Centre for Internet and Society

Pervasive Technologies: Working Document Series – Updated Research Methodology – Applying the Actor Network Theory to Competition Law and Standard Essential Patent Litigation in India

nehaa — 2015-10-04T04:20:13Z

This document lays out the updated research methodology for the paper on competition law issues around standard essential patent litigation in India.

Read the earlier posts:

Pervasive Technologies Project Working Document Series: Document 1 - Research Methodology for a Paper on Competition Law + IPR + Access to < $100 Mobile Devices
Pervasive Technologies: Working Document Series - Research Questions and a Literature Review on the Actor-Network Theory

In New Delhi, as in Fascist Milan or Nazi Berlin, the individual is lost; the scale is not human but super human; not national, but super-national: it is, in a word, Imperial.[1]

Twenty plus years later, written after he was awe-struck by the grandeur of the Rashtrapati Bhawan in New Delhi, Dalrymple’s delightful choice of words on the similarities between Lutyen’s Delhi and Speer’s Nuremberg[2] rather aptly describe today’s globalized narrative of intellectual property (“IP”) rights determination and ownership. The process of determination of standards applied in mobile devices, claims of IP ownership in these standards and the subsequent enforcement (globally) of these IP claims are all instances of this narrative.

The increasingly global nature of both – innovation and intellectual property has been well documented by researchers over the years and needs no further exploration in this article. This article will seek to examine how this narrative influences (either overtly or covertly) the application of competition law to the regulation of standard essential patents (SEPs) in India. More specifically, this article seeks to study the role of various human and non-human actors involved were competition law to be considered as a potential solution to the matter of SEP litigation in India.

This article examines four research questions. First, how does the globalized narrative of intellectual property influence the determination of standards around mobile devices, their IP protection, licensing and enforcement? Second, what are the important competition law issues in SEP litigation in the United States of America (“USA”) and the European Union (“EU”), and how have regulators (the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the European Commission (“EC”) respectively) and courts in these jurisdictions addressed these issues? Third, what are the critical issues in SEP litigation and competition law in India and how do they compare with similar questions in other jurisdictions? Fourth, could solutions and methodology from the FTC and the EC be applied to SEP competition law matters in India?

In this effort, this article will employ Bruno Latour’s Actor-Network Theory[3] (“ANT”) as the primary research methodology, supplemented where needed by others including comparative research and case studies. A detailed approach into discussing the (above) research questions has been discussed below.

Question one - how does the globalized narrative of intellectual property influence the determination of standards around mobile devices, their IP protection, licensing and enforcement?

This question primarily seeks to explain the determination SEPs on standards through International Standard Setting Organizations (“SSOs”) and the subsequent obligation on members of the SSOs to licence these SEPs on a Fair, Reasonable and Non Discriminatory (“FRAND”) basis.

Applying the ANT, this question will identify both human and non-human actors and that play a role internationally, in the determination of SEPs and their licensing. Illustratively, these actors include the SSOs, multinational corporations that are members of the SSOs, the FRAND licences and the contracts/terms of reference between the SSOs and their member corporations. In order to address this question, the author will refer to academic writing and other literature explaining the role of various actors and the international nature of the standard setting process. Networks that these actors share with each other and the possible influences to the determination of international standards will be studied. This question will explore the international IP environment, and the power of various actors that have an influence on IP norm setting, and attempt to locate the power of these various actors in their network setting.

Question two - what are the important competition law issues in SEP litigation in the USA and the EU, and how have regulators (the FTC and the EC respectively) and courts in these jurisdictions addressed these issues?

This question will study the competition law issues arising from the international determination of standards and the cross-border assertion and enforcement of intellectual property rights discussed in the previous question. This question will also study how (first, whether) courts and regulators have attempted to address some of the competition law issues.

Also applying the ANT, this question will identify various actors involved in competition law litigation around SEPs before the FTC, EC and the courts in the USA and the EU. Illustratively, these include the parties to the litigation, the regulator (whether the FTC or the EC), the court and the legal principles employed. Further applying the ANT, this question will also study how the various actors relate to one another, as a result of their connections within this network, i.e., the litigation, and other connections in other networks (for instance, the position of the parties in certain markets).

Under this research question, select a case study method will be employed to select cases from each jurisdiction. The most important cases pertaining to competition law questions will be studied. These are yet to be identified.

Question three - what are the critical issues in SEP litigation and competition law in India and how do they compare with similar questions in other jurisdictions?

This research question will seek to map the global context around SEP litigation (discussed above) to specific cases in India. In doing so, the author will study the two SEP disputes in India with competition law implications – the Ericsson and Micromax dispute and the Ericsson and Intex dispute; based on information available in the public domain. While there are other pending disputes around SEPs in India, they do not involve the Competition Commission of India (India’s market regulator), and hence are outside the scope of this article. Through a study of these cases, questions of competition law will be identified. Such questions may be either those as a result of the direct application of the Competition Act, 2000 or certain actions taken by the courts with competition law implications (for instance, granting ex-parte interim injunctions).

Having identified competition law issues in SEP litigation in India, the author will then employ the comparative research methodology to trace similar issues in international SEP litigation, discussed under the previous research question. What the author is most interested in locating is the position of the actors in domestic as well as international SEP litigation. Specifically, it is submitted that characters in the domestic litigation also trace back to the context of global IP norm setting; some of them more directly than others. For instance, multinational corporations are directly involved in IP norm setting and are a party to domestic disputes. Further, domestic regulators may seek to draw inferences or apply commonly understood international legal principles, thus invoking more international actors. This phase will attempt to distill the uniqueness of India in the narrative of global IP ownership around SEP litigation.

Question four- what are the challenges for competition regulation of SEPs in India; do principles and methodology from the FTC/ EU and courts present solutions to these challenges?

In this question, the author deliberates the challenge of competition regulation for SEPs in India and whether the approach of international regulators and courts could serve as a roadmap to address these issues.

In answering this question, the author will trace India’s specific location in global competition. The tensions between differently situated actors and the networks that they form will be examined. Some comparisons will be made to illustrate how the relationship of international jurisdictions (mainly the USA and the EU) with international multinational corporations that are a party to litigation differs from that of India. Legal traditions and institutions in India will be used to understand what legal possibilities are available for using competition regulation to regulate SEPs. This includes specifically the levers in competition law such as abuse of dominance as well as the nature of the competition regulator and the role that it identifies for itself. One might also consider the relative ‘youth’ of the competition regulator as a factor in laying down legal principles, the constraints it imposes on itself as well as a tension between the market regulator and the courts. This phase will also attempt to make a case for IP regulation within India’s existing culture of engaging with the public interest in intellectual property regulation.

Having examined global IP norm setting in SEPs, international and domestic issues around SEP litigation and the network of actors involved in these proceedings, in concluding this article, the author seeks to illustrate how actors and networks in the SEP-competition set-up derive power from each other; and how the location of an actor within a network is likely to influence law and regulation. Tracing this location will then in turn be useful in determining what solutions would best address the matter of competition regulation for SEPs in India.

[1]William Dalrymple, The City of Djinns – A Year in Delhi (rep. 2014, Penguin, India) at 83.

[2]Id at 82.

[3]Bruno Latour, Networks, Societies, Spheres: Reflections of an Actor – Network Theorist, International Journal of Communication 5 (2011), 796- 810, http://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/viewArticle/1094 (accessed 31 August, 2015).

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/pervasive-technologies-working-document-series-2013-updated-research-methodology-2013-applying-the-actor-network-theory-to-competition-law-and-standard-essential-patent-litigation-in-india

Pervasive Technologies: Working Document Series - Research Questions and a Literature Review on the Actor-Network Theory

nehaa — 2015-09-05T04:56:03Z

This document is divided into two parts - the first part lays out a series of research questions, potentially seeking to apply actor-network theory as a research methodology. The second part seeks to map literature around the Actor-Network Theory ("ANT") as a research methodology.

Part 1: Research Questions

The aim of this exercise is to delineate the contours of the paper, and provide some insight into the demarcation of the various sections.

The overall context to this paper will be determined by a globalized form of intellectual property ownership, and the various instances in which this narrative finds a place (either overtly or covertly) in the regulation of standard essential patents in India. In our paper, the globalized form of IP ownership is probably most clearly indicated in the standard setting process, where participants are International Standard Setting Organizations determining, in a manner of speaking - the rules of the game - that is - licensing on Fair Reasonable and Non Discriminatory Basis. The other important player to our understanding of global ownership would be multilateral organizations such as Ericsson, involved in many of the disputes before the Delhi High Court and the Competition Commission of India ("CCI"). Perhaps international actors/actants would also be international legal principles as well as international regulators such as the FTC or the ECC themselves. This phase of the paper will also trace India's specific location in global competition. In doing so, not only will the market positions of some of the players be examined, but also some comparisons will be made to illustrate how the relationship of international jurisdictions (mainly the USA and the EU) with international multinational corporations that are a party to litigation differs from that of India. This phase of the chapter will most likely apply the doctrinal method of research, study academic texts as sources as well as study some decisions by international regulators and courts to understand the tools and sites available for regulation as well as the nature of the regulatory process itself.

The second phase of this chapter will seek to map the overall context to specific cases - that is, pending legal processes in India. This includes both, ongoing litigation on patent infringement at the Delhi High Court as well as ongoing disputes before the CCI as well. The characters in this litigation also trace back to the broader context; some of them more directly than others. The multinational corporations are directly involved in both contexts, whereas the domestic regulators may seek to draw inferences or apply commonly understood international legal principles, thus invoking more international actants.

This phase of the chapter will study three key litigations in India - Ericsson and Micromax, Ericsson and Intex, and a third that is yet to be defined. Legal traditions and institutions in India will be used to understand what legal possibilities are available for using competition regulation to regulate SEPs. This includes specifically the levers in competition law such as abuse of dominance as well as the nature of the competition regulator and the role that it identifies for itself. One might also consider the relative 'youth' of the competition regulator as a factor in laying down legal principles, the constraints it imposes on itself as well as a tension between the market regulator and the courts. Perhaps this might also be an actant, in the context of the actor network theory. This phase of the chapter will most likely apply the doctrinal method of research, study academic texts as sources as well as study legal instruments and judicial decisions as sources.

The third phase of this chapter will now ask the question of standard essential patent (SEP) regulation, located within this broader matrix of intellectual property ownership and fluidity of actants. The specific question to be asked will be what is the competition regulation challenge for SEPs in India? This phase will attempt to distill the uniqueness of India in the narrative of global IP ownership around SEP litigation. It will be observed that the nature of the players in international litigation as well as in India is rather different. This phase will also attempt to make a case for IP regulation within India's existing culture of engaging with the public interest in intellectual property regulation.

It is in this phase that one must also examine the usefulness of the actor-network theory as a research methodology to study SEP regulation in India. It must be noted that while SEP regulation so used is used to refer to competition regulation specifically, and not to other levers, such as mechanisms within intellectual property law itself. The focus of this exercise will be competition regulation, with an engagement with other areas of the law and the judicial process only in as much as it informs our understanding of competition regulation of SEPs or impedes it. If one were to apply the actor network theory to this phase of the exercise, one would view courts, parties involved in the litigation, the CCI, international legal principles, international market regulators, international SSOs, competition law as well as issues raised in the litigation as 'actants', both human and non human, who are to be treated on par with each other, with a study of the networks that these actants create, or are a part of.

