Centre for Internet and Society

Pervasive Technologies: Working Document Series - Research Questions and a Literature Review on the Actor-Network Theory

nehaa — 2015-09-05T04:56:03Z

This document is divided into two parts - the first part lays out a series of research questions, potentially seeking to apply actor-network theory as a research methodology. The second part seeks to map literature around the Actor-Network Theory ("ANT") as a research methodology.

Part 1: Research Questions

The aim of this exercise is to delineate the contours of the paper, and provide some insight into the demarcation of the various sections.

The overall context to this paper will be determined by a globalized form of intellectual property ownership, and the various instances in which this narrative finds a place (either overtly or covertly) in the regulation of standard essential patents in India. In our paper, the globalized form of IP ownership is probably most clearly indicated in the standard setting process, where participants are International Standard Setting Organizations determining, in a manner of speaking - the rules of the game - that is - licensing on Fair Reasonable and Non Discriminatory Basis. The other important player to our understanding of global ownership would be multilateral organizations such as Ericsson, involved in many of the disputes before the Delhi High Court and the Competition Commission of India ("CCI"). Perhaps international actors/actants would also be international legal principles as well as international regulators such as the FTC or the ECC themselves. This phase of the paper will also trace India's specific location in global competition. In doing so, not only will the market positions of some of the players be examined, but also some comparisons will be made to illustrate how the relationship of international jurisdictions (mainly the USA and the EU) with international multinational corporations that are a party to litigation differs from that of India. This phase of the chapter will most likely apply the doctrinal method of research, study academic texts as sources as well as study some decisions by international regulators and courts to understand the tools and sites available for regulation as well as the nature of the regulatory process itself.

The second phase of this chapter will seek to map the overall context to specific cases - that is, pending legal processes in India. This includes both, ongoing litigation on patent infringement at the Delhi High Court as well as ongoing disputes before the CCI as well. The characters in this litigation also trace back to the broader context; some of them more directly than others. The multinational corporations are directly involved in both contexts, whereas the domestic regulators may seek to draw inferences or apply commonly understood international legal principles, thus invoking more international actants.

This phase of the chapter will study three key litigations in India - Ericsson and Micromax, Ericsson and Intex, and a third that is yet to be defined. Legal traditions and institutions in India will be used to understand what legal possibilities are available for using competition regulation to regulate SEPs. This includes specifically the levers in competition law such as abuse of dominance as well as the nature of the competition regulator and the role that it identifies for itself. One might also consider the relative 'youth' of the competition regulator as a factor in laying down legal principles, the constraints it imposes on itself as well as a tension between the market regulator and the courts. Perhaps this might also be an actant, in the context of the actor network theory. This phase of the chapter will most likely apply the doctrinal method of research, study academic texts as sources as well as study legal instruments and judicial decisions as sources.

The third phase of this chapter will now ask the question of standard essential patent (SEP) regulation, located within this broader matrix of intellectual property ownership and fluidity of actants. The specific question to be asked will be what is the competition regulation challenge for SEPs in India? This phase will attempt to distill the uniqueness of India in the narrative of global IP ownership around SEP litigation. It will be observed that the nature of the players in international litigation as well as in India is rather different. This phase will also attempt to make a case for IP regulation within India's existing culture of engaging with the public interest in intellectual property regulation.

It is in this phase that one must also examine the usefulness of the actor-network theory as a research methodology to study SEP regulation in India. It must be noted that while SEP regulation so used is used to refer to competition regulation specifically, and not to other levers, such as mechanisms within intellectual property law itself. The focus of this exercise will be competition regulation, with an engagement with other areas of the law and the judicial process only in as much as it informs our understanding of competition regulation of SEPs or impedes it. If one were to apply the actor network theory to this phase of the exercise, one would view courts, parties involved in the litigation, the CCI, international legal principles, international market regulators, international SSOs, competition law as well as issues raised in the litigation as 'actants', both human and non human, who are to be treated on par with each other, with a study of the networks that these actants create, or are a part of.

Part 2: Literature Review on the Actor-Network Theory

The aim of this exercise is to first, understand the ANT as a research methodology; second, to study its components and third, to ascertain its suitability as a research method for exploring the challenge of regulating SEP litigation through completion law mechanisms in India.

What is the Actor-Network Theory?

David Banks, in a 2011 blog post, contextualized in trying to trace a relationship between our offline and online behavior presents an overview of the ANT.[1] Banks describes ANT as an ongoing project that seeks to radically transform how social scientists talk about society's relationship to technology and other non human actors ; and identifies Bruno Latour, John Law and Michael Callon as the major authors in this space. (It is observed that there might have been additions or deletions to this core list of thinkers - not to self for further reading).

In his paper[2] reflecting on the ANT, Bruno Latour refers to himself as a 'fellow traveler' of the various network 'revolutions', and says that in the network, he has found a powerful way of rephrasing basic issues of social theory, epistemology and philosophy. Latour says that in its simplest and deepest sense, the notion of the network is of use whenever action has to be redistributed.[3] In a different paper, Latour argues that the purpose of the ANT is not to provide explanations for the behaviour and reasons of actors, but only to map procedures which enable actors to relate to each other and each others' world building capacity. My discomfort with this reading is trying to locate what these procedures would be in an SEP regulation environment.

Identifying the components of the ANT

Latour presents an actant - or an actor - as something that acts, or to which some sort of activity is assigned by others. [4] There is no special motivation of humans or human actors. "An actant," says Latour, "can literally be anything provided it is granted to be the source of the action."[5] The conception of an actant, Latour further articulates, should be not as fixed entities, but as fluid, circulating objects, whose stability and continuity depends on other actions. [6]

So what is on its agenda? The attribution of human, unhuman, nonhuman, inhuman, characteristics; the distribution of properties among these entities; the connections established between them; the circulation entailed by these attributions, distributions and connections; the transformation of those attributions, distributions and connections, of the many elements that circulates and of the few ways through which they are sent.[7]

Banks[8] identifies actants to be of two types - human and non human, further explaining that 'actors' is typically used to refer to humans. These actants have equal amounts of agency within the actor-network. Banks proceeds to demonstrate this applicability of equal agency with an illustration of getting wi-fi connectivity in Albany. In his narrative [9] (and as he notes later himself), Banks uses the same language (read as according agency to the inanimate) to describe both, the human and non human actants. Says Banks, that the actants are merely nodes that facilitate a larger functioning. It is submitted that the 'larger functioning' being referred to is probably something that would be determined on a case to case basis - depending on what was being studied.

In a 1999 paper On Recalling ANT[10], Latour articulates a problem with the usage of the word 'network' as a result of its usage having changed over time - from using it to refer to a series of transformations incapable of being captured by prevalent social theory at the time, to an unmediated access to every piece of information (to my understanding within the context of the World Wide Web). Latour explains that his new understanding is exactly the opposite of what they meant and that it ought not to be used to mean the transformations they were initially articulating.

Another of Latour's papers is helpful in arriving at an understanding of the 'network', where he argues that it would be fallacious to consider it in a technical sense, as one would a sewage, a train or a telephone network.[11] Unlike a technical network, Latour argues, an actor-network may have no compulsory paths, no nodes and might be quite local in nature. Latour further argues that thinking in terms of a network helps us overcome the tyranny of distance, citing a range of examples including standing one metre away from somebody in a telephone booth and yet being more closely connected to his mother, thousands of miles away, among others[12]. In each of his illustrations, however, Latour articulates closeness or distance in terms of geography or presence in a physical sense, which might not be entirely applicable to the research question we're seeking to study. What might be more useful perhaps, is the articulation of the network where he argues that instead of tracing an individual to the collective or the agency, one could only at the number of connections an element has and gauge the importance of the element in light of these connections . The greater the number of connections, the more important an element and vice versa. [13]

ANT Criticism and Applicability of the ANT to our research question?

Before delving into specifics of the ANT that lend themselves to a critique, I submit a broader reservation with the application of the ANT to studying legal and regulatory processes. From my reading and understanding of the ANT so far, a cornerstone appears to be the exclusion normative ideologies, with a focus on studying processes and networks as is, without formulating a value-judgment on their larger place in the society being studied. In so far as defending this claim, Latour and other supporters of this theory have relied on scientific examples (for instance, the reference to the Colombia Shuttle - NASA and its complex organizational structure)[14] or illustrations from the social sciences or social phenomena. I'm still attempting to locate a paper that utilizes the ANT to study law or regulation. Prima facie, the challenge being posed is to study inherently normative structures and processes with clear power structures.

Banks[15] describes the efficacy of the ANT in describing the processes by which inventions and technological systems come into being, or fail to do so. Perhaps in studying the legal regulation of SEP litigation in India, the efficacy of the ANT would like in describing the processes by which legal regulation and legal systems in India (specifically to regulate SEPs) come into being, or fail to do so. By extension, for our research question, non human actants as identified by Banks[16] would probably be legal institutions and the parties to the litigation themselves. What is unclear at the moment is whether policy and legal instruments or levers themselves would be actors.

Banks, in his article also articulates criticisms[17] to the ANT propounded by Sandra Harding, David Bloor and Sal Restivo, on the grounds of being blind towards other social factors such as race or patriarchy. If one were to extend this to the research question at hand, an argument could be made that the ANT seeks to equate dissimilarly situated institutions. Corollaries to race and patriarchy might be found in the market power of parties (an Ericsson v. a Micromax), or even within regulatory set up itself, where, based on the facts so far, an argument could be made out that different regulators are situated differently, where the Delhi High Court could pass an order restraining another regulator - the Competition Commission of India, from passing its own order.

A reference to the 'agency' critique of the ANT is made by Latour himself, in his 1999 paper. Latour goes on to acknowledges the critiques of the ANT, but says that most have (mistakenly) centered either around the actor or around the network; and that the idea was to never occupy a position in the agency/structure debate.[18] Later in the paper, Latour further clarifies that actants are not to be perceived as playing the role of agency, and network is not to be seen as playing the role of the structure. Instead, says he, they represent two sides of the same phenomenon. Latour further explains that the ANT merely tried to learn from the actors (what was sought to be learnt was difficult to grasp), without attempting to be an explanation of societal pressures (and the reasons for such pressures) on actors. The difficulty in reading this paper for me was that it was rather dense in many respects, with various concepts - including, for instance, the idea of the 'social', which he refers to constantly, not being clearly articulated. Further, what is uncertain to me is how this question of agency will play out if applied to a legal or regulatory context. If, for instance, a legal principle was to be a non human actant, how would this have an agency independent of the human actor (the judge) that would be the one applying the legal principle in the first place? Can we truly exclude the question of agency from the ANT if the very exclusion of agency means a recognition of the existence of agency in the first place? How does one exclude the question of agency in seemingly unequally situated actors with an inherent power dynamic? Is the ANT, then even a useful research methodology? In his 1999 paper, Latour argues that the aim of the ANT is to study actors without the imposition of an a priori definition of their world building capacities.[19] The question now arises for me, is how to divest regulators of their 'world building capacities'.

Explaining the rationale[20] for the ANT (in social science research), Latour articulates a dissatisfaction that social scientists have with both, micro (local sites) and macro levels (more abstract ideas like culture, patriarchy etc.) of research. This dissatisfaction, he argues, results in a back and forth between these sites ad infinitum. The ANT, argues Latour, is a way of tracing these dissatisfactions, not for the purposes of finding a solution, but to follow them elsewhere and explore the very conditions that make these two disappointments possible. Latour further clarifies that one must not understand 'network' in ANT to mean a larger society that would help make sense of local interactions or as an anonymous field of forces. Instead, he says, it refers to summing up various interactions through various devices, inscriptions, forms and formulae into a very local, very practical, very tiny locus. My key takeaway from this articulation was that ANT could be used to study various interactions between various key stakeholders, with a very specific research question. Given that the locus could also be tiny, perhaps if the research question was narrowed further, the key stakeholders, or the 'network' and the 'actants' would reduce as well.

Latour has also argued that the ANT makes no assumptions about how an actor should behave and assumes infinite pliability and absolute freedom of actors. [21] In itself AT is not a theory of action no more than cartography is a theory on the shape of coasts lines and deep sea ridges; it just qualify what the observer should suppose in order for the coast lines to be recorded in their fine fractal patterns. Any shape is possible provided it is obsessively coded as longitude and latitude. Similarly any association is possible provided it is obsessively coded as heterogeneous associations through translations.

there is no difficulty in seeing that AT is not about traced networks by about a network-tracing activity. As I said above there is not a net and an actor laying down the net, but there is an actor whose definition of the world outlines, traces, delineate, limn, describe, shadow forth, inscroll, file, list, record, mark, or tag a trajectory that is called a network. No net exists independently of the very act of tracing it, and no tracing is done by an actor exterior to the net. A network is not a thing but the recorded movement of a thing. The questions AT addresses have now changed. It is not longer whether a net is representation or a thing, a part of society or a part of discourse or a part of nature, but what moves and how this movement is recorded. [22]

A useful articulation of the application of ANT emerges out of Jonathan Murdoch's 1997 paper.[23]He submits that the human gaze is being increasingly considered as an unreliable source of knowledge, being in a constant state of flux. Citing the example of the environment/biosphere to demonstrate the futility of the separations we make between nature and society, Murdoch argues that any solution to the environmental crisis will involve a profound re-thinking of how we link these two domains.[24]Extending this argument to our research question, one might ponder for instance that any solution to the SEP litigation and regulation conundrum will involve a profound re-thinking of how we link the courts and the CCI. What is unclear is what method we will use to arrive at this re-thinking, or what the re-thought out version would look like.

Murdoch does, however, articulate concerns with the 'non dualistic' framework (which the ANT positions itself as) and argues, relying on others before him, that such an adoption could have far reaching consequences; that the very basis of the development of social science is such a binary division. Murdoch argues that the nature-society divide has enabled social scientists to break the hegemony of the natural scientists. Murdoch further submits his reading of Latour, where he states that the power of laboratories arises as a result of their ability to tie together actors that are beyond the lab into networks that are then used to disseminate scientific facts.[25] Murdoch's paper largely focuses on blurring the distance between 'natural' and 'social' actors, and identifies the difficulties in attempting to compare the two. Murdoch questions if natural actors whose identity emerge from nature itself are malleable as social actors, who are by definition, a product of society. What is unclear, however, is how malleable are two dissimilarly situated social actors; and whether 'social actors' is broad enough to encompass all institutions born out of or with a human/societal interaction component. Specifically, for our paper, would courts and the CCI both qualify as social actors? Would legal principles? Would the decision making process by the courts itself? Latour's very example for proposing the ANT was that of pasteurization in France. Murdoch also questions whether it's possible to in fact treat various actants as each other. In order to address another critique of ANT, that where we exclude notions of power, Mudoch says Law's articulation - of focusing on 'victims' instead of 'heroes' might prove to be useful. This has not been discussed in detail, leaving the reader to make their own inferences.

In other words, can ANT, with its seamless webs, forever crisscrossing the human-nonhuman divide, provide a secure platform for critique, for the expression of a profound dissatisfaction with the activities of powerful social actors and the attribution of responsibility to those actors? Can it, in other words, ever do anything more than describe, in a prosaic fashion, the dangerous imbroglios that enmesh us?
Does this emphasis on description necessarily represent "an insuperable obstacle to effective and convincing social criticism

[1] David Banks, A Brief Summary of Actor Network Theory, available at http://thesocietypages.org/cyborgology/2011/12/02/a-brief-summary-of-actor-network-theory/ (last accessed 29 August, 2015).

[2] Bruno Latour - Networks, Societies, Spheres : Reflections of an Actor - Network Theorist, International Journal of Communication 5 (2011), 796- 810, available at http://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/viewArticle/1094 (last accessed 31 August, 2015).

[3] Id at 797.

[4] Bruno Latour - complications paper - at internal page 7.

[5] Id.

[6] Id at internal page 8.

[7] Id at internal page 7.

[8] Id.

[9] Id.

[10] Bruno Latour, On Recalling ANT, available at http://www.bruno-latour.fr/sites/default/files/P-77-RECALLING-ANT-GBpdf.pdf (last accessed 28 August, 2015).

[11] Bruno Latour, On actor-network theory. A few clarifications plus more than a few complications, available at http://www.bruno-latour.fr/sites/default/files/P-67%20ACTOR-NETWORK.pdf (last accessed 30 August, 2015) at internal page 2.

[12] Id at internal page 4

[13] Id at internal page 6.i

[14] Latour, the networks, societies, spheres paper

[15] Id.

[16] Id.

[17] Id.

[18] Latour, recalling the ANT paper.

[19] Recalling ANT paper, page 20

[20] Bruno Latour, On Recalling ANT, available at http://www.bruno-latour.fr/sites/default/files/P-77-RECALLING-ANT-GBpdf.pdf (last accessed 28 August, 2015).

[21] Latour, the complications paper, page 9.

[22] Id at 14.

[23] Jonathan Murdoch, Inhuman/nonhuman/: actor-network theory and the prospects for a nondualistic and symmetrical perspective on nature and society, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 1997, Volume 15, 731-576

[24] Murdoch at page 732.

[25] Murdoch at page 737.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/pervasive-technologies-working-document-series-research-questions-and-a-literature-review-on-actor-network-theory

Pervasive Technologies: Patent Pools

nehaa — 2013-07-03T06:57:59Z

In this research paper, Nehaa Chaudhari gives an analysis of patent pools. She discusses the working of a patent pool, study patent pool in other areas of technology, and patenting in telecom and related technology.

Click to download the full research paper here (PDF, 475 Kb)

Introduction

The network landscape over the past few years has been characterized by several battles of supremacy between two or more rival technologies. [1] These battles have included, inter alia, the constant efforts at besting rivals in the arena of patenting innovations in technology, often as a result characterised by the imposition of high royalties on rivals, for the use of one’s patents. However, having realised that such efforts at besting the other could prove detrimental for all parties concerned in the long run, and stall technological advancements which would in turn translate into lower business revenue, mechanisms were devised to ensure a relatively equitable utilization of patents in the market place. One such mechanism that has been developed is that of patent pools.

Patent pools have been developed around most areas of high end technology and research and development. Over the course of this paper, the author has confined herself to a study on patent pools in the area of telecommunications, and the issues to be addressed therein. Specifically, the author will be dealing with patent pools around 3G, 4G, LTE, TD-SCDMA and TD-LTE technologies. Within this framework, the author seeks to examine what are patent pools, whether and what kind of patent pools exist, their associated costs, their licensing arrangements and the structure of the payment of royalty, and the feasibility of these patent pools.

Understanding Patent Pools

Patent pools are agreements among patent owners through which patent owners combine their patents, waiving their exclusive rights to the patent to enable others, or themselves, to obtain rights to license the pooled patents.[2] Therefore, such pools may be focussed either on cross licensing, that is companies mutually making their patents available to each other, or on out licensing, that is, a group of companies making a collection of patents available to companies that do not or might not have patents of their own to contribute to the pool.[3] Typically, modern patent pools combine patents of various companies and are around inventions that are required to implement an established industry standard, are licensed as a whole (on an all or nothing basis) and not as individual licenses for patents owned by various companies within that pool, and are available to any non member for licensing.[4] Such licensing is done under a standard agreement and royalty rates, on a non discriminatory basis. The exception to this rule is that if certain members have contributed patents to the pool, they may receive more favourable terms, in recognition of their cross licensing relationship to the pool.[5] When viewed from a law and economics perspective, patent pools are seen to be an efficient institutional solution to various problems that arise when companies have complementary intellectual property rights, and these rights are essential to new technologies being used and employed. [6] However, this perspective also warns about the antitrust risks that may arise when competitors or potential competitors are involved in the coordination of their intellectual property. For instance, such pools may be used to allocate markets or otherwise chill competition. [7]

The Working of a Patent Pool

Generally, a patent pool may be administered in one of two ways- it may either have an administrative entity, or may also just be a system of cross licensing between two firms.[8] In case of the former, the licensing agency may be one of the patent holders, [9] or may be an independent licensing company (e.g. MPEG).[10]

The ownership of patents within the pool is retained by the owners, who then license them to the operator/administrator on a non exclusive basis, with sub licensing rights. This means that the owners are free to continue to license their patents on an individual basis, and the administrator also has the right to further license the patents to any party who is interested in licensing from the patent pool.[11] The responsibility of managing licensing and licenses is vested in the operator/administrator of the patent pool. Licensees are required to report sales and pay royalties to the pool administrator, who in turn would enforce the conditions of the license.[12] The distribution of royalties between the members of the pool is on the basis of a formula which may, or may not be transparent to non member licensees, with the pool operator retaining a management fee.[13] Typically, pool licenses are also structured in a manner so as to render difficult early termination by the licensee. The nature of the contract, once signed by a licensee, is typically binding in nature. Therefore, this would mean that the administrator of the patent pool could sue the licensee for non performance of the contract.[14] However, unless a pool operator is a member of the pool itself, it cannot sue for the infringement of patents. [15] Therefore, in the event that a patented technology were to be utilised without having taken a license, one or more of the individual patent owners would be required to take legal action. The involvement of the pool operator would be limited to being a part of any settlement discussions, if they were to occur, since one of the options for the alleged infringer could be to obtain a license for the patent pool.[16]

Drawing Parallels with Other Patent Pools

In this section of the paper, the author seeks to study patent pools in other areas of technology in order to better understand the structure and pricing of patent pools.

The ‘3C DVD’ Patent Pool
Established in 1998, the 3C DVD Patent Pool was the brainchild of Philips, Sony and Pioneer, and L.G. was subsequently inducted as a member. Philips acts as a licensing administrator for patents held by all the companies, which are over two hundred in number. These patents include those for the manufacture of the DVD players, and for the manufacture of the DVD disks themselves. [17] The player license per unit royalty was set as 3.5% of the net selling price of each player sold. This was subject to a minimum fee of $7 per unit, which after January 1, 2000 became $5 per unit. The disc license royalty was set as $0.05 per disc sold.[18]

The ‘DVD- 6C’ Patent Pool
Established in June 1999, the members of this pool at the time of its inception were Hitachi, Matsushita, Mitsubishi, Time Warner, Toshiba, and JVC. This pool was also for the DVD-ROM and the DVD- Video formats, with Toshiba acting as the administrator. [19] The royalties were set at $.075 per DVD Disc and 4% of the net sales price of DVD players and DVD decoders, with a minimum royalty of $4.00 per player or decoder, which saw a substantial reduction in 2003.[20] Subsequently, there were various changes that were made to this group, including the inclusion of newer standards, the joining and subsequent departure of IBM and other organizations as a member etc. Hitachi and Panasonic also act as regional agents in certain regions of the world.

