Centre for Internet and Society

CIS Submission to TRAI Consultation on Free Data

pranesh — 2016-07-01T16:04:27Z

The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) held a consultation on Free Data, for which CIS sent in the following comments.

The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) asked for public comments on free data. Below are the comments that CIS submitted to the four questions that it posed.

Question 1
Is there a need to have TSP agnostic platform to provide free data or suitable reimbursement to users, without violating the principles of Differential Pricing for Data laid down in TRAI Regulation? Please suggest the most suitable model to achieve the objective.

Is There a Need for Free Data?

No, there is no need for free data, just as there is no need for telephony or Internet. However, making provisions for free data would increase the amount of innovation in the Internet and telecom sector, and there is a good probability that it would lead to faster adoption of the Internet, and thus be beneficial in terms of commerce, freedom of expression, freedom of association, and many other ways.

Thus the question that a telecom regulator should ask is not whether there is a need for TSP agnostic platforms, but whether such platforms are harmful for competition, for consumers, and for innovation. The telecom regulator ought not undertake regulation unless there is evidence to show that harm has been caused or that harm is likely to be caused. In short, TRAI should not follow the precautionary principle, since the telecom and Internet sectors are greatly divergent from environmental protection: the burden of proof for showing that something ought to be prohibited ought to be on those calling for prohibition.

Goal: Regulating Gatekeeping

TRAI wouldn’t need to regulate price discrimination or Net neutrality if ISPs were not “gatekeepers” for last-mile access. “Gatekeeping” occurs when a single entity establishes itself as an exclusive route to reach a large number of people and businesses or, in network terms, nodes. It is not possible for Internet services to reach their end customers without passing through ISPs (generally telecom networks). The situation is very different in the middle-mile and for backhaul. Even though anti-competitive terms may exist in the middle-mile, especially given the opacity of terms in “transit agreements”, a packet is usually able to travel through multiple routes if one route is too expensive (even if that is not the shortest network path, and is thus inefficient in a way). However, this multiplicity of routes is generally not possible in the last mile.¹ This leaves last mile telecom operators (ISPs) in a position to unfairly discriminate between different Internet services or destinations or applications, while harming consumer choice.

However, the aim of regulation by TRAI cannot be to prevent gatekeeping, since that is not possible as long as there are a limited number of ISPs. For instance, even by the very act of charging money for access to the Internet, ISPs are guilty of “gatekeeping” since they are controlling who can and cannot access an Internet service that way. Instead, the aim of regulation by TRAI should be to “regulate gatekeepers to ensure they do not use their gatekeeping power to unjustly discriminate between similarly situated persons, content or traffic”, as we proposed in our submission to TRAI (on OTTs) last year.

Models for Free Data

There are multiple models possible for free data, none of which TRAI should prohibit unless it would enable OTTs to abuse their gatekeeping powers.

Government Incentives For Non-Differentiated Free Data

The government may opt to require all ISPs to provide free Internet to all at a minimum QoS in exchange for exemption from paying part of their USO contributions, or the government may pay ISPs for such access using their USO contributions.

TRAI should recommend to DoT that it set up a committee to study the feasibility of this model.

ISP subsidies

ISP subsidies of Internet access only make economic sense for the ISP under the following ‘Goldilocks’ condition is met: the experience with the subsidised service is ‘good enough’ for the consumers to want to continue to use such services, but ‘bad enough’ for a large number of them to want to move to unsubsidised, paid access.

Providing free Internet to all at a low speed.
1. This naturally discriminates against services and applications such as video streaming, but does not technically bar access to them.
Providing free access to the Internet with other restrictions on quality that aren’t discriminatory with respect to content, services, or applications.

Rewards model

A TSP-agnostic rewards platform will only come within the scope of TRAI regulation if the platform has some form of agreement with the TSPs, even if it is collectively. If the rewards platform doesn’t have any agreement with any TSP, then TRAI does not have the power to regulate it. However, if the rewards platform has an agreement with any TSP, it is unclear whether it would be allowed under the Differential Data Tariff Regulation, since the clause 3(2) read with paragraph 30 of the Explanatory Memorandum might disallow such an agreement.

Assuming for the sake of argument that platforms with such agreements are not disallowed, such platforms can engage in either post-purchase credits or pre-purchase credits, or both. In other words, it could be a situation where a person has to purchase a data pack, engage in some activity relating to the platform (answer surveys, use particular apps, etc.) and thereupon get credit of some form transferred to one’s SIM, or it could be a situation where even without purchasing a data pack, a consumer can earn credits and thereupon use those credits towards data.

The former kind of rewards platform is not as useful when it comes to encouraging people to use the Internet, since only those who already see worth in using in the Internet (and can afford it) will purchase a data pack in the first place. The second form, on the other hand is quite useful, and could be encouraged. However, this second model is not as easily workable, economically, for fixed line connections, since there is a higher initial investment involved.

Recharge API

A recharge API could be fashioned in one of two ways: (1) via the operating system on the phone, allowing a TSP or third parties (whether OTTs or other intermediaries) to transfer credit to the SIM card on the phone which have been bought wholesale. Another model could be that of all TSPs providing a recharge API for the use of third parties. Only the second model is likely to result in a “toll-free” experience since in the first model, like in the case of a rewards platform that requires up-front purchase of data packs, there has to be a investment made first before that amount is recouped. This is likely to hamper the utility of such a model.

Further, in the first case, TRAI would probably not have the powers to regulate such transactions, as there would be no need for any involvement by the TSP. If anti-competitive agreements or abuse of dominant position seems to be taking place, it would be up to the Competition Commission of India to investigate.

However, the second model would have to be overseen by TRAI to ensure that the recharge APIs don’t impose additional costs on OTTs, or unduly harm competition and innovation. For instance, there ought to be an open specification for such an API, which all the TSPs should use in order to reduce the costs on OTTs. Further, there should be no exclusivity, and no preferential treatment provided for the TSPs sister concerns or partners.

“0.example” sites

Other forms of free data, for instance by TSPs choosing not to charge for low-bandwidth traffic should be allowed, as long as it is not discriminatory, nor does it impose increased barriers to entry for OTTs. For instance, if a website self-certifies that it is low-bandwidth and optimized for Internet-enabled feature phones and uses 0.example.tld to signal this (just as wap.* were used in for WAP sites and m.* are used for mobile-optimized versions of many sites), then there is no reason why TSPs should be prohibited from not charging for the data consumed by such websites, as long as the TSP does so uniformly without discrimination. In such cases, the TSP is not harming competition, harming consumers, nor abusing its gatekeeping powers.

OTT-agnostic free data

If a TSP decides not to charge for specific forms of traffic (for example, video, or for locally-peered traffic) regardless of the Internet service from which that traffic emanates, as as long as it does so with the end customer’s consent, then there is no question of the TSP harming competition, harming consumers, nor abusing its gatekeeping powers. There is no reason such schemes should be prohibited by TRAI unless they distort markets and harm innovation.

Unified marketplace

One other way to do what is proposed as the “recharge API” model is to create a highly-regulated market where the gatekeeping powers of the ISP are diminished, and the ISP’s ability to leverage its exclusive access over its customers are curtailed. A comparison may be drawn here to the rules that are often set by standard-setting bodies where patents are involved: given that these patents are essential inputs, access to them must be allowed through fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory licences. Access to the Internet and common carriers like telecom networks, being even more important (since alternatives exist to particular standards, but not to the Internet itself), must be placed at an even higher pedestal and thus even stricter regulation to ensure fair competition.

A marketplace of this sort would impose some regulatory burdens on TRAI and place burdens on innovations by the ISPs, but a regulated marketplace harms ISP innovation less than not allowing a market at all.

At a minimum, such a marketplace must ensure non-exclusivity, non-discrimination, and transparency. Thus, at a minimum, a telecom provider cannot discriminate between any OTTs who want similar access to zero-rating. Further, a telecom provider cannot prevent any OTT from zero-rating with any other telecom provider. To ensure that telecom providers are actually following this stipulation, transparency is needed, as a minimum.

Transparency can take one of two forms: transparency to the regulator alone and transparency to the public. Transparency to the regulator alone would enable OTTs and ISPs to keep the terms of their commercial transactions secret from their competitors, but enable the regulator, upon request, to ensure that this doesn’t lead to anti-competitive practices. This model would increase the burden on the regulator, but would be more palatable to OTTs and ISPs, and more comparable to the wholesale data market where the terms of such agreements are strictly-guarded commercial secrets. On the other hand, requiring transparency to the public would reduce the burden on the regulator, despite coming at a cost of secrecy of commercial terms, and is far more preferable.

Beyond transparency, a regulation could take the form of insisting on standard rates and terms for all OTT players, with differential usage tiers if need be, to ensure that access is truly non-discriminatory. This is how the market is structured on the retail side.

Since there are transaction costs in individually approaching each telecom provider for such zero-rating, the market would greatly benefit from a single marketplace where OTTs can come and enter into agreements with multiple telecom providers.

Even in this model, telecom networks will be charging based not only on the fact of the number of customers they have, but on the basis of them having exclusive routing to those customers. Further, even under the standard-rates based single-market model, a particular zero-rated site may be accessible for free from one network, but not across all networks: unlike the situation with a toll-free number in which no such distinction exists.

To resolve this, the regulator may propose that if an OTT wishes to engage in paid zero-rating, it will need to do so across all networks, since if it doesn’t there is risk of providing an unfair advantage to one network over another and increasing the gatekeeper effect rather than decreasing it.

Question 2

Whether such platforms need to be regulated by the TRAI or market be allowed to develop these platforms?

In many cases, TRAI would have no powers over such platforms, so the question of TRAI regulating does not arise. In all other cases, TRAI can allow the market to develop such platforms, and then see if any of them violates the Discriminatory Data Tariffs Regualation. For government-incentivised schemes that are proposed above, TRAI should take proactive measure in getting their feasibility evaluated.

Question 3

Whether free data or suitable reimbursement to users should be limited to mobile data users only or could it be extended through technical means to subscribers of fixed line broadband or leased line?

Spectrum is naturally a scarce resource, though technological advances (as dictated by Cooper’s Law) and more efficient management of spectrum make it less so. However, we have seen that fixed-line broadband has more or less stagnated for the past many years, while mobile access has increased. So the market distortionary power of fixed-line providers is far less than that of mobile providers. However, competition is far less in fixed-line Internet access services, while it is far higher in mobile Internet access. Switching costs in fixed-line Internet access services are also far higher than in mobile services. Given these differences, the regulation with regard to price discrimination might justifiably be different.

All in all, for this particular issue, it is unclear why different rules should apply to mobile users and fixed line users.

Question 4

Any other issue related to the matter of Consultation.

None.

In India’s mobile telecom sector, according to a Nielsen study, an estimated 15% of mobile users are multi-SIM users, meaning the “gatekeeping” effect is significantly reduced in both directions: Internet services can reach them via multiple ISPs, and conversely they can reach Internet services via multiple ISPs. See Nielsen, ‘Telecom Transitions: Tracking the Multi-SIM Phenomena in India’, http://www.nielsen.com/in/en/insights/reports/2015/telecom-transitions-tracking-the-multi-sim-phenomena-in-india.html↩

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-submission-trai-consultation-free-data

Jurisdiction: The Taboo Topic at ICANN

pranesh — 2016-06-29T07:51:05Z

The "IANA Transition" that is currently underway is a sham since it doesn't address the most important question: that of jurisdiction. This article explores why the issue of jurisdiction is the most important question, and why it remains unaddressed.

In March 2014, the US government announced that they were going to end the contract they have with ICANN to run the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), and hand over control to the “global multistakeholder community”. They insisted that the plan for transition had to come through a multistakeholder process and have stakeholders “across the global Internet community”.

Why is the U.S. government removing the NTIA contract?

The main reason for the U.S. government's action is that it will get rid of a political thorn in the U.S. government's side: keeping the contract allows them to be called out as having a special role in Internet governance (with the Affirmation of Commitments between the U.S. Department of Commerce and ICANN, the IANA contract, and the cooperative agreement with Verisign), and engaging in unilateralism with regard to the operation of the root servers of the Internet naming system, while repeatedly declaring that they support a multistakeholder model of Internet governance.

This contradiction is what they are hoping to address. Doing away with the NTIA contract will also increase — ever so marginally — ICANN’s global legitimacy: this is something that world governments, civil society organizations, and some American academics have been asking for nearly since ICANN’s inception in 1998. For instance, here are some demands made in a declaration by the Civil Society Internet Governance Caucus at WSIS, in 2005:

“ICANN will negotiate an appropriate host country agreement to replace its California Incorporation, being careful to retain those aspects of its California Incorporation that enhance its accountability to the global Internet user community. "ICANN's decisions, and any host country agreement, must be required to comply with public policy requirements negotiated through international treaties in regard to, inter alia, human rights treaties, privacy rights, gender agreements and trade rules. … "It is also expected that the multi-stakeholder community will observe and comment on the progress made in this process through the proposed [Internet Governance] Forum."

