Centre for Internet and Society

Ban on pornography temporary, says government

pranesh — 2015-09-13T08:46:24Z

The government has taken a dramatic U-turn from its stated position on internet pornography.

The article was published in Business Standard on August 4, 2015. Pranesh Prakash has been quoted.

A year after conveying to the Supreme Court that a blanket ban on internet pornography was not possible, through the department of electronics and information technology, it has asked internet providers to disable 857 websites that carry adult content. A senior official from the department of telecommunications (DoT) said the ban was a temporary measure, till the final order is announced by the apex court on August 10.

The government is looking at setting up an ombudsman to oversee cyber content, which will have representatives from NGOs, child activists and the government. The DoT official said, “There has to be some kind of regulatory oversight away from the government intervention… An ombudsman might be set up for overseeing cyber related content issues.”

The genesis of the current notification lies in the public interest litigation (PIL) filed by advocate Vijay Panjwani in April 2013. The PIL has sought curbs on these websites on the internet, especially the ones showing child pornography. The senior DoT official conveyed that the blocking of 857 websites was in compliance with the SC directive asking for measures to block porn sites, particularly those dealing with child pornography.

The July 31 notification from DoT has advised internet service licensees to disable content on 857 websites, as the content "hosted on these websites relates to morality and decency as given in Article 19(2) of the Constitution of India". The government had stated last year that it was not technologically feasible to monitor such contents as it would require physical intervention, which would impact data speeds.

In December 2014, the government had approached telecom providers and internet service providers to help identify such sites, but the service providers did not cooperate. Consequently, the government has gone ahead and identified 857 websites. However, the government has not given any detail as what was the criterion to identify such websites.

Pranesh Prakash, policy director at the Centre for Internet and Society, says DoT has used the provision of 79 (3) (b) of the IT Act, which is a convoluted Section that the intermediatory (ISPs) may lose protection from liability. This section is very convulated, the provisions for website blocking does not allow blocking porn. In section 69 (a), the entire procedure is that it allows an opportunity for the blocked website to be heard. “I can't comment on the reasons that the government for doing this. I know the order says the ban relates to morality, decency," adds Prakash.

Last year, the government took a position that said blocking these websites was not feasible, given that these sites are hosted outside India. In case of any ban, these sites can be relocated within hours to bypass it. Pavan Duggal, an advocate who specialises in cyber laws, has called the disablement 'cosmetic,' as it will not have the requisite deterrent effect. Duggal says: "This is a lost battle from the word go, as it is impossible to disable access permanently."

Watching such content in India is currently not an offence and, thus, the government is invoking “morality and decency” while seeking a curb on a fundamental right — Freedom of Speech & Expression. Under Article 19 (2) of the Constitution, the state can curb a fundamental right in order to maintain public order, decency or morality.

TO BAN OR NOT TO BAN

2013

Advocate Vijay Panjwani & Kamlesh Vaswani file PIL seeking curbs on internet pornography

Aug 2014

Supreme Court bench under Chief Justice R M Lodha agreed with the PIL and sought strict laws to curb online content

8 Jul 2015

Chief Justice of India H L Dattu upholds personal liberty and refuses to pass an interim order. Asks government to take a stand on the issue
CJI, heading a three-judge Bench, asks government to a detailed affidavit within four weeks

Jul 31

DoT sends notification seeking ban on 857 websites
Currently, there are no laws banning internet pornography in India, other than those related to children
Government’s stated position has been that it is difficult to curb online content

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/business-standard-august-4-2015-ban-on-pornography-temporary-says-government

Indian Porn Ban is Partially Lifted But Sites Remain Blocked

pranesh — 2015-09-13T09:00:03Z

The Indian government made a quick about-face on its order to block hundreds of pornography websites on Tuesday, partially lifting the ban after political backlash against the moral policing.

The article was published in Wall Street Journal on August 5, 2015. Pranesh Prakash gave his inputs.

But the websites remained blocked because Internet service providers were afraid of legal trouble.

The new order from the Department of Telecommunications said that Internet service providers could unblock any of the 857 websites, so long as they don’t contain child pornography. However, the websites remain blocked because service providers say they have no way of knowing whether they contain child porn, and no control over whether they will in the future.

Ravi Shankar Prasad, the IT minister, said Tuesday night that the government would trim down the list of banned sites, to focus only on those that contain child porn.

“A new notification will be issued shortly. The ban will be partially withdrawn. Sites that do not promote child porn will be unbanned,” said Mr. Prasad on the TV news channel India Today.

The wording of the new order created confusion, because it appears to put the responsibility for policing the Internet for child pornography on service providers.

“How can we go ahead? What if something comes up tomorrow [on one of these sites], which has child porn, or something else?,” said an executive at an Indian service provider who asked not to be named.

“The onus cannot be put on the service providers. What the government is doing is inherently unfair, it is not what the law requires,” said Pranesh Prakash, policy director at the Centre for Internet and Society, a Bangalore-based civil liberties advocacy group. It is the government’s job to determine what violates the law, not private companies, Mr. Prakash said.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-wall-street-journal-august-5-2015-sean-mclain-indian-porn-ban-is-partially-lifted-but-sites-remain-blocked

Porn block in India sparks outrage

pranesh — 2015-08-05T02:10:46Z

India’s government has triggered a storm of protest after blocking 857 alleged pornography websites, with privacy and internet freedom campaigners, as well as consumers, condemning the move as arbitrary and unlawful.

The article by Amanda Hodge was published in the Australian on August 5, 2015. Pranesh Prakash gave his inputs.

The order, enforced since Sunday by the country’s main internet service providers, comes amid debate about the influence of pornography on sex crime in India, and as the Supreme Court considers a petition by lawyer Kamlesh Vaswani to ban pornographic websites that harm children.

The government has been forced to defend the move, saying it was taken in response to Supreme Court criticism at inaction against child pornography websites, although the Supreme Court itself has refused to impose any interim ban while it considers the petition. The websites — a fraction of the world’s millions of internet pornography sites — will remain blocked until the government figures out how to restrict access, a spokesman said.

Critics have slammed the measure as unconstitutional and pointed out the list includes adult humour sites that contain no pornographic content. Others have suggested it is another intrusion into the private lives of ordinary Indians by an administration intent on pushing a puritanical Hindu agenda, citing the recent ban on beef in several states and an alleged “Hindu-isation” of school textbooks.

That prompted outrage from Telecom Minister Ravi Shankar Prasad. “I reject with contempt the charge that it is a Talibani government. Our government supports free media, respects communication on social media and has respected freedom of communication always,” he said.

While India has no law preventing citizens accessing internet pornography, regulations do restrict the publishing of “obscene information in electronic form”. Centre for Internet and Society policy director Pranesh Prakash told The Australian yesterday that some elements of that act were welcome — such as prohibition of child pornography and the uploading of a person’s private parts without consent — but “the provisions relating to ‘sexually explicit materials’ are far too broad, with no exceptions made for art, architecture, education or literature”.

Mr Prakash said the pornography ban amounted to an “abdication of the government’s duty”, given the list of sites blocked was provided on request to the government by one of the Vaswani petitioners. “The additional solicitor-general essentially asked one of the petitioners to provide a list of websites, which she passed on to the Department of Information Technology, which in turn passed to Department of Telecommunications asking for them to be blocked or disabled.

“That is not acceptable in a democracy where it is not the government which has actually found any of these websites to be unlawful.” Mr Prakash also criticised the secrecy surrounding the order, which he said contravened Indian law requiring a public declaration of any intended ban so that it might be challenged. The bans were made under “Rule 12” of India’s IT Act, which empowers the government to force ISPs to block sites when it is “necessary or expedient”.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-australian-news-august-5-2015-amanda-hodge-porn-block-in-india-sparks-outrage

Porn ban: People will soon learn to circumvent ISPs and govt orders, expert says

pranesh — 2015-08-05T01:47:52Z

The article by Karthikeyan Hemalatha was published in the Times of India on August 2. Pranesh Prakash gave inputs.

The government used other sections of the Act to circumvent this provision. Sources in the Department of Telecommunication, which comes under the ministry of communications and information technology, said a notification had been issued under Section 79 (b) of IT Act under which internet service providers could be penalized for not following government orders. "Though the section protects an internet service provider (ISP) from legal action for the content it may allow, it can be penalized for not following government orders to ban them," said Prakash.

Last month, the Supreme Court declined to pass an interim order to block websites which have pornographic content. "Such interim orders cannot be passed by this court. Somebody may come to the court and say 'look I am above 18 and how can you stop me from watching it within the four walls of my room?' It is a violation of Article 21 [right to personal liberty]," said Chief Justice H L Dattu.

The judge was reacting to a public interest litigation filed by advocate Kamlesh Vashwani who was seeking to block porn websites in the country. "The issue is definitely serious and some steps need to be taken. The Centre is expected to take a stand. Let us see what stand the Centre will take," the Chief Justice said and directed the Centre to reply within four weeks. Over the weekend, the stance became clear.

Sources also say that Section 19 (2) of the Constitution was used for the ban. The section allows the government to impose "reasonable restrictions in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the state, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court."

For netizens, the government could actually be providing crash courses on proxy sites. "This is the best way to teach people on how to circumvent ISPs and government orders," said Prakash, adding that real abusive porn sites might still be available.

"There is no dynamic mechanism to block all sites with pornographic content. The government has to individually pick URLs (uniform resource locator) to ban websites. Right now, only popular websites have been banned and the little known abusive sites like those that propagate revenge porn or child porn," said Prakash. "No ban can be comprehensive," he added.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-times-of-india-august-2-2015-karthikeyan-hemalatha-porn-ban

India blocks access to 857 porn sites

pranesh — 2015-08-05T01:31:32Z

India has blocked free access to 857 porn sites in what it says is a move to prevent children from accessing them.

The story was published by BBC on August 3, 2015. Pranesh Prakash gave his inputs.

Adults will still be able to access the sites using virtual private networks (VPNs) or proxy servers. In July, the Supreme Court expressed its unhappiness over the government's inability to block sites, especially those featuring child pornography.

Telecom companies have said they will not be able to enforce the "ban" immediately.

"We have to block each site one by one and it will take a few days for all service providers to block all the sites," an unnamed telecom company executive told The Times of India newspaper.

A senior official, who preferred to remained unnamed, told the BBC Hindi that India's department of telecommunications had "advised" telecom operators and Internet service providers to "control free and open access" to 857 porn sites.