The MPEG LA pool
The MPEG-2 is a standard for describing the coding of data inter alia, on DVD discs. For MPEG-2, a patent pool has been established, where the administrator is an independent, external organization known as the MPEG Licensing Authority, that set itself the aim to develop a patent pool for this standard. [21] The MPEG LA invited parties that thought they owned patents essential to this standard to join the program, which took off in 1997. At present, the pool has over a hundred patents and thousands of licensees.[22]

Patenting in Telecom and Related Technology

In this section of the paper, the author examines the working of patenting and patent pools in the telecommunications sector and in areas of related technology.

Early Developments and the Emergence of GSM
Patent pools are slowly developing into a key component of the telecommunications and the technological industry. The technology industry has been said to be an ecosystem, wherein there is a complex correlation between those who develop the technology and those who implement it in the creation and development of products.[23] In the telecommunications industry for instance, each handset manufacturer has declared only a small percentage of the various types of intellectual property assets that are necessary to implement a 3G compatible cellular phone. Therefore, the working in such a context is that various companies develop different technologies, and the same is shared by various manufacturers that seek to make use of this technology.[24]

The revival of patenting in the sector of telecommunications, post a period of decline in the decades of the 19540s to the 1980s, is attributed to the advent of the GSM standard for mobile communications in Europe.[25] In 1988, the main European operators invited equipment suppliers and developed a procedure wherein manufacturers would have to give up their intellectual property rights and to provide free world wide licenses for essential patents.[26] After opposition from the manufacturers, the approach was modified to one wherein the operators required the suppliers to sign a declaration agreeing to serve all of the GSM community on fair, reasonable and non discriminatory conditions.[27] In the early 1990s, Motorola by refusing to grant non discriminatory licenses for its substantial portfolio of essential patents and only agreeing to enter into cross license agreements further intensified the debate over IPRs in telecommunications. The company only lifted these restrictions after various countries across the world expressed a preference for this standard. The experience in this standard has demonstrated that it would not be accurate to expect that all parties holding essential patents would be willing to license them to all interested parties.[28] Companies were only willing to relax their licensing conditions once revenue generating opportunities increased.

The 3G3P and the UMTS
In July 2000 the 3G Patent Platform Partnership (3G3P) and its 18 partners notified various agreements to the end of establishing a worldwide patent platform. The purpose behind this was disclosed to be that of providing a voluntary and cost effective mechanism to evaluate, verify and license patents that were essential for third generation (3G) mobile communication systems.[29] It was also claimed that the said agreements would have pro competitive effects and that the purpose behind this Platform was the facilitation of access to technology and consequent entry into the markets.[30] On the intellectual property front, the purpose was to reduce cost uncertainties and the delays that were accompaniments of licensing numerous essential patents for complex technologies.

While it has often been considered to be a patent pool, this arrangement has been said to be only similar to a patent pool.[31] The 3G3P itself has argued that since it was a mere facilitator of transactions between patent holders and licensees, and that membership was open to both licensors and licensees as opposed to only licensors as in the case of patent pools, it would be fallacious to classify the Platform as a patent pool. Further, it has also been argued that licensing by members is not restricted to the Platform and that there was no bundling or real pooling of the patents per se and those licensees have the opportunity to pick and choose between patents with the licensing being carried out on a bilateral basis. Additionally, unlike in a patent pool, there is no single license between the patent holders as a collective and the licensee, and the parties have a choice between the Standard License of the Platform, and a negotiable individual license.[32] A Standard License provides for Standard Royalty Rate, a Maximum Cumulative Royalty Rate and a Cumulative Royalty Rate.[33] Bilateral transactions on the other hand, are negotiated between the parties where the consideration is to be determined on fair and equitable terms.[34] This Platform also provides for a price cap, which, instead of being absolute and set at a pre-determined royalty rate, is a default five percent maximum (not minimum) cumulative royalty rate for potential licensees per product category.[35] The royalty rate for each individual patent will differ for each of the licensees and this depends on the patent portfolio under each product category that the licensee has chosen.[36]

The concerns and challenges of the GSM experience were well perceived during the determination of the course of action for UMTS. European actors were especially wary of Qualcomm and expected the firm to demand high license fees, with some even fearing them to be in excess of 10%.[37] Subsequently, various attempts at developing licensing schemes failed, until 2004 and the establishment of the W-CDMA Patent Licensing Programme for UMTS FDD patents.[38] At the outset, seven licensors offered their patents as a bundle to prospective licensors, a number which decreased over time.[39]

The Development of LTE Patent Pools
The next stage in the process of innovation in the realm of telecommunications was the development of the Long Term Evolution (LTE) Standard, which while being essential to 4G technology has also seen application in the realm of 3G. Consequently, patent pools or similar structures have been developed in these areas. LTE patents are being viewed as among the most valuable intellectual property resource in the mobile telecommunications industry, with most operators around the world building LTE networks.[40]

As per in a study conducted in 2011, 23% of the patents about this technology were owned by L.G. Electronics, with Qualcomm coming in second with 21%. Motorola Mobility, InterDigital, Nokia and Samsung each owned 9%, China’s ZTE owned about 6%[41] and Nortel owned 4%, which were later sold to a consortium of Apple, EMC, Ericsson, Microsoft, Research in Motion (RIM) and Sony, after Nortel filed for bankruptcy in 2009.[42] Ericsson also independently owns 2% of the patent pool and RIM owns 1%.[43] However, another analysis[44] of IP databases conducted by ZTE in 2011 revealed differing results. As per this analysis, InterDigital was the leader, with its Patent Holdings arm controlling 13% and the Technology arm controlling 11% of LTE essential patents. Qualcomm controlled 13%, Nokia and Samsung 9% each, Ericsson controlled 8%, as did Huawei, ZTE controlled 7%, L.G. controlled 6% and NTT DoCoMo brought up the rear with 5%. The remaining 11% was held by various other firms.[45] It is to be realized that these studies have often come under criticism from different companies, with each of them eager to portray themselves as the market leader.[46] Setting aside criticism driven by corporate egos, the principle of it, that is, the difficulty in assessing and valuing patents cannot be disputed. Valuing patents is far from merely counting the number of patents owned by a company. The complications are especially evident when it comes to determining which of these patents are essential and which of them aren’t. Additionally, the worth of these patents varies depending on the existence or the absence of certain conditions, including transfer restrictions, cross licensing arrangements, ownership and market conditions.[47]

The aforesaid discussion reveals the complexity and the fragmentation of the LTE environment, which further underscored the need to have patent pools in this field. Although the need for a patent pool was realized in 2009-2010, given that the WCDMA patent pool had been met with very limited success,[48] industry watchers were reluctant to be optimistic. This was in part fuelled by the understanding of the attitude of dominant players, wherein they continued to believe that they could derive more monetary, cross licensing and litigation defence value if they did not pool their patents.[49]

The development of LTE patent pools can be traced back to 2009, and the response of Via Licensing¸ Sisvel and MPEG LA to a Request for Information on forming such a patent pool by the Next Generation Mobile Network Alliance (NGMN).[50] Sisvel’s proposal, which it subsequently made at a public conference in 2010 sought to demonstrate that patent pools could prevent excessive costs from royalty stacking.[51] Among various other examples, Roberto Dini, the founder of Sisvel suggested that if patents were to be licensed individually, for instance, 85 patents for MPEG video at 50 cents apiece would cost $42.50. As opposed to this, the patent pool charged $2.50.[52] In 2011, the NGMN reiterated its recommendation to all stakeholders in the mobile industry that were interested in developing patent pools to hasten their development process to avoid further delays in LTE licensing.[53] The NGMN also went on to state that it would be ideal if all the parties were to agree on a single patent pool that promoted reasonable royalties, offered certainty on the availability of the licenses for patents and created a framework for evaluation of their essentiality, where the value of the patents essential to the pool would be established by the industry.[54] These recommendations were not without their fair share of criticism, both, from industry watchers[55] and from vendors.[56] Notwithstanding these reservations, both, Sisvel[57] and Via Licensing have gone on to issue calls for patents for the purposes of creating patent pools in the LTE marketplace.

The Sisvel LTE Patent Pool materialized in late 2012, wherein licenses were offered under a portfolio of patents essential to LTE.[58] The pool includes patents owned by Cassidian, the China Academy of Telecommunication Technology, the Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute, France Telecom, TDF, and KPN, in addition to some patents that had been originally filed by Nokia but were acquired by Sisvel in 2011.[59] The pool is also open to other organizations that have patents essential to LTE. At present, the current portfolio of these patents is available under standard terms and conditions. The running royalty rate is 0.99 Euros per device.[60]

Having promised a launch within a few months in June, 2012[61] Via Licensing has also developed its own LTE Patent Pool, with the initial companies in this pool being AT&T, Clearwire Corporation, DTVG Licensing, HP, KDDI Corporation, MTT DoCoMo, SK Telecom, Telecom Italia, Telefónica and ZTE.[62] Like Sisvel’s Patent Pool, this pool is also open to other organizations that believe they possess essential LTE patents, and they are encouraged to submit the same for evaluation.[63] The patent pool floated by Via leans heavily towards service providers, but some of the big players in the industry including Nokia, Ericsson, Huawei Technologies and Samsung Electronics are conspicuous by their absence.[64] This absence is felt even in Sisvel’s patent pool, with the reasoning being proposed[65] that these key patent holders may prefer private licensing and subsequent litigation over pooled resources in patent pools.[66] Understandably, the launch of the LTE Patent Pools has been met with approval by the NGMN[67] but given the nascent stages in which both of these pools find themselves, it would be premature to comment (without first observing for a few months) the likelihood of their success or failure and how they would play out against each other.

The TD-SCDMA and the TD-LTE
Reportedly, China has spent several billion dollars on the import of analog and GSM technology,[68] and the country’s mobile communications industry continues to be dominated by foreign players.[69] Therefore, in continuation of a purportedly growing trend[70] in the area of telecommunications as well, domestically developed systems are being preferred and developed over standardized technologies that enjoy strong patent protection outside China.[71] Besides the avoidance of paying royalties to foreigners, the idea is also to use China’s strong market presence and have more participants in China’s home grown technology.[72]

Time Divisional- Synchronous Code Division Multiple Access (TD-SCDMA), developed by the China Academy of Telecommunications Technology (CATT), in collaboration with Datang and Siemens[73] is a Chinese indigenously developed 3G technology standard developed by China to reduce its dependence on western standards.[74] Interestingly however, it has been reported that the Chinese hold core patent technology only about 7% whereas most of the rest of it is taken by other foreign organizations.[75] In 2000, an industry consortium, the TD-SCDMA forum was established. The participants were China Mobile, China Telecom, China Unicom, Huawei, Motorola, Nortel, and Siemens, with the objective of developing and supporting this technology. Government support was received in 2002, following which the TD-SCDMA Industry Alliance was founded by well known market players including Datang, SOUTEC, Holley, Huawei, LENOVO, ZTE, CEC and China Putian. There has also been the creation of various joint ventures with international giants such as Alcatel, Ericsson, Nokia, (erstwhile) Nortel, Philips, Samsung and Siemens have also been created.[76]

Information about the existence of patent pools in this technology has been hard to come by. One of the few to write about patent pools in his 2008 paper,[77] Dazheng Wang proposes patent pools as a solution to the problem of commercialization of TD-SCDMA. He suggests that the framework of this patent pool should be on the industry principles of fair, reasonable and non discriminatory licensing terms for essential patents, with the end result being one of increased innovation and competition and an overall increase in market presence. Interestingly, a few articles[78] on blog posts on the internet speak about the existence of patent pools and their apparent misuse[79] as well.

It is submitted that these inconsistencies regarding the division of patents between various patent holders, where the percentage of patents held by each company have been pegged differently,[80] and about the existence of a patent pool or not raise pressing concerns about the payment of royalties and how licensing works in such a situation. On a very basic level, in order to be able to pay royalties and enter into licensing agreements, the existence of an identified, non disputed patent holder would be the sine qua non, which seems to be missing in the case of patents for TD-SCDMA. This problem is only further compounded by the lack of clarity on the very existence of patent pools. Had there been specified patent pools, the issues of determination of essential patents and the setting of royalties and licensing fees would have been standardized, a situation that cannot be invoked, without dispute, in the present Chinese context.

It is further submitted that despite China being the world’s largest market for mobile communications, and its progress from a mere importer to a developer of some parts of technology,[81] the Chinese experiment with TD-SCDMA seems to have met with limited success, in comparison to what was envisaged. For instance, while an agency had forecast that the number of TD-SCDMA subscribers in 2010 would be 34 million, by April, 2010 there were only 8 million or (even lower) subscribers.[82] One of the reasons for preferring other standards, for instance, the W-CDMA is the number of handsets compatible with the same and the consequent variety that is available to the consumer. To illustrate, one could look at the figures from June, 2010. At this point of time China Unicom had 94 models for W-CDMA from twenty four manufacturers including nine foreign ones, whereas China Mobile had only twenty eight models that were compatible with TD-SCDMA.[83] Interestingly, if one were to measure popularity in terms of sheer numbers, TD-SCDMA would emerge the winner over W-CDMA by a couple of million subscribers, but if the growth rate were to be considered, W-CDMA would come out on top. While TD-SCDMA grew only by 24%, W-CDMA has grown at 32% monthly since the start of its service is October, 2009.[84]

China’s experiments with creating its home grown telecommunication standards have not stopped with the development of the TD-SCDMA, with the country being on track in the development of the TD-LTE. Reports suggest that although the systems are in ‘trial’ mode officially, the 4G spectrum situation remains uncertain.[85] It is submitted that although this is in the nascent stages as compared to the TD-SCDMA, the concerns expressed earlier about TD-SCDMA and the suggestions made therein for the technology to realise its full potential would be equally applicable in this scenario as well.

Therefore, in light of this discussion it would not be fallacious to conclude that while the TD-SCDMA, and now more recently the TD-LTE standard might still be in its nascent stages, on a fundamental level it seems to have not fulfilled the objectives with which it was developed, especially given that a sizeable portion of its patents continue to be owned by foreign corporations. In addition to the challenges of attracting subscribers, it would also need to streamline its system of patents, royalties and licensing, if it wants to have a truly global or even national presence. To this end perhaps patent pools structured along the lines of those being developed or in place for other mobile communication technologies might provide a viable solution meriting consideration.

Concluding Observations

One of the fundamental concerns that plague most downstream organizations in the mobile communications sector is the prevalence of high licensing fees that need to be paid on essential patents, the cost of which often trickles down to the customers. A study on the licensing arrangements prevalent at the moment[86] reveals that as of the moment, the result of royalty rate caps is that they save money for downstream manufacturers, but this is at the expense of upstream licensors. The most significant savers are the ones downstream with no IP to trade, and vertically integrated companies while losing some revenue, are able to save significantly more in reduced expenses.[87]

Therefore, it comes as no surprise that efforts at limiting aggregate licensing fees have been at the forefront over the past couple of years. It is in this scenario that patent pools have developed, with operators such as Via Licensing and Sisvel even promoting themselves as being able to put together patent pools that would greatly limit licensing fees.[88] However, some owners of intellectual property continue to find bilateral licensing and cross licensing to be more profitable as opposed to patent pools.

One of the key concerns when it comes to fore when dealing with how patent pools are structured is about the distribution of income received from royalties within the members of the pool, which ties in with the bigger question of classifying patents as essential and non essential. More often than not, patent pools also have to grapple with the problem of members having conflicting interests. For instance, manufacturers have the incentive to cap aggregate royalties of certain essential patents that they would use in manufacturing, in order to reduce their licensing costs. However, these manufacturers could have also brought their own essential patents to the pool, perhaps of a new way of doing things, and would certainly be averse of having caps imposed on these royalties.

One of the key other considerations that patent pools need to take into account include the royalty rates affixed. In an interview some time ago, the founder of Sisvel, went on to state that while affixing these royalty rates, there could be no discrimination against licensees, since that would be a sure fire way of ensuring the collapse of the patent pool.[89] Additionally, patent pools also need to account for the difference in regulatory mechanism and their execution that exists across jurisdictions. For instance, customs officials in France pay a lot more attention to counterfeit goods than they would to patent infringing products, whereas those in Germany would have a keen eye on the latter.[90]

Various other concerns have also been identified with regard to patent pools over time. One of these is that they could potentially eliminate competition that comes from outside of patent pools.[91]

Additionally, patent pools are not all inclusive, since participation is entirely voluntary. Therefore, patent pools would not even be reasonably expected to cover all essential patents required to make a standardised product. This problem is rendered even more complex as a result of the presence of multiple patent pools around the same technology, as in the case of DVDs and more recently, LTE technology.

In sum, while portfolio cross licenses and patent pools can be helpful in resolving issues created by patent thickets by reducing transaction costs for licensees, while preserving to a definitive extent financial incentives for inventors to commercialize their existing inventions and undertake new research, the significant shortcomings of these pools also need to be taken into account before they can be heralded as the solution to problems presented by complex patent landscapes. While voluntary patent pools might have proved to be beneficial in some respects, the imposition of patent pools would be a fallacious approach to undertake.

[1]. Hui Yan, The 3G Standard Setting Strategy and Indigenous Innovation Policy in China: Is TD-SCDMA a Flagship?, DRUID Working Paper No 07-01, available at http://www2.druid.dk/conferences/viewpaper.php?id=1454&cf=9 (last accessed 07 12 2012)

[2]. Josh Lerner and Jean Tirole, Efficient Patent Pools, 4 Am. Econ. Rev. 691, 691 (2004)

[3]. Patent Pools- Some Not So Frequently Answered Questions, available at http://blog.patentology.com.au/2012/11/patent-pools-some-not-so-frequently.html (last accessed 10 December, 2012)

[4]. Id.

[5]. Id.

[6]. Philip B. Nelson, Patent Pools: An Economic Assessment of Current Law and Policy, Rutgers Law Journal, Volume 38:539, 559 (2007)

[7].

[8]. Roger B. Andewelt, Analysis of Patent Pools Under the Antitrust Laws, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 611, 611 (1984).

[9]. Philips has been known to have been the licensing agency for patent pools where it was a member

[10]. Supra note 3

[11]. Supra note 3

[12]. Supra note 3

[13]. Supra note 3

[14]. Supra note 3

[15]. Supra note 3

[16]. Supra note 3

[17]. Rudi Bekkers et. al., Patent Pools and Non Assertion Agreements: Coordination Mechanisms for Multi Party IPR Holders in Standardization, available at http://www-i4.informatik.rwth-aachen.de/Interest/EASST_Bekkers_Iversen_Blind.pdf 22 (last accessed 09 December, 2012)

[18]. Id.

[19]. Id.

[20]. Id.

[21]. Supra note 17 at 23.

[22]. Supra note 17 at 23.

[23]. Keith Mallinson, Fixing IP Prices with Royalty Rate Caps and Patent Pools, available at http://ipfinance.blogspot.in/2011/07/fixing-ip-prices-with-royalty-rate-caps.html (last accessed 10 December, 2012)

[24]. Id. See Appendix 1 for a graphical representation of declared intellectual property assets in 2009.

[25]. Supra note 17 at 25

[26]. Supra note 17 at 27

[27]. Supra note 17 at 27

[28]. Supra note 17 at 28

[29]. Dessy Choumelova, Competition Law Analysis of Patent Licensing Agreements- the Particular Case of 3G3P, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/2003_1_41.pdf- 41 (last accessed 10 December, 2012)

[30]. Id.

[31]. Id.

[32]. Id.

[33]. Id at 42.

[34]. Id at 42.

[35]. Id at 42-43.

[36]. Id at 43.

[37]. Supra note 17 at 29.

[38]. Supra note 17 at 39.

[39]. Supra note 17 at 39.

[40]. Elizabeth Woyke, Identifying the Tech Leaders in LTE Wireless Patents, available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/elizabethwoyke/2011/09/21/identifying-the-tech-leaders-in-lte-wireless-patents/ (last accessed 08 December, 2012)

[41]. Id.

[42]. Id.

[43]. Id.

[44]. Caroline Gabriel, ZTE Claims 7% of LTE Essential Patents, available at http://www.rethink-wireless.com/2011/01/11/zte-claims-7-lte-essential-patents.htm (last accessed 09 December, 2012)

[45]. Id.

[46]. Id.

[47]. Supra note 40.

[48]. Keith Mallinson, Mallinson: Uncertain Futures in LTE Patent Pool Licensing, available at http://www.fiercewireless.com/europe/story/mallinson-uncertain-outlook-patent-pool-licensing/2010-08-25 (last accessed 10 December, 2012)

[49]. Id.

[50]. Id.

[51]. Id.

[52]. Id.

[53]. NGMN Board Recommendation on LTE Patent Pool, available at http://4g-portal.com/ngmn-board-recommendation-on-lte-patent-pool (last accessed 10 December, 2012)

[54]. Id.

[55]. Caroline Gabriel, NGMN’s Calls for an LTE Patent Pool Will be Futile in the Current IPR Climate, available at http://www.4gtrends.com/articles/53511/ngmns-calls-for-an-lte-patent-pool-will-be-futile-/ (last accessed 11 December, 2012)

[56]. Michelle Donegan, Vendors Balk at LTE Patent Pool Proposal, available at http://www.lightreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=212362 (last accessed 11 December, 2012).

[57]. SISVEL: Patent Pool for 3G Long Term Evolution (LTE), available at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/SISVEL%3A+Patent+Pool+for+3G+Long+Term+Evolution+(LTE).-a0199544458 (last accessed 08 December, 2012)

[58]. LTE Patent Pool from Sisvel, available at http://4g-portal.com/lte-patent-pool-from-sisvel (last accessed 09 December, 2012)

[59]. Id.

[60]. Id.

[61]. Mike Dano, Via Promises LTE Patent Pool Launch Within Months, available at http://www.fiercewireless.com/story/licensing-promises-lte-patent-pool-launch-within-months/2012-06-15 (last accessed 07 December, 2012)

[62]. LTE Patent Pool Available Through Via’s Licensing Program, available at http://4g-portal.com/lte-patent-pool-available-through-vias-licensing-program (last accessed 10 December, 2012).

[63]. Id.