In short: the objective of the transition is political, not technical. In an ideal world, we should aim at reducing U.S. state control over the core of the Internet's domain name system.¹

It is our contention that U.S. state control over the core of the Internet's domain name system is not being removed by the transition that is currently underway.

Why is the Transition Happening Now?

Despite the U.S. government having given commitments in the past that were going to finish the IANA transition by "September 30, 2000", (the White Paper on Management of Internet Names and Addresses states: "The U.S. Government would prefer that this transition be complete before the year 2000. To the extent that the new corporation is established and operationally stable, September 30, 2000 is intended to be, and remains, an 'outside' date.") and later by "fall of 2006",² those turned out to be empty promises. However, this time, the transition seems to be going through, unless the U.S. Congress manages to halt it.

However, in order to answer the question of "why now?" fully, one has to look a bit at the past.

In 1998, through the White Paper on Management of Internet Names and Addresses the U.S. government asserted it’s control over the root, and asserted — some would say arrogated to itself — the power to put out contracts for both the IANA functions as well as the 'A' Root (i.e., the Root Zone Maintainer function that Network Solutions Inc. then performed, and continues to perform to date in its current avatar as Verisign). The IANA functions contract — a periodically renewable contract — was awarded to ICANN, a California-based non-profit corporation that was set up exclusively for this purpose, but which evolved around the existing IANA (to placate the Internet Society).

Meanwhile, of course, there were criticisms of ICANN from multiple foreign governments and civil society organizations. Further, despite it being a California-based non-profit on contract with the government, domestically within the U.S., there was pushback from constituencies that felt that more direct U.S. control of the DNS was important.

As Goldsmith and Wu summarize:

"Milton Mueller and others have shown that ICANN’s spirit of “self-regulation” was an appealing label for a process that could be more accurately described as the U.S. government brokering a behind-the-scenes deal that best suited its policy preferences ... the United States wanted to ensure the stability of the Internet, to fend off the regulatory efforts of foreign governments and international organizations, and to maintain ultimate control. The easiest way to do that was to maintain formal control while turning over day-to-day control of the root to ICANN and the Internet Society, which had close ties to the regulation-shy American technology industry." [footnotes omitted]

And that brings us to the first reason that the NTIA announced the transition in 2014, rather than earlier.

ICANN Adjudged Mature Enough

The NTIA now sees ICANN as being mature enough: the final transition was announced 16 years after ICANN's creation, and complaints about ICANN and its legitimacy had largely died down in the international arena in that while. Nowadays, governments across the world send their representatives to ICANN, thus legitimizing ICANN. States have largely been satisfied by participating in the Government Advisory Council, which, as its name suggests, only has advisory powers. Further, unlike in the early days, there is no serious push for states assuming control of ICANN. Of course they grumble about the ICANN Board not following their advice, but no government, as far as I am aware, has walked out or refused to participate.

L'affaire Snowden

Many within the United States, and some without, believe that the United States not only plays an exceptional role to play in the running of the Internet — by dint of historical development and dominance of American companies — but that it ought to have an exceptional role because it is the best country to exercise 'oversight' over 'the Internet' (often coming from clueless commentators), and from dinosaurs of the Internet era, like American IP lawyers and American 'homeland' security hawks, Jones Day, who are ICANN's lawyers, and other jingoists and those policymakers who are controlled by these narrow-minded interests.

The Snowden revelations were, in that way, a godsend for the NTIA, as it allowed them a fig-leaf of international criticism with which to counter these domestic critics and carry on with a transition that they have been seeking to put into motion for a while. The Snowden revelations led Dilma Rousseff, President of Brazil, to state in September 2013, at the 68th U.N. General Assembly, that Brazil would "present proposals for the establishment of a civilian multilateral framework for the governance and use of the Internet", and as Diego Canabarro points out this catalysed the U.S. government and the technical community into taking action.

Given this context, a few months after the Snowden revelations, the so-called I* organizations met — seemingly with the blessing of the U.S. government³ — in Montevideo, and put out a 'Statement on the Future of Internet Governance' that sought to link the Snowden revelations on pervasive surveillance with the need to urgently transition the IANA stewardship role away from the U.S. government. Of course, the signatories to that statement knew fully well, as did most of the readers of that statement, that there is no linkage between the Snowden revelations about pervasive surveillance and the operations of the DNS root, but still they, and others, linked them together. Specifically, the I* organizations called for "accelerating the globalization of ICANN and IANA functions, towards an environment in which all stakeholders, including all governments, participate on an equal footing."

One could posit the existence of two other contributing factors as well.

Given political realities in the United States, a transition of this sort is probably best done before an ultra-jingoistic President steps into office.

Lastly, the ten-yearly review of the World Summit on Information Society was currently underway. At the original WSIS (as seen from the civil society quoted above) the issue of US control over the root was a major issue of contention. At that point (and during where the 2006 date for globalization of ICANN was emphasized by the US government).

Why Jurisdiction is Important

Jurisdiction has a great many aspects. Inter alia, these are:

Legal sanctions applicable to changes in the root zone (for instance, what happens if a country under US sanctions requests a change to the root zone file?)
Law applicable to resolution of contractual disputes with registries, registrars, etc.
Law applicable to labour disputes.
Law applicable to competition / antitrust law that applies to ICANN policies and regulations.
Law applicable to disputes regarding ICANN decisions, such as allocation of gTLDs, or non-renewal of a contract.
Law applicable to consumer protection concerns.
Law applicable to financial transparency of the organization.
Law applicable to corporate condition of the organization, including membership rights.
Law applicable to data protection-related policies & regulations.
Law applicable to trademark and other speech-related policies & regulations.
Law applicable to legal sanctions imposed by a country against another.

Some of these, but not all, depend on where bodies like ICANN [the policy-making body], the IANA functions operator [the proposed "Post-Transition IANA"], and the root zone maintainer are incorporated or maintain their primary office, while others depend on the location of the office [for instance, Turkish labour law applies for the ICANN office in Istanbul], while yet others depend on what's decided by ICANN in contracts (for instance, the resolution of contractual disputes with ICANN, filing of suits with regard to disputes over new generic TLDs, etc.).

However, an issue like sanctions, for instance, depends on where ICANN/PTI/RMZ are incorporated and maintain their primary office.

As Milton Mueller notes, the current IANA contract "requires ICANN to be incorporated in, maintain a physical address in, and perform the IANA functions in the U.S. This makes IANA subject to U.S. law and provides America with greater political influence over ICANN."

He further notes that:

While it is common to assert that the U.S. has never abused its authority and has always taken the role of a neutral steward, this is not quite true. During the controversy over the .xxx domain, the Bush administration caved in to domestic political pressure and threatened to block entry of the domain into the root if ICANN approved it (Declaration of the Independent Review Panel, 2010). It took five years, an independent review challenge and the threat of litigation from a businessman willing to spend millions to get the .xxx domain into the root.

Thus it is clear that even if the NTIA's role in the IANA contract goes away, jurisdiction remains an important issue.

U.S. Doublespeak on Jurisdiction

In March 2014, when NTIA finally announced that they would hand over the reins to “the global multistakeholder community”. They’ve laid down two procedural condition: that it be developed by stakeholders across the global Internet community and have broad community consensus, and they have proposed 5 substantive conditions that any proposal must meet:

Support and enhance the multistakeholder model;
Maintain the security, stability, and resiliency of the Internet DNS;
Meet the needs and expectation of the global customers and partners of the IANA services; and,
Maintain the openness of the Internet.
Must not replace the NTIA role with a solution that is government-led or an inter-governmental organization.

In that announcement there is no explicit restriction on the jurisdiction of ICANN (whether it relate to its incorporation, the resolution of contractual disputes, resolution of labour disputes, antitrust/competition law, tort law, consumer protection law, privacy law, or speech law, and more, all of which impact ICANN and many, but not all, of which are predicated on the jurisdiction of ICANN’s incorporation), the jurisdiction(s) of the IANA Functions Operator(s) (i.e., which executive, court, or legislature’s orders would it need to obey), and the jurisdiction of the Root Zone Maintainer (i.e., which executive, court, or legislature’s orders would it need to obey).

However, Mr. Larry Strickling, the head of the NTIA, in his testimony before the U.S. House Subcommittee on Communications and Technology, made it clear that,

“Frankly, if [shifting ICANN or IANA jurisdiction] were being proposed, I don't think that such a proposal would satisfy our criteria, specifically the one that requires that security and stability be maintained.”

Possibly, that argument made sense in 1998, due to the significant concentration of DNS expertise in the United States. However, in 2015, that argument is hardly convincing, and is frankly laughable.⁴

Targetting that remark, in ICANN 54 at Dublin, we asked Mr. Strickling:

"So as we understand it, the technical stability of the DNS doesn't necessarily depend on ICANN's jurisdiction being in the United States. So I wanted to ask would the US Congress support a multistakeholder and continuing in the event that it's shifting jurisdiction."

Mr. Strickling's response was:

"No. I think Congress has made it very clear and at every hearing they have extracted from Fadi a commitment that ICANN will remain incorporated in the United States. Now the jurisdictional question though, as I understand it having been raised from some other countries, is not so much jurisdiction in terms of where ICANN is located. It's much more jurisdiction over the resolution of disputes.

"And that I think is an open issue, and that's an appropriate one to be discussed. And it's one I think where ICANN has made some movement over time anyway.

"So I think you have to ... when people use the word jurisdiction, we need to be very precise about over what issues because where disputes are resolved and under what law they're resolved, those are separate questions from where the corporation may have a physical headquarters."

As we have shown above, jurisdiction is not only about the jurisdiction of "resolution of disputes", but also, as Mueller reminds us, about the requirement that ICANN (and now, the PTI) be "incorporated in, maintain a physical address in, and perform the IANA functions in the U.S. This makes IANA subject to U.S. law and provides America with greater political influence over ICANN."

In essence, the U.S. government has essentially said that they would veto the transition if the jurisdiction of ICANN or PTI's incorporation were to move out of the U.S., and they can prevent that from happening after the transition, since as things stand ICANN and PTI will still come within the U.S. Congress's jurisdiction.

Why Has the ICG Failed to Consider Jurisdiction?

Will the ICG proposal or the proposed new ICANN by-laws reduce existing U.S. control? No, they won't. (In fact, as we will argue below, the proposed new ICANN by-laws make this problem even worse.) The proposal by the names community ("the CWG proposal") still has a requirement (in Annex S) that the Post-Transition IANA (PTI) be incorporated in the United States, and a similar suggestion hidden away as a footnote. Further, the proposed by-laws for ICANN include the requirement that PTI be a California corporation. There was no discussion specifically on this issue, nor any documented community agreement on the specific issue of jurisdiction of PTI's incorporation.

Why wasn't there greater discussion and consideration of this issue? Because of two reasons: First, there were many that argued that the transition would be vetoed by the U.S. government and the U.S. Congress if ICANN and PTI were not to remain in the U.S. Secondly, the ICANN-formed ICG saw the US government’s actions very narrowly, as though the government were acting in isolation, ignoring the rich dialogue and debate that’s gone on earlier about the transition since the incorporation of ICANN itself.

While it would be no one’s case that political considerations should be given greater weightage than technical considerations such as security, stability, and resilience of the domain name system, it is shocking that political considerations have been completely absent in the discussions in the number and protocol parameters communities, and have been extremely limited in the discussions in the names community. This is even more shocking considering that the main reason for this transition is, as has been argued above, political.

It can be also argued that the certain IANA functions such as Root Zone Management function have a considerable political implication. It is imperative that the political nature of the function is duly acknowledged and dealt with, in accordance with the wishes of the global community. In the current process the political aspects of the IANA function has been completely overlooked and sidelined. It is important to note that this transition has not been a necessitated by any technical considerations. It is primarily motivated by political and legal considerations. However, the questions that the ICG asked the customer communities to consider were solely technical. Indeed, the communities could have chosen to overlook that, but they did not choose to do so. For instance, while the IANA customer community proposals reflected on existing jurisdictional arrangements, they did not reflect on how the jurisdictional arrangements should be post-transition , while this is one of the questions at the heart of the entire transition. There were no discussions and decisions as to the jurisdiction of the Post-Transition IANA: the Accountability CCWG's lawyers, Sidley Austin, recommended that the PTI ought to be a California non-profit corporation, and this finds mention in a footnote without even having been debated by the "global multistakeholder community", and subsequently in the proposed new by-laws for ICANN.

Why the By-Laws Make Things Worse & Why "Work Stream 2" Can't Address Most Jurisdiction Issues

The by-laws could have chosen to simply stayed silent on the matter of what law PTI would be incorporated under, but instead the by-law make the requirement of PTI being a California non-profit public benefit corporation part of the fundamental by-laws, which are close to impossible to amend.