"There is no total ban. This was done in the backdrop of Supreme Court's observation on children having free access to porn sites. The idea is also to protect India's cultural fabric. This will not prevent adults from visiting porn sites," the official said.

In July, the top court had observed that it was not for the court to order a ban on porn sites.

"It is an issue for the government to deal with. Can we pass an interim order directing blocking of all adult websites? And let us keep in mind the possible contention of a person who could ask what crime have I committed by browsing adult websites in private within the four walls of my house. Could he not argue about his right to freedom to do something within the four walls of his house without violating any law?," the court said.

According to statistics released by adult site Pornhub, India was its fourth largest source of traffic in 2014, behind the US, UK and Canada. Pranesh Prakash of the Bangalore based Centre for Internet and Society said the directive to block the 857 sites was "the largest single order of its kind" in India.

"The government's reasoning that it is not a ban because adults can still access the porn sites is ridiculous," he told the BBC. The move has caused a great deal of comment on Indian social media networks, with many prominent personalities coming forward to condemn it.

Popular author Chetan Bhagat, writer and commentator Nilanjana Roy, politician Milind Deora and director Ram Gopal Varma have all added their voices to the debate.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/bbc-news-august-3-2015-india-blocks-access-to-857-porn-sites

India launches crackdown on online porn

pranesh — 2015-08-05T01:21:12Z

India has launched a crackdown on internet pornography, banning access to more than 800 adult websites, including Playboy and Pornhub.

The article by James Crabtree published in Financial Times on August 3, 2015 quotes Pranesh Prakash.

The restrictions followed a ruling from India’s telecoms ministry ordering internet service providers, including international telecoms groups operating in the country such as the UK’s Vodafone, to block 857 such sites.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government provided no public justification for the unexpected ban when it came into effect at the weekend. However, on Monday India’s telecoms ministry said that the order, issued under India’s Information Technology Act, had been prompted by comments made by a supreme court judge during a hearing in July.

The ministry said that the restrictions were temporary and did not amount to a “blanket” ban, arguing that internet users running virtual private networks, which can be used to access blocked sites, could still view the material. “It isn’t that they are being banned lock, stock and barrel,” the ministry said. “The justice noted that free and open access to these websites.... should be controlled, but these sites will continue to be available through the mechanism of a VPN.”

The crackdown is set to raise fresh concerns about sudden and sweeping legal restrictions in India, after the introduction of a ban on the sale of beef earlier this year in the western state of Maharashtra, a move that was supported by Mr Modi’s government. The ruling also drew criticism from legal experts following broader concerns about a recent rise in poorly-targeted internet rules, including some restrictions on global social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter.

Pranesh Prakash of the Bangalore-based Centre for Internet and Society think-tank questioned the basis of the ruling, describing it as a further example of a “clumsy” approach to online regulation.

“There is no proper justification that they have given for banning all porn, rather than child porn or revenge porn or something like that,” he said. “The reaction is heavy handed, and has been done under the cloak of secrecy.” The remarks by a judge cited by India’s government as a rationale for the ban were a comment made in court rather than a legal ruling, Mr Prakash added, casting further doubt on the basis for the restrictions.

India’s mix of strict regulation and conservative public morals mean explicit sexual content is almost unheard of in mainstream media, where Bollywood films seldom featuring more than a chaste on-screen embrace.However India’s fast-growing internet population of about 300m is now both the world’s second largest after China, and an increasingly important sources for traffic for global pornographic websites.

Pornhub, which is the world’s 66th most visited website according to ranking service Alexa, said Indians were the fourth largest national users of its content during 2014.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/financial-times-james-crabtree-august-3-2015-india-launches-crackdown-on-online-porn

Proxies and VPNs: Why govt can't ban porn websites?

pranesh — 2015-09-13T08:26:17Z

The government's move to block more than 800 pornographic websites has led experts to question whether this latest attempt to police the internet is even feasible.

The article by Siladitya Ray was published in the Hindustan Times on August 3, 2015. Pranesh Prakash was quoted.

Internet service providers (ISPs) have confirmed they received letters from the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) on Saturday that directed them to block certain websites. But can the government stop users from visiting porn sites?

The answer seems to be no.

"It is extremely easy to circumvent these blocks, using virtual private networks (VPNs) and proxies that anonymise your traffic," said Pranesh Prakash, policy director at the Centre for Internet and Society in Bengaluru.

A cursory Google search on how to unblock porn websites throws up millions of how-tos and guides on using proxies and VPNs to get around restrictions set by authorities. All these services anonymise users’ web traffic by routing them through foreign servers.

According to data from Pornhub, one of the world's biggest porn sites, India ranks fifth for the most daily visitors to the website. Pornhub saw a total of 78.9 billion video views globally in 2014.

The government can try to keep up with proxies and block them too. But as proxies change on a daily basis and there are always dozens of functioning proxies to choose from across, blocking all of them will be a near impossible task.

Tor, an anonymity network, is also a popular way to surf blocked sites.

But is it legal to circumvent blocks put in place by authorities by using VPNs and proxies?

There is no law in India that prohibits viewing pornography, experts say. Section 67 of the Information Technology Act only deals with "publishing obscene information in electronic form".

This provision has been interpreted as a measure to criminalise the posting of pornographic content online. However, accessing "obscene" content privately – such as within the four walls of a person’s home – is not illegal, say experts.

In July, while hearing a petition seeking the blocking of pornographic websites, Supreme Court Chief Justice HL Dattu wondered whether the court could restrain an adult from watching pornography within his home and described such a ban as a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution, which grants the right to personal liberty to its citizens.

But what about the legality of using VPNs and proxies? “There are no laws preventing the use of VPNs and proxies in India," said Prakash.

Are proxies and VPNs safe?

While the use of proxies and VPNs is very simple, they do come with their own set of problems. These services have access to all your browsing data and may push adware and other forms of malware.

Prakash advised that users should only choose services that are well known and have a good reputation.

"Sites like TorrentFreak put out annual lists of the top VPNs available," he said. These can be used as a guide to determine what services are safe.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/hindustan-times-august-3-2015-siladitya-ray-proxies-and-vpns

DOT Order Blocking 857 Websites on Grounds of Decency and Morality

pranesh — 2015-08-03T07:42:53Z

Copy of leaked DOT order blocking 857 websites on grounds of morality and decency, claiming powers under section 79(3)(b) of the Information Technology Act.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/dot-morality-block-order-2015-07-31

Indian government orders ISPs to block 857 porn websites

pranesh — 2015-09-13T08:18:33Z

The Indian government has ordered a large number of porn websites to be blocked, creating an uproar among users and civil rights groups in the country.

The blog post by John Ribeiro was originally published by IDG News Service and mirrored on PC World website on August 2, 2015.

The Department of Telecommunications has issued orders for the blocking of 857 websites serving pornography, said two persons familiar with the matter, who declined to be named.

Section 69 (A) of India’s Information Technology Act allows the government to order blocking of public access to websites and other information through computer resources, though this section appears to be designed to be invoked when a threat is perceived to the sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the state, friendly relations with foreign states or public order.

“The government cannot on its own block private access to pornography under current statutes,” said Pranesh Prakash, policy director of the Centre for Internet and Society in Bangalore. “Parliament has not authorized the government to ban porn on its own.”

“However, courts have in the past ordered specific websites to be blocked for specific offences such as defamation, though as far as I know not for obscenity,” Prakash added.

Viewing pornography privately is not a crime in the country, though its sale and distribution is an offense.

Some porn websites were still accessible through certain Internet service providers on Monday, as some ISPs took some time to implement the order. “All the 857 websites will be blocked by all ISPs today,” said a source in the ISP industry, who requested anonymity. “As licensees we have to follow the orders.”

The government could not be immediately reached for comment.

Reports of the blocks created a furore among Internet users in the country, who criticized the move on Reddit, Twitter and other social media.

India’s Supreme Court struck down in March as unconstitutional an Internet law that provided for the arrest of people sending online messages considered offensive or menacing. But it upheld Section 69 (A) in that same ruling, which it described as a “narrowly drawn provision” limited to a few subjects.

In a public interest lawsuit on the blocking of pornography, the Supreme Court last month declined to issue an interim order that would block porn websites at the request of the private litigant, according to a report.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/idg-news-service-august-2-2015-indian-govt-orders-isps-to-block-857-porn-websites

Will Indians have to pay for WhatsApp?

pranesh — 2015-08-24T02:00:56Z

India's Department of Telecommunications (DoT) formed a panel in January 2015 to look into net neutrality in the country.

This was originally published by BBC on July 25. Pranesh Prakash has been quoted.

Net neutrality means service providers should treat all traffic equally. Users should be able to access all websites at the same speed and cost.

A battle to decide the future of the internet in India is being fought online, between telecom users and operators.

The panel has now released its report to the public and invited comments. Pranesh Prakash from the Centre for Internet Studies decodes the report and what it means for Indians.

What does the panel say?

Internet-based Over-the-top (OTT) communication services like WhatsApp, Viber, and the like are currently taking advantage of "regulatory arbitrage", meaning that the regulations that apply to non-Internet based communications services (telephone calls) are different from OTT communications services.

Under current rules, the OTT services don't have to get a licence from the government, don't have to abide by anti-spam, do-not-disturb regulations, share any revenue with the government or abide by national security conditions. The panel wants to bring these services under a licensing regime.

The report distinguishes between Internet-based voice calls (voice over IP, or VoIP) and messaging services and doesn't wish to interfere with the latter. This means it could regulate services like Skype, Viber and WhatsApp calls but not WhatsApp or Viber messages. It also distinguishes between domestic and international VoIP calls, and believes only the former need regulation. It is unclear on what basis these distinctions are made.

The core principles of net neutrality - which are undefined in the report, though definitions proposed in submissions they've received are quoted - should be adhered to. In the long-run, these should find place in a new law, but for the time being they can be enforced through the licence agreement between the government and telecom providers.

Where does the panel report go wrong?

The proposal by the panel to regulate VoIP services like Skype or Viber is a terrible idea.

Many important terms are left undefined, and many distinctions that the report draws are left unexplained. For instance, it is unclear on what regulatory basis the report distinguishes between domestic and international VoIP calls or between regulation of messaging services and VoIP services.

Will it increase cost of access to WhatsApp and Viber?

