sell in India to any other person. How could this contract between those two parties come in way of a third person buying from a foreign market and importing into India? If it was the case of an exclusive UK licensee selling in India, then both the exclusive Indian licensee as well as the owner of the copyright would have cause of action in India on the basis of both violation of contract as well as violation of copyright (for exceeding his territorial licence). However, a third party who buys from a stream of commerce cannot be bound by these contracts because he becomes the owner of the book and not a licensee. Thus, the judgment makes a contract between two private parties, which merely creates a right in personam, applicable to the entire world. By doing this it allows a contract to create a right in rem without any express provision of the law doing do. Indeed, this issue was examined by the United State Supreme Court in 1908 in the case of Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus,[3] in which the doctrine of first sale was judicially evolved.

Doctrine of first sale/exhaustion

Importantly, nowhere in the judgment does the judge bother to go into the details of the interaction between the sale of a copy of a book (upon the occurrence of which no further conditions can be laid) and the Copyright Act. If I sell you a bicycle laying down a condition that you cannot re-sell it, such a condition cannot be upheld in a court of law because by sale I divest all saleable interest I have in the bicycle. This principle is what is embodied in sections 10 and 11 of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 10 states–“Where property is transferred subject to a condition or limitation absolutely restraining the transferee or any person claiming under him from parting with or disposing of his interest in the property, the condition or limitation is void, except in the case of a lease where the condition is for the benefit of the lessor or those claiming under him. In the same vein, section 11 states–“Where, on a transfer of property, an interest therein is created absolutely in favour of any person, but the terms of the transfer direct that such interest shall be applied or enjoyed by him in a particular manner, he shall be entitled to receive and dispose of such interest as if there were no such direction.” Thus, by selling of a copy of a book (as opposed to a licensing the book), I divest myself of all saleable interests in that particular copy of the book (though not copyright). I cannot prevent you from re-selling that book. However, copyright law would require that you can only re-sell a copy of a book without the owner’s permission, and cannot sell it without the owner’s permission. This is known as the doctrine of first sale, which evolved as a via media between copyright law, which gave the owner of copyright rights in a book, and property law, which gave the buyer of a book rights in her particular copy of the book.

The best appreciation of this doctrine of first sale (also known as “exhaustion of rights”) has come in a judgment by Justice Ravindra Bhat, who states the meaning of the doctrine very clearly:

The doctrine of exhaustion of copyright enables free trade in material objects on which copies of protected works have been fixed and put into circulation with the right holder’s consent. The exhaustion principle in a sense arbitrates the conflict between the right to own a copy of a work and the author’s right to control the distribution of copies. Exhaustion is decisive with respect to the priority of ownership and the freedom to trade in material carriers on the condition that a copy has been legally brought into trading. Transfer of ownership of a carrier with a copy of a work fixed on it makes it impossible for the owner to derive further benefits from the exploitation of a copy that was traded with his consent. The exhaustion principle is thus termed legitimate by reason of the profits earned for the ownership transfer, which should be satisfactory to the author if the work is not being exploited in a different exploitation field.

Exhaustion of rights is linked to the distribution right. The right to distribute objects (making them available to the public) means that such objects (or the medium on which a work is fixed) are released by or with the consent of the owner as a result of the transfer of ownership. In this way, the owner is in control of the distribution of copies since he decides the time and the form in which copies are released to the public. Content wise the distribution rights are to be understood as an opportunity to provide the public with copies of a work and put them into circulation, as well as to control the way the copies are used. The exhaustion of rights principle thus limits the distribution right, by excluding control over the use of copies after they have been put into circulation for the first time.

1994 Amendment to the Act

Interestingly, the Penguin judgment was sought to be overturned by an amendment to section 14 in 1994. That amendment removed the right to “publish”, and instead made it a right to “to issue copies of the work to the public not being copies already in circulation”. It stands to reason that this not only ensures the centrality of the doctrine of first sale in India, but also allows for international exhaustion, thus allowing for parallel import. This is clear from the fact that we, in Indian law (as per section 40), makes it clear that “all or any provisions of this Act shall apply to work first published in any class territory outside India to which the order (under section 40) relates in like manner as if they were first published within India.

Thus, even books published internationally are, under the legal fiction under section 40, akin to books published in India. Since we are granting foreign works all the protection under the Act as though they had been published in India by Indian authors, it is but natural that they should be subject to all the same limitations as well (such as the doctrine of first sale).

As one commentator puts it, “with amendments, the decision of the Penguin case is no more the law. Like most other nations, we have also accepted the principle of international exhaustion. This seems to be after taking into view the public interest angle.”[4]

Unfortunately, legal commentators seemed to have paid greater attention to legislative changes than did the courts.

Eurokids case[5]

In 2005, the same issue of parallel importation in literary works arose before the Bombay High Court. Highly unfortunately, the decision by the Bombay High Court was even more ill-reasoned than that of the Delhi High Court in the Penguin case. Nowhere in the judgment is the issue of the first sale doctrine, on which the issue of parallel importation rests, even cursorily examined. Nowhere is the amendment to section 14 of the Copyright Act even noted. Indeed, the only time that section 14 is even mentioned is when the section is quoted to establish it as providing the meaning of “copyright” in Indian law. The implications of section 14 in terms of exhaustion of rights are simply not examined. Section 2(m) of the Act, which it is necessary to examine (as shown above) to understand what to make of the phrase “infringing copy” in section 51, is not even mentioned once. As per the logic of the judgment, any copy that is sold in India by a third party in contravention of an exclusive licence contract is automatically assumed to be infringing. Thus, once again, copyright law magically overrides the concept of privity of contract without so much as an explanation.

Most importantly, because the case relies on the Penguin decision without having noticed and accounting for the subsequent change in the text of the law because of the 1994 amendment, it should be held to be per incuriam, and should not act as a precedent.