While "Work Stream 2" (the post-transition work related to improving ICANN's accountability) has jurisdiction as a topic of consideration, the scope of that must necessarily discount any consideration of shifting the jurisdiction of incorporation of ICANN, since all of the work done as part of CCWG Accountability's "Work Stream 1", which are now reflected in the proposed new by-laws, assume Californian jurisdiction (including the legal model of the "Empowered Community"). Is ICANN prepared to re-do all the work done in WS1 in WS2 as well? If the answer is yes, then the issue of jurisdiction can actually be addressed in WS2. If the answer is no — and realistically it is — then, the issue of jurisdiction can only be very partially addressed in WS2.

Keeping this in mind, we recommended specific changes in the by-laws, all of which were rejected by CCWG's lawyers.

The Transition Plan Fails the NETmundial Statement

The NETmundial Multistakeholder Document, which was an outcome of the NETmundial process, states:

In the follow up to the recent and welcomed announcement of US Government with regard to its intent to transition the stewardship of IANA functions, the discussion about mechanisms for guaranteeing the transparency and accountability of those functions after the US Government role ends, has to take place through an open process with the participation of all stakeholders extending beyond the ICANN community

[...]

It is expected that the process of globalization of ICANN speeds up leading to a truly international and global organization serving the public interest with clearly implementable and verifiable accountability and transparency mechanisms that satisfy requirements from both internal stakeholders and the global community.

The active representation from all stakeholders in the ICANN structure from all regions is a key issue in the process of a successful globalization.

As our past analysis has shown, the IANA transition process and the discussions on the mailing lists that shaped it were neither global nor multistakeholder. The DNS industry represented in ICANN is largely US-based. 3 in 5 registrars are from the United States of America, whereas less than 1% of ICANN-registered registrars are from Africa. Two-thirds of the Business Constituency in ICANN is from the USA. While ICANN-the-corporation has sought to become more global, the ICANN community has remained insular, and this will not change until the commercial interests involved in ICANN can become more diverse, reflecting the diversity of users of the Internet, and a TLD like .COM can be owned by a non-American corporation and the PTI can be a non-American entity.

What We Need: Jurisdictional Resilience

It is no one's case that the United States is less fit than any other country as a base for ICANN, PTI, or the Root Zone Maintainer, or even as the headquarters for 9 of the world's 12 root zone operators (Verisign runs both the A and J root servers). However, just as having multiplicity of root servers is important for ensuring technical resilience of the DNS system (and this is shown in the uptake of Anycast by root server operators), it is equally important to have immunity of core DNS functioning from political pressures of the country or countries where core DNS infrastructure is legally situated and to ensure that we have diversity in terms of legal jurisdiction.

Towards this end, we at CIS have pushed for the concept of "jurisdictional resilience", encompassing three crucial points:

Legal immunity for core technical operators of Internet functions (as opposed to policymaking venues) from legal sanctions or orders from the state in which they are legally situated.
Division of core Internet operators among multiple jurisdictions
Jurisdictional division of policymaking functions from technical implementation functions

Of these, the most important is the limited legal immunity (akin to a greatly limited form of the immunity that UN organizations get from the laws of their host countries). This kind of immunity could be provided through a variety of different means: a host-country agreement; a law passed by the legislature; a U.N. General Assembly Resolution; a U.N.-backed treaty; and other such options exist. We are currently investigating which of these options would be the best option.

And apart from limited legal immunity, distribution of jurisdictional control is also valuable. As we noted in our submission to the ICG in September 2015:

Following the above precepts would, for instance, mean that the entity that performs the role of the Root Zone Maintainer should not be situated in the same legal jurisdiction as the entity that functions as the policymaking venue. This would in turn mean that either the Root Zone Maintainer function be taken up Netnod (Sweden-headquartered) or the WIDE Project (Japan-headquartered) [or RIPE-NCC, headquartered in the Netherlands], or that if the IANA Functions Operator(s) is to be merged with the RZM, then the IFO be relocated to a jurisdiction other than those of ISOC and ICANN. This, as has been stated earlier, has been a demand of the Civil Society Internet Governance Caucus. Further, it would also mean that root zone servers operators be spread across multiple jurisdictions (which the creation of mirror servers in multiple jurisdictions will not address).

However, the issue of jurisdiction seems to be dead-on-arrival, having been killed by the United States government.

Unfortunately, despite the primary motivation for demands for the IANA transition being those of removing the power the U.S. government exercises over the core of the Internet's operations in the form of the DNS, what has ended up happening through the IANA transition is that these powers have not only not been removed, but in some ways they have been entrenched further! While earlier, the U.S. had to specify that the IANA functions operator had to be located in the U.S., now ICANN's by-laws themselves will state that the post-transition IANA will be a California corporation. Notably, while the Montevideo Declaration speaks of "globalization" of ICANN and of the IANA functions, as does the NETmundial statement, the NTIA announcement on their acceptance of the transition proposals speaks of "privatization" of ICANN, and not "globalization".

All in all, the "independence" that IANA is gaining from the U.S. is akin to the "independence" that Brazil gained from Portugal in 1822. Dom Pedro of Brazil was then ruling Brazil as the Prince Regent since his father Dom João VI, the King of United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil and the Algarves had returned to Portugal. In 1822, Brazil declared independence from Portugal (which was formally recognized through a treaty in 1825). Even after this "independence", Dom Pedro continued to rule Portugal just as he had before indepedence, and Dom João VI was provided the title of "Emperor of Brazil", aside from being King of the United Kingdom of Portugal and the Algarves. The "indepedence" didn't make a whit of a difference to the self-sufficiency of Brazil: Portugal continued to be its largest trading partner. The "independence" didn't change anything for the nearly 1 million slaves in Brazil, or to the lot of the indigenous peoples of Brazil, none of whom were recognized as "free". It had very little consequence not just in terms of ground conditions of day-to-day living, but even in political terms.

Such is the case with the IANA Transition: U.S. power over the core functioning of the Domain Name System do not stand diminished after the transition, and they can even arguably be said to have become even more entrenched. Meet the new boss: same as the old boss.

It is an allied but logically distinct issue that U.S. businesses — registries and registrars — dominate the global DNS industry, and as a result hold the reins at ICANN.↩
As Goldsmith & Wu note in their book Who Controls the Internet: "Back in 1998 the U.S. Department of Commerce promised to relinquish root authority by the fall of 2006, but in June 2005, the United States reversed course. “The United States Government intends to preserve the security and stability of the Internet’s Domain Name and Addressing System (DNS),” announced Michael D. Gallagher, a Department of Commerce official. “The United States” he announced, will “maintain its historic role in authorizing changes or modifications to the authoritative root zone file.”↩
Mr. Fadi Chehadé revealed in an interaction with Indian participants at ICANN 54 that he had a meeting "at the White House" about the U.S. plans for transition of the IANA contract before he spoke about that when he visited India in October 2013 making the timing of his White House visit around the time of the Montevideo Statement.↩
As an example, NSD, software that is used on multiple root servers, is funded by a Dutch foundation and a Dutch corporation, and written mostly by European coders.↩

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/jurisdiction-the-taboo-topic-at-icann

List of Blocked 'Escort Service' Websites

pranesh — 2016-06-15T08:33:31Z

Here is the full list of URLs that Indian ISPs were asked to block on Monday, June 13, 2016.

On April 20, 2016, DNA carried a report on a PIL seeking action against advertisements for prostitution in newspapers and on websites. That report noted that the Mumbai Police had obtained an order from a magistrates court to block 174 objectionable websites, and had sent a list to the "Group Coordinator (Cyber Laws)" within the Department of Electronics and IT. On June 13, 2016, some news agencies carried reports about the Ministry of Communications and IT having ordered ISPs to block 240 websites.

As far as we know, the Mumbai Police has not proceeded against any of the people who run these websites, whose phone numbers are available, and whose names and addresses are also available in many cases through WHOIS queries on the domain names.

Unfortunately, the government does not make available publicly the list of websites they have ordered ISPs to block. Given that knowledge of what is censored by the government is crucial in a democracy, we are publishing the entire list of blocked websites.

Those of these websites that use TLS (i.e., those with 'https'), still appear to be available on multiple Indian ISPs, and others can be accessed by using a proxy VPN from outside India or by using Tor.

Notes:

The list circulated to ISPs has two sub-lists, numbered from 1-174 (but containing 175 entries, with a numbering mistake), and 1-64, for a total of 239 URLs.
4 URLs are repeated in the list ("www.salini.in/navi-mumbai-independent-escort-service.php", "exmumbai.in", "www.mansimathur.in/pinkyagarwal", "www.mumbaifunclubs.com")
For one website, both the domain name and a specific web page within it are listed (""www.mumbaiwali.in" and "www.mumbaiwali.in/navi-mumbai-escort-service.php")
One URL is incomplete (No. 214: "www.independentescortservicemumbai.com/mumbai%20escort%20servi..")
There are thus 235 unique URLs, targetting 234 websites and web pages.

Full List of Blocked URLs

www.sterlingbioscience.com
rawpoint.biz
www.onemillionbabes.com
www.mumbaihotcollection.in
simranoberoi.in
rubinakapoor.biz
talita.biz
www.mumbaiescortsagency.net
www.mumbaifunclubs.com
www.alishajain.co.in
www.ankitatalwar.co.in
https://www.jennyarora.ind.in
www.riya-kapoor.com
shneha.in
missinimi.in
www.mumbaiglamour.in
kalyn.in
www.saumyagiri.co.in/city/mumbai/
bookerotic.com
www.divyamalik.in
www.suhanisharma.co.in
www.ruhi.biz
umbaiqueens.in
www.aliyaghosh.com
priyasen.in
www.highprofilemumbaiescorts.co.in
charmingmumbai.com
www.poojamehata.in
kiiran.in/
mansikher.in
www.newmumbaiescorts.in
www.mumbaifunclubs.com
www.punarbas.in
www.discreetbabes.in
www.alisharoy.in
www.arpitarai.in
www.nidhipatel.in
navimumbailescort.com
www.zoyaescorts.com
www.juhioberoi.in
shoniya.in
panchibora.in
rehu.in
www.nehaanand.com
www.aditiray.co.in
www.rakhibajaj.in
www.alianoidaescorts.in
www.sobiya.in
www.alishaparul.in
mumbai-escorts.leathercurrency.com
ankita-ahuja.in
www.yamika.in
mumbailescort.co
www.ranjika.in
www.aditiray.com
www.alinamumbailescort.in
www.sonikaa.com/services/
riyamodel.in
mumbai-escorts.info
soonam.in
www.sejalthakkar.com
www.yomika-tandon.in
www.asika.in
www.siyasharma.org/
www.rubikamathur.in
www.mumbaiescortslady.com
www.sexyshe.in
www.indepandentescorts.com
www.saanvichopra.co.in
www.goswamipatel.in
ojaloberoi.in
www.naincy.in
www.sonyamehra.com
www.pinkgrapes.in
anjalitomar.in/
www.nishakohli.com/
sagentia.co.in
mumbai.vivastreet.co.in/escort+mumbai
www.deseescortgirls.in
guides.wonobo.com/mumbai/mumbai-escorts-service/.4299
jasmineescorts.com
www.shalinisethi.com
www.highclassmumbailescort.com
www.vipescortsinmumbai.com
www.mumbaiescorts69.co.in
monikabas.co.in
www.riyasehgal.com
onlycelebrity.in
www.greatmumbaiescorts.com/escort-service-mumbai.html
www.aishamumbailescort.com
www.jennydsouzaescort.com
www.desifun.in
www.siyaescort.co.in
masti—escort.in
www.sofya.in
www.mumbaiwali.in/navi-mumbai-escort-service.php
www.mumbaiwali.in
www.calldaina.com
www.mumbaiescortsservice.co.in
www.escortsgirlsinmumbai.com
www.passionmumbai.escorts.com
www.nehakapoor.in
meerakapoor.com
www.dianamumbaiescorts.net .in
www.allmumbailescort.in
www.rakhiarora.in
www.ritikasingh.com
www.rekhapatil.com
www.mumbaidolls.com
www.piapandey.com
www.mumbaicuteescorts.in
www.mumbaiescortssevice.com
www.onlycelebrity.com
www.meetescortservice.com
onlyoneescorts.com
simirai.org
www.riyamumbaiescorts.in
www.neharana.in
www.tanyaroy.com
www.mumbaihiprofilegirls.in
www.sexyescortsmumbai.in
www.sexymumbai.escorts.com
www.four-seasons—escort.in
www.mumbaiescortsgirl.com
www.vdreamescorts.com
www.passionatemumbaiescorts.in
www.payalmalhotra.in
www.shrutisinha.com
www.juliemumbaiescorts.com
www.indiasexservices.com/mumbai.html
www.mumbai-escorts.co.in
www.aliyamumbaiescorts.net.in
shivaniarora.co.in/escort–service-mumbai.html
www.pinkisingh.com
soyam.in
www.arpitaray.com
www.localescorts.in
www.jennifermumbaiescorts.com
www.yanaroy.com
escorts18.in/mumbai—escorts.html
www.tinamumbaiescorts.com
www.mumbaijannatescorts.com
www.deepikaroy.com
www.nancy.co.in
www.pearlpatel.in
30minsmumbaiescorts.in
www.datinghopes.com
https://www.riyaroy.com/services.html
www.sonalikajain.com
www.zainakapoor.co.in
kavyajain.in
www.kinnu.co.in
exmumbai.in/
www.mansimathur.in/pinkyagarwal
exmumbai.in
www.mansimathur.in/pinkyagarwal
www.devikabatra.in
katlin.in
riyaverma.in
escortsinindia.co/
www.snehamumbaiescorts.in
shimi.in
www.mumbaiescortsforu.com/about
www.chetnagaur.co.in/chetna-gaur.html
www.escortspoint.in
www.rupalikakkar.in
www.hemangisinha.co.in
1escorts.in/location/mumbai.html
www.salini.in/navi-mumbai-independent—escort-service.php
www.salini.in/navi-mumbai-independent-escort-service.php
www.mumbaibella.in
mohitescortservicesmumbai.com
www.anchu.in
www.aliyaroy.co.in
jaanu.co.in/mumbai-escorts-service-call-girls.html
www.andyverma.com
dreams-come-true.biz
feel–better.biz
jellyroll.biz
dreamgirlmumbai.com
role-play.biz
mansi—mathur.com
www.zarinmumbaiescorts.com
mymumbai.escortss.com
www.goldentouchescorts.com
www.mumbaipassion.biz
ishitamalhotra.com
happy-ending.biz
juicylips.biz
www.escortsmumbai.name
www.kirstygbasai.net
www.hiremumbaiescorts.com
www.meeraescorts.com/mumbai-escorts.php
3–5–7star.biz
www.pranjaltiwari.com
www.richagupta.biz
way2heaven.biz
piya.co/
pinkflowers.info
www.beautifulmumbaiescorts.com
www.bestescortsinmumbai.com/charges-html
www.mumbaiescorts.me
www.tanikatondon.com
www.escortsinmumbai.biz
www.escortgirlmumbai.com
www.mumbaicallgrils.com
www.quickescort4u.com
www.mayamalhotra.com
www.legal-escort.com
escortsbaba.com/mumbai-escorts.html
rupa.biz
www.mumbaiescorts.agency/erotic-service-mumbai.html
www.escortscelebrity.com
www.independentescortservicemumbai.com/mumbai%20escort%20servi..
garimachopra.com
kajalgupta.biz
lipkiss.site
aanu.in
bombayescort.in
hotkiran.co.in
khushikapoor.in
joyapatel.in
rici.in
aaditi.in
andheriescorts.org.in
www.jiyapatel.in
spicymumbai.in
rimpyarora.in
lovemaking.co.in
riyadubey.co.in
escortservicesmumbai.in
mumbaiescorts.co.in
midnightprincess.in/
vashiescorts.co.in/
angee.in/
www.rozakhan.in/
www.mumbaiescortsvilla.in/
kylie.co.in/
escortservicemumbai.co.in