"Zero-rating" is a policy whereby telecoms providers agree not to pass on the costs of handling the data traffic so that consumers can receive services for free.

On the one hand, this could decrease the cost of access to WhatsApp and Viber. But that might not be allowed because free services could harm competition and distort markets.

Whether this will lead to consumers paying for WhatsApp and similar services depends on what kinds of regulations are placed on them, and if any costs are imposed on them.

Does the report uphold net neutrality?

The report is clear that it strongly endorses the "core principles of net neutrality".

On the issue of "zero-rating" the panel proposes some sound measures, saying that there should be a two-part mechanism for ensuring that "harmful" zero-rating doesn't go through.

First, telecom services need to submit "zero-rating" tariff proposals to an expert body constituted by telecoms department.

Second, consumers will be able to complain about the harmful usage of "zero-rating" by any service provider, which may result in a fine.

Where have people got the report wrong?

There have been reports saying that the panel has recommended increased charges for domestic VoIP calls. This is untrue.

There are reports saying the panel has given the go-ahead for all forms of zero-rating. Once again, this is untrue. The panel cites instances of zero-rating that aren't discriminatory, violative of net neutrality and don't harm competition or distort consumer markets (such as zero-rating of all Internet traffic for a limited time period). Then it goes on to state that the regulator should not allow zero-rating that violates the core principles of net neutrality.

Pranesh Prakash is policy director at the Centre for Internet and Society. A longer article he wrote on the panel report can be accessed here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/bbc-july-25-2015-will-indians-have-to-pay-for-whatsapp

Clearing Misconceptions: What the DoT Panel Report on Net Neutrality Says (and Doesn't)

pranesh — 2015-07-21T12:36:26Z

There have been many misconceptions about what the DoT Panel Report on Net Neutrality says: the most popular ones being that they have recommended higher charges for services like WhatsApp and Viber, and that the report is an anti-Net neutrality report masquerading as a pro-Net neutrality report. Pranesh Prakash clears up these and other incorrect notions about the report in this brief analysis.

Background of the DoT panel

In January 2015, the Department of Telecommunication (DoT) formed a panel to look into "net neutrality from public policy objective, its advantages and limitations," as well the impact of a "regulated telecom services sector and unregulated content and applications sector". After spending a few months collecting both oral and written testimony from a number of players in this debate, and analysing it, on July 16 that panel submitted its report to the DoT and released it to the public for comments (till August 15, 2015). At the same time, independently, the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) is also considering the same set of issues. TRAI received more than a million responses in response to its consultation paper — the most TRAI has ever received on any topic — the vast majority of of them thanks in part to the great work of the Save the Internet campaign. TRAI is yet to submit its recommendations to the DoT. Once those recommendations are in, the DoT will have to take its call on how to go ahead with these two sets of issues: regulation of certain Internet-based communications services, and net neutrality.

Summary of the DoT panel report

The DoT panel had the tough job of synthesising the feedback from dozens of people and organizations. In this, they have done an acceptable job. Although, in multiple places, the panel has wrongly summarised the opinions of the "civil society" deponents: I was one of the deponents on the day that civil society actors presented their oral submissions, so I know. For instance, the panel report notes in 4.2.9.c that "According to civil society, competing applications like voice OTT services were eroding revenues of the government and the TSPs, creating security and privacy concerns, causing direct as well as indirect losses." I do not recall that being the main thrust of any civil society participant's submission before the panel. That having been said, one might still legitimately claim that none of these or other mistakes (which include errors like "emergency" instead of "emergence", "Tim Burners Lee" instead of "Tim Berners-Lee", etc.) are such that they have radically altered the report's analysis or recommendations.

The report makes some very important points that are worth noting, which can be broken into two broad headings:

On governmental regulation of OTTs

Internet-based (i.e., over-the-top, or "OTT") communications services (like WhatsApp, Viber, and the like) are currently taking advantage of "regulatory arbitrage": meaning that the regulations that apply to non-IP communications services and IP communications services are different. Under the current "unified licence" regime, WhatsApp, Viber, and other such services don't have to get a licence from the government, don't have to abide by anti-spam Do-Not-Disturb regulations, do not have to share any part of their revenue with the government, do not have to abide by national security terms in the licence, and in general are treated differently from other telecom services. The report wishes to bring these within a licensing regime.
The report distinguishes between Internet-based voice calls (voice over IP, or VoIP) and messaging services, and doesn't wish to interfere with the latter. It also distinguishes between domestic and international VoIP calls, and believes only the former need regulation. It is unclear on what bases these distinctions are made.
OTT "application services" do not need special telecom-oriented regulation.
There should a separation in regulatory terms between the network layer and the service layer. While this doesn't mean much in the short-term for Net neutrality, it will be very important in the long-term for ICT regulation, and is very welcome.

On Net neutrality

The core principles of Net neutrality — which are undefined in the report, though definitions proposed in submissions they've received are quoted — should be adhered to. In the long-run, these should find place in a new law, but for the time being they can be enforced through the licence agreement between the DoT and telecom providers.
On the contentious issue of zero-rating, a process that involves both ex-ante and ex-post regulation is envisaged to prevent harmful zero-rating, while allowing beneficial zero-rating. Further, the report notes that the supposed altruistic or "public interest" motives of the zero-rating scheme do not matter if they result in harm to competition, distort consumer markets, violate the core tenets of Net neutrality, or unduly benefit an Internet "gatekeeper".

Where does the DoT panel report go wrong?

The proposal by the DoT panel of a licensing regime for VoIP services is a terrible idea. It would presumptively hold all licence non-holders to be unlawful, and that should not be the case. While it is in India's national interest to want to hold VoIP services to account if they do not follow legitimate regulations, it is far better to do this through ex-post regulations rather than an ex-ante licensing scheme. A licensing scheme would benefit Indian VoIP companies (including services like Hike, which Airtel has invested in) over foreign companies like Viber. The report also doesn't say how one would distinguish between OTT communication services and OTT application services, when many apps such as food ordering apps, including text chat facilities. Further, VoIP need not be provided by a company: I run my own XMPP servers, which is a protocol used for both text and video/voice. Will a licensing regime force me to become a licence-holder or will it set a high bar? The DoT panel report doesn't say. Will there be a revenue-sharing mechanism, as is currently the case under the Unified Licence? If so, how will it be calculated in case of services like WhatsApp? These questions too find no answer in the report. All in all, this part of the report's analysis is found to be sadly wanting.
Many important terms are left undefined, and many distinctions that the report draws are left unexplained. For instance, it is unclear on what regulatory basis the report distinguishes between domestic and international VoIP calls — which is an unenforceable (not to mention regulatorily unimportant) distinction — or between regulation of messaging services and VoIP services, or what precisely they mean by "application-agnostic" and "application-specific" network management (since different scholars on this issue mean different things when they say "application").

What does the DoT panel report mean for consumers?

Not too much currently, since the DoT panel report is still just a set of recommendations by an expert body based on (invited) public consultations.
Does it uphold Net neutrality? The DoT panel report is clear that they strongly endorse the "core principles of Net neutrality". On the issue of "zero-rating", the panel proposes some sound measures, saying that there should be a two-part mechanism for ensuring that harmful zero-rating doesn't go through: First, telecom services need to submit zero-rating tariff proposals to an expert body constituted by DoT; and second consumers will be able to complain about the harmful usage of zero-rating by any service provider, which may result in a fine. What constitutes harm / violation of Net neutrality? The panel suggests that any tariff scheme that may harm competition, distorts the consumer market, or violates the core principles of Net neutrality is harmful. This makes sense.
Will it increase cost of access to WhatsApp and Viber? Well, one the one hand, zero-rating of those services could decrease the cost of access to WhatsApp and Viber, but that might not be allowed if the DoT panel recommendations are accepted, since that would possibly be judged to harm competition and distort the consumer markets. The DoT panel has also recommended bringing such services within a licensing framework to bridge the "regulatory arbitrage" that they are able benefit from (meaning that these services don't have to abide by many regulations that a telecom provider has to follow). Whether this will lead to WhatsApp and similar services charging depends on what kinds of regulations are placed on them, and if any costs are imposed on them. If the government decides to take the approach they took to ISPs in the late 90s (essentially, charging them Re. 1 as the licence fee), doesn't impose any revenue sharing (as they currently require of all telecom services), etc., then there needn't be any overly burdensome costs that WhatsApp-like services will need to pass on to consumers.

What misunderstandings do people have?

There are multiple news reports that the DoT panel has recommended increased charges for domestic VoIP calls, or that ISPs will now be able to double-charge. Both of these are untrue. The DoT panel's recommendations are about "regulatory arbitrage" and licensing, which need not be related to cost.
There is a fear that the exception from net neutrality of "managed services and enterprise services" is a "loophole", or that exceptions for "emergency services" and "desirable public or government services" are too vague and carry the potential of misuse. If one goes by the examples that the panel cites of managed services (e.g., services an ISP provides for a private company separately from the rest of the Internet, etc.), these fear seems largely misplaced. We must also realize the the panel report is a report, and not legislation, and the rationale for wanting exemptions from Net neutrality are clear.
The DoT panel has given the go-ahead for zero-rating. Once again, this is untrue. The panel cites instances of zero-rating that aren't discriminatory, violative of Net neutrality and don't harm competition or distort consumer markets (such as zero-rating of all Internet traffic for a limited time period). Then it goes on to state that the regulator should not allow zero-rating that violates the core principles of Net neutrality.

What's missing in the Net neutrality debate is nuance. It's become a debate in which you are either for Net neutrality or against it. However, none of the underlying components of Net neutrality — a complex mix of competition policy, innovation policy, the right to freedom of expression, etc. — are absolutes; therefore, it is clear that Net neutrality cannot be an absolute either.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/clearing-misconceptions-dot-panel-net-neutrality

Regulatory Perspectives on Net Neutrality

pranesh — 2015-07-18T02:46:30Z

In this paper Pranesh Prakash gives an overview on why India needs to put in place net neutrality regulations, and the form that those regulations must take to avoid being over-regulation.

With assistance by Vidushi Marda (Programme Officer, Centre for Internet and Society) and Tarun Krishnakumar (Research Volunteer, Centre for Internet and Society). I would like to specially thank Vishal Misra, Steve Song, Rudolf van der Berg, Helani Galpaya, A.B. Beliappa, Amba Kak, and Sunil Abraham for extended discussions, helpful suggestions and criticisms. However, this paper is not representative of their views, which are varied.

