Centre for Internet and Society

IANA Transition & ICANN Accountability Process and India' s Position

jyoti — 2015-08-23T09:26:06Z

Jyoti Panday participated in the workshop organized by CCAOI on "IANA Transition & ICANN Accountability Process and India' s Position" on May 30, 2015.

Dr Ajay Kumar launched the IANA Transition Report and set the context for the workshop. Dr Mahesh Uppal was the moderator of the panel and other participants included Mr Samiran Gupta, ICANN providing an overview of the current status on the transition, Mr Parminder Singh, IT for Change and Mr Rahul Sharma, DSCI sharing concerns of different stakeholders.

The panel also saw discussion on issues in the transition process that are of relevance to India and what should their position going forward including ensuring the efficiency of ICANN Functions included in the CWG draft proposal.

CIS raised issues around financial accountability and the role of ICANN in shaping markets therefore the urgent need for improving transparency and accountability measures.

The report launched at the workshop is available here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/iana-transition-icann-accountability-process-indian-position

Where Does ICANN’s Money Come From? We Asked; They Don’t Know

geetha — 2015-03-05T07:43:45Z

Just how transparent is ICANN? How responsive are they to requests for information? At CIS, we sent ICANN ten questions seeking information about, inter alia, their revenues, commitment to the NETmundial Principles, Globalisation Advisory Groups and organisational structure. Geetha Hariharan wonders at ICANN's reluctance to respond.

Why Is ICANN Here?

The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is responsible for critical backbones of the Internet. It manages the root server system, the global allocation of IP addresses, protocol registries and the domain name system (management of gTLDs, ccTLDs, as well as the newly rolled-out “new gTLDs”).

ICANN was incorporated in California in 1998, and was intended as the technical coordination body for the backbone of the Internet. That is, it was to administer the Internet’s domain names and IP addresses, and also manage the Internet root servers.

As a result of an agreement with the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) in the US Department of Commerce, ICANN is the IANA functions operator. It carries out the IANA functions, which include making changes to the root zone file (the backbone of the domain name system), allocation of IP address blocks to the five Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), and maintaining protocol parameter registries in collaboration with the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). The RIRs are responsible for allocating IP addresses (IPv4 and IPv6) to national and local Internet registries. The IETF develops Internet standards and protocols, such as those within the TCP/IP suite. To be clear, ICANN does not make policy for the IP address or Internet standards/protocols; those are the domains of RIRs and the IETF, respectively.

ICANN, Domain Names and All That Buried Treasure

ICANN is the de facto policy-making body for domain names. Through ICANN’s community Supporting Organisations and Advisory Committees (SOACs) – largely a multi-stakeholder community – ICANN determines policies for dispute resolution (see, for instance, the UDRP for domain name disputes), maintaining the WHOIS database, etc. for domain names.

Under its contracts with Top Level Domain (TLD) Registries, ICANN receives payment for all registrations and/or renewals of domain names. For instance, under the .bharti Registry Agreement, ICANN receives a fixed annual registry free of US $6250. If there are more than 50,000 registrations or renewals of domain names under a TLD (say, .bharti) in a quarter, then ICANN also receives an amount equal to (No. of registrations or renewals X US $0.25). TLD Registries “own” TLDs like .com, and they maintain a list of all the domain names registered under that TLD. There are around 816 such Registry Agreements, and in FY14, ICANN received over US $47 million in Registry fees [see page 7].

Similar agreements exist between ICANN and domain name Registrars accredited by it, too. Domain name Registrars are entities like Go Daddy and Big Rock, from whom people like you and me (or companies) can register domain names. Only Registrars accredited by ICANN can register domain names that will be included in the ICANN DNS, the most frequently used DNS on the Web. Each Registrar pays a yearly accreditation fee of US $4000 to ICANN (see Clause 3.9). Each Registrar also pays to ICANN fees for every domain name registration or renewal. There are over 500 ICANN-accredited Registrars, and in FY14, ICANN received over US $34.5 million in Registrar fees [see page 7].

Now, apart from this, in its IANA operator role, ICANN is responsible for the global allocation of IP addresses (IPv4 and IPv6). From the global pool of IP addresses, ICANN allocates to the five Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), which then allocate to National Internet Registries like the National Internet Exchange of India (NIXI as IRINN), local Internet registries or ISPs. For this, ICANN receives a combined contribution of US $823,000 each year as revenue from RIRs [see, ex.: FY09 Financial Statements, page 3].

And this isn’t all of it! With its new gTLD program, ICANN is sitting on a large treasure trove. Each gTLD application cost US $185,000, and there were 1930 applications in the first round (that’s US $357 million). Where there arose disagreements as to the same or similar strings, ICANN initiated an auction process. Some new gTLDs were auctioned for as high as US $6 million.