Warner Bros. case [6]

In 2009, the Delhi High Court pronounced yet another verdict on parallel importation in the case of Warner Bros. v. Santosh V.G. However, this was a case on DVDs, and not on books. While the Court correctly understands the meaning of the first sale doctrine in terms of literary works (and thus becoming the first judgment to explicitly talk about this doctrine), it is open to debate whether it was correct in its ruling on the inapplicability of the doctrine when it came to cinematograph films. The reasoning of the court (in paragraphs 77 and 78) as to why parallel importation is not allowed under Indian law is faulty, and is worth quoting in extenso:

In this case, the copies that are being let out for rent/hire by the defendant are not made in India. Rather, they have been made in the US and imported into India. As noticed earlier, copyright in a work published abroad, in a Berne Convention country, like the United States, entitles its owner to assert copyright in India; such rights are “as if” the works were published in India (section 40 and provisions of the order). An infringing copy is one “made or imported in contravention of the provisions of this Act”. In this context, the proviso to section 51(b)(iv), in the court’s view, provides the key to Parliamentary intention. It carves only one exception, permitting “import of one copy of any work for the private and domestic use of the importer”. The plaintiffs’ argument is that there would have been no need to enact this exception, if there were no restriction on import of cinematograph films, genuinely made outside India. The effect of the proviso to section 51(b)(iv) is plainly, not to relax the importation of genuinely made cinematographic films but to allow for the importation of one copy of any work “for the private and domestic use of the importer.” This would mean that the proviso allows for the importation of an infringing work, for private and domestic use of the importer, and not commercial use.

Quite obviously, there are some glaring problems in the court’s reasoning. The proviso to section 51(b)(iv) does indeed carve out an exception, but that exception is for infringing copies of a work, and not for non-infringing or “genuine” copies. The plaintiffs’ argument, according to the judge, is: If all genuine copies of the cinematograph film could be legally imported, there would be no need to enact this exception. However, there could well be a need to enact this exception to cover a single non-genuine copy of a cinematograph film. It is precisely because of this that the exception is so very narrow, being for not only private use, as in section 52(1)(a), but of a single copy of a work and that too only for “private and domestic use”. This possibility of allowing import of a non-genuine copy is completely overlooked by the judge. The judgment continues:

The defendant’s argument that the plaintiffs lost the power to deal with the copy, once placed in the market place, in the United States, is also unsupportable as too broad a proposition. In the context of the Act, the argument is more hopeful, than convincing. Even in the United States, it has been held (United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 1977)) that though, after “first sale", a vendee “is not restricted by statute from further transfers of that copy”, yet a first sale does not, however, exhaust other rights, such as the copyright holder’s right to prohibit copying of the copy he sells. The Federal Appellate Court noted that “other copyright rights (reprinting, copying, etc.) remain unimpaired”. It is clear therefore that the copies in question are infringing copies. Therefore, their importation, and more importantly, use for any of the purposes under section 51, other than the one spelt out in it the proviso is in contravention of the Act. The question, however, is whether the action of the defendants amounts to infringement of the copyright of the plaintiffs. This must be answered independently of the question of whether parallel importation of copyrighted goods is permissible under Indian copyright law.

While the reading of the law is correct (i.e., the first sale doctrine does not exhaust all rights, but merely the right to prevent further transfers), the application of the law to the facts is incorrect. In this case, the fact situation before the court was not of “reprinting, copying, etc.” but of the physical transfer of copies of a work bought in the US into India. As is noted in United States v. Wise, “after first sale,” the buyer “is not restricted by statute from further transfers of that copy”. Indeed, this was case can be seen as exactly such a “further transfer” (of the rights over that copy from a shop in the US to the buyer in India). How the judge misreads the argument as being about something other than transfer of property rights in a copy (and more as something akin to reproduction), and concludes that “it is clear therefore that the copies in question are infringing copies,” is not clear.

However, the verdict of the court does not proceed on this ground alone, and involves discussion of the doctrine of first sale with regard to cinematograph films, the provisions of section 53, which apply only to cinematograph films, none of which are applicable in case of literary works.

Export of copyrighted works

Now, that we have dealt with the traditionally contentious part on imports, we may now examine the rare, but even more contentious issue of exports. Barring a few exceptions, notably the United States, the copyright law in no country regulates exports. Even in the United States, section 602 of their Copyright Act regulates only the export of infringing works, and not the export of legitimate works. In India, though, there are two judgments of the Delhi High Court that seemingly make illegal export from India of legal copies of a copyrighted work. As one of these decisions is an ex parte order without any reasoning—indeed calling the reasoning “bare minimum” would be doing that phrase a disservice—we shall focus only on the other judgement: the one pronounced by Justice Manmohan Singh in John Wiley & Sons v. Prabhat Chander Kumar Jain [7]. The facts of the judgment are rather simple. John Wiley & Sons Inc., based in New York, exclusively licensed the rights over certain books to Wiley India Pvt. Ltd. (all the other plaintiffs follow the same model, so we shall restrict ourselves to the case of the Wiley corporation). These books were sold at a reduced cost in the Indian market and were clearly labelled as being “Wiley Student Edition restricted for sale only in Bangladesh, Myanmar, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka and Vietnam”. Another label on the same book read: “The book for sale only in the country to which first consigned by Wiley India Pvt. Ltd and may not be re-exported. For sale only in: Bangladesh, Myanmar, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka and Vietnam.”[8]. Quite clearly, John Wiley & Sons, being the owner of the rights, had given exclusive license to Wiley India Pvt. Ltd. to publish and print an English Language reprint edition only in the territories entailed in the agreement and not beyond that. Further, they wished to impose this restriction on all buyers of the book by way of that notice and attached conditionality, and thus prevent exports to the United States.

At this stage, it would do us well to dwell into the facts of the 1908 US Supreme Court case of Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus[9]. In this case, the plaintiff-appellant sold a copyrighted novel with a clear notice under the copyright notice stating that, “The price of this book at retail is $1 net. No dealer is licensed to sell it at a lower price, and a sale at a lower price will be treated as an infringement of the copyright”. Macy & Co., a famous retailer, purchased large lots of books both at wholesale prices and at retail prices, and re-sold the books to its customers at 89 cents a copy. This was quite clearly in violation of the condition imposed by the notice.