Today, we no longer live in a world of "roti, kapda, makaan", but in the world of "roti, kapda, makaan aur broadband". ^{^[1]} This is recognized by the National Telecom Policy IV.1.2, which states the need to "recognise telecom, including broadband connectivity as a basic necessity like education and health and work towards 'Right to Broadband'."^{^[2]} According to the IAMAI, as of October 2014, India had 278 million internet users. ^{^[3]} Of these, the majority access Internet through their mobile phones, and the WEF estimates only 3 in 100 have broadband on their mobiles.^{^[4]} Thus, the bulk of our population is without broadband. Telecom regulation and net neutrality has a very important role in enabling this vision of Internet as a basic human need that we should aim to fulfil.

1. Why should we regulate the telecom sector?

All ICT regulation should be aimed at achieving five goals: achieving universal, affordable access; ^{^[5]} ensuring and sustaining effective competition in an efficient market and avoiding market failures; protecting against consumer harms; ensuring maximum utility of the network by ensuring interconnection; and addressing state needs (taxation, security, etc.). Generally, all these goals go hand in hand, however some tensions may arise. For instance, universal access may not be provided by the market because the costs of doing so in certain rural or remote areas may outweigh the immediate monetary benefits private corporations could receive in terms of profits from those customers. In such cases, to further the goal of universal access, schemes such as universal service obligation funds are put in place, while ensuring that such schemes either do not impact competition or very minimally impact it.

It is clear that to maximise societal benefit, effective regulation of the ICT sector is a requirement, which otherwise, due to the ability of dominant players to abuse network effect to their advantage, is inherently prone towards monopolies. For instance, in the absence of regulation, a dominant player would charge far less for intra-network calls than inter-network calls, making customers shift to the dominant network. This kind of harm to competition should be regulated by the ICT regulator. However, it is equally true that over-regulation is as undesirable as under-regulation, since over-regulation harms innovation - whether in the form of innovative technologies or innovative business models. The huge spurt of growth globally of the telecom sector since the 1980s has resulted not merely from advancements in technology, but in large part from the de-monopolisation and deregulation of the telecom sector.^{^[6]} Similarly, the Internet has largely flourished under very limited technology-specific regulation. For instance, while interconnection between different telecom networks is heavily regulated in the domestic telecom sector, interconnection between the different autonomous systems (ASes) that make up the Internet is completely unregulated, thereby allowing for non-transparent pricing and opaque transactions. Given this context, we must ensure we do not over-regulate, lest we kill innovation.

2. Why should we regulate Net Neutrality? And whom should we regulate?

We wouldn't need to regulate Net Neutrality if ISPs were not "gatekeepers" for last-mile access. "Gatekeeping" occurs when a single company establishes itself as an exclusive route to reach a large number of people and businesses or, in network terms, nodes. It is not possible for Internet services to reach the customers of the telecom network without passing through the telecom network. The situation is very different in the middle-mile and for backhaul. Even though anti-competitive terms may exist in the middle-mile, especially given the opacity of terms in "transit agreements", a packet is usually able to travel through multiple routes if one route is too expensive (even if that is not the shortest network path, and is thus inefficient in a way). However, this multiplicity of routes is not possible in the last mile.

This leaves last mile telecom operators (ISPs) in a position to unfairly discriminate between different Internet services or destinations or applications, while harming consumer choice. This is why we believe that promoting the five goals mentioned above would require regulation of last-mile telecom operators to prevent unjust discrimination against end-users and content providers.

Thus, net neutrality is the principle that we should regulate gatekeepers to ensure they do not use their power to unjustly discriminate between similarly situated persons, content or traffic.

3. How should we regulate Net Neutrality?

3.1. What concerns does Net Neutrality raise? What harms does it entail?

Discriminatory practices at the level of access to the Internet raises the following set of concerns:

1. Freedom of speech and expression, freedom of association, freedom of assembly, and privacy.

2. Harm to effective competition

a. This includes competition amongst ISPs as well as competition amongst content providers.

b. Under-regulation here may cause harm to innovation at the content provider level, including through erecting barriers to entry.

c. Over-regulation here may cause harm to innovation in terms of ISP business models.

3. Harm to consumers

a. Under-regulation here may harm consumer choice and the right to freedom of speech, expression, and communication.

b. Over-regulation on this ground may cause harm to innovation at the level of networking technologies and be detrimental to consumers in the long run.

4. Harm to "openness" and interconnectedness of the Internet, including diversity (of access, of content, etc.)

a. Exceptions for specialized services should be limited to preserve the open and interconnectedness of the Internet and of the World Wide Web.

It might help to think about Net Neutrality as primarily being about two overlapping sets of regulatory issues: preferential treatment of particular Internet-based services (in essence: content- or source-/destination-based discrimination, i.e., discrimination on basis of 'whose traffic it is'), or discriminatory treatment of applications or protocols (which would include examples like throttling of BitTorrent traffic, high overage fees upon breaching Internet data caps on mobile phones, etc., i.e., discrimination on the basis of 'what kind of traffic it is').

Situations where the negative or positive discrimination happens on the basis of particular content or address should be regulated through the use of competition principles, while negative or positive discrimination at the level of specific class of content, protocols, associated ports, and other such sender-/receiver-agnostic features, should be regulated through regulation of network management techniques . The former deals with instances where the question of "in whose favour is there discrimination" may be asked, while the latter deals with the question "in favour of what is there discrimination".

In order to do this, a regulator like TRAI can use both hard regulation - price ceilings, data cap floors, transparency mandates, preventing specific anti-competitive practices, etc. - as well as soft regulation - incentives and disincentives.

3.1.1 Net Neutrality and human rights

Any discussion on the need for net neutrality impugns the human rights of a number of different stakeholders. Users, subscribers, telecom operators and ISPs all possess distinct and overlapping rights that are to be weighed against each other before the scope, nature and form of regulatory intervention are finalised. The freedom of speech, right to privacy and right to carry on trade raise some of the most pertinent questions in this regard.

For example, to properly consider issues surrounding the practice of paid content-specific zero-rating from a human rights point of view, one must seek to balance the rights of content providers to widely disseminate their 'speech' to the largest audiences against the rights of consumers to have access to a diverse variety of different, conflicting and contrasting ideas.

This commitment to a veritable marketplace or free-market of ideas has formed the touchstone of freedom of speech law in jurisdictions across the world as well as finding mention in pronouncements of the Indian Supreme Court. Particular reference is to be made to the dissent of Mathew, J. inBennett Coleman v. Union of India^{^[7]} and of the majority Sakal Papers v. Union of India^{^[8]} which rejected the approach.

Further, the practice of deep-packet inspection, which is sometimes used in the process of network management, raises privacy concerns as it seeks to go beyond what is "public" information in the header of an IP packet, necessary for routing, to analysing non-public information. ^{^[9]}

3.2 What conditions and factors may change these concerns and the regulatory model we should adopt?

While the principles relating to Net Neutrality remain the same in all countries (i.e., trying to prevent gatekeepers from unjustly exploiting their position), the severity of the problem varies depending on competition in the market, on the technologies, and on many other factors. One way to measure fair or stable allocation of the surplus created by a network - or a network-of-networks like the Internet - is by treating it as a convex cooperation game and thereupon calculating that game's Shapley value:^{^[10]} in the case of the Internet, this would be a game involving content ISPs, transit ISPs, and eyeball (i.e., last-mile) ISPs. The Shapley value changes depending on the number of competitors there are in the market: thus, the fair/stable allocation when there's vibrant competition in the market is different from the fair/stable allocation in a market without such competition. That goes to show that a desirable approach when an ISP tries to unjustly enrich itself by charging other network-participants may well be to increase competition, rather than directly regulating the last-mile ISP. Further, it shows that in a market with vibrant last-mile competition, the capacity of the last-mile ISP to unjustly are far diminished.

In countries which are remote and have little international bandwidth, the need to conserve that bandwidth is high. ISPs can regulate that by either increasing prices of Internet connections for all, or by imposing usage restrictions (such as throttling) on either heavy users or bandwidth-hogging protocols. If the amount of international bandwidth is higher, the need and desire on part of ISPs to indulge in such usage restrictions decreases. Thus, the need to regulate is far higher in the latter case, than in the former case.

The above paragraphs show that both the need for regulation and also the form that the regulation should take depend on a variety of conditions that aren't immediately apparent.

Thus, the framework that the regulator sets out to tackle issues relating to Net Neutrality are most important, whereas the specific rules may need to change depending on changes in conditions. These conditions include:

● last-mile market

○ switching costs between equivalent service providers

○ availability of an open-access last-mile

○ availability of a "public option" neutral ISP

○ increase or decrease in the competition, both in wired and mobile ISPs.

● interconnection market

○ availability of well-functioning peering exchanges

○ availability of low-cost transit

● technology and available bandwidth

○ spectrum efficiency

○ total amount of international bandwidth and local network bandwidth

● conflicting interests of ISPs

○ do the ISPs have other business interests other than providing Internet connectivity? (telephony, entertainment, etc.)

3.3 How should we deal with anti-competitive practices?

Anti-competitive practices in the telecom sector can take many forms: Abuse of dominance, exclusion of access to specific services, customer lock-in, predatory pricing, tying of services, cross-subsidization, etc., are a few of them. In some cases the anti-competitive practice targets other telecom providers, while in others it targets content providers. In the both cases, it is important to ensure that ensure that telecom subscribers have a competitive choice between effectively substitutable telecom providers and an ability to seamlessly switch between providers.

3.3.1 Lowering Switching Costs

TRAI has tackled many of these issues head on, especially in the mobile telephony space, while competitive market pressures have helped too:

● Contractual or transactional lock-in. The easiest way to prevent shifting from one network to another is by contractually mandating a lock-in period, or by requiring special equipment (interoperability) to connect to one's network. In India, this is not practised in the telecom sector, with the exception of competing technologies like CDMA and GSM. Non-contractual lock-ins, for instance by offering discounts for purchasing longer-term packages, are not inherently anti-competitive unless that results in predatory pricing or constitutes an abuse of market dominance. In India, switching from one mobile provider to another, though initiated 15 years into the telecom revolution, is in most cases now almost as easy as buying a new SIM card.^{^[11]} TRAI may consider proactive regulation against contractual lock-in.