So ICANN is sitting on a great deal of treasure (US $355 million in revenues in FY14 and growing). It accumulates revenue from a variety of quarters; the sources identified above are by no means the only revenue-sources. But ICANN is unaware of, or unwilling to disclose, all its sources of revenue.

ICANN's Troubling Scope-creep and Does Transparency Matter?

At CIS, we are concerned by ICANN’s unchecked influence and growing role in the Internet governance institutional space. For instance, under its CEO Fadi Chehade, ICANN was heavily involved backstage for NETmundial, and has set aside over US $200,000 for Mr. Chehade’s brainchild, the NETmundial Initiative. Coupled with its lack of transparency and vocal interests in furthering status quo (for instance, both the names and numbers communities’ proposals for IANA transition want ICANN to remain the IANA functions operator, without stringent safeguards), this makes for a dangerous combination.

The clearest indication lies in the money, one might say. As we have written before, ICANN budgets for less than US $10 million for providing core Internet functions out of a US $160 million strong budget (Budget FY15, page 17). It has budgeted, in comparison, US $13 million for travel and meetings alone, and spent over US $18 million on travel in FY14 (Budget FY15, page 11).

To its credit, ICANN makes public its financial statements (current and historic), and community discussions are generally open. However, given the understandably complex contractual arrangements that give ICANN its revenues, even ploughing through the financials does not give one a clear picture of where ICANN’s money comes from.

So one is left with questions such as the following: Which entities (and how many of them) pay ICANN for domain names? What are the vendor payments received by ICANN and who pays? Who all have paid ICANN under the new gTLD program, and for what purposes? Apart from application fees and auctions, what other heads of payment exist? How much does each RIR pay ICANN and what for, if IP addresses are not property to be sold? For how many persons (and whom all) does ICANN provide pay for, to travel to meetings and other events?

You may well ask why these questions matter, and whether we need greater transparency. To put it baldly: ICANN’s transparency is crucial. ICANN is today something of a monopoly; it manages the IANA functions, makes policy for domain names and is increasingly active in Internet governance. It is without greater (effective) accountability than a mere review by the NTIA, and some teething internal mechanisms like the Documentary Information Disclosure Policy (DIDP), Ombudsman, Reconsideration and Independent Review and the Accountability and Transparency Review (ATRT). I could elaborate on why these mechanisms are inadequate, but this post is already too long. Suffice it to say that by carefully defining these mechanisms and setting out their scope, ICANN has stifled their effectiveness. For instance, a Reconsideration Request can be filed if one is aggrieved by an action of ICANN’s Board or staff. Under ICANN’s By-laws (Article IV, Section 2), it is the Board Governance Committee, comprising ICANN Board members, that adjudicates Reconsideration Requests. This simply violates the principles of natural justice, wherein one may not be a judge in one’s own cause (nemo debet esse judex in propria causa).

Moreover, ICANN serves corporate interests, for it exists on account of contractual arrangements with Registries, Registrars, the NTIA and other sundry entities. ICANN has also troublingly reached into Internet governance domains to which it was previously closed, such as the NETmundial Initiative, the NETmundial, the IGF and its Support Association. It is unclear that ICANN was ever intended to overreach so, a point admitted by Mr. Chehade himself at the ICANN Open Forum in Istanbul (IGF 2014).

Finally, despite its professed adherence to multi-stakeholderism, there is evidence that ICANN’s policy-making and functioning revolve around small, cohesive groups with multiple professional inter-linkages with other I-Star organisations. For instance, a revolving door study by CIS of the IANA Coordination Group (ICG) found that 20 out of 30 ICG members had close and longterm ties with I-Star organisations. This surely creates concern as to the impartiality and fairness of the ICG’s decision-making. It may, for instance, make a pro-ICANN outcome inevitable – and that is definitely a serious worry.

But ICANN is intended to serve the public interest, to ensure smooth, stable and resilient running of the Internet. Transparency is crucial to this, and especially so during the IANA transition phase. As advisor Jan Scholte asked at ICANN52, what accountability will ICANN exercise after the transition, and to whom will it be accountable? What, indeed, does accountability mean? The CCWG-Accountability is still asking that question. But meanwhile, one among our cohorts at CIS has advocated transparency as a check-and-balance for power.

The DIDP process at ICANN may prove useful in the long run, but does it suffice as a transparency mechanism?