It may be seen that the facts in this case quite clearly mirror the fact situation in John Wiley & Sons v. Prabhat Chander Kumar Jain. It is only the nature of the conditionality that differentiates the two cases: in the one it was a restriction on price at which the book could be further sold, in the other it was a restriction on where the book could be further sold. How did the judge rule in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Strauss? The court ruled that it was on the record that Macy & Co. had knowledge of the notice. However, despite that, the notice was held not to be binding on Macy & Co. The court noted:

The precise question, therefore, in this case is, “Does the sole right to vend secure to the owner of the copyright the right, after a sale of the book to a purchaser, to restrict future sales of the book at retail, to the right to sell it at a certain price per copy, because of a notice in the book that a sale at a different price will be treated as an infringement, which notice has been brought home to one undertaking to sell for less than the named sum?” We do not think the statute can be given such a construction copyright statutes, while protecting the owner of the copyright in his right to multiply and sell his production, do not create the right to impose, by notice, such as is disclosed in this case, a limitation at which the book shall be sold at retail by future purchasers, with whom there is no privity of contract …To add to the right of exclusive sale, the authority to control all future retail sales, by a notice that such sales must be made at a fixed sum, would give a right not included in the terms of the statute, and, in our view, extend its operation, by construction, beyond its meaning, when interpreted with a view to ascertaining the legislative intent in its enactment.

This judgment proceeded on privity of contract, the factum of a sale having occurred, and created what is now known as the doctrine of first sale–an established principle that the exclusive right to sell, distribute or circulate a copy of the copyrighted work exhausts the moment the item is placed into a stream of commerce through a sale. This can, of course, be contradicted if explicitly stated so in a statute.[10] However, as we noted earlier, the Indian statute explicitly notes that the right to issue copies of a work to the public, guaranteed to the owner of the copyright over a literary, dramatic, or artistic work is restricted to copies not already in circulation. Thus, it might seem to one to be quite clear how the court would in the John Wiley & Sons case. One would then be wrong.

In fact, Justice Manmohan Singh, in a very detailed and circuitous judgment, rules that the activity done by the defendant is a violation not of some implied contract between Wiley India Pvt. Ltd. and him, but that it constituted a violation of the Indian Copyright Act, and notably section 51 of the Copyright Act. How does he reach this conclusion?

His reasoning rests on 3 dubious pillars:

that the rights of the licensee are distinct from that of the owner, and that the former may get exhausted without affecting the latter;
that the licensee cannot pass on better title to those that buy from him than he himself has;
that sale or even offer for sale or taking of orders for sale are all forms of putting into circulation or issuance of copies.

First, through a close reading of the various provisions of the Copyright Act he notes that the Act creates a clear difference between the rights of the owner and the rights of the licensee (para 47-50). He then finally comes to noting that,

“A logical corollary drawn from above analysis which needs reiteration at this stage is that for the purposes of section 51 which is in the preceding chapter, the term owner of the copyright does not include exclusive licensee. Thus, the rights of the owner although may include rights of the exclusive licensee but the court cannot read the term owner of the copyright as that of the exclusive licensee and their rights are different as per the allocation by the owner.” (para 62).

Thus, he establishes that some rights of the licensee may be extinguished (as per the doctrine of exhaustion) without extinguishing that same right of the owner. In other words, while the right of circulation of the licensee get exhausted, the right of circulation of the owner remains unaffected. Justice Singh doesn’t go into the implications of this, but there can be two ways of interpreting what this means. It could mean that by virtue of the circulation rights of the licensee getting exhausted, the circulation right of the owner gets exhausted in those nine countries for which the licensee had been granted rights of circulation. Else, it could mean that the exhaustion of the licensee’s circulation rights does not at all affect the owner’s circulation rights. This latter one is obviously an absurd idea, since that would, in all cases, leave the owner with a cause of action in case of all sales even when the owner is in India. Thus, one is left considering the former the only logical meaning.

However, that this cannot possibly be right is demonstrated by the fact that this can easily be applied to an all-in-India transaction as well. Thus, for instance, the owner of rights can decide never to directly sell any book, but only allow its licensees to sell. Thus, it can contractually bind a licensee to sell only in Andhra Pradesh and hold that because of that license contract any buyer who buys from the Andhra Pradesh licensee and decides to re-sell to a second-hand bookstore in Karnataka is actually violating the terms of the license (because the circulation right gets extinguished only insofar as the licensee is concerned, and that licence only allows sales in Andhra Pradesh).

That is obviously cannot be held to be the purpose of the law. Thus, the privity of the contract between the owner of the right and the licensee must be upheld and may not be held to bind a third party purchaser.

The second ground on which Justice Singh rules is on the general property law principle that a person cannot pass on a better title than she herself has. Thus, Justice Singh holds that when the licensee sells a book to a person, that person only receives as much of the title to that book that the licensee has. Thus, since the licensee only has title in the book insofar as those nine countries go, the person who buys that book cannot get better title.

The plain fault in this reasoning is the very founding basis of the doctrine of first sale: the differentiation between property rights in a copy of a book and the copyright in the book. No one has contended in this case that the transaction between the licensee and the book purchaser is not a sale. Once a sale happens, all property rights in that copy of the book are alienated to the book purchaser. It must be remembered that this transaction is not the case of the licensee sub-licensing the right to circulate the book. The licensee cannot sub-license to another party the right to sell the book in, say, Australia, because she does not have that right in the first place. However, in this case, the licensee is invoking the right to sell the book in India, and is not passing on that right. The right of a book buyer to re-sell comes from the statute— from the doctrine of first sale and not from a passing on of that right from the licensee.

The last pillar of the judge’s reasoning is that the sale—or even offer for sale, or taking of orders for sale—of a book online are all forms of putting into circulation or issuance of copies. Section 40 does not work two ways. It only deems a foreign work “Indian”, and does not deem a sale in a foreign land the same as sale in India. Thus, even if we are to accept the other two pillars of Justice Singh’s reasoning, it is unclear how an offer made online to sell a book is equated to actually placing a book in circulation in India. How can an India law prohibit circulation on the streets of Bogotá? This is only possible if a separate right of export is recognised. But Justice Singh is extremely clear that he is not creating such a distinct right.

A notice to the buyer that re-exports are prohibited cannot be held to constitute a valid contract because the Transfer of Property Act clearly makes such a prohibition invalid (sections 10 and 11) after all, it is a sale that takes place and not a license as does the Copyright Act (section 14).

Amendment to Section 2(m)

There has been much controversy lately with some publishers trying to stop the government from amending section 2(m) of the Indian Copyright Act, clarifying that a parallel import will not be seen as an “infringing copy”. Some lawyers for the publishing industry have made the claim that allowing for parallel importation would legally allow for the exports of low-priced edition and overturn the basis of the Wiley judgment. This is false.

The amendment itself merely adds the following proviso at the end of section 2(m) (which itself defines what an “infringing copy” means):

Provided that a copy of a work published in any country outside India with the permission of the author of the work and imported from that country shall not be deemed to be an infringing copy.