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/list-of-blocked-escort-service-websites

CIS's Comments on the Draft Geospatial Information Regulation Bill, 2016

pranesh — 2016-06-05T15:06:09Z

The Centre for Internet and Society is alarmed by the Draft Geospatial Information Regulation Bill, 2016, and has recommended that the proposed law be withdrawn in its entirety. It offered the following detailed comments as its submission.

Comments on the Draft Geospatial Information Regulation Bill, 2016

by the Centre for Internet and Society

1. Preliminary

1.1. This submission presents comments and recommendations by the Centre for Internet and Society (“CIS”) on the draft Geospatial Information Regulation Bill, 2016 (“the draft bill” / “the proposed bill” / “the bill”).

2. Centre for Internet and Society

2.1. The Centre for Internet and Society is a non-profit organisation that undertakes interdisciplinary research on internet and digital technologies from the perspectives of policy and academic research. The areas of focus include accessibility for persons with disabilities, access to knowledge, intellectual property rights, openness (including open data, free and open source software, open standards, open access, open educational resources, and open video), internet governance, telecommunication reform, digital privacy, and cyber-security. The academic research at CIS seeks to understand the reconfiguration of social processes and structures through the internet and digital media technologies, and vice versa.

2.2. This submission is consistent with CIS’ commitment to safeguarding the public interest, and particularly the representing the interests of ordinary citizens and consumers. The comments in this submission aim to further the principles of people’s right to information regarding their own country, openness-by-default in governmental activities, freedom of speech and expression, and the various forms of public good that can emerge from greater availability of open (geospatial) data created by both public and private agencies, and the innovations made possible as a result.

3. Comments

3.1. General Remarks

3.1.1. While CIS welcomes the intentions of the government to prevent use of geospatial information to undermine national security, the proposed bill completely fails to do so, infringes upon Constitutional rights, harms innovation, undermines the national initiatives of Digital India and Startup India, is completely impractical and unworkable, and it will lead to a range of substantial harms if the government actually seeks to enforce it.

3.1.2. There are already laws in place that prevent the use of geospatial information to undermine national security. For instance, the Official Secrets Act, 1923 (“OSA”) already contains provisions — sections 3(2)(a), (b), and (c) — all of which would prevent a person from creating maps that undermine national security and would penalise their doing so. Section 5 of the OSA contains multiple provisions that penalise the possession and communication of maps that undermine “national security.” The penalties under the OSA range from imprisonment of up to 3 years all the way to imprisonment up to 14 years. Given this, there is absolutely no need to create yet another law to deal with maps that undermine “national security.” Indeed, it is the government’s stated policy to reduce the number of laws in India, whereas the proposed bill introduces a redundant new law that adds multiple layers of bureaucracy.

3.1.3. The National Mapping Policy, 2005, already puts in place restrictions on wrongful depictions of India’s international boundaries, and as we explain below in section 3.4 of this document, even the National Mapping Policy is over-broad. Even if the government wishes to provide statutory backing to the policy, it should be a very different law that is far more limited in scope, and restricts itself to criminalising those who misrepresent India’s international boundary with an intention to mislead people into thinking that that is the official boundary of India as recognised by the Survey of India. CIS would support a law of such limited scope and mandate, provided it has an appropriate penalty.

3.1.4. There would be much utility in a law that creates a duty on the Survey of India to make available, in the form of an open standard, an official electronic version of the maps that it creates, and expressly allows and encourages citizens and startups to reuse such official maps, however the Ministry of Home Affairs would not be the nodal ministry for such a law.

3.1.5. We recommend that the proposed law be scrapped in its entirety.

3.1.6. We additionally provide an alternative manner of reducing the harms caused by this bill, in our comments below. By no means should these further comments be seen as a repudiation of our above position, since we do not feel the proposed bill, even with the inclusion of all of our recommendations, would truly further its stated aims. All our below recommendations would do is to reduce the bill’s harmful, and often unintended, consequences.

3.2. Definition of “Geospatial Information” is over-broad, all- encompassing

3.2.1. The second part of the definition of “geospatial information” refers to all “graphic or digital data depicting natural or man-made physical features, phenomenon or boundaries of the earth or any information related thereto” that are “referenced to a co-ordinate system and having attributes.” (Section 2(1)(e)) As per the definition, this will include all geo-referenced information, and data, that is produced by everyday users as an integral part of various everyday uses of digital technologies. This will also include geo-referenced tweets and messages, location of public and private vehicles shared in the real-time with agencies tracking their location (from public transport authorities, to insurance agencies, etc.), location data of mobile phones collected and used by telecommunication service providers, location of mobile phones shared by the user with various kinds of service providers (from taxi companies to delivery agencies), etc.

3.2.2. We recommend that instead of regulating all kinds of geospatial information, and giving rise to a range of possible harms, the draft bill be revised to specifically address “sensitive geospatial information,” defined as geospatial information related to the “Prohibited Places” as defined in the Official Secrets Act 1923 (section 2(8)) which will allow the bill to effectively respond to its key stated concerns of ensuring “security, sovereignty and integrity of India.” Since the National Map Policy defines “Vulnerable Points” and “Vulnerable Areas” (para 3(b)) as the two main types of geospatial units associated with “Prohibited Places”, these terms should also be referred to in the revised version of the draft bill.

3.3. Unreasonable regulation of acquiring and end-use of geospatial information

3.3.1. Section 3 of the draft bill states that “[s]ave as otherwise provided in this Act, rules or regulations made thereunder, or with the general or special permission of the Security Vetting Authority, no person shall acquire geospatial imagery or data including value addition” and “[e]very person who has already acquired any geospatial imagery or data ... including value addition prior to coming of this Act into effect, shall within one year from the commencement of this Act, make an application alongwith requisite fees to the Security Vetting Authority.” This effectively makes it illegal to acquire and maintain ownership of geospatial information that has not been subjected to security vetting.

3.3.2. This draft bill doesn’t apply just to geospatial information that may undermine national security but covers all manners of geospatial information and modern geospatial technologies embedded in everyday digital devices and intimately connected to various electronic products and services, from cars to mobile phones, result in the creation and acquiring of various kinds of geo-referenced information, ranging from the geo-referenced photographs to locations shared with friends. Even ordinary users who are unknowingly looking at maps that contain sensitive geospatial information, which are illegal under the Official Secrets Act, are committing an illegal act under the draft bill, because the users temporarily acquires such sensitive geospatial information in her/his digital device, as part of the very act of browsing the map concerned. This clearly cannot be the intention of the bill. Thus we recommend deletion of the word “acquire.”

3.3.3. Further, the insertion of the phrase “including value addition” in both Section 3(1) and 3(2) appears to suggest that all users who have created derivative products using geospatial information that includes sensitive data (that is data related to Prohibited Places) may be held liable under this draft bill, even if these users have not themselves collected or created such sensitive geospatial information, which was part of the original geospatial information published by the source map agency. This too cannot be the intention of the bill. Thus, we recommend deletion of the phrase “including value addition.”

3.3.4. In the definition of the “Security Vetting of Geospatial Information” itself, it is mentioned that the process will include “screening of the credentials of the end-users and end-use applications, with the sole objective of protecting national security, sovereignty, safety and integrity.” (Section 2(1)(o)) This appears to indicate that all end-users of all electronic and analog services and products using geospatial information will have to be individually vetted before such services and products are used, which would cover a large proportion of the Indian population. This imposes an enormous and impractical burden on the Indian digital economy in particular, and the entire national economy in general, without improving national security. This too cannot be the intention of the draft bill. Thus, we recommend deletion of this phrase, and ensure that end users are not covered by the law.

3.3.5. Given these specific characteristics of how modern geospatial technologies work, and how they provide a basis for various kinds of everyday use of electronic products and services, we would like to submit that the regulatory focus should be on large-scale and/or commercial dissemination, publication, or distribution of geospatial information, and not on the acts of acquiring, possessing, sharing, and using geospatial information. Further, the regulation in general should be aimed at the party owning the geospatial information in question, and not at the parties involved in its dissemination (say, Internet Service Providers) or in its generation or use (say, end-users).

3.4. Removal of journalistic, political, artistic, creative, and speculative depictions of India from the scope of Section 6

3.4.1. Section 6 of the draft bill states that “[n]o person shall depict, disseminate, publish or distribute any wrong or false topographic information of India including international boundaries through internet platforms or online services or in any electronic or physical form.” Section 15 imposes a penalty for such wrong depiction of maps of India.

3.4.2. Depictions of India, which do not purport to accurately represent the international boundaries as recognised by the Indian government should not be penalised. For instance, a map published in a newspaper article about India’s border disputes that shows the incorrect claims that the Chinese government has made over Indian territory would also be penalised as “wrong or false topographic information of India”, since there is a clear intention to depict the boundary as claimed by China. Criminalising such journalism cannot be the legitimate intent of such a provision.

3.4.3. There are numerous instances which have been willfully depicting inaccurate and inauthentic maps of India with international borders for political ends. For instance, there are often depictions of India which show territories within present day Pakistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and Sri Lanka as part of an “Akhand Bharat.” Depictions of this sort should not be penalised. In doing so, would contradict the freedom of expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) without being a reasonable restriction under Article 19(2).

3.4.4. Even depictions of India for purposes of speculative fiction would be penalised under this proposed bill unless they depict the official borders. This is clearly undesirable and would not be allowed as a reasonable restriction under Article 19(2).