Part 2: Literature Review on the Actor-Network Theory

The aim of this exercise is to first, understand the ANT as a research methodology; second, to study its components and third, to ascertain its suitability as a research method for exploring the challenge of regulating SEP litigation through completion law mechanisms in India.

What is the Actor-Network Theory?

David Banks, in a 2011 blog post, contextualized in trying to trace a relationship between our offline and online behavior presents an overview of the ANT.[1] Banks describes ANT as an ongoing project that seeks to radically transform how social scientists talk about society's relationship to technology and other non human actors ; and identifies Bruno Latour, John Law and Michael Callon as the major authors in this space. (It is observed that there might have been additions or deletions to this core list of thinkers - not to self for further reading).

In his paper[2] reflecting on the ANT, Bruno Latour refers to himself as a 'fellow traveler' of the various network 'revolutions', and says that in the network, he has found a powerful way of rephrasing basic issues of social theory, epistemology and philosophy. Latour says that in its simplest and deepest sense, the notion of the network is of use whenever action has to be redistributed.[3] In a different paper, Latour argues that the purpose of the ANT is not to provide explanations for the behaviour and reasons of actors, but only to map procedures which enable actors to relate to each other and each others' world building capacity. My discomfort with this reading is trying to locate what these procedures would be in an SEP regulation environment.

Identifying the components of the ANT

Latour presents an actant - or an actor - as something that acts, or to which some sort of activity is assigned by others. [4] There is no special motivation of humans or human actors. "An actant," says Latour, "can literally be anything provided it is granted to be the source of the action."[5] The conception of an actant, Latour further articulates, should be not as fixed entities, but as fluid, circulating objects, whose stability and continuity depends on other actions. [6]

So what is on its agenda? The attribution of human, unhuman, nonhuman, inhuman, characteristics; the distribution of properties among these entities; the connections established between them; the circulation entailed by these attributions, distributions and connections; the transformation of those attributions, distributions and connections, of the many elements that circulates and of the few ways through which they are sent.[7]

Banks[8] identifies actants to be of two types - human and non human, further explaining that 'actors' is typically used to refer to humans. These actants have equal amounts of agency within the actor-network. Banks proceeds to demonstrate this applicability of equal agency with an illustration of getting wi-fi connectivity in Albany. In his narrative [9] (and as he notes later himself), Banks uses the same language (read as according agency to the inanimate) to describe both, the human and non human actants. Says Banks, that the actants are merely nodes that facilitate a larger functioning. It is submitted that the 'larger functioning' being referred to is probably something that would be determined on a case to case basis - depending on what was being studied.

In a 1999 paper On Recalling ANT[10], Latour articulates a problem with the usage of the word 'network' as a result of its usage having changed over time - from using it to refer to a series of transformations incapable of being captured by prevalent social theory at the time, to an unmediated access to every piece of information (to my understanding within the context of the World Wide Web). Latour explains that his new understanding is exactly the opposite of what they meant and that it ought not to be used to mean the transformations they were initially articulating.

Another of Latour's papers is helpful in arriving at an understanding of the 'network', where he argues that it would be fallacious to consider it in a technical sense, as one would a sewage, a train or a telephone network.[11] Unlike a technical network, Latour argues, an actor-network may have no compulsory paths, no nodes and might be quite local in nature. Latour further argues that thinking in terms of a network helps us overcome the tyranny of distance, citing a range of examples including standing one metre away from somebody in a telephone booth and yet being more closely connected to his mother, thousands of miles away, among others[12]. In each of his illustrations, however, Latour articulates closeness or distance in terms of geography or presence in a physical sense, which might not be entirely applicable to the research question we're seeking to study. What might be more useful perhaps, is the articulation of the network where he argues that instead of tracing an individual to the collective or the agency, one could only at the number of connections an element has and gauge the importance of the element in light of these connections . The greater the number of connections, the more important an element and vice versa. [13]

ANT Criticism and Applicability of the ANT to our research question?

Before delving into specifics of the ANT that lend themselves to a critique, I submit a broader reservation with the application of the ANT to studying legal and regulatory processes. From my reading and understanding of the ANT so far, a cornerstone appears to be the exclusion normative ideologies, with a focus on studying processes and networks as is, without formulating a value-judgment on their larger place in the society being studied. In so far as defending this claim, Latour and other supporters of this theory have relied on scientific examples (for instance, the reference to the Colombia Shuttle - NASA and its complex organizational structure)[14] or illustrations from the social sciences or social phenomena. I'm still attempting to locate a paper that utilizes the ANT to study law or regulation. Prima facie, the challenge being posed is to study inherently normative structures and processes with clear power structures.

Banks[15] describes the efficacy of the ANT in describing the processes by which inventions and technological systems come into being, or fail to do so. Perhaps in studying the legal regulation of SEP litigation in India, the efficacy of the ANT would like in describing the processes by which legal regulation and legal systems in India (specifically to regulate SEPs) come into being, or fail to do so. By extension, for our research question, non human actants as identified by Banks[16] would probably be legal institutions and the parties to the litigation themselves. What is unclear at the moment is whether policy and legal instruments or levers themselves would be actors.

Banks, in his article also articulates criticisms[17] to the ANT propounded by Sandra Harding, David Bloor and Sal Restivo, on the grounds of being blind towards other social factors such as race or patriarchy. If one were to extend this to the research question at hand, an argument could be made that the ANT seeks to equate dissimilarly situated institutions. Corollaries to race and patriarchy might be found in the market power of parties (an Ericsson v. a Micromax), or even within regulatory set up itself, where, based on the facts so far, an argument could be made out that different regulators are situated differently, where the Delhi High Court could pass an order restraining another regulator - the Competition Commission of India, from passing its own order.

A reference to the 'agency' critique of the ANT is made by Latour himself, in his 1999 paper. Latour goes on to acknowledges the critiques of the ANT, but says that most have (mistakenly) centered either around the actor or around the network; and that the idea was to never occupy a position in the agency/structure debate.[18] Later in the paper, Latour further clarifies that actants are not to be perceived as playing the role of agency, and network is not to be seen as playing the role of the structure. Instead, says he, they represent two sides of the same phenomenon. Latour further explains that the ANT merely tried to learn from the actors (what was sought to be learnt was difficult to grasp), without attempting to be an explanation of societal pressures (and the reasons for such pressures) on actors. The difficulty in reading this paper for me was that it was rather dense in many respects, with various concepts - including, for instance, the idea of the 'social', which he refers to constantly, not being clearly articulated. Further, what is uncertain to me is how this question of agency will play out if applied to a legal or regulatory context. If, for instance, a legal principle was to be a non human actant, how would this have an agency independent of the human actor (the judge) that would be the one applying the legal principle in the first place? Can we truly exclude the question of agency from the ANT if the very exclusion of agency means a recognition of the existence of agency in the first place? How does one exclude the question of agency in seemingly unequally situated actors with an inherent power dynamic? Is the ANT, then even a useful research methodology? In his 1999 paper, Latour argues that the aim of the ANT is to study actors without the imposition of an a priori definition of their world building capacities.[19] The question now arises for me, is how to divest regulators of their 'world building capacities'.

Explaining the rationale[20] for the ANT (in social science research), Latour articulates a dissatisfaction that social scientists have with both, micro (local sites) and macro levels (more abstract ideas like culture, patriarchy etc.) of research. This dissatisfaction, he argues, results in a back and forth between these sites ad infinitum. The ANT, argues Latour, is a way of tracing these dissatisfactions, not for the purposes of finding a solution, but to follow them elsewhere and explore the very conditions that make these two disappointments possible. Latour further clarifies that one must not understand 'network' in ANT to mean a larger society that would help make sense of local interactions or as an anonymous field of forces. Instead, he says, it refers to summing up various interactions through various devices, inscriptions, forms and formulae into a very local, very practical, very tiny locus. My key takeaway from this articulation was that ANT could be used to study various interactions between various key stakeholders, with a very specific research question. Given that the locus could also be tiny, perhaps if the research question was narrowed further, the key stakeholders, or the 'network' and the 'actants' would reduce as well.

Latour has also argued that the ANT makes no assumptions about how an actor should behave and assumes infinite pliability and absolute freedom of actors. [21] In itself AT is not a theory of action no more than cartography is a theory on the shape of coasts lines and deep sea ridges; it just qualify what the observer should suppose in order for the coast lines to be recorded in their fine fractal patterns. Any shape is possible provided it is obsessively coded as longitude and latitude. Similarly any association is possible provided it is obsessively coded as heterogeneous associations through translations.

there is no difficulty in seeing that AT is not about traced networks by about a network-tracing activity. As I said above there is not a net and an actor laying down the net, but there is an actor whose definition of the world outlines, traces, delineate, limn, describe, shadow forth, inscroll, file, list, record, mark, or tag a trajectory that is called a network. No net exists independently of the very act of tracing it, and no tracing is done by an actor exterior to the net. A network is not a thing but the recorded movement of a thing. The questions AT addresses have now changed. It is not longer whether a net is representation or a thing, a part of society or a part of discourse or a part of nature, but what moves and how this movement is recorded. [22]

A useful articulation of the application of ANT emerges out of Jonathan Murdoch's 1997 paper.[23]He submits that the human gaze is being increasingly considered as an unreliable source of knowledge, being in a constant state of flux. Citing the example of the environment/biosphere to demonstrate the futility of the separations we make between nature and society, Murdoch argues that any solution to the environmental crisis will involve a profound re-thinking of how we link these two domains.[24]Extending this argument to our research question, one might ponder for instance that any solution to the SEP litigation and regulation conundrum will involve a profound re-thinking of how we link the courts and the CCI. What is unclear is what method we will use to arrive at this re-thinking, or what the re-thought out version would look like.

Murdoch does, however, articulate concerns with the 'non dualistic' framework (which the ANT positions itself as) and argues, relying on others before him, that such an adoption could have far reaching consequences; that the very basis of the development of social science is such a binary division. Murdoch argues that the nature-society divide has enabled social scientists to break the hegemony of the natural scientists. Murdoch further submits his reading of Latour, where he states that the power of laboratories arises as a result of their ability to tie together actors that are beyond the lab into networks that are then used to disseminate scientific facts.[25] Murdoch's paper largely focuses on blurring the distance between 'natural' and 'social' actors, and identifies the difficulties in attempting to compare the two. Murdoch questions if natural actors whose identity emerge from nature itself are malleable as social actors, who are by definition, a product of society. What is unclear, however, is how malleable are two dissimilarly situated social actors; and whether 'social actors' is broad enough to encompass all institutions born out of or with a human/societal interaction component. Specifically, for our paper, would courts and the CCI both qualify as social actors? Would legal principles? Would the decision making process by the courts itself? Latour's very example for proposing the ANT was that of pasteurization in France. Murdoch also questions whether it's possible to in fact treat various actants as each other. In order to address another critique of ANT, that where we exclude notions of power, Mudoch says Law's articulation - of focusing on 'victims' instead of 'heroes' might prove to be useful. This has not been discussed in detail, leaving the reader to make their own inferences.

In other words, can ANT, with its seamless webs, forever crisscrossing the human-nonhuman divide, provide a secure platform for critique, for the expression of a profound dissatisfaction with the activities of powerful social actors and the attribution of responsibility to those actors? Can it, in other words, ever do anything more than describe, in a prosaic fashion, the dangerous imbroglios that enmesh us?
Does this emphasis on description necessarily represent "an insuperable obstacle to effective and convincing social criticism

[1] David Banks, A Brief Summary of Actor Network Theory, available at http://thesocietypages.org/cyborgology/2011/12/02/a-brief-summary-of-actor-network-theory/ (last accessed 29 August, 2015).

