Centre for Internet and Society

Don't Shoot the Messenger: Speech on Intermediary Liability at 22nd SCCR of WIPO

pranesh — 2012-06-01T15:01:08Z

This is a speech made by Pranesh Prakash at an side-event co-organized by the World Intellectual Property Organization and the Internet Society on intermediary liability, to coincide with the release of Prof. Lillian Edwards's WIPO-commissioned report on 'Role and Responsibility of the Internet Intermediaries in the Field of Copyright'.

Good afternoon. I've been asked to provide a user's perspective to the question of intermediary liability. "In what cases should an Internet intermediary—a messenger—be held liable for the doings of a third party?" is the broad question. I believe that in answering that question we can be guided by two simple principles: As long as intermediaries don't exercise direct editorial control, they should not be held liable; and as long as they don't instigate or encourage the illegal activity, they should not be held liable. In all other cases, attacking Internet intermediaries generally a sign of 'shooting the messenger'. General intermediary liability and intermediary liability for copyright infringement share a common philosophical foundation, and so I will talk about general intermediary liability first.

While going about holding intermediaries liable, we must remember that what is at stake here is the fact that intermediaries are a necessary component of ensuring freedom of speech and self-expression on the World Wide Web. In this regard, we must keep in mind the joint declaration issued by four freedom of expression rapporteurs under the aegis of the Organization of American States on June 1, 2011:

Intermediary Liability

a. No one who simply provides technical Internet services such as providing access, or searching for, or transmission or caching of information, should be liable for content generated by others, which is disseminated using those services, as long as they do not specifically intervene in that content or refuse to obey a court order to remove that content, where they have the capacity to do so (‘mere conduit principle’).

b. Consideration should be given to insulating fully other intermediaries, including those mentioned in the preamble, from liability for content generated by others under the same conditions as in paragraph 2(a). At a minimum, intermediaries should not be required to monitor user-generated content and should not be subject to extra-judicial content takedown rules which fail to provide sufficient protection for freedom of expression (which is the case with many of the ‘notice and takedown’ rules currently being applied).

It is useful to keep in mind what the kind of liability we affix on offline intermediaries: Would we hold a library responsible for unlawful material that a user has placed on its shelves without its encouragement?

Ensuring a balanced system of intermediary liability is also very important in preserving the forms of innovations we have seen online. Ensuring that intermediaries aren't always held liable for what third parties do is an essential component of encouraging new models of participation, such as Wikipedia. While Wikipedia has community-set standards with regard to copyright, obscenity, and other such issues, holding the Wikimedia Foundation (which has only around 30-40 people) itself responsible for what millions of users write on Wikipedia will hamper such new models of peer-production. This point, unfortunately, has not prevented the Wikimedia Foundation being sued a great number of times in India, a large percentage of which take the form of SLAPP ('strategic lawsuit against public participation') cases, since if the real intention had been to remove the offending content, editing Wikipedia is an easy enough way of achieving that.

While searching for these balanced solutions, we need to look beyond Europe, and look at how countries like Chile, Brazil, India and others are looking at these issues. Unfortunately, this being Geneva, most of the people I see represented in this room are from the developed world as are the examples we are discussing (France and Spain).

In India, for instance, the Internet Service Providers Association made it clear in 2006 (when there was an outcry over censorship of blogging platforms) that they do not want to be responsible for deciding whether something about which they have received a complaint is unlawful or not.

With respect to copyright and the Internet, while the Internet allows for copyright infringement to be conducted more easily, it also allows for copyright infringement to be spotted more easily. Earlier, if someone copied, it would be difficult to find out. Now that is not so. So, that balance is already ingrained, and while many in the industry focus on the fact of easier infringement and thus ask for increased legal protection, such increase in legal protection is not required since the same technological factors that enable increased infringement also enable increased ability to know about that infringement.

On the Internet, intermediaries sometimes engage in primary infringement due to the very nature of digital technology. In the digital sphere, everything is a copy. Thus, whenever you're working on a computer, copies of the copyrighted that show up on your screen are automatically copied to your computer's RAM. Whenever you download anything from the Internet, copies of it are created en route to your computer. (That is the main reason that exceptions in the copyright laws of most countries that allow you to re-sell a book you own don't apply to electronic books.) In such a case, intermediaries must be specially protected.

Additionally, online activities that we take for granted, for instance search technologies, violate the copyright law of most countries. For online search technology to be reasonably fast (instead of taking hours for each search), the searching has to be done on a copies (cache) of actual websites instead of the actual websites. For image searching, it would be unreasonable to expect search companies to take licences for all the images they allow you to search through. Yet, not doing so might violate the copyright laws of many countries. No one, or so one would think, would argue that search engines should be made illegal, but in some countries copyright law is being used to attack intermediaries.

As noted above, intermediaries are a necessary part of online free speech. Current methods of regulating copyright infringement by users via intermediaries online may well fall afoul of internationally accepted standards of human rights. Frank La Rue, the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression in his recent report to the UN Human Rights Council stated:

While blocking and filtering measures deny access to certain content on the Internet, States have also taken measures to cut off access to the Internet entirely.

The Special Rapporteur is deeply concerned by discussions regarding a centralized “on/off” control over Internet traffic. In addition, he is alarmed by proposals to disconnect users from Internet access if they violate intellectual property rights. This also includes legislation based on the concept of “graduated response”, which imposes a series of penalties on copyright infringers that could lead to suspension of Internet service, such as the so-called “three-strikes law” in France and the Digital Economy Act 2010 of the United Kingdom.

Beyond the national level, the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) has been proposed as a multilateral agreement to establish international standards on intellectual property rights enforcement. While the provisions to disconnect individuals from Internet access for violating the treaty have been removed from the final text of December 2010, the Special Rapporteur remains watchful about the treaty’s eventual implications for intermediary liability and the right to freedom of expression.

With respect to graduated response, there is very little that one can add to Prof. Edwards's presentation. I would like to add one further suggestion that Prof. Ed Felten originally put forward as a 'modest proposal': Corporations which make or facilitate three wrongful accusations should face the same penalty as the users who are accused thrice. The recent US strategy of seizing websites even before trial has been sufficiently criticised, so I shall not spend my time on it.

I still have not seen any good evidence as to why for other kinds of primary or secondary liability incurred by online intermediaries the procedure for offline copyright infringement should not apply, since they are usually crafted taking into account principles of natural justice.

The only 'international' and slightly troublesome issue that a resolution is needed to is that of problems relating to different jurisdiction’s laws applying on a single global network. However, this question is much larger one that of copyright and a copyright-specific solution cannot be found. Thus WIPO is not the right forum for the redress of that problem.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/intermediary-liability-wipo-speech

Comments on the draft National Data Sharing and Accessibility Policy

pranesh — 2011-08-24T06:32:55Z

A draft of the 'National Data Sharing and Accessibility Policy', which some hope will be the open data policy of India, was made available for public comments in early May. This is what the Centre for Internet and Society submitted.

These are the comments that we at the Centre for Internet and Society submitted to the National Spatial Data Infrastructure on the draft National Data Sharing and Accessibility Policy.

Comments on the National Data Sharing and Accessibility Policy by the Centre for Internet and Society

We would like to begin by noting our appreciation for the forward-thinking nature of the government that is displayed by its pursuit of a policy on sharing of governmental data and enabling its use by citizens. We believe such a policy is a necessity in all administratively and technologically mature democracies. In particular, we applaud the efforts to make this applicable through a negative list of data that shall not be shared rather than a positive list of data that shall be shared, hence making sharing the default position. However, we believe that there are many ways in which this policy can be made even better than it already is.

1. Name

We believe that nomenclature of the policy must accurately reflect both the content of the policy as well as prevailing usage of terms. Given that 'accessibility' is generally used to mean accessibility for persons with disabilities, it is advisable to change the name of the policy.

Recommendation:

A. We would recommend calling this the "National Open Data Policy" to reflect the nomenclature already established for similar policies in other nations like the UK. In the alternative, it could be called a "National Public Sector Information Reuse Policy". If neither of those are acceptable, then it could be re-titled the "National Data Sharing and Access Policy".

2. Scope and Enforceability

It is unclear from the policy what all departments it covers, and whether it is enforceable.

Recommendation:

A. This policy should cover the same scope as the Right to Information (RTI) Act: all 'public authorities' as defined under the RTI Act should be covered by this policy.

B. Its enforceability should be made clear by including provisions on consequences of non-compliance.

3. Categorization

The rationale for the three-fold categorization is unclear. In particular, it is unclear why the category of 'registered access' exists, and on what basis the categorization into 'open access' and 'registered access' is to be done. If the purpose of registration is to track usage, there are many better ways of doing so without requiring registration.

Recommendation:

A. Having three categories of:

Open data
Partially restricted data
Restricted data

B. Data that is classified as non-shareable (as per a reading of s.8 and s.9 of RTI Act as informed by the decisions of the Central Information Commission) should be classified as ‘restricted’.

C. The rationale for classifying data as 'open' or 'partially restricted' should be how the data collection body is funded. If it depends primarily on public funds, then the data it outputs should necessarily be made fully open. If it is funded primarily through private fees, then the data may be classified as 'partially restricted'. 'Partially restricted' data may be restricted for non-commercial usage, with registration and/or a licence being required for commercial usage.

4. Licence

No licence has been prescribed in the policy for the data. Despite India not allowing for database rights, it still allows for copyright over original literary works, which includes original databases. All governmental works are copyrighted by default in India, just as they are in the UK. To ensure that this policy goes beyond merely providing access to data to ensure that people are able to use that data, it must provide for a conducive copyright licence.

Recommendation:

A. The licence that has been created by the UK government (another country in which all governmental works are copyrighted by default) may be referred to: http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/

B. However, the UK needed to draft its own licence because the concept of database rights are recognized in the EU, which is not an issue here in India. Thus, it would be preferable to use the Open Data Commons - Attribution licence:

http://www.opendatacommons.org/licenses/by/

The UK licence is compatible with both the above-mentioned licence as well as with the Creative Commons - Attribution licence, and includes many aspects that are common with Indian law, e.g., bits on usage of governmental emblems, etc.

5. Integrity of the data

Currently, there is no way of ensuring that the data that is put out by the data provider is indeed the data that has been downloaded by a citizen.

Recommendation:

It is imperative to require data providers to provide integrity checks (via an MD5 hash of the data files, for instance) to ensure that technological corruption of the data can be detected.

6. Authenticity of the data

Currently, there is no way of ensuring that the data that is put out by the data provider indeed comes from the data provider.

Recommendation:

It is preferable to require data providers to authenticate the data by using a digital signature.

7. Archival and versioning

The policy is silent on how long data must be made available.

Recommendation:

There must be a system of archival that is prescribed to enable citizens to access older data. Further, a versioning and nomenclature system is required alongside the metadata to ensure that citizens know the period that the data pertains to, and have access to the latest data by default.

8. Open standards

While the document does mention standards-compliance, it is preferable to require open standards to the greatest extent possible, and require that the data that is put out be compliant with the Interoperability Framework for e-Governance (IFEG) that the government is currently in the process of drafting and finalizing.

Recommendation:

A. The policy should reference the National Open Standards Policy that was finalised by the Department of Information Technology in November 2010, as well as to the IFEG.

B. The data should be made available, insofar as possible, in structured documents with semantic markup, which allows for intelligent querying of the content of the document itself. Before settling upon a usage-specific semantic markup schema, well-established XML schemas should be examined for their suitability and used wherever appropriate. It must be ensured that the metadata are also in a standardized and documented format.

9. Citizen interaction

One of the most notable failings of other governments' data stores has been the fact that they don't have adequate interaction with the citizen projects that emerge from that data. For instance, it is sometimes seen that citizens may point out flaws in the data put out by the government. At other times, citizens may create very useful and interesting projects on the basis of the data made public by the government.

Recommendation:

A. The government's primary datastore (data.gov.in) should catalogue such citizen projects, including open and documented APIs that the have been made available for easy access to that data.

B. Additionally the primary datastore should act as a conduit for citizen's comments and corrections to the data provider. Data providers should be required to take efforts to keep the data up-to-date.

C. Multiple forms of access should preferably be provided to data, to allow non-technical users interactive use of the data through the Web.

10. Principles, including 'Protection of Intellectual Property'

It is unclear why ‘protection of intellectual property’ is one of the guiding principles of this policy. Only those ideals which are promoted by this policy should be designated as ‘principles’. This policy, insofar as we can see, has no relation whatsoever with protection of intellectual property. The government is not seeking to enforce copyright over the data through this policy. Indeed, it is seeking to encourage the use of public data. Indeed, the RTI Act makes it clear in s.9 that government copyright shall not act as a barrier to access to information.

Given that, it makes no sense to include ‘protection of intellectual property’ amongst the principles guiding this policy. Further, there are some other principles that may be removed without affecting the purpose or aim of this document: ‘legal conformity’ (this is a given since a policy wouldn’t wish to violate laws); ‘formal responsibility’ (‘accountability’ encapsulates this); ‘professionalism’ (‘accountability’ encapsulates this); ‘security’ (this policy isn’t about promoting security, though it needs to take into account security concerns).

Recommendation:

A. Remove ‘protection of intellectual property’, ‘legal conformity’, ‘formal responsibility’, ‘professionalism’, and ‘security’ from the list of principles in para 1.2.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/blog-old/draft-ndsap-comments

Killing the Internet Softly with Its Rules

pranesh — 2011-08-20T12:51:42Z

While regulation of the Internet is a necessity, the Department of IT, through recent Rules under the IT Act, is guilty of over-regulation. This over-regulation is not only a bad idea, but is unconstitutional, and gravely endangers freedom of speech and privacy online.

A slightly modified version of this blog entry was published as an op-ed in the Indian Express on May 9, 2011.

Over-regulation of the Internet

Regulation of the Internet, as with regulation of any medium of speech and commerce, is a balancing act. Too little regulation and you ensure that criminal activities are carried on with impunity; too much regulation and you curb the utility of the medium. This is especially so with the Internet, as it has managed to be the impressively vibrant space it is due to a careful choice in most countries of eschewing over-regulation. India, however, seems to be taking a different turn with a three sets of new rules under the Information Technology Act.