ICANN's Responses to CIS' DIDP Requests

Over December ’14 and January ’15, CIS sent 10 DIDP requests to ICANN. Our aim was to test and encourage transparency from ICANN, a process crucial given the CCWG-Accountability’s deliberations on ways to enhance ICANN’s accountability. We have received responses for 9 of our requests. We summarise ICANN’s responses in a table: please go here.

A glance at the table above will show that ICANN’s responses are largely negative. In 7 requests out of 9, ICANN provides very little new information. Though the responses are detailed, the majority of information they provide is already identified in CIS’ requests. For instance, in the response to the NETmundial Request, ICANN links us to blogposts written by CEO Fadi Chehade, where he notes the importance of translating the NETmundial Principles into action. They also link us to the Final Report of the Panel on Global Internet Cooperation and Governance Mechanism, and ICANN’s involvement in the NETmundial Initiative.

However, to the query on ICANN’s own measures of implementing the NETmundial Principles – principles that it has lauded and upheld for the entire Internet governance community – ICANN’s response is surprisingly evasive. Defending lack of action, they note that “ICANN is not the home for implementation of the NETmundial Principles”. But ICANN also responds that they already implement the NETmundial Principles: “Many of the NETmundial Principles are high-level statements that permeate through the work of any entity – particularly a multistakeholder entity like ICANN – that is interested in the upholding of the inclusive, multistakeholder process within the Internet governance framework” (emphasis provided). One wonders, then, at the insistence on creating documents involving such high-level principles; why create them if they’re already implemented?

Responses to other requests indicate that the DIDP is, in its current form, unable to provide the transparency necessary for ICANN’s functioning. For instance, in the response to the Ombudsman Request, ICANN cites confidentiality as a reason to decline providing information. Making Ombudsman Requests public would violate ICANN Bylaws, and topple the independence and integrity of the Ombudsman.

These are, perhaps, valid reasons to decline a DIDP request. But it is also important to investigate these reasons. ICANN’s Ombudsman is appointed by the ICANN Board for 2 year terms, under Clause V of ICANN’s Bylaws. The Ombudsman’s principal function is to “provide an independent internal evaluation of complaints by members of the ICANN community who believe that the ICANN staff, Board or an ICANN constituent body has treated them unfairly”. The Ombudsman reports only to the ICANN Board, and all matters before it are kept confidential, including the names of parties and the nature of complaints. The Ombudsman reports on the categories of complaints he receives, and statistics regarding decisions in his Annual Reports; no details are forthcoming for stated reasons of confidentiality and privacy.

This creates a closed circle in which the Ombudsman operates. The ICANN Board appoints the Ombudsman. He/she listens to complaints about unfair treatment by the ICANN Board, Staff or constituency. He/she reports to the ICANN Board alone. However, neither the names of parties, the nature of complaints, nor the decisions of the Ombudsman are publicly available. Such a lack of transparency throws doubt on the functioning of the Ombudsman himself – and on his independence, neutrality and the extent of ICANN’s influence on him/her. An amendment of ICANN’s Bylaws would then be imperative to rectify this problem; this matter is squarely within the CCWG-Accountability’s mandate and should be addressed.

As is clear from the above examples, ICANN’s DIDP is an inadequate tool to ensure transparency functioning. The Policy was crafted without community input, and requires substantial amendments to make it a sufficient transparency mechanism. CIS’ suggestions in this regard shall be available in our next post.

CIS' Annual Reports are here. Our audit is ongoing, and the Annual Report for 2013-14 will be up shortly. Pranav Bidare (3rd year) of the National Law School, Bangalore assisted with research for this post, and created the table of CIS' DIDP requests and responses.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/where-does-icann2019s-money-come-from-we-asked-they-don2019t-know

ICANN accountability, IANA transition and open questions

geetha — 2015-02-06T11:39:21Z

On February 3, 2015, the Centre for Communication Governance (NLU, Delhi) hosted a pre-event briefing in light of ICANN52 (Singapore, February 7-12, 2015). Geetha Hariharan attended the event.

At a briefing on ICANN52 organized by the Centre for Communication Governance (NLU, Delhi) on 3 February, 2015 (‘CCG Briefing Event’), consensus was seen on two broad things: ICANN’s processes on IANA transition and accountability are crucial for Internet governance this year, and India’s participation (both municipal and international) is wanting. The meeting, which saw discussion following the Chatham House rules, was attended by members from industry associations, government and civil society. A light parsing of the current proposals from the CWG-Names and CRISP (the names and numbers communities) for IANA transition brought the composition of the transition proposals under scrutiny.