[2] Bruno Latour - Networks, Societies, Spheres : Reflections of an Actor - Network Theorist, International Journal of Communication 5 (2011), 796- 810, available at http://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/viewArticle/1094 (last accessed 31 August, 2015).

[3] Id at 797.

[4] Bruno Latour - complications paper - at internal page 7.

[5] Id.

[6] Id at internal page 8.

[7] Id at internal page 7.

[8] Id.

[9] Id.

[10] Bruno Latour, On Recalling ANT, available at http://www.bruno-latour.fr/sites/default/files/P-77-RECALLING-ANT-GBpdf.pdf (last accessed 28 August, 2015).

[11] Bruno Latour, On actor-network theory. A few clarifications plus more than a few complications, available at http://www.bruno-latour.fr/sites/default/files/P-67%20ACTOR-NETWORK.pdf (last accessed 30 August, 2015) at internal page 2.

[12] Id at internal page 4

[13] Id at internal page 6.i

[14] Latour, the networks, societies, spheres paper

[15] Id.

[16] Id.

[17] Id.

[18] Latour, recalling the ANT paper.

[19] Recalling ANT paper, page 20

[20] Bruno Latour, On Recalling ANT, available at http://www.bruno-latour.fr/sites/default/files/P-77-RECALLING-ANT-GBpdf.pdf (last accessed 28 August, 2015).

[21] Latour, the complications paper, page 9.

[22] Id at 14.

[23] Jonathan Murdoch, Inhuman/nonhuman/: actor-network theory and the prospects for a nondualistic and symmetrical perspective on nature and society, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 1997, Volume 15, 731-576

[24] Murdoch at page 732.

[25] Murdoch at page 737.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/pervasive-technologies-working-document-series-research-questions-and-a-literature-review-on-actor-network-theory

National IPR Policy Series: What Have the Sectoral Innovation Councils Been Doing on IPR

nehaa — 2015-08-13T01:36:35Z

In this post, Nehaa Chaudhari and Varun Baliga delve into the question of what the mandate of the Sectoral Innovation Councils is, what its activities are, and what vision for IPR development in India has it put forth. An RTI Application has been filed by CIS to attain information on these issues.

Thanks to Amulya.P for her support on this.

The National Innovation Council [“NIC”] was constituted by the Prime Minister’s Office “to create a roadmap for innovation for the ‘Decade of Innovation - 2010-2020’ focussing on five key parameters namely Platform, Inclusion, Eco-system, Drivers and Discourse”.[1] Pursuant to the creation of the NIC, Sectoral Innovation Councils [“SIC”][2] were established in order to promote innovation in particular sectors.

The focus of this post is on the SIC established by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion [“DIPP”] – a 12 member body on Intellectual Property Rights [“IPR”]. What is the mandate of this body? What have been its activities over the few years of its existence? What vision does it have of the development of IPR in India over the course of this critical decade?

In 2012, the body drafted a strategy document that did three things: an overview of the contemporary IP system, stakeholders’ involved in the protection and commercialization of IPRs and recommendations for an IPR Strategy.[3] This ambitious document merits significant work in order for actionable recommendations that will form the basis for a coherent IPR Strategy. The body has the burden to show how its work will be consistent with that of the IPR Think Tank and the National IPR Policy. In light of the circulation of the 2012 first draft of the strategy, Ajay Dua, former Secretary of the DIPP commented that the strategy would help in improving trade and capital flows. CIS has noted the increasingly trade-oriented approach to IPR in a previous comment on the US 301 Report.[4] However, the work and action that the SIC has taken does not reflect any of these ambitious documents or statements. In limbo for the past three years, we know very little about its functioning.

First, we know the Terms of Reference of the SIC.[5] The SIC has the mandate to formulate the National IPR Strategy to “address key concerns of sustainable development, inclusive growth and food security”. Further, formulation of medium term policy objectives that would provide the proper context to the strategy itself. Significantly, the SIC is required by the Terms of Reference to submit a roadmap within six months of its establishment.

The IPR Think Tank constituted by the DIPP also has a similar mandate, in so far as the Terms of Reference for the IPR Think Tank includes tasks such as drafting the National IPR Policy, identifying areas in IPRs that require further studying, creating views on the implications of demands by various negotiating partners, keeping the government informed about developments in IPR law, advising the government on best practices to be followed in different government offices that work with IPRs, advising the Ministry on solutions to any anomalies in IPR legislation, examining issues raised by industry associations and those that may have appeared in the media and providing suggestions to the Ministry on the IPR issues of the day.[6]

This raises questions of whether the SIC is required at all and what if any purpose it serves that is not already covered by the National IPR Think Tank.

Second, we know the minutes of the meeting of the SIC on IPRs dated 30 April 2013.[7] No further information of any other meetings, if any, is provided by the DIPP or the NIC. The minutes are an insightful window into the functioning of this body. Of the 12 members of the SIC, only 6 were present at the meeting. Of these 6 individuals, 2 – Mr. Sushil Kumar Jain and Professor Surendra Prasad – were not present in person but sent representatives instead. This was noted in a slightly disapproving tone by the body: “It was agreed that in future since members have been nominated by name, they may not send representatives and may instead provide their valuable views in the meeting”. We do not know whether future meetings, if any, witnessed better attendance.

In conclusion, the dormant nature of the SIC can only be probed further using the tools of the Right to Information Act [“RTI”]. What, however, is the harm of an institution like the SIC that is doing nothing. At a pragmatic level, it is a drain on public resources and time. More egregiously, on a principled level, such bodies serve to only legitimize contemporary trends in IP discourse. We have explored some of these trends in past blog posts.[8] Whether it is its trade-oriented nature or the undue emphasis on rights-holders, bodies like the SIC serve to entrench the alienation of the raison d’etre, the founding principles, of IP – innovation and creativity for all.

Annex I – RTI filed by CIS with the DIPP seeking information on the functioning of the NIC

26 June 2015

To,

Central Public Information Officer,
IPR I, II, III, IV, V and VI Sections,
Room No. 260,
Udyog Bhawan, New Delhi.

Subject: Request for Information under Section 6 of the Right to Information Act, 2005 regarding Functioning of the Sectoral Innovation Council on Intellectual Property Rights under the National Innovation Council

Dear Sir/Ma’am,

Full Name of the Applicant: Nehaa Chaudhari
Address of the Applicant: Centre for Internet and Society, G-15 Top Floor, Hauz Khas, New Delhi - 110016. Mailing Address: nehaa@cis-india.org
Information Required: Context

Please consider this an application for information under Section 6 of the Right to Information Act, 2005.

Therefore, I seek information on the following:

a) How many meetings has the Sectoral Innovation Council [“SIC”] of the DIPP on Intellectual Property Rights [“IPR”] held since its establishment?

b) Please supply minutes and all related documents of all its meetings?

c) How much are members of the SIC paid? Are members paid on the basis of time or number of meetings held?

d) Has the SIC done any work or produced any outputs other than the 2012 draft of the National IPR Strategy?

This is to certify that I, Nehaa Chaudhari, am a citizen of India.

A fee of Rs. 10/- (Rupees Ten Only) has been made out in the form of a demand draft drawn in favour of “Public Information Officer, ..................................................”

Please provide me this information in electronic form, via the email address provided above.

[1] http://innovationcouncilarchive.nic.in/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=74&Itemid=47

[2] http://innovationcouncilarchive.nic.in/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=25&Itemid=18

[3] http://dipp.nic.in/english/Discuss_paper/draftNational_IPR_Strategy_26Sep2012.pdf

[4] http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/us-301-report-a-myopic-view-of-ip-rights

[5] http://innovationcouncilarchive.nic.in/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=74&Itemid=47

[6] http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=110790

[7]http://innovationcouncilarchive.nic.in/images/stories/sectoral/minutes/IPRs%20-%20Minutes%20of%20the%20meeting%20-%2020April2013.pdf

[8] http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/us-301-report-a-myopic-view-of-ip-rights

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/national-ipr-policy-series-what-have-sectoral-innovation-councils-been-doing-on-ipr

Statement by the Centre for Internet and Society on the Broadcast Treaty at SCCR 30

nehaa — 2015-07-02T01:20:38Z

The 30th Session of the World Intellectual Property Organization's ("WIPO") Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights ("SCCR") is underway in Geneva from 29 June, 2015 to 03 July, 2015. While CIS was unable to attend this meeting, we have the following statement to make on negotiations on the Proposed Treaty for Broadcasting Organizations.

This statement was prepared on behalf of CIS by Nehaa Chaudhari. Many thanks to Pranesh Prakash and Amulya Purushothama for their inputs.

Mister Chair,

Our intervention will speak to the presentations made by broadcasting organizations on Day 1 and Member and Group Statements on Days 1 and 2.

First, Mr. Chair, generally on technical panels- If this is the manner in which this Committee will be appraised of new developments, without prejudice to our reservations about this ad-hoc manner itself, we strongly suggest that other interest groups and stakeholders be provided a similar opportunity to present their side of the story, in front of this Committee, for one entire day. Industry representatives, including those from telecommunications, information technology, consumers electronics, and performers- and not just various public interest NGOs have been expressing reservations and concerns about this Treaty from at least as far back as 2006, if not earlier. We appreciate Group B’s ask in their introductory statement to “continue to hear the voices of the real world” – We only ask that you award all stakeholders an equivalent, if not equal opportunity to be heard in the manner that you have the broadcasters; without privileging the interests of the broadcasters above the others. There must be a recognition of the rights of other stakeholders including content owners- not just in the Treaty as noted by India yesterday, but also in the discussions leading up to it.

Second, Mr. Chair, on Technical Background Paper document SCCR 7/8 – which you had flagged off as relevant for this session in your summary of SCCR 29 – but, of course, I stand to be corrected if I have understood incorrectly. Mr. Chair, this document is more than a decade old – it seems to have seen no updates since 2002, and even in that form, it is wanting. The document excludes from its scope the rationale for the treaty as well as the scope for protection, which we find problematic, especially given as these have been among the most contentious topics in this Committee. Additionally in only dealing primarily with the Rome Convention with but a passing reference to other international instruments, if at all, it presents an incomplete overview of the legal framework already available to broadcasters. I also have other comments to this document, which I will send in writing. We’d strongly urge that an updated version of this document be presented to this Committee so that we can have a more accurate discussion, just like the one on market and technology trends has been updated as SCCR 30/5.

Third, Mr. Chair, on the presentations and statements themselves. A reason oft cited in this Committee, Mr. Chair, has been the need to protect the underlying investment and the purported loss of revenue. From their presentations on Day 1 Mr. Chair, it seems to us that the broadcasters are doing perfectly alright without a Broadcast Treaty. Mr. Knapp for IHS in fact said that “Despite digitization, TV homes, paid TV homes are growing globally”, stating also, that there was a very high average revenue per user in North America and a “double digit growth in the pay TV sector” in other regions, which meant a “fairly healthy industry despite all the digital disruption side”. We have also heard from TV Globo who told us of the progress made in advertising and pay TV and smartphone penetration in Brazil, and from Zee Telefilms from India who spoke of a booming broadcasting industry.

Mr. Chair, Nothing we have heard so far addresses three important questions – why is there a need for a separate right? Why are protections under the Rome Convention inadequate? While piracy might well be an issue, why can’t it be covered under existing copyright law – all of which comes down to why we’re discussing the creation of a para copyright regime for broadcasting organizations.