● Number of competitors. Even if switching from one network to another is easy, it is not useful unless there are other equivalent options to switch to. In the telecom market, coverage is a very important factor in judging equivalence. Given that last mile connectivity is extremely expensive to provide, the coverage of different networks are very different, and this is even more true when one considers wired connectivity, which is difficult to lay in densely-populated urban and semi-urban areas and unprofitable in sparsely-populated areas. The best way to increase the number of competitors is to make it easier for competitors to exist. Some ways of doing this would be through enabling spectrum-sharing, lowering right-of-way rents, allowing post-auction spectrum trading, and promoting open-access last-mile fibre carriers and to thereby encourage competition on the basis of price and service and not exclusive access to infrastructure.

● Interconnection and mandatory carriage. The biggest advantage a dominant telecom player has is exclusive access to its customer base. Since in the telecom market, no telco wants to not connect to customers of another telco, they do not outright ban other networks. However, dominant players can charge high prices from other networks, thereby discriminating against smaller networks. In the early 2000s, Airtel-to-Airtel calls were much cheaper than Airtel-to-Spice calls. However, things have significantly changed since then. TRAI has, since the 2000s, heavily regulated interconnection and imposed price controls on interconnection ("termination") charges.^{^[12]} Thus, now, generally, inter-network calls are priced similarly to intra-network calls. And if you want cheaper Airtel-to-Airtel calls, you can buy a special (unbundled) pack that enables an Airtel customer to take advantage of the fact that her friends are also on the same network, and benefits Airtel since they do not in such cases have to pay termination charges. Recently, TRAI has even made the interconnection rates zero in three cases: landline-to-landline, landline-to-cellular, and cellular-to-landline, in a bid to decrease landline call rates, and incentivise them, allowing a very low per call interconnection charges of 14 paise for cellular-to-cellular connections. ^{^[13]}

○ With regard to Net Neutrality, we must have a rule that no termination charges or carriage charges may be levied by any ISP upon any Internet service. No Internet service may be discriminated against with regard to carriage conditions or speeds or any other quality of service metric. In essence all negative discrimination should be prohibited. This means that Airtel cannot forcibly charge WhatsApp or any other OTT (which essentially form a different "layer") money for the "privilege" of being able to reach Airtel customers, nor may Airtel slow down WhatsApp traffic and thus try to force WhatsApp to pay. There is a duty on telecom providers to carry any legitimate traffic ("common carriage"), not a privilege. It is important to note that consumer-facing TSPs get paid by other interconnecting Internet networks in the form of transit charges (or the TSP's costs are defrayed through peering). There shouldn't be any separate charge on the basis of content (different layer from the carriage) rather than network (same layer as the carriage). This principle is especially important for startups, and which are often at the receiving end of such discriminatory practices.

● Number Portability. One other factor that prevents users from shifting between one network and another is the fact that they have to change an important aspect of their identity: their phone number (this doesn't apply to Internet over DSL, cable, etc.). At least in the mobile space, TRAI has for several years tried to mandate seamless mobile number portability. The same is being tried by the European Commission in the EU. ^{^[14]} While intra-circle mobile number portability exists in India - and TRAI is pushing for inter-circle mobile number portability as well^{^[15]} - this is nowhere as seamless as it should be.

● Multi-SIM phones. The Indian market is filled with phones that can accommodate multiple SIM cards, enabling customers to shift seamlessly between multiple networks. This is true not just in India, but most developing countries with extremely price-sensitive customers. Theoretically, switching costs would approach zero if in a market with full coverage by n telecom players every subscriber had a phone with n SIM slots with low-cost SIM cards being available.

The situation in the telecom sector with respect to the above provides a stark contrast to the situation in the USA, and to the situation in the DTH market. In the USA, phones get sold at discounts with multi-month or multi-year contracts, and contractual lock-ins are a large problem. Keeping each of the above factors in mind, the Indian mobile telecom space is far more competitive than the US mobile telecom space.

Further, in the Indian DTH market, given that there is transactional lock-in (set-top boxes aren't interoperable in practice, though are mandated to be so by law^{^[16]}), there are fewer choices in the market; further, the equivalent of multi-SIM phones don't exist with respect to set-top boxes. Further, while there are must-carry rules with respect to carriage, they can be of three types: 1) must mandatorily provide access to particular channels^{^[17]} (positive obligation, usually for government channels); 2) prevented from not providing particular channels (negative obligation, to prevent anti-competitive behaviour and political censorship); and 3) must mandatorily offer access to at least a set number of channels (positive obligation for ensuring market diversity). ^{^[18]} Currently, only (1) is in force, since despite attempts by TRAI to ensure (3) as well.^{^[19]}

If the shifting costs are low and transparency in terms of network practice is reported in a standard manner and well-publicised, then that significantly weakens the "gatekeeper effect", which as we saw earlier, is the reason why we wish to introduce Net Neutrality regulation. This consequently means, as explained above in section 3.2, that despite the same Net Neutrality principles applying in all markets and countries, the precise form that the Net Neutrality regulations take in a telecom market with low switching costs would be different from the form that such regulations would take in a market with high switching costs.

3.3.2 Anti-competitive Practices

Some potential anti-competitive practices, which are closely linked, are cross-subsidization, tying (anti-competitive bundling) of multiple services, and vertical price squeeze. All three of these are especial concerns now, with the increased diversification of traditional telecom companies, and with the entry into telecom (like with DTH) of companies that create content. Hence, if Airtel cross-subsidizes the Hike chat application that it recently acquired, ^{^[20]} or if Reliance Infocomm requires customers to buy a subscription to an offering from Reliance Big Entertainment, or if Reliance Infocomm meters traffic from another Reliance Big Entertainment differently from that from Saavn, all those would be violative of the principle of non-discrimination by gatekeepers. This same analysis can be applied to all unpaid deals and non-commercial deals, including schemes such as Internet.org and Wikipedia Zero, which will be covered later in the section on zero-rating.

While we have general rules such as sections 3 and 4 of the Competition Act, we do not currently have specific rules prohibiting these or other anti-competitive practices, and we need Net Neutrality regulation that clearly prohibit such anti-competitive practices so that the telecom regulator can take action for non-compliance . We cannot leave these specific policy prescriptions unstated, even if they are provided for in section 3 of the Competition Act. These concerns are especial concerns in the telecom sector, and the telecom regulator or arbitrator should have the power to directly deal with these, instead of each case going to the Competition Commission of India. This should not affect the jurisdiction of the CCI to investigate and adjudicate such matters, but should ensure that TRAI both has suo motu powers, and that the mechanism to complain is made simple (unlike the current scenario, where some individual complainants may fall in the cracks between TRAI and TDSAT).

3.3.3 Zero-rating

Since a large part of the net neutrality debate in India involves zero-rating practices, we deal with that in some length. Zero-rating is the practice of not counting (aka "zero-rating") certain traffic towards a subscriber's regular Internet usage. The zero-rated traffic could be zero-priced or fixed-price; capped or uncapped; subscriber-paid, Internet service-paid, paid for by both, or unpaid; content- or source/destination-based, or agnostic to content or source/destination; automatically provided by the ISP or chosen by the customer . The motivations for zero-rating may also be varied, as we shall see below. Further, depending on the circumstances, zero-rating could be competitive or anti-competitive. All forms of zero-rating result in some form of discrimination, but not all zero-rating is harmful, nor does all zero-rating need to be prohibited.

While, as explained in the section on interconnection and carriage above, negative discrimination at the network level should be prohibited, that leaves open the question of positive discrimination. It follows from section 3.1 that the right frame of analysis of this question is harm to competition, since the main harm zero-rating is, as we shall see below, about discriminating between different content providers, and not discrimination at the level of protocols, etc.

Whether one should allow for any form of positive discrimination at the network level or not depends on whether positive discrimination of (X) has an automatic and unfair negative impact on all (~X). That, in turn, depends on whether (~X) is being subject to unfair competition. As Wikipedia notes, "unfair competition means that the gains of some participants are conditional on the losses of others, when the gains are made in ways which are illegitimate or unjust." Thus, positive discrimination that has a negative impact on effective competition shall not be permitted, since in such cases it is equivalent to negative discrimination ("zero-sum game") . Positive discrimination that does not have a negative impact on effective competition may be permitted, especially since it results in increased access and increases consumer benefit, as long as the harm to openness and diversity is minimized .

While considering this, one should keep in mind the fact that startups were, 10-15 years ago, at a huge disadvantage with regard to wholesale data purchase. The marketplaces for data centres and for content delivery networks (which speed up delivery of content by being located closer, in network terms, to multiple last-mile ISPs) were nowhere near as mature as they are today, and the prices were high. There was a much higher barrier to startup entry than there is today, due to the prices and due to larger companies being able to rely on economies of scale to get cheaper rates. Was that unfair? No. There is no evidence of anti-competitive practices, nor of startups complaining about such practices. Therefore, that was fair competition, despite specific input costs that were arguably needed (though not essential) for startups to compete being priced far beyond their capacity to pay.

Today the marketplace is very different, with a variety of offerings. CDNs such as Cloudflare, which were once the preserve of rich companies, even have free offerings, thus substantially lowering barriers for startups that want faster access to customers across the globe.

Is a CDN an essential cost for a startup? No. But in an environment where speed matters and customers use or don't use a service depending on speed; and where the startup's larger competitors are all using CDNs, a startup more or less has to. Thankfully, given the cheap access to CDNs these days, that cost is not too high for a startup to bear. If the CDN market was not competitive enough, would a hypothetical global regulator have been justified in outright banning the use of CDNs to 'level' the playing field? No, because the hypothetical global regulator instead had the option to (and would have been justified in) regulating the market to ensure greater competition.

A regulator should not prohibit an act that does not negatively impact access, competition, consumer benefit, nor openness (including diversity), since that would be over-regulation and would harm innovation.

3.3.3.1 Motivations for Zero-Rating

3.3.3.1.1 Corporate Social Responsibility / Incentivizing Customers to Move Up Value Chain

There exist multiple instances where there is no commercial transaction between the OTT involved and the telecom carrier, in which zero-priced zero-rating of specific Internet content happens. We know that there is no commercial transaction either through written policy (Wikipedia Zero) or through public statements (Internet.org, a bouquet of sites). In such cases, the telecom provider would either be providing such services out of a sense of public interest, given the social value of those services, or would be providing such services out of self-interest, to showcase the value of particular Internet set the same time.