[64]. Stephen Lawson, Lte Patent Pool Brings Together Technologies From At&T, Zte, Hp And Others, available at http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9232043/LTE_patent_pool_brings_together_technologies_from_AT_amp_T_ZTE_HP_and_others (last accessed 09 December, 2012)

[65]. Peter White, Sisvel LTE Patent Pool Emerges After All- Majors Still Hold Back from Committing, available at http://www.rethink-wireless.com/2012/11/05/sisvel-lte-patent-pool-emerges-all-majors-hold-committing.htm (last accessed 09 December, 2012)

[66]. Shankar Pandiath, Sisvel Launches Patent Pool for 3G Long Term Evolution (LTE), available at http://next-generation-communications.tmcnet.com/topics/nextgen-voice/articles/314957-sisvel-launches-patent-pool-3g-long-term-evolution.htm (last accessed 09 December, 2012).

[67].NGMN Board Welcomes Launch of LTE Patent Pool, available at http://4g-portal.com/ngmn-board-welcomes-launch-of-lte-patent-pool (last accessed 09 December, 2012).

[68]. ELSPETH THOMSON AND JON SIGURDSON (EDS.), CHINA’S SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SECTOR AND THE FORCES OF GLOBALIZATION 17 (2008, World Scientific Publishing Company, Singapore).

[69]. Cong Cao, Challenges for Technological Development in China’s Industry, available at http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/924 (last accessed 11 December, 2012)

[70]. Peter Zura, China Launches TD-SCDMA Telecom Standard¸ available at http://271patent.blogspot.in/2006/01/china-launches-td-scdma-telecom.html (last accessed 10 December, 2012)

[71]. Id.

[72]. Id.

[73]. TD-SCDMA (time division synchronous code division multiple access), available at http://searchmobilecomputing.techtarget.com/definition/TD-SCDMA (last accessed 07 December, 2012).

[74]. SHAHD AKHTAR AND PATRICIA ARINTO (EDS.), DIGITAL REVIEW OF ASIA PACIFIC : 2009-2010 8 (2010, Sage Publications, New Delhi).

[75]. Supra note 1 at 2. See Appendix 2 for the breakup of patent holding. However, see details on Infra note 78 for a contradictory view, wherein China claims to own 30% of all TD-SCDMA patents.

[76]. Pierre Vialle, On the relevance of Indigenous Standard Setting Policy: the Case of TD-SCDMA in China, 2^nd International Conference on Economics, Trade and Development, (2012) 36 IPEDR 184-185 (IACSIT Press, Singapore).

[77]. Dazheng Wang, Patent Pool: A Solution to the Problem of TD-SCDMA’s Commercialization, http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/login.jsp?tp=&arnumber=5076744&url=http%3A%2F%2Fieeexplore.ieee.org%2Fiel5%2F5076660%2F5076661%2F05076744.pdf%3Farnumber%3D5076744 (last accessed 11 December, 2012).

[78]. China Owns 30% of TD-SCDMA Related Patents, available at http://www.cn-c114.net/582/a310685.html (last accessed 11 December, 2012).

[79]. The Legal Regulation on Patent Pool Misuse, available at http://www.socpaper.com/the-legal-regulation-on-patent-pool-misuse.html (last accessed 11 December, 2012).

[80]. Supra notes 75 and 78.

[81]. Tomoo Marukawa, Chinese Innovations in Mobile Telecommunications: Third Generation vs. “Guerrilla Handsets”, Paper presented at the IGCC Conference: Chinese Approaches to National Innovation, La Jolla, California, June 28-29, 2010 at 1.

[82]. Id at 8.

[83]. Id at 9.

[84]. Id at 9.

[85]. China to Speed Up TD-LTE Process, available at http://www.tdscdma-forum.org/en/news/see.asp?id=11998&uptime=2012-11-29 (last accessed 08 December, 2012)

[86]. Supra note 23.

[87]. Id.

[88]. Supra note 23.

[89]. Sisvel’s Patent Strategy, available at http://www.managingip.com/Article/2400452/Sisvels-patent-strategy.html (last accessed 12 December, 2012).

[90]. Id.

[91]. Supra note 23.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/patent-pools

PERVASIVE TECHNOLOGIES PROJECT WORKING DOCUMENT SERIES: DOCUMENT 1 - RESEARCH METHODOLOGY FOR A PAPER ON COMPETITION LAW + IPR + ACCESS TO < $100 MOBILE DEVICES

nehaa — 2015-10-04T02:51:06Z

This blog post is the research methodology for my research paper under the Pervasive Technologies Project. This is a work in progress and is likely to be modified from time to time.

See a subsequent version titled Pervasive Technologies: Working Document Series - Research Questions and a Literature Review on the Actor-Network Theory

Preliminary

The realization of the promise of the sub hundred dollar mobile device as a facilitator of access to knowledge is contingent inter alia on its availability in the market place. In turn, the market availability of the sub hundred dollar mobile device is influenced by the existence of an enabling environment for producers to produce, and consumers to consume. From a regulatory perspective, the enabling environment itself is a function of existing laws and policies, and the 'developmental effects' of certain laws and policies (Saraswati, 2012).

This research paper under the Pervasive Technologies: Access to Knowledge in the Market Place Project ("PT Project") examines one such legal and policy lever and the role of a regulator in the development of an enabling environment for access to sub hundred dollar mobile devices. This paper is founded on four assumptions: first, that access to sub hundred dollar mobile devices is influenced by their price; second, that the question of access necessitates conversation between the intellectual property regime and several other actors, sites and tools; third, that one of the fundamental goals of regulatory reform is the creation of a 'stable, open and future- proof environment' (Guermazi and Satola, 2005) that encourages access to these devices; and fourth, that there exist public law implications of intellectual property that justify the involvement of State actors and regulators in matters that may arise out of private transactions.

Research Questions

This research paper will examine whether there is a role to be played by one regulator, that is, the Competition Commission of India (“CCI”), in this narrative of innovation, intellectual property and access to sub hundred dollar mobile devices. Specifically, the following research questions will be addressed:

First, what is the relationship between intellectual property and competition law? Second, what are the competition law/antitrust concerns that arise around the licensing of intellectual property (standard essential patents)? Third, can existing mechanisms in competition law address concerns around the licensing of standard essential patents on sub hundred dollar devices, and is competition law a viable solution to address this issue? If so, which ones? Fourth, given the frequency of these litigations, is there a role to be played by an ex-post regulator, such as the CCI, or is there a need for ex-ante regulation?

Research Objects

In an attempt to address these research questions, this paper will examine the role of the Competition Commission of India and the Indian Judiciary. This paper will also examine the role of similarly placed institutions in the United States of America as well as some member states of the European Union.

This research paper will also examine select tools and sites sought to be used to create an enabling environment to facilitate access to these sub hundred dollar mobile devices: first, principles, legal frameworks and provisions of competition law/antitrust law; second, all relevant judicial decisions.

Research Method

First , this research paper will begin with establishing the case for the intervention of the regulator and/or the judiciary in the sub hundred dollar mobile device market by undertaking a review of primary and secondary literature [1]("literature"). Second, also through a literature review, the research will be contextualized to India in terms of the market, the actors involved and the legal framework. Third, a cross jurisdictional comparative legal search will be undertaken to understand the potential areas of intervention for the judiciary and the Competition Commission of India based on existing legal disputes in other jurisdictions; and the possible challenges that might ensue. Fourth, in a scenario building exercise, an attempt will be made to outline the role that the judiciary and the regulator might play in India, in order to ensure access to sub hundred dollar mobile devices is not impeded by litigation around standard essential patents.

Generally, in the writing of this paper, inputs will be sought from experts including MHRD Chair Professors, legal practitioners in India, academics in India and abroad and members of relevant departments of the Indian Government.

Research Communication

This research will be communicated through a series of blog posts- one every month from December, 2014 to December, 2015. A preliminary draft of a research paper will be produced by December, 2015, tentatively to be presented at the 4th Global Congress on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest, New Delhi. The final output will be a research paper.

References

Bouthenia Guermazi and David Satola, Creating the "Right" Enabling Environment for ICT, in Robert Schware (ed.), E-development: From Excitement to Effectiveness (2005, World Bank Publications).
Jyoti Saraswati, Dot. Compradors- Power and Policy in the Development of the Indian Software Industry (2012, Pluto Press)

[1] Unless otherwise specified, for the purposes of this document, primary and secondary literature includes academic articles and books, newspaper articles and opinion pieces, blog posts, case law and other legal provisions.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/methodology-sub-hundred-dollar-mobile-devices-and-competition-law

Pervasive Technologies Project Presentations at the 4th Global Congress, 2015

nehaa — 2016-01-21T16:33:41Z

These are the presentations made by the members of the PT Project team at the 4th Global Congress on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest, 2015 at National Law University, New Delhi.

Nehaa Chaudhari: The Curious Case of the CCI: Competition Law and SEP Regulation in India
Amba Uttara Kak and Maggie Huang: Rethinking Music Copyright Management in the Age of Digital Distribution: Business Models, Licensing Practices and Copyright Institutions in India
Rohini Lakshané: Patent Landscaping in the sub-$100 Mobile Device Market in India
Anubha Sinha: IP in Mobile Applications Development in India

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/pervasive-technologies-project-presentations-at-the-4th-global-congress-2015

Opening Comments by India on Limitations and Exceptions for Libraries and Archives at WIPO SCCR 28

nehaa — 2014-07-21T17:55:28Z

This was the statement made by the Indian delegation at the 28th session of the World Intellectual Property Organization Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights on July 2, 2014.

Hon'ble Chair

In the quest for Knowledge society-for the developing countries- the issue of haves and have -not’s is now sliced with an additional divide of knows and Know -not’s. Libraries and Archives are the engines of creativity and promote intergeneration equity. They indeed are the modern day temples, mosques and churches- The notion of strong copyright boundaries has found its resonance to encircle spaces hitherto providing the socio economic infrastructure for developing nations. It is in this context that we need to look for appropriate international instrument to consolidate the access by way of limitations and exceptions to libraries, archives, educational institutions and other disabled people.

The overemphasis of stricter and stronger copyright as the engine of creativity is now questioned by latest studies. Ekhard Höffner a German historian has in his comprehensive research argues the fact that in the 19th century Germany outpaced UK, as the copyright laws were not strong as it was in UK. This fact goes contrary to the established view that Copyright is directly correlated to the expansion of creative works and publication. In fact Germany could do the catch up with the other powers in Europe.

I am mentioning this to emphasize for the developing world to do the catch up it is necessary to have limitations and exceptions for Libraries/archives/educational institutions. At this junction it is necessary to recognize the importance of such consensus without presuming whether what sort of International Instrument it should be.

India supports the effort of harmonizing the exceptions and limitations from an international dimension for intergenerational equity and as a tool to develope socio-economic- human resource infrastructure.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/opening-statement-of-india-on-limitations-and-exceptions-for-libraries-and-archives

National IPR Policy Series: What Have the Sectoral Innovation Councils Been Doing on IPR

nehaa — 2015-08-13T01:36:35Z

In this post, Nehaa Chaudhari and Varun Baliga delve into the question of what the mandate of the Sectoral Innovation Councils is, what its activities are, and what vision for IPR development in India has it put forth. An RTI Application has been filed by CIS to attain information on these issues.

Thanks to Amulya.P for her support on this.

The National Innovation Council [“NIC”] was constituted by the Prime Minister’s Office “to create a roadmap for innovation for the ‘Decade of Innovation - 2010-2020’ focussing on five key parameters namely Platform, Inclusion, Eco-system, Drivers and Discourse”.[1] Pursuant to the creation of the NIC, Sectoral Innovation Councils [“SIC”][2] were established in order to promote innovation in particular sectors.

The focus of this post is on the SIC established by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion [“DIPP”] – a 12 member body on Intellectual Property Rights [“IPR”]. What is the mandate of this body? What have been its activities over the few years of its existence? What vision does it have of the development of IPR in India over the course of this critical decade?

In 2012, the body drafted a strategy document that did three things: an overview of the contemporary IP system, stakeholders’ involved in the protection and commercialization of IPRs and recommendations for an IPR Strategy.[3] This ambitious document merits significant work in order for actionable recommendations that will form the basis for a coherent IPR Strategy. The body has the burden to show how its work will be consistent with that of the IPR Think Tank and the National IPR Policy. In light of the circulation of the 2012 first draft of the strategy, Ajay Dua, former Secretary of the DIPP commented that the strategy would help in improving trade and capital flows. CIS has noted the increasingly trade-oriented approach to IPR in a previous comment on the US 301 Report.[4] However, the work and action that the SIC has taken does not reflect any of these ambitious documents or statements. In limbo for the past three years, we know very little about its functioning.

First, we know the Terms of Reference of the SIC.[5] The SIC has the mandate to formulate the National IPR Strategy to “address key concerns of sustainable development, inclusive growth and food security”. Further, formulation of medium term policy objectives that would provide the proper context to the strategy itself. Significantly, the SIC is required by the Terms of Reference to submit a roadmap within six months of its establishment.

The IPR Think Tank constituted by the DIPP also has a similar mandate, in so far as the Terms of Reference for the IPR Think Tank includes tasks such as drafting the National IPR Policy, identifying areas in IPRs that require further studying, creating views on the implications of demands by various negotiating partners, keeping the government informed about developments in IPR law, advising the government on best practices to be followed in different government offices that work with IPRs, advising the Ministry on solutions to any anomalies in IPR legislation, examining issues raised by industry associations and those that may have appeared in the media and providing suggestions to the Ministry on the IPR issues of the day.[6]

This raises questions of whether the SIC is required at all and what if any purpose it serves that is not already covered by the National IPR Think Tank.

Second, we know the minutes of the meeting of the SIC on IPRs dated 30 April 2013.[7] No further information of any other meetings, if any, is provided by the DIPP or the NIC. The minutes are an insightful window into the functioning of this body. Of the 12 members of the SIC, only 6 were present at the meeting. Of these 6 individuals, 2 – Mr. Sushil Kumar Jain and Professor Surendra Prasad – were not present in person but sent representatives instead. This was noted in a slightly disapproving tone by the body: “It was agreed that in future since members have been nominated by name, they may not send representatives and may instead provide their valuable views in the meeting”. We do not know whether future meetings, if any, witnessed better attendance.

In conclusion, the dormant nature of the SIC can only be probed further using the tools of the Right to Information Act [“RTI”]. What, however, is the harm of an institution like the SIC that is doing nothing. At a pragmatic level, it is a drain on public resources and time. More egregiously, on a principled level, such bodies serve to only legitimize contemporary trends in IP discourse. We have explored some of these trends in past blog posts.[8] Whether it is its trade-oriented nature or the undue emphasis on rights-holders, bodies like the SIC serve to entrench the alienation of the raison d’etre, the founding principles, of IP – innovation and creativity for all.

Annex I – RTI filed by CIS with the DIPP seeking information on the functioning of the NIC

26 June 2015

To,

Central Public Information Officer,
IPR I, II, III, IV, V and VI Sections,
Room No. 260,
Udyog Bhawan, New Delhi.

Subject: Request for Information under Section 6 of the Right to Information Act, 2005 regarding Functioning of the Sectoral Innovation Council on Intellectual Property Rights under the National Innovation Council

Dear Sir/Ma’am,

Full Name of the Applicant: Nehaa Chaudhari
Address of the Applicant: Centre for Internet and Society, G-15 Top Floor, Hauz Khas, New Delhi - 110016. Mailing Address: nehaa@cis-india.org
Information Required: Context

Please consider this an application for information under Section 6 of the Right to Information Act, 2005.

Therefore, I seek information on the following:

a) How many meetings has the Sectoral Innovation Council [“SIC”] of the DIPP on Intellectual Property Rights [“IPR”] held since its establishment?

b) Please supply minutes and all related documents of all its meetings?

c) How much are members of the SIC paid? Are members paid on the basis of time or number of meetings held?

d) Has the SIC done any work or produced any outputs other than the 2012 draft of the National IPR Strategy?

This is to certify that I, Nehaa Chaudhari, am a citizen of India.

A fee of Rs. 10/- (Rupees Ten Only) has been made out in the form of a demand draft drawn in favour of “Public Information Officer, ..................................................”

Please provide me this information in electronic form, via the email address provided above.

[1] http://innovationcouncilarchive.nic.in/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=74&Itemid=47

[2] http://innovationcouncilarchive.nic.in/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=25&Itemid=18

[3] http://dipp.nic.in/english/Discuss_paper/draftNational_IPR_Strategy_26Sep2012.pdf

[4] http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/us-301-report-a-myopic-view-of-ip-rights

[5] http://innovationcouncilarchive.nic.in/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=74&Itemid=47

[6] http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=110790

[7]http://innovationcouncilarchive.nic.in/images/stories/sectoral/minutes/IPRs%20-%20Minutes%20of%20the%20meeting%20-%2020April2013.pdf

[8] http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/us-301-report-a-myopic-view-of-ip-rights

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/national-ipr-policy-series-what-have-sectoral-innovation-councils-been-doing-on-ipr

National IPR Policy Series: RTI Requests by CIS to DIPP + DIPP Responses

nehaa — 2015-04-26T08:47:00Z

In earlier blog posts, we have discussed the development of India’s National IPR Policy (“the Policy”); comments by the Centre for Internet and Society (“CIS”) to the IPR Think Tank before the release of the first draft of the Policy and CIS’ comments to the IPR Think Tank in response to the first draft of the Policy. Continuing our National IPR Policy Series, this article documents our requests to the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (“DIPP” / “the Department”) under the Right to Information (“RTI”) Act, 2005 and the responses of the Department.

View the PDF here.

Details of RTI Requests Filed by CIS

In February, 2015, CIS had filed three RTI requests with the DIPP. The first request was four-pronged, seeking information related to first, the process followed by the Department in the creation of the IPR Think Tank; second, details and documents of a meeting held to constitute the Think Tank; third, details and documents of all/multiple meetings held to constitute the Think Tank; fourth, details of a directive/directives received from any other Government Ministry/authority directing the constitution of the Think Tank and fifth, the process of shortlisting the members of the Think Tank by the DIPP.

In our second RTI request, first, we requested details of the process followed by the Think Tank in the formulation of the Policy; second, we requested all documents relating to a meeting held for the formulation of the Policy; third, we requested all documents held for multiple meetings for the creation of the Policy and fourth, we requisitioned all suggestions and comments received by the Think Tank from stakeholders before the release of the Policy, that is, those suggestions/comments received in November, 2014.

In our third RTI request, also filed on also filed in February, 2015, we had asked the DIPP to indicate all suggestions and comments received by the IPR Think Tank from different stakeholders in response to the first draft of the National IPR Policy (to have been submitted on or before January 30, 2015 as per DIPP’s Public Notice).

Responses by DIPP to CIS' RTI Requests

The DIPP replied to our three RTI requests in multiple stages. At first, in a letter dated 12 February, 2015, we were directed to resubmit our application , seemingly because we hadn’t addressed the Postal Money Order to the correct authority, and were directed to do the same. Funnily enough, we received three other responses – one for each of our RTI requests (the first of these is not dated; the second one is dated 19 February, 2015 and then revised to 26 February, 2015; and the third is also dated 26 February, 2015).

The First Response: On the Constitution of the Think Tank

In the first of their responses to these requests, the Department has grouped our queries into five questions and provided a point-wise response to these questions, as under:

Please indicate in detail the process followed by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion for the constitution for an IPR Think Tank to draft the National Intellectual Property Rights Policy under Public Notice No. 10 (22)/2013 –IPR-III dated November 13, 2014 (sic).

In its response the Department notes that it convened an interactive meeting on IPR issues which was chaired by the Minister for Commerce and Industry (Independent Charge), i.e., Ms. Nirmala Sitharaman. As per the Department’s response, this meeting was held on 22 September, 2014 (“the Meeting”) and was aimed at discussing issues related to IPRs, including finalization of the Terms of Reference for IPR Think-Tank proposed to be established (sic.) The Department also notes that representatives from various Ministries/Departments, Member of various Expert Committees constituted by the Department, besides IP experts and other Legal Practitioners (sic) were invited to the meeting. The Department then states that the composition of the Think Tank was decided on the basis of the discussions held in the department after the said interactive Meeting (sic).

If there was a meeting held to decide on the same, please include all necessary documents including the minutes of the meeting, records, documents, memos, e-mails, opinion, advices, press releases, circulars, orders etc in which the constitution of the aforesaid mentioned IPR Think Tank was decided (sic).

The Department has attached the Minutes of the Meeting held on 22 September, 2014 (“the Minutes”) and states that there were no documents or papers that were circulated at this meeting and that the participants were asked to present their views on various IP issues at this meeting.

Excerpts from the Minutes

The Secretary of the Department (Shri Amitabh Kant) refers to a (then) recent announcement made by the Minister of State for Commerce and Industry (“the Minister”) on the formulation of the National IPR Policy and the establishment of an IPR Think Tank and states that the meeting had been convened to discuss on various IPR issues with IP experts and legal practitioners so that it would provide essential inputs to the policy needs of the department (sic). The Minutes report that Mr. Kant further stated that the objective of the department was to have a world class IP system and that this included a comprehensive National IPR Policy and which takes care of various issues like IP creation, protection, administration and capacity building (sic). He is also reported to have said that such a stakeholder interaction was important for the government to seek inputs.

The Minister is reported to have said that the purpose of the meeting was to constitute an IP Think Tank that would regularly provide inputs to all IP policy needs of this department as well as advice government in disparate legal aspects (sic). The Minutes also report her to have said that the department would finalize an IP policy within ninety days of the Meeting, based on the inputs of the participants.

According to the Minutes, various issues emerged from the discussion. Inter alia, these include first, that the proposal to constitute the Think Tank was a welcome measure, along the lines of similar initiatives taken by Australia, South Kora, the United Kingdom and the United States of America; second, that in order to remove misconceptions held by foreign stakeholders about IP enforcement in India, there was a need to highlight judgments of Indian courts that were favorable to foreign stakeholders and MNCs; third, that the national policies on telecom, manufacturing and IP ought to be integrated; fourth, that the focus of the Policy should be increase in creation of IP including commercialization of IP and strengthening human capital and IP management and fifth, that empirical studies should be conducted to examine the feasibility of Utility Models protection, that there was a need to revise the law on Geographical Indications and that the Policy should include protection for traditional knowledge and guidelines for publicly funded research.

The Minister is then said to have identified six major areas during the discussion, including IP institution, legislation, implementation, public awareness, international aspects and barriers in IP growth as areas to be covered under the Policy.

Who attended the Meeting?