CRISP and the proposed Service Level Agreements:

The proposal from the numbers community, the CRISP, suggests that ICANN and the five RIRs enter into Service Level Agreements. Under the proposal, existing accountability, oversight and policy development mechanisms remain unchanged, with ICANN agreeing to perform IANA functions to meet requisite service levels. If it fails to meet such standards, the RIRs may terminate the contract or refuse to renew it.

The CRISP proposal does not look beyond ICANN for an IANA functions operator, and places its faith entirely in ICANN’s past performance of numbering IANA functions. As so many have said before, the CRISP proposal is blithe in its lack of review mechanism or safeguards, having even fewer safeguards than the CWG-Names proposal. Doubtless, a cause for concern.

CWG-Names and the Four New Entities:

The CWG-Names proposal suggests that four new entities be created to replace the NTIA’s role under the IANA Functions Contract. Under the proposal, ICANN will continue to be the IANA Functions Operator for the present. It will enter into an IANA Functions Contract with “Contract Co.”, a new shell entity which will replace NTIA as the contracting party. Contract Co. is to be a lightweight entity, with few staff or administrative capabilities.

At present, the NTIA performs what it considers a “clerical role” in its oversight of the DNS. However, the IANA Functions Contract also includes review functions, such as the rebidding and renewal process to determine whether ICANN (or some other entity) ought to continue as the IANA functions operator. Under the CWG-Names proposal, these review functions, which also include budget reviews, reporting, etc. are to be carried out by a “Multi-stakeholder Review Team (MRT)”, the terms of whose composition are as yet undecided.

The composition of the MRT is crucial to an independent and representative oversight of IANA. At the CCG Briefing Event, concerns were raised as to the representation of ccTLDs on the MRT. Not all ccTLDs are represented in the ICANN ecosystem, in the ccNSO; 152 ccTLDs are members of the ccNSO. Of course, one may argue that this concern exists under the present IANA functions contract as well. But the devil is in the details, or lack thereof. We don’t know, for instance, who will populate the MRT, whether they will enjoy immunities normally reserved for diplomatic or consular agents, or most importantly, what relationship the MRT will enjoy with ICANN. Will there be a contract with ICANN, or a memorandum of understanding that sets out ICANN’s responsibilities, failing which the IANA contract may be terminated?

The third new creation of the CWG-Names proposal is the “Customer Standing Committee (CSC)”. While the CSC’s composition is also nebulous, its functions are to work with the MRT to establish Service Levels and Performance Indicators for the naming functions, and to receive performance reports from the IANA operator (ICANN). Clause C.2.8 of the present IANA functions contract requires that the IANA operator (ICANN) develop performance standards for all enumerated IANA functions (see Clause C.2.9.1 to C.2.9.4), and also to report on them (Clause C.4). Presumably, the CSC will fill the role of the NTIA’s Contracting Officer’s Representative in receiving these performance reports.

The fourth and final new entity is the “Independent Appeals Panel (IAP)”, the composition of which is also undecided. The IAP is intended to hear and adjudicate all actions related to the root zone or root zone WHOIS, and under the present proposal, the CWG-Names suggests it should be constituted from time to time in the manner of a binding arbitration process. However, it should be noted that the CWG-Names proposal is unclear whether the IAP decisions are binding on or advisory to the ICANN Board. Concerns of the IAP’s composition aside, dangers of making its decisions only advisory to the ICANN Board loom large and real, and the CCG Briefing Event reflected this.

Already, the ICANN Board wields extensive power with regard to policy decisions. For instance, policies developed under the global policy development process by Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) may be rejected by the ICANN Board by a 2/3rds majority vote. Such a rejection may result in a mediation process according to agreed procedure. Another instance is the change in the ICANN Board’s treatment of GAC advice. Prior to the amendment to ICANN’s Bye-laws, the Board was not required to provide reasons for its rejection of GAC advice. In its present form, Article XI, Section 2(1) of ICANN’s Bye-laws make such reasons mandatory. How ought IAP decisions be treated, as binding or advisory? If they are to be binding, ICANN or any other IANA functions operator will have to enter into a legal arrangement (by contract or MoU, or in the best case, an amendment to ICANN Bye-laws).

Dodging the real issues: ICANN incumbency, IANA separation and where will all the money come from?

Both the CWG-Names and CRISP proposals skim past certain issues relating to ICANN’s incumbency in the IANA role. The first concern, of course, is whether ICANN should continue to be the IANA functions operator. Both proposals accept ICANN’s role, suggesting no change. While there are compelling reasons for ICANN’s continued role as IANA functions operator, unquestioning incumbency is equal to lack of accountability. And as neither proposal sets out a review process (the CWG-Names proposal only mentions that the MRT shall have this function), it is a concern.