From the Caribbean Broadcasting Union, we heard about emerging technologies and the challenges due to piracy. There was also a mention of significant investment – but if that is to be the basis for this treaty, we would ask that detailed reports of these investments and losses also be placed before this Committee. Also, none of this addresses the lacunae in the Rome Convention or existing international copyright law.

Mr. Chair, we have repeatedly heard from Group B and the European Union on the ‘significant economic value of broadcasting’, but, this economic value has had international law recognition for a while now. While the CEBS group, Japan and Russia speak highly of technological advancements to justify the need for the Broadcast Treaty, there has still been no discussion on the inadequacy of existing international law to address these technological advancements. There needs to be something more that justifies this attempt to give broadcasters an additional layer of rights. It might be useful to conduct a comprehensive study on signal theft and piracy and the legal frameworks in every member state to deal with signal theft and piracy, and an updated study on the international legal framework as well. This Committee has precedent on such an exercise in Prof. Kenneth Crews’ study on limitations and exceptions for libraries and archives that has been tabled at this SCCR.

Mr. Chair, this para copyright we’re trying to create, especially without all stakeholders being heard equally, would in effect severely limit any competition that broadcasting organizations would face from the Internet and other emerging technologies; which is undesirable for any market, besides access to free knowledge and information, as well put by the delegation of Iran.

Thank you.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/statement-by-the-centre-for-internet-and-society-india-on-the-broadcast-treaty-at-sccr-30

National IPR Policy Series : Follow-up RTI to DIPP on the IPR Think Tank

nehaa — 2015-06-25T00:43:34Z

This RTI was prepared by Varun Baliga and Nehaa Chaudhari as a follow-up, based on the responses of the DIPP to our earlier RTI requests (available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/national-ipr-policy-series-rti-requests-by-cis-to-dipp-dipp-responses)

To,

Ms. Palka Sahni,

Deputy Secretary,

Central Public Information Officer,

IPR-II, IPR-III, IPR-IV, IPR-VI,

Room No. 254,

Udyog Bhawan, Delhi.

Subject: Request for Information under Section 6 of the Right to Information Act, 2005 regarding Information on the Procedure to File a Right to Information Application with the IPR Think Tank

Dear Madam,

1. Full Name of the Applicant: Nehaa Chaudhari

2. Address of the Applicant: Centre for Internet and Society, G-15 Top Floor, Hauz Khas, New Delhi - 110016

Mailing Address : nehaa@cis-india.org

3. Information Required: Context

Please consider this an application for information under Section 6 of the Right to Information Act, 2005. Since the request for this information is inextricable from the context in which it is made, it is previewed with a succinct overview of the facts.

I, as an employee of the Centre for Internet and Society ["CIS"], first filed a Right to Information ["RTI"] application with the Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion ["DIPP"] requesting information on the procedure followed in the appointment of the IPR Think Tank ["Think Tank"]. We received a response from the DIPP detailing the procedure followed. Then, we filed a RTI application with the DIPP requesting information on its functioning, particularly procedure followed and comments received prior to and after the release of the first draft of the National IPR Policy ["Policy"]. [1] In your response dated 26^th February 2015, the DIPP stated that the Think Tank functioned "independently without any interference of this Department (DIPP)". Therefore, apart from information that an "interactive meeting with stakeholders" was conducted while drafting the Policy, the DIPP stated it was not in a position to give any further information. Finally, the DIPP in a separate response dated 26^th February 2015, stated that "suggestions and comments on the draft of on [sic] National IPR Policy have been received by the IPR Think Tank directly". CIS followed this up by filing a RTI application with the Think Tank itself but we have not received a response.

4. Information Required: Details

Therefore, I seek information on the following:

a) The Think Tank is a public authority constituted for the purpose of the RTI Act. Who is the Public Information Officer of the Think Tank for the purpose of filing RTI applications? What are the measures taken by the Think Tank to comply with its obligations under the RTI Act?

b) What is the procedure to be followed in filing an RTI Application with the Think Tank?

c) Given that there is no information on the above, would the appropriate authority to request for information on the functioning of the IPR Think Tank be the DIPP?

5. Proof of Payment of Application Fee:

An Indian Postal Order for the amount of Rs. 10 dated ___________ favouring the Public Information Officer, Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion is enclosed as proof of payment of application fee.

This is to certify that I, Nehaa Chaudhari, am a citizen of India.

Please provide me this information at the address provided earlier in this letter.

Thank you

Yours sincerely

Nehaa Chaudhari

[1] http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/national-ipr-policy-series-rti-requests-by-cis-to-dipp-dipp-responses

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/national-ipr-policy-series-follow-up-rti-to-dipp-on-ipr-think-tank

The US 301 Report – A Myopic View of IP Rights

nehaa — 2015-06-24T15:35:29Z

Varun Baliga and Nehaa Chaudhari discuss the 2015 US 301 Report, focussing on its narrow and convenient understanding of IP rights. A farrago of contradictions, it supports a rightsholder-centric view but not when the right, Geographical Indicator, is not to their liking. Similarly, the emphasis on the rights themselves gives short shrift to critical exceptions and limitations that also enhance and incentivize innovation, the ostensible purpose of IP.

The US Trade Representative ["USTR"] is the office in charge of the United States Special 301 Report ["301 Report"] - an annual report on the state of intellectual property rights in countries around the world. The Executive Summary of the 2015 Report states that it is conducted "pursuant to Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 and the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. § 2242)". [1] The relevant excerpt of the provision states:

" The Trade Representative shall, by not later than the date by which countries are identified under subsection (a) of this section, transmit to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate, a report on actions taken under this section during the 12 months preceding such report, and the reasons for such actions, including a description of progress made in achieving improved intellectual property protection and market access for persons relying on intellectual property rights ."

The 2015 301 Report, much like its predecessors, prioritizes the existence of institutional mechanisms for the protection of intellectual property rights over the purported end goals of those rights, as argued by Shamnad Basheer.[2] The purported link between intellectual property and innovation, a key element of the CIS comment on the National IPR Policy , is not studied by the Report but simply assumed as a truism. In the usual criticism of India's laws, the Report notes that "IPR protection and enforcement challenges continue, and there are serious questions regarding the future of the innovative climate in India", operating on the assumption that IPR is the sole driving force of innovation. Instead, the Report is guided by the 'business climate' in a country as facilitated by its IP laws. To borrow from the EFF's incisive critique of this annual exercise, the 301 Report pressurizes India to criminalize the act of camcording in a cinema hall despite domestic copyright law that prohibits it subject to statutory exceptions.[3] Further, the Report finds India's compliance with the Berne Convention to be insufficient since 'business climate' favours as comprehensive an intellectual property regime as possible directed at the expansion of rights and the narrowing of exceptions critical to education and openness of knowledge.

International law on intellectual property is interpreted instrumentally by the drafters of the report. What this means is that IP is being viewed solely through the prism of national interest. A particularly egregious implication is being witnessed in the shift of preferred fora to discuss IP from bodies like the WIPO to trade-oriented platforms, a theme that is discussed later on in this piece. Further, Italy's notice and takedown regime is praised in the 2015 Report notwithstanding its procedure of obtaining an order of removal not from the courts but the Communications Regulatory Authority, against the Manila Principles of Intermediary Liability, an important albeit non-binding piece of state practice.[4]

Furthermore, the emphasis on the interests of rightsholders themselves coupled with enforcement seldom happens in a comparative context, in the Report. This means that the Report privileges the interests of rightsholders to the exclusion of any interest that the exceptions to copyright, for fair use and education for instance, may hold. The 2015 Report, for instance, notes positive developments in IP law as exclusively including the strengthening of the regulatory framework weighted in favour of rights. It fails to note the ratification of the Accessible Books Consortium or the Report of the UN Special Rapporteur Farida Shaheed on copyright policy,[5] implicitly signalling that the US does not consider these developments favourable. This is problematic at two level.

First, competing interests of free speech, open access to knowledge, education, public health are either downplayed or outright ignored. For example, the Report entirely ignores the work of WIPO on exceptions and limitations, and the Marrakesh Treat among the multilateral and plurilateral initiatives of note. Switzerland, for instance, is censured for the 2010 Swiss Federal Court decision that erred on the side of privacy by prohibiting Logistep from tracking IP addresses of entities accused of file-sharing.[6] Even in the emphasis on rightsholders, the 301 Report reeks of hypocrisy and doublespeak. Gabriel J. Michael notes that the 301 Report criticized the European Union for having too much protection of IP through geographical indicators (GI). So, IP protection appears to be an unreserved good as long as it's the right kind of IP as determined by the United States.

" For example, by any reasonably objective standard, the European Union offers very high levels of IP protection. Yet as recently as 2006, Special 301 listed the European Union on its watch list, citing "concerns" about the EU's geographical indication (GI) regime. Given that GIs are a form of intellectual property, USTR essentially placed the EU on its watch list for offering too much IP-or, if you prefer, the wrong kind of IP. Interestingly, this is a tacit admission by the U.S. that at least some kinds of IP can act as trade barriers ."[7]

Second, the 301 Report operates on the assumption that intellectual property is a right in rem. It does not even attempt to engage with the notion of IP as a public right. This is a direct implication of the methodology of the Report that privileges the simple existence of IP frameworks and enforcement mechanisms over a more substantive examination of the causal nexus between IP and its purported raison d'etre. Therefore, the interpretive approach of the 301 Report towards intellectual property law construes it not as a means to ends but as an end in itself.

What Does This Mean?

Finally, there are two implications of this approach to IP rights. The first is on the Report's words on India this year. Credit is given to India for establishing the High Level Working Group on Intellectual Property ["IPR Working Group"]. The purpose of the Working Group is said to be to "enable India to achieve its important domestic policy goals of increasing investment and stimulating innovation through, not at the expense of, IPR protection and enforcement". The façade of public interest behind which the 301 Report attempted to operate is finally off, one might say. IP exists, it seems, to facilitate not broader goals of public interest but investment and innovation within the myopic interests of 'rightsholders'. Paradoxically, however, the Report does call for more consultation on the First Draft of India's National IPR Policy - a noteworthy development, although inconsistent with the tenor of the rest of the Report. Second, the 301 Report as a reflection of American foreign policy goals is now being understood through the lens of ongoing trade negotiations. This steady shift in the preferable forum for IP negotiations from inclusive and democratic platforms, such as WIPO, towards restrictive and secretive ones, such as the WTO, is driven by regressive notions of IP as reflected in the 301 Report. Signalling a move towards a state-centric approach heralded by the United States, critical non-state actors from civil society find it increasingly difficult to exercise agency in these negotiations. While WIPO provides space for non-state actors such as non-governmental organizations to represent their positions and aid states with research, trade negotiations shunt civil society. The cloak and daggers approach of the United States Government towards the Trans-Pacific Partnership Treaty,[8] brought to some light with recent votes in the US Congress, negotiations contrasted with the democratic and open nature of the negotiations surrounding the Marrakech treaty underscores the important difference in approach.[9]

As a result, the civil society finds itself unable to counterbalance the power hierarchies entrenched in international relations as it has done, for example, with the attempted imposition of TRIPS-plus standards through bilateral and multilateral agreements. A state-centric approach makes it easier for larger economies to coerce smaller and dependent countries to draft laws with little regard for limitations and flexibilities that are key for innovation and standard of life in large swathes of Global South - peoples who cannot afford the costs of IP protected-innovation. Further, issues of IP and trade are not pertinent solely to states but are increasingly driven by and relevant to a raft of non-state actors. Any policy that does not actively seek to include these stakeholders in the decision making process is destined to fail. Therefore, on both principled and consequentialist grounds, the Special 301 Report deserves very little attention from the international community.