These rules deal with the liability of intermediaries (i.e., a large, inclusive, group of entities and individuals, that transmit and allow access to third-party content), the safeguards that cybercafes need to follow if they are not to be held liable for their users' activities, and the practices that intermediaries need to follow to ensure security and privacy of customer data.

Effect of not following the rules

By not observing any of the provisions of these Rules, the intermediary opens itself up for liability for actions of its users. Thus, if a third-party defames someone, then the intermediary can be held liable if he/she/it does not follow the stringent requirements of the Rules.

The problem, however is that, many of the provisions of the Rules have no rational nexus with the due diligence to be observed by the intermediary to absolve itself from liability.

What does the Act require?

Section 79 of the IT Act states that intermediaries are generally not liable for third party information, data, or communication link made available or hosted. It qualifies that by stating that they are not liable if they follow certain precautions (basically, to show that they are real intermediaries). They observe 'due diligence' and don't exercise an editorial role; they don't help or induce commission of the unlawful act; and upon receiving 'actual knowledge', or on being duly notified by the appropriate authority, the intermediary takes steps towards some kind of action.

So, rules were needed to clarify what 'due diligence' involves (i.e., to state that no active monitoring is required of ISPs), what 'actual knowledge' means, and to clarify what happens in happens in case of conflicts between this provision and other parts of IT Act and other Acts.

Impact on freedom of speech and privacy

However, that is not what the rules do. The rules instead propose standard terms of service to be notified by all intermediaries. This means everyone from Airtel to Hotmail to Facebook to Rediff Blogs to Youtube to organizations and people that allow others to post comments on their website. What kinds of terms of service? It will require intermediaries to bar users from engaging in speech that is disparaging', It doesn't cover only intermediaries that are public-facing. So this means that your forwarding a joke via e-mail, which "belongs to another person and to which the user does not have any right" will be deemed to be in violation of the new rules. While gambling (such as betting on horses) isn’t banned in India and casino gambling is legal in Goa, for example, under these Rules, all speech ‘promoting gambling’ is prohibited.

The rules are very onerous on intermediaries, since they require them to act within 36 hours to disable access to any information that they receive a complaint about. Any 'affected person' can complain. Intermediaries will now play the role that judges have traditionally played. Any affected person can bring forth a complaint about issues as diverse as defamation, blasphemy, trademark infringement, threatening of integrity of India, 'disparaging speech', or the blanket 'in violation of any law'. It is not made mandatory to give the actual violator an opportunity to be heard, thus violating the cardinal principle of natural justice of 'hearing the other party' before denying them a fundamental right. Many parts of the Internet are in fact public spaces and constitute an online public sphere. A law requiring private parties to curb speech in such a public sphere is unconstitutional insofar as it doesn't fall within Art.19(2) of the Constitution.

Since intermediaries would lose protection from the law if they don't take down content, they have no incentives to uphold freedom of speech of their users. They instead have been provided incentives to take down all content about which they receive complaints without bothering to apply their minds and coming to an actual conclusion that the content violates the rules.

Cybercafe rules

The cybercafe rules require all cybercafe customers be identified with supporting documents, their photographs taken, all their website visit history logged, and these logs maintained for a year. Compare this to the usage of public pay-phones. Anyone can use a pay-phone without their details being logged. Indeed, such logging allows for cybercafe owners to blackmail their users if they find some embarrassing websites in the history logs—which could be anything from medical diseases to sexual orientation to the fact that you're a whistleblower.

The cybercafe rules also require that all of them install "commercially available safety or filtering software" to prevent access to pornography. In two cases along these lines in the Madras High Court (Karthikeyan R. v. Union of India) and the Bombay High Court (Janhit Manch v. Union of India), the High Courts refused to direct the government to take proactive steps to curb access to Internet pornography stating that such matters require case-by-case analysis to be constitutionally valid under Art.19(1)(a) [Right to freedom of speech and expression].

Such software tends to be very ineffective—non-pornographic websites also get wrongly filtered, and not all pornographic websites get filtered—and the High Courts were right in being wary of any blanket ban. They preferred for individual cases to be registered. If the worry is that our children are getting corrupted, it is up to parents to provide supervision, and not for the government to insist that software do the parenting instead.

Given that all of these were pointed out by both civil society organizations, news media, and industry bodies, when the draft rules were released, it smacks of governmental high-handedness that almost none of the changes suggested by the public have been incorporated in the final rules.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/killing-the-internet-oped

Open Government Data Study

pranesh — 2015-09-03T08:08:22Z

CIS produced a report on the state of open government data in India, looking at policy, infrastructure, and particular case studies, as well as emerging concerns, future strategies and recommendations. The report is authored by Glover Wright, Pranesh Prakash, Sunil Abraham, and Nishant Shah. We are grateful to the Transparency and Accountability Initiative for providing generous funding for this report.

Cross-posted from the Transparency and Accountability Initiative website.

Open Government Data Study: India

India provides one of the most fascinating examples of the use of open government data in a developing country context. It has one of the best right to information laws in the world and the government’s approach to open data builds on this legacy of making open data relevant to Indian citizens. An estimated 456 million Indians live on less than $1.25 a day and a key issue for India, and other developing countries, is how open data can be accessible to them.

This paper reviews the progress being made towards open government data in India. Using case studies, it examines some of the pressing challenges facing the adoption of OGD in India. These include infrastructural problems, privacy concerns and the power imbalances that improved transparency can unwittingly create. It also examines government attitudes towards open data and related policies and reviews the relationships between open government data, the media and civil society.

The authors argue that the Indian Government’s responsibility should not stop short at just providing information, but also extend to making it available and accessible in a way that facilitates analysis and enhances offline usability – and ultimately makes it accessible to the poorest.

The paper concludes by suggesting technical and policy strategies to develop, promote, implement and maintain a robust open government data policy in India.

Download the report [PDF, 1.03 MB]

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/blog-old/open-government-data-study

Consumers International IP Watchlist 2011 — India Report

pranesh — 2014-05-29T05:52:28Z

Pranesh Prakash prepared the India Report for the Consumers International IP Watchlist 2011. The report was published on the A2K Network website.

The report says:

India's Copyright Act is a relatively balanced instrument that recognises the interests of consumers through its broad private use exception, and by facilitating the compulsory licensing of works that would otherwise be unavailable. However, the compulsory licensing provision have not been utilized so far, because of both a lack of knowledge and more importantly because of the stringent conditions attached to them. Currently, the Indian law is also a bit out of sync with general practices as the exceptions and limitations allowed for literary, artistic and musical works are often not available with sound recordings and cinematograph films. There are numerous other such inconsistencies.

While India has not acceded to the WIPO [23] Copyright Treaty or the WIPO Performers and Phonograms Treaty, yet a set of amendments have been proposed which would bring the Indian law in compliance with both the WCT and the WPPT. These amendments would expose India's consumers to the same problems experienced in other jurisdictions which have prohibited the use of circumvention devices to gain access to legally-acquired copyright material. These amendments also propose a substantial increase in the copyright term for photographs (from 50 years to life plus 60 years), and a conditional increase of ten years for cinematograph films to 70 years if a special agreement is entered into by the producer with the director. It is true that copyright infringement, particularly in the form of physical media, is widespread in India. However this must be taken in the context that India, although fast-growing, remains one of the poorest countries in the world. Although India's knowledge and cultural productivity over the centuries and to the present day has been rich and prodigious, its citizens are economically disadvantaged as consumers of that same knowledge and culture. Indeed, most students, even in the so-called elite institutions, need to employ photocopying and other such means to be able to afford the requisite study materials. Physically challenged persons have no option but to disobey the law that does not grant them equal access to copyrighted works.

Legitimate operating systems (with the notable exception of most free and open source OSes) add a very high overhead to the purchase of cheap computers, thus driving users to pirated software. Thus, these phenomena need to be addressed not at the level of enforcement, but at the level of supply of affordable works in a suitable format.

Over the last year, the Standing Committee tasked with review of the Copyright Amendment Bill has held hearings and presented its findings and recommendations to the HRD Ministry. However, not a single consumer rights organization was called by the Standing Committee, and no civil society engagement was sought except for the issue of access for persons with disabilities. This was despite a number of civil society organizations sending in written submissions to the Standing Committee. The government is going to re-table the Bill in this session of Parliament (February-April).

Click to download the full report [PDF, 150 kb]
Read the report published by A2K Network here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/ip-watch-list-2011

Rebuttal of DIT's Misleading Statements on New Internet Rules

pranesh — 2012-07-11T13:18:04Z

The press statement issued on May 11 by the Department of Information Technology (DIT) on the furore over the newly-issued rules on 'intermediary due diligence' is misleading and is, in places, plainly false. We are presenting a point-by-point rebuttal of the DIT's claims.

In its press release on Wednesday, May 11, 2011, the DIT stated:

The attention of Government has been drawn to news items in a section of media on certain aspects of the Rules notified under Section 79 pertaining to liability of intermediaries under the Information Technology Act, 2000. These items have raised two broad issues. One is that words used in Rules for objectionable content are broad and could be interpreted subjectively. Secondly, there is an apprehension that the Rules enable the Government to regulate content in a highly subjective and possibly arbitrary manner.

There are actually more issues than merely "subjective interpretation" and "arbitrary governmental regulation".

The Indian Constitution limits how much the government can regulate citizens’ fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. Any measure afoul of the constitution is invalid.
Several portions of the rules are beyond the limited powers that Parliament had granted the Department of IT to create interpretive rules under the Information Technology Act. Parliament directed the Government to merely define what “due diligence” requirements an intermediary would have to follow in order to claim the qualified protection against liability that Section 79 of the Information Technology Act provides; these current rules have gone dangerously far beyond that, by framing rules that insist that intermediaries, without investigation, has to remove content within 36-hours of receipt of a complaint, keep records of a users' details and provide them to law enforcement officials.

The Department of Information Technology (DIT), Ministry of Communications & IT has clarified that the Intermediaries Guidelines Rules, 2011 prescribe that due diligence need to be observed by the Intermediaries to enjoy exemption from liability for hosting any third party information under Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000. These due diligence practices are the best practices followed internationally by well-known mega corporations operating on the Internet. The terms specified in the Rules are in accordance with the terms used by most of the Intermediaries as part of their existing practices, policies and terms of service which they have published on their website.

We are not aware of any country that actually goes to the extent of deciding what Internet-wide ‘best practices’ are and actually converting those ‘best practices’ into law by prescribing a universal terms of service that all Internet services, websites, and products should enforce.
The Rules require all intermediaries to include the government-prescribed terms in an agreement, no matter what services they provide. It is one thing for a company to choose the terms of its terms of service agreement, and completely another for the government to dictate those terms of service. As long as the terms of service of an intermediary are not unlawful or bring up issues of users’ rights (such as the right to privacy), there is no reason for the government to jump in and dictate what the terms of service should or should not be.
The DIT has not offered any proof to back up its assertion that 'most' intermediaries already have such terms. Google, a ‘mega corporation’ which is an intermediary, does not have such an overarching policy. Indiatimes, another ‘mega corporation’ intermediary, does not either. Just because a company like Rediff and Blizzard's World of Warcraft have some of those terms does not mean a) that they should have all of those terms, nor that b) everyone else should as well.

In attempting to take different terms of service from different Internet services and products—the very fact of which indicate the differing needs felt across varying online communities—the Department has put in place a one-size-fits-all approach. How can this be possible on the Internet, when we wouldn't regulate the post-office and a book publisher under the same rules of liability for, say, defamatory speech.
There is also a significant difference between the effect of those terms of service and that of these Rules. An intermediary-framed terms of service suggest that the intermediary may investigate and boot someone off a service for violation, while the Rules insist that the intermediary simply has to mandatorily remove content, keep records of users' details and provide them to law enforcement officials, else be subject to crippling legal liability.

So to equate the effect of these Rules to merely following ‘existing practices’ is plainly wrong. An intermediary—like the CIS website—should have the freedom to choose not to have terms of service agreements. We now don’t.“In case any issue arises concerning the interpretation of the terms used by the Intermediary, which is not agreed to by the user or affected person, the same can only be adjudicated by a Court of Law. The Government or any of its agencies have no power to intervene or even interpret. DIT has reiterated that there is no intention of the Government to acquire regulatory jurisdiction over content under these Rules. It has categorically said that these rules do not provide for any regulation or control of content by the Government.”

The Rules are based on the presumption that all complaints (and resultant mandatory taking down of the content) are correct, and that the incorrectness of the take-downs can be disputed in court. Why not just invert that, and presume that all complaints need to be proven first, and the correctness of the complaints (instead of the take-downs) be disputed in court?

Indeed, the courts have insisted that presumption of validity is the only constitutional way of dealing with speech. (See, for instance, Karthikeyan R. v. Union of India, a 2010 Madras High Court judgment.)

Further, only constitutional courts (namely High Courts and the Supreme Court) can go into the question of the validity of a law. Other courts have to apply the law, even if it the judge believes it is constitutionally invalid. So, most courts will be forced to apply this law of highly questionable constitutionality until a High Court or the Supreme Court strikes it down.

What the Department has in fact done is to explicitly open up the floodgates for increased liability claims and litigation - which runs exactly counter to the purpose behind the amendment of Section 79 by Parliament in 2008.

“The Government adopted a very transparent process for formulation of the Rules under the Information Technology Act. The draft Rules were published on the Department of Information Technology website for comments and were widely covered by the media. None of the Industry Associations and other stakeholders objected to the formulation which is now being cited in some section of media.”

This is a blatant lie.

Civil society voices, including CIS, Software Freedom Law Centre, and individual experts (such as the lawyer and published author Apar Gupta) sent in comments. Companies such as Google, E2E Networks, and others had apparently raised concerns as well. The press has published many a cautionary note, including editorials, op-ed and articles in the Hindu, the Hoot, Medianama.com, and Kafila.com, well before the new rules were notified. We at CIS even received a 'read notification' from the email account of the Group Coordinator of the DIT’s Cyber Laws Division—Dr. Gulshan Rai—on Thursday, March 3, 2011 at 12:04 PM (we had sent the mail to Dr. Rai on Monday, February 28, 2011). We never received any acknowledgement, though, not even after we made an express request for acknowledgement (and an offer to meet them in person to explain our concerns) on Tuesday, April 5, 2011 in an e-mail sent to Mr. Prafulla Kumar and Dr. Gulshan Rai of DIT.