The apprehended risk is that of such a scheme creating a "walled garden", where users would be exposed only to those services which are free since the search and discovery costs of non-free Internet (i.e., any site outside the "walled garden") would be rather high. This risk, while real, is rather slim given the fact that the economic incentives for those customers who have the ability to pay for "Internet packs" but currently do not find a compelling reason to do so, or out of both a sense of public interest and self-interest of the telecom providers works against this.

In such non-commercial zero-priced zero-rating, a telecom provider would only make money if and only if subscribers start paying for sites outside of the walled garden. If subscribers are happy in the walled garden, the telecom provider starts losing money, and hence has a strong motivation to stop that scheme. If on the other hand, enough subscribers start becoming paying customers to offset the cost of providing the zero-priced zero-rated service(s) and make it profitable, that shows that despite the availability of zero-priced options a number of customers will opt for paid access to the open Internet and the open Web, and the overall harms of such zero-priced zero-rating would be minimal. Hence, the telecom providers have an incentive to keep the costs of Internet data packs low, thus encouraging customers who otherwise wouldn't pay for the Internet to become paying customers.

There is the potential of consumer harm when users seek to access a site outside of the walled garden, and find to their dismay that they have been charged for the Internet at a hefty rate, and their prepaid balance has greatly decreased. This is an issue that TRAI is currently appraised of, and a suitable solution would need to be found to protect consumers against such harm.

All in all, given that the commercial interests of the telecom providers align with the healthy practice of non-discrimination, this form of limited positive discrimination is not harmful in the long run, particularly because it is not indefinitely sustainable for a large number of sites. Hence, it may not be useful to ban this form of zero-priced zero-rating of services as long as they aren't exclusive, or otherwise anti-competitive (a vertical price-squeeze, for instance), and the harm to consumers is prohibited and the harm to openness/diversity is minimized.

3.3.3.1.2 Passing on ISP Savings / Incentivizing Customers to Lower ISP's Cost

Suppose, for instance, an OTT uses a CDN located, in network distance terms, near an eyeball ISP. In this case, the ISP has to probably pay less than it would have to had the same data been located in a data centre located further away, given that it would have fewer interconnection-related charges.

Hence the monetary costs of providing access to different Web destinations are not equal for the ISP. This cost can be varied either by the OTT (by it locating the data closer to the ISP - through a CDN, by co-locating where the ISP is also present, or by connecting to an Internet Exchange Point which the ISP is also connected to - or by it directly "peering" with the ISP) or by the ISP (by engaging in "transparent proxying" in which case the ISP creates caches at the ISP level of specific content (usually by caching non-encrypted data the ISP's customers request) and serves the cached content when a user requests a site, rather than serving the actual site). None of the practices so far mentioned are discriminatory from the customer's perspective with regard either to price or to prioritization, though all of them enable faster speeds to specific content. Hence none of the above-mentioned practices are considered even by the most ardent Net Neutrality advocates to be violations of that principle. ^{^[21]} However, if an ISP zero-rates the content to either pass on its savings to the customer^{^[22]} or to incentivize the customer to access services that cost the ISP less in terms of interconnection costs, that creates a form of price discrimination for the customer, despite it benefiting the consumer.

The essential economic problem is that the cost to the ISP is variable, but the cost to the customer is fixed. Importantly, this problem is exacerbated in India where web hosting prices are high, transit prices are high, peering levels are low, and Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) are not functioning well. ^{^[23]} These conditions create network inefficiencies in terms of hosting of content further away from Indian networks in terms of network distance, and thus harms consumers as well as local ISPs. In order to set this right, zero-rating of this sort may be permitted as it acts as an incentive towards fixing the market fundamentals. However, once the market fundamentals are fixed, such zero-rating may be prohibited.

This example shows that the desirability or otherwise of discriminatory practices depends fully on the conditions present in the market, including in terms of interconnection costs.

3.3.3.1.3 Unbundling Internet into Services ("Special Packs")

Since at least early 2014, mobile operators have been marketing special zero-rating "packs". These packs, if purchased by the customer, allow capped or in some instances uncapped, zero-rating of a service such as WhatsApp or Facebook, meaning traffic to/from that service will not be counted against their regular Internet usage.

For a rational customer, purchasing such a pack only makes sense in one of two circumstances:

● The person has Internet connectivity on her Internet-capable phone, but has not purchased an "Internet data pack" since she doesn't find the Internet valuable. Instead, she has heard about "WhatsApp", has friends who are on it, and wishes to use that to reduce her SMS costs (and thereby eat into the carriage provider's ability to charge separately for SMSes). She chooses to buy a WhatsApp pack for around ₹25 a month instead of paying ₹95 for an all-inclusive Internet data pack.

● The person has Internet connectivity on her Internet-capable phone, and has purchased an "Internet data pack". However, that data pack is capped and she has to decide between using WhatsApp and surfing web sites. She is on multiple WhatsApp groups and her WhatsApp traffic eats up 65% of her data cap. She thus has to choose between the two, since she doesn't want to buy two Internet data packs (each costing around ₹95 for a month). She chooses to buy a WhatsApp pack for ₹25 a month, paying a cumulative total of ₹120 instead of ₹190 which she would have had to had she bought two Internet data packs. In this situation, "unbundling" is happening, and this benefits the consumer. Such unbundling harms the openness and integrity of the Internet.

If users did not find value in the "special" data packs, and there is no market demand for such products, they will cease to be offered. Thus, assuming a telco's decision to offer such packs is purely customer-demand driven - and not due to deals it has struck with service providers - if Orkut is popular, telcos would be interested in offering Orkut packs and if Facebook is popular, they would be interested in offering a Facebook pack. Thus, clearly, there is nothing anti-competitive about such customer-paid zero-rating packs, whereas they clearly enhance consumer benefit. Would this increase the popularity of Orkut or Facebook? Potentially yes. But to prohibit this would be like prohibiting a supermarket from selectively (and non-collusively) offering discounts on popular products. Would that make already popular products even more popular? Potentially, yes. But that would not be seen as a harm to competition but would be seen as fair competition. This contravenes the "openness" of the Internet (i.e., the integral interconnected diversity that an open network like the Internet embodies) as an independent regulatory goal. The Internet, being a single gateway to a mind-boggling variety of services, allows for a diverse "long tail", which would lose out if the Internet was seen solely as a gateway to popular apps, sites, and content. However, given that this is a choice exercised freely by the consumer, such packs should not be prohibited, as that would be a case of over-regulation.

The one exception to the above analysis of competition, needless to say, is if that these special packs aren't purely customer-demand driven and are the product of special deals between an OTT and the telco. In that case, we need to ensure it isn't anti-competitive by following the prescriptions of the next section.

3.3.3.1.4 Earning Additional Revenues from Content Providers

With offerings like Airtel Zero, we have a situation where OTT companies are offering to pay for wholesale data access used by their customers, and make accessing their specific site or app free for the customer. From the customer's perspective, this is similar to a toll-free number or a pre-paid envelope or free-to-air TV channel being offered on a particular network.

However, from the network perspective, these are very different. Even if a customer-company pays Airtel for the toll-free number, that number is accessible and toll-free across all networks since the call terminates on Airtel networks and Airtel pays the connecting network back the termination charge from the fee they are paid by the customer-company. This cannot happen in case of the Internet, since the "call" terminates outside of the reach of the ISP being paid for zero-rating by the OTT company; hence unless specific measures are taken, zero-rating has to be network-specific.

The comparison to free-to-air channels is also instructive, since in 2010 TRAI made recommendations that consumers should have the choice of accessing free-to-air channels à-la-carte, without being tied up to a bouquet.^{^[24]} This would, in essence, allow a subscriber to purchase a set-top box, and without paying a regular subscription fee watch free-to-air channels. ^{^[25]} However, similar to toll-free numbers, these free-to-air channels are free-to-air on all MSO's set-top boxes, unlike the proposed Airtel Zero scheme under which access to a site like Flipkart would be free for customers on Airtel's network alone.

Hence, these comparisons, while useful in helping think through the regulatory and competition issues, should not be used as instructive exact analogies, since they aren't fully comparable situations.

3.3.3.1.5 Market Options for OTT-Paid Zero-Rating

As noted above, a competitive marketplace already exists for wholesale data purchase at the level of "content ISPs" (including CDNs), which sell wholesale data to content providers (OTTs). This market is at present completely unregulated. The deals that exist are treated as commercial secrets. It is almost certain that large OTTs get better rates than small startups due to economies of scale.

However, at the eyeball ISP level, it is a single-sided market with ISPs competing to gain customers in the form of end-users. With a scheme like "Airtel Zero", this would get converted into a double-sided market, with a gatekeeper without whom neither side can reach the other being in the middle creating a two-sided toll. This situation is ripe for market abuse: this situation allows the gatekeeper to hinder access to those OTTs that don't pay the requisite toll or to provide preferential access to those who pay, apart from providing an ISP the opportunity to "double-dip".

One way to fix this is to prevent ISPs from establishing a double-sided market. The other way would be to create a highly-regulated market where the gatekeeping powers of the ISP are diminished, and the ISP's ability to leverage its exclusive access over its customers are curtailed. A comparison may be drawn here to the rules that are often set by standard-setting bodies where patents are involved: given that these patents are essential inputs, access to them must be allowed through fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory licences. Access to the Internet and common carriers like telecom networks, being even more important (since alternatives exist to particular standards, but not to the Internet itself), must be placed at an even higher pedestal and thus even stricter regulation to ensure fair competition.

A marketplace of this sort would impose some regulatory burdens on TRAI and place burdens on innovations by the ISPs, but a regulated marketplace harms ISP innovation less than not allowing a market at all.

At a minimum, such a marketplace must ensure non-exclusivity, non-discrimination, and transparency. Thus, at a minimum, a telecom provider cannot discriminate between any OTTs who want similar access to zero-rating. Further, a telecom provider cannot prevent any OTT from zero-rating with any other telecom provider. To ensure that telecom providers are actually following this stipulation, transparency is needed, as a minimum.

Transparency can take one of two forms: transparency to the regulator alone and transparency to the public. Transparency to the regulator alone would enable OTTs and ISPs to keep the terms of their commercial transactions secret from their competitors, but enable the regulator, upon request, to ensure that this doesn't lead to anti-competitive practices. This model would increase the burden on the regulator, but would be more palatable to OTTs and ISPs, and more comparable to the wholesale data market where the terms of such agreements are strictly-guarded commercial secrets. On the other hand, requiring transparency to the public would reduce the burden on the regulator, despite coming at a cost of secrecy of commercial terms, and is far more preferable.