It seems that this is in fact a provision introduced solely to clarify that this (i.e., following international exhaustion) is the position that India holds, and not to change the statute itself. It is merely to clarify that the courts have misread the provisions of the law, or that they have indeed not read the provisions of the law (as in the Eurokids case).

This provision will have no effect whatsoever on the Wiley ruling. While the Wiley ruling deserves to fail on its own merits, the reasoning in that case does not depend on whether we follow international or national exhaustion. Indeed, in para 104, the judge states:

As per my opinion, as the express provision for international exhaustion is absent in our Indian law, it would be appropriate to confine the applicability of the same to regional exhaustion.

Be that as it may, in the present case, the circumstances do not even otherwise warrant this discussion as the rights if at all are exhausted are to the extent to which they are available with the licensees as the books are purchased from the exclusive licensees who have limited rights and not from the owner. In these circumstances, the question of exhaustion of rights of owner in the copyright does not arise at all.

Thus, the argument that following the principle of international exhaustion will upturn this judgment is faulty. Imports and exports are two distinct things. India’s following of the principle of “international exhaustion” means that the right to first sale is exhausted in India, when the work is legally published anywhere internationally (i.e., regardless of where that copyrighted work is legally published). The principle of international exhaustion does not not exhaust the right of first sale internationally—the word “international” is used to indicate where the publication has to take place for exhaustion to occur, and not where the exhaustion takes place. After all, Indian law on a matter cannot determine whether a book can or cannot be sold anywhere else in the world (which is precisely what it would do if it is to hold that rights are exhausted internationally by virtue of a book being printed in India).

Conclusion

I think the best way of concluding this are by quoting, in extenso, a passage from a book on the Indian intellectual property law by Prof. N.S. Gopalakrishnan & Dr. T.G. Agitha:

Under the Indian law there is no express provision recognising the right of importation. This would in fact enable parallel importation of works. “Parallel importation” means transportation of “legitimate” goods which are available at a cheaper rate in one country by independent buyers (e.g. book sellers), for sale in another country. This could act as an effective check on creating monopoly in the market. Hence, it is an important aspect to be borne in mind for a developing country like India. Since there is no international obligation against parallel importation, nothing prevented the court from taking the stand that unless there is an express provision conferring importation rights on the owner of copyright or prohibiting parallel importation, it need not be considered to be prohibited in India. It is pertinent to note that India supported the principle of international exhaustion and not the national exhaustion principle. [11]

However, it is submitted that the court (in Penguin v. India Book Distributors) failed to take note of these aspects while deciding this case.”[12]

One can only hope those words by these leading experts on IP law in India are paid heed to, and that the arguments otherwise will fail to convince both the government as well as future court decisions.

* Please do not cite this note in an academic paper. Feel free to cite elsewhere. This note is still very much a work in progress. However, given the urgency of this issue and the importance of ensuring debate on the legal ramifications of the proposed amendment to s.2(m), this note should prove useful.

Notes

[1]. Section 51(b)(iv) states: “Copyright in a work shall be deemed to be infringed (b) when any person (iv) imports into India, any infringing copies of the work.” A proviso to the section reads: “Provided that nothing in Sub-clause (iv) shall apply to the import of one copy of any work for the private and domestic use of the importer.”

[2]. Ed.: MANU/DE/0402/1984: AIR 1985 Delhi 29, 26 (1984) DLT 316”

[3]. 210 U.S. 339 (1908).

[4]. Arathi Ashok, Economic Rights of Authors under Copyright Law, 15 J. Intell. Prop. Rights 46 (2010) at 50.

[5]. MANU/MH/0938/2005.

[6]. MANU/DE/0406/2009.

[7]. MANU/DE/1142/2010: MIPR 2010 (2) 0247.

[8]. While the exact countries were different in the case of each of the plaintiffs, there were all restricted to sale in India and a few of its neighbouring countries.

[9]. 210 U.S. 339 (1908).

[10]. All signatories of the TRIPS Agreement have to ensure a right of rental, over and above a right of first sale, for all video (or what are known as cinematograph films in the Indian law).

[11]. R.V. Vaidyanatha Ayyar, The Process and Politics of a Diplomatic Conference on Copyright (1998) 1 JWIP 3 at 17, cited in N.S. Gopalakrishnan and T.G. Agitha, Principles of Intellectual Property 256 (2009).

[12]. N.S. Gopalakrishnan and T.G. Agitha, Principles of Intellectual Property 256 (2009).

Also see SSRN

Download the file here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/exhaustion

Engaging on the Digital Commons

pranesh — 2011-08-20T12:56:26Z

We at the Centre for Internet and Society are very glad to be able to participate in the 13th Biennial Conference of the International Association for the Study of the Commons (IASC). Our interest in the conference arises mainly from our work in the areas of intellectual property rights reform and promotion of different forms of ‘opennesses’ that have cropped up as a response to perceived problems with our present-day regime of intellectual property rights, including open content, open standards, free and open source software, open government data, open access to scholarly research and data, open access to law, etc., our emerging work on telecom policy with respect to open/shared spectrum, and the very important questions around Internet governance. The article by Sunil Abraham and Pranesh Prakash was published in the journal Common Voices, Issue 4.

Our work on intellectual property reform are proactive measures at effecting policy change that go towards protecting and preserving an intellectual, intangible commons. We have opposed the Protection and Utilization of the Public-funded Intellectual Property Bill (an Indian version of the American Bayh-Dole Act) which sought to privatise the fruits of publicfunded research by mandating patents on them. We are working towards reform of copyright law which we believe is lopsided in its lack of concern for consumers and that its current march towards greater enclosure of the public domain is unsustainable. Believing that not all areas of industry and technology are equal, and that patent protection is ill-suited for the software industry, we have worked to ensure that the current prohibitions against patenting of software are effectively followed.

Defensively—that is working within the existing framework of intellectual property law—we seek to promote the various forms of copyright and patent licensing that have arisen as reactions to restrictive IP laws. Free/open source software and open content have arisen as a reaction to the restrictive nature of copyright law, such as the presumption under copyright law that a work is copyrighted by the mere fact of it coming into existence. (for instance, this was not so in the United States until 1989, till when a copyright notice was required to assert copyright). While earlier the presumption was that a work was to belong to the public domain, after the Berne Convention, that presumption was reversed. This led to the creation of the idea of special licences, by using which one could allow all others to share his/her work and reuse it. This innovation in using the law to promote, rather than restrict, what others could do with one’s works has enabled the creation and sharing of everything from Wikipedia, to Linux (which powers more than 85 percent of the world’s top 500 supercomputers) and Apache HTTP server (more than 60 percent of all websites). The advent of the Internet has allowed the creation of intangible digital commons.