The process can hardly be called 'transparent' when the replies received from 'industry associations and other stakeholders' have not been made public by the DIT. Those comments which are public all indicate that serious concerns were raised as to the constitutionality of the Rules.

The Government has been forward looking to create a conducive environment for the Internet medium to catapult itself onto a different plane with the evolution of the Internet. The Government remains fully committed to freedom of speech and expression and the citizen’s rights in this regard.

The DIT has limited this statement to the rules on intermediary due diligence, and has not spoken about the controversial new rules that stifle cybercafes, and restrict users' privacy and freedom to receive information.

If the government is serious about creating a conducive environment for innovation, privacy and free expression on the Internet, then it wouldn’t be passing Rules that curb down on them, and it definitely will not be doing so in such a non-transparent fashion.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/rebuttal-dit-press-release-intermediaries

CDT Provides Answers to Questions on Internet Neutrality

pranesh — 2012-06-04T05:56:46Z

Pranesh Prakash of CIS asked David Sohn of CDT a few pointed questions on the emerging hot topic of 'Internet neutrality', and received very useful responses. Those questions and Mr. Sohn's responses are documented in this blog post.

As part of the Centre for Democracy and Technology's (CDT's) excellent "Ask CDT" initiative, we were provided the opportunity to clear up some of our doubts around "net neutrality" (which CDT prefers referring to as Internet neutrality rather than network neutrality) by asking an expert: David Sohn, CDT's Senior Policy Counsel. Reproduced below are the questions that I asked (inset and in gray), and David's replies (provided below each question). Some of the questions I asked below were doubts that I had, while some others are instances of donning the roles of devil's advocate. We hope this will be helpful in clarifying doubts that some of the readers of this blog have had as well.

1a. "As far as I can understand, content distribution networks (CDNs) such as Akamai, don't really fall within your understanding of violations of Internet neutrality. Why not? In what cases is 'spending more to get faster speeds' permitted for content hosts? Since not only specialised companies like Akamai, but regular Tier 1 companies like Level3 and AT&T also engage in CDN-like behaviour, does it make it more liable to illicit/underhand/non-transparent service differentiation techniques?"

1a. That's correct, CDNs don't violate either Internet neutrality principles or the FCC's recent rules. I talked about this at some length in a blog post a couple years ago. The short answer is that Internet neutrality does not aim to guarantee that all online content and services will work equally well, but rather to prevent ISPs from exercising "gatekeeper" control with respect to their subscribers. Thus, content providers who have money can purchase various advantages -- for example, more or better servers, upgraded software, or caching services from a CDN such as Akamai. Significantly, things like servers and caching are available from competitive sources; no supplier has gatekeeper control. In contrast, priority treatment on the transmission facilities serving any given Internet user is an advantage that only that user's ISP could provide. Another difference is that when one content provider purchases caching, it doesn't slow anybody else's traffic (indeed, it could speed it up, since it may help reduce overall network congestion). By contrast, when an ISP designates favoured traffic for priority transmission, non-favoured traffic by definition is de-prioritized. Think about a line of "bits" waiting in a router queue -- if you let some bits "cut in line," it inevitably lengthens the wait for those who don't get to cut. Given CDT's general comfort level with CDNs and the existence of competitive offerings in the marketplace, I'm not too concerned about who provides the service (Akamai, Level3, AT&T, etc.). It doesn't seem to be a case of the ISP leveraging its unique control over access to subscribers.

1b. "A large part of the claims of Internet neutrality supporters are founded on the basis of 'dumb networks', which can also be seen as a reformulation of the end-to-end principle. A question arises, which is often posed by the likes of Dave Farber, Bob Kahn and Robert Pepper: why should we stick dogmatically to the end-to-end principle when embedding 'intelligence' in the core is/will soon be a viable option *without* jeopardising the simplicity of the Internet? If you are fine with CDNs, then are you fine with a partial supplanting of the dogmatism of the end-to-end principle (because, after all, CDNs are in a sense, intelligence in the core rather than in the edges)?"

1b. I don't think that supporting Internet neutrality requires a dogmatic opposition to any and all built-in "intelligence" in the network. Certainly a strong case can be made for handling certain network management matters, such as some cyber security issues, at the network level. I get concerned on neutrality grounds not by the mere existence of "intelligence" in the core, but by the use of that intelligence to make judgments and decisions about which applications and services are most important or most in need of special treatment -- as opposed to remaining application-agnositic or, in the alternative, leaving the decision to end users. Intelligence that is put in the service of end users, allowing the users themselves to make judgments about what to prioritize, does not concern me at all. But if the network-level intelligence results in broader reliance on centralized evaluation and categorization of the type or content of Internet communications, and centralized decisions about what to favor or disfavor, then I think it poses a neutrality problem. The bottom line is, the idea that networks could benefit from some built-in intelligence does not argue for giving ISPs unbounded discretion to discriminate among traffic. Indeed, a network that empowered users themselves to determine the relative priority levels of their traffic based on their individual needs would be far "smarter" than on in which ISPs make broad, across-the-board choices.

2. "What is the bright-line rule that separates some IP-based networks that are 'private' (and hence free to do as they please), and others that are part of the 'Internet' (and hence need to follow Internet neutrality)? Where does IPTV fall? (While answering that question, think not only of present-day IPTV, but keep in mind its potential applications.) Where do 'walled gardens' of the WWW fall?"

2. In CDT's view, Internet access service provides a general-purpose ability to send and receive data communications across the Internet. Other services could be exempt from neutrality rules if they serve specific and limited functional purposes and have limited impact on the technical performance of Internet traffic. CDT's comments to the FCC went into considerable detail -- see, for example, the comments we filed in October. The FCC rules took a similar but not identical tack, saying that Internet access services are services that provide the capability to send and receive data "from all or substantially all Internet endpoints" or that provide a functional equivalent of such a service. In any event, the question of how clear the line is between Internet access services that are subject to neutrality rules and other services that are not is an important one that will bear close watching over time. As for IPTV, it offers a specific function -- access to video programming -- rather than general purpose access to the entire Internet. So IPTV can be distinguished from Internet service. As for "walled gardens," it likely would depend how large the garden is. If the garden seeks to offer a wide enough variety of sites that it can be used as a substitute for Internet access, then the FCC could choose to apply neutrality rules. At some point, a garden can become big and general-purpose enough that it is effectively serving as a non-neutral version of an Internet access service. That kind of end-run around neutrality rules shouldn't be allowed.

3a. "Should Internet neutrality be kept at the level of non-enforceable (but still important) enunciation of principles, or should they be enforceable laws? In either case, who has the authority to regulate Internet neutrality, given the non-territoriality of the 'Internet' (and especially keeping in mind the direction that ICANN's been taking with things like the Affirmation of Commitments). Why should the FCC have such powers? Why should any American governmental body have such powers?"

3a. It is important to have some enforceable rules. The FCC enunciated principles back in its 2005 broadband Policy Statement -- but when the agency tried to act after Comcast violated those principles, a court ruled that the FCC had no ability to do so. Enunciated principles are of little value if ISPs are free to violate them without consequence. For U.S. Internet users, I think the FCC is an appropriate agency in which to lodge the authority to police neutrality violations; the FCC has a long history of working to ensure that providers of physical communications infrastructure do not abuse their position. And since the focus is on the provisions of physical communications connections, I don't the the territoriality issue you raise is a major problem. The United States has the authority to establish rules for companies providing last-mile communications links to U.S.-based subscribers. The Internet is of course a global medium, but the endpoint connections have a clear geographic location.

3b. "If Internet neutrality is really about ensuring fair competition (so an ISP doesn't promote one company's content), then why not just allow competition law / anti-trust law to ensure that fair competition? What are the lacunae in global competition laws that necessitate the separate articulation of 'Internet neutrality' principles/rules?"

3b. The ability of antitrust law to protect Internet openness is pretty limited. Absent a clear anticompetitive motive, network operators likely could curtail Internet openness in a variety of ways without running afoul of antitrust law. Antitrust’s prohibition against anticompetitive conduct is a far cry from any kind of affirmative policy to preserve the Internet’s uniquely open network structure. Nor can antitrust law take into account the major non-economic reasons for maintaining an open Internet, such as the impact on independent speech and civic empowerment. Finally, as a practical matter, antitrust cases tend to drag on for many years. Individual innovators and small startup companies – key beneficiaries of Internet openness – are unlikely to be in a position to bring antitrust cases against major network operators.

4a. "One of the strongest arguments of anti-Internet neutrality folks is that adoption of Internet neutrality principles/rules will ensure that it is only the consumers who foot the bill for bandwidth consumption, and bandwidth hogs (like NetFlix) don't ever pay. This, they say, is unfair on consumers. How do you respond to this?"

4a. First, I question the statement that "bandwidth hogs like NetFlix don't ever pay." For starters, NetFlix buys a huge amount of bandwidth connecting its servers to the Internet. Once on the Internet, its traffic is carried onward pursuant to peering agreements between the ISPs and backbone providers. When NetFlix traffic volume grows, it may trigger new payment demands between carriers, as we've seen in the recent dispute between Comcast and Level3. But the bottom line is, nobody is forced to carry any traffic they haven't contractually agreed to handle. Of course, it is true that NetFlix doesn't make payments to (for example) AT&T for delivering NetFlix traffic to AT&T's customers. That might seem unfair if you think of NetFlix as a "bandwidth hog" eating up AT&T's capacity. I believe that is the wrong way to think about it. NetFlix has no ability to forcefeed traffic onto AT&T's network. Every bit it sends was requested by an AT&T subscriber. So if there are "bandwidth hogs" here, they are the end users -- they are the ones that pull all those bits onto AT&T's network. And they have already paid AT&T for the ability to get those bits. I would add that when individual users choose to download huge volumes, I have no problem with the ISP charging them more. Second, you suggest that it may be unfair to ask consumers to foot the full bill for their connectivity. But the Internet is such an open and innovation-friendly platform precisely because it is so user-driven. This user-centric focus could change if ISPs start thinking of themselves as providing services not just to end user subscribers, but also to non-subscribers such as large online content providers to whom the ISPs do not directly provide bandwidth. The ISPs would then have divided loyalties; rather than just focusing on empowering users, they would be collecting fees to steer users in particular directions. Sure, in other contexts there are examples of "two-sided markets" in which end users foot only part of the bill. Newspapers are often cited. But including paid advertising in newspapers doesn't have much impact in how the overall product is perceived or presented to users. In contrast, ISPs charging content providers for special transmission priority would be akin to a newspaper in which advertisers pay not just to place ads, but also to influence where the substantive articles appear -- which ones go on the front page and which on the interior, for example. In turn, content providers of all stripes would need to think about striking deals with multiple ISPs -- something that is not necessary today. In the end, turning the Internet into a two-sided market would make the medium dramatically less open, less innovative, and less empowering of users.

4b. "If a consumer wants a faster connection (to access content faster), she can get that by paying the ISP more and getting more bandwidth. If a business wants a faster connection (to deliver content faster), it can get that by paying the ISP more bandwidth. However, certain kinds of paying for faster delivery of content are sought to be curbed. Where should we draw that line? And Why should we hold on so dearly to a certain model of accounting for costs?"

4b. Consumers and businesses should be able to pay their respective ISPs for more bandwidth. I think that is very different from paying other people's ISPs for preferential treatment. The latter arrangement turns ISPs into gatekeepers with respect to their subscribers -- because once the quality of delivery depends on which content providers have struck a deal with the subscribers' ISP, every content provider needs to negotiate with that ISP in order to keep up with its competitors. We hold on to the Internet's model of accounting for costs because it is part of what makes the Internet such an open, innovative environment: content providers and innovators don't face the hurdle of having to negotiate deals with all their users' ISPs.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cdt-internet-neutrality

DIT's Response to RTI on Website Blocking

pranesh — 2011-08-02T07:13:47Z

For the first time in India, we have a list of websites that are blocked by order of the Indian government. This data was received from the Department of Information Technology in response to an RTI that CIS filed. Pranesh Prakash of CIS analyzes the implications of these blocks, as well as the shortcomings of the DIT's response.

Quick Analysis of DIT's Response to the RTI

Blocked websites

The eleven websites that the DIT acknowledges are blocked in India are:

Of the eleven blocked websites, one was still accessible on a Tata Communications DSL connection. Two of the blocked websites are grassroots news organizations connected to the Independent Media Centre: IndyBay (San Francisco Bay Area IMC) and the Arizona Indymedia website. The Bloggernews.net page that is on the blocked list is in fact an article by N. Vijayashankar (Naavi) from March 12, 2010 titled "Is E2 labs right in getting zone-h.org blocked?", criticising the judicial blocking of Zone-H.org by E2 Labs (with E2 Labs being represented by lawyer Pawan Duggal). The Zone-H.org case is still going through the judicial motions in the District Court of Delhi, but E2 Labs managed to get an ex parte (i.e., without Zone-H being heard) interim order from the judge asking Designated Officer (Mr. Gulshan Rai of DIT) to block access to Zone-H.org.

As has happened in the past, the government (or the court) accidentally ordered the blocking of all of website host webs.com, instead of blocking only http://donotdial100.webs.com (which subdomain apparently hosted 'defamatory' and 'abusive' information about mafia links within the Maharashtra police and political circles).

It is interesting to note that for most of the websites on most ISPs one gets a 'request timed out' error while trying to access the blocked websites, and not a sign saying: "site blocked for XYZ reason on request dated DD-MM-YYYY received from the DIT". On Reliance broadband connections, for some of the above websites an error message appears, which states: "This site has been blocked as per instructions from Department of Telecom".

Judicial blocking

As per the response of the government, all eleven seem to have been blocked on orders received from the judiciary. While they don't state this directly, this is the conclusion one is led to since the Department admits to blocking eleven websites and also notes that there have been eleven requests for blocking from the judiciary. Normally the judiciary is often thought of as a check on the executive's penchant for banning (seen especially in the recent book banning cases in Maharashtra, for instance, where the Bombay High Court has overturned most of the government's banning orders). However, in these cases the ill-informed lower judiciary seem to be manipulated by lawyers to suppress freedom of speech and expression, even going to the extent of blocking grassroots activist news organizations like the Independent Media Centre.