*3.4.5.* Even geography students in schools and colleges who mis-draw the official map of India would be liable to penalties under the draft bill. This plainly, cannot be the intention of the drafters of this bill. The creator of a rough and inaccurate tourist map of an Indian city can also be identified as committing a criminal act under the proposed bill as she would be depicting “… wrong or false topographic information of India …”

3.4.6. In brief: Merely depicting, disseminating, publishing or distributing any “wrong or false topographic information of India” should not be penalised. unless a person publishes and widely circulates an incorrect map of India while claiming that that represents the official international boundaries of India, such should not be penalised.

3.4.7. CIS recommends that the bill should instead state: “No person shall depict, disseminate, publish, or distribute any topographic information purporting to accurately depict the international boundaries of India as recognised by the Survey of India unless he is authorised to do so by the Surveyor General of India; provided that usage by any person of the international boundaries as is electronically and in print made available by the Survey of India shall deemed to be usage that is authorised by the Surveyor General of India.”

3.5. Absence of Publicly Available and Openly Reusable Standardised National Boundary of India

3.5.1. Given the lack of an reusable versions of maps of India, including of India’s official boundary as recognised by the Survey of India, it becomes impossible for people to accurately depict the boundary of India. We recommend that the bill requires the Survey of India to publish all “Open Series Maps,”as defined in the National Mapping Policy, 2005, including maps depicting the official international and subnational political and administrative boundaries of India, using open geospatial standards and under an open licence allowing such geospatial data to be used by citizens and all companies.

3.6. Remove Requirement for Prior License for Acquire, Dissemination, Publication, or Distribution of Geospatial Information

3.6.1. Section 9 of the draft bill refers to “any person who wants to acquire, disseminate, publish, or distribute any geospatial information of India” (emphasis added), which can be interpreted as the need for a prior license before any person decides to acquire (including creation, collection, generation, and buying) geospatial information. This creates at least two problems:

modern digital geospatial technologies have enabled everyday digital devices (like smartphones) to instantaneously acquire, disseminate, publish, and distribute geospatial information all the time when the person holding that device is looking at online digital maps, say Google Maps, or sharing location with their friends, online platforms and services and service providers (both local and foreign); and
the requirement of prior license involves payment of a “requisite fees” to the Security Vetting Authority, which may act as an arbitrary (since the fee might be based upon the volume of geospatial information to be acquired that one may not know fully determine before acquiring) and effective barrier to acquiring, dissemination, publication, or distribution of geospatial information even if it does not violate the concerns of “security, sovereignty, and integrity” in any manner. This requirement also impedes competition in the market, because new entrants to the geospatial industry may not have enough upfront capital to procure licenses.

3.6.2. Further, the requirement of necessary prior license for acquiring geospatial information does not seem to be a crucial component of the security vetting process, since the geospatial information, once acquired by the agency concerned, is in any case directed to be shared with the Security Vetting Authority for undertaking necessary expunging of sensitive or incorrect information.

3.6.3. We recommend revision of this section so that no prior license and/or permission is required for collection, acquiring, distribution, and/or use of geospatial information; instead, a framework may be established for monitoring of published geospatial information for purposes of ensuring geospatial information pertaining to “Prohibited Places,” as defined under the Official Secrets Act, is not made available to the general public by any person or entity under Indian jurisdiction, including, for instance, Indian subsidiaries and branches of foreign corporations.. Such a framework must not address the end-user of such geospatial information, but its publishers.

3.7. Unenforceable jurisdictional scope

3.7.1. Section 5 of the draft bill states “[s]ave as otherwise provided in any international convention, treaty or agreement of which India is signatory or as provided in this Act, rules or regulations made thereunder, or with the general or special permission of the Security Vetting Authority, no person shall, in any manner, make use of, disseminate, publish or distribute any geospatial information of India, outside India, without prior permission from the Security Vetting Authority.”

3.7.2. In compliance with this section, domestic and foreign companies and platforms will be required to obtain permission from the Security Vetting Authority of India prior to publishing, distributing etc. geospatial information. Similarly in the preliminary, the draft bill holds in person who commits an offence beyond India under the scope of the bill. The bill is thus proposing extraterritorial applicability of its provisions, yet the extent and method of enforcement of the same on other jurisdictions are kept unclear.

3.8. Negative implications for rights of citizens

3.8.1. There are a number of sections in the draft bill which have negative implications for the rights of all users and potentially impinge on the constitutional rights of Indian citizens. These include:

a. Section 18(2) which empowers the Enforcement Authority to conduct a search without a judicial search order;

b. Section 17(3) which empowers the Enforcement Authority to conduct undefined surveillance and monitoring to enforce the Act;

c. Chapter (V) which penalises individuals with Rs. 1-100 Crores and/or seven years in prison for an offence under the act;

d. Section 22 which allows the government to take ownership of a person’s land if a financial penalty has not been paid;

e. Section 30(1) which holds, in the case of the offense being committed by a company, every person in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of the company, guilty and liable.

3.9. Overly broad powers and responsibilities of the Apex Committee and Enforcement Authority, and lack of adequate oversight

3.9.1. Section 7(2) states that “[t]he Apex Committee shall do all such acts and deeds that may be necessary or otherwise desirable to achieve the objectives of the Act, including the following functions:...” The wording in this section is broad and open ended, and allows for the responsibilities of the Apex Committee to be expanded without clear oversight of such expansion.

3.9.2. Similarly, section 17 established an “Enforcement Authority” for the purpose of carrying out surveillance and monitoring for enforcement of the draft bill. The Authority has been given a number of powers including the power of inquiry, the power to adjudicate, and the power to give directions. These powers have direct implications on the rights of individuals, yet the Authority is not subject to oversight or accountability requirements.

3.9.3. We recommend that the powers and responsibilities of the Apex Committee and Enforcement Authority are narrowly defined in the draft bill itself, limited by the principle of necessity, and subject to independent oversight and accountability requirements.

3.10. Remove the Security Vetting Authority’s power of delegation

3.10.1. Section 8(3) allows the Security Vetting Authority to delegate to any constituent member of the Authority, other subordinate committee, or officer powers and functions as it may deem necessary except the power to grant a licence. In practice, this will allow security vetting to be done by another institution and risks potential involvement of private agencies and/or quasi-governmental bodies.

3.10.2. We recommend that the power of delegation should not be granted to the Security Vetting Authority.

3.11. Negative implications for innovation and India’s digital economy

3.11.1. Section 3 of the draft bill states “[s]ave as otherwise provided in this Act, rules or regulations made thereunder, or with the general or special permission of the Security Vetting Authority, no person shall acquire geospatial imagery or data including value addition of any part of India either through any space or aerial platforms such as satellite, aircrafts, airships, balloons, unmanned aerial vehicles or terrestrial vehicles, or any other means whatsoever”. This effectively ensures that each and every user of geospatial data, products, services, and solutions — since all of these either include or are derivatives of geospatial information — would require prior permission from the Security Vetting Authority. This will substantially affect the existing and emerging digital economy in particular, and the entire economy in general.

3.11.2. Further, Section 9 of the draft bill mandates that any person submitting an application for geospatial information to be vetted must pay a fee. As the provisions of the bill mandate that users approach the Security Vetting Authority for license to use geospatial information, this will impose an immense burden on all users of digital devices in and outside of India. CIS submits that imposition of this fee for security vetting be removed.

3.12. Disproportionate penalty for acquisition of geospatial information

3.12.1. Section 12 states that “[p]enalty for illegal acquisition of geospatial information of India.- Whoever acquires any geospatial information of India in contravention of section 3, shall be punished with a fine ranging from Rupees one crore to Rupees one hundred crore and/or imprisonment for a period upto seven years.” Seven years in prison is disproportionate to the offense of acquiring geospatial information without vetting by the authority concerned. This is particularly true given the broad and all-encompassing definition of “geospatial information” in the draft bill, and the fact that the bill applies to individuals and companies both within and outside of India.

3.13. Improper and inconsistent usage of terms in the draft bill

3.13.1. Section 4 of the draft bill regulates the visualization, publication, dissemination and distribution of geospatial information of India, while section 5 regulates use, dissemination, publication, and distribution of geospatial information outside of India. The definition of “visualization” remains unclear, and the act is only regulated in section 4. The section 6 of the draft bill uses the term ‘depict’, which is undefined as well. We submit that in this context terms are interchangeable, and the draft bill should either define them expressly to avoid ambiguity in interpretations, or consistently use only one throughout the draft bill.

3.13.2. Section 11 (3) of the draft bill requires licensees to “[d]isplay the insignia of the clearance of the Security Vetting Authority on the security-vetted geospatial information by appropriate means such as water-marking or licence as relevant, while disseminating or distributing of such geospatial information.” We observe that geospatial information includes graphical representation, location coordinates, inter alia. While the former may be represented visually on an “as is” basis after the completion of the vetting, the latter may be used to perform other complex functions at the “back-end” (i.e., vendor-facing side) in various technologies. Water-marking and/or displaying of insignia would place undue burden on the licensee, depending on the kind of platform, service, or individual.

3.14. Lack of reference to technical implementation guidance

3.14.1. The regulation, harmonisation, and standardisation of the collection, generation, dissemination etc. of geospatial information is a complex process that goes beyond a process of security vetting and that will require extensive technical implementation guidance from the government. At a minimum this could include quality assurance considerations and standard operating procedures, yet the draft bill makes no reference to the need for technical standards or guidance.

Comments prepared by Sumandro Chattapadhyay, Adya Garg, Pranesh Prakash, Anubha Sinha, and Elonnai Hickok. Submitted by the Centre for Internet and Society, on June 3, 2016.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-draft-geospatial-information-regulation-bill-2016

Accessible ICT Procurement

pranesh — 2016-05-09T14:48:49Z

Today in India there is an excellent opportunity to address the needs of persons with disabilities through accessible ICT procurement. There is a growing body of evidence globally to demonstrate that governments are successfully using accessible procurement as a means of ensuring the human rights of persons with disabilities,. They are amongst the largest purchasers of IT in any country and by requiring accessible products and services, ensure that all citizens with disabilities and government employees who are disabled are able to access and use public infrastructure and communication. CIS along with 20 other organisations petition the Ministry of Social Justice & Empowerment, Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Information Technology to bring in accessibility considerations within the draft Procurement Bill.

To
The Secretary,
Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities (DEPwD)
Ministry of Social Justice & Empowerment,
Room No: 525, 5^th Floor,
Paryavaran Bhawan, CGO Complex, Lodhi Road,
New Delhi - 110003

The Secretary
Ministry of Finance
North Block, New Delhi- 110001

The Secretary
Ministry of Information Technology
Electronics Niketan, 6,
CGO Complex, Lodhi Road, New Delhi - 110003

Dear Sir/ Madam,

Subject: Urgent opportunity to address the needs of persons with disabilities through accessible ICT procurement in the draft procurement bill.

We are a group of organisations working to protect and promote the rights of persons with disabilities in India. You may be aware that persons with disabilities are the world’s largest minority, comprising over a billion persons of the world population as of 2011. We give below some important points which outline the need to consider accessible procurement for your consideration:

Demographic need: As per the census of India in 2011, there are 2.21 per cent or 26 million persons with disabilities living in India. However, there is an inconsistency between the estimates of the Census and the NSS surveys due to various reasons such as different definitions, different methodologies, traditional diagnostic techniques, varied reporting responses and even the 11^th five year plan opines that these numbers may be under representative and the actual number may be closer to approximately 5-6%. A World Bank report pegs the number at about 5-8% or approximately 55-90 million in India. Hence, there is a large constituency of persons with disabilities and possibly an equally large number of persons having special needs and requiring accommodations who are not necessarily identified within this group. The needs of these persons must be taken into account in order to achieve complete national development.
Need for accessible IT infrastructure: With the increasing emphasis and reliance on IT for administration, governance, communication and information through the ‘Digital India’ and ‘Smart Initiatives’, there is a need for the IT infrastructure to be accessible to enable use by all, i.e. a product or service should be usable to its maximum potential by all persons with ease and comfort irrespective of ability. For instance: Persons with disabilities cannot be given productive work in a bank if banking is not usable with the help of assistive technology; and Persons with special needs will not be able to pay bills or do banking or avail services rendered by e-governance platforms if ICT infrastructure is not usable with assistive technology. This need has already been recognized by the Government of India (GoI) through its ‘Accessible India Campaign’. Accessible ICT Procurement will be a vehicle to achieving this.
Legal imperative: India is strongly committed towards creating a barrier free world with equal opportunities and without discrimination, and facilitating enjoyment of all fundamental and human rights for persons with disabilities and complete digital inclusion. India has signed and ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) which identifies access to information and information and communication technologies as a human right and requires governments to facilitate enjoyment of these rights on an equal basis and without discrimination through various measures, such as encouraging private organisations to provide accessible services and information and provide other forms of assistance to facilitate access to information and adopting minimum standards of accessibility and design for accessibility at early stage of production to reduce cost.