[1] Full text of the provision available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/19/2242.

[2] http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/these-rancid-rankings/99/

[3] https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/04/special-301-balance-not-found

[4] https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/04/special-301-balance-not-found ; https://www.manilaprinciples.org/

[5] http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/HRC/28/57 .

[6] http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2010/09/switzerland-gathering-ip-addresses-from-bittorrent-sites-illegal/

[7] https://topromotetheprogress.wordpress.com/2014/06/05/special-301-is-it-effective/ ;

https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140612/17435227561/ustrs-special-301-list-naughty-countries-without-strong-enough-patent-copyright-laws-is-complete-joke.shtml

[8] http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/05/tpp-elizabeth-warren-labor-118068.html#.VWvcMk-qqko ; http://www.ip-watch.org/2015/04/23/divide-and-conquer-the-new-us-strategy-to-disentangle-the-tpp-negotiations/

[9] http://www.ip-watch.org/2013/12/19/wipo-delegates-hear-concerns-of-ngos-on-exceptions-for-libraries/

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/us-301-report-a-myopic-view-of-ip-rights

National IPR Policy Series : India's National IPR Policy - What Would WIPO Think?

nehaa — 2015-07-02T17:47:58Z

As part of the National IPR Policy Series, CIS is evaluating how India's National IPR Policy framework and process holds up to WIPO's suggestions. In this note, Varun Baliga and Nehaa Chaudhari examine in particular, the functioning of the IPR Think Tank and the first draft of the National Policy in light of the WIPO framework and the principles it encapsulates.

This note is a brief overview of the approach set out by the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") for the development of National IPR Strategies by various countries. This note also compares WIPO's approach to the approach adopted by the IPR Think Tank ("Think Tank") in the formulation of India's National IPR Policy This note is only an academic exercise and is not to be construed as a recommendation of the procedure set out by WIPO for the development of National IPR Policies/Strategies.

An Overview of WIPO's Approach

WIPO's suggested model of a National IPR Policy operates at three levels - The Process, Baseline Questionnaire and Benchmarking Indicators. [1] On process, WIPO suggests an 8-step procedure in developing a National IP Strategy that lays clear emphasis on both continuous consultation and methodological rigour in data collection. The initial 'Assessment Mission' is aimed at preparing the ground for the formulation of the policy, and includes meetings with stakeholders so as to involve interested entities from the very beginning. [2] Given that an IPR policy is necessarily a political exercise, WIPO recommends that the mission be used to secure the political capital and commitment that would be necessary to see the exercise through. Then, a 'project (national) team' is constituted for an IP audit and develop an understanding of the economic, social and political infrastructure as context for the formulation of the policy. It is also stated that, in most instances, the team will include an international consultant. This is further complemented by 'Desk Research' and 'Data Collection' using the 'Baseline Survey Questionnaire', an integrated data collection tool developed by WIPO. The desk research is an assessment of the existing IP policies coupled with the country's broader goals - developmental, economic and social, so as to conceptualize a policy that is in conformity with the goals.

The data collection through the Baseline Survey Questionnaire is meant to complement the IP audit to understand the "weaknesses, strengths and potential" of "the current IP situation in the country". This audit and data collection drive is then buttressed with 'National Consultations' to validate the data and conclusions reached thus far. WIPO is unambiguous that the aim of these consultations is to enable a wide range of parties to exercise meaningful ownership and agency over the process of conceptualizing a national IPR policy. With the inputs received from the process so far, WIPO recommends that the drafting of the strategy commence on the basis of the "suggestions, opinions and recommendations received during the national consultation process". The drafting should operate at the level of each sector and the country as a whole. This is followed by a 'second round of stakeholder consultations'. These serve a dual purpose: to validate the findings of the first draft and to verify whether the first round of inputs are reflected in the draft itself. Finally, an 'implementation framework' including "implementation structures, a resource mobilization strategy, and monitoring and evaluation mechanisms".

Assessing the First Draft of India's National IPR Policy:

Now, we look at the National IPR Policy in India in light of the WIPO framework outlined above. First we look at the Assessment Mission or process followed prior to the announcement of any IPR policy. Then, we look at what assessment was undertaken of the existing IP laws in the country. Finally, the stakeholders meetings conducted so far are analysed in comparison to the purpose of such consultations that WIPO envisages.

Assessment Mission: There are no reports of an initial meeting having been held to explain the scope and methodology of the process. However, the IPR Think Tank invited comments before the release of the draft national policy in order to seek suggestions on the tentative policy. It should be noted that these comments have not been published.
Assessment of existing IP framework: The overview of the existing IP system in the draft policy covers just the various IP legislations and the relevant government departments. It then proceeds to underscore elements in Indian law that enhance and incentivize stricter standards for IP protection. For example, it illustrated the future challenge in copyright law as being enforcement on digital platforms. It identifies a need for concerted action to increase patent filings by Indians as over "75% of patent filings are by foreign entities". Further, even when it mentions India's ratification of the 2013 Marrakesh Treaty ensuring access to copyrighted works for persons with visual impairment, it is in the context of further reinforcement of copyright.Therefore, it is clear that the perspective of the draft policy towards India's existing framework downplays provisions ensuring access and protecting the public interest and focusses on more expansive IP protection, narrower exceptions and an overall priority for IP rights over the public interest in accessing knowledge. The purpose of the IP audit and desk research, "to obtain a clear picture of the current IP situation…, its weaknesses, strengths and potential.", has not been done justice by this audit weighted in favour of rightsholders. Finally, the Baseline Survey Questionnaire -an integrated tool for extensive data collection - has no mention in the draft policy. There is no indication that it has been utilized for the purpose of data collection, if any.
On stakeholder meetings: The Draft National IP Policy was released on 24 December 2014. A DIPP Press Release called for comments and suggestions to the First Draft to be sent in by January 30^th, 2015.[3] The first set of stakeholder meetings were only held on February 5^th and 6^th, 2015.[4] This is at odds with what the WIPO recommends. The very first step in the WIPO framework is the 'Assessment Mission' which involves meetings with stakeholders that explains the scope and methodology of the process, presumably to elicit views. There is no publicly available information that suggests that this has taken place. Second, the national consultation precedes the drafting of the strategy with the explicit goal of validating the IP audit findings and eliciting views on the drafting of the strategy. This is not intended to be a merely formalistic exercise but meaningful involvement of stakeholders in the whole process of conceptualizing a national IPR policy. Now, the DIPP has solicited comments prior to the publication of the first draft. However, mere solicitation of comments without meaningful consultation is a mere shadow of the objective of the WIPO recommendation of national consultations - "..to actively participate in the validation of the IP audit findings and the formulation of the National IP Strategy..to enhance a wide a range of IP stakeholders' ownership of the process of developing and eventually implementing a national IP strategy." Therefore, the principled objective of the consultation process as outlined by WIPO - enabling stakeholders to exercise a sense of agency over the policy document and drafting process - was severely undermined. Furthermore, WIPO suggests that the drafting of the policy should be based on the findings and suggestions submitted by the stakeholders. Given that comments have been solicited before the policy was drafted, it is incumbent upon the Think Tank to make comments submitted public. [5]

The following table summarizes the comparison in the WIPO approach to that of the IPR Think Tank. Apart from the procedure outlined thus far, the table touches upon other points of comparison that are sure to inform the continued functioning of the Think Tank in the road towards a National IPR Policy.

WIPO Suggestion	India's National IP Policy Framework - Comparison
WIPO has also suggested a number of justifications that may be advanced for the development of a national IP strategy. [6] These justifications will help in grounding the policy in a clear, lucid set of objectives. These are: Need to consolidate sectoral policies National long-term development agenda Benchmarking and best practices International trade obligations Strengthening the national IP office	India's Draft National IP Policy provides for the following objectives:[7] Create awareness of the economic, social and cultural benefits of IP (IP Awareness and Promotion) Stimulate the creation and growth of IP (Creation of IP) Strong and effective laws that protect IP rights in a manner consistent with national priorities and intl obligations and that balance the interests of the rights owners and the public (Legal and Legislative Framework) Strengthen IP administration and management of IP rights (IP Administration and Management) Augment Commercialization of IP rights; valuation, licensing and technology transfer (Commercialization of IP) Strengthen enforcement and adjudicatory mechanisms to protect and combat against IP rights violations ( Enforcement and Adjudication) Human Capital Development in IP
The second prong of WIPO's suggestions is devoted entirely to the Baseline Survey Questionnaire. There are seven clusters identified: IP Administration and Management Generation of IP by universities, research organizations, business, industry, SMEs and individuals Commercialization of IP and technology transfer by universities, research organization, business, industry, SMEs and individuals Copyright and copyright industries Plan breeders; rights (plant variety protection) Enforcement of IP rights IP and public policy	While there are elements of these clusters in the draft policy, there is no mention of them in the context of the method of a Baseline Survey Questionnaire. This means that the data collection was not undertaken in compliance with WIPO's recommendations and means that there was either no data collected or the results are undermined.
Finally, the WIPO framework places great emphasis on the implementation of the policy.[8] It has elements of this in all three prongs. It requires the policy to have an effective framework for its implementation that includes resource mobilization and monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.[9]	The issue of implementation is covered by the draft policy at two levels: 1. Implementation of IP rights - This includes a) Placing the burden on individuals to protect their IP rights as IP is an "essentially private rights [sic]". [10] The state merely plays the role of the facilitator for protection. b) Enacting rules and setting up institutions. Examples include the Intellectual Property Rights (Imported Goods) Enforcement Rules 2007 framed to implement border control measures as well as the Copyright Enforcement Advisory Council. [11] Further, strengthening enforcement mechanisms includes the establishment of a centralized 'Multi-Agency Task Force' for coordination between the raft of agencies that India has. [12] c) Facilitate IP dispute resolution through the designation of a specialized patent bench in select High Courts. It also calls for the creation of regional benches of the IPAB in all five regions where IPOs are located as well as an increase in the powers of the IPAB. [13] 2. Implementation of the Policy itself -[14] a) It suggests that the integration of the policy with stated government programmes such as 'Make in India' and 'Digital India' would enable its implementation. b) The establishment of IP Promotion and Development Council (IPPDC) which will open IP Promotion and Development Units (IPPDU) for promoting IP awareness, protection and utlilization. c) IP support to MSMEs. d) Technology Acquisition and Development Fund under the Manufacturing Policy for licensing or procuring patented technologies. e) Manufacturing units will be encouraged to set up IP cells in their own units and make IP a part of their corporate strategy. f) Integrate with government initiatives.

Conclusion: Testing Times Ahead

The IPR Think Tank has not been consistent with WIPO's recommendations on drafting a National IPR Policy. In terms of data analysis, the Think Tank has not displayed an iota of the analytical rigour and data collection that WIPO believes is necessary to understand both the state of IP in the country and devise effective means of responding to lacunae. Further, while consultations have been held with civil society, these have been lacking in two respects. They have not followed the timelines prescribed by WIPO insofar as consultations have happened only after the release of the first draft. As a result, the Think Tank has failed in actualizing the raison d'etre behind national consultations - "enhance a wide range of IP stakeholders' ownership of the process of developing and eventually implementing a national IP strategy". Finally, this piece is not an endorsement of WIPO or its recommendations but a mere acknowledgement of the role WIPO has played in this exercise. In the final analysis, India has fallen short of adhering to the principles reflected in the WIPO framework.