Websites not blocked by DIT

The DIT also notes that the blocks on Typepad.com was not authorized by it (nor, according to the RTI response received by Nikhil Pahwa of Medianama was the Mobango.com block authorised by the DIT). Typepad.com, Mobango.com, and Clickatell.com don't seem to be blocked currently. However, as was reported by Medianama, for a while when they were being blocked, some sites and ISPs (such as Typepad.com on Bharti Airtel DSL) showed a message stating that the website was blocked on request from the Department of Telecom, which we don't believe has the authority to order blocking of websites. While we still await a response from the Department of Telecom to the RTI we filed with them on this topic, in a letter to the Hindu, the Department of Telecom has clarified that it did not order any block on Typepad.com or any of the other websites. This leaves us unsure as to who ordered these blocks. Further, it points out a lacuna in our information policy that ISPs can suo motu block websites without justifications (such as violation of terms of use), proper notice to customers, or any kind of repercussions for wrongful blocking.

Insufficient information on Committee for Examination of Requests

All requests for websites blocking (except those directly from the judiciary) must be vetted by the Committee for Examination of Requests (CER) under Rule 8(4) of the Rules under s.69A of the IT Act. Given that the DIT admits that the Designated Officer (who carries out the blocking) has received 21 requests to date, there should be at least 21 recommendations of the CER. However, the DIT has not provided us with the details of those 21 requests and the 21 recommendations. We are filing another RTI to uncover this information.

Text of the DIT's Response

Government of India
Ministry of Communications & Information Technology
Department of Information Technology
Electronics Niketan, 6 CGO Complex,
New Delhi-110003

No : 14(3)/2011-ESD

Shri Pranesh Prakash
Centre for Internet and Society
194, 2-C Cross,
Domulur Stage II,
Bangalore- 560071.

Subject: Request for information under RTI Act,

Sir,
Reference your request dated 28lh February 2011 on the above subject.
The point wise information as received from the custodian of Information is enclosed for your reference and records.

sd/-
(A.K.Kaushik)
Additional Director & CPIO
Tel: 011-24364803

Subject : RTI on website blocking requested by Shri Pranesh Prakash

(i) Did the Department order Airtel to block TypePad under S.69A of the Information Technology Act ("IT Act"), 2000 read with the Information Technology (Procedures and Safeguards for Blocking Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009 ("Rules") or any other law for the time being in force? If so, please provide a copy of such order or orders. If not, what action, if at all, has been taken by the Department against Airtel for blocking of websites in contravention of S.69A of the IT Act?

Reply - This Department did not order Airtel to block the said site.

(ii) Has the Department ever ordered a block under s.69A of the IT Act? If so, what was the information that was ordered to be blocked?

Reply - The Department has issued directions for blocking under section 69A for the following websites:
(a) www.zone-h.org.
(b) http://donotdial100.webs.com (IP 216.52.115.50)
(c) www.bloggernews.net/124029
(d) http://www.google.co.in/#h 1 =en&source=hp& biw=1276&bih=843&=dr+babasaheb+ambedkar+ wallpaper&aq=4&aqi=g10&aql =&oq=dr+ babas& gs_rfai=&fp=e791 fe993fa412ba
(e) http://www.cinemahd.net/desktop-enhancements/wallpaper/23945- wallpapers-beautiful-girl-wallpaper.html
(f) http://www.chakpak.com/find/images/ kamasutra-hindi-movie
(g) http://www.submitlink.khatana.net/2010/09/jennifer-stano-is-engaged- to.html
(h) http://www.result.khatana.net/2010/11/im-no-panty-girl-yana-gupta- wardrobe.html.
(i) http://www.facebook.com/pages/l-Hate-Ambedkar/172025102828076
(j) www.indybay.org
(k) www.arizona.indymedia.org

(iii) How many requests for blocking of information has the Designated Officer received, and how many of those requests have been accepted and how many rejected? How many of those requests were for emergency blocking under Rule 9 of the Rules?

Reply - Designated Officer received 21 request for blocking of information. 11 websites have been blocked on the basis of orders received from court of law. One request has been rejected. For other requests, additional input/information has been sought from the Nodal Officer.

No request for emergency blocking under rule 9 of the Rules have been received.

(iv) Please provide use the present composition of the Committee for Examination of Requests constituted under Rule 7 of the Rules.

Reply - The present composition of the Committee is :
(a) Designated Officer (Group Coordinator - Cyber Law)
(b) Joint Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs
(c) Joint Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting
(d) Additional Secretary and Ministry of Law & Justice
(e) Senior Director, Indian Computer Emergency Response Team

(v) Please provide us the dates and copies of the minutes of all meetings held by the Committee for Examination of Requests under Rule 8(4) of the Rules, and copies of their recommendations.

Reply - The Committee had met on 24-08-2010 with respect to request for blocking of website www.betfair.com.

(vi) Please provide us the present composition of the Review Committee constituted under rule 419A of the Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.
(vii) Please provide us the dates and copies of the minutes of all meetings held by the Review Committee under Rule 14 of the Rules, and copies of all orders issued by the Review Committee.

Reply - This Department do not have details for above. The said information may be available with Department of Telecommunications.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/rti-response-dit-blocking

Comments to the Ministry on WIPO Broadcast Treaty (March 2011)

pranesh — 2012-12-14T10:29:20Z

As a follow up to a stakeholder meeting called by the MHRD on the WIPO Broadcast Treaty, CIS provided written comments on the April 2007 Non-Paper of the WIPO Broadcast Treaty, emphasising the need for a signal-based approach to be taken on the Broadcast Treaty, and making it clear that India should continue to oppose the creation of new rights for webcasters.

On February 22, 2011, the Ministry of Human Resource Development held a meeting to decide on the Indian position on the WIPO Broadcast Treaty. The Ministry asked the participants at the meeting to send in written submissions on four matters. We sent in submissions on those four issues, as well as a few others.

Comments on the non-paper for the WIPO Broadcast Treaty by the Centre for Internet and Society

On February 23, 2011, the Ministry of HRD had asked for comments on four matters:

Article 3 of the Non-paper which was circulated earlier
Term of protection for signal
Nature of limitations and exceptions
Protection of signal and retransmission

We have made submissions on those and a few other matters as well. Unless noted otherwise, all comments made in this note pertain to the final non-paper (April 2007) and not the draft non-paper (March 2007).

Article 3

Article 3 of the draft non-paper that was circulated (March 2007) for comments from country delegates stated:

3. Scope of Application

The provisions of this Treaty shall not provide any protection in respect of

(i) mere retransmissions;

(ii) any transmissions where the time of the transmission and the place of its reception may be individually chosen by members of the public (on-demand transmissions); or

(iii) any transmissions over computer networks (transmissions using the Internet

Protocol, “webcasting”, or “netcasting”).

A number of people present at the recent MHRD-organized meeting noted that “mere retransmissions” is a confusing term. In the revised non-paper (April 2007), it has been clarified that protection is not granted to third parties for merely retransmitting another’s signal (Art. 3(4)(i)).

3. Specific Scope and Object of Protection

(4) The provisions of this Treaty shall not provide any protection

(i) to retransmitting third parties in respect of their mere retransmissions by any means of broadcasts by broadcasting organizations;

(ii) to any person for transmissions where the time of the transmission and the place of its reception may be individually chosen by members of the public (on-demand transmissions); or

(iii) to any person for transmissions over computer networks

In addition, Art. 3(4)(iii) is currently ambiguous since it is not clear whether “retransmissions” are subsumed under the word transmission. By allowing for separate rights for retransmission over computer networks, the Treaty allows for the creation of two classes: traditional broadcasters who will have rights over retransmissions over computer networks, and all other persons who will have no rights over transmissions. Thus, if “retransmission” is not subsumed under the word “transmission”, it would be advisable to alter that clause to read “to any person for transmissions or retransmissions over computer networks”.

Lastly, Art. 3(4) should additional prevent protection for persons broadcasting materials for which they have not acquired copyright, or for broadcasting materials in the public domain.

Term of Protection of Signals

No term of protection should be provided. As was noted by the US government in its response to the draft non-paper, it is questionable “whether a 20-year term of protection is consistent with a signal-based approach”. The Brazilian delegation also states: “Article 13 should be deleted. A twenty-year term of protection is unnecessary. The agreed “signal-based” approach to the Treaty implies that the objected of protection is the signal, and therefore duration of protection must be linked with the ephemeral life of the signal itself.” Thus, a term is only needed if we stray away from a signal-based approach. As we do not wish to do so, there should be no term of protection.

Limitations and Exceptions

The limitations and exceptions (L&E) currently provided for allow for mirroring of copyright L&E limited by a Berne-like three-step test.

However, reasons for providing protection over broadcasting are not the same as those for copyright. For instance, a country may wish to make exceptions to signal protection for cases such as broadcast of a national sport, as India has done with the Sports Broadcasting Signals (Mandatory Sharing with Prasar Bharati) Act.

This might well afoul of the three-step test proposed in Article 10(2). Furthermore, a country may wish to limit the application of broadcasters rights for national broadcasters (whose programming is paid for by taxpayers, and thus should be available to them), but may not be able to do so under the provisions of Article 10(2). Thus, Article 10(2) should be deleted, and Article 10(1) should be expanded to include issues of national interest and for free-to-air broadcast signals.

Protection of Signal and Retransmission

It should be a sine qua non condition of India’s that that this be a purely signal-based treaty with no fixation or post-fixation rights. Thus, it should restrict itself to protection of signals, and simultaneous retransmission.

As a result, no separate right to prevent unauthorized “decryption” should be granted, since signal-theft is already a crime. For instance, this provision would also cover decrypting an unauthorized retransmission without authorization from the retransmitter. This provides the unauthorized retransmitter rights, even though s/he has no right to retransmit. This leads to an absurd situation.

As stated by the Brazilian government:

“[Article 10 of the draft non-paper and Article 9 of the non-paper] is inconsistent with a “signal-based approach”. It creates unwarranted obstacles to technological development, to access to legitimate uses, flexibilities and exceptions and to access to the public domain. It does not focus on securing effective protection against an illicit act, but rather creates new exclusive rights so that they cover areas unrelated with the objective of the treaty, such as control by holder of industrial production of goods, the development and use of encryption technologies, and private uses. The prohibition of mere decryption of encrypted signals, without there having been unauthorized broadcasting activity, is abusive.”

Other comments

Article 7

Article 7 of the non-paper provides broadcasters rights post-fixation (“Broadcasting organizations shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing … the deferred transmission by any means to the public of their fixed broadcasts. ”). This is contrary to a signal-based approach. A signal-based approach would necessarily mean that it is only signal theft (which happens only via unauthorized simultaneous retransmission) that should be protected. Deferred transmission should implicate the rights of the owner of copyright, but not of the broadcasting organization.

Article 4

As suggested by the Brazilian government, Article 4(1) which proposes a non-prejudice clause should be amended to add the words “and access to the public domain” at its end. This is consistent with the WIPO Development Agenda.

Article 5

India should re-iterate its suggestion to add the following to the definition of “broadcast” under Art. 5(a): “‘broadcast’ shall not be understood as including transmission of such a set of signals over computer networks. ”

Further, the phrase “general public ” should be retained in Art.5 (as was present in the draft non-paper), and should not be made into “public”. The danger is that a limited public (say family members) could possibly be covered by the term “public”, while they will be excluded from “general public”, which in any case is the target audience of all broadcast.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/wipo-broadcast-treaty-comments-march-2011

RTI Applications on Blocking of Websites

pranesh — 2012-12-21T06:34:27Z

In recent weeks, an increasing number of incidents have come to light on government-ordered blocking of websites. In one case involving Zone-H.org, it is clear who has ordered the block (a Delhi district court judge, as an interim order), even though the block itself is open to constitutional challenge. In all others cases, including the TypePad case, it is unclear who has ordered the block and why. We at CIS have sent in two right to information requests to find out.

While under the law (i.e., s.69A of the Information Technology Act), the Department of Information Technology (DIT) has the power to order blocks (via the 'Designated Officer'), in some cases it has been noted that the ISPs have noted that the order to block access to the websites have come from the Department of Telecom (DoT). Due to this, we have sent in RTI applications to both the DIT and the DoT.

RTI Application to Department of Information Technology

Shri B.B.Bahl,
Joint Director and PIO (RTI)
Office of PIO (RTI)
Room No 1016, Electronics Niketan
Department of Information Technology (DIT)
Ministry of Communications and Information Technology
6, CGO Complex, New Delhi

Dear Sir,

Subject: Information on Website Blocking Requested under the Right to Information Act, 2005

1. Full Name of the Applicant:
Pranesh Prakash

2. Address of the Applicant:
E-mail Address:
pranesh[at]cis-india.org

Mailing Address:
Centre for Internet and Society
194, 2-C Cross,
Domlur Stage II,
Bangalore – 560071

3. Details of the information required:

It has come to our attention that Airtel Broadband Services (“Airtel”) has recently blocked access to a blog host called TypePad (http://www.typepad.com) (“TypePad”) for all its users across the country. In this regard, we request information on the following queries under Section 6(1) of the Right to Information Act, 2005:

Did the Department order Airtel to block TypePad under s.69A of the Information Technology Act (“IT Act”), 2000 read with the Information Technology (Procedures and Safeguards for Blocking Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009 (“Rules”) or any other law for the time being in force? If so, please provide a copy of such order or orders. If not, what action, if at all, has been taken by the Department against Airtel for blocking of websites in contravention of s.69A of the IT Act?
Has the Department ever ordered a block under s.69A of the IT Act? If so, what was the information that was ordered to be blocked?
How many requests for blocking of information has the Designated Officer received, and how many of those requests have been accepted and how many rejected? How many of those requests were for emergency blocking under Rule 9 of the Rules?
Please provide use the present composition of the Committee for Examination of Requests constituted under Rule 7 of the Rules.
Please provide us the dates and copies of the minutes of all meetings held by the Committee for Examination of Requests under Rule 8(4) of the Rules, and copies of their recommendations.
Please provide us the present composition of the Review Committee constituted under rule 419A of the Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.
Please provide us the dates and copies of the minutes of all meetings held by the Review Committee under Rule 14 of the Rules, and copies of all orders issued by the Review Committee.

4. Years to which the above requests pertain:
2008-2011

5. Designation and Address of the PIO from whom the information is required:

To the best of my belief, the details sought for fall within your authority. Further, as provided under section 6(3) of the Right to Information Act (“RTI Act”), in case this application does not fall within your authority, I request you to transfer the same in the designated time (5 days) to the concerned authority and inform me of the same immediately.