We are also starting to engage with the question of telecom policy around spectrum allocation, and believe that promotion of a shared spectrum would help make telecom services, including broadband Internet, available to people at reasonable prices. We also believe that Internet governance should not be the prerogative of governments, and should not happen in a top-down fashion.

Comparisons between tangible commons and intangible commons have been made by people like Elinor and Vincent Ostrom, who in 1977 contributed to our understanding of subtractability and public goods. James Boyle has written about the expansion of copyright law as “the second enclosure movement”, following in the footsteps of the first enclosure movement against the take-over of common land which stretched from the fifteenth century till the nineteenth. Yochai Benkler, has written extensively on commons in information and communication systems as well as on spectrum commons. Just as Elinor Ostrom’s work shows how Garrett Hardin’s evocative ‘tragedy of the commons’ and the problems of free-riding are very often avoided in practice, Michael Heller’s equally evocative phrase ‘gridlock economy’ shows that ‘over-propertisation’ of knowledge can lead to a ‘tragedy of the anti-commons’.

Through this conference we wish to learn of the lessons that academic writings on tangible commons have to impart to intangible commons which are configured very differently (in terms of subtractability, for instance). Ostrom’s work shows how individuals can, in a variety of settings, work to find institutional solutions that promote social cooperation and human betterment. As part of her nine design principles of stable local common pool resource management, she lists clearly defined boundaries for effective exclusion of external unentitled parties. How does that work, when even the existing mechanisms of boundary-definition in intellectual property, such as patent claims, are often decried as being ambiguous thanks to the legalese they are written in? What of traditional knowledge for which defining the community holding ownership rights becomes very difficult? As Ostrom and Hess note, “the rules and flow patterns are different with digital information”, but how do these differences affect the lessons learned from CPR studies? How do Ostrom’s pronouncements against uniform top-down approaches to resource management affect the way that copyright and patents seek to establish a uniform system across multiple areas of art, science and industry (musical recordings and paintings, pharmaceuticals and software)? And how can Ostrom’s work on management of natural resources inform us about the management of resources such as spectrum or the Internet itself? These are all very interesting and important questions that need to be explored, and we are glad that this conference will help us understand these issues better.

Please read the article in Common Voices Issue 4 here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/blog-old/digital-commons

Eben Moglen

pranesh — 2008-12-11T07:40:59Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/publications/ebenmoglen.jpg

Draft Report on Open Government Data in India (v2)

pranesh — 2011-08-23T02:47:22Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/publications/ogd-draft-v2

Draft nonsense

pranesh — 2012-12-03T09:08:10Z

Seriously flawed and dodgily drafted provisions in the IT Act provide the state a stick to beat its citizens with.

Pranesh Prakash's op-ed was published in the Times of India on November 24, 2012.

Section 66A of the Information Technology Act once again finds itself in the middle of a brewing storm. It has been used in cases ranging from the Mamata Banerjee cartoon case, the Aseem Trivedi case, the Karti Chidambaram case, the Chinmayi case, to the current Bal Thackeray-Facebook comments case. In all except the Karti Chidambaram case (which is actually a case of defamation where 's. 66A' is inapplicable), it was used in conjunction with another penal provision, showing that existing laws are more than adequate for regulation of online speech. That everything from online threats wishing sexual assault (the Chinmayi case) to harmless cartoons are sought to be covered under this should give one cause for concern. Importantly, this provision is cognisable (though bailable), meaning an arrest warrant isn't required. This makes it a favourite for those wishing to harass others into not speaking.

Section 66A prohibits the sending "by means of a computer resource or a communication device" certain kinds of messages. These messages are divided into three sub-parts : (a) anything that is "grossly offensive or has menacing character";(b) information known to be false for the purposes of "causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will" and is sent persistently;or (c) "for the purpose of causing annoyance or inconvenience or to deceive or to mislead the addressee or recipient about the origin of such messages". This carries with it a punishment of up to three years in jail and a fine without an upper limit. As even non-lawyers can see, these are very broadly worded, with use of 'or' everywhere instead of 'and', and the punishment is excessive. The lawyers amongst the readers will note that while some of the words used are familiar from other laws (such as the Indian Penal Code), they are never used this loosely. And all should hopefully be able to conclude that large parts of section 66A are plainly unconstitutional.

If that is so obvious, how did we end up getting this law? We copied (and badly at that) from the UK. The sad part is that the modifications that were introduced while copying are the bits that cause the most trouble. The most noteworthy of these changes are the increase in term of punishment to 3 years (in the UK it's 6 months); the late introduction (on December 16, 2008 by A Raja) of sub-section (c), meant as an anti-spam provision, but covering everything in the world except spam;and the mangling up of sub-section (b) to become a witches brew of all the evil intentions in this world.

Further, we must recognise that our Constitution is much stronger when it comes to issues like free speech than the UK's unwritten constitution, and our high courts and Supreme Court have the power to strike down laws for being unconstitutional, unlike in the UK where Parliament reigns supreme. The most the courts can do there is accommodate the European Convention on Human Rights by 'reading down' laws rather than striking them down.

Lastly, even if we do decide to engage in policy-laundering, we need to do so intelligently. The way the government messed up section 66A should serve as a fine lesson on how not to do so. While one should fault the ministry of communications and IT for messing up the IT Act so badly, it is apparent that the law ministry deserves equal blame as well for being the sleeping partner in this deplorable joint venture. For instance, wrongfully accessing a computer to remove material which one believes can be used for defamation can be considered 'cyber-terrorism'. Where have all our fine legal drafters gone? In a meeting, former SEBI chairman M Damodaran noted how bad drafters make our policies seem far dumber than they are. We wouldn't be in this soup if we had good drafters who clearly understand the fundamental rights guaranteed by our constitution.