Attached with the Minutes was also a list of participants who attended the Meeting. Out of the thirty six attendees, I have not been able to locate a single individual or organization representing civil society. Participants include representatives from various government departments and ministries, including inter alia, the DIPP, the Department of Commerce, the Ministry of External Affairs, the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, the Copyright Division from the Department of Higher Education of the Ministry of Human Resources Development, the Office of the Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks and the Ministry of Culture. The Meeting was also attended by representatives of corporations and industry associations, including FICCI, CII and Cadila Pharmaceuticals; in addition to representatives from law firms including Luthra and Luthra, K&S Partners and Inventure IP and academics including, inter alia, faculty from the Asian School of Business, Trivandrum, Indian Law Institute, Delhi, Tezpur University, Assam, National Law University, Delhi, NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad, the Indian Institute of Technology, Madras and the National Law School of India University, Bangalore.

If there were multiple meetings held for the same please provide all necessary documents including the minutes of all such meetings, records, documents, memos, e-mails, opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, orders etc. for all such meetings held (sic).

The Department answered, “No”; which I’m taking to mean that there weren’t other meetings held for the formulation of the Think Tank or the Policy. This is interesting, because the Minutes (referred to earlier) speak of another inter-ministerial meeting including IP experts and legal practitioners slated to be held around the 10^th of October, 2014, to discuss the framework of the Policy.

If a directive or directives were received by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion from any other government body to constitute such a think tank, please provide a copy of such a directive received by the DIPP from any Government authority, to constitute such a Think Tank (sic).

The Department answered, “No”; which I’m taking to mean that there was no communication received by the Department to constitute this Think Tank.

Please indicate in detail the process of shortlisting the members of the IPR Think Tank by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion or any other body that was responsible for the same (sic).

The Department replied that the answer to this was the same as that to the first question.

The Second Response: The Drafting of the Policy

The second of the Department's responses to our requests came in the form of separate responses to each of our four questions, as under:

Please indicate in detail the process followed by the IPR Think Tank constituted by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion via Public Notice No. 10 (22)/2013-IPR-III dated November 13, 2014 while framing the first draft of the National IPR Policy dated Dec. 19, 2014 (sic).

The Department stated that the IPR Think Tank conducted its meetings independently without any interference from the Department. The Department then stated that the Think Tank had received comments from stakeholders via a dedicated email id and conducted the interactive meeting with stakeholders while framing the draft on the National IPR Policy.

If there was a meeting held to decide on the same, please include all necessary documents including the minutes of the meeting, records, documents, memos, e-mails, opinion, advices, press releases, circulars, orders, suggestions etc. related to drafting of such National IPR Policy Think Tank chaired by Justice Prabha Sridevan (sic).

The Department replied that since the IPR Think Tank had decided its process by themselves (sic), the Department do not have the minutes of the meeting etc. conducted by the IPR Think Tank (sic). It attached with its reply a copy of the press releases announcing the composition of the Think Tank and asking stakeholders to submit comments to the first draft of the Policy.

If there were multiple meetings held for the same, please provide all necessary documents including the minutes of all such meetings, records, documents, memos, e-mails, opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, order suggestions etc. for all such meetings held (sic).

The Department replied that the response to this was the same as that to the earlier question above.

Please provide all the suggestions and comments received by the IPR Think Tank from stakeholders after the DIPP issued Public Notice No. 10/22/2013-IPR-III dated 13.11.2014 asking for suggestions and comments on or before November 30, 2014 (sic).

The Department replied that the comments and suggestions were received by the Think Tank directly and that therefore, the Department was not in a position to provide the same.

The Third Response: Stakeholder Comments

In its third and final response to our requests, the DIPP replied to our query as under:

Please indicate all the suggestions and comments received by the IPR Think Tank by different stakeholders on or before January 30, 2015 on its first draft of the National Intellectual Property Policy submitted by the IPR Think Tank on December 19, 2014.

The Department said that the suggestions and comments on the draft on National IPR Policy have been received by the IPR Think Tank directly. As such this Department is not in a position to provide the same (sic.).

Observation on the DIPP's Responses

Prima facie, the responses by the Department are rather curious, leading to a range of oddities and unanswered questions.

Who Will Watch the IPR Think Tank

In its response to our first RTI request, the Department quite clearly stated that it decided the composition of the IPR Think Tank based on discussions in a meeting that it convened, which was also chaired by the Minister of State for Commerce and Industry, the parent ministry of the DIPP. In the same response, the Department also stated that it had not received any directive from any other ministry/government department directing the constitution of the IPR Think Tank, leading to the conclusion that this decision was taken by the DIPP/the Ministry of Commerce and Industry itself. Subsequently however, the Department justified its refusal to furnish us with documents leading to the development of the first draft of the National IPR Policy (contained in our second RTI request) by stating that the IPR Think Tank conducted its business without any interference from the Department, and that the Department did not have access to any of the submissions made to the IPR Think Tank or any of the internal minutes of the meetings etc. that were a part of the process of drafting the IPR Policy.

Various press releases by the DIPP have stated that it has constituted the IPR Think Tank, and that the purpose of the IPR Think Tank would be to advise the Department on IPR issues. Visibly, the Department intends for the IPR Think Tank to play an active role in shaping India’s IP law and policy, including suggesting amendments to laws wherever necessary. It is concerning therefore that on the question of accountability of the IPR Think Tank, the DIPP remains silent. It may be argued perhaps, that the IPR Think Tank constitutes a ‘public authority’ under Section 2(h)(d) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (“RTI Act”). In that case, the IPR Think Tank would have to fulfill, inter alia, all of the obligations under Section 4 of the RTI Act as well as designate a Public Information Officer. Alternatively, given that the IPR Think Tank has been constituted by the DIPP and performs functions for the DIPP, the Public Information Officer of the DIPP would have to furnish all relevant information under the RTI Act (including the information that we sought in our requests, which was not provided to us).

Who are the Stakeholders

Even a preliminary look at the list of participants at the Meeting (based on which the Department constituted the IPR Think Tank) reveals that not all stakeholders have been adequately represented. I haven’t been able to spot any representation from civil society and other organizations that might be interested in a more balanced intellectual property framework that is not rights-heavy. The following chart (based on a total sample size of 36 participants, as stated in the list of participants provided to us by the DIPP) will help put things in perspective.

What Could've Been Done?

Setting aside arguments on its necessity, let us for the moment assume that this drafting of the National IPR Policy is an exercise that needed to have been undertaken. We must now examine what might possibly be the best way to go about this.

In 2014, the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) (based on whose approach the Policy seems to have been based- at least in part), produced a detailed Methodology for the Development of National Intellectual Property Strategies, outlining a detailed eight step process before a National IP Policy was implemented in a Member State. While this approach is one to be followed by the WIPO and might not be entirely suited to India’s drafting exercise, specific sections on the national consultation process as well as the drafting and implementation of national intellectual property strategies might prove to be a decent starting point.

(More on this in an upcoming article).d

Where Do We Go From Here?

The DIPP’s responses have left me with more questions, probably the subject of more RTI requests. Is the IPR Think Tank a public authority for the purposes of the Right to Information Act, 2005? To whom should questions of informational accountability of the IPR Think Tank be addressed, if there is no information available on the IPR Think Tank, and the DIPP claims to have no access to it? Do we need to re-examine the draft National IPR Policy given that there has been inadequate representation of all stakeholders? What were the suggestions made by different stakeholders, and (how) have these been reflected in the first draft of the Policy? Was there an evaluation exercise conducted before the first draft of the Policy was released in order to better inform the formulation of the Policy?

We will be looking at these and other questions as they arise, and sending some of these to the DIPP in the form of RTI requests. (Watch the blog for more).

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/national-ipr-policy-series-rti-requests-by-cis-to-dipp-dipp-responses

National IPR Policy Series: Quick Observations on the Leaked Draft of the National IPR Policy

nehaa — 2015-11-19T05:13:14Z

Earlier this week, the “Don’t Trade Our Lives Away” blog leaked the supposed final draft of India’s National IPR Policy (“leaked draft”). This article presents quick comments on this leaked draft.

The leaked draft (which is not final) is available here. The only official document that the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (“DIPP”) has released so far is the First Draft of the National IPR Policy (“First Draft”).

CIS has tracked these developments since the beginning. We have submitted preliminary comments, critical comments to the First Draft, sent multiple requests under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (“RTI requests”) to the DIPP and published their responses, discussed the IPR Think Tank as a public authority under the RTI Act, analysed the process compared to recommendations by the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”), compared the First Draft to an earlier National IPR Strategy[N1] , written a letter to the Think Tank and have now begun to track the work being done by the Sectoral Innovation Council on IPR, also established under the DIPP. At the time of writing this post, we have been unable to locate comments to the First Draft made available by the DIPP.

Since the release of the First Draft in December, 2014, this leaked document has been the first look at an updated IPR Policy for India. Not much seems to have changed since December, 2014 and this new leaked draft (which is dated April, 2015), barring the inclusion of some Special Focus Areas.

Perhaps one of the strongest criticisms of the First Draft had been that it supposed a nexus between IP and innovation, and various stakeholders had been quick to point this out as problematic, and fallacious. Unfortunately, since the language of the new draft has barely changed (I have managed to count only two-three additions), this remains the underlying issue in the new draft as well.

What continues to be worrying in both drafts is sweeping references of benefits of IP to India’s socio-economic development. What constitutes this development and how IPR, and specifically the IPR Policy will achieve it is anyone’s guess, given that there are no references to studies undertaken to assess how IPR contributes to socio-economic development, specifically in India.

Here are some other quick comments:

In the first objective on IP Awareness and Promotion, the new draft includes an additional recommended step – that of engaging with the media to ‘sensitize them on IP issues’ (sic.). Given that this is under a broader objective of encouraging IP promotion, I am inclined to believe that this could be interpreted as telling the media to print positive things about intellectual property and refrain from criticizing intellectual property (that seems to be the theme of this entire document!). What does it mean to ‘sensitize’ the media about intellectual property?
In the second objective, on IP creation, the leaked draft contains a recommendation to conduct a study to assess the contribution of various IP based industries to the economy – including employment, exports and technology transfer. No other details have been provided in the draft.
Also in the second objective, the new draft makes a mention of improving the IP output of universities, national laboratories etc. The new draft proposes to encourage and facilitate the acquisition of intellectual property rights by these labs and institutions, whereas the earlier draft recommended the protection of IPRs created by them.
In the covering letter to the leaked draft, Justice Sridevan states that the final draft includes a discussion on key focus areas – creative industries, biotechnology, ICT, energy, agriculture, health, geographical indications (“GIs”) and traditional knowledge (“TK”). These have been discussed at the end of the new draft.
Limitations and exceptions remain confined to an area of future study/research for future policy development. The ‘Creative Industries’ section of the leaked draft makes a mention of the significance of limitations and exceptions to safeguard access to knowledge and information; and the need to balance user rights and property rights. One would have liked to see this discussed more substantively in the policy and not confined only to a paragraph in the section on ‘Creative Industries’.
In a welcome move, the policy draft (new) seeks to promote the adoption of free and open standards and free and open software in the ‘Information and Communication Technology and Electronics’ section.

With the DIPP Secretary’s latest update that the new policy draft will be released in about a month’s time, one will have to wait and see what the final draft looks like.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/national-ipr-policy-series-quick-observations-on-the-leaked-draft-of-the-national-ipr-policy

National IPR Policy Series : Who is a 'public authority' under the RTI Act?

nehaa — 2015-05-21T17:03:30Z

In this blog post, CIS intern Devrupa Rakshit examines case law with respect to the understanding of a 'public authority' under the Right to Information ("RTI") Act, 2005.

In earlier blog posts, India’s National IPR Policy has been discussed at length. In February 2015, three RTI applications were made by the Centre for Internet and Society to the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (hereinafter, the “DIPP”). The response of the DIPP to these requests could be described as vague, at best. A detailed blog post by Nehaa Chaudhari discusses the questions, the responses and the other nuances of this endeavour at length.

Having failed repeatedly in our attempts to retrieve information pertaining to the IPR Think Tank that was, essentially, in charge of formulating the National IPR Policy, we put forth an RTI request to the IPR Think Tank earlier this month. The response is awaited, at the moment. In the meantime, we have undertaken the task of finding out whether the IPR Think Tank can indeed be classified as a “public authority” under the Right to Information Act, (hereinafter, the “RTI Act”, or simply the “Act”) because if it can, then it must have a Public Information Officer as per Section 5 of the Act.

The RTI Act defines “public authorities” in Section 2(h) –

A “public authority” means any authority or body or institution of self- government established or constituted –

(a) by or under the Constitution;

(b) by any other law made by Parliament;

(c) by any other law made by State Legislature;

(d) by notification issued or order made by the appropriate Government, and includes any –

(i) body owned, controlled or substantially financed;

(ii) non-Government organization substantially financed, directly or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate Government.

A. Who is a "Public Authority"?

In 2011, the Punjab-Haryana High Court[1] while deciding on 24 civil writ petitions against the Central/State Information Commissioners had held that if any person, or body, satisfies the following conditions then it would "squarely fall within the ambit and scope of definition of 'public authorities'" and would be "legally required to impart the indicated information as envisaged under the RTI Act" -

(i) the institution cannot come into existence and function unless registered and regulated by the provisions of a legislation; or

(ii) the State Government has some degree of control over it through the medium of Acts/Rules; or

(iii) it is substantially financed by means of funds provided directly, or indirectly, by the appropriate Government; or

(iv) the mandate and command of the provisions of the RTI Act along with its Preamble, aims, objects and regime extends to their public dealing; or

(v) the larger public interest and totality of the other facts and circumstances emanating from the records suggest that such information may be disclosed.

The Court was further inclined to believe that arguments to the contrary would "nullify the aims and objects of the RTI Act, perpetuating and inculcating the injustice to the larger public interest in general."

The Central Information Commission (hereinafter, the "CIC") has also held[2] that pension trusts are "public authorities" under the RTI Act.

The CIC also held[3] that the LIC Housing Finance Limited (hereinafter, the "LICHFL") and LIC Mutual Fund Asset Management Co. Ltd. would qualify as "public authorities" under the RTI Act. It was held that LIC is a body established, constituted, owned and controlled by Central Government. Further, LIC is a public authority having been constituted by an Act of Parliament. And, since the Chairman and Managing Director for both LIC and LICHFL is the same, and since LIC has 40.497% of the shares of LICHFL, LICHFL would be regarded as a "public authority" for the purposes of the RTI Act.

In a verdict that has remained prominent for over half-a-decade now, the CIC had alluded to the judgment of the Madras High Court in Tamil Nadu Newsprint & Papers Ltd v. State Information Commission. In this case, the court had observed that since the mere requirement of the RTI Act for an institution to be deemed a "public authority" is that the Government must substantially finance it, and exercise control over its affairs, it is not necessary that the Government must be the majority shareholder in that institution. The Court had further gone ahead to make an observation that whether or not the government exercises such control is immaterial. Having relied heavily upon this judgment by the Madras High Court, the CIC had further stated that the practice of funding and general control over the affairs and functions of the LIC Mutual Fund by the Central Government is nothing but a manner of indirect funding, and hence LIC Mutual Fund would qualify as a "public authority" under the RTI Act.

In the same case, it was held that the GIC Housing Finance Limited is also a "public authority" for the purposes of the RTI Act since "the shareholding of six Public Authorities in GIC Housing Finance is 47.68% and coupled with the control they exercise over the GIC Housing Finance, it is sufficient to bring them within the ambit of the definition of 'Public Authority' as defined in Section 2(h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005."

Further, the Indian Olympic Association (hereinafter, the "IOA") was held[4] to be a "public authority" under the RTI Act on account of substantial funding by the Government not only for the discharge of functions of the IOA, but also for the construction of its building. In fact, the level of funding by the Government, here, is such that without it, the IOA is unlikely to be able to discharge its functions under the Olympic Charter itself.

In another judgment[5], where it was contended that the body, in question, was a non-governmental organisation, and was not funded by the Government, the CIC held that the impugned body would be a "public authority" as it had been substantially financed by the funds provided by the Government.

In a judgment[6] by the Madras High Court, even an aided private school was held to fall under the ambit of the RTI Act as its entire teaching staff received 100% of their salary from the aid received from the government. The same line of reasoning was resonated in a judgment by the Allahabad High Court in the following year.[7] Yet another private recognised school was held[8] by the CIC to be a "public authority" under the RTI Act because it was substantially funded by the appropriate Government, and was under its control.

The Delhi High Court held[9] the Krishak Bharti Co-operative Ltd. (hereinafter, the "KRIBHCO") - a society registered under the Multi-State Co- operative Societies Act, 2002 (hereinafter, the "MSCS Act" - to be a "public authority" for the purpose of the RTI Act because certain devices laid down in the MSCS Act itself makes KRIBHCO amenable to the control of the Government. On the same grounds, the National Cooperative Consumer Federation of India Ltd. (and the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation of India Ltd. (hereinafter, the "NAFED") - two other societies registered under the MSCS Act - are "public authorities".

Furthermore, the NAFED is also "a nodal agency of the Government of India for the purchase of agricultural and non- agricultural commodities under Market Intervention Scheme and the losses incurred in the implementation of the schemes by NAFED are shared by the Government of India and the State Government concerned in the ratio of 50:50."

Continuing its trend of according a liberal approach to "public authorities" under the RTI Act, the Madras High Court stated in the New Tirupur Area Development case[10] that while Section 2(h)(d)(i) qualifies a "body owned" or a "body controlled", nowhere does it state that the body must be wholly owned, or wholly controlled, by the State. And, as the court observed, even the term "substantially financed" has not been defined though it has been qualified by the terms " directly or indirectly". Section 2(h)(d)(ii) further ropes in non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that are substantially financed. This reflects the intent and purpose of the legislators. In any case, the object of the Act to is to provide the citizens with a right to information from public authorities, and hence, as the Division Bench of the court had previously opined in the Tamil Nadu Road Development Corporation Ltd.'s case[11], the impugned section must receive a liberal interpretation.

Further ahead in this judgment[12], the court made an observation saying that if the State Government, instead of undertaking a work that is essentially its own duty, substantially funds an agency to do it, then such work can hardly be deemed as a private activity. It evolves "very much (into) a public activity over which public interest can generate."

In the same case[13], it was also observed that under the Act, the quantum of the finance required for a body to qualify as "substantially financed" is not spelt out. On this point, the High Court also relied on a precedent [14] (the Tamil Nadu Road Development case decided by Justice A.K. Ganguly) where the court had refused to accept the argument of the petitioner, which stated that the financial support by the government was meagre at best.

B. Which bodies are exempted from the Ambit of "Public Authorities"?

The Kerala High Court, in a 2011 judgment[15], exempted the offices and officers of public religious institutions and endowments to which the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 applies from the definition of "public authorities" under the RTI Act.

In a subsequent case[16], the CIC said that despite the fact that 46% of the equity capital of the National Commodity and Derivatives Exchange Ltd. was held by the PSUs (which are, of course, public authorities), the National Commodity and Derivatives Exchange Ltd. cannot, in itself, be regarded as a "public authority" as there is no direct or indirect funding by an appropriate Government.

Three Karnataka High Court judgments in 2009 [(a) dealing with the Basava Samithi[17] - an organisation that promotes the Basava Philosophy of Life and is registered under the Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1961; (b) dealing with a co-operative housing society[18] in Malleswaram, Bangalore; (c) dealing with a Bank [19]] held three different bodies as not the creation of any law made by the Legislature, or not as bodies owned or controlled or substantially financed by the Government, and hence, exempt from the ambit of a "public authority" under the RTI Act. These judgments were, however, criticised in the Punjab and Haryana High Court[20] wherein it said that in the three 2009-judgments, the Karnataka High Court had overlooked the basic aims and objectives of larger public interest enshrined in the Preamble of the RTI Act.

C. Conclusion

The easiest way to establish that the IPR Think Tank would qualify as a "public authority" under the RTI Act would be to show that it is a body owned, controlled or substantially funded directly or indirectly by the Government, or that it is created either by any other law made by the Parliament or State Legislature, or under the Constitution itself.

Moreover, it appears from The Hindu Urban Cooperative Bank Limited v. The State Information Commission[21] that when discharging public functions, even though a private entity does not become a State per se, considering the public interest involved, it must be deemed to be a "public authority" in a bid to avoid diluting the aims and objectives of the RTI Act. Now, since the drafting of the National IPR Policy can, in all likelihood, be described as the exercise of a public function, the IPR Think Tank should then qualify as a "public authority" under the Act.

In addition, the underlying principle used in Indubala Agarwal v. National Commodity and Derivatives Exchange Ltd. [22] was that while the public bodies engaging in commercial or business activities - often, even profitable - that are created by any government in exercise of its sovereign functions would qualify as "public authorities" as per Section 2(h) of the Act, the set of commercial bodies further created by these public bodies as part of their business ventures would not qualify as "public authorities" as per Section 2(h). The simple reason behind this discrimination of sorts is that the latter set of bodies lacks any direct, or indirect, involvement of an appropriate government. However, it is unlikely that this rationale could be used to keep the IPR Think Tank outside the domain of "public authorities" under the Act since it would hardly qualify as a commercial body. Furthermore, it was not created by the DIPP merely in a bid to expand its business interests, but to formulate a National IPR Policy that is quite a far cry from being classified as a commercial activity.

On a different but related note, in the well-known case of Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi [23], the test laid down for a "public body" was whether a said person, or body, is an instrumentality or agency of the State, and not as to how it was brought into existence, i.e., the idea is to find out why it was created, and not how. No doubt, the context of the judgment was Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and not the RTI Act. Nonetheless, considering that there is no apparent reason to distinguish between public bodies under Article 226 and under the RTI Act, what if this test were to be applied to the issue at hand? Since the IPR Think Tank has been created for the purpose of drawing up the National IPR Policy which obviously affects the public, it may not be entirely wrong to state, then, that it would fall within the ambit of "public authorities" the RTI Act .