To the best of my knowledge the information sought does not fall within the restrictions contained in section 8 and 9 of the RTI Act, and any provision protecting such information in any other law for the time being in force is inapplicable due to section 22 of the RTI Act.

Please provide me this information in electronic form, via the e-mail address provided above.

This to certify that I, Pranesh Prakash, am a citizen of India.

A fee of Rs. 10/- (Rupees Ten Only) has been made out in the form of a demand draft drawn in favour of “Pay and Accounts Officer, Department of Information Technology” payable at New Delhi.

Date: Monday, February 28, 2011
Place: Bengaluru, Karnataka

(Pranesh Prakash)

RTI Application to Department of Telecom

Shri Subodh Saxena
Central Public Information Officer (RTI)
Director (DS-II)
Room No 1006, Sanchar Bhawan
Department of Telecommunications (DoT)
Ministry of Communications and Information Technology
20, Ashoka Road, New Delhi — 110001

Dear Sir,

Subject: Information on Website Blocking Requested under the Right to Information Act, 2005

1. Full Name of the Applicant:
Pranesh Prakash

2. Address of the Applicant:
E-mail Address:
pranesh[at]cis-india.org

Mailing Address:
Centre for Internet and Society
194, 2-C Cross,
Domlur Stage II,
Bangalore – 560071

3. Details of the information required:

It has come to our attention that Airtel Broadband Services (“Airtel”) has recently blocked access to a blog host called TypePad (http://www.typepad.com) (“TypePad”) for all its users across the country. Airtel subscribers trying to access this website receive a message noting “This site has been blocked as per request by Department of Telecom”. In this regard, we request information on the following queries under Section 6(1) of the Right to Information Act, 2005:

Does the Department have powers to require an Internet Service Provider to block a website? If so, please provide a citation of the statute under which power is granted to the Department, as well as the the safeguards prescribed to be in accordance with Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India.
Did the Department order Airtel to block TypePad or any blog hosted by TypePad? If so, please provide a copy of such order or orders. If not, what action, if at all, has been taken by the Department against Airtel for blocking of websites?
Has the Department ever ordered the blocking of any website? If so, please provide a list of addresses of all the websites that have been ordered to be blocked.
Please provide use the present composition of the Committee constituted under rule 419A of the Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.
Please provide us the dates and copies of the minutes of all meetings held by the Committee constituted under rule 419A of the Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951, and copies of all their recommendations.

4. Years to which the above requests pertain:
2005-2011

5. Designation and Address of the PIO from whom the information is required:
Shri Subodh Saxena
Central Public Information Officer (RTI)
Director (DS-II)
Room No 1006, Sanchar Bhawan
Department of Telecommunications (DoT)
Ministry of Communications and Information Technology
20, Ashoka Road, New Delhi — 110001

Please provide me this information in electronic form, via the e-mail address provided above.

This to certify that I, Pranesh Prakash, am a citizen of India.

A fee of Rs. 10/- (Rupees Ten Only) has been made out in the form of a demand draft drawn in favour of “Pay and Accounts Officer (HQ), Department of Telecom” payable at New Delhi.

Date: Monday, February 28, 2011
Place: Bengaluru, Karnataka

(Pranesh Prakash)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/rtis-on-website-blocking

Exhaustion: Imports, Exports and the Doctrine of First Sale in Indian Copyright Law

pranesh — 2014-05-29T06:18:31Z

This article by Pranesh Prakash was published in the Manupatra Intellectual Property Reports, February 2011, Volume 1, Part 2, pp. 149-160. In this short note, the author argues that Indian courts have fundamentally misunderstood the doctrine of first sale, and consequently have wrongly held that parallel importation is disallowed by Indian law. He further looks at the ingenuity displayed by a court in prohibiting export of low-priced editions from India, and comes to the conclusion that this is also wrong in law. He believes there is a way out of this quagmire that we find ourselves in due to judicial inventions: that of accepting a proposed amendment to the Copyright Act.

Can foreign works be copyrighted works?

Section 13(2) of the Indian Copyright Act states that insofar as published works go, copyright only subsists if the work is first published in India or if the work is by an Indian citizen. It does except the application of this section to all those works to which sections 40 and 41 of the Act apply. Section 40 allows for the provisions of the Act to be extended to foreign works and foreign authors by special order of the government. The government is required to do so, being a member of the Berne Convention, the Universal Copyright Convention as well as the TRIPS Agreement, and has fulfilled its requirement via International Copyright Order, the latest such order having been issued in 1999.

Thus, for purposes of our law, we protect not only Indian works, but foreign works as well. It expressly places foreign authors and works published in a foreign country in the same shoes as Indian authors and works published in India, respectively.

Import of copyrighted works

Thus having established that foreign books enjoy protection under Indian law, we now turn to the question of whether import of foreign works into India is permissible under Indian law. There is no provision of the Copyright Act by which the owner or licensee of copyright given the exclusive right to import a copyrighted work into India. Section 51(b)(iv) does, however, makes it illegal to import infringing copies of a work.[1];It is clear that illegally published copies are infringing copies, and thus cannot be imported. But are legally published copies that are legally purchased outside of India also ‘infringing copies’ and is their import also prohibited by the section 51?

This question is laid out as:

We now arrive at one of the most difficult topics in copyright law. It is our ambition to expound this subject as clearly as possible but inevitably this involves exposing some troublesome problems which lurk not far beneath the surface. The basic idea is simple. It has long been the policy of copyright law in the UK and other countries which follow our system that as a rule, mere selling or other secondary dealings with articles manufactured in the home market shall not be treated as copyright infringement unless their marking was piratical in the first place. Further, it is policy that traders should be free to buy and sell goods without getting involved in copyright proceedings, so long as they do so in good faith. Do not deal in pirate copies where you can tell they are probably such” is a law anyone can understand. Dealing in pirate copies where you know or have reason to believe that they are such is called secondary infringement in contrast to primary infringement (e.g. manufacturing) where liability is strict.

This idea works fine as long as one does not need to examine too closely, what one means by pirate copies; it is usually pretty obvious. However, when it comes to parallel imports it is not so obvious, and one has to know precisely what is meant. It is plain that the test cannot be whether the copy was made piratically in its country of origin because the copyright laws of foreign states are irrelevant so far as rights in the UK are concerned, and in some cases these laws may not even exist. Since foreign copyrights are separate and distinct rights, and since it is commonplace for these to be assigned so as to be exploited by different hands, it cannot matter whether a copy imported from Britannia was lawfully made in its country of origin; this principle has been recognized from an early date.

According to section 2(m) of the Act, a reproduction of a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, a copy of a film or sound recording is an "infringing copy" if such reproduction, copy or sound recording is made or imported in contravention of the provisions of this Act. So section 2(m) does not clarify matters either, because it applies only to that importation that is “in contravention of the provisions of” the Copyright Act. So we look to section 14 which lays down the meaning of copyright and is read with section 51 when determining what does and does not constitute infringement. Nowhere, in section 14 of the Act is a right to import granted to the copyright owner. However, section 14 does clearly lays down that insofar as literary, dramatic or musical works go; it is the copyright owner’s exclusive right to issue copies of the work to the public not being copies already in circulation”. The explanation to this section goes to clarify that for the purposes of this section, a copy which has been sold once shall be deemed to be a copy already in circulation.”What this means and how this has been construed by various courts shall be seen in the following sections.

Judicial history on importation

The Penguin case [2]

The issue of parallel importation first reached the higher judiciary in 1984 when the Delhi High Court was called upon to pronounce judgment on whether import by a third party without the express authorisation of the copyright owner constitute infringement. The court, bizarrely, ruled that it constituted infringement because it constituted a violation of the owner’s right to publish:

While publication generally refers to issue to public, importation for the specified purpose may be a necessary step in the process of issuing to the public, and therefore of publishing. It appears to me that the exclusive right of the copyright owner to print, publish and sell these titles in India would extend to the exclusive right to import copies into India for the purpose of selling or by way of trade offering or exposing for sale the hooks in question. This is the true meaning of the word “publish” as used in section 14(1)(a)(4).

It is also an infringement of copyright knowingly to import into India for sale or hire infringing copies of a work without the consent of the owner of the copyright, though they may have been made by or with the consent of the owner of the copyright in the place where they were made.

It should be noted that prior to the 1994 amendment of the Copyright Act, the first two clauses of section 14 read: “(i) to reproduce the work in any material form; (ii) to publish the work”. Thus, this judgment extends the right to “publish the work” (or in the words of the judge, “print, publish and sell”) to include a right of importation out of thin air, simply by stating that it appears so. While the judge notes that “publication” under the Act (in 1984) was defined as meaning the issue of copies of the work, either in whole or in part, to the public in a manner sufficient to satisfy the reasonable requirements of the public having regard to the nature of the work”, he does not explain how importation is subsumed under that definition contrary to a plain reading of the law. Finally, the judge does note that, “It is true that India Distributors are not printing these books and are not guilty of what is called primary infringement”, but goes on to state however, that “when they issue copies of these titles for public distribution they are guilty of secondary infringement”. These categories are created, but neither explained nor explored in the judgment. One other legal nuance that was examined was the allowance granted to the Registrar of Copyright under section 53 to “order that copies made out of India of the work which if made in India would infringe copyright shall not be imported. The judge noted that the words infringing copy as contained in section 53 could not be different in meaning from the same words contained in section 51(b). The implication of this shall be demonstrated shortly.

Importantly, the judgment does not look into section 16 of the Act which states that there shall be no copyright except as provided by the Act, and how this should prevent a judge from expanding the rights provided in the law to include a new judicially created right to prevent imports.

Privity of contract

Nowhere in the judgment does the judge explain how an exclusive distribution contract between two parties can affect a third party in violation of the well-held principle of privity of contract. This is an important issue because in effect, the judgment makes a third party bound by the contract entered into by two private parties. The parties agree inter se (for example) to ensure that the India distributor does not sell the book outside of India and that the owner of rights will not give the right to sell in India to any other person. How could this contract between those two parties come in way of a third person buying from a foreign market and importing into India? If it was the case of an exclusive UK licensee selling in India, then both the exclusive Indian licensee as well as the owner of the copyright would have cause of action in India on the basis of both violation of contract as well as violation of copyright (for exceeding his territorial licence). However, a third party who buys from a stream of commerce cannot be bound by these contracts because he becomes the owner of the book and not a licensee. Thus, the judgment makes a contract between two private parties, which merely creates a right in personam, applicable to the entire world. By doing this it allows a contract to create a right in rem without any express provision of the law doing do. Indeed, this issue was examined by the United State Supreme Court in 1908 in the case of Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus,[3] in which the doctrine of first sale was judicially evolved.

Doctrine of first sale/exhaustion

Importantly, nowhere in the judgment does the judge bother to go into the details of the interaction between the sale of a copy of a book (upon the occurrence of which no further conditions can be laid) and the Copyright Act. If I sell you a bicycle laying down a condition that you cannot re-sell it, such a condition cannot be upheld in a court of law because by sale I divest all saleable interest I have in the bicycle. This principle is what is embodied in sections 10 and 11 of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 10 states–“Where property is transferred subject to a condition or limitation absolutely restraining the transferee or any person claiming under him from parting with or disposing of his interest in the property, the condition or limitation is void, except in the case of a lease where the condition is for the benefit of the lessor or those claiming under him. In the same vein, section 11 states–“Where, on a transfer of property, an interest therein is created absolutely in favour of any person, but the terms of the transfer direct that such interest shall be applied or enjoyed by him in a particular manner, he shall be entitled to receive and dispose of such interest as if there were no such direction.” Thus, by selling of a copy of a book (as opposed to a licensing the book), I divest myself of all saleable interests in that particular copy of the book (though not copyright). I cannot prevent you from re-selling that book. However, copyright law would require that you can only re-sell a copy of a book without the owner’s permission, and cannot sell it without the owner’s permission. This is known as the doctrine of first sale, which evolved as a via media between copyright law, which gave the owner of copyright rights in a book, and property law, which gave the buyer of a book rights in her particular copy of the book.

The best appreciation of this doctrine of first sale (also known as “exhaustion of rights”) has come in a judgment by Justice Ravindra Bhat, who states the meaning of the doctrine very clearly:

The doctrine of exhaustion of copyright enables free trade in material objects on which copies of protected works have been fixed and put into circulation with the right holder’s consent. The exhaustion principle in a sense arbitrates the conflict between the right to own a copy of a work and the author’s right to control the distribution of copies. Exhaustion is decisive with respect to the priority of ownership and the freedom to trade in material carriers on the condition that a copy has been legally brought into trading. Transfer of ownership of a carrier with a copy of a work fixed on it makes it impossible for the owner to derive further benefits from the exploitation of a copy that was traded with his consent. The exhaustion principle is thus termed legitimate by reason of the profits earned for the ownership transfer, which should be satisfactory to the author if the work is not being exploited in a different exploitation field.

Exhaustion of rights is linked to the distribution right. The right to distribute objects (making them available to the public) means that such objects (or the medium on which a work is fixed) are released by or with the consent of the owner as a result of the transfer of ownership. In this way, the owner is in control of the distribution of copies since he decides the time and the form in which copies are released to the public. Content wise the distribution rights are to be understood as an opportunity to provide the public with copies of a work and put them into circulation, as well as to control the way the copies are used. The exhaustion of rights principle thus limits the distribution right, by excluding control over the use of copies after they have been put into circulation for the first time.

1994 Amendment to the Act

Interestingly, the Penguin judgment was sought to be overturned by an amendment to section 14 in 1994. That amendment removed the right to “publish”, and instead made it a right to “to issue copies of the work to the public not being copies already in circulation”. It stands to reason that this not only ensures the centrality of the doctrine of first sale in India, but also allows for international exhaustion, thus allowing for parallel import. This is clear from the fact that we, in Indian law (as per section 40), makes it clear that “all or any provisions of this Act shall apply to work first published in any class territory outside India to which the order (under section 40) relates in like manner as if they were first published within India.

Thus, even books published internationally are, under the legal fiction under section 40, akin to books published in India. Since we are granting foreign works all the protection under the Act as though they had been published in India by Indian authors, it is but natural that they should be subject to all the same limitations as well (such as the doctrine of first sale).