There are a great many things flawed in this unconstitutional provision, from the disproportionality of the punishment to the non-existence of the crime. The 2008 amendment to the IT Act was one of eight laws passed in 15 minutes without any debate in the 2008 winter session of Parliament. For far too long the Indian government has spoken about "multi-stakeholder" governance of the internet at international fora (meaning that civil society and industry must be seen as equal to governments when it comes to policymaking for the governance of the internet). It is about time we implemented multi-stakeholder internet governance domestically. The way to go forward in changing this would be to set up a multi-stakeholder body (including civil society and industry) which can remedy this and other ridiculously unconstitutional provisions of our IT Act.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/times-crest-pranesh-prakash-november-24-2012-draft-nonsense

DOT Order Blocking 857 Websites on Grounds of Decency and Morality

pranesh — 2015-08-03T07:42:53Z

Copy of leaked DOT order blocking 857 websites on grounds of morality and decency, claiming powers under section 79(3)(b) of the Information Technology Act.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/dot-morality-block-order-2015-07-31

Don't Shoot the Messenger: Speech on Intermediary Liability at 22nd SCCR of WIPO

pranesh — 2012-06-01T15:01:08Z

This is a speech made by Pranesh Prakash at an side-event co-organized by the World Intellectual Property Organization and the Internet Society on intermediary liability, to coincide with the release of Prof. Lillian Edwards's WIPO-commissioned report on 'Role and Responsibility of the Internet Intermediaries in the Field of Copyright'.

Good afternoon. I've been asked to provide a user's perspective to the question of intermediary liability. "In what cases should an Internet intermediary—a messenger—be held liable for the doings of a third party?" is the broad question. I believe that in answering that question we can be guided by two simple principles: As long as intermediaries don't exercise direct editorial control, they should not be held liable; and as long as they don't instigate or encourage the illegal activity, they should not be held liable. In all other cases, attacking Internet intermediaries generally a sign of 'shooting the messenger'. General intermediary liability and intermediary liability for copyright infringement share a common philosophical foundation, and so I will talk about general intermediary liability first.

While going about holding intermediaries liable, we must remember that what is at stake here is the fact that intermediaries are a necessary component of ensuring freedom of speech and self-expression on the World Wide Web. In this regard, we must keep in mind the joint declaration issued by four freedom of expression rapporteurs under the aegis of the Organization of American States on June 1, 2011:

Intermediary Liability

a. No one who simply provides technical Internet services such as providing access, or searching for, or transmission or caching of information, should be liable for content generated by others, which is disseminated using those services, as long as they do not specifically intervene in that content or refuse to obey a court order to remove that content, where they have the capacity to do so (‘mere conduit principle’).

b. Consideration should be given to insulating fully other intermediaries, including those mentioned in the preamble, from liability for content generated by others under the same conditions as in paragraph 2(a). At a minimum, intermediaries should not be required to monitor user-generated content and should not be subject to extra-judicial content takedown rules which fail to provide sufficient protection for freedom of expression (which is the case with many of the ‘notice and takedown’ rules currently being applied).

It is useful to keep in mind what the kind of liability we affix on offline intermediaries: Would we hold a library responsible for unlawful material that a user has placed on its shelves without its encouragement?

Ensuring a balanced system of intermediary liability is also very important in preserving the forms of innovations we have seen online. Ensuring that intermediaries aren't always held liable for what third parties do is an essential component of encouraging new models of participation, such as Wikipedia. While Wikipedia has community-set standards with regard to copyright, obscenity, and other such issues, holding the Wikimedia Foundation (which has only around 30-40 people) itself responsible for what millions of users write on Wikipedia will hamper such new models of peer-production. This point, unfortunately, has not prevented the Wikimedia Foundation being sued a great number of times in India, a large percentage of which take the form of SLAPP ('strategic lawsuit against public participation') cases, since if the real intention had been to remove the offending content, editing Wikipedia is an easy enough way of achieving that.

While searching for these balanced solutions, we need to look beyond Europe, and look at how countries like Chile, Brazil, India and others are looking at these issues. Unfortunately, this being Geneva, most of the people I see represented in this room are from the developed world as are the examples we are discussing (France and Spain).

In India, for instance, the Internet Service Providers Association made it clear in 2006 (when there was an outcry over censorship of blogging platforms) that they do not want to be responsible for deciding whether something about which they have received a complaint is unlawful or not.

With respect to copyright and the Internet, while the Internet allows for copyright infringement to be conducted more easily, it also allows for copyright infringement to be spotted more easily. Earlier, if someone copied, it would be difficult to find out. Now that is not so. So, that balance is already ingrained, and while many in the industry focus on the fact of easier infringement and thus ask for increased legal protection, such increase in legal protection is not required since the same technological factors that enable increased infringement also enable increased ability to know about that infringement.

On the Internet, intermediaries sometimes engage in primary infringement due to the very nature of digital technology. In the digital sphere, everything is a copy. Thus, whenever you're working on a computer, copies of the copyrighted that show up on your screen are automatically copied to your computer's RAM. Whenever you download anything from the Internet, copies of it are created en route to your computer. (That is the main reason that exceptions in the copyright laws of most countries that allow you to re-sell a book you own don't apply to electronic books.) In such a case, intermediaries must be specially protected.

Additionally, online activities that we take for granted, for instance search technologies, violate the copyright law of most countries. For online search technology to be reasonably fast (instead of taking hours for each search), the searching has to be done on a copies (cache) of actual websites instead of the actual websites. For image searching, it would be unreasonable to expect search companies to take licences for all the images they allow you to search through. Yet, not doing so might violate the copyright laws of many countries. No one, or so one would think, would argue that search engines should be made illegal, but in some countries copyright law is being used to attack intermediaries.

As noted above, intermediaries are a necessary part of online free speech. Current methods of regulating copyright infringement by users via intermediaries online may well fall afoul of internationally accepted standards of human rights. Frank La Rue, the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression in his recent report to the UN Human Rights Council stated:

While blocking and filtering measures deny access to certain content on the Internet, States have also taken measures to cut off access to the Internet entirely.

The Special Rapporteur is deeply concerned by discussions regarding a centralized “on/off” control over Internet traffic. In addition, he is alarmed by proposals to disconnect users from Internet access if they violate intellectual property rights. This also includes legislation based on the concept of “graduated response”, which imposes a series of penalties on copyright infringers that could lead to suspension of Internet service, such as the so-called “three-strikes law” in France and the Digital Economy Act 2010 of the United Kingdom.