Beyond transparency, a regulation could take the form of insisting on standard rates and terms for all OTT players, with differential usage tiers if need be, to ensure that access is truly non-discriminatory. This is how the market is structured on the retail side.

Since there are transaction costs in individually approaching each telecom provider for such zero-rating, the market would greatly benefit from a single marketplace where OTTs can come and enter into agreements with multiple telecom providers.

Even in this model, telecom networks will be charging based not only on the fact of the number of customers they have, but on the basis of them having exclusive routing to those customers. Further, even under the standard-rates based single-market model, a particular zero-rated site may be accessible for free from one network, but not across all networks: unlike the situation with a toll-free number in which no such distinction exists.

To resolve this, the regulator may propose that if an OTT wishes to engage in paid zero-rating, it will need to do so across all networks, since if it doesn't there is risk of providing an unfair advantage to one network over another and increasing the gatekeeper effect rather than decreasing it.

However, all forms of competitive Internet service-paid zero-priced zero-rating, even when they don't harm competition, innovation amongst content providers, or consumers, will necessarily harm openness and diversity of the Internet. For instance, while richer companies with a strong presence in India may pay to zero-rate traffic for their Indian customers, decentralized technologies such as XMPP and WebRTC, having no central company behind them, would not, leading to customers preferring proprietary networks and solutions to such open technologies, which in turn, thanks to the network effect, leads to a vicious cycle. These harms to openness and diversity have to be weighed against the benefit in terms of increase in access when deciding whether to allow for competitive OTT-paid zero-priced zero-rating, as such competition doesn't exist in a truly level playing field . Further, it must be kept in mind that there are forms of zero-priced zero-rating that decrease the harm to openness / diversity, or completely remove that harm altogether: that there are other options available must be acknowledged by the regulator when considering the benefit to access from competitive OTT-paid zero-priced zero-rating.

3.3.3.1.6 Other options for zero-rating

There are other models of zero-priced zero-rating that either minimize the harm is that of ensuring free Internet access for every person. This can take the form of:^{^[26]}

● A mandatorily "leaky" 'walled garden':

○ The first-degree of all hyperlinks from the zero-rated OTT service are also free.

○ The zero-rated OTT service provider has to mandatorily provide free access to the whole of the World Wide Web to all its customers during specified hours.

○ The zero-rated OTT service provider has to mandatorily provide free access to the whole of the World Wide Web to all its customers based on amount on usage of the OTT service.^{^[27]}

● Zero-rating of all Web traffic

○ In exchange for viewing of advertisements

○ In exchange for using a particular Web browser

○ At low speeds on 3G, or on 2G.

3.3.3.2. What kinds of zero-rating are good

The majority of the forms of zero-rating covered in this section are content or source/destination-based zero-rating. Only some of the options covered in the "other options for zero-rating" section cover content-agnostic zero-rating models. Content-agnostic zero-rating models are not harmful, while content-based zero-rating models always harm, though to varying degrees, the openness of the Internet / diversity of OTTs, and to varying degrees increase access to Internet-based services. Accordingly, here is an hierarchy of desirability of zero-priced zero-rating, from most desirable to most harmful:

1. Content- & source/destination-agnostic zero-priced zero-rating.^{^[28]}

2. Content- & source/destination-based non-zero-priced zero-rating, without any commercial deals, chosen freely & paid for by users. ^{^[29]}

3. Content- & source/destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, without any commercial deals, with full transparency. ^{^[30]}

4. Content- & source/destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, on the basis of commercial deal with partial zero-priced access to all content, with non-discriminatory access to the same deal by all with full transparency.^{^[31]}

5. Content- & source/destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, on the basis of a non-commercial deal, without any benefits monetary or otherwise, flowing directly or indirectly from the provider of the zero-rated content to the ISP, with full transparency. ^{^[32]}

6. Content- & source-destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, across all telecom networks, with standard pricing, non-discriminatory access, and full transparency.

7. Content- & source-destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, with standard pricing, non-discriminatory access, and full transparency.

8. Content- & source-destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, with non-discriminatory access, and full transparency.

9. Content- & source-destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, with non-discriminatory access, and transparency to the regulator.

10. Content- & source-destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, without any regulatory framework in place.

3.3.4 Cartels and Oligopoly

While cartels and oligopolies may have an impact on Net Neutrality, they are not problems that any set of anti-discrimination rules imposed on gatekeepers can fix. Further, cartels and oligopolies don't directly enhance the ability of gatekeepers to unjustly discriminate if there are firm rules against negative discrimination and price ceilings and floors on data caps are present for data plans. Given this, TRAI should recommend that this issue be investigated and the Competition Commission of India should take this issue up.

3.4 Reasonable Network Management Principles

Reasonable network management has to be allowed to enable the ISPs to manage performance and costs on their network. However, ISPs may not indulge in acts that are harmful to consumers in the name of reasonable network management. Below are a set of guidelines for when discrimination against classes of traffic in the name of network management are justified.

● Discrimination between classes of traffic for the sake of network management should only be permissible if:

○ there is an intelligible differentia between the classes which are to be treated differently, and

○ there is a rational nexus between the differential treatment and the aim of such differentiation, and

○ the aim sought to be furthered is legitimate, and is related to the security, stability, or efficient functioning of the network, or is a technical limitation outside the control of the ISP^{^[33]}, and

○ the network management practice is the least harmful manner in which to achieve the aim.

● Provision of specialized services (i.e., "fast lanes") is permitted if and only if it is shown that

○ The service is available to the user only upon request, and not without their active choice, and

○ The service cannot be reasonably provided with "best efforts" delivery guarantee that is available over the Internet, and hence requires discriminatory treatment, or

○ The discriminatory treatment does not unduly harm the provision of the rest of the Internet to other customers.

These principles are only applicable at the level of ISPs, and not on access gateways for institutions that may in some cases be run by ISPs (such as a university network, free municipal WiFi, at a work place, etc.), which are not to be regulated as common carriers.

These principles may be applied on a case-by-case basis by a regulator, either suo motu or upon complaint by customers.

^{^[1]} Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, (19 May 2011), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/A.HRC.17.27_en.pdf.

^{^[2]} Available at http://www.trai.gov.in/WriteReadData/userfiles/file/NTP%202012.pdf.

^{^[3]} IAMAI, India to Cross 300 million internet users by Dec 14, (19 November, 2014), http://www.iamai.in/PRelease_detail.aspx?nid=3498&NMonth=11&NYear=2014.

^{^[4]} World Economic Forum, The Global Information Technology Report 2015, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global_IT_Report_2015.pdf.

^{^[5]} http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/4.1#s4.1.1

^{^[6]} See R.U.S. Prasad, The Impact of Policy and Regulatory Decisions on Telecom Growth in India (July 2008), http://web.stanford.edu/group/siepr/cgi-bin/siepr/?q=system/files/shared/pubs/papers/pdf/SCID361.pdf.

^{^[7]} 1973 AIR 106

^{^[8]} 1962 AIR 305

^{^[9]} "When ISPs go beyond their traditional use of IP headers to route packets, privacy risks begin to emerge." Alissa Cooper, How deep must DPI be to incur privacy risk? http://www.alissacooper.com/2010/01/25/how-deep-must-dpi-be-to-incur-privacy-risk/

^{^[10]} Richard T.B. Ma & Vishal Misra, The Public Option: A Non-Regulatory Alternative to Network Neutrality, http://dna-pubs.cs.columbia.edu/citation/paperfile/200/netneutrality.pdf

^{^[11]} Mobile number portability was launched in India on January 20, 2011 in the Haryana circle. See http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/pm-launches-nationwide-mobile-number-portability/1/127176.html . Accessed on April 24, 2015.

^{^[12]} For a comprehensive list of all TRAI interconnection regulations & subsequent amendments, see http://www.trai.gov.in/Content/Regulation/0_1_REGULATIONS.aspx.

^{^[13]} See Telecommunication Interconnection Usage Charges (Eleventh Amendment) Regulations, 2015 (1 of 2015), available at http://www.trai.gov.in/Content/Regulation/0_1_REGULATIONS.aspx.

^{^[14]} Article 30 of the Universal Service Directive, Directive 2002/22/EC.

^{^[15]} See Telecommunication Mobile Number Portability (Sixth Amendment) Regulations, 2015 (3 of 2015), available at http://www.trai.gov.in/Content/Regulation/0_1_REGULATIONS.aspx.

^{^[16]} The Telecommunication (Broadcasting and Cable) Services (Seventh) (The Direct to Home Services) Tariff Order, 2015 (2 of 2015).

^{^[17]} Section 8, Cable Television Networks Act, 1995.

^{^[18]} TRAI writes new rules for Cable TV, Channels, Consumers, REAL TIME NEWS, (August 11, 2014), http://rtn.asia/rtn/233/1220_trai-writes-new-rules-cable-tv-channels-consumers.

^{^[19]} An initial requirement for all multi system operators to have a minimum capacity of 500 channels was revoked by the TDSAT in 2012. For more details, see http://www.televisionpost.com/cable/msos-not-required-to-have-500-channel-headends-tdsat/.

^{^[20]} Aparna Ghosh, Bharti SoftBank Invests $14 million in Hike, LIVE MINT, (April 2, 2014), http://www.livemint.com/Companies/nI38YwQL2eBgE6j93lRChM/Bharti-SoftBank-invests-14-million-in-mobile-messaging-app.html.

^{^[21]} Mike Masnick, Can We Kill This Ridiculous Shill-Spread Myth That CDNs Violate Net Neutrality? They Don't, https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140812/04314528184/can-we-kill-this-ridiculous-shill-spread-myth-that-cdns-violate-net-neutrality-they-dont.shtml.

^{^[22]} Mathew Carley, What is Hayai's stance on "Net Neutrality"?, https://www.hayai.in/faq/hayais-stance-net-neutrality?c=mgc20150419

^{^[23]} Helani Galpaya & Shazna Zuhyle, South Asian Broadband Service Quality: Diagnosing the Bottlenecks, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1979928

^{^[24]} DTH players told to offer pay channels on la carte basis, HINDU BUSINESS LINE (July 22, 2010), http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/todays-paper/dth-players-told-to-offer-pay-channels-on-la-carte-basis/article999298.ece.