Article 4(a)-(d) requires states parties to act in conformance with the convention. Accessibility is an underlying principle of the CRPD and integral for persons with disabilities to enjoy all the other human rights such as access to education, employment, assistive technologies, political participation, health, independent living and cultural materials.

India has also signed other national and international instruments in this regard, such as the Inchen strategy to make the rights real for persons with disabilities, the Marrakesh Treaty to facilitate access to published works for persons who are blind, visually impaired or otherwise reading disabled, the Biwako Millineum framework and the Biwako plus 5, enacting various legislations related to disability, including the upcoming Bill on the Rights of persons with disabilities, the National Universal Electronic Accessibility Policy and Guidelines for Indian Government Websites (GIGW) which prescribes accessibility requirements. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) – which were finalised in September 2015 and by which India is bound, also call for inclusiveness in all its goals such as education, inequality reduction, infrastructure building, economy, habitation, institutions, poverty reduction and sustainability. Hence there is a very strong legal case for implementing accessible ICT procurement, as the driver for achieving complete inclusion and participation of persons with disabilities.

Proven effective mechanism: Public procurement has been identified as a very effective tool in the hands of policy makers to implement accessibility and significant strides have been made by different countries such as USA, Australia and countries in the European Union. Statistics reveal that governments are amongst the largest purchasers of IT products and services and hence well positioned to leverage this power to ensure that all products and services developed, delivered and maintained out of public money and for the use of the public or government employees are accessible. The Government of India (GoI) is also one of the largest employers of persons with disabilities, hence the absence of accessible public infrastructure hinders efficient functioning of the government itself.
Standards for accessible ICT procurement: Today accessible procurement has proven a successful tool in the hands of policy makers and there are evolved standards in this domain. The two major standards are that of section 508 in USA and the En 301-549 (EN) in Europe. The latter is the most comprehensive and updated standard and there is a global move to develop a harmonized standard based on the EN. Hence, there is a readily available framework and standard in the form of the En for India to adopt and base its framework.

Key Global Initiatives

We’d like to draw your attention to the accessible public procurement initiative and charter launched by G3ict and to the arguments in the G3ict white paper for adoption of this policy. We strongly support the arguments made therein and recommend that GoI embrace accessible public procurement in the draft Procurement Bill of 2014. Some key points from the charter and initiative which argue strongly for the case of having an accessible ICT procurement policy in India are extracted and given below:

“Accessible procurement is relevant for the enjoyment of human rights as set out in the UNCRPD, which has been signed by 160 countries.
Public procurement accounts for 10-15% of a country’s GDP and up to 16 per cent in countries in the EU, In USA, the federal government alone purchases 25 per cent of ICTs and the purchase of the federal and state governments together account for 40 per cent of the total ICT purchases of the country.
Public procurement policy is a strong instrument to achieve digital inclusion and serves to incentivize accessible design from the start of the development process.
It strengthens the local technology industry of a country and creates positive ripple effects into the broader consumer ICT marketplace.
It develops the national accessibility ecosystem, capacity, and expertise to develop and deliver accessible products and services and lowers costs through harmonized standards & competition. It also drives the creation of new development tools for accessible technology and better accessibility training for technology professionals.”

Conclusion and Recommendations:

Access to public services and information are critical for citizens to participate in the nation building process. The development of India hinges on the progress and inclusion of all its citizens. India has already recognized the criticality of building smart cities and the need to create an accessible India. Hence, the adoption of accessible procurement falls directly within the mandate of the GoI as it is a fundamental step to achieving India’s goals. Accessible procurement is not an option, but a necessity. We hence request the GoI to take immediate steps to rectify the lapse and include accessibility as a key consideration within the procurement Bill. Accordingly, we propose the following approach for GoI’s consideration:

Preparation and circulation of a note explaining the need to include accessibility as a key component of the procurement process within the government, describing rationale, business case and best practices.
Inclusion of suitable provisions in the present draft Procurement Bill covering the following:

Identifying accessibility as a key requirement of procurement
Including definitions of accessibility and accessibility standard within the definition section. (We recommend that a national standard be adopted which is similar to or in line with the European standard EN 301-549 since it is extremely evolved and being widely adopted by countries within and outside Europe.
Requiring accessibility experts and persons with disabilities to be part of all committees set up towards implementation of the Act and procurement related processes at the central and state levels.
Including a distinct and comprehensive section in the procurement rules notified after enactment of the Act dealing with accessible procurement processes and communication which may include the following: identification of accessibility as a selection/ award criteria, inclusion of accessibility at different stages of the procurement process, such as preparatory study, pre-qualification documents, contracts for design, development, delivery and maintenance of products and services, purchase of off the shelf products, requirement of attestation and verification procedures, self-declaration by vendors, training requirements, exemption cases, transparent bidding processes to ensure inclusion of accessibility, accessible communication, and implementation and audit mechanisms.
Requiring procuring entities to include accessibility implementation within their reporting requirements.

GoI may undertake capacity building activities to raise awareness amongst procuring entities on accessibility.
GoI may draw up a plan with time lines for implementation which may be in two phases. Phase 1 may relate to setting in the process for all present and future procurement and phase 2 may relate to a plan for legacy systems which will not necessarily be replaced anew.

We would be happy to provide further inputs in this regard.

Thanking you

Yours sincerely

Mr. Pranesh Prakash
Policy Director
Centre for Internet and Society

List of Signatories

Sl. No	Name of the Person	Designation	Organisation	Email id
1	Dr. Nirmita Narasimhan	Policy Director	Centre for Internet and Society, Bangalore	nirmita@cis-india.org
2	Mr. Dipendra Manocha	President	Daisy Forum of India and President, National Association for the Blind(Delhi)	dipendra.manocha@gmail.com
3	Mr. Muralidharan	Convener	National Platform for the Rights of the Disabled (NPRD)	nprd.in@gmail.com
4	Mr. Praful Vyas	Secretary	Andhjan Kalyan Trust	aktrust.drj@gmail.com prafulnvyas@gmail.com
5	Mr. Nilesh Singit	Advocacy & Research Officer	Centre for Disability Studies, NALSAR
6	Ms. Charudatta Jadhav		Techenvision	charudatta.chess@gmail.com
7	Dr. Beula Christy	HOD-Vision	Rehabilitation Centres, L V Prasad Eye Institute	beula@lvpei.org
8	Dr. Ramesh C Gaur	University Librarian	Jawaharlal Nehru University(JNU)	1. rcgaur@mail.jnu.ac.in 2. rcgaur66@gmail.com
9	Dr. Homiyar Mobedji		Bookshare	dr.homiyar@gmail.com
10	Dr. Sam Taraporewala	Director	Xavier’s Resource Centre for the Visually Challenged	sam@xrcvc.org
11	Mr. Srinivasu Chakravarthula,	Hon. Joint Secretary	The National Association for the Blind, Karnataka	srinivasu@srinivasu.org
12	Mr. K Raghuraman		Karna Vidya Foundation	raghuram.mcc@gmail.com
13	Mr. Dhanajay Bhole	Coordinator	Acc Savitribai Phule Pune university
14	Mr. Prashant Ranjan Verma	Joint Secretary	National Association for the Blind – Delhi	Pr_verma@hotmail.com
15	Mr. N S Sastry		Samrita Trust	samritatrust2006@gmail.com, norisastry@gmail.com
16	Ms. Madhu Singhal		Mitrajyothi	admin.office@mitrajyothi.org
17	Mr. Bhushan Punani		Blind People’s Association (BPA)	blinabad1@bsnl.in
18	Mr. Anil Mudgal	Secretary	Arushi	arushiorg@gmail.com
19	Ms. Poonam Tyagi	General Secretary	National Association for the Blind, Meerut
20	Dr. Vimal Dengla		National Association for the Blind
21	Mr. V S Sunder	Member	DRA India	sunder@imsc.res.in
22	Mr. Mohith B P			Bpmohith.ckm@gmail.com

[1]. Available at http://censusindia.gov.in/Census_And_You/disabled_population.aspx
[2]. Please see
http://mospi.nic.in/Mospi_New/upload/disablity_india_statistical_data_11mar2011/Chapter%204-Dimension_Disability.pdf
[3]. Available at http://www.section508.gov/
[4]. Available at
https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_en/301500_301599/301549/01.00.00_20/en_301549v010000c.pdf
[5]. Global Charter: Promoting Global Digital Inclusion through ICT Procurement Policies & Accessibility Standards, G3ict; URL:
http://g3ict.org/resource_center/g3ict_global_charter
[6]. CRPD Implementation: Promoting Global Digital Inclusion through ICT Procurement Policies & Accessibility Standards, G3ict available at: http://g3ict.org/resource_center/publications_and_reports/p/productCategory_whitepapers/subCat_7/id_339/

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/accessibility/blog/accessible-ict-procurement

CIS Submission to TRAI Consultation on Regulatory Framework for Over-the-Top Services

pranesh — 2016-03-25T17:59:56Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/net-neutrality/2015-03-27_cis_trai-submission_regulation-OTTs

CIS Position Paper on Net Neutrality in India (Background Submission to TRAI)

pranesh — 2016-03-25T16:35:12Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/net-neutrality/2015-06-29_PositionPaperonNetNeutralityinIndia

CIS Counter Comments on TRAI Consultation on Differential Pricing

pranesh — 2016-03-25T16:28:06Z

This counter-comment also includes: a) An appendix that charts regulations on zero-rating across the globe, and shows that the popular press have misunderstood and misrepresented regulations in foreign countries; b) An appendix that charts specialized services (including differential pricing of specialized services) across the globe.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/net-neutrality/2016-01-14_cis_trai-counter-comments_differential-pricing

Aadhaar: Still Too Many Problems

pranesh — 2016-04-06T15:31:32Z

While one wishes to welcome govt’s attempt to bring Aadhaar within a legislative framework, the fact is there are too many problems that still remain unaddressed for one to be optimistic.

The article was published by Livemint on March 7, 2016.

The Aadhaar Bill has been introduced as a money bill, even though it doesn’t qualify as such under Article 110 of the Constitution. If the Speaker agrees to this, it will render the Rajya Sabha toothless in this matter, and will weaken our democracy. The government should reintroduce it as an ordinary legislative bill, which is what it is.

While the government has in the past argued before the Supreme Court that Aadhaar is voluntary, Section 7 of the bill allows the government to mandate an Aadhaar number (or application for an Aadhaar number) as a prerequisite for obtaining some subsidies, benefits, services, etc. This undermines its arguments before the Supreme Court, which led the court to pass orders holding that Aadhaar should not be made mandatory. This move to make it mandatory will now need the government to argue that rather than contravene the apex court order, it has instead removed the rationale for it.

Interestingly, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government seems to have done a U-turn on the issue of the unique identification number not being proof of citizenship or domicile. The previous Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government never meant the Aadhaar number to be proof of citizenship or domicile. This was attacked by the Yashwant Sinha-chaired standing committee on finance, which feared that illegal immigrants would get Aadhaar numbers. Now, the BJP and the NDA seem to be in agreement with the original UPA vision of Aadhaar.

Importantly, there is very strong language when it comes to the issue of privacy and confidentiality of the information that is held by the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI). Section 29 (1), for instance, says that no biometric information will be shared for any reason whatsoever, or used for any purpose other than Aadhaar number generation and authentication. However, that provision is undermined wholly by Section 33, which says that “in the interest of national security”, the biometric info may be accessed if authorized by a joint secretary. This will only fan the fears of those who have argued that the real rationale for Aadhaar was not, in fact, delivery of services, but to create a national database of biometric data available to government snoops.

Also Read

Pros and cons of Aadhaar bill

Further, there are no remedies available for governmental abuse of this provision.

Lastly, in terms of privacy, the concern of those people who have been opposing Aadhaar is not just that the biometric and other identity information may be leaked to private parties, but also that having a unique Aadhaar number helps private parties to combine and use other databases that are linked with Aadhaar numbers in a manner that is not within the subject’s control. This is not at all addressed in this bill, and we need a robust data protection law in order to do that.

There are some other crucial details that the law doesn’t address: Is user consent, to be taken by third parties that use the UID database for authentication, needed for each instance of authentication, or would a general consent hold forever? How can consent be revoked?

There were many other objections that were raised against the Aadhaar scheme that have not been addressed by the government. For instance, in a recent article in the Economic and Political Weekly, Hans Varghese Mathews points out that going by the test data UIDAI made available in 2012, for a population of 1.3 billion people, the incidence of false positives—the probability of the identities of two people matching—is 1/112.

This is far too high a ratio to be acceptable.

Actual data from the field in Andhra Pradesh—of people who were unable to claim rations under the public distribution system (PDS)—paints a worse picture. A survey commissioned by the Andhra Pradesh government said 48% of respondents pointed to Aadhaar-related failures as the cause of their inability to claim rations.