[1] http://www.wipo.int/ipstrategies/en/methodology/

[2] The stakeholders that WIPO mentions are "..inter alia, the national IP office(s), relevant government departments, universities and research institutes, SMEs, inventors, creators, legal practitioners, non-governmental organizations (NGOs)".

[3] http://www.dipp.nic.in/English/acts_rules/Press_Release/pressRelease_IPR_Policy_30December2014.pdf

[4] http://spicyip.com/2015/01/examining-the-draft-national-ip-policy-stakeholder-meetings-to-be-held.html

[5] http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/national-ipr-policy-series-cis-comments-to-the-first-draft-of-the-national-ip-policy

[6] Methodology for the Development of National Intellectual Property Strategies, Tool 1: The Process, p. 11.

[7] National IPR Policy (First Draft), p. 6-23.

[8] Methodology for the Development of National Intellectual Property Strategies, Tool 1: The Process, p. 9.

[9] Ibid .

[10] Ibid , p. 20.

[11] Ibid , p. 20.

[12] Ibid , p. 21.

[13] Ibid , p. 22.

[14] Ibid , p. 25-26.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/national-ipr-policy-series-indias-national-ipr-policy-what-would-wipo-think

National IPR Policy Series - CIS Letter to IPR Think Tank

nehaa — 2015-05-28T13:08:12Z

We sent this letter to the IPR Think Tank following responses that we received from the DIPP, to our RTI requests.

CIS acknowledges Varun Baliga and Devrupa Rakshit for their research.

To,
Justice (Retd.) Prabha Sridevan,
Chairperson,
IPR Think Tank

Dear Ma'am,

Subject - Request for Information pertaining to the Constitution and Functioning of the IPR Think Tank

I seek your indulgence regarding some information about the IPR Think Tank of which you are the Chairperson. Unfortunately, this is information that I could not find in the public domain despite searching for it extensively. Such information includes, but is not limited to, an official website of the IPR Think Tank. My queries concern, broadly, the constitution of the think tank, the formulation of the National IPR Policy and a related pieces of information that has been listed ahead. With apologies, I felt compelled to address these queries to you as there does not seem to be a Public Information Officer in charge of the IPR Think Tank.
Further, I had also addressed some of these questions via a Right to Information Request to the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion ("DIPP"). In its response, the DIPP has informed me that the Think Tank works independently of the DIPP and hence the DIPP was not in a position to furnish information to these queries.[1] Accordingly, I am addressing these queries to you, as the Chairperson of the Think Tank.
I wish to understand the process followed by the DIPP in constituting the IPR Think Tank whose mandate it is to draft the National Intellectual Property Rights Policy under Public Notice No. 10/22/2013-IPR-III dated November 13, 2014. I would greatly appreciate the details of this process followed.
In particular, were the current members of the IPR Think Tank required to send in applications seeking to be considered for the IPR Think Tank? As members of the think tank, which body is in charge of paying the members financial remuneration, if any? Upon or prior to appointment, have you, as the Chairperson, or the members received any instructions from any departments of the government? If so, I request information regarding the content of these instructions and the department that issued the same.
Further, I request a copy of the letters of the appointment of the members of the IPR Think Tank.
In the event that there was a meeting held to decide on the same, I request that all necessary documents including the minutes of the meeting, records, documents, memos, e-mails, opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, orders, etc., in which the constitution of the aforesaid mentioned IPR Think Tank was discussed or decided, be included.
If there were multiple meetings held for the same, please provide all necessary documents including the minutes of all such meetings, records, documents, memos, e-mails, opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, orders, etc., for all such meetings held.
If a directive or directives were received by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion from any other government body to constitute such a think tank, I request a copy of such a directive.
While considering the constitution of the IPR Think Tank, please can you share, in detail, the process of shortlisting the members of the IPR Think Tank by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, or any other body that was responsible for the same.
Please do indicate the instructions that the IPR Think Tank received from the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion upon its constitution under Public Notice No. 10/22/2013-IPR-III dated November 13, 2014, as well as the individual(s)/body(s) that send these instructions.
Please do indicate the financial details of the IPR Think Tank including the source that remunerates the members as well as the amount of remuneration.
Please indicate in detail the process followed by the IPR Think Tank constituted by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion via Public Notice No. 10 (22)/2013-IPR-III dated November 13, 2014 while framing the first draft of the National IPR Policy dated December 19, 2014.
If there was a meeting held to decide on the same, please include all necessary documents including the minutes of the meeting, records, documents, memos, emails, opinion, advices, press releases, circulars, orders, suggestions, etc., related to the drafting of such National IPR Policy Think Tank chaired by Justice (Retd.) Prabha Sridevan.
If there were multiple meetings held for the same, please provide all necessary documents including the minutes of all such meetings, records, documents, memos, e-mails, opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, orders, suggestions, etc., for all such meetings held.
Please provide all the suggestions and comments received by the IPR Think Tank from stakeholders after the DIPP issued Public Notice No. 10/22/2013-IPR-III dated November 13, 2014 asking for suggestions and comments on or before November 30, 2014.
Please also provide all the suggestions and comments received by the IPR Think Tank by different stakeholders on or before January 30, 2015 on its first draft of the National Intellectual Property Policy submitted by the IPR Think Tank on December 19, 2014.
Finally, for further reference, please clarify whether the Public Information Officer for the IPR Think Tank would be the same person as Public Information Officer for the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion since the IPR Think Tank was constituted by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion via Public Notice No. 10 (22)/2013-IPR-III dated November 13, 2014.
If the immediately preceding question is to be answered in the negative, then does the IPR Thank Tank have a Public Information Officer, or alternatively, to whom shall one address queries such as these with respect to the IPR Think Tank.

Please do circulate a copy of this letter to the other constituent members of the IPR Think Tank, viz. -

Ms. Pratibha M Singh, Sr.Advocate, Singh & Singh Law Firm, Member;
Ms. Punita Bhargava, Advocate, Inventure IP, Member;
Dr. Unnat Pandit, Cadila Pharmaceuticals Limited, Member;
Shri Rajeev Srinivasan, Director, Asian School of Business, Thiruvananthapuram, Member; and
Shri Narendra K. Sabarwal, Retired DDG, WIPO, Member and Convener.

Thank you.

Yours sincerely,

Nehaa Chaudhari,
The Centre for Internet and Society,
G-15, Top Floor, Hauz Khas,
New Delhi - 110016
+91-11-40503285

Date - 25/05/2015

[1] For details of my queries and the responses of the DIPP, please see - http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/national-ipr-policy-series-rti-requests-by-cis-to-dipp-dipp-responses (last accessed 25 May, 2015).

Note: Nehaa Chaudhari's name was misspelt in the letter but has been corrected in this blog post.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/national-ipr-policy-series-cis-letter-to-ipr-think-tank

National IPR Policy Series : Who is a 'public authority' under the RTI Act?

nehaa — 2015-05-21T17:03:30Z

In this blog post, CIS intern Devrupa Rakshit examines case law with respect to the understanding of a 'public authority' under the Right to Information ("RTI") Act, 2005.

In earlier blog posts, India’s National IPR Policy has been discussed at length. In February 2015, three RTI applications were made by the Centre for Internet and Society to the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (hereinafter, the “DIPP”). The response of the DIPP to these requests could be described as vague, at best. A detailed blog post by Nehaa Chaudhari discusses the questions, the responses and the other nuances of this endeavour at length.

Having failed repeatedly in our attempts to retrieve information pertaining to the IPR Think Tank that was, essentially, in charge of formulating the National IPR Policy, we put forth an RTI request to the IPR Think Tank earlier this month. The response is awaited, at the moment. In the meantime, we have undertaken the task of finding out whether the IPR Think Tank can indeed be classified as a “public authority” under the Right to Information Act, (hereinafter, the “RTI Act”, or simply the “Act”) because if it can, then it must have a Public Information Officer as per Section 5 of the Act.

The RTI Act defines “public authorities” in Section 2(h) –

A “public authority” means any authority or body or institution of self- government established or constituted –

(a) by or under the Constitution;

(b) by any other law made by Parliament;

(c) by any other law made by State Legislature;

(d) by notification issued or order made by the appropriate Government, and includes any –

(i) body owned, controlled or substantially financed;

(ii) non-Government organization substantially financed, directly or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate Government.

A. Who is a "Public Authority"?

In 2011, the Punjab-Haryana High Court[1] while deciding on 24 civil writ petitions against the Central/State Information Commissioners had held that if any person, or body, satisfies the following conditions then it would "squarely fall within the ambit and scope of definition of 'public authorities'" and would be "legally required to impart the indicated information as envisaged under the RTI Act" -

(i) the institution cannot come into existence and function unless registered and regulated by the provisions of a legislation; or

(ii) the State Government has some degree of control over it through the medium of Acts/Rules; or

(iii) it is substantially financed by means of funds provided directly, or indirectly, by the appropriate Government; or

(iv) the mandate and command of the provisions of the RTI Act along with its Preamble, aims, objects and regime extends to their public dealing; or

(v) the larger public interest and totality of the other facts and circumstances emanating from the records suggest that such information may be disclosed.

The Court was further inclined to believe that arguments to the contrary would "nullify the aims and objects of the RTI Act, perpetuating and inculcating the injustice to the larger public interest in general."

The Central Information Commission (hereinafter, the "CIC") has also held[2] that pension trusts are "public authorities" under the RTI Act.

The CIC also held[3] that the LIC Housing Finance Limited (hereinafter, the "LICHFL") and LIC Mutual Fund Asset Management Co. Ltd. would qualify as "public authorities" under the RTI Act. It was held that LIC is a body established, constituted, owned and controlled by Central Government. Further, LIC is a public authority having been constituted by an Act of Parliament. And, since the Chairman and Managing Director for both LIC and LICHFL is the same, and since LIC has 40.497% of the shares of LICHFL, LICHFL would be regarded as a "public authority" for the purposes of the RTI Act.

In a verdict that has remained prominent for over half-a-decade now, the CIC had alluded to the judgment of the Madras High Court in Tamil Nadu Newsprint & Papers Ltd v. State Information Commission. In this case, the court had observed that since the mere requirement of the RTI Act for an institution to be deemed a "public authority" is that the Government must substantially finance it, and exercise control over its affairs, it is not necessary that the Government must be the majority shareholder in that institution. The Court had further gone ahead to make an observation that whether or not the government exercises such control is immaterial. Having relied heavily upon this judgment by the Madras High Court, the CIC had further stated that the practice of funding and general control over the affairs and functions of the LIC Mutual Fund by the Central Government is nothing but a manner of indirect funding, and hence LIC Mutual Fund would qualify as a "public authority" under the RTI Act.

In the same case, it was held that the GIC Housing Finance Limited is also a "public authority" for the purposes of the RTI Act since "the shareholding of six Public Authorities in GIC Housing Finance is 47.68% and coupled with the control they exercise over the GIC Housing Finance, it is sufficient to bring them within the ambit of the definition of 'Public Authority' as defined in Section 2(h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005."

Further, the Indian Olympic Association (hereinafter, the "IOA") was held[4] to be a "public authority" under the RTI Act on account of substantial funding by the Government not only for the discharge of functions of the IOA, but also for the construction of its building. In fact, the level of funding by the Government, here, is such that without it, the IOA is unlikely to be able to discharge its functions under the Olympic Charter itself.