^{^[25]} The Telecommunication (Broadcasting and Cable) Services (Fourth) (Addressable Systems) Tariff Order, 2010.

^{^[26]} These suggestions were provided by Helani Galpaya and Sunil Abraham, based in some cases on existing practices.

^{^[27]} This is what is being followed by the Jana Loyalty Program: http://www.betaboston.com/news/2015/05/06/with-a-new-loyalty-program-mobile-app-marketplace-jana-pushes-deeper-into-the-developing-world/

^{^[28]} Example: free Internet access at low speeds, with data caps.

^{^[29]} Example: special "packs" for specific services like WhatsApp.

^{^[30]} Example: zero-rating of all locally-peered settlement-free traffic.

^{^[31]} Example: "leaky" walled gardens, such as the Jana Loyalty Program that provide limited access to all of the Web alongside access to the zero-rated content.

^{^[32]} Example: Wikipedia Zero.

^{^[33]} A CGNAT would be an instance of such a technology that poses network limitations.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/regulatory-perspectives-on-net-neutrality

Digital India: PM Modi to launch BJP's flagship programme likely in July

pranesh — 2015-08-22T16:45:33Z

The article by Jochelle Mendonca and Neha Alawadhi was published in the Economic Times on May 29, 2015.

The Modi government, which completed one year at the Centre, is preparing for a big-ticket launch of Digital India, taking technology to the villages and block levels, through merchandise, hackathons and games spread over a week-long initiative across the country.

The National e-Governance Division (NeGD), under the Department of Electronics and Information Technology (DeitY), has empanelled agencies for a messaging campaign, gamification, printing and merchandise, advertising and creatives, including advertising for rural outreach and social media.

Working directly with the Prime Minister's Office, NeGD has been tasked with preparing for the launch since February. Though no formal dates have been fixed yet, the Digital India Week (DIW) is likely to take off in July, and will involve stakeholders across state governments and ministries, and is expected to be the flagship programme for the second year of the BJP government, EThas learnt.

"They really want to make this the biggest programme of the second year. The idea is that many things have been done in the digital space that need to get highlighted," an individual with knowledge of the plans told ET.

The event is certainly being planned on a grand scale, according to the tender documents issued by the government. The government has asked for merchandise such as t-shirts, caps, trophies, pen drives and leather cloth and plastic bags. A gamification agency will work on the portals, mobile applications and social media handles to boost participation.

The messaging agency must be able to carry out, track, record and analyse 50 lakh to one crore messages a day. The event will be launched by the Prime Minister through a radio address on "Mann ki Baat", which will be followed by events at gram panchayats, block and sub divisional headquarters, district and state levels, eventually culminating in a national event, according to a presentation seen by ET.

As part of the run-up to the DIW, events such as hackathons, training programmes and webinars would be held in schools and colleges, followed by crowdsourcing ideas through the government's portal MyGov, as well as a new Digital India portal that is being designed. "It is a typical BJP-style campaign.

The Prime Minister does not want to hold the final day event in Delhi and the location is being finalised. All state and line ministries have been involved, and are being asked to showcase e-services and best practices, along with the launch of some programmes like digital locker," said another person familiar with the plans being rolled out for the DIW. The watch words of the campaign will be "inform, educate and engage", which will include taking the message of Digital India to the masses through educational institutions, industry and government agencies.

"It will educate people on various important services such as digital literacy, cyber hygiene and e-waste management, and also look at engaging a large number of people, especially youth on a continuous basis," said a person familiar with the ongoing preparation.

NeGD is looking at using the principles of gamification to gather feedback. Experts on e-governance say this is a good move as most e-governance projects, across the world, fail because there's not enough buy-in from stakeholders or the goals aren't communicated widely to the public.

"E-governance needs evangelising. That is what this campaign looks like it will do. Some parts are dated — such as posters and the print elements. But this is a good idea. Whether it works or not depends on the participation they see at the end," Sunil Abraham, director at the Centre for Internet and Society, said.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/economic-times-may-29-2015-jochelle-mendonca-and-neha-alawadhi-digital-india

Definition of Net Neutrality should be flexible: Pranesh Prakash

pranesh — 2015-06-19T01:43:04Z

Critics argue that Facebook’s Internet.org violates the principle of Net Neutrality.

The article by Sanjay Vijaykumar was published in the Hindu on May 10, 2015. Pranesh Prakash is extensively quoted.

The definition of Net Neutrality should be flexible enough to allow for experimentation with different models of providing cheaper Internet access and such experimentation needs to be regulated by the telecom regulator, Telecom and Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) according to Internet expert Pranesh Prakash.

Mr. Prakash was reacting to the business model of Boston-based start-up Jana, which said it had figured out a way to offer billions of people in the emerging world free access to the Internet, without violating the web’s open nature. The firm has launched Jana Loyalty, a product that seeks to reward its smartphone users in two ways. One, it reimburses users the cost of downloading and using an app of Jana’s clients. Two, it gives free additional data with which the user can access any content online.

“While Jana is like Internet.org, since it is Internet service-specific zero-rating, Jana Loyalty is what my colleague Sunil Abraham dubs a ‘leaky walled garden’. The walled garden (site-specific access) exists, but you also get free access to the whole of the Web in return. Given that there is no one universal definition of Net Neutrality, and given India currently doesn’t have a definition, I can’t answer if this is a violation of Net Neutrality,” said Mr. Prakash, who is Policy Director at The Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), a Bangalore-based, non-profit, research and policy advocacy.

Facebook’s attempts to provide a limited version of the Internet free has been attracting criticism from supporters of Net Neutrality, especially in India. Critics argue that Facebook’s Internet.org, which offers users free access to a bouquet of pre-selected Web sites, violates the principle of Net Neutrality by choosing what is accessible and what isn’t. Facebook has reacted to this by opening up Internet.org to all developers who meet its guidelines. Mr. Prakash said the definition of Net Neturality should be flexible enough to allow for experimentation with different models of providing cheaper Internet access, including Jana Loyalty.

“However, such experimentation ought to be regulated by the telecom regulator. To minimise harm, they should be allowed on a case-by-case basis after the regulator has had an opportunity to conduct risk-benefit analysis against four goals it should seek to promote — universal and affordable access; effective competition; protection of consumers against harm; and diversity that arises from the openness and interconnectedness of the Internet,” he added.

Net neutrality is a principle that says Internet Service Providers (ISPs) should treat all traffic and content on their networks equally.

Why now?

Late last month, Trai released a draft consultation paper seeking views from the industry and the general public on the need for regulations for over-the-top (OTT) players such as Whatsapp, Skype, Viber etc, security concerns and net neutrality. The objective of this consultation paper, the regulator said, was to analyse the implications of the growth of OTTs and consider whether or not changes were required in the current regulatory framework.

What is an OTT?

OTT or over-the-top refers to applications and services which are accessible over the internet and ride on operators' networks offering internet access services. The best known examples of OTT are Skype, Viber, WhatsApp, e-commerce sites, Ola, Facebook messenger. The OTTs are not bound by any regulations. The Trai is of the view that the lack of regulations poses a threat to security and there’s a need for government’s intervention to ensure a level playing field in terms of regulatory compliance.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-hindu-sanjay-vijaykumar-may-10-2015-pranesh-prakash-on-definition-of-net-neutrality

Response to TRAI Consultation Paper on Regulatory Framework for Over-the-Top (OTT) Services

pranesh — 2015-05-09T11:27:15Z

The Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) sent a joint response to the TRAI Consultation Paper on Regulatory Framework for Over-the-top (OTT) Services with scholars from Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad. The response was sent on March 27, 2015.

Executive Summary

The principle objective of net neutrality is that “all the Internet traffic has to be treated equally without any discrimination”; but this has had different interpretations over varied contexts. While the discourse in India has often treated net neutrality as a singular policy construct, we break down net neutrality to its various components. We then individually contextualise each component to the unique characteristics of the Indian telecommunications industry such as dependence on wireless internet access, the fragmented and non-contiguous distribution of spectrum, high competition between TEL-SPs and low digital literacy. The evolving nature of markets and networks are also considered while taking into account various public policy perspectives.

In this submission, we also argue for the need to introduce reasonable regulatory parity between functionally equivalent communications services provided by OTT-SPs and TEL-SPs. We compare the regulations for OTT-SPs under the Information Technology Act 2000 (as amended) with the regulations for TEL-SPs under the Telegraph Act 1885 (as amended), the license agreements (UL, UASL, ISP-L) and TRAI Regulations. Based on an analysis of the current laws and regulations, we suggest how TRAI needs to intervene to create this regulatory parity (for example in areas such as privacy, spam/UCC, interception etc.).

Through the above analysis, we recommend an overall regulatory framework that should be adopted by the Government. The framework takes a nuanced approach to various components of net neutrality, contextualised to India, and also attempts to bring reasonable regulatory parity. Instead of compartmentalising TEL-SPs and OTT-SPs as two distinct actors, the recommended framework considers a two-layered approach which recognises that there is an overlap between TEL-SPs and OTT-SPs. The first layer comprises of network and infrastructure (collectively called the network layer) and the second layer comprises of services and applications (collectively called the service layer).

The framework further divides the service layer into “Non-IP Services”, “Specialised Services” and “Internet Based Services”. The concept of “Specialised Services”, which is borrowed from the European Union, refers to traditional services that have migrated to an IP architecture such as facilities-based VoIP calls to PSTN and IPTV, and are either logically distinct from the Internet or have special needs which the “best efforts” delivery of the general Internet cannot satisfy. This concept helps in applying different evaluation criteria to functionally equivalent “Non-IP Services”, “Specialised Services” and “Internet Based Services”. In the framework, “Specialised Services” are also recognised as an exception to net neutrality. The concept of “Specialised Services” also helps to create an incentive for continued investment in underlying infrastructure by TEL-SPs.

This framework has helped us to bring a more balanced approach from the perspective of both TEL-SPs and OTT-SPs, while also taking into account technological convergence. It has also helped us to bring a more nuanced approach to various issues comprising net neutrality such as zero rating, paid prioritisation etc. We have considered best practices from different international regimes and the pros and cons during implementation in order to determine the exceptions and boundaries of net neutrality that should be adopted in India.

Download the full text of the Response

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/telecom/blog/joint-response-to-trai-consultation-paper-on-regulatory-framework-for-over-the-top-services