So, even if the Aadhaar numbers were no longer issued to Lord Hanuman (Rajasthan), to dogs (e.g., Tommy Singh, a mutt in Madhya Pradesh), and with photos of a tree (New Delhi), it might not prove to be usable in a country of India’s size, given the capabilities of the fingerprint machines. As my colleague Sunil Abraham notes, the law cannot fix technological flaws.

So, while one wishes one could welcome the government’s attempt to bring Aadhaar within a legislative framework, the fact is there are too many problems that still remain unaddressed for one to be optimistic.

Pranesh Prakash is policy director at the Centre for Internet and Society, a think tank.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/livemint-march-7-2016-pranesh-prakash-aadhaar-still-too-many-problems

World Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media Development

pranesh — 2016-02-17T17:03:42Z

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) had published a book in 2014 that examines free speech, expression and media development. The chapter contains a Foreword by Irina Bokova, Director General, UNESCO. Pranesh Prakash contributed to Independence: Introduction - Global Media Chapter. The book was edited by Courtney C. Radsch.

Foreword

Tectonic shifts in technology and economic models have vastly expanded the opportunities for press freedom and the safety of journalists, opening new avenues for freedom of expression for women and men across the world. Today, more and more people are able to produce, update and share information widely, within and across national borders. All of this is a blessing for creativity, exchange and dialogue.

At the same time, new threats are arising. In a context of rapid change, these are combining with older forms of restriction to pose challenges to freedom of expression, in the shape of controls not aligned with international standards for protection of freedom of expression and rising threats against journalists.

These developments raise issues that go to the heart of UNESCO’s mandate “to promote the flow of ideas by word and image” between all peoples, across the world. For UNESCO, freedom of expression is a fundamental human right that underpins all other civil liberties, that is vital for the rule of law and good governance, and that is a foundation for inclusive and open societies. Freedom of expression stands at the heart of media freedom and the practice of journalism as a form of expression aspiring to be in the public interest.

At the 36^th session of the General Conference (November 2011), Member States mandated UNESCO to explore the impact of change on press freedom and the safety of journalists. For this purpose, the Report has adopted four angles of analysis, drawing on the 1991 Windhoek Declaration, to review emerging trends through the conditions of media freedom, pluralism and independence, as well as the safety of journalists. At each level, the Report has also examined trends through the lens of gender equality.

The result is the portrait of change -- across the world, at all levels, featuring as much opportunity as challenge. The business of media is undergoing a revolution with the rise of digital networks, online platforms, internet intermediaries and social media. New actors are emerging, including citizen journalists, who are redrawing the boundaries of the media. At the same time, the Report shows that the traditional news institutions continue to be agenda-setters for media and public communications in general – even as they are also engaging with the digital revolution. The Report highlights also the mix of old and new challenges to media freedom, including increasing cases of threats against the safety of journalists.

The pace of change raises questions about how to foster freedom of expression across print, broadcast and internet media and how to ensure the safety of journalists. The Report draws on a rich array of research and is not prescriptive -- but it sends a clear message on the importance of freedom of expression and press freedom on all platforms.

To these ends, UNESCO is working across the board, across the world. This starts with global awareness raising and advocacy, including through World Press Freedom Day. It entails supporting countries in strengthening their legal and regulatory frameworks and in building capacity. It means standing up to call for justice every time a journalist is killed, to eliminate impunity. This is the importance of the United Nations Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity, spearheaded by UNESCO and endorsed by the UN Chief Executives Board in April 2012. UNESCO is working with countries to take this plan forward on the ground. We also seek to better understand the challenges that are arising – most recently, through a Global Survey on Violence against Female Journalists, with the International News Safety Institute, the International Women’s Media Foundation, and the Austrian Government.

Respecting freedom of expression and media freedom is essential today, as we seek to build inclusive, knowledge societies and a more just and peaceful century ahead. I am confident that this Report will find a wide audience, in Member States, international and regional organizations, civil society and academia, as well as with the media and journalists, and I wish to thank Sweden for its support to this initiative. This is an important contribution to understanding a world in change, at a time when the international community is defining a new global sustainable development agenda, which must be underpinned and driven by human rights, with particular attention to freedom of expression.

Executive Summary

Freedom of expression in general, and media development in particular, are core to UNESCO’s constitutional mandate to advance ‘the mutual knowledge and understanding of peoples, through all means of mass communication’ and promoting ‘the free flow of ideas by word and image.’ For UNESCO, press freedom is a corollary of the general right to freedom of expression. Since 1991, the year of the seminal Windhoek Declaration, which was endorsed by the UN General Assembly, UNESCO has understood press freedom as designating the conditions of media freedom, pluralism and independence, as well as the safety of journalists. It is within this framework that this report examines progress as regards press freedom, including in regard to gender equality, and makes sense of the evolution of media actors, news media institutions and journalistic roles over time.

This report has been prepared on the basis of a summary report on the global state of press freedom and the safety of journalists, presented to the General Conference of UNESCO Member States in November 2013, on the mandate of the decision by Member States taken at the 36th session of the General Conference of the Organization.[*]

The overarching global trend with respect to media freedom, pluralism, independence and the safety of journalists over the past several years is that of disruption and change brought on by technology, and to a lesser extent, the global financial crisis. These trends have impacted traditional economic and organizational structures in the news media, legal and regulatory frameworks, journalism practices, and media consumption and production habits. Technological convergence has expanded the number of and access to media platforms as well as the potential for expression. It has enabled the emergence of citizen journalism and spaces for independent media, while at the same time fundamentally reconfiguring journalistic practices and the business of news.

The broad global patterns identified in this report are accompanied by extensive unevenness within the whole. The trends summarized above, therefore, go hand in hand with substantial variations between and within regions as well as countries.

Download the PDF

[*]. 37 C/INF.4 16 September 2013 “Information regarding the implementation of decisions of the governing bodies”. http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0022/002230/223097e.pdf; http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0022/002230/223097f.pdf

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/unesco-world-trends-in-freedom-of-expression-and-media-development

World Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media Development

pranesh — 2016-02-17T16:41:28Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/world-trends-in-freedom-of-expression-and-media-development

CIS Submission to TRAI on Differential Pricing

pranesh — 2016-02-09T08:52:31Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/net-neutrality/2016-01-07_cis_trai-submission_differential-pricing

CIS's Comments on the CCWG-Accountability Draft Proposal

pranesh — 2016-01-29T15:17:48Z

The Centre for Internet & Society (CIS) gave its comments on the failures of the CCWG-Accountability draft proposal as well as the processes that it has followed.

We from the Centre for Internet and Society wishes to express our dismay at the consistent way in which CCWG-Accountability has completely failed to take critical inputs from organizations like ours (and others, some instances of which have been highlighted in Richard Hill’s submission) into account, and has failed to even capture our concerns and misgivings about the process — as expressed in our submission to the CCWG-Accountability’s 2nd Draft Proposal on Work Stream 1 Recommendations — in any document prepared by the CCWG. We cannot support the proposal in its current form.

Time for Comments

We believe firstly that the 21 day comment period itself was too short and is going to result effectively in many groups or categories of people from not being able to meaningfully participate in the process, which flies in the face of the values that ICANN claims to uphold. This extremely short period amounts to procedural unsoundness, and restrains educated discussion on the way forward, especially given that the draft has altered quite drastically in the aftermath to ICANN55.

Capture of ICANN and CCWG Process

The participation in the accountability-cross-community mailing list clearly shows that the process is dominated by developed countries (of the top 30 non-staff posters to the list, 26 were from the ‘WEOG’ UN grouping, with 14 being from the USA, with only 1 from Asia Pacific, 2 from Africa, and 1 from Latin America), by males (27 of the 30 non-staff posters), and by industry/commercial interests (17 of the top 30 non-staff posters). If this isn’t “capture”, what is? There is no stress test that overcomes this reality of capture of ICANN by Western industry interests. The global community is only nominally multistakeholder, while actually being grossly under-representative of the developing nations, women and minority genders, and communities that are not business communities or technical communities. For instance, of the 1010 ICANN-accredited registrars, 624 are from the United States, and 7 from the 54 countries of Africa.

Culling statistics from the accountability-cross-community mailing list, we find that of the top 30 posters (excluding ICANN staff):

57% were, as far as one could ascertain from public records, from a single country: the United States of America.
87% were, as far as one could ascertain from public records, participants from countries which are part of the WEOG UN grouping (which includes Western Europe, US, Canada, Israel, Australia, and New Zealand), which only has developed countries. None of those who participated substantively were from the EEC (Eastern European) group and only 1 was from Asia-Pacific and only 1 was from GRULAC (Latin American and Caribbean Group).
90% were male and 3 were female, as far as one could ascertain from public records.
57% were identifiable as primarily being from industry or the technical community, as far as one could ascertain from public records, with only 2 (7%) being readily identifiable as representing governments.

This lack of global multistakeholder representation greatly damages the credibility of the entire process, since it gains its legitimacy by claiming to represent the global multistakeholder Internet community.

Bogey of Governmental Capture

With respect to Stress Test 18, dealing with the GAC, the report proposes that the ICANN Bylaws, specifically Article XI, Section 2, be amended to create a provision where if two-thirds of the Board so votes, they can reject a full GAC consensus advice. This amendment is not connected to the fear of government capture or the fear that ICANN will become a government-led body; given that the advice given by the GAC is non-binding that is not a possibility. Given the state of affairs described in the submission made above, it is clear that for much of the world, their governments are the only way in which they can effectively engage within the ICANN ecosystem. Therefore, nullifying the effectiveness of GAC advice is harmful to the interests of fostering a multistakeholder ecosystem, and contributes to the strengthening of the kind of industry capture described above.

Jurisdiction

All discussions on the Sole Designator Model seem predicated on the unflinching certainty of ICANN’s jurisdiction continuing to remain in California, as the legal basis of that model is drawn from Californian corporate law. To quote the draft report itself, in Annexe 12, it is stated that:

"Jurisdiction directly influences the way ICANN’s accountability processes are structured and operationalized. The fact that ICANN today operates under the legislation of the U.S. state of California grants the corporation certain rights and implies the existence of certain accountability mechanisms. It also imposes some limits with respect to the accountability mechanisms it can adopt. The topic of jurisdiction is, as a consequence, very relevant for the CCWG-Accountability. ICANN is a public benefit corporation incorporated in California and subject to California state laws, applicable U.S. federal laws and both state and federal court jurisdiction."

Jurisdiction has been placed within the mandate of WS2, to be dealt with post the transition. However, there is no analysis in the 3rd Draft on how the Sole Designator Model would continue to be upheld if future Work Stream 2 discussions led to a consensus that there needed to be a shift in the jurisdiction of ICANN. In the event that ICANN shifts to, say, Delaware or Geneva, would there be a basis to the Sole Designator Model in the law? Therefore this is an issue that needs to be addressed before this model is adopted, else there is a risk of either this model being rendered infructuous in the future, or this model foreclosing open debate and discussion in Work Stream 2.

Right of Inspection

We strongly support the incorporation of the rights of Inspection under this model as per Section 6333 of the California Corporations Code as a fundamental bylaw. As there is a severe gap between the claims that ICANN raises about its own transparency and the actual amount of transparency that it upholds, we opine that the right of inspection needs to be provided to each member of the ICANN community.

Timeline for WS2 Reforms

We support the CCWG’s commitment to the review of the DIDP Process, which they have committed to enhancing in WS2. Our research on this matter indicates that ICANN has in practice been able to deflect most requests for information. It regularly utilised its internal processes and discussions with stakeholders clauses, as well as clauses on protecting financial interests of third parties (over 50% of the total non-disclosure clauses ever invoked - see chart below) to do away with having to provide information on pertinent matters such as its compliance audits and reports of abuse to registrars. We believe that even if ICANN is a private entity legally, and not at the same level as a state, it nonetheless plays the role of regulating an enormous public good, namely the Internet. Therefore, there is a great onus on ICANN to be far more open about the information that they provide. Finally, it is extremely disturbing that they have extended full disclosure to only 12% of the requests that they receive. An astonishing 88% of the requests have been denied, partly or otherwise. See "Peering behind the veil of ICANN's DIDP (II)".

In the present format, there has been little analysis on the timeline of WS2; the report itself merely states that:

"The CCWG-Accountability expects to begin refining the scope of Work Stream 2 during the upcoming ICANN 55 Meeting in March 2016. It is intended that Work Stream 2 will be completed by the end of 2016."

Without further clarity and specification of the WS2 timeline, meaningful reform cannot be initiated. Therefore we urge the CCWG to come up with a clear timeline for transparency processes.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/ciss-comments-on-the-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal

The 'Global Multistakholder Community' is Neither Global Nor Multistakeholder

pranesh — 2016-11-03T10:42:53Z

CIS research shows how Western, male, and industry-driven the IANA transition process actually is.