In another judgment[5], where it was contended that the body, in question, was a non-governmental organisation, and was not funded by the Government, the CIC held that the impugned body would be a "public authority" as it had been substantially financed by the funds provided by the Government.

In a judgment[6] by the Madras High Court, even an aided private school was held to fall under the ambit of the RTI Act as its entire teaching staff received 100% of their salary from the aid received from the government. The same line of reasoning was resonated in a judgment by the Allahabad High Court in the following year.[7] Yet another private recognised school was held[8] by the CIC to be a "public authority" under the RTI Act because it was substantially funded by the appropriate Government, and was under its control.

The Delhi High Court held[9] the Krishak Bharti Co-operative Ltd. (hereinafter, the "KRIBHCO") - a society registered under the Multi-State Co- operative Societies Act, 2002 (hereinafter, the "MSCS Act" - to be a "public authority" for the purpose of the RTI Act because certain devices laid down in the MSCS Act itself makes KRIBHCO amenable to the control of the Government. On the same grounds, the National Cooperative Consumer Federation of India Ltd. (and the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation of India Ltd. (hereinafter, the "NAFED") - two other societies registered under the MSCS Act - are "public authorities".

Furthermore, the NAFED is also "a nodal agency of the Government of India for the purchase of agricultural and non- agricultural commodities under Market Intervention Scheme and the losses incurred in the implementation of the schemes by NAFED are shared by the Government of India and the State Government concerned in the ratio of 50:50."

Continuing its trend of according a liberal approach to "public authorities" under the RTI Act, the Madras High Court stated in the New Tirupur Area Development case[10] that while Section 2(h)(d)(i) qualifies a "body owned" or a "body controlled", nowhere does it state that the body must be wholly owned, or wholly controlled, by the State. And, as the court observed, even the term "substantially financed" has not been defined though it has been qualified by the terms " directly or indirectly". Section 2(h)(d)(ii) further ropes in non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that are substantially financed. This reflects the intent and purpose of the legislators. In any case, the object of the Act to is to provide the citizens with a right to information from public authorities, and hence, as the Division Bench of the court had previously opined in the Tamil Nadu Road Development Corporation Ltd.'s case[11], the impugned section must receive a liberal interpretation.

Further ahead in this judgment[12], the court made an observation saying that if the State Government, instead of undertaking a work that is essentially its own duty, substantially funds an agency to do it, then such work can hardly be deemed as a private activity. It evolves "very much (into) a public activity over which public interest can generate."

In the same case[13], it was also observed that under the Act, the quantum of the finance required for a body to qualify as "substantially financed" is not spelt out. On this point, the High Court also relied on a precedent [14] (the Tamil Nadu Road Development case decided by Justice A.K. Ganguly) where the court had refused to accept the argument of the petitioner, which stated that the financial support by the government was meagre at best.

B. Which bodies are exempted from the Ambit of "Public Authorities"?

The Kerala High Court, in a 2011 judgment[15], exempted the offices and officers of public religious institutions and endowments to which the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 applies from the definition of "public authorities" under the RTI Act.

In a subsequent case[16], the CIC said that despite the fact that 46% of the equity capital of the National Commodity and Derivatives Exchange Ltd. was held by the PSUs (which are, of course, public authorities), the National Commodity and Derivatives Exchange Ltd. cannot, in itself, be regarded as a "public authority" as there is no direct or indirect funding by an appropriate Government.

Three Karnataka High Court judgments in 2009 [(a) dealing with the Basava Samithi[17] - an organisation that promotes the Basava Philosophy of Life and is registered under the Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1961; (b) dealing with a co-operative housing society[18] in Malleswaram, Bangalore; (c) dealing with a Bank [19]] held three different bodies as not the creation of any law made by the Legislature, or not as bodies owned or controlled or substantially financed by the Government, and hence, exempt from the ambit of a "public authority" under the RTI Act. These judgments were, however, criticised in the Punjab and Haryana High Court[20] wherein it said that in the three 2009-judgments, the Karnataka High Court had overlooked the basic aims and objectives of larger public interest enshrined in the Preamble of the RTI Act.

C. Conclusion

The easiest way to establish that the IPR Think Tank would qualify as a "public authority" under the RTI Act would be to show that it is a body owned, controlled or substantially funded directly or indirectly by the Government, or that it is created either by any other law made by the Parliament or State Legislature, or under the Constitution itself.

Moreover, it appears from The Hindu Urban Cooperative Bank Limited v. The State Information Commission[21] that when discharging public functions, even though a private entity does not become a State per se, considering the public interest involved, it must be deemed to be a "public authority" in a bid to avoid diluting the aims and objectives of the RTI Act. Now, since the drafting of the National IPR Policy can, in all likelihood, be described as the exercise of a public function, the IPR Think Tank should then qualify as a "public authority" under the Act.

In addition, the underlying principle used in Indubala Agarwal v. National Commodity and Derivatives Exchange Ltd. [22] was that while the public bodies engaging in commercial or business activities - often, even profitable - that are created by any government in exercise of its sovereign functions would qualify as "public authorities" as per Section 2(h) of the Act, the set of commercial bodies further created by these public bodies as part of their business ventures would not qualify as "public authorities" as per Section 2(h). The simple reason behind this discrimination of sorts is that the latter set of bodies lacks any direct, or indirect, involvement of an appropriate government. However, it is unlikely that this rationale could be used to keep the IPR Think Tank outside the domain of "public authorities" under the Act since it would hardly qualify as a commercial body. Furthermore, it was not created by the DIPP merely in a bid to expand its business interests, but to formulate a National IPR Policy that is quite a far cry from being classified as a commercial activity.

On a different but related note, in the well-known case of Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi [23], the test laid down for a "public body" was whether a said person, or body, is an instrumentality or agency of the State, and not as to how it was brought into existence, i.e., the idea is to find out why it was created, and not how. No doubt, the context of the judgment was Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and not the RTI Act. Nonetheless, considering that there is no apparent reason to distinguish between public bodies under Article 226 and under the RTI Act, what if this test were to be applied to the issue at hand? Since the IPR Think Tank has been created for the purpose of drawing up the National IPR Policy which obviously affects the public, it may not be entirely wrong to state, then, that it would fall within the ambit of "public authorities" the RTI Act .

[1] The Hindu Urban Cooperative Bank Limited and Ors . v. The State Information Commission and Ors. [2011] (Pun & Har HC)
available at - <http://indiankanoon.org/doc/155741837/>

[2] Mr. SK Choudhary v. Delhi Transco Limited [2010] (CIC) available at - < http://www.rti.india.gov.in/cic_decisions/SG-26022010-12.pdf>

[3] Shri Nisar Ahmed Shaikh and Ors. v. LIC Housing Finance Limited and Ors. [2009] (CIC) available at - < http://www.rti.india.gov.in/cic_decisions/FB-28102009-01.pdf>

[4] Veeresh Malik v. Indian Olympic Association [2006] (CIC) available at - http://www.rti.india.gov.in/cic_decisions/Decision_28112006_3.pdf >

[5] Mrs Navneet Kaur v. Electronics and Computer Software Export Promotion Council [2006] (CIC) available at - < http://cic.gov.in/CIC-Orders/CIC_Order_Dtd_22032006.pdf>

[6] Diamond Jubilee Higher Secondary School v. Union of India [2007] (Mad HC) available at - <http://indiankanoon.org/doc/563155/ >

[7] Dhara Singh Girls High School v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2008] AIR (All HC) available at - < http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1378411/>

[8] Mr. Tilak Raj Tanwar v. The PIO, Deputy Director of Education [2012] (CIC) available at - < http://rti.india.gov.in/cic_decisions/CIC_AD_A_2011_001699_M_73865.pdf >

[9] Krishak Bharti Cooperative Ltd. v. Ramesh Chander Bawa [2010] (Del HC) available at - < http://indiankanoon.org/doc/159896809/>

[10] New Tirupur Area Development v. State of Tamil Nadu [2010] (Mad HC) available at - < http://judis.nic.in/judis_chennai/qrydisp.aspx?filename=25472>

[11] Tamil Nadu Road Development Company Limited v. Tamil Nadu Information Commission [2008] 6 MLJ 737 (Mad HC) available at - < http://indiankanoon.org/doc/454066/>

[12] ibid .

[13] See n 12.

[14] See n 13.

[15] AC Bhanunni Valluvanattukara v. The Commissioner, Malabar Devaswom Board [2011] (Ker HC) available at - < http://judis.nic.in/judis_kerala/qrydisp.aspx?filename=239775>

[16] Indubala Agarwal v. National Commodity and Derivatives Exchange Ltd. [2010] (CIC) available at - <Part 1: http://www.rti.india.gov.in/cic_decisions/LS-01012010-08.pdf> and <Part 2 - http://www.rti.india.gov.in/cic_decisions/LS-08022010-06.pdf>.

[17] SS Angadi v. State Chief Information Commissioner [2009] 5 RCR (Civil) 312 (Kar HC) available at - < http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1198428/>

[18] Dattaprasad Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. Karnataka State Chief Information Commissioner [2009] 5 RCR (Civil) 833 (Kar HC) available at - < http://www.the-laws.com/Encyclopedia/Browse/Case?CaseId=018002943000 >

[19] Bidar District Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Karnataka Information Commission, Bangalore [2009] 5 RCR (Civil) 394 (Kar HC) available at - < http://www.the-laws.com/Encyclopedia/Browse/Case?CaseId=018002573000 >

[20] See n 1.

[21] See n 1.

[22] See n 16.

[23] Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi [1981] 2 SCR 79 (SC) available at - < http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1186368/>

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/national-ipr-policy-series-who-is-a-public-authority-under-rti-act

National IPR Policy Series: RTI Requests by CIS to DIPP + DIPP Responses

nehaa — 2015-04-26T08:47:00Z

In earlier blog posts, we have discussed the development of India’s National IPR Policy (“the Policy”); comments by the Centre for Internet and Society (“CIS”) to the IPR Think Tank before the release of the first draft of the Policy and CIS’ comments to the IPR Think Tank in response to the first draft of the Policy. Continuing our National IPR Policy Series, this article documents our requests to the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (“DIPP” / “the Department”) under the Right to Information (“RTI”) Act, 2005 and the responses of the Department.

View the PDF here.

Details of RTI Requests Filed by CIS

In February, 2015, CIS had filed three RTI requests with the DIPP. The first request was four-pronged, seeking information related to first, the process followed by the Department in the creation of the IPR Think Tank; second, details and documents of a meeting held to constitute the Think Tank; third, details and documents of all/multiple meetings held to constitute the Think Tank; fourth, details of a directive/directives received from any other Government Ministry/authority directing the constitution of the Think Tank and fifth, the process of shortlisting the members of the Think Tank by the DIPP.

In our second RTI request, first, we requested details of the process followed by the Think Tank in the formulation of the Policy; second, we requested all documents relating to a meeting held for the formulation of the Policy; third, we requested all documents held for multiple meetings for the creation of the Policy and fourth, we requisitioned all suggestions and comments received by the Think Tank from stakeholders before the release of the Policy, that is, those suggestions/comments received in November, 2014.

In our third RTI request, also filed on also filed in February, 2015, we had asked the DIPP to indicate all suggestions and comments received by the IPR Think Tank from different stakeholders in response to the first draft of the National IPR Policy (to have been submitted on or before January 30, 2015 as per DIPP’s Public Notice).