[1] The Hindu Urban Cooperative Bank Limited and Ors . v. The State Information Commission and Ors. [2011] (Pun & Har HC)
available at - <http://indiankanoon.org/doc/155741837/>

[2] Mr. SK Choudhary v. Delhi Transco Limited [2010] (CIC) available at - < http://www.rti.india.gov.in/cic_decisions/SG-26022010-12.pdf>

[3] Shri Nisar Ahmed Shaikh and Ors. v. LIC Housing Finance Limited and Ors. [2009] (CIC) available at - < http://www.rti.india.gov.in/cic_decisions/FB-28102009-01.pdf>

[4] Veeresh Malik v. Indian Olympic Association [2006] (CIC) available at - http://www.rti.india.gov.in/cic_decisions/Decision_28112006_3.pdf >

[5] Mrs Navneet Kaur v. Electronics and Computer Software Export Promotion Council [2006] (CIC) available at - < http://cic.gov.in/CIC-Orders/CIC_Order_Dtd_22032006.pdf>

[6] Diamond Jubilee Higher Secondary School v. Union of India [2007] (Mad HC) available at - <http://indiankanoon.org/doc/563155/ >

[7] Dhara Singh Girls High School v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2008] AIR (All HC) available at - < http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1378411/>

[8] Mr. Tilak Raj Tanwar v. The PIO, Deputy Director of Education [2012] (CIC) available at - < http://rti.india.gov.in/cic_decisions/CIC_AD_A_2011_001699_M_73865.pdf >

[9] Krishak Bharti Cooperative Ltd. v. Ramesh Chander Bawa [2010] (Del HC) available at - < http://indiankanoon.org/doc/159896809/>

[10] New Tirupur Area Development v. State of Tamil Nadu [2010] (Mad HC) available at - < http://judis.nic.in/judis_chennai/qrydisp.aspx?filename=25472>

[11] Tamil Nadu Road Development Company Limited v. Tamil Nadu Information Commission [2008] 6 MLJ 737 (Mad HC) available at - < http://indiankanoon.org/doc/454066/>

[12] ibid .

[13] See n 12.

[14] See n 13.

[15] AC Bhanunni Valluvanattukara v. The Commissioner, Malabar Devaswom Board [2011] (Ker HC) available at - < http://judis.nic.in/judis_kerala/qrydisp.aspx?filename=239775>

[16] Indubala Agarwal v. National Commodity and Derivatives Exchange Ltd. [2010] (CIC) available at - <Part 1: http://www.rti.india.gov.in/cic_decisions/LS-01012010-08.pdf> and <Part 2 - http://www.rti.india.gov.in/cic_decisions/LS-08022010-06.pdf>.

[17] SS Angadi v. State Chief Information Commissioner [2009] 5 RCR (Civil) 312 (Kar HC) available at - < http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1198428/>

[18] Dattaprasad Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. Karnataka State Chief Information Commissioner [2009] 5 RCR (Civil) 833 (Kar HC) available at - < http://www.the-laws.com/Encyclopedia/Browse/Case?CaseId=018002943000 >

[19] Bidar District Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Karnataka Information Commission, Bangalore [2009] 5 RCR (Civil) 394 (Kar HC) available at - < http://www.the-laws.com/Encyclopedia/Browse/Case?CaseId=018002573000 >

[20] See n 1.

[21] See n 1.

[22] See n 16.

[23] Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi [1981] 2 SCR 79 (SC) available at - < http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1186368/>

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/national-ipr-policy-series-who-is-a-public-authority-under-rti-act

National IPR Policy Series : The Development of the National IPR Policy

nehaa — 2015-01-22T00:48:33Z

This is the first blog post in a series of posts on India's National IPR Policy. In this post, CIS intern, Varnika Chawla traces the evolution of the National IPR Policy.

Significant changes have been implemented in the Intellectual Property regime of India since India's accession to TRIPS in 1995. This post details the timeline of the development of Intellectual Property law in India, highlighting the discourse around the formulation of a National IPR Policy. The author has also looked at the formulation of IP Strategies in different nations across the world, summarized in the infographic, observing that the trend for the same is very recent and has only emerged over the last decade.

"Intellectual Property Right is a private right recognized within the territory of a country and assigned to an individual or individuals for a specified period of time in return for making public, the results of their creativity and innovation." India has a well-established and comprehensive legislative, judicial and administrative framework for intellectual property. The decade of 2010-2020 was declared as the Decade of Innovation, with an objective of expanding the space for dialogue for inclusive growth. With the emergence of globalization, the Indian society has become more knowledge-intensive giving rise to rapid development in the field of information technology and consequently intellectual property, thereby increasing the role of the legislature as well as the judiciary to protect and promote intellectual property rights.

India gained membership of the World Trade Organization in 1995. This membership initiated a new round of revisions resulting in the upheaval of the Indian intellectual property system. All IP legislations were hereby required to comply with the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement by 2000, with the exception of the Patents Act, which had an extended time limit to be compliant till 2005.

The Indian system of intellectual property rights is designed in a manner to ensure the protection of intellectual property while maintaining a balance between rights and obligations. There are several legislations which deal with the protection of intellectual property in India. These include thePatents Act, 1970, the Trade Marks Act, 1999, theGeographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999, the Semiconductor Integrated Circuits Layout Design Act, 2000, the Competition Act, 2002 as well as theBiological Diversity Act, 2002. India is also thefirst country to ratify theMarrakesh Treaty, 2013 for access to copyright works for visually impaired persons. India also recently acceded to the Madrid Protocol in 2013.

National IP Strategy and the Role of WIPO

A National IP strategy has been defined by WIPO as "a vehicle for creating better functional linkages between the national economic objectives, development priorities and resources, and the IP system of the country concerned."[1] It is therefore a set of policy measures undertaken by governments in order to facilitate the proper use of IP as a strategic tool, for economic, social, cultural and technological development.[2] WIPO also gave the framework of the planning process each country should implement, in its efforts to adopt an IP strategy. As per this, the process is divided into four main stages:

Government initiative
Establishment of a National IP Strategy Formulation Committee
Presentation of draft strategy before stakeholders
Government approval of National IP Strategy,[3]

WIPO can assist in the formulation of a National IP Strategy by advising the governments as well as providing technical expertise during the planning process and providing support and assistance as and when required.[4]

India's National IPR Strategy

Realizing the significance of having a strong and well-balanced IP system in the emerging economy of India, several initiatives have been undertaken by the Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion at the policy level to create an environment conducive for the development of intellectual property and technology. Accordingly, a draft for the National IPR Strategy, outlining a set of measures and guidelines to encourage and facilitate the effective creation, protection, management and commercialization of IP for accelerating economic, social, cultural and technological development and for enhancing enterprise competitiveness prepared by the Sectoral Innovation Council on IPR was released by DIPP on September 26, 2012, inviting views from various stakeholders. It was felt that the National IP Strategy needs to be developed in a manner such that it is integrated with the overall national plan for development in order for better cooperation with IP components of specific and targeted national strategies in areas such as trade and investment, education, food and agriculture, science and technology etc.

Subsequently, a revised draft for the National IPR Strategy in India was released on July 21, 2014, detailing a vision statement, objectives and means to achieve the same.

The DIPP constituted an IPR Think Tank , as notified on November 13, 2014, in order to draft the National Intellectual Property Rights Policy and to advise DIPP on IPR-related issues. Finally, a First Draft of the National IPR Policy was submitted by the IPR Think Tank on December 19, 2014 , inviting comments and suggestions from all stakeholders on or before January 30, 2015.

National IP Strategies: Around the World

WIPO Member States adopted 45 recommendations at the 2007 General Assembly, made by the Provisional Committee on Proposals Related to a WIPO Development Agenda. This also included Member States setting up "appropriate national strategies in the field of intellectual property." These recommendations were identified for immediate and effective implementation, resulting in countries beginning to adopt the same, with the objective of promoting and enforcing IP rights. The info-graphic below highlights the formulation of IP Strategies in Member States around the world.

China announced its "National Intellectual Property Strategic Principles" in June, 2008. Japan established its "Intellectual Property Strategy Headquarters" in 2003, and its Intellectual Property Strategic Program in 2004, while USA legislated the " Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act" in 2008. Furthermore, the Presidential Advisory Council on Education, Science and Technology in Korea announced the " Strategy for Intellectual Property System Constructing Plan" on June 27, 2006, consisting of three aspects: Creation and Application, Law and Regulation, and Infrastructure. The European Union has adopted a " Strategy for the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in Third Countries", aimed at evaluating the recent major changes that have taken place in the international IP arena, preparing to meet the challenges in an effective manner. Finland adopted " The Government's Resolution on the Strategy Concerning Intellectual Property Rights " on March 26, 2009. Therefore, it is observed that the trend of National IP Strategies has only started recently, in the last decade.

Therefore we see the emerging need of an all-encompassing IP Policy arising in nations around the world, aimed at promoting a holistic environment conducive to the development of Intellectual Property.

[1] WIPO's Contribution to the Elaboration and Implementation of Strategies and National Plans for the Development of IP and Innovation , WTO Strategic Planning Workshop, Geneva, Switzerland, June 13, 2014.

[2] Id .

[3] Id .

[4] Id.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/the-development-of-the-national-ipr-policy

National IPR Policy Series : RTI Requests to DIPP seeking Details on the IPR Think Tank and the National IPR Policy

nehaa — 2015-04-12T12:48:00Z

In an earlier blog post titled " National IPR Policy Series : The Development of the National IPR Policy", we discussed the formation of an IPR Think Tank to draft the first National IPR Policy. Since many details about the constitution and working of this Think Tank were unavailable, we decided to send out RTI requests to find out more.

According to the press release by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) which can be found here, an IPR Think Tank was constituted in order to draft the National Intellectual Property Policy. The Think Tank, chaired by retired Justice Prabha Sridevan, submitted a confidential first draft of the National IPR policy to the DIPP on 19th December, 2014. This document was made publicly available by the DIPP and all stakeholders were requested to provide comments and suggestions to the first draft of the National IPR Policy.

Though the IPR Think Tank has expediently released their first draft of the National IPR policy, there is a lack of information available on the constitution of this IPR Think Tank. There is no data on how the members of this Think Tank were shortlisted and selected or how the Chairperson and Convener of the Think Tank were elected. Further, the suggestions and comments received by the IPR Think Tank before and after publishing the first draft of the policy have not been made publicly available.

In an attempt to obtain more data on the process of the constitution of the Think Tank and it’s working, CIS filed three RTI requests to the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion date February 2, 2015. A copy of the RTI requests is included below:

RTI Request 1: Information on Constitution of IPR Think Tank

Dear Sir/Ma’am,

Subject: Request for Information under Right to Information Act 2005.

Information Sought:

Please provide the following information:

Please indicate in detail the process followed by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion for the constitution for an IPR Think Tank to draft the National Intellectual Property Rights Policy under Public Notice No. 10/22/2013-IPR-III dated November 13, 2014.
If there was a meeting held to decide on the same, please include all necessary documents including the minutes of the meeting, records, documents, memos, emails, opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, orders, etc. in which the constitution of the aforementioned IPR Think Tank was decided.
If there were multiple meetings held for the same, please provide all necessary documents including the minutes of all such meetings, records, documents, memos, emails, opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, orders etc. for all such meetings held.
If a directive or directives were received by Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion from any other government body to constitute such a think tank, please provide a copy of such a directive received by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion from any Government authority, to constitute such a Think Tank.
Please indicate in detail the process of shortlisting the members of the IPR Think Tank by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion or any other body that was responsible for the same.

In case the information is held by or related to another public authority, the application or such part of it as may be appropriate may be transferred to that other public authority under intimation to the undersigned as per Section 6(3) of RTI Act.

Proof of payment of application fee:

An Indian Postal Order for the amount of Rs.10 dated 2/2/2015 favouring the Public Information Officer, Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion is enclosed as proof of payment of application fee.

I hereby declare that I am a citizen of India. I request you to ensure that the information is furnished before the expiry of the 30 day period after you have received the application.

Details of Applicant:

Ms. Nehaa Chaudhari
Centre for Internet and Society
G-15, Hauz Khas
New Delhi – 110016

Date: 2/2/2015

RTI Request 2: Working of IPR Think Tank while drafting National IPR policy

To,
Ms. Chandni Raina
Central Public Information Officer
Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (IPR I, II, III, IV, V and VI Sections)
Room No.260
Udyog Bhawan, New Delhi

Dear Sir/Ma’am,

Subject: Request for Information under Right to Information Act 2005.

Information Sought:

Please provide the following information:

Please indicate in detail the process followed by the IPR Think Tank constituted by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion via Public Notice No. 10/22/2013-IPR-III dated November 13, 2014 while framing the first draft of the National IPR Policy dated December 19, 2014.
If there was a meeting held to decide on the same, please include all necessary documents including the minutes of the meeting, records, documents, memos, e-mails, opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, orders, suggestions etc. related to the drafting of such National IPR Policy by the IPR Think Tank chaired by Justice Prabha Sridevan.
If there were multiple meetings held for the same, please provide all necessary documents including the minutes of all such meetings, records, documents, memos, e-mails, opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, orders suggestions etc. for all such meetings held.
Please provide all the suggestions and comments received by the IPR Think Tank from stakeholders after the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion issued Public Notice No. 10/22/2013-IPR-III dated November 13, 2014 asking for suggestions and comments on or before November 30, 2014.

Proof of payment of application fee:

I hereby declare that I am a citizen of India. I request you to ensure that the information is furnished before the expiry of the 30 day period after you have received the application.

Details of Applicant:

Ms. Nehaa Chaudhari
Centre for Internet and Society
G-15, Hauz Khas
New Delhi – 110016

Date: 2/2/2015

RTI Request 3: Request for suggestions and feedback received by DIPP on the first draft of the National IPR Policy

To,
Ms. Chandni Raina
Central Public Information Officer
Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (IPR I, II, III, IV, V and VI Sections)
Room No.260
Udyog Bhawan, New Delhi

Dear Sir/Ma’am,

Subject: Request for Information under Right to Information Act 2005.

Please provide the following information:

Please indicate all the suggestions and comments received by the IPR Think Tank by different stakeholders on or before January 30, 2015 on its first draft of the National Intellectual Property Policy submitted by the IPR Think Tank on December 19, 2014.

Proof of payment of application fee:

I hereby declare that I am a citizen of India. I request you to ensure that the information is furnished before the expiry of the 30 day period after you have received the application.

Details of Applicant:

Ms. Nehaa Chaudhari
Centre for Internet and Society
G-15, Hauz Khas
New Delhi – 110016

Date: 2/2/2015

(Many thanks to CIS intern Protyush Choudhury for his assistance with this.)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/rti-requests-dipp-details-on-constitution-and-working-of-ipr-think-tank

National IPR Policy Series : India's National IPR Policy - What Would WIPO Think?

nehaa — 2015-07-02T17:47:58Z

As part of the National IPR Policy Series, CIS is evaluating how India's National IPR Policy framework and process holds up to WIPO's suggestions. In this note, Varun Baliga and Nehaa Chaudhari examine in particular, the functioning of the IPR Think Tank and the first draft of the National Policy in light of the WIPO framework and the principles it encapsulates.

This note is a brief overview of the approach set out by the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") for the development of National IPR Strategies by various countries. This note also compares WIPO's approach to the approach adopted by the IPR Think Tank ("Think Tank") in the formulation of India's National IPR Policy This note is only an academic exercise and is not to be construed as a recommendation of the procedure set out by WIPO for the development of National IPR Policies/Strategies.

An Overview of WIPO's Approach

WIPO's suggested model of a National IPR Policy operates at three levels - The Process, Baseline Questionnaire and Benchmarking Indicators. [1] On process, WIPO suggests an 8-step procedure in developing a National IP Strategy that lays clear emphasis on both continuous consultation and methodological rigour in data collection. The initial 'Assessment Mission' is aimed at preparing the ground for the formulation of the policy, and includes meetings with stakeholders so as to involve interested entities from the very beginning. [2] Given that an IPR policy is necessarily a political exercise, WIPO recommends that the mission be used to secure the political capital and commitment that would be necessary to see the exercise through. Then, a 'project (national) team' is constituted for an IP audit and develop an understanding of the economic, social and political infrastructure as context for the formulation of the policy. It is also stated that, in most instances, the team will include an international consultant. This is further complemented by 'Desk Research' and 'Data Collection' using the 'Baseline Survey Questionnaire', an integrated data collection tool developed by WIPO. The desk research is an assessment of the existing IP policies coupled with the country's broader goals - developmental, economic and social, so as to conceptualize a policy that is in conformity with the goals.

The data collection through the Baseline Survey Questionnaire is meant to complement the IP audit to understand the "weaknesses, strengths and potential" of "the current IP situation in the country". This audit and data collection drive is then buttressed with 'National Consultations' to validate the data and conclusions reached thus far. WIPO is unambiguous that the aim of these consultations is to enable a wide range of parties to exercise meaningful ownership and agency over the process of conceptualizing a national IPR policy. With the inputs received from the process so far, WIPO recommends that the drafting of the strategy commence on the basis of the "suggestions, opinions and recommendations received during the national consultation process". The drafting should operate at the level of each sector and the country as a whole. This is followed by a 'second round of stakeholder consultations'. These serve a dual purpose: to validate the findings of the first draft and to verify whether the first round of inputs are reflected in the draft itself. Finally, an 'implementation framework' including "implementation structures, a resource mobilization strategy, and monitoring and evaluation mechanisms".

Assessing the First Draft of India's National IPR Policy:

Now, we look at the National IPR Policy in India in light of the WIPO framework outlined above. First we look at the Assessment Mission or process followed prior to the announcement of any IPR policy. Then, we look at what assessment was undertaken of the existing IP laws in the country. Finally, the stakeholders meetings conducted so far are analysed in comparison to the purpose of such consultations that WIPO envisages.

Assessment Mission: There are no reports of an initial meeting having been held to explain the scope and methodology of the process. However, the IPR Think Tank invited comments before the release of the draft national policy in order to seek suggestions on the tentative policy. It should be noted that these comments have not been published.
Assessment of existing IP framework: The overview of the existing IP system in the draft policy covers just the various IP legislations and the relevant government departments. It then proceeds to underscore elements in Indian law that enhance and incentivize stricter standards for IP protection. For example, it illustrated the future challenge in copyright law as being enforcement on digital platforms. It identifies a need for concerted action to increase patent filings by Indians as over "75% of patent filings are by foreign entities". Further, even when it mentions India's ratification of the 2013 Marrakesh Treaty ensuring access to copyrighted works for persons with visual impairment, it is in the context of further reinforcement of copyright.Therefore, it is clear that the perspective of the draft policy towards India's existing framework downplays provisions ensuring access and protecting the public interest and focusses on more expansive IP protection, narrower exceptions and an overall priority for IP rights over the public interest in accessing knowledge. The purpose of the IP audit and desk research, "to obtain a clear picture of the current IP situation…, its weaknesses, strengths and potential.", has not been done justice by this audit weighted in favour of rightsholders. Finally, the Baseline Survey Questionnaire -an integrated tool for extensive data collection - has no mention in the draft policy. There is no indication that it has been utilized for the purpose of data collection, if any.
On stakeholder meetings: The Draft National IP Policy was released on 24 December 2014. A DIPP Press Release called for comments and suggestions to the First Draft to be sent in by January 30^th, 2015.[3] The first set of stakeholder meetings were only held on February 5^th and 6^th, 2015.[4] This is at odds with what the WIPO recommends. The very first step in the WIPO framework is the 'Assessment Mission' which involves meetings with stakeholders that explains the scope and methodology of the process, presumably to elicit views. There is no publicly available information that suggests that this has taken place. Second, the national consultation precedes the drafting of the strategy with the explicit goal of validating the IP audit findings and eliciting views on the drafting of the strategy. This is not intended to be a merely formalistic exercise but meaningful involvement of stakeholders in the whole process of conceptualizing a national IPR policy. Now, the DIPP has solicited comments prior to the publication of the first draft. However, mere solicitation of comments without meaningful consultation is a mere shadow of the objective of the WIPO recommendation of national consultations - "..to actively participate in the validation of the IP audit findings and the formulation of the National IP Strategy..to enhance a wide a range of IP stakeholders' ownership of the process of developing and eventually implementing a national IP strategy." Therefore, the principled objective of the consultation process as outlined by WIPO - enabling stakeholders to exercise a sense of agency over the policy document and drafting process - was severely undermined. Furthermore, WIPO suggests that the drafting of the policy should be based on the findings and suggestions submitted by the stakeholders. Given that comments have been solicited before the policy was drafted, it is incumbent upon the Think Tank to make comments submitted public. [5]

The following table summarizes the comparison in the WIPO approach to that of the IPR Think Tank. Apart from the procedure outlined thus far, the table touches upon other points of comparison that are sure to inform the continued functioning of the Think Tank in the road towards a National IPR Policy.

WIPO Suggestion	India's National IP Policy Framework - Comparison
WIPO has also suggested a number of justifications that may be advanced for the development of a national IP strategy. [6] These justifications will help in grounding the policy in a clear, lucid set of objectives. These are: Need to consolidate sectoral policies National long-term development agenda Benchmarking and best practices International trade obligations Strengthening the national IP office	India's Draft National IP Policy provides for the following objectives:[7] Create awareness of the economic, social and cultural benefits of IP (IP Awareness and Promotion) Stimulate the creation and growth of IP (Creation of IP) Strong and effective laws that protect IP rights in a manner consistent with national priorities and intl obligations and that balance the interests of the rights owners and the public (Legal and Legislative Framework) Strengthen IP administration and management of IP rights (IP Administration and Management) Augment Commercialization of IP rights; valuation, licensing and technology transfer (Commercialization of IP) Strengthen enforcement and adjudicatory mechanisms to protect and combat against IP rights violations ( Enforcement and Adjudication) Human Capital Development in IP
The second prong of WIPO's suggestions is devoted entirely to the Baseline Survey Questionnaire. There are seven clusters identified: IP Administration and Management Generation of IP by universities, research organizations, business, industry, SMEs and individuals Commercialization of IP and technology transfer by universities, research organization, business, industry, SMEs and individuals Copyright and copyright industries Plan breeders; rights (plant variety protection) Enforcement of IP rights IP and public policy	While there are elements of these clusters in the draft policy, there is no mention of them in the context of the method of a Baseline Survey Questionnaire. This means that the data collection was not undertaken in compliance with WIPO's recommendations and means that there was either no data collected or the results are undermined.
Finally, the WIPO framework places great emphasis on the implementation of the policy.[8] It has elements of this in all three prongs. It requires the policy to have an effective framework for its implementation that includes resource mobilization and monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.[9]	The issue of implementation is covered by the draft policy at two levels: 1. Implementation of IP rights - This includes a) Placing the burden on individuals to protect their IP rights as IP is an "essentially private rights [sic]". [10] The state merely plays the role of the facilitator for protection. b) Enacting rules and setting up institutions. Examples include the Intellectual Property Rights (Imported Goods) Enforcement Rules 2007 framed to implement border control measures as well as the Copyright Enforcement Advisory Council. [11] Further, strengthening enforcement mechanisms includes the establishment of a centralized 'Multi-Agency Task Force' for coordination between the raft of agencies that India has. [12] c) Facilitate IP dispute resolution through the designation of a specialized patent bench in select High Courts. It also calls for the creation of regional benches of the IPAB in all five regions where IPOs are located as well as an increase in the powers of the IPAB. [13] 2. Implementation of the Policy itself -[14] a) It suggests that the integration of the policy with stated government programmes such as 'Make in India' and 'Digital India' would enable its implementation. b) The establishment of IP Promotion and Development Council (IPPDC) which will open IP Promotion and Development Units (IPPDU) for promoting IP awareness, protection and utlilization. c) IP support to MSMEs. d) Technology Acquisition and Development Fund under the Manufacturing Policy for licensing or procuring patented technologies. e) Manufacturing units will be encouraged to set up IP cells in their own units and make IP a part of their corporate strategy. f) Integrate with government initiatives.