In March 2014, the US government announced that they were going to end the contract they have with ICANN to run something called the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), and hand over control to the “global multistakeholder community”. They insisted that the plan for transition had to come through a multistakeholder process and have stakeholders “across the global Internet community”.

Analysis of the process since then shows how flawed the “global multistakeholder community” that converges at ICANN has not actually represented the disparate interests and concerns of different stakeholders. CIS research has found that the discussions around IANA transition have not been driven by the “global multistakeholder community”, but mostly by males from industry in North America and Western Europe.

CIS analysed the five main mailing lists where the IANA transition plan was formulated: ICANN’s ICG Stewardship and CCWG Accountability lists; IETF’s IANAPLAN list; and the NRO’s IANAXFER list and CRISP lists. What we found was quite disheartening.

A total of 239 individuals participated cumulatively, across all five lists.
Only 98 substantively contributed to the final shape of the ICG proposal, if one takes a count of 20 mails (admittedly, an arbitrary cut-off) as a substantive contribution, with 12 of these 98 being ICANN staff some of whom were largely performing an administrative function.

We decided to look at the diversity within these substantive contributors using gender, stakeholder grouping, and region. We relied on public records, including GNSO SOI statements, and extensive searches on the Web. Given that, there may be inadvertent errors, but the findings are so stark that even a few errors wouldn’t affect them much.

2 in 5 (39 of 98, or 40%) were from a single country: the United States of America.
4 in 5 (77 of 98) were from countries which are part of the WEOG UN grouping (which includes Western Europe, US, Canada, Israel, Australia, and New Zealand), which only has developed countries.
None were from the EEC (Eastern European and Russia) group, and only 5 of 98 from all of GRULAC (Latin American and Caribbean Group).
4 in 5 (77 of 98) were male and 21 were female.
4 in 5 (76 of 98) were from industry or the technical community, and only 4 (or 1 in 25) were identifiable as primarily speaking on behalf of governments.

This shows also that the process has utterly failed in achieving the recommendation of Paragraph 6 of the 3 in 5 registrars are from the United States of America (624 out of 1010, as of March 2014, according to ICANN's accredited registrars list), with only 0.6% being from the 54 countries in Africa (7 out of 1010).

45% of all the registries are from the United States of America! (307 out of 672 registries listed in ICANN’s registry directory in August 2015.)

66% (34 of 51) of the Business Constituency at ICANN are from a single country: the United States of America. (N.B.: This page doesn’t seem to be up-to-date.)

This shows that businesses from the United States of America continues to dominate ICANN to a very significant degree, and this is also reflected in the nature of the dialogue within ICANN, including the fact that the proposal that came out of the ICANN ‘global multistakeholder community’ on IANA transition proposes a clause that requires the ‘IANA Functions Operator’ to be a US-based entity. For more on that issue, see this post on the jurisdiction issue at ICANN (or rather, on the lack of a jurisdiction issue at ICANN).

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/global-multistakeholder-community-neither-global-nor-multistakeholder

Comments on the DoT Panel Report via MyGov

pranesh — 2015-09-26T10:16:44Z

On behalf of the Centre for Internet and Society, I must commend the Department of Telecom Panel on its report. Overall, it displays a far better understanding of the underlying issues than the TRAI consultation paper did, and is overall a good effort at balancing the different sides. However, some of its most important recommendations are completely off-mark and would be disastrous if accepted by the government.

It is praiseworthy that the panel emphasizes the separation in regulatory terms between the network layer and the service layer. This also means that telecom carriers should be regulated differently from OTT services.

Licensing of Communication OTT Services

The proposal by the DoT panel of a licensing regime for communication OTT services is a terrible idea. It would presumptively hold all licence non-holders to be unlawful, and that should not be the case; as the panel itself notes, apps that lower the cost of communication are a welcome development and should be encouraged by the government and not made presumptively unlawful.

While it is in India's national interest to want to hold VoIP services to account if they do not follow legitimate regulations, it is far better to do this through ex-post regulations rather than an ex-ante licensing scheme.

A licensing scheme would benefit Indian VoIP companies (including services like Hike, which Airtel has invested in) over foreign companies like Viber, or free/open source technologies like WebRTC. The Universal Licence is designed for a world where all the licencees have an operational presence in India. This is not true of communications OTT services. Therefore a licensing regime would unjustly favour some services over others.

Further, VoIP services need not be provided by a company: a person can choose to run XMPP, SIP, or Mumble — all of which are protocol that support VoIP — on their own computers. Will a licensing regime force such individuals' many of whom may not be Indian nationals — to become licence-holders if they facilitate domestic communications within India? The DoT panel report doesn't say. This would also result in a licensing regime unjustly favouring some services over others.

The report also doesn't say how one would distinguish between OTT communication services and OTT application services, when many apps such as personal assistance apps like HelpChat, are centred around communications. It also does not mention what regulatory distinction exists between text communication services and video/voice communication services, or between purely domestic and international video/voice communications. Stating that certain telecom companies are currently earning most of their revenue from domestic voice traffic will not suffice as a regulatory, just as it did not suffice to say that VSNL's international telephony monopoly earned it a lot of money. Regulatory fairness is the important issue and not protecting specific business models. Thus, there is no rational distinction to be drawn. Even if the panel has some regulatory distinction that it has not stated, this is an impossibility to enforce. Much domestic IP traffic is 'round-tripped', with traffic leaving India and coming back in. How would the regulator propose to regulate that?

Will there be a revenue-sharing mechanism, as is currently the case under the Unified Licence? If so, how will it be calculated in case of services like WhatsApp? These questions too find no answer in the report.

Given these numerous objections and unanswered questions, the government would be well-advised not seek to license OTT communications services. Instead, it would be useful for the government to hold public consultations about:

1. What Universal Licence conditions makes sense in the world of IP-based services, and international services?
2. How can we frame ex-post regulations that address legitimate concerns? Is there overlap with provisions of the IT Act such as s.69, s.69B, s.79, and others?
3. How can we ensure that the regulatory burden for telecom players with respect to their being able to provide IP-based services that are equivalent to OTT communication services?

Net neutrality

While the DoT panel reiterates a number of times that the core principles of Net neutrality should be adhered to, it nowhere defines what these core tenets are. We suggest the following definition:

net neutrality is the principle that we should regulate gatekeepers to ensure they do not use their power to unjustly discriminate between similarly situated persons, content or traffic.

The above definition applies to the way the ISPs treat consumers, treat interconnecting networks, as well as the way they treat traffic internally.
We agree with the panel that in that while Net neutrality should find place in a new law, for the time being Net neutrality principles can be enforced through the licence agreement between the DoT and telecom providers.

Traffic Management

It is unclear what precisely the DoT panel means by "application-agnostic" and "application-specific" network management. Different scholars on this issue — such as Barbara van Schewick and Christopher Yoo — mean different things when they use the word "application". Without a definition, it is difficult to say whether the panel's recommendation on that front are sound.
Instead, we suggest the following tests:
Discrimination between classes of traffic for the sake of network management should only be permissible if:

there is an intelligible differentia between the classes which are to be treated differently, and
there is a rational nexus between the differential treatment and the aim of such differentiation, and
the aim sought to be furthered is legitimate, and is related to the security, stability, or efficient functioning of the network, or is a technical limitation outside the control of the ISP, and
the network management practice is the least harmful manner in which to achieve the aim.

As for the provision of enterprise and managed services, which we more broadly term "specialized services", we would recommend:

Provision of specialized services is permitted if and only if it is shown that
The service is available to the user only upon request, and not without their active choice, and
The service cannot be reasonably provided with "best efforts" delivery guarantee that is available over the Internet, and hence requires discriminatory treatment, or
The discriminatory treatment does not unduly harm the provision of the rest of the Internet to other customers.

Lastly, we would recommend that the above regulatory guidlines only be applied against ISPs, and not against public providers of Internet connectivity, such as a library, a school, an airport, a hotel, etc.

Zero-rating

On the contentious issue of zero-rating, a process that involves both ex-ante and ex-post regulation is envisaged to prevent harmful zero-rating, while allowing beneficial zero-rating. Further, the report notes that the supposed altruistic or "public interest" motives of the zero-rating scheme do not matter if they result in harm to competition, distort consumer markets, violate the core tenets of Net neutrality, or unduly benefit an Internet "gatekeeper".

Much of the discussion around zero-rating has been happening around an assumption of common understanding of the phrase. Unfortunately, that is not true. There is no consensus as to whether a "special Facebok pack of 200MB for Rs.20" offered by a telecom company constitutes zero-rating or not. Without a working definition of zero-rating, not much progress can be made.

We propose the following as a definition:

Zero-rating is the practice of not counting (aka "zero-rating") certain traffic towards a subscriber's regular Internet usage.

The zero-rated traffic could be zero-priced or fixed-price; capped or uncapped; subscriber-paid, Internet service-paid, paid for by both, or unpaid; content- or source/destination-based, or agnostic to content or source/destination; automatically provided by the ISP or chosen by the customer.

We believe that zero-rating can be non-discriminatory in nature, and such zero-rating should not be prohibited. Having a system with both ex-ante and ex-post checks is rather heavy-handed regulation, but since the issue is very contentious in India, we believe it might be merited.

We thank you for giving us this opportunity to comment.
Pranesh Prakash, Policy Director at the Centre for Internet and Society

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/telecom/blog/comments-on-dot-panel-report-via-mygov

Centre for Internet and Society

CIS Submission to TRAI Consultation on Free Data

Question 1 Is there a need to have TSP agnostic platform to provide free data or suitable reimbursement to users, without violating the principles of Differential Pricing for Data laid down in TRAI Regulation? Please suggest the most suitable model to achieve the objective.

Is There a Need for Free Data?

Goal: Regulating Gatekeeping

Models for Free Data

Government Incentives For Non-Differentiated Free Data

ISP subsidies

Rewards model

Recharge API

“0.example” sites

OTT-agnostic free data

Unified marketplace

Question 2

Question 3

Question 4

Jurisdiction: The Taboo Topic at ICANN

Why is the U.S. government removing the NTIA contract?

Why is the Transition Happening Now?

ICANN Adjudged Mature Enough

L'affaire Snowden

Why Jurisdiction is Important

U.S. Doublespeak on Jurisdiction

Why Has the ICG Failed to Consider Jurisdiction?

Why the By-Laws Make Things Worse & Why "Work Stream 2" Can't Address Most Jurisdiction Issues

The Transition Plan Fails the NETmundial Statement

What We Need: Jurisdictional Resilience

List of Blocked 'Escort Service' Websites

Full List of Blocked URLs

CIS's Comments on the Draft Geospatial Information Regulation Bill, 2016

Comments on the Draft Geospatial Information Regulation Bill, 2016

1. Preliminary

2. Centre for Internet and Society

3. Comments

3.1. General Remarks

3.2. Definition of “Geospatial Information” is over-broad, all- encompassing

3.3. Unreasonable regulation of acquiring and end-use of geospatial information

3.4. Removal of journalistic, political, artistic, creative, and speculative depictions of India from the scope of Section 6

3.5. Absence of Publicly Available and Openly Reusable Standardised National Boundary of India

3.6. Remove Requirement for Prior License for Acquire, Dissemination, Publication, or Distribution of Geospatial Information

3.7. Unenforceable jurisdictional scope

3.8. Negative implications for rights of citizens

3.9. Overly broad powers and responsibilities of the Apex Committee and Enforcement Authority, and lack of adequate oversight

3.10. Remove the Security Vetting Authority’s power of delegation

3.11. Negative implications for innovation and India’s digital economy

3.12. Disproportionate penalty for acquisition of geospatial information

3.13. Improper and inconsistent usage of terms in the draft bill

3.14. Lack of reference to technical implementation guidance

Accessible ICT Procurement

Key Global Initiatives

Conclusion and Recommendations:

CIS Submission to TRAI Consultation on Regulatory Framework for Over-the-Top Services

CIS Position Paper on Net Neutrality in India (Background Submission to TRAI)

CIS Counter Comments on TRAI Consultation on Differential Pricing

Aadhaar: Still Too Many Problems

Also Read

Pros and cons of Aadhaar bill

World Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media Development

Foreword

Executive Summary

World Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media Development

CIS Submission to TRAI on Differential Pricing

CIS's Comments on the CCWG-Accountability Draft Proposal

Time for Comments

Capture of ICANN and CCWG Process

Bogey of Governmental Capture

Jurisdiction

Right of Inspection

Timeline for WS2 Reforms

The 'Global Multistakholder Community' is Neither Global Nor Multistakeholder

Comments on the DoT Panel Report via MyGov

Licensing of Communication OTT Services

Net neutrality

Traffic Management

Zero-rating

Question 1
Is there a need to have TSP agnostic platform to provide free data or suitable reimbursement to users, without violating the principles of Differential Pricing for Data laid down in TRAI Regulation? Please suggest the most suitable model to achieve the objective.