As one commentator puts it, “with amendments, the decision of the Penguin case is no more the law. Like most other nations, we have also accepted the principle of international exhaustion. This seems to be after taking into view the public interest angle.”[4]

Unfortunately, legal commentators seemed to have paid greater attention to legislative changes than did the courts.

Eurokids case[5]

In 2005, the same issue of parallel importation in literary works arose before the Bombay High Court. Highly unfortunately, the decision by the Bombay High Court was even more ill-reasoned than that of the Delhi High Court in the Penguin case. Nowhere in the judgment is the issue of the first sale doctrine, on which the issue of parallel importation rests, even cursorily examined. Nowhere is the amendment to section 14 of the Copyright Act even noted. Indeed, the only time that section 14 is even mentioned is when the section is quoted to establish it as providing the meaning of “copyright” in Indian law. The implications of section 14 in terms of exhaustion of rights are simply not examined. Section 2(m) of the Act, which it is necessary to examine (as shown above) to understand what to make of the phrase “infringing copy” in section 51, is not even mentioned once. As per the logic of the judgment, any copy that is sold in India by a third party in contravention of an exclusive licence contract is automatically assumed to be infringing. Thus, once again, copyright law magically overrides the concept of privity of contract without so much as an explanation.

Most importantly, because the case relies on the Penguin decision without having noticed and accounting for the subsequent change in the text of the law because of the 1994 amendment, it should be held to be per incuriam, and should not act as a precedent.

Warner Bros. case [6]

In 2009, the Delhi High Court pronounced yet another verdict on parallel importation in the case of Warner Bros. v. Santosh V.G. However, this was a case on DVDs, and not on books. While the Court correctly understands the meaning of the first sale doctrine in terms of literary works (and thus becoming the first judgment to explicitly talk about this doctrine), it is open to debate whether it was correct in its ruling on the inapplicability of the doctrine when it came to cinematograph films. The reasoning of the court (in paragraphs 77 and 78) as to why parallel importation is not allowed under Indian law is faulty, and is worth quoting in extenso:

In this case, the copies that are being let out for rent/hire by the defendant are not made in India. Rather, they have been made in the US and imported into India. As noticed earlier, copyright in a work published abroad, in a Berne Convention country, like the United States, entitles its owner to assert copyright in India; such rights are “as if” the works were published in India (section 40 and provisions of the order). An infringing copy is one “made or imported in contravention of the provisions of this Act”. In this context, the proviso to section 51(b)(iv), in the court’s view, provides the key to Parliamentary intention. It carves only one exception, permitting “import of one copy of any work for the private and domestic use of the importer”. The plaintiffs’ argument is that there would have been no need to enact this exception, if there were no restriction on import of cinematograph films, genuinely made outside India. The effect of the proviso to section 51(b)(iv) is plainly, not to relax the importation of genuinely made cinematographic films but to allow for the importation of one copy of any work “for the private and domestic use of the importer.” This would mean that the proviso allows for the importation of an infringing work, for private and domestic use of the importer, and not commercial use.

Quite obviously, there are some glaring problems in the court’s reasoning. The proviso to section 51(b)(iv) does indeed carve out an exception, but that exception is for infringing copies of a work, and not for non-infringing or “genuine” copies. The plaintiffs’ argument, according to the judge, is: If all genuine copies of the cinematograph film could be legally imported, there would be no need to enact this exception. However, there could well be a need to enact this exception to cover a single non-genuine copy of a cinematograph film. It is precisely because of this that the exception is so very narrow, being for not only private use, as in section 52(1)(a), but of a single copy of a work and that too only for “private and domestic use”. This possibility of allowing import of a non-genuine copy is completely overlooked by the judge. The judgment continues:

The defendant’s argument that the plaintiffs lost the power to deal with the copy, once placed in the market place, in the United States, is also unsupportable as too broad a proposition. In the context of the Act, the argument is more hopeful, than convincing. Even in the United States, it has been held (United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 1977)) that though, after “first sale", a vendee “is not restricted by statute from further transfers of that copy”, yet a first sale does not, however, exhaust other rights, such as the copyright holder’s right to prohibit copying of the copy he sells. The Federal Appellate Court noted that “other copyright rights (reprinting, copying, etc.) remain unimpaired”. It is clear therefore that the copies in question are infringing copies. Therefore, their importation, and more importantly, use for any of the purposes under section 51, other than the one spelt out in it the proviso is in contravention of the Act. The question, however, is whether the action of the defendants amounts to infringement of the copyright of the plaintiffs. This must be answered independently of the question of whether parallel importation of copyrighted goods is permissible under Indian copyright law.

While the reading of the law is correct (i.e., the first sale doctrine does not exhaust all rights, but merely the right to prevent further transfers), the application of the law to the facts is incorrect. In this case, the fact situation before the court was not of “reprinting, copying, etc.” but of the physical transfer of copies of a work bought in the US into India. As is noted in United States v. Wise, “after first sale,” the buyer “is not restricted by statute from further transfers of that copy”. Indeed, this was case can be seen as exactly such a “further transfer” (of the rights over that copy from a shop in the US to the buyer in India). How the judge misreads the argument as being about something other than transfer of property rights in a copy (and more as something akin to reproduction), and concludes that “it is clear therefore that the copies in question are infringing copies,” is not clear.

However, the verdict of the court does not proceed on this ground alone, and involves discussion of the doctrine of first sale with regard to cinematograph films, the provisions of section 53, which apply only to cinematograph films, none of which are applicable in case of literary works.

Export of copyrighted works

Now, that we have dealt with the traditionally contentious part on imports, we may now examine the rare, but even more contentious issue of exports. Barring a few exceptions, notably the United States, the copyright law in no country regulates exports. Even in the United States, section 602 of their Copyright Act regulates only the export of infringing works, and not the export of legitimate works. In India, though, there are two judgments of the Delhi High Court that seemingly make illegal export from India of legal copies of a copyrighted work. As one of these decisions is an ex parte order without any reasoning—indeed calling the reasoning “bare minimum” would be doing that phrase a disservice—we shall focus only on the other judgement: the one pronounced by Justice Manmohan Singh in John Wiley & Sons v. Prabhat Chander Kumar Jain [7]. The facts of the judgment are rather simple. John Wiley & Sons Inc., based in New York, exclusively licensed the rights over certain books to Wiley India Pvt. Ltd. (all the other plaintiffs follow the same model, so we shall restrict ourselves to the case of the Wiley corporation). These books were sold at a reduced cost in the Indian market and were clearly labelled as being “Wiley Student Edition restricted for sale only in Bangladesh, Myanmar, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka and Vietnam”. Another label on the same book read: “The book for sale only in the country to which first consigned by Wiley India Pvt. Ltd and may not be re-exported. For sale only in: Bangladesh, Myanmar, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka and Vietnam.”[8]. Quite clearly, John Wiley & Sons, being the owner of the rights, had given exclusive license to Wiley India Pvt. Ltd. to publish and print an English Language reprint edition only in the territories entailed in the agreement and not beyond that. Further, they wished to impose this restriction on all buyers of the book by way of that notice and attached conditionality, and thus prevent exports to the United States.

At this stage, it would do us well to dwell into the facts of the 1908 US Supreme Court case of Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus[9]. In this case, the plaintiff-appellant sold a copyrighted novel with a clear notice under the copyright notice stating that, “The price of this book at retail is $1 net. No dealer is licensed to sell it at a lower price, and a sale at a lower price will be treated as an infringement of the copyright”. Macy & Co., a famous retailer, purchased large lots of books both at wholesale prices and at retail prices, and re-sold the books to its customers at 89 cents a copy. This was quite clearly in violation of the condition imposed by the notice.

It may be seen that the facts in this case quite clearly mirror the fact situation in John Wiley & Sons v. Prabhat Chander Kumar Jain. It is only the nature of the conditionality that differentiates the two cases: in the one it was a restriction on price at which the book could be further sold, in the other it was a restriction on where the book could be further sold. How did the judge rule in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Strauss? The court ruled that it was on the record that Macy & Co. had knowledge of the notice. However, despite that, the notice was held not to be binding on Macy & Co. The court noted:

The precise question, therefore, in this case is, “Does the sole right to vend secure to the owner of the copyright the right, after a sale of the book to a purchaser, to restrict future sales of the book at retail, to the right to sell it at a certain price per copy, because of a notice in the book that a sale at a different price will be treated as an infringement, which notice has been brought home to one undertaking to sell for less than the named sum?” We do not think the statute can be given such a construction copyright statutes, while protecting the owner of the copyright in his right to multiply and sell his production, do not create the right to impose, by notice, such as is disclosed in this case, a limitation at which the book shall be sold at retail by future purchasers, with whom there is no privity of contract …To add to the right of exclusive sale, the authority to control all future retail sales, by a notice that such sales must be made at a fixed sum, would give a right not included in the terms of the statute, and, in our view, extend its operation, by construction, beyond its meaning, when interpreted with a view to ascertaining the legislative intent in its enactment.

This judgment proceeded on privity of contract, the factum of a sale having occurred, and created what is now known as the doctrine of first sale–an established principle that the exclusive right to sell, distribute or circulate a copy of the copyrighted work exhausts the moment the item is placed into a stream of commerce through a sale. This can, of course, be contradicted if explicitly stated so in a statute.[10] However, as we noted earlier, the Indian statute explicitly notes that the right to issue copies of a work to the public, guaranteed to the owner of the copyright over a literary, dramatic, or artistic work is restricted to copies not already in circulation. Thus, it might seem to one to be quite clear how the court would in the John Wiley & Sons case. One would then be wrong.

In fact, Justice Manmohan Singh, in a very detailed and circuitous judgment, rules that the activity done by the defendant is a violation not of some implied contract between Wiley India Pvt. Ltd. and him, but that it constituted a violation of the Indian Copyright Act, and notably section 51 of the Copyright Act. How does he reach this conclusion?

His reasoning rests on 3 dubious pillars:

that the rights of the licensee are distinct from that of the owner, and that the former may get exhausted without affecting the latter;
that the licensee cannot pass on better title to those that buy from him than he himself has;
that sale or even offer for sale or taking of orders for sale are all forms of putting into circulation or issuance of copies.

First, through a close reading of the various provisions of the Copyright Act he notes that the Act creates a clear difference between the rights of the owner and the rights of the licensee (para 47-50). He then finally comes to noting that,

“A logical corollary drawn from above analysis which needs reiteration at this stage is that for the purposes of section 51 which is in the preceding chapter, the term owner of the copyright does not include exclusive licensee. Thus, the rights of the owner although may include rights of the exclusive licensee but the court cannot read the term owner of the copyright as that of the exclusive licensee and their rights are different as per the allocation by the owner.” (para 62).

Thus, he establishes that some rights of the licensee may be extinguished (as per the doctrine of exhaustion) without extinguishing that same right of the owner. In other words, while the right of circulation of the licensee get exhausted, the right of circulation of the owner remains unaffected. Justice Singh doesn’t go into the implications of this, but there can be two ways of interpreting what this means. It could mean that by virtue of the circulation rights of the licensee getting exhausted, the circulation right of the owner gets exhausted in those nine countries for which the licensee had been granted rights of circulation. Else, it could mean that the exhaustion of the licensee’s circulation rights does not at all affect the owner’s circulation rights. This latter one is obviously an absurd idea, since that would, in all cases, leave the owner with a cause of action in case of all sales even when the owner is in India. Thus, one is left considering the former the only logical meaning.

However, that this cannot possibly be right is demonstrated by the fact that this can easily be applied to an all-in-India transaction as well. Thus, for instance, the owner of rights can decide never to directly sell any book, but only allow its licensees to sell. Thus, it can contractually bind a licensee to sell only in Andhra Pradesh and hold that because of that license contract any buyer who buys from the Andhra Pradesh licensee and decides to re-sell to a second-hand bookstore in Karnataka is actually violating the terms of the license (because the circulation right gets extinguished only insofar as the licensee is concerned, and that licence only allows sales in Andhra Pradesh).

That is obviously cannot be held to be the purpose of the law. Thus, the privity of the contract between the owner of the right and the licensee must be upheld and may not be held to bind a third party purchaser.

The second ground on which Justice Singh rules is on the general property law principle that a person cannot pass on a better title than she herself has. Thus, Justice Singh holds that when the licensee sells a book to a person, that person only receives as much of the title to that book that the licensee has. Thus, since the licensee only has title in the book insofar as those nine countries go, the person who buys that book cannot get better title.

The plain fault in this reasoning is the very founding basis of the doctrine of first sale: the differentiation between property rights in a copy of a book and the copyright in the book. No one has contended in this case that the transaction between the licensee and the book purchaser is not a sale. Once a sale happens, all property rights in that copy of the book are alienated to the book purchaser. It must be remembered that this transaction is not the case of the licensee sub-licensing the right to circulate the book. The licensee cannot sub-license to another party the right to sell the book in, say, Australia, because she does not have that right in the first place. However, in this case, the licensee is invoking the right to sell the book in India, and is not passing on that right. The right of a book buyer to re-sell comes from the statute— from the doctrine of first sale and not from a passing on of that right from the licensee.

The last pillar of the judge’s reasoning is that the sale—or even offer for sale, or taking of orders for sale—of a book online are all forms of putting into circulation or issuance of copies. Section 40 does not work two ways. It only deems a foreign work “Indian”, and does not deem a sale in a foreign land the same as sale in India. Thus, even if we are to accept the other two pillars of Justice Singh’s reasoning, it is unclear how an offer made online to sell a book is equated to actually placing a book in circulation in India. How can an India law prohibit circulation on the streets of Bogotá? This is only possible if a separate right of export is recognised. But Justice Singh is extremely clear that he is not creating such a distinct right.

A notice to the buyer that re-exports are prohibited cannot be held to constitute a valid contract because the Transfer of Property Act clearly makes such a prohibition invalid (sections 10 and 11) after all, it is a sale that takes place and not a license as does the Copyright Act (section 14).

Amendment to Section 2(m)

There has been much controversy lately with some publishers trying to stop the government from amending section 2(m) of the Indian Copyright Act, clarifying that a parallel import will not be seen as an “infringing copy”. Some lawyers for the publishing industry have made the claim that allowing for parallel importation would legally allow for the exports of low-priced edition and overturn the basis of the Wiley judgment. This is false.