Conclusion: Testing Times Ahead

The IPR Think Tank has not been consistent with WIPO's recommendations on drafting a National IPR Policy. In terms of data analysis, the Think Tank has not displayed an iota of the analytical rigour and data collection that WIPO believes is necessary to understand both the state of IP in the country and devise effective means of responding to lacunae. Further, while consultations have been held with civil society, these have been lacking in two respects. They have not followed the timelines prescribed by WIPO insofar as consultations have happened only after the release of the first draft. As a result, the Think Tank has failed in actualizing the raison d'etre behind national consultations - "enhance a wide range of IP stakeholders' ownership of the process of developing and eventually implementing a national IP strategy". Finally, this piece is not an endorsement of WIPO or its recommendations but a mere acknowledgement of the role WIPO has played in this exercise. In the final analysis, India has fallen short of adhering to the principles reflected in the WIPO framework.

[1] http://www.wipo.int/ipstrategies/en/methodology/

[2] The stakeholders that WIPO mentions are "..inter alia, the national IP office(s), relevant government departments, universities and research institutes, SMEs, inventors, creators, legal practitioners, non-governmental organizations (NGOs)".

[3] http://www.dipp.nic.in/English/acts_rules/Press_Release/pressRelease_IPR_Policy_30December2014.pdf

[4] http://spicyip.com/2015/01/examining-the-draft-national-ip-policy-stakeholder-meetings-to-be-held.html

[5] http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/national-ipr-policy-series-cis-comments-to-the-first-draft-of-the-national-ip-policy

[6] Methodology for the Development of National Intellectual Property Strategies, Tool 1: The Process, p. 11.

[7] National IPR Policy (First Draft), p. 6-23.

[8] Methodology for the Development of National Intellectual Property Strategies, Tool 1: The Process, p. 9.

[9] Ibid .

[10] Ibid , p. 20.

[11] Ibid , p. 20.

[12] Ibid , p. 21.

[13] Ibid , p. 22.

[14] Ibid , p. 25-26.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/national-ipr-policy-series-indias-national-ipr-policy-what-would-wipo-think

National IPR Policy Series : Follow-up RTI to DIPP on the IPR Think Tank

nehaa — 2015-06-25T00:43:34Z

This RTI was prepared by Varun Baliga and Nehaa Chaudhari as a follow-up, based on the responses of the DIPP to our earlier RTI requests (available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/national-ipr-policy-series-rti-requests-by-cis-to-dipp-dipp-responses)

To,

Ms. Palka Sahni,

Deputy Secretary,

Central Public Information Officer,

IPR-II, IPR-III, IPR-IV, IPR-VI,

Room No. 254,

Udyog Bhawan, Delhi.

Subject: Request for Information under Section 6 of the Right to Information Act, 2005 regarding Information on the Procedure to File a Right to Information Application with the IPR Think Tank

Dear Madam,

1. Full Name of the Applicant: Nehaa Chaudhari

2. Address of the Applicant: Centre for Internet and Society, G-15 Top Floor, Hauz Khas, New Delhi - 110016

Mailing Address : nehaa@cis-india.org

3. Information Required: Context

Please consider this an application for information under Section 6 of the Right to Information Act, 2005. Since the request for this information is inextricable from the context in which it is made, it is previewed with a succinct overview of the facts.

I, as an employee of the Centre for Internet and Society ["CIS"], first filed a Right to Information ["RTI"] application with the Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion ["DIPP"] requesting information on the procedure followed in the appointment of the IPR Think Tank ["Think Tank"]. We received a response from the DIPP detailing the procedure followed. Then, we filed a RTI application with the DIPP requesting information on its functioning, particularly procedure followed and comments received prior to and after the release of the first draft of the National IPR Policy ["Policy"]. [1] In your response dated 26^th February 2015, the DIPP stated that the Think Tank functioned "independently without any interference of this Department (DIPP)". Therefore, apart from information that an "interactive meeting with stakeholders" was conducted while drafting the Policy, the DIPP stated it was not in a position to give any further information. Finally, the DIPP in a separate response dated 26^th February 2015, stated that "suggestions and comments on the draft of on [sic] National IPR Policy have been received by the IPR Think Tank directly". CIS followed this up by filing a RTI application with the Think Tank itself but we have not received a response.

4. Information Required: Details

Therefore, I seek information on the following:

a) The Think Tank is a public authority constituted for the purpose of the RTI Act. Who is the Public Information Officer of the Think Tank for the purpose of filing RTI applications? What are the measures taken by the Think Tank to comply with its obligations under the RTI Act?

b) What is the procedure to be followed in filing an RTI Application with the Think Tank?

c) Given that there is no information on the above, would the appropriate authority to request for information on the functioning of the IPR Think Tank be the DIPP?

5. Proof of Payment of Application Fee:

An Indian Postal Order for the amount of Rs. 10 dated ___________ favouring the Public Information Officer, Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion is enclosed as proof of payment of application fee.

This is to certify that I, Nehaa Chaudhari, am a citizen of India.

Please provide me this information at the address provided earlier in this letter.

Thank you

Yours sincerely

Nehaa Chaudhari

[1] http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/national-ipr-policy-series-rti-requests-by-cis-to-dipp-dipp-responses

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/national-ipr-policy-series-follow-up-rti-to-dipp-on-ipr-think-tank

National IPR Policy Series : Comments on the Proposed Intellectual Property Rights Policy to the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion

nehaa — 2015-04-12T11:39:16Z

On 13 November, 2014, the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion had released a Call for Suggestions for India's proposed National IPR Policy. This is the Centre for Internet and Society's (CIS) submission for the same.

Submitted by CIS with inputs from Pranesh Prakash, Director, Nehaa Chaudhari, Programme Officer, Anubha Sinha, Programme Officer and Amulya P., Intern. Click to view the PDF.

I. Preliminary

I.1. This submission presents comments from the Centre for Internet and Society ("CIS")[1] on the proposed National Intellectual Property Rights Policy ("National IPR policy") to the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India. ("DIPP").

I.2. CIS commends the DIPP for this initiative, and appreciates the opportunity to provide comments on the National IPR Policy. CIS' comments are as stated hereafter.

II. Principles

II.1.1. The characterization of intellectual property rights may be two- fold- first, at their core, intellectual property rights, are temporary monopolies granted to inter alia, authors and inventors; and second, they are a tool to ensure innovation, social, scientific and cultural progress and further access to knowledge. This dual nature and purpose of intellectual property protection is particularly critical in developing economies such as India. Excessive intellectual property protection could result in stunted innovation and negatively impact various stakeholders. [2] It is therefore our submission that the development of the IPR Policy be informed by broader principles of fairness and equity, balancing intellectual property protections with limitations and exceptions/user rights such as those for research, education and access to medicines.

II.1.2. These comments will evaluate the recent developments in the intellectual property regime in India and point out instances for possible reform.

II.1.3. These comments have been divided into five sections, dealing with patents, openness, open access to scholarly works, copyright, and negotiating free trade agreements in that order.

III. Detailed Comments

III.1. Patents

III.1.1. Key Issues Regarding Patents

III.1.1.1. The key issues involving patents in India include compulsory licensing, uncertainty in software patenting, slow pace of examination of patent applications, inter alia.

III.1.1.2. CIS submits that the Indian intellectual property regime contains numerous safeguards to ensure that monopolies of intellectual property are not exercised to the detriment of the public and that the National IPR Policy should continue to reflect these ideals.

III.1.2. Software Patents and Dual Monopoly

III.1.2.1. Presently, software in India may be copyrighted and computer related inventions are patentable. CIS is of the opinion that this results in an ambiguity that could potentially result in a dual monopoly over the same subject matter. This ambiguity around the legality of software patents and the scope of patents on computer related inventions has existed since the Parliament introduced the term "per se" to section 3(k) through the Patent (Amendment) Act, 2002, persisting despite repeated attempts[3] to bring about clarity in the law (the most recent one being the Draft Guidelines on Computer Related Inventions, released in 2013 by the Indian patent office).

III.1.2.2. CIS believes that software is currently adequately protected under copyright, and does not merit patent protection. The software industry in its infancy grew by leaps and bounds in the absence of patents, and imposing twenty year monopolies is stunting the development of software, especially, in an industry where technology changes every two to five years.

III.1.2.3. Therefore, CIS is of the opinion that the National IPR Policy should recognise the danger of software patenting, and encourage the adoption of and development of alternatives to a strict intellectual property regime, for instance, Free/Open Source/Libre Software.

III.1.3. Compulsory Licensing of Patents

III.1.3.1. CIS believes that the current regime allowing for compulsory licensing of patents in India helps achieve a balance between the two concerns of rewarding inventions and making them available to the public during times of need, of the rights of the patent holder with his obligations to ensure availability of products at a reasonable price by allowing third parties who do not own the patent to license the use of the patent during the term of protection.[4] CIS believes that such a balance cannot be arrived at merely by market mechanisms. CIS further believes that achieving such a balance is important for a developing country like India as we have special concerns regarding access to healthcare and access to technologies that will protect our national interest.[5]

III.1.3.2. Therefore CIS submits that the National IPR policy should continue to make positive allowances for government involvement in this space, through the compulsory licensing of patents in certain situations.

III.1.4. Alternative Licensing Mechanisms

III.1.4.1. CIS believes that government participation in the patenting regime ensures that all interests are taken on board and the social costs of patents are kept in mind. CIS is of the opinion that the National IPR policy should be formed after careful consideration of alternative patent licensing mechanisms that could help achieve a balance between the interests of different stakeholders particularly because as a developing economy we have greater needs for access to medicines and technologies to ensure economic development.[6]

III.1.4.2. On patent pools: In the interests of ensuring development of technology and innovation while balancing the social costs of patents, CIS submits that the National IPR Policy should consider alternative licensing mechanisms such as patent pools which present an efficient legal arrangement to the different problems that arise when companies have complementary intellectual property rights and these rights are essential to new technologies being used and employed[7]. Such a licensing could be done with government participation to ensure standard royalty rates and standard agreements.

III.1.4.3. On tailoring patent strengths: Our patent system provides for a one size first all approach to patent terms. CIS believes that the National IPR Policy could suggest the adoption of a more studied approach to differential patent strengths that properly balances out the benefits of the innovation against social costs of patents both in the form of monopoly pricing and threats to subsequent pricing is required to ensure that our patent system is fair equitable and in our national interest.[8]

III.1.4.4. On royalty caps: CIS believes that the National IPR policy could encourage bringing back royalty caps for certain sectors as a means of regulating the market and ensuring that access to technologies is unharmed. CIS believes that this will serve the larger national interest and ensure technological development.[9]

III.2. Openness

III.2.1. Free and Open Source Software

III.2.1.1. Free and Open Source Software ("FOSS") has emerged as a key agent in information technology policy making in India. There has been an increased importance of free and open source software in education, governmental agencies, as recently demonstrated by the Indian Government's decision to shift to open source software, in sync with the Digital India initiative.[10]

III.2.1.2. CIS believes that the IPR policy should encourage free and open software in education, governmental agencies etc. CIS believes that this shift in open source software is necessary to keep our IPR policy in sync with developments in the digital world.

III.3. Open Access to Scholarly Works

III.3.1. Open Access Policies and Scientific and Scholarly Works

III.3.1.1. The benefits of implementing an open access policy with regard to scientific and scholarly works are manifold. Providing open access to scholarly research will ensure percolation of cutting edge research into the society. It has been often argued that restricted access to government funded research is unethical, since scientific research conducted by government agencies is partly, if not entirely, funded by the taxpayers' money.

III.3.1.2. Government Initiatives Towards Open Access

III.3.1.2.1. CIS believes that the steps taken in this regard by the Department of Biotechnology and Department of Science to make scientific research publicly available by developing an open access policy are laudable, especially from the view of increasing access to research undertaken at these institutions.

III.3.1.2.2. There are several other government agencies which have implemented open access policies, namely, the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, Indian Council of Agricultural Research and Institute of Mathematical Sciences. CIS believes that this is step in the right direction

III.3.1.2.3. Copyright is the key instrument to effect open access policies. CIS believes that the work should be appropriately copyrighted to allow for free and open access to any interested person.

III.4. Copyright

III.4.1. Exceptions for Fair Dealings

III.4.1.1. The 2012, Amendment Act extended fair dealing exceptions in several ways; to sound recordings, videos, to the making of three dimensional works from two dimensional works,[11] to storing of electronic copies at non-commercial public libraries, [12] to rights of commercial rental.[13] While the Act touched upon some of the burning issues with regard to limitations and exceptions to copyright, CIS believes that it did miss out on laying down clear rules for issues like exceptions for educational institutions, libraries and archives which is currently being negotiated at the standing committee of the WIPO as an international instrument,[14] parallel importation of books for non-commercial libraries, and extending the current exceptions for education to distance education and digital education. CIS is of the opinion that while this was a step in the right direction the IPR policy should continue the trend of extending exceptions for fair dealing and should encourage forming general guidelines for fair dealings as it would help achieve goals of education and scientific and cultural progress.

III.4.1.2. CIS believes that it would be beneficial if general guidelines for fair dealing were provided for. These guidelines must not take away from existing fair dealing exceptions under the law, but should act as a framework to understand what constitutes fair dealing. CIS submits that this coupled with support for the International Treaty for Limitations and Exceptions for Libraries and Archives[15] and for International Treaty for Limitations and Exceptions for Educational and Research Institutions [16]would help serve national interest as it would help reduce the freezing effect by reducing the costs of using copyrighted work legitimately and ensure social and cultural progress. CIS submits that the National IPR policy should encourage the international instruments aimed at providing for exceptions and limitations for fair dealings.

III.4.2. Exceptions for Government Produced Works

III.4.2.1. CIS believes that the current exceptions for use of government produced works are far too limited and taxpayers must be free to use the works that they have paid for.[17] CIS submits that the National IPR policy should encourage the broadening of exceptions with regard to government produced works.

III.4.3. Compulsory Licensing

III.4.3.1. The Act allowed for compulsory licensing of foreign works[18] and put in place statutory licenses for broadcasters[19] CIS believes that this was a positive step that will encourage cultural and scientific education in India. CIS submits that compulsory licenses for copyrighted works help achieve goals of education, of scientific and cultural progress. CIS submits that the National IPR policy should encourage compulsory licensing of copyrighted works in certain situations for the promotion of access to knowledge and information.

III.4.4. Protection of Authors/ Performers Rights

III.4.4.1. The Act allowed for protection of author's rights regarding storing of their work in electronic medium[20] and for protection of rights of performers both commercial [21] and moral.[22] CIS believes that while this is in itself a positive step, there is need to ensure that such moral rights are not abused by authors or rights holders to stop discourse or to stop fair use and adequate measures to ensure the same must be put in place to avoid excessive intellectual property rights. CIS submits that the National IPR policy should discuss limitations to moral rights of authors and performers to make room for fair dealings.

III.4.5. Users Rights Regarding Cover Versions Of Songs

III.4.5.1. The Act allows for users to make cover versions of a sound recording required provided they comply with rules regarding notices and royalties. CIS believes that this is potentially problematic as even recording companies have acknowledged that the non-commercial cover versions help in increasing the popularity of the original and therefore help in the growth of the film and music industry and this new law could possibly stop individuals from making such cover versions due to fear of violating the law and therefore harm the film and music industry. Therefore, CIS believes that the National IPR policy should consider measures to provide more rights to the users in order to ensure development of the music and film industry; CIS believes that this is an instance of excessive intellectual property and is harmful to all stakeholders involved.

III.4.6. Relinquishment of Copyright and Creative Commons

III.4.6.1. The amended Section 21 of the Act now only requires a simply public notice from the author to relinquish his copyright as opposed to an application to the registrar of copyrights. CIS believes that this is a positive step as now the requirement under the rules can easily be satisfied by using a Creative Commons Zero license.[23] CIS submits that the National IPR policy should undertake similar steps to encourage the usage of creative commons licenses and thereby facilitate access to knowledge.

III.4.7. Term of Protection of Copyrights

III.4.7.1. The Act provided for an extension of term of copyright for photographs to almost double its earlier duration, [24] CIS believes that this is possibly harmful as it could lead to copyrighted works not entering the public domain for unnecessarily long periods of time and thereby harm progress in science and culture. In this regard CIS further believes that since the term of protections provided under our copyright law for all works extends beyond our international obligations, The National IPR policy should try to ensure that scientific and cultural development are not hindered by excessive terms of protection that go beyond the minimum owed under our international obligations.

III.4.8. Protection Of Rights Management Information

III.4.8.1. The amendment Act provided for protection of rights management information (RMI) and provided for both criminal and civil remedies in instances of unauthorised alteration or removal of RMIs.[25] CIS believes that these provisions are unnecessary as India does not have obligations to do so under international treaties and there is no actual demand for these rights as it is yet unclear how these rights help authors or performers. CIS submits that these provisions increase the costs for users who want to legitimately break these digital locks to obtain accessible formats for the information and that so long as the rights holder does not have an obligation to ensure that their works are accessible, provisions such as these cripple creativity and stunt industry growth.[26] Therefore CIS submits that the National IPR policy should help achieve a balance of concerns of users who want to legitimately break these digital locks on the one hand and the need to prevent digital piracy on the other.

III.4.9. Intermediary Liability

III.4.9.1. CIS submits that due to the IT (Intermediary Guidelines) Rules, 2011, there is a freezing effect on free speech on the internet as these rules are procedurally flawed and go against the principles of natural justice.[27] CIS believes that such a restraint on free speech harms creativity and innovation, to this end CIS submits that the National IPR policy should ensure free speech is not unfairly hindered by rules regarding copyright infringement.

III.4.10. Criminalization of Copyright Infringement

III.4.10.1. Individual non-commercial infringement of copyright is a crime under Section 63A of the Copyright Act [28] and is punishable by imprisonment which can extend to three years or a fine that can extend up to rs. 2,00,000/- CIS believes that this is an instance of excessive intellectual property protection; CIS is of the opinion that the civil remedies available for copyright enforcement are enough for copyright protection and that the criminal remedies under the Copyright Act, 1957 function only to ensure that there are obstacles to free and legitimate use of copyrighted material. CIS believes that such provisions are harmful for innovation within India and impose unnecessary costs on users.[29] Therefore CIS believes the National IPR policy should reconsider the question of criminalisation of copyright infringement and should ensure that any penal consequences are proportional to the act committed.

III.4.11. Concluding Remarks on Copyrights

III.4.11.1. In conclusion while India has what some call the most balanced approach to intellectual property law in the world today, [30] one that balances both the interests of the author and the copyrights holder as well as the end user and the overall public interest, there is room for improvement as far as adapting to the internet age is concerned, especially considering the easy appeal of forming an intellectual property regime that is excessive and in the end harms all the concerned stakeholders.

III.5. Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)

III.5.1. Need for Transparency Regarding FTA Negotiations

III.5.1.1. India has lately been negotiating Free Trade Agreements with several developed nations, these are closed door negotiations and the texts of the meetings are not available to the public. CIS believes that these texts should be made available to the public to ensure transparency and to ensure all stakeholders know of any developments, CIS believes that public knowledge of the positions of various actors in any negotiation process will help ensure that such positions are taken keeping in mind the interests of all stakeholders and will ensure that any outcome from such negotiations will be in national interest.[31] CIS therefore submits that the National IPR policy should encourage transparency with regards to negotiations for free trade agreements.

III.5.2. FTAs with Developed Nations and TRIPS Plus Standards

III.5.2.1. Leaked drafts of the European Union- India FTA negotiations have revealed that provisions on intellectual property protection were extensive and affected the pharmaceuticals sector, these provisions, if agreed upon, could go well beyond India's obligations under the WTO and under the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement. In fact, developed countries including the US [32] and EU[33] have tried time again and again to encourage developing countries to adopt standards of IP protection in bilateral or regional trade investment agreements that go beyond TRIPS [34]

India has repeatedly indicated to the WTO that it was not willing to commit to an agreement beyond TRIPS.[35] These commitments could include data exclusivity protection measures, ever-greening of patents etc. [36]

CIS believes that despite the growing pressure from developed nations regarding various FTAs,[37] India must hold its ground and ensure that concerns about India's national interest and the difference in the development levels of the European Union or other developed countries and developing countries like India are kept in mind while negotiating obligations under international agreements. Therefore CIS believes that the National IPR policy should ensure that TRIPS plus standards are not acceptable to India as they will undermine our national interest and hinder development at the national level.[38]

III.5.3. Shift from Multilateral Forums to Bilateral FTA negotiations

III.5.3.1. CIS believes that the trend of shift in negotiations from a multilateral forum such as the WIPO or the WTO to a bilateral or a regional forum [39] is harmful as certain flexibilities are built into the TRIPS and therefore multilateral negotiations based on TRIPS will help pursue India's interests better. And therefore when possible, India must prefer negotiations at multilateral forums as opposed to bilateral or regional treaties, CIS believes that the National IPR policy should reflect the same preferences. [40]

IV. Concluding observations

IV.1. On patents, CIS submits that the National IPR policy reconsider software patenting, that encourage open source software, continue and strengthen that compulsory licensing and consider and study alternative licensing mechanisms as means to achieve a balancing of the interests of different stakeholders.

IV.2. On openness, CIS submits that the IPR policy should encourage free and open software in education, governmental agencies etc.

IV.3. On open access to scholarly work, CIS commends the work done by government agencies so far and submits that the IPR policy should encourage open access to scholarly works.