Responses by DIPP to CIS' RTI Requests

The DIPP replied to our three RTI requests in multiple stages. At first, in a letter dated 12 February, 2015, we were directed to resubmit our application , seemingly because we hadn’t addressed the Postal Money Order to the correct authority, and were directed to do the same. Funnily enough, we received three other responses – one for each of our RTI requests (the first of these is not dated; the second one is dated 19 February, 2015 and then revised to 26 February, 2015; and the third is also dated 26 February, 2015).

The First Response: On the Constitution of the Think Tank

In the first of their responses to these requests, the Department has grouped our queries into five questions and provided a point-wise response to these questions, as under:

Please indicate in detail the process followed by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion for the constitution for an IPR Think Tank to draft the National Intellectual Property Rights Policy under Public Notice No. 10 (22)/2013 –IPR-III dated November 13, 2014 (sic).

In its response the Department notes that it convened an interactive meeting on IPR issues which was chaired by the Minister for Commerce and Industry (Independent Charge), i.e., Ms. Nirmala Sitharaman. As per the Department’s response, this meeting was held on 22 September, 2014 (“the Meeting”) and was aimed at discussing issues related to IPRs, including finalization of the Terms of Reference for IPR Think-Tank proposed to be established (sic.) The Department also notes that representatives from various Ministries/Departments, Member of various Expert Committees constituted by the Department, besides IP experts and other Legal Practitioners (sic) were invited to the meeting. The Department then states that the composition of the Think Tank was decided on the basis of the discussions held in the department after the said interactive Meeting (sic).

If there was a meeting held to decide on the same, please include all necessary documents including the minutes of the meeting, records, documents, memos, e-mails, opinion, advices, press releases, circulars, orders etc in which the constitution of the aforesaid mentioned IPR Think Tank was decided (sic).

The Department has attached the Minutes of the Meeting held on 22 September, 2014 (“the Minutes”) and states that there were no documents or papers that were circulated at this meeting and that the participants were asked to present their views on various IP issues at this meeting.

Excerpts from the Minutes

The Secretary of the Department (Shri Amitabh Kant) refers to a (then) recent announcement made by the Minister of State for Commerce and Industry (“the Minister”) on the formulation of the National IPR Policy and the establishment of an IPR Think Tank and states that the meeting had been convened to discuss on various IPR issues with IP experts and legal practitioners so that it would provide essential inputs to the policy needs of the department (sic). The Minutes report that Mr. Kant further stated that the objective of the department was to have a world class IP system and that this included a comprehensive National IPR Policy and which takes care of various issues like IP creation, protection, administration and capacity building (sic). He is also reported to have said that such a stakeholder interaction was important for the government to seek inputs.

The Minister is reported to have said that the purpose of the meeting was to constitute an IP Think Tank that would regularly provide inputs to all IP policy needs of this department as well as advice government in disparate legal aspects (sic). The Minutes also report her to have said that the department would finalize an IP policy within ninety days of the Meeting, based on the inputs of the participants.

According to the Minutes, various issues emerged from the discussion. Inter alia, these include first, that the proposal to constitute the Think Tank was a welcome measure, along the lines of similar initiatives taken by Australia, South Kora, the United Kingdom and the United States of America; second, that in order to remove misconceptions held by foreign stakeholders about IP enforcement in India, there was a need to highlight judgments of Indian courts that were favorable to foreign stakeholders and MNCs; third, that the national policies on telecom, manufacturing and IP ought to be integrated; fourth, that the focus of the Policy should be increase in creation of IP including commercialization of IP and strengthening human capital and IP management and fifth, that empirical studies should be conducted to examine the feasibility of Utility Models protection, that there was a need to revise the law on Geographical Indications and that the Policy should include protection for traditional knowledge and guidelines for publicly funded research.

The Minister is then said to have identified six major areas during the discussion, including IP institution, legislation, implementation, public awareness, international aspects and barriers in IP growth as areas to be covered under the Policy.

Who attended the Meeting?

Attached with the Minutes was also a list of participants who attended the Meeting. Out of the thirty six attendees, I have not been able to locate a single individual or organization representing civil society. Participants include representatives from various government departments and ministries, including inter alia, the DIPP, the Department of Commerce, the Ministry of External Affairs, the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, the Copyright Division from the Department of Higher Education of the Ministry of Human Resources Development, the Office of the Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks and the Ministry of Culture. The Meeting was also attended by representatives of corporations and industry associations, including FICCI, CII and Cadila Pharmaceuticals; in addition to representatives from law firms including Luthra and Luthra, K&S Partners and Inventure IP and academics including, inter alia, faculty from the Asian School of Business, Trivandrum, Indian Law Institute, Delhi, Tezpur University, Assam, National Law University, Delhi, NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad, the Indian Institute of Technology, Madras and the National Law School of India University, Bangalore.

If there were multiple meetings held for the same please provide all necessary documents including the minutes of all such meetings, records, documents, memos, e-mails, opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, orders etc. for all such meetings held (sic).

The Department answered, “No”; which I’m taking to mean that there weren’t other meetings held for the formulation of the Think Tank or the Policy. This is interesting, because the Minutes (referred to earlier) speak of another inter-ministerial meeting including IP experts and legal practitioners slated to be held around the 10^th of October, 2014, to discuss the framework of the Policy.

If a directive or directives were received by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion from any other government body to constitute such a think tank, please provide a copy of such a directive received by the DIPP from any Government authority, to constitute such a Think Tank (sic).

The Department answered, “No”; which I’m taking to mean that there was no communication received by the Department to constitute this Think Tank.

Please indicate in detail the process of shortlisting the members of the IPR Think Tank by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion or any other body that was responsible for the same (sic).

The Department replied that the answer to this was the same as that to the first question.

The Second Response: The Drafting of the Policy

The second of the Department's responses to our requests came in the form of separate responses to each of our four questions, as under:

Please indicate in detail the process followed by the IPR Think Tank constituted by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion via Public Notice No. 10 (22)/2013-IPR-III dated November 13, 2014 while framing the first draft of the National IPR Policy dated Dec. 19, 2014 (sic).

The Department stated that the IPR Think Tank conducted its meetings independently without any interference from the Department. The Department then stated that the Think Tank had received comments from stakeholders via a dedicated email id and conducted the interactive meeting with stakeholders while framing the draft on the National IPR Policy.

If there was a meeting held to decide on the same, please include all necessary documents including the minutes of the meeting, records, documents, memos, e-mails, opinion, advices, press releases, circulars, orders, suggestions etc. related to drafting of such National IPR Policy Think Tank chaired by Justice Prabha Sridevan (sic).

The Department replied that since the IPR Think Tank had decided its process by themselves (sic), the Department do not have the minutes of the meeting etc. conducted by the IPR Think Tank (sic). It attached with its reply a copy of the press releases announcing the composition of the Think Tank and asking stakeholders to submit comments to the first draft of the Policy.

If there were multiple meetings held for the same, please provide all necessary documents including the minutes of all such meetings, records, documents, memos, e-mails, opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, order suggestions etc. for all such meetings held (sic).

The Department replied that the response to this was the same as that to the earlier question above.

Please provide all the suggestions and comments received by the IPR Think Tank from stakeholders after the DIPP issued Public Notice No. 10/22/2013-IPR-III dated 13.11.2014 asking for suggestions and comments on or before November 30, 2014 (sic).

The Department replied that the comments and suggestions were received by the Think Tank directly and that therefore, the Department was not in a position to provide the same.

The Third Response: Stakeholder Comments

In its third and final response to our requests, the DIPP replied to our query as under:

Please indicate all the suggestions and comments received by the IPR Think Tank by different stakeholders on or before January 30, 2015 on its first draft of the National Intellectual Property Policy submitted by the IPR Think Tank on December 19, 2014.

The Department said that the suggestions and comments on the draft on National IPR Policy have been received by the IPR Think Tank directly. As such this Department is not in a position to provide the same (sic.).

Observation on the DIPP's Responses

Prima facie, the responses by the Department are rather curious, leading to a range of oddities and unanswered questions.

Who Will Watch the IPR Think Tank

In its response to our first RTI request, the Department quite clearly stated that it decided the composition of the IPR Think Tank based on discussions in a meeting that it convened, which was also chaired by the Minister of State for Commerce and Industry, the parent ministry of the DIPP. In the same response, the Department also stated that it had not received any directive from any other ministry/government department directing the constitution of the IPR Think Tank, leading to the conclusion that this decision was taken by the DIPP/the Ministry of Commerce and Industry itself. Subsequently however, the Department justified its refusal to furnish us with documents leading to the development of the first draft of the National IPR Policy (contained in our second RTI request) by stating that the IPR Think Tank conducted its business without any interference from the Department, and that the Department did not have access to any of the submissions made to the IPR Think Tank or any of the internal minutes of the meetings etc. that were a part of the process of drafting the IPR Policy.

Various press releases by the DIPP have stated that it has constituted the IPR Think Tank, and that the purpose of the IPR Think Tank would be to advise the Department on IPR issues. Visibly, the Department intends for the IPR Think Tank to play an active role in shaping India’s IP law and policy, including suggesting amendments to laws wherever necessary. It is concerning therefore that on the question of accountability of the IPR Think Tank, the DIPP remains silent. It may be argued perhaps, that the IPR Think Tank constitutes a ‘public authority’ under Section 2(h)(d) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (“RTI Act”). In that case, the IPR Think Tank would have to fulfill, inter alia, all of the obligations under Section 4 of the RTI Act as well as designate a Public Information Officer. Alternatively, given that the IPR Think Tank has been constituted by the DIPP and performs functions for the DIPP, the Public Information Officer of the DIPP would have to furnish all relevant information under the RTI Act (including the information that we sought in our requests, which was not provided to us).

Who are the Stakeholders

Even a preliminary look at the list of participants at the Meeting (based on which the Department constituted the IPR Think Tank) reveals that not all stakeholders have been adequately represented. I haven’t been able to spot any representation from civil society and other organizations that might be interested in a more balanced intellectual property framework that is not rights-heavy. The following chart (based on a total sample size of 36 participants, as stated in the list of participants provided to us by the DIPP) will help put things in perspective.

What Could've Been Done?

Setting aside arguments on its necessity, let us for the moment assume that this drafting of the National IPR Policy is an exercise that needed to have been undertaken. We must now examine what might possibly be the best way to go about this.

In 2014, the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) (based on whose approach the Policy seems to have been based- at least in part), produced a detailed Methodology for the Development of National Intellectual Property Strategies, outlining a detailed eight step process before a National IP Policy was implemented in a Member State. While this approach is one to be followed by the WIPO and might not be entirely suited to India’s drafting exercise, specific sections on the national consultation process as well as the drafting and implementation of national intellectual property strategies might prove to be a decent starting point.

(More on this in an upcoming article).d

Where Do We Go From Here?

The DIPP’s responses have left me with more questions, probably the subject of more RTI requests. Is the IPR Think Tank a public authority for the purposes of the Right to Information Act, 2005? To whom should questions of informational accountability of the IPR Think Tank be addressed, if there is no information available on the IPR Think Tank, and the DIPP claims to have no access to it? Do we need to re-examine the draft National IPR Policy given that there has been inadequate representation of all stakeholders? What were the suggestions made by different stakeholders, and (how) have these been reflected in the first draft of the Policy? Was there an evaluation exercise conducted before the first draft of the Policy was released in order to better inform the formulation of the Policy?

We will be looking at these and other questions as they arise, and sending some of these to the DIPP in the form of RTI requests. (Watch the blog for more).

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/national-ipr-policy-series-rti-requests-by-cis-to-dipp-dipp-responses