The amendment itself merely adds the following proviso at the end of section 2(m) (which itself defines what an “infringing copy” means):

Provided that a copy of a work published in any country outside India with the permission of the author of the work and imported from that country shall not be deemed to be an infringing copy.

It seems that this is in fact a provision introduced solely to clarify that this (i.e., following international exhaustion) is the position that India holds, and not to change the statute itself. It is merely to clarify that the courts have misread the provisions of the law, or that they have indeed not read the provisions of the law (as in the Eurokids case).

This provision will have no effect whatsoever on the Wiley ruling. While the Wiley ruling deserves to fail on its own merits, the reasoning in that case does not depend on whether we follow international or national exhaustion. Indeed, in para 104, the judge states:

As per my opinion, as the express provision for international exhaustion is absent in our Indian law, it would be appropriate to confine the applicability of the same to regional exhaustion.

Be that as it may, in the present case, the circumstances do not even otherwise warrant this discussion as the rights if at all are exhausted are to the extent to which they are available with the licensees as the books are purchased from the exclusive licensees who have limited rights and not from the owner. In these circumstances, the question of exhaustion of rights of owner in the copyright does not arise at all.

Thus, the argument that following the principle of international exhaustion will upturn this judgment is faulty. Imports and exports are two distinct things. India’s following of the principle of “international exhaustion” means that the right to first sale is exhausted in India, when the work is legally published anywhere internationally (i.e., regardless of where that copyrighted work is legally published). The principle of international exhaustion does not not exhaust the right of first sale internationally—the word “international” is used to indicate where the publication has to take place for exhaustion to occur, and not where the exhaustion takes place. After all, Indian law on a matter cannot determine whether a book can or cannot be sold anywhere else in the world (which is precisely what it would do if it is to hold that rights are exhausted internationally by virtue of a book being printed in India).

Conclusion

I think the best way of concluding this are by quoting, in extenso, a passage from a book on the Indian intellectual property law by Prof. N.S. Gopalakrishnan & Dr. T.G. Agitha:

Under the Indian law there is no express provision recognising the right of importation. This would in fact enable parallel importation of works. “Parallel importation” means transportation of “legitimate” goods which are available at a cheaper rate in one country by independent buyers (e.g. book sellers), for sale in another country. This could act as an effective check on creating monopoly in the market. Hence, it is an important aspect to be borne in mind for a developing country like India. Since there is no international obligation against parallel importation, nothing prevented the court from taking the stand that unless there is an express provision conferring importation rights on the owner of copyright or prohibiting parallel importation, it need not be considered to be prohibited in India. It is pertinent to note that India supported the principle of international exhaustion and not the national exhaustion principle. [11]

However, it is submitted that the court (in Penguin v. India Book Distributors) failed to take note of these aspects while deciding this case.”[12]

One can only hope those words by these leading experts on IP law in India are paid heed to, and that the arguments otherwise will fail to convince both the government as well as future court decisions.

* Please do not cite this note in an academic paper. Feel free to cite elsewhere. This note is still very much a work in progress. However, given the urgency of this issue and the importance of ensuring debate on the legal ramifications of the proposed amendment to s.2(m), this note should prove useful.

Notes

[1]. Section 51(b)(iv) states: “Copyright in a work shall be deemed to be infringed (b) when any person (iv) imports into India, any infringing copies of the work.” A proviso to the section reads: “Provided that nothing in Sub-clause (iv) shall apply to the import of one copy of any work for the private and domestic use of the importer.”

[2]. Ed.: MANU/DE/0402/1984: AIR 1985 Delhi 29, 26 (1984) DLT 316”

[3]. 210 U.S. 339 (1908).

[4]. Arathi Ashok, Economic Rights of Authors under Copyright Law, 15 J. Intell. Prop. Rights 46 (2010) at 50.

[5]. MANU/MH/0938/2005.

[6]. MANU/DE/0406/2009.

[7]. MANU/DE/1142/2010: MIPR 2010 (2) 0247.

[8]. While the exact countries were different in the case of each of the plaintiffs, there were all restricted to sale in India and a few of its neighbouring countries.

[9]. 210 U.S. 339 (1908).

[10]. All signatories of the TRIPS Agreement have to ensure a right of rental, over and above a right of first sale, for all video (or what are known as cinematograph films in the Indian law).

[11]. R.V. Vaidyanatha Ayyar, The Process and Politics of a Diplomatic Conference on Copyright (1998) 1 JWIP 3 at 17, cited in N.S. Gopalakrishnan and T.G. Agitha, Principles of Intellectual Property 256 (2009).

[12]. N.S. Gopalakrishnan and T.G. Agitha, Principles of Intellectual Property 256 (2009).

Also see SSRN

Download the file here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/exhaustion

Engaging on the Digital Commons

pranesh — 2011-08-20T12:56:26Z

We at the Centre for Internet and Society are very glad to be able to participate in the 13th Biennial Conference of the International Association for the Study of the Commons (IASC). Our interest in the conference arises mainly from our work in the areas of intellectual property rights reform and promotion of different forms of ‘opennesses’ that have cropped up as a response to perceived problems with our present-day regime of intellectual property rights, including open content, open standards, free and open source software, open government data, open access to scholarly research and data, open access to law, etc., our emerging work on telecom policy with respect to open/shared spectrum, and the very important questions around Internet governance. The article by Sunil Abraham and Pranesh Prakash was published in the journal Common Voices, Issue 4.

Our work on intellectual property reform are proactive measures at effecting policy change that go towards protecting and preserving an intellectual, intangible commons. We have opposed the Protection and Utilization of the Public-funded Intellectual Property Bill (an Indian version of the American Bayh-Dole Act) which sought to privatise the fruits of publicfunded research by mandating patents on them. We are working towards reform of copyright law which we believe is lopsided in its lack of concern for consumers and that its current march towards greater enclosure of the public domain is unsustainable. Believing that not all areas of industry and technology are equal, and that patent protection is ill-suited for the software industry, we have worked to ensure that the current prohibitions against patenting of software are effectively followed.

Defensively—that is working within the existing framework of intellectual property law—we seek to promote the various forms of copyright and patent licensing that have arisen as reactions to restrictive IP laws. Free/open source software and open content have arisen as a reaction to the restrictive nature of copyright law, such as the presumption under copyright law that a work is copyrighted by the mere fact of it coming into existence. (for instance, this was not so in the United States until 1989, till when a copyright notice was required to assert copyright). While earlier the presumption was that a work was to belong to the public domain, after the Berne Convention, that presumption was reversed. This led to the creation of the idea of special licences, by using which one could allow all others to share his/her work and reuse it. This innovation in using the law to promote, rather than restrict, what others could do with one’s works has enabled the creation and sharing of everything from Wikipedia, to Linux (which powers more than 85 percent of the world’s top 500 supercomputers) and Apache HTTP server (more than 60 percent of all websites). The advent of the Internet has allowed the creation of intangible digital commons.

We are also starting to engage with the question of telecom policy around spectrum allocation, and believe that promotion of a shared spectrum would help make telecom services, including broadband Internet, available to people at reasonable prices. We also believe that Internet governance should not be the prerogative of governments, and should not happen in a top-down fashion.

Comparisons between tangible commons and intangible commons have been made by people like Elinor and Vincent Ostrom, who in 1977 contributed to our understanding of subtractability and public goods. James Boyle has written about the expansion of copyright law as “the second enclosure movement”, following in the footsteps of the first enclosure movement against the take-over of common land which stretched from the fifteenth century till the nineteenth. Yochai Benkler, has written extensively on commons in information and communication systems as well as on spectrum commons. Just as Elinor Ostrom’s work shows how Garrett Hardin’s evocative ‘tragedy of the commons’ and the problems of free-riding are very often avoided in practice, Michael Heller’s equally evocative phrase ‘gridlock economy’ shows that ‘over-propertisation’ of knowledge can lead to a ‘tragedy of the anti-commons’.

Through this conference we wish to learn of the lessons that academic writings on tangible commons have to impart to intangible commons which are configured very differently (in terms of subtractability, for instance). Ostrom’s work shows how individuals can, in a variety of settings, work to find institutional solutions that promote social cooperation and human betterment. As part of her nine design principles of stable local common pool resource management, she lists clearly defined boundaries for effective exclusion of external unentitled parties. How does that work, when even the existing mechanisms of boundary-definition in intellectual property, such as patent claims, are often decried as being ambiguous thanks to the legalese they are written in? What of traditional knowledge for which defining the community holding ownership rights becomes very difficult? As Ostrom and Hess note, “the rules and flow patterns are different with digital information”, but how do these differences affect the lessons learned from CPR studies? How do Ostrom’s pronouncements against uniform top-down approaches to resource management affect the way that copyright and patents seek to establish a uniform system across multiple areas of art, science and industry (musical recordings and paintings, pharmaceuticals and software)? And how can Ostrom’s work on management of natural resources inform us about the management of resources such as spectrum or the Internet itself? These are all very interesting and important questions that need to be explored, and we are glad that this conference will help us understand these issues better.

Please read the article in Common Voices Issue 4 here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/blog-old/digital-commons

CIS Para-wise Comments on Intermediary Due Diligence Rules, 2011

pranesh — 2012-07-11T10:27:26Z

On February 7th 2011, the Department of Information Technology, MCIT published draft rules on its website (The Information Technology (Due diligence observed by intermediaries guidelines) Rules, 2011) in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 87(2)(zg), read with Section 79(2) of the Information Technology Act, 2000. Comments were invited from the public before February 25th 2011. Accordingly, Privacy India and Centre for Internet and Society, Bangalore have prepared the following para-wise comments for the Ministry’s consideration.

A. General Objections

A number of the provisions under these Rules have no nexus with their parent provision, namely s.79(2). Section 79(1) provides for exemption from liability for intermediaries. Section 79(2) thereupon states:

79. Intermediaries not to be liable in certain cases—

(2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply if—

(a) the function of the intermediary is limited to providing access to a communication system over which information made available by third parties is transmitted or temporarily stored or hasted; or

(b) the intermediary does not—

(i) initiate the transmission,

(ii) select the receiver of the transmission, and

(iii) select or modify the information contained in the transmission;

(c) the intermediary observes due diligence while discharging his duties under this Act and also observes such other guidelines as the Central Government may prescribe in this behalf.

Therefore, by not observing any of the provisions of the Rules, the intermediary opens itself up for liability for actions of its users. However, many of the provisions of the Rules have no rational nexus with due diligence to be observed by the intermediary to absolve itself from liability.

B. Specific Objections

Rule 2(b), (c), and (k)

(b) “Blog” means a type of website, usually maintained by an individual with regular entries of commentary, descriptions of events, or other material such as graphics or video. Usually blog is a shared on-line journal where users can post diary entries about their personal experiences and hobbies;

(c) “Blogger” means a person who keeps and updates a blog;

(k) “User” means any person including blogger who uses any computer resource for the purpose of sharing information, views or otherwise and includes other persons jointly participating in using the computer resource of intermediary

Comments

It is unclear why it is necessary to specifically target bloggers as users, leaving out other users such as blog commenters, social network users, microbloggers, podcasters, etc. It makes the rules technologically non-neutral.

Recommendation

We recommend that these 3 sub-rules be deleted.

Rule 3(2)

3. Due Diligence observed by intermediary.— The intermediary shall observe following due diligence while discharging its duties.

(2) The intermediary shall notify users of computer resource not to use, display, upload, modify, publish, transmit, update, share or store any information that : —

(a) belongs to another person;

(b) is harmful, threatening, abusive, harassing, blasphemous, objectionable, defamatory, vulgar, obscene, pornographic, paedophilic, libellous, invasive of another’s privacy, hateful, or racially, ethnically or otherwise objectionable, disparaging, relating or encouraging money laundering or gambling, or otherwise unlawful in any manner whatever;

(c) harm minors in any way;

(d) infringes any patent, trademark, copyright or other proprietary rights;

(e) violates any law for the time being in force;

(f) discloses sensitive personal information of other person or to which the user does not have any right to;

(g) causes annoyance or inconvenience or deceives or misleads the addressee about the origin of such messages or communicates any information which is grossly offensive or menacing in nature;

(h) impersonate another person;

(i) contains software viruses or any other computer code, files or programs designed to interrupt, destroy or limit the functionality of any computer resource;

(j) threatens the unity, integrity, defence, security or sovereignty of India, friendly relations with foreign states, or or public order or causes incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence or prevents investigation of any offence or is insulting any other nation.

Comments

Firstly, such ‘standard’ terms of use [1] might make sense for one intermediary, but not for all. For instance, an intermediary such as site with user-generated content (e.g., Wikipedia) would need different terms of use from an intermediary such as an e-mail provider (e.g., Hotmail), because the kind of liability they accrue are different. This is similar to how the liability that a newspaper publisher accrues is different from that accrued by the post office. However, forcing standard terms of use negates this difference. Thus, these are impractical.

Secondly, read with the legal obligation of the intermediary to remove such information (contained in rule 3(3)), they vest an extraordinary power of censorship in the hands of the intermediary, which could easily lead to the stifling of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech online. Analogous restrictions do not exist in other fields, e.g., against the press in India or against courier companies, and there is no justification to impose them on content posted online. Taken together, these provisions make it impossible to publish critical views about anything without the risk of being summarily censored.

Thirdly, while it is possible to apply Indian law to intermediaries, it is impracticable to require all intermediaries (whether in India or not) to have in their terms of use India-specific clauses such as rule 3(2)(j). Instead, it is better to merely require them to ask their users to follow all relevant laws.

Individual instances of how these rules are overly broad are contained in an appendix to this submission.

Recommendation

We strongly recommend the deletion of this sub-rule, except clause (e).

Rule 3(3)

(3) The intermediary shall not itself host or publish or edit or store any information or shall not initiate the transmission, select the receiver of transmission, and select or modify the information contained in the transmission as specified in sub-rule (2).

Comments

This sub-rule is ultra vires s.79 of the IT Act, which does not require intermediaries not to “host or publish or edit or store any information”. If fact, s.79(2) merely states that by violating the provisions of s.79(2), the intermediary loses the protection of s.79(1). It does not however make it unlawful to violate s.79(2), as rule 3(3) does. This makes rule 3(3) ultra vires the Act.

Recommendation

This sub-rule should be deleted.