Beyond the national level, the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) has been proposed as a multilateral agreement to establish international standards on intellectual property rights enforcement. While the provisions to disconnect individuals from Internet access for violating the treaty have been removed from the final text of December 2010, the Special Rapporteur remains watchful about the treaty’s eventual implications for intermediary liability and the right to freedom of expression.

With respect to graduated response, there is very little that one can add to Prof. Edwards's presentation. I would like to add one further suggestion that Prof. Ed Felten originally put forward as a 'modest proposal': Corporations which make or facilitate three wrongful accusations should face the same penalty as the users who are accused thrice. The recent US strategy of seizing websites even before trial has been sufficiently criticised, so I shall not spend my time on it.

I still have not seen any good evidence as to why for other kinds of primary or secondary liability incurred by online intermediaries the procedure for offline copyright infringement should not apply, since they are usually crafted taking into account principles of natural justice.

The only 'international' and slightly troublesome issue that a resolution is needed to is that of problems relating to different jurisdiction’s laws applying on a single global network. However, this question is much larger one that of copyright and a copyright-specific solution cannot be found. Thus WIPO is not the right forum for the redress of that problem.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/intermediary-liability-wipo-speech

DIT's Response to RTI on Website Blocking

pranesh — 2011-08-02T07:13:47Z

For the first time in India, we have a list of websites that are blocked by order of the Indian government. This data was received from the Department of Information Technology in response to an RTI that CIS filed. Pranesh Prakash of CIS analyzes the implications of these blocks, as well as the shortcomings of the DIT's response.

Quick Analysis of DIT's Response to the RTI

Blocked websites

The eleven websites that the DIT acknowledges are blocked in India are:

Of the eleven blocked websites, one was still accessible on a Tata Communications DSL connection. Two of the blocked websites are grassroots news organizations connected to the Independent Media Centre: IndyBay (San Francisco Bay Area IMC) and the Arizona Indymedia website. The Bloggernews.net page that is on the blocked list is in fact an article by N. Vijayashankar (Naavi) from March 12, 2010 titled "Is E2 labs right in getting zone-h.org blocked?", criticising the judicial blocking of Zone-H.org by E2 Labs (with E2 Labs being represented by lawyer Pawan Duggal). The Zone-H.org case is still going through the judicial motions in the District Court of Delhi, but E2 Labs managed to get an ex parte (i.e., without Zone-H being heard) interim order from the judge asking Designated Officer (Mr. Gulshan Rai of DIT) to block access to Zone-H.org.

As has happened in the past, the government (or the court) accidentally ordered the blocking of all of website host webs.com, instead of blocking only http://donotdial100.webs.com (which subdomain apparently hosted 'defamatory' and 'abusive' information about mafia links within the Maharashtra police and political circles).

It is interesting to note that for most of the websites on most ISPs one gets a 'request timed out' error while trying to access the blocked websites, and not a sign saying: "site blocked for XYZ reason on request dated DD-MM-YYYY received from the DIT". On Reliance broadband connections, for some of the above websites an error message appears, which states: "This site has been blocked as per instructions from Department of Telecom".

Judicial blocking

As per the response of the government, all eleven seem to have been blocked on orders received from the judiciary. While they don't state this directly, this is the conclusion one is led to since the Department admits to blocking eleven websites and also notes that there have been eleven requests for blocking from the judiciary. Normally the judiciary is often thought of as a check on the executive's penchant for banning (seen especially in the recent book banning cases in Maharashtra, for instance, where the Bombay High Court has overturned most of the government's banning orders). However, in these cases the ill-informed lower judiciary seem to be manipulated by lawyers to suppress freedom of speech and expression, even going to the extent of blocking grassroots activist news organizations like the Independent Media Centre.

Websites not blocked by DIT

The DIT also notes that the blocks on Typepad.com was not authorized by it (nor, according to the RTI response received by Nikhil Pahwa of Medianama was the Mobango.com block authorised by the DIT). Typepad.com, Mobango.com, and Clickatell.com don't seem to be blocked currently. However, as was reported by Medianama, for a while when they were being blocked, some sites and ISPs (such as Typepad.com on Bharti Airtel DSL) showed a message stating that the website was blocked on request from the Department of Telecom, which we don't believe has the authority to order blocking of websites. While we still await a response from the Department of Telecom to the RTI we filed with them on this topic, in a letter to the Hindu, the Department of Telecom has clarified that it did not order any block on Typepad.com or any of the other websites. This leaves us unsure as to who ordered these blocks. Further, it points out a lacuna in our information policy that ISPs can suo motu block websites without justifications (such as violation of terms of use), proper notice to customers, or any kind of repercussions for wrongful blocking.

Insufficient information on Committee for Examination of Requests

All requests for websites blocking (except those directly from the judiciary) must be vetted by the Committee for Examination of Requests (CER) under Rule 8(4) of the Rules under s.69A of the IT Act. Given that the DIT admits that the Designated Officer (who carries out the blocking) has received 21 requests to date, there should be at least 21 recommendations of the CER. However, the DIT has not provided us with the details of those 21 requests and the 21 recommendations. We are filing another RTI to uncover this information.

Text of the DIT's Response

Government of India
Ministry of Communications & Information Technology
Department of Information Technology
Electronics Niketan, 6 CGO Complex,
New Delhi-110003

No : 14(3)/2011-ESD

Shri Pranesh Prakash
Centre for Internet and Society
194, 2-C Cross,
Domulur Stage II,
Bangalore- 560071.

Subject: Request for information under RTI Act,

Sir,
Reference your request dated 28lh February 2011 on the above subject.
The point wise information as received from the custodian of Information is enclosed for your reference and records.

sd/-
(A.K.Kaushik)
Additional Director & CPIO
Tel: 011-24364803

Subject : RTI on website blocking requested by Shri Pranesh Prakash

(i) Did the Department order Airtel to block TypePad under S.69A of the Information Technology Act ("IT Act"), 2000 read with the Information Technology (Procedures and Safeguards for Blocking Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009 ("Rules") or any other law for the time being in force? If so, please provide a copy of such order or orders. If not, what action, if at all, has been taken by the Department against Airtel for blocking of websites in contravention of S.69A of the IT Act?

Reply - This Department did not order Airtel to block the said site.

(ii) Has the Department ever ordered a block under s.69A of the IT Act? If so, what was the information that was ordered to be blocked?