IV.4. On copyright, CIS submits that the IPR policy work toward strengthening and extending fair dealings provisions, supporting international instruments that strengthen fair dealing, encourage compulsory licensing. CIS submits that the IPR policy should work towards ensuring that protections for copyright such as terms of protection, intermediary liability, protection of rights management information, criminalisation of copyright infringement etc., do not harm other legitimate interests of users or unnecessarily restrict free speech.

IV.5. On FTAs, CIS submits that the IPR policy encourage transparency with regard to FTA negotiations, ensure that TRIPS plus standards are not accepted as they would harm national interest and to encourage multilateral negotiations over bilateral free trade agreements.

IV.6. CIS welcomes the initiative of the DIPP to form a National IPR policy, CIS believes that it is essential that such an IPR policy avoid excessive intellectual property rights protection and is formed keeping in mind goals of development and national interest.

IV.7. CIS is thankful to the DIPP for the opportunity to provide comments on the National IPR policy and would be privileged to work with the government on this and other matters in these areas.

[1] www.cis-india.org (Last Accessed: 30/11/14).

[2] The Washington Declaration on Intellectual Property and Public Interest concluded after the Global Congress on Intellectual property and Public Interest in August 2011 attended by over 180 experts from 32 countries articulate this position perfectly. Available at: http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Washington-Declaration.pdf (Last Accessed:29/11/14)

[3] Shashank Singh, Guidelines for Examination of Computer Related Inventions: Mapping the Stakeholders' Response, Available at: http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/guidelines-for-examination-of-computer-related-inventions (Last Accessed: 30/11/14).

[4] N.S. Gopalakrishnan, Compulsory License Under Indian Patent Law, MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, Vol.22, 2015, pp.11-42.

[5] Raadhika Gupta, Compulsory Licensing under TRIPS: How Far it Addresses Public Health Concerns in Developing Nations, Journal of Intellectual Property Rights, Vol.15, September 2010, pp.357-363. Available at: http://nopr.niscair.res.in/bitstream/123456789/10211/1/JIPR%2015(5)%20357-363.pdf (Last Accessed: 30/11/14).

[6] Id.

[7] Nehaa Chaudhari, Pervasive Technologies: Patent Pools, Available at: http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/patent-pools (Last Accessed: 30/11/14).

[8] One of the measures along which we could have differential patent strengths could be the time for the invention to reach the market, see, Benjamin N Roin, The case for Tailoring Patent Awards Based on the Time-to-Market of Inventions, UCLA Law Review, Vol.61, 2013, Available at: http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/10612849/Case%20for%20Tailoring%20Patent%20Awards%203-15-13.pdf?sequence=1 (Last Accessed: 30/11/14).

[9] Sunil Abraham, Patented Games, Available at: http://cis-india.org/a2k/patented-games (Last Accessed: 30/11/14.

[10] See Nabi Hasan, Issues and Challenges in Open Source Software Environment with Special Reference to India, Available at: http://crl.du.ac.in/ical09/papers/index_files/ical-43_144_317_1_RV.pdf (Last Accessed: 30/11/14).

[13] Zakir Thomas, Overview of Changes to the Indian Copyright Law, Journal of Intellectual Property Rights, Vo.17, July 2012, pp.324-334.

[14] See conclusions of the chair at the 23^rd session of the Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights at the WIPO, Available at: http://www.eifl.net/wipo-sccr23-conclusions (Last Accessed: 30/11/14).

[15] For draft proposal of the treaty see IFLA, Treaty proposal on Limitations and Exceptions for Libraries and Archives, Available at: http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_27/sccr_27_2_rev.pdf (Last Accessed: 30/11/14).

[16] See The Draft WIPO Treaty on Exceptions and Limitations for the Persons with Disabilities, Educational and Research Institutions, Libraries and Archives, proposal by the African Group (document SCCR/22/12).Available at: http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_22/sccr_22_12.pdf (Last Accessed: 30/11/14).

[17] See Section 52(q) of the Copyright Act, 1957.

[21] Id.

[23] CIS, Comments on Draft Copyright Rules, 2012, available at: http://cis-india.org/a2k/feedback-to-draft-copyright-rules-2012 (Last Accessed: 29/11/14).

[24] See Pranesh Prakash, Analysis of the Copyright (Amendment) Bill, 2012, Available at: http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/analysis-copyright-amendment-bill-2012

[26] Pranesh Prakash, Technological Protection Measures in the Copyright (Amendment) Bill, 2010, Available at: http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/tpm-copyright-amendment (Last Accessed: 29/11/14).

[27] Rishabh Dara, Intermediary Liability in India: Chilling Effects on Free Expression on the Internet, 2011, Available at: http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/intermediary-liability-in-india.pdf (Last Accessed: 30/11/14).

[28] Section 63A, Copyright Act 1957.

[29] See Right to Share: Principles on Freedom of Expression and Copyright in the Digital Age, Article19, Available at: http://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/3716/en/ (Last Accessed: 29/11/14).

[30] V Premanath, S Sivaram, Intellectual Property Systems in India: Progressing towards Greater Maturity and Diversity, Available at: http://iimahd.ernet.in/users/anilg/files/Articles/Emerging%20IPR%20Consciousness,%20vikalpa.pdf (Last Accessed: 29/11/14).

[31] Jan Wouters, Idesbald Goddeeries, Bregt Natens etc, Some Critical Issues in the EU -India Free Trade Agreement Negotiation, Working Paper No.102,KU Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/publications/working_papers/new_series/wp101-110/wp102-wouters-goddeeris-natens.pdf , February 2013, p.16.

Monika Ermert, Lack of Transparency in EU-India FTA Talks Spurs Requests for Halt, ip-watch, Available at: http://www.ip-watch.org/2010/09/03/lack-of-transparency-in-eu-india-fta-talks-spurs-requests-for-halt/ .

[32] The current policy of the US Trade Representative is seen to be reflected in the 2002 Trade Act available here: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-107hr3009enr/pdf/BILLS-107hr3009enr.pdf See HR3009.

[33] The current trade strategy for the EU can be found here http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/july/tradoc_152643.pdf .

[34] Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy, Available at: http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/ciprfullfinal.pdf , p.174.

[35] C. Correa, 'Negotiation of a Free Trade Agreement European Union-India: Will India Accept Trips-Plus

Protection?', (2009) Oxfam Deutschland and Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst Analysis,

http://www.oxfam.de/files/20090609_negotiationofafreetradeaggrementeuindia_218kb.pdf .

[36] S. Sharma, 'the EU-India FTA: Critical Considerations in a Time of Crisis', (2009) Centad Working Paper.

[37] Asit Ranjan Mishra, India to negotiate FTAs with emerging market nations, Livemint, Available at: http://www.livemint.com/Politics/RlJNxUXovjNVaRzQt9KXmO/India-to-negotiate-FTAs-with-emerging-market-nations.html .

[38] Sisule F Musungu and Graham Dutfield, Commission Multilateral Agreements and a TRIPS -Plus Word: the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), Available at: http://www.iprsonline.org/ictsd/docs/WIPO_Musungu_Dutfield.pdf.

[39] For Trends, See Beginda Pakpahan, Deadlock in the WTO: What is next? Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/public_forum12_e/art_pf12_e/art19.htm .

[40] See Amit Sengupta, Do not trade away our lives, Vo.9, No.2, Indian Journal of Medical Ethics, 2012, Available at: http://www.issuesinmedicalethics.org/index.php/ijme/article/view/88/1047 .

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/comments-on-proposed-ip-rights-policy-to-dipp

National IPR Policy Series : CIS Comments to the First Draft of the National IP Policy

nehaa — 2015-02-09T00:59:10Z

The Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, Government of India invited comments on the First Draft of India's National IPR Policy. The Centre for Internet & Society (CIS) made this submission. The comments were prepared by Nehaa Chaudhari, Pranesh Prakash and Anubha Sinha. We also thank our intern, Varnika Chawla for her assistance.

The press release from the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion in which it invited comments is here. The First Draft of India's National IPR Policy is here. Click to view the PDF. Note: In some places there might be references to paragraph/page numbers (of the document) and for that readers should refer to the PDF since the formatting in HTML is slightly different.

Preliminary

This submission presents comments from the Centre for Internet and Society, India ("CIS")¹ on the proposed National Intellectual Property Rights Policy ("the Policy") to the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India.("DIPP").
This submission is made in response to the requests and suggestions from stakeholders sought by the DIPP in its Press Release. ²
CIS commends the DIPP for this initiative, and appreciates the opportunity to provide comments on the National IPR Policy. CIS' comments are as stated hereafter.

About CIS

CIS³ is a non-profit research organization that works on among others, issues of intellectual property law reform,⁴ openness,⁵ privacy, freedom of speech and expression and internet governance,⁶ accessibility for persons with disabilities,⁷ and engages in academic research on digital humanities⁸ and digital natives. ⁹
CIS is an accredited Observer¹⁰ at the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO"), enabling us to attend formal meetings of member states and participate in debates and consultations on various issues. CIS has been attending meetings of the WIPO Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights since 2010. At these sessions, CIS has actively participated through various interventions, emphasizing the adoption of an approach balancing the rights holders' perspective with public interest. CIS has also attended sessions of some other committees at WIPO, made interventions wherever applicable, produced reports of these meetings, and profiled the work of other non-governmental organizations engaging in similar work on intellectual property law and policy reform. ¹¹
CIS undertakes research in other fields of intellectual property, in addition to WIPO-related work. Over the past five years since our inception, some of our key research has included analyses of intellectual property issues of the proposed Indo-EU Free Trade Agreement¹² and other free trade agreements,¹³ the US Special 301 Report,¹⁴ the (2010) amendment to the Copyright Act, 1957,¹⁵ the (draft) Science, Technology and Innovation Policy,¹⁶ parallel importation, ¹⁷ the (draft) Patent Manual and the subsequent Guidelines for Computer Related Inventions,¹⁸ royalty caps,¹⁹ copyright exceptions and limitations for education, ²⁰ and the preparation of the India Report for the Consumers International IP Watch List.²¹

Structure of this Submission

This submission is divided into 4 parts. The first part gives a preliminary overview of the suggestions submitted by CIS. The second part highlights the principles that should be followed in the formulation of a National IPR Policy, the third part provides detailed comments and recommendations for the National IPR Policy and the last part provides certain concluding remarks.

Principles

The characterization of intellectual property rights may be two-fold - first, at their core, intellectual property rights, are temporary monopolies granted to inter alia, authors and inventors; and second, they are a tool to ensure innovation, social, scientific and cultural progress and further access to knowledge. This dual nature and purpose of intellectual property protection is particularly critical in developing economies such as India. Excessive intellectual property protection could result in stunted innovation and negatively impact various stakeholders.²² It is therefore our submission that the development of the IPR Policy be informed by broader principles of fairness and equity, balancing intellectual property protections with limitations and exceptions/user rights such as those that promote freedom of expression, research, education and access to medicines, cultural rights, data mining, use of governmental works, etc.

Detailed Comments

This section will detail CIS' submissions on various aspects of the National IPR Policy. Submissions have been categorised thematically.

On the Vision

It is submitted that the Vision of the National IPR Policy ("Vision") in encouraging growth for the 'benefit of all' and in accepting the philosophy that knowledge owned 'is transformed into knowledge shared' ²³ is commendable.However, the vision is at odds with the methods proposed in the document. True advancement in science and technology, arts and culture, protection of traditional knowledge as well as bio-diverse resources and the true sharing of knowledge would be impaired by a system centred only around the development and maximization of intellectual property.
An attractive social culture would be one where citizens had access to a cornucopia of ideas and information, thereby fostering an environment of cultural diversity, which would enable individuals to shape themselves. Indeed, this is not just an ideal, but is a right recognized under Article 27(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and Article 15 of the .²⁴ However, an IP maximization approach, which the draft stategy seems to embrace, hinders the growth of such a culture, creating a protectionist environment while preventing access to various resources which may be of use for further innovations.
The question of whether IP rights given to innovators are the most effective tools to promote innovation in society has been widely discussed in economics, politics and law, especially in the last four decades.²⁵ Traditional arguments in favour of temporary monopolies incentivising innovation have been effectively questioned as creating monopolies on innovation, contributing to increasing prices and a distorted allocation of resources, inefficiency and a net loss of welfare. ²⁶ It has also been effectively established that most innovation is incremental and cumulative, necessitating the access to pre-existing data and works.²⁷ It would be welcome if the huge amount of academic literature on these matter were taken into consideration by the expert group. While intellectual property rights are not per se antithetical to innovation, creativity, and cultural development, an IP-maximalist policy and law has been shown to harm those very objectives.
CIS therefore submits that the vision of the policy also reflect the commitment to the creation of a holistic and balanced framework of intellectual property rights in the nation with the recognition that an intellectual property-centric system would not necessarily be the best means of promoting creativity, innovation and access, the promotion of which are part of the stated desire of the policy.
Further, we believe that the principles of freedom of expression and of due process of law, both of which are constitutionally-recognized rights in India, should be recognized in the vision as principles that any intellectual property rights regime should respectively seek to promote and respect.

On the Mission

CIS appreciates the commitment to establish a balanced, dynamic and vibrant intellectual property system in India.²⁸ We recommend that the mission of the policy also include a commitment tofoster access to knowledge as well as the commitment to creating asystem of intellectual property rights which serve the public interest by strengthening limitations and exceptions to IP regimes, which are aimed to provide a public interest oriented counterbalance to the monopoly rights granted under IPR laws.
We believe that preventing unreasonable and disproportionate remedies to IPR law violations are an important part of ensuring that these laws serve the public interest rather than subvert them for purely private interests. This important principle ought to find reflection in the policy's mission statement.
It is suggested that in addition to public health, food security and the environment²⁹, other areas of socio-economic and cultural importance, including inter alia,foundational scientific research, education, disability rights, and access to knowledge, be added as additional areas that warrant special protection , in the mission statement.
It is submitted that these commitments are essential to the creation and working of a balanced intellectual property framework that the Policy seeks to achieve.

On Objective 1: IP Awareness and Promotion

The first objective of the Policy lays out a detailed action plan for creating awareness about intellectual property as well as for the promotion of intellectual property. The underlying rationale for this endeavour has been identified on various levels - that there are economic, social and cultural benefits of intellectual property;³⁰ that intellectual property protection accelerates development, promotes entrepreneurship as well as increases competitiveness; ³¹ and that the global regime is one of strongly protected intellectual property rights.³²
It is submitted that the identification of this underlying rationale is not backed by sufficient evidence. These justifications, in their pursuit of a favourable intellectual property regime do not present a balanced picture of all the facts.
Current existing empirical research does not show an unambiguous nexus between the granting of IP rights and an increase in innovation and productivity, as innovation and productivity cannot not identified with the number of patents awarded. ³³ This can be seen in the US economy, where despite an enormous increase in the number of patents, there has been no dramatic acceleration in technological progress. ³⁴ In fact, studies prove the contrary to be true. In the United States, patenting increased drastically over the last few decades, quadrupling from 59,715 patents being issued in 1983, to 244,341 in 2010. However, according to the Bureau of Labour Statistics, annual growth in the total factor productivity reduced from 1.2% in 1970-79 to below 1% in 2000-09, ³⁵ whereas the annual expenditure on research and development saw hardly any change, oscillating in a band of 2.5% of the GDP for over three decades.³⁶ In relatively new industries such as software and biotechnology, still in their nascent stages of development, patenting has been introduced without any positive contributions to innovation. In fact, in their empirical work described in Patent Failure (2008), ³⁷ Bessen and Meurer have argued that increased patenting has resulted in decreased social welfare.
Further, no unambiguous connections have been found between innovation and intellectual property rights in academic studies. In a meta-study conducted in 2006,³⁸ Boldrin and Levine observed that there was weak or no evidence which suggested that strengthening the patent regime led to an increase in innovation. Similarly, it was observed by Jaffe that "despite the significance of policy changes and the wide availability of detailed data relating to patenting, robust conclusions regarding the empirical consequences for technological innovations of changes in patent policy are few. There is widespread unease that the costs of stronger patent protection may exceed the benefits. Both theoretical and, to a lesser extent, empirical research suggest this possibility." ³⁹
In his study of 60 nations over the past 150 years, Josh Lerner concluded that "the impact of patent protection-enhancing on innovation was in fact negative, thereby running counter to assumptions made by economists that incentives affect behavior and that stronger property rights encourage economic growth.⁴⁰
Even in those studies, where support is found for a positive correlation between patents and innovation, it is made clear that this correlation is not applicable to developing and least-developed countries. This, for instance, is the conclusion of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization's meta-study titled "The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Technology Transfer and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence". ⁴¹
It is crucial that all policy be based on evidence, and not ideology.
Thus, it is submitted that any program that seeks to create awareness about intellectual property must necessarily be one that presents a balanced view, clearly stating all facts and as many diverse opinions as possible; avoiding the current situation where public interest groups and academics are sidelined in favour of rights-holders groups.
CIS submits that the nation-wide program of promotion on the benefits of intellectual property ⁴² must be based on evidence. Crucially, the importance of the public domain, for which a great deal of evidence exists,⁴³ must highlighted in any such also equally promote the importance the role of limitations and exceptions and clearly identify the issues with the intellectual property system, including the fact that it has not been proven that there is a nexus between intellectual property and innovation. The nation wide program should convey the role of different stakeholders, including libraries and archives, organizations working with persons with disabilities and educational institutions and the negative effects of a rights centric intellectual property system on such important institutions.
It is important that public-funded research organizations should be engaged in neutral - non-industry funded -research, and not campaigns (as identified in the policy).⁴⁴ This will help identify the issues of the present intellectual property system as well as the potential for reform, tailored to the Indian context. We have to ensure that campaigns - as with policymaking and pedagogic material - are based on research rather than faith or ideology. It is further submitted that course materials to be created for educational institutions at all levels as well as for online and distance learning programs ⁴⁵ should include a discussion on the drawbacks of a maximalist intellectual property system, a discussion on limitations and exceptions, alternatives to intellectual property, as well as case studies from different parts of the world highlighting the use of intellectual property as well as alternatives in a socio-economic and culture specific environment. Particularly in the case of education institutions as well as online and distance learning mechanisms, which are often faced with great challenges as a result of rights-holders centric intellectual property laws, the irony in promoting a system that only acts to their detriment would be great.

On Objective 2: Creation of IP

The second objective of the Policy seeks to stimulate the creation and growth of intellectual property through measures that encourage IP generation.⁴⁶ This objective seeks to encourage IP generation and creation across various sectors, including the introduction of the system of 'utility models' in India. There are several problems with this objective, primarily that it assumes IP generation is necessarily a means to innovation, whereas it is submitted that the emphasis should be on innovation holistically, including by incentive mechanisms other than IP.

On the IP-Innovation/ Creativity Nexus

It is submitted that similar to the earlier objective relating to the promotion and the creation of awareness about intellectual property, the underlying rationale behind this objective too seems to be the perception that there is a positive correlation between greater amounts of intellectual property and greater innovation, and the belief that intellectual property protection necesarrily promotes innovation. However, there is relatively little research to back this assumption. Illustratively, the following example may be considered. In a study conducted by Heidi L. Williams,⁴⁷ the sequencing of the human genome was used to provide an empirical context to showcase the deterioration in development due to the presence of IP. It was concluded by Williams that the presence of IP rights in the sequencing of the human genome resulted in reductions in subsequent scientific research and product development by up to 20-30%. ⁴⁸ Williams further observed that "if more socially valuable technologies are more likely to be held with IP, then the welfare costs for the same could be substantial." The presence of intellectual property rights, it is argued, stifles subsequent product development by restricting access to the data or technology required for further development. ⁴⁹
Prof. Petra Moser of Stanford has conducted a large volume of research on economic evidence on the linkages between patents and innovation. Her research, which shows that in the 19th century the majority of inventions happened outside the patent system ⁵⁰ indicates that alternative explanations might explain inventions better, including "the importance of a culture of entrepreneurship,⁵¹ experimentation,⁵² the free exchange of knowledge, ⁵³ and science.⁵⁴ In a paper titled, "How do Patent Laws Influence Innovation", she concludes that "I find no evidence that patent laws increased levels of innovative activity but strong evidence that patent systems influenced the distribution of innovative activity across industries."
Prof. Bryan Mercurio, in a paper written for the World Economic Forum and the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, concludes, "The empirical evidence suggests that increasing levels of patent protection have not resulted in increased innovation. Instead, it has limited competition, and increased the cost of business, to the detriment of the world economy. Innovation has also suffered, as increasing protection has inhibited the ability of many firms to innovate." He further recommends that we "conduct further research on the correlation or causal relationship between patents and innovation, including the indirect benefits for innovation that patent protection may provide". Petra Moser notes, "Patent laws that existed in the mid-nineteenth century had been adopted in a relatively ad-hoc manner, dependent more on legal traditions than economic considerations".⁵⁵
The empirical data collected by scholars, as provided above is goes to show that innovation is not necessarily benefitted by stronger patent regimes. Further, even the literature that asserts a positive correlation between the two acknowledge that this doesn't apply to developing countries. In addition, whilepatents may provide revenue to patent owners, it also makes further innovation more costly, thereby discouraging competitors from entering the arena due to high prices, and due to the large number of pre-existing patents. This effect, known as the
The Supreme Court of Canada, has for instance, has on multiple occasions recognized the importance of the public domain. In "2002, Justice Binne, writing for the majority in Théberge v. Galerie d'Art du Petit Champlain inc., stated: 'Excessive control by holders of copyrights and other forms of intellectual property may unduly limit the ability of the public domain to incorporate and embellish creative innovation in the long-term interests of society as a whole (para.32).' Two years later, in CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, Chief Justice McLachlin spoke of the importance that there be 'room for the public domain to flourish as others are able to produce new works by building on the ideas and information contained in the works of others (para. 23).'"⁵⁶
Lastly, there is even evidence that in multiple sectors - including fashion, finance, font design, and software - lesser IP protection in the form of patents, trademarks, and copyright, actual encourages increased innovation.⁵⁷

On Utility Models

On the question of introduction of a new on utility models⁵⁸ CIS observes that DIPP has previously considered developing a framework for granting Utility Models for 'innovations' and invited suggestions on a discussion paper on the subject.⁵⁹ Reports ⁶⁰ suggest that Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises are in favour of the Utility Model Protection system in India because developing countries such as China and Korea have demonstrated a corresponding economic growth attributable to the introduction of the system. However, there is no evidentiary data to support this hypothesis. Studies suggest that there exist only correlations and not causal links between heightened innovative activity and implementation of utility model protection. ⁶¹ Empirical evidence on the role of intellectual property protection in promoting innovation and growth in general remains limited and inconclusive.⁶² Reports also suggest that in China, the abundance of Utility Model has led to lowering of quality of innovation. ⁶³ In Australia, an "innovation patent" - the Australian version of utility model protection - was awarded for a "circular transportation facilitation device", i.e., a wheel. ⁶⁴
It is this submitted that whether the ushering of a 2nd tier of protection model for lower and incremental innovations would have a positive impact on innovation in India is extremely debatable. There have been several criticisms of utility models, inter alia, explosion in litigation of poor quality patents and legal uncertainty - which impact small business the maximum in terms of costs ⁶⁵; the system may be more utilised by foreign companies rather than local firms, in which case there is a possibility that this will lead to an increase in a flow of royalties and licensing fees to overseas producers. Utility model rights can be, and have been, used by companies to cordon off entire areas of research. ⁶⁶
CIS submits that as the policy 'intends to harness the full benefits of creation and innovation in the larger interest of society and citizens' ⁶⁷ the introduction of a law on utility models would be antithetical to this objective.