Rule 3(4)

(4) The intermediary upon obtaining actual knowledge by itself or been brought to actual knowledge by an authority mandated under the law for the time being in force in writing or through email signed with electronic signature about any such information as mentioned in sub-rule (2) above, shall act expeditiously to work with user or owner of such information to remove access to such information that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity. Further the intermediary shall inform the police about such information and preserve the records for 90 days

Comments

This rule is also ultra vires s.69A of the IT Act as well as the Constitution of India. Section 69A states all the grounds on which an intermediary may be required to restrict access to information [2]. It does not allow for expansion of those grounds, because it has been carefully worded to maintains its constitutional validity vis-a-vis Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(2) of the Constitution of India. The rules framed under s.69A prescribe an elaborate procedure before such censorship may be ordered. The rules under s.69A will be rendered nugatory if any person could get content removed or blocked under s.79(2).

This rule requires an intermediary to immediately take steps to remove access to information merely upon receiving a written request from “any authority mandated under the law”. Thus, for example, any authority can easily immunize itself from criticism on the internet by simply sending a written notice to the intermediary concerned. This is directly contrary to, and completely subverts the legislative intent expressed in Section 69B which lays down an elaborate procedure to be followed before any information can be lawfully blocked.

If any person is aggrieved by information posted online, they may seek their remedies—including the relief of injunction—from courts of law, under generally applicable civil and criminal law. Inserting a rule such as this one would take away the powers of the judiciary in India to define the line dividing permissible and impermissible speech, and vest it instead in the whims of each intermediary. This can only have a chilling effect on debates in the public domain (of which the Internet is a part) which is the foundation of any democracy.

Recommendation

This rule should modified so that an intermediary is obliged to take steps towards removal of content only when (a) backed by an order from a court or (b) a direction issued following the procedure prescribed by the rules framed under Section 69A.

Rule 3(5) & (7) & (8) & (10)

(5) The Intermediary shall inform its users that in case of non-compliance with terms of use of the services and privacy policy provided by the Intermediary, the Intermediary has the right to immediately terminate the access rights of the users to the site of Intermediary;

(7) The intermediary shall not disclose sensitive personal information;

(8) Disclosure of information by intermediary to any third party shall require prior permission or consent from the provider of such information, who has provided such information under lawful contract or otherwise;

(10) The information collected by the intermediary shall be used for the purpose for which it has been collected.

Comments

These sub-rules have no nexus with intermediary liability or non-liability under s.79(2). For instance, it is unreasonable to say that an intermediary may be held liable for the actions of its users if it does not inform its users about its right to terminate access by the user to its services. Furthermore, not all intermediaries need be websites, as sub-rule 5 assumes. An intermediary can even be an “internet service provider” or a “cyber cafe” or a “telecom service provider”, as per rule 2(j) read with s.2(1)(w) of the IT Act.

The requirements under sub-rules (7), (8), and (10) are rightfully the domain of s.43A and the rules made thereunder, and not s.79(2) nor these rules.

Recommendation

These sub-rules should be deleted, and sub-rules (7), (8), and (10) may placed instead in the rules made under s.43A.

Rule 3(9)

(9) Intermediary shall provide information to government agencies who are lawfully authorised for investigative, protective, cyber security or intelligence activity. The information shall be provided for the purpose of verification of identity, or for prevention, detection, investigation, prosecution, cyber security incidents and punishment of offences under any law for the time being in force, on a written request stating clearly the purpose of seeking such information.

Comments

This provision is ultra vires ss.69 and 69B. Rules have already been issued under ss.69 and 69B which stipulate the mechanism and procedure to be followed by the government for interception, monitoring or decrypting information in the hands of intermediaries. Thus under the Interception Rules 2009 framed under Section 69, permission must first be obtained from a “competent authority” before an intermediary can be directed to provide access to its records and facilities. The current rule completely removes the safeguards contained in s.69 and its rules, and would make intermediaries answerable to virtually any request from any government agency. This is contrary to the legislative intent expressed in Section 69.

Recommendation

We recommend this sub-rule be deleted.

Rule 3(12)

(12) The intermediary shall report cyber security incidents and also share cyber security incidents related information with the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team.

Comments

The rules relating to how and when the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team may request for information from intermediaries is rightfully the subject matter of s.70B(5) [3] and the rules made thereunder by virtue of the rule making power granted by s.87(2)(yd). The subject matter of rule 3(12) is not liability of intermediaries for third-party actions, hence there is no nexus between the rule-making power, and the rule.

Recommendations

We recommend that this sub-rule be deleted.

Rule 3(14)

(14) The intermediary shall publish on its website the designated agent to receive notification of claimed infringements.

Comments

It is unclear what “infringements” are being referred to in this sub-rule. Neither s.79 nor these rules provide for “infringements”. The same reasoning applied for rule 3(4) would also apply here. It would be better to require the intermediary to publish on its website a method of providing judicial notice.

Recommendations

Delete, and replace with a requirement for the intermediary to publish on its website a method of providing judicial notice.

Footnotes

For instance, the Section B(1) of the World of Warcraft Code of Conduct “When engaging in Chat, you may not: (i) Transmit or post any content or language which, in the sole and absolute discretion of Blizzard, is deemed to be offensive, including without limitation content or language that is unlawful, harmful, threatening, abusive, harassing, defamatory, vulgar, obscene, hateful, sexually explicit, or racially, ethnically or otherwise objectionable.
It is only “in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India. defence of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to above” that intermediaries may be issued directions to block access to information.
70B(5) sates that the The manner of performing functions and duties of the agency referred to in sub-section (1) shall be such as may be prescribed.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/intermediary-due-diligence

CIS Comments on the Interoperability Framework for e-Governance (Phase I)

pranesh — 2013-05-22T10:48:52Z

In November 2010, the Central Government released the Draft 0.6 of the Technical Standards for the Interoperability Framework for e-Governance (Phase I), requesting comments by January 27, 2011. Here are the comments that CIS submitted.

General Review Comments

The present document is an excellent step in the right direction, following very ably the policy guidelines laid down in the National Policy on Open Standards for e-Governance.
The Expert Committee and other contributors have made excellent choices as to the 19 standards that have been laid down in the IFEG. It is praiseworthy that of these 18 are designated as mandatory, and only two are designated as interim standards. Furthermore, the system has been very transparent with the selection of standards, providing concise descriptions for each.
It is also important to note that while accessibility has been mentioned while talking of HTML, accessibility standards should preferably also be specifically mentioned in the presentation and archival domain.
However, many other governmental interoperability frameworks are going beyond merely listing technical standards. Some governments, such as Germany and the EU, go beyond technical interoperability, and also have documents dealing with organizational, informational, and legal interoperability. These are equally important components of an interoperability framework. Other governments also also lay down best practice guides, and other aids to implementation, sometimes even including application recommendations. Further, there are many which lay out standards for the the semantic layer, business services layer, etc.
We at the Centre for Internet and Society are currently advising the government of Iraq on development of their e-Governance Interoperability Framework, and would be glad to extend any support that the Department of IT may require of us, including comments on all further phases.

Specific Section-wise Review Comments

Section 5.2.7 - In the “additional remarks” row, it is stated that “If Adobe Systems Incorporated’s intent to make it royalty free is achieved then no further reviews will be necessary.”

This should be changed to indicate that (a) there might be entities other than Adobe that hold necessary patents over PDF v1.7, and (b) that a desirable feature—of there being multiple implementations of the standard—might not be fulfilled by PDF v1.7.

Adobe has in fact published a public patent licence that covers PDF v1.7 (ISO 32000-1:2008), and makes all of Adobe’s essential claims over PDF v1.7 available royalty-free.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/blog-old/comments-ifeg-phase-1

Thomas Abraham's Rebuttal on Parallel Importation

pranesh — 2011-08-04T04:47:12Z

We engaged in an e-mail conversation with Thomas Abraham, the managing director of Hachette India, on the issue of parallel importation of books into India. We thought it would be in the public interest to publish a substantive part of that conversation. In this post he points at great length how our arguments are faulty. While we still believe that he doesn't succeed, we hope this will clarify matters a bit.

Nature of disagreement

There is essentially fundamental disagreement on principle and definition-and I guess there will always be if you knock actual knowledge and see things as abstract philosophical (and legal) points. Why I think detailed knowledge is necessary is precisely illustrated at the logic (or lack thereof actually) employed by the Ministry. And then there is to me the fundamental problem of disregarding the author's wishes (for no greater good).

Second hand books and libraries

The comparison is not the same. Both (second-hand and libraries) have had a first sale where the copyright holder has got his/her basic right-the designated royalty. (I have explained earlier how export royalties and remainder royalties are much lower and results in losses to the author.) So here we come back to the basic philosophy-who has greater right on deciding on creative works? The creator or the government? A just answer would be the creator provided commercial dissemination fulfilled society's needs-which in India's case would be availability and right pricing keeping in mind socio-economic needs. Both are happening through local publishing and pricing of imports. But parallel imports would take away that right an author has of deriving a rightful income as per existing norms in all mature markets (including India so far). We are heading towards being a mature market and this has come about only because we are in the self-perpetuating framework of publishing, writing, and cultural development.

So the argument is that second hand books and libraries foster reading without depriving the author of rightful royalty or ruining the market.

Parallel importation does both. There is every reason to know that this will happen-that's exactly the substantiation we are offering. And the advocates of parallel importation have none to offer-pricing (where is it high, and by how much should it come down?), what is not freely available and at special prices? So for what reason do we want the existing law-also made by lawmakers-to change the stated remit of exhaustion from national to international.

No book publisher objects to libraries or even second hand books. But they are objecting to parallel importation. So leave it to them to decide. It is a tad patronizing to tell us what will help us, without having a shred of actual knowledge.

Helping libraries and disabled

This is completely false. No library needs to import from Amazon. And if it is a public library then they are wasting taxpayer money. Almost any book in the world they will still get at a special price through Indian publishers or distributors. There are societies for the disabled to whom publishers give rights at almost no cost. The UK has a law that a copy must be made available at near cost for disabled. By all means have such a law here. Why try and use parallel importation as an excuse for this?

Flexibility in the law

To your point: "Even if prices don't fall, it is good to have the flexibility for libraries to import four copies of a book that students need and isn't being made available in India. That flexibility is crucial, for availability, and just on principle, and not just for the sake of prices". By all means pass the law that gives the libraries the right to import 5 copies of any book they want. Publishers won't gripe at that. Libraries would still get it cheaper here than Amazon but that's the libraries' call.

Law should promote fairness and equity, not perpetuate a particular business model

No disagreement here. But the contention is that it will result in exactly the opposite. Sure, so let the lawmakers demonstrate they have done due diligence and outline evidence for their assumptions and how it will promote fairness and equity. What is unfair right now and what is not equitable? And how this law will address that. Why do other markets have it, and why should we not? On no count is there any detailing-just three false assumptions-availability, pricing and current editions.

Equally one can't have the law being made the proverbial ass because the lawmakers won't do their homework.

Export and remainder royalties are lower

I explained export vs domestic royalties in my first rebuttal. Not just remainders. Remainders are near zero royalties. Export surplus even pre-remainders are low royalty-against the author's wishes. And parallel importation will result in further loss of royalties from loss of sales of the hitherto legitimate edition.

Why anti-dumping laws will not be practical

Firstly there will be 40,000-plus titles to track, and the damage would have been done by the time you invoke the law. And assuming we want to invoke anti-dumping law, what parameters will be fixed? what discount are you going to fix? What quantity? I'll explain why this will never work. There are no real averages to draw lines and say this much and no more for either discount or price or quantity. To understand why we need to understand cost to price structures. Indian publishing (both publishing and imports) is low margin. Our books are priced to market; that means from cost our mark up is 2.5 times for imports and about 3-4 on average for local publishing-to enable the prices you see. Abroad it is 8-10 times from cost. To enable low pricing in India, we already have overseas terms that exceed 70% discounts, going into 'net pricing' for the ones that we pick to push big. Once the market is opened up, you will have two things-(a) targeted remainders as against the minor trickle now and (b) surplus clearance or even targeted sale to undercut the existing lawful edition. And I repeat the point that these remainders and 'targeted exports' can still end up undercutting the local edition. Not significantly enough to cause a change in pricing pattern (no benefit to consumer), but enough to undermine existing industry structures.

And yes, parallel importation (the current trickle) does see enforcement the logical way (by which I mean that the intensity of the problem merits the level of redressal). So far (believe me, each of us keeps tabs) we have 'unaware imports' and 'deliberate imports'. It is an irritant but is gradually reducing as the market matures. And the unaware ones are easily remedied by a simple letter asking for infringing stock to be withdrawn. In fact 8 out of 10 cases this simple letter works. For the deliberate ones, as I said earlier, it's just one or two where the impact is not worth the cost. Our margins do not allow us to hire expensive lawyers. But the moment it touches key brands or high revenue, legal action is taken.

Market expansion

Again the inherent assumption that this is some 'fat cat' lobbying protest. For once the lawmakers need to apply themselves-why is everybody from Penguin & Hachette (biggest) to Zubaan and Yatra (amongst smallest) all opposing it? Similarly from Crossword (large chain) to 'The Bookshop' in Jor Bagh (small independent), nobody wants this. Why? Surely that must speak for something? The only ones it will benefit are the remainder stalls you see (of which there must be about 25-30 all over the country). But over time every bookshop will be forced to keep this kind of stocking eroding current shelf space (they will have no choice). This is not market expansion.

Pricing drop

The other thing being ignored is that it's not just short term spoiler pricing. When one thinks in purely theoretical terms and says "open up, prices will drop", one is also not factoring in that the composition of what is stocked will changed. It's no longer status quo at reduced prices. That's the key to a mature market, that what the market needs is available-from bestsellers to literary works to philosophical works-balancing commercial and cultural needs and at prices the market can afford. So sure we can sit back and say we don't care if the history and philosophy shelves are eroded, if local publishing shrinks, let market forces prevail and let there be just foreign mass market novels and old editions (which will flow in by the thousand). But I'd like to hear the government say that.

Not just about copyrighted books but about all copyrighted materials

Yes, and we're not commenting about the others (other materials, i.e.) because we do not know enough. But we cannot have one size fits all if there are legitimate grounds to think about otherwise. Why is there a redressal of authors' needs in the music and film industry and a total disregard of books? Why were there panels created to discuss and thresh the whole thing through for films, and no detailed consultation at all for the books industry?

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/parallel-importation-rebuttal