Reply - The Department has issued directions for blocking under section 69A for the following websites:
(a) www.zone-h.org.
(b) http://donotdial100.webs.com (IP 216.52.115.50)
(c) www.bloggernews.net/124029
(d) http://www.google.co.in/#h 1 =en&source=hp& biw=1276&bih=843&=dr+babasaheb+ambedkar+ wallpaper&aq=4&aqi=g10&aql =&oq=dr+ babas& gs_rfai=&fp=e791 fe993fa412ba
(e) http://www.cinemahd.net/desktop-enhancements/wallpaper/23945- wallpapers-beautiful-girl-wallpaper.html
(f) http://www.chakpak.com/find/images/ kamasutra-hindi-movie
(g) http://www.submitlink.khatana.net/2010/09/jennifer-stano-is-engaged- to.html
(h) http://www.result.khatana.net/2010/11/im-no-panty-girl-yana-gupta- wardrobe.html.
(i) http://www.facebook.com/pages/l-Hate-Ambedkar/172025102828076
(j) www.indybay.org
(k) www.arizona.indymedia.org

(iii) How many requests for blocking of information has the Designated Officer received, and how many of those requests have been accepted and how many rejected? How many of those requests were for emergency blocking under Rule 9 of the Rules?

Reply - Designated Officer received 21 request for blocking of information. 11 websites have been blocked on the basis of orders received from court of law. One request has been rejected. For other requests, additional input/information has been sought from the Nodal Officer.

No request for emergency blocking under rule 9 of the Rules have been received.

(iv) Please provide use the present composition of the Committee for Examination of Requests constituted under Rule 7 of the Rules.

Reply - The present composition of the Committee is :
(a) Designated Officer (Group Coordinator - Cyber Law)
(b) Joint Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs
(c) Joint Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting
(d) Additional Secretary and Ministry of Law & Justice
(e) Senior Director, Indian Computer Emergency Response Team

(v) Please provide us the dates and copies of the minutes of all meetings held by the Committee for Examination of Requests under Rule 8(4) of the Rules, and copies of their recommendations.

Reply - The Committee had met on 24-08-2010 with respect to request for blocking of website www.betfair.com.

(vi) Please provide us the present composition of the Review Committee constituted under rule 419A of the Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.
(vii) Please provide us the dates and copies of the minutes of all meetings held by the Review Committee under Rule 14 of the Rules, and copies of all orders issued by the Review Committee.

Reply - This Department do not have details for above. The said information may be available with Department of Telecommunications.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/rti-response-dit-blocking

Digital Security Workshop for Journalists and Human Rights Workers

pranesh — 2015-09-02T03:41:47Z

The Centre for Internet and Society would like to welcome journalists and human rights workers to attend a workshop on digital security. The workshop will be led by Pranesh Prakash, policy director at CIS and resident security expert. In this workshop, the participants will be provided hands-on training on how to assess security threats, how to protect sources, how to prevent others from snooping on private communications, and how to harden your computer and electronic devices' security. The training will focus both on understanding security, how it can mean different things in different situations, and the trade-offs involved, as well as on practical easy-to-use tools.

All attending are requested to bring their laptops, smartphones, and tablets.

Please mail pranesh AT cis-india DOT org if you wish to attend, or if you have any queries.

This workshop furthers CIS's work as part of the Cyber Stewards Network.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/events/digital-security-workshop-journalists-bangalore-sept-2015

Digital India: PM Modi to launch BJP's flagship programme likely in July

pranesh — 2015-08-22T16:45:33Z

The article by Jochelle Mendonca and Neha Alawadhi was published in the Economic Times on May 29, 2015.

The Modi government, which completed one year at the Centre, is preparing for a big-ticket launch of Digital India, taking technology to the villages and block levels, through merchandise, hackathons and games spread over a week-long initiative across the country.

The National e-Governance Division (NeGD), under the Department of Electronics and Information Technology (DeitY), has empanelled agencies for a messaging campaign, gamification, printing and merchandise, advertising and creatives, including advertising for rural outreach and social media.

Working directly with the Prime Minister's Office, NeGD has been tasked with preparing for the launch since February. Though no formal dates have been fixed yet, the Digital India Week (DIW) is likely to take off in July, and will involve stakeholders across state governments and ministries, and is expected to be the flagship programme for the second year of the BJP government, EThas learnt.

"They really want to make this the biggest programme of the second year. The idea is that many things have been done in the digital space that need to get highlighted," an individual with knowledge of the plans told ET.

The event is certainly being planned on a grand scale, according to the tender documents issued by the government. The government has asked for merchandise such as t-shirts, caps, trophies, pen drives and leather cloth and plastic bags. A gamification agency will work on the portals, mobile applications and social media handles to boost participation.

The messaging agency must be able to carry out, track, record and analyse 50 lakh to one crore messages a day. The event will be launched by the Prime Minister through a radio address on "Mann ki Baat", which will be followed by events at gram panchayats, block and sub divisional headquarters, district and state levels, eventually culminating in a national event, according to a presentation seen by ET.

As part of the run-up to the DIW, events such as hackathons, training programmes and webinars would be held in schools and colleges, followed by crowdsourcing ideas through the government's portal MyGov, as well as a new Digital India portal that is being designed. "It is a typical BJP-style campaign.

The Prime Minister does not want to hold the final day event in Delhi and the location is being finalised. All state and line ministries have been involved, and are being asked to showcase e-services and best practices, along with the launch of some programmes like digital locker," said another person familiar with the plans being rolled out for the DIW. The watch words of the campaign will be "inform, educate and engage", which will include taking the message of Digital India to the masses through educational institutions, industry and government agencies.

"It will educate people on various important services such as digital literacy, cyber hygiene and e-waste management, and also look at engaging a large number of people, especially youth on a continuous basis," said a person familiar with the ongoing preparation.

NeGD is looking at using the principles of gamification to gather feedback. Experts on e-governance say this is a good move as most e-governance projects, across the world, fail because there's not enough buy-in from stakeholders or the goals aren't communicated widely to the public.

"E-governance needs evangelising. That is what this campaign looks like it will do. Some parts are dated — such as posters and the print elements. But this is a good idea. Whether it works or not depends on the participation they see at the end," Sunil Abraham, director at the Centre for Internet and Society, said.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/economic-times-may-29-2015-jochelle-mendonca-and-neha-alawadhi-digital-india