On Improving IP Output of National Research Laboratories, Universities et al

The Policy seeks to improve the output of national research laboratories, universities and technical institutions, among others.⁶⁸ It is submitted that these institutions are public funded institutions, ⁶⁹ and in effect, this recommendation of the Policy seeks to therefore promote intellectual property creation in public funded institutions.
A significant chunk of research and development occurs at public funded academic and research institutions and, excessive use of IPR as a tool to creating private ownership rights over inventions may preclude use of such innovation by the public. This may also create a barrier to access the best technologies and research- which were funded by taxpayers' money to begin with. CIS supports the principle that IPRs resulting from of publicly funded research should automatically belong to the funder.⁷⁰
Further, it is submitted that there exists a danger of public funded research institutions re-orienting their objectives focus only on areas of commercial value. This may lead to neglect of certain research areas. A stringent policy will create an unfavourable conflict between revenue generation and sharing of public good. The policy must ensure that it is flexible and compensates the inventors whilst permitting public access to research.
CIS submits that there should be no encumbrances over public funded research and inventions. The Policy must also ensure that such proposed IP creation does not prevent or interfere with dissemination of public funded research. ⁷¹
CIS strongly supports the recent steps by government agencies (including the Department of Science and Technology and the Department of Biotechnology⁷² as well as other institutions including the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research⁷³, Indian Council of Agricultural Research⁷⁴ and Institute of Mathematical Sciences ⁷⁵) in making scholarly research openly accessible. The benefits of implementing an open access policy with regard to scientific and scholarly works are manifold. Providing open access to scholarly research will ensure percolation of cutting edge research into the society.
It is thus submitted that the Policy should adopt a more nuanced, cautious and balanced take on the creation of intellectual property, particularly taking into consideration India's economic status as an emerging economy and our international position. The Policy must recognise that there is no inherent societal merit in the mere creation of intellectual property and that innovation flourishes even in the absence of intellectual property protections.

On Objective 3: Legal and Legislative Framework

According to the Policy, the objective sought to be achieved is the creation of strong and effective laws on intellectual property, consistent with national priorities as well as our international obligations, balancing the interest of the rights holders with public interest. ⁷⁶
CIS fully supports the view that the legislative framework on intellectual property must balance the rights of all stakeholders and be in public interest. CIS is also appreciates the importance of national priorities in the framing of India's legislative framework. CIS also notes with appreciation that the discussion in the Policy reiterates that India's laws are in compliance with the TRIPS Agreement ⁷⁷ as well as the stance that India will continue to utilize the flexibilities available in international treaties as well as the TRIPS Agreement⁷⁸ while creating its legal framework.
CIS also supports the acknowledgement of the fact that India's laws need to be updated periodically, depending on various factors.⁷⁹ CIS fully supports the process proposed for amendments to the law, including,inter alia, the conduction of objective and analytical studies and inputs from various stakeholders. ⁸⁰ It is submitted however, that equal weightage must be given to the inputs from all stakeholders and measures must be taken to ensure that the interests and demands of rights-holders do not outweigh the interests and demands of other stakeholders, particularly those at the other end of the spectrum, who greatly rely on the existence and guarantee of flexibilities, limitations and exceptions to intellectual property.

On Utility Models and Intellectual Property in Public Funded Research

The Policy envisages significant changes to India's intellectual property system, including the creation of a law for the protection of utility models as well as introduction of intellectual property in public funded research.
CIS recommends that it would not be advisable to introduce intellectual property in public funded research as well as cautions against the introduction of a law on utility patents. A detailed submission on these issues has been made earlier in this document, in Section 3.4.3. at page 7 for intellectual property in public funded research as well as in Section 3.4.2. at page 6 on utility models.

On the Negotiation of International Treaties and Agreements

CIS commends the recommendation of the Policy that the negotiation of international treaties and agreements will be in consultation with various stakeholders. However, CIS cautions against entering into bilateral or plurilateral international agreements which increase India's IPR obligations beyond our current obligations under multilateral agreements. It was only in 2006 that
It is submitted that FTAs often levy standards which are beyond those found in the TRIPS Agreement, and have thus been criticized. ⁸¹ A central aspect of this criticism is that TRIPS-plus-FTAs reduce policy space for the implementation of TRIPS flexibilities. This also creates the impression that TRIPS only imposes a "minimum level" of protection, which must be available in all national laws of its Member States, without any apparent limitation to a further extension of such protection or intervention which one country may impose on another. The World Health Organization enunciated that "bilateral trade agreements should not seek to incorporate TRIPS-plus protection in ways that may reduce access to medicines in developing countries.⁸² Further, WHO members were urged in the Fifty-Seventh World Health Assembly "to take into account in bilateral trade agreements the flexibilities contained in the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and recognized by the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health adopted by the WTO Ministerial Conference."⁸³
Furthermore, TRIPS-plus initiatives consequent in the dilution into a bilateral forum, as opposed to the plurality provided in multilateral fora, provided by the TRIPS. The imposition of standards by FTAs may ultimately disturb the balance of rights and obligations which are enshrined in the TRIPS Agreement,⁸⁴ and also have the potential to constrain the flexibilities provided to Member States in the TRIPS, particularly in areas which are of extreme significance to developing countries, such as transfer of technology, socio-economic development, promotion of innovation, public health and access to knowledge. Furthermore, they also tend to negate decisions which were taken multilaterally such as the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.
It is therefore submitted that the Policy must caution against entering into any international agreement that seeks to enforce TRIPS-plus standards, contrary to India's stance (as noted by the Policy itself) that its laws were compliant with international obligations.

On Limitations and Exceptions

It is observed that the Policy recommends that laws be enacted to address national needs, ⁸⁵ but the only mentions limitations and exceptions as an area of study for future policy development.⁸⁶It is submitted that while it is indeed necessary for further research to be undertaken in the area of limitations and exceptions, it is also critical to enact new laws and amend existing ones to foster a rich environment for limitations and exceptions, in order to achieve a holistic and balanced intellectual property framework. It is further submitted that this would also be in consonance with the objective of the negotiation of international treaties and agreements in consultation with stakeholders.
While the granting of exclusive rights over intellectual property is considered to be an incentive for further investments into innovative activities and the production of knowledge, allowing the exercise of the full scope of this exclusion in all circumstances may not meet the end goal of the enhancement of public welfare, using the intellectual property system. Therefore, it is essential that an intellectual property system be flexible allowing for certain limitations and exceptions in order to strike a balance between right holders, the public and third parties. The need for such flexibility in the intellectual property system of a country has also been highlighted by the World Intellectual Property Organization.
It is therefore suggested that the Policy include an additional recommendation for the inclusion, adoption and periodic renewal of limitations and exceptions in India's intellectual property laws, either be enacting new legislations or by amending existing legislations wherever applicable. It is further suggested that this recommendation also inform India's negotiations at the international level, where any agreement that India might potentially sign, not invalidate or narrow in any form any limitations and exceptions and provide for their continued exercise in the broadest possible scope and manner.

On Standard Setting

CIS commends the Policy's focus on standards in technology and standard setting organisations. CIS strongly supports the adoption of open standards as a measure that helps stimulate active competition amongst implementors of various standards, and thereby encourages innovation. The Department of IT finalized its Policy on Open Standards for e-Governance in 2010,⁸⁷ and CIS strongly supports this policy, and would encourage it be adopted by all state governments as well.
CIS strongly recommends developing and supporting the evolution of open standards. The Policy must not encourage use of IPR to limit access to standards, because these are the foundational rules any technology must adhere to enter the market or ensure quality. ⁸⁸ CIS submits that access to these standards must not be limited by making them proprietary through IPR protection. Further, the Policy must support transparent standard setting processes and procedures in national and at international for a for all participants.
CIS further appreciates the endeavor to encourage the development of global standards influenced by technologies developed in India.
CIS submits that it is also important to ensure that India emerges as a global player in the technology sector, not just in the development of indigenous standards, but also in the equally important space of manufacturing using existing standards, particularly in light of the Government's recent "Make In India" and "Digital India" initiatives. It is further submitted however, that in most instances, these standards are protected by patents; where patents essential to a standard would be standard essential patents. CIS suggests that the Policy recommend measures that might be adopted to ensure access to standards essential patents, including, for instance, the establishment of a government aided patent pool. It is submitted that addressing the question of access to standards and not just their development would be a holistic approach that the Policy should adopt.

On Objective 5: Commercialization of IP

CIS appreciates that the Policy seeks to promote licensing and technology transfer for intellectual property, and notes that the Policy also seeks to promote reasonable and non-discriminatory patent pooling to maximise the ability of smaller companies to commercialise IP and bring innovative solutions based on standards to the market.
CIS believes that the government establishing patent pools for digital technologies will promote access to knowledge and stimulate manufacturing in the information technology and electronics sectors in India, in line with the government's "Make In India" and "Digital India" initiatives. CIS has earlier urged the government to enable access to low cost access devices by establishing a government-aided patent pool of essential technologies, without which there is a high likelihood of such devices getting caught up in the 'patent wars' that have happened elsewhere around the world over smartphones.⁸⁹ CIS submits that the creation of government-aided patent pools and facilitation of cross-licensing will also be helpful in resolving issues created by patent thickets and gridlocks by reducing transaction costs for licensees and solving an economic cooperation problem.

Concluding Remarks

Debabrata Saha, the Deputy Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations, while speaking on the introduction of the Development Agenda at the World Intellectual Property Organization, with admirable clarity noted, "Let me start on a positive note by asking: with all the damage that TRIPS has wrought on developing countries could it possibly have a silver lining? Maybe - if we want to be generous. TRIPS, one might argue, did bring intellectual property to the forefront of consciousness of people everywhere, and, over time made them aware of the dangers inherent in a protective regime that takes little account of either public policy, or the state of development of a member country." It is thus imperative that when we fashion our public policy, we take account of the dangers he mentioned. He went on to note, "Intellectual property rights have to be viewed not as a self contained and distinct domain, but rather as an effective policy instrument for wide ranging socio-economic and technological development. The primary objective of this instrument is to maximize public welfare." We wholeheartedly support this position of the Indian government, and would encourage the IPR Think Tank to seek to maximize public welfare and creativity and innovation rather than maximizing IPR alone. Importantly, as Mr. Saha, speaking on behalf of the Indian government noted, IP is not an end in itself, contrary to what the current draft of the National IPR Policy seems to promote.
Flexibility is considered to be an essential characteristic in defining and shaping the intellectual property system of countries around the world. Such flexibility allows scope for further innovations and creations, thereby subserving the common good. As per Article 39 of the Constitution of India, "the State shall in particular, direct its policy towards securing that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good." It is therefore submitted that the National IPR Policy of India should be contoured in such a manner that it encourages greater use of exceptions and limitations to the otherwise exclusionary use of intellectual property, encourages the expansion of the public domain, secures proportionality in enforcement of IP rights, promotes alternatives to IP - including open access to scholarly literature, open educational resources, free/open source software, open standards, open data, and aims to create a regime of intellectual property that aims to serve the public interest and not just the narrow interest of private right holders. Such an approach should not be merely rights-based, but look at interests of the general public, especially the poor, as well, in order to further the aim of the nation to create a more egalitarian society, and adopt the Directive Principles in the Constitution.

1 www.cis-india.org (last accessed 30 November, 2014).

2 http://www.dipp.nic.in/English/acts_rules/Press_Release/pressRelease_IPR_Policy_30December2014.pdf.

3 See http://cis-india.org/ (last accessed 18 January, 2015).

4 See http://cis-india.org/a2k (last accessed 18 January, 2015).

5 See http://cis-india.org/openness (last accessed 18 January, 2015).

6 See http://cis-india.org/internet-governance (last accessed 18 January, 2015).

7 See http://cis-india.org/accessibility (last accessed 18 January, 2015).

8 See http://cis-india.org/digital-natives (last accessed 18 January, 2015).

9 See http://cis-india.org/raw (last accessed 18 January, 2015).

10 See http://www.wipo.int/members/en/admission/observers.html (last accessed 18 January, 2015).

11 See http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/ngo-profile-knowledge-ecology-international (last accessed 18 January, 2015); http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/ngo-profile-third-world-network (last accessed 18 January, 2015).

12 See illustratively http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/analysis-copyright-expansion-india-eu-fta (last accessed 18 January, 2015); http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/india-eu-fta-copyright-issues (last accessed 18 January, 2015); http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/a-guide-to-the-proposed-india-european-union-free-trade-agreement (last accessed 18 January, 2015).

13 See illustratively http://cis-india.org/news/inet-bangkok-june-8-2013-governance-in-the-age-of-internet-and-fta (last accessed 18 January, 2015).

14 See illustratively http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/2010-special-301 (last accessed 18 January, 2015).

15 See illustratively http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/analysis-copyright-amendment-bill-2012 (last accessed 18 January, 2015); http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/sc-report-on-amendments (last accessed 18 January, 2015); http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/copyright-bill-parliament (last accessed 18 January, 2015); http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/tpm-copyright-amendment (last accessed 16 January, 2015); http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/copyright-privacy (last accessed 16 January, 2015); http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/copyright-bill-analysis (last accessed 18 January, 2015).

16 See http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/comments-on-science-technology-and-innovation-policy-draft (last accessed 18 January, 2015).

17 See http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/exhaustion (last accessed 18 January, 2015); http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/parallel-importation-of-books (last accessed 18 January, 2015).

18 See http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/cis-submission-draft-patent-manual-2010 (last accessed 18 January, 2015) and http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/comments-on-draft-guidelines-for-computer-related-inventions (last accessed 18 January, 2015) respectively.

19 See http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/lid-on-royalty-outflows (last accessed 18 January, 2015).

20 See http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/exceptions-and-limitations (last accessed 18 January, 2015).

21 See illustratively http://cis-india.org/a2k/consumers-international-ip-watchlist-report-2012 (last accessed 18 January, 2015); http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/ip-watch-list-2011 (last accessed 18 January, 2015); http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/consumers-international-ip-watch-list-2009 (last accessed 18 January, 2015).

22 The Washington Declaration on Intellectual Property and Public Interest concluded after the Global Congress on Intellectual property and Public Interest in August 2011 attended by over 180 experts from 32 countries articulate this position perfectly. Available at: http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Washington-Declaration.pdf (Last Accessed: 29 November, 2014).

23 IPR Think Tank, National IPR Policy (First Draft) at page 5.

24 Article 27(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: "Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits."

25 Julia Brüggemann, Paolo Crosetto et al, Intellectual Property Rights Hinder Sequential Innovation - Experimental Evidence, Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research, Number 227, January 2015.

26 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights, Duke Law Journal, 57(6): 1693-1724.

27 Graham M. Dutfield, Uma Suthersanen, The Innovation Dilemma: Intellectual Property and the Historical Legacy of Cumulative Creativity, Intellectual Property Quarterly, 2004 at 379.

28 IPR Think Tank, National IPR Policy (First Draft) at page 5.

29 IPR Think Tank, National IPR Policy (First Draft) at page 5.

30 IPR Think Tank, National IPR Policy (First Draft) at page 6.

31 Id .

32 Id .

33 Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 27, No.1 - Winter 2013, 3-22.

34 Id .

35 Id .

36 Id .

37 James Bessen and Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats and Lawyers Put Innovation at Risk, March 2008.

38 Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine Supra Note 32.

39 B.J. Jaffe, The US Patent System in Transition: Innovation and the Innovation Process, Research Policy, 29, 531-557, 2000.

40 Josh Lerner, The Empirical Impact of Intellectual Property Rights on Innovation: Puzzles and Clues, Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Growth in the Long-Run: A Discover Model (2009).

41 Rod Falvey & Neil Foster, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Technology Transfer and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence (UNIDO Working Paper,

42 ¶ 1.2 IPR Think Tank, National IPR Policy (First Draft) at page 6.

43 See

44 ¶ 1.3 IPR Think Tank, National IPR Policy (First Draft) at page 7.

45 ¶ 1.5 IPR Think Tank, National IPR Policy (First Draft) at page 8.

46 IPR Think Tank, National IPR Policy (First Draft) at page 8.

47 Heidi L. Williams, Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation: Evidence from the Human Genome, National Bureau of Economic Research. Working Paper 16213, July 2010.

48 Id .

49 Id .

50 Petra Moser, Innovations and Patents in Oxford Handbook of Economic History (Cain et al., eds., forthcoming), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2503503.

51 See generally , David. S. Landes, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present (1969).

52 See generally , Joel Mokyr. The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress (1990).

53 See generally , Alessandro Nuvolari Collective Invention during the British Industrial Revolution: the Case of the Cornish Pumping Engine, 28 Cambridge J. Econ. 347 (2004). See also, Robert C. Allen, Collective Invention, 4 J. Econ. Behavior & Org. 1 (1983).

54 A. Arora & N. Rosenberg, Chemicals: A US Success Story in Chemicals and Long-Term Economic Growth 71 (Arora et al., eds., 1998); see also, David C. Mowery & Nathan Rosenberg, Paths of Innovation. Technological Change in 20th-century America (1998).

55 Petra Moser, How Do Patent Laws Influence Innovation? Evidence from Nineteenth-Century World Fairs, NBER Working Paper Series 9909, http://www.nber.org/papers/w9909.

56 Meera Nair, A Short-Lived Celebration, Fair Duty (Jan. 8, 2012), https://fairduty.wordpress.com/2012/01/08/a-short-lived-celebration/

57 See generally, Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Knockoff Economy (2012).

58 ¶ 2.10 IPR Think Tank, National IPR Policy (First Draft) at page 10.

59 See FICCI Suggestions on Discussion Paper on Utility Model available at http://www.ficci.com/Sedocument/20179/UM.pdf (last accessed January 28, 2015).

60 See FICCI Suggestions on Discussion Paper on Utility Model available at http://www.ficci.com/Sedocument/20179/UM.pdf (last accessed January 28, 2015).

61 See Utility Model: A Tool for Economic and Technological Development: A Case Study of Japan available at http://www.ipindia.nic.in/research_studies/finalreport_april2007.pdf (last accessed January 28, 2015).

62 U. Suthersanen, Utility Models and Innovation in Developing Countries, International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), Issue Paper No. 13 (2006), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteipc20066_en.pdf , (last accessed January 28, 2015).

63 See China's great leap forward in patents , available at http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/04/04/chinas-great-leap-forward-in-patents/id=38625/ (last accessed January 28, 2015).

64 Will Knight, Wheel Patented in Australia, New Scientist (July 3, 2001), http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn965-wheel-patented-in-australia.html .

65 Keith E. Maskus, Beyond the Treaties: A Symposium on Compliance with International Intellectual Property Law, February 6, 2000.

66 U. Suthersanen, Utility Models and Innovation in Developing Countries, International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), Issue Paper No. 13 (2006), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteipc20066_en.pdf , (last accessed January 28, 2015).

67 IPR Think Tank, National IPR Policy (First Draft) at page 1.

68 ¶ 2.3 IPR Think Tank, National IPR Policy (First Draft) at page 10.

69 See http://mhrd.gov.in/technical-education-1 (last accessed 30 January, 2015).

70 See 'Expert Group Report on Role and Strategic Use of IPR (Intellectual Property Rights) in International Research Collaborations' by European Commission 'available at http://ec.europa.eu/research/era/pdf/ipr-eur-20230_en.pdf (last accessed January 28, 2015).

71 See 'Ministry of Science makes Open Access to Research Mandatory ', available at http://cis-india.org/news/down-to-earth-july-16-2014-aparajita-singh-ministry-of-science-makes-open-access-to-research-mandatory (last accessed January 28, 2015).

72 DBT and DST Open Access Policy - Policy on Open Access to DBT and DST Funded Research, Department of Biotechnology and Department of Science and Technology, Ministry of Science and Technology, Government of India.

73 Id.

74 Id.

75 Id.

76 IPR Think Tank, National IPR Policy (First Draft) at page 11.

77 Id .

78 IPR Think Tank, National IPR Policy (First Draft) at pages 10, 11.

79 IPR Think Tank, National IPR Policy (First Draft) at page 12.

80 Id .

81 The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health and the Contradictory Trend in Bilateral and Regional Free Trade Agreements (2004), Available at http://www.quno.org/geneva/pdf/ec onomic/Occasional/TRIPS-Public-Health-FTAs.pdf.

82 World Health Organization, Report of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health, Recommendation 4.26 (2006), available at http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/ documents/thereport/CIPIHReport23032006.pdf [hereinafter WHO].

83 Fifty-Seventh World Health Assembly, May17-22,2004, (May 22, 2004), available at http:// apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA57/A57_R14-en.pdf;

84 Preamble, Articles 7, 8, TRIPS Agreement, 1994.

85 ¶ 3.2 IPR Think Tank, National IPR Policy (First Draft) at page 12.

86 ¶ 3.6 IPR Think Tank, National IPR Policy (First Draft) at page 13.

87 See 'Open Standards Policy' , available at http://cis-india.org/news/open-standards-policy (last accessed January 28, 2015).

88 See 'The BIS, Standards and Copyright' , available at http://spicyip.com/2014/11/the-bis-standards-and-copyright.html (last accessed January 28, 2015).

89 See CIS' Letter for Establishment of Patent Pool for Low-cost Access Devices through Compulsory Licenses , available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/letter-for-establishment-of-patent-pool-for-low-cost-access-devices (last accessed January 29, 2015).

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/national-ipr-policy-series-cis-comments-to-the-first-draft-of-the-national-ip-policy