Perhaps the CCWG-Accountability, convened under the Enhancing ICANN Accountability process, is better equipped to provide suggestions. However, the CCWG-Accountability is hard-pressed for time. Its two Workstreams, dealing with IANA transition related accountability mechanisms and ICANN’s internal accountability, are unlikely to see desired progress before the transition deadline of September 2015. For instance, within the CCWG-Accountability, a debate is ongoing as to ICANN’s composition. At the time of its incorporation, a suggestion that ICANN ought to have statutory members was floated, but turned down. The suggestion has reared its head again in the CCWG-Accountability, to consider checks and balances on the ICANN Board.

The second concern relates to IANA’s continued existence within ICANN, without separation of policy and implementation. This concern has been clamouring for attention for many months. Milton Mueller, for instance, has recommended structural separation of IANA and ICANN, as did I and others during the course of the face-to-face meetings of the CWG-Names (I attended remotely).

A structural separation is beneficial for many reasons. It enforces a simple separation of powers. “When”, as Montesquieu stated, “the legislative and the executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may rise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner”. Tyranny is speaking in terms too extreme for ICANN, perhaps, it is undeniable that ICANN has grown larger in scope and size from its original incorporation. It was incorporated, as Professor DeNardis has noted [Protocol Politics, 161], to perform technical coordination of the global DNS and other functions performed originally by Jon Postel as IANA.

Today, in addition to technical coordination and policy-setting for names and numbers (through the gPDP), ICANN is a major player in the Internet governance institutional space; its involvement in and aggressive marketing of the NETmundial Initiative is but an example. For instance, ICANN budgets for less than US $10 million for providing core Internet functions out of a US $160 million strong budget (FY2015). It has budgeted, in comparison, US $13 million for travel and meetings alone (FY2015). Separating IANA from ICANN will, as others have suggested, protect it from political or other influences within ICANN.

In any event, once the NTIA terminates the IANA functions contract, IANA is not strictly required to be within the US. At the moment, Clause C.2.1 of the IANA functions contract requires that the IANA functions operator be “a wholly U.S. owned and operated firm or fully accredited United States University or College operating in one of the 50 states of the United States or District of Columbia; b) incorporated within one of the fifty (50) states of the United States or District of Columbia; and c) organized under the laws of a state of the United States or District of Columbia”.

Were structural separation to be achieved, IANA could be incorporated in another, neutral jurisdiction. Not only would be assuage optical considerations and ensure separation of powers, but as our experience with filtering on the Internet shows (see, for instance, the Open Net Initiative’s research), unilateral controls are much harder to enforce when the apparatus is decentralized.

The third concern raised at the CCG Briefing Event concerned the funding of the new entities proposed by the CWG-Names. Would these entities be self-financing, or perhaps ICANN would support them? While some participants felt ICANN could also provide financial support, this would, in my view, bring ICANN too close to its oversight entities, and increase chances of influence.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann-accountability-iana-transition-and-open-questions

Revolving Door Analysis: IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group

Lakshmi Venkataraman — 2014-12-16T05:44:40Z

The IANA Stewardship Coordination Group (ICG) is the body that will accept and coordinate different proposals for IANA transition. It will make the global Internet community's final proposal for transition to the NTIA. Lakshmi Venkataraman finds that a majority of the ICG's membership have had longstanding affiliations with I-star organisations. What will this mean for IANA transition?

Following the NTIA’s announcement of its decision to not renew the IANA Functions contract, ICANN instituted a process in search of an alternative oversight mechanism. The IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group (ICG), comprising 30 individuals, is the body set up to accept and coordinate proposals for IANA transition, and after this, to make a final proposal to the NTIA. ICANN claims that the ICG comprises individuals representing 13 different communities and the interests of different stakeholders (direct and indirect), including those of governments, technical community and non-commercial users.

The communities represented in the ICG are as follows:

ALAC – At-Large Advisory Committee to ICANN
ASO – Policy making body of ICANN w.r.t. IP addresses
ccNSO – Policy making body of ICANN w.r.t. ccTLDs
GNSO – Makes recommendations on gTLDs to the ICANN Board
IAB – Deals with technical and engineering aspects of the ISOC
IETF – Deals with the development of standards under the ISOC
NRO – Policy Advisor to ICANN w.r.t. IP addresses
SSAC – Advisory body of ICANN, w.r.t. security of naming systems
RSSAC – Advisory body of ICANN, w.r.t. operation, security and integrity of the Internet’s Root Server System

Now, the ICG has been set up to devise and present to the NTIA, an IANA transition proposal that incorporates views and concerns of diverse stakeholders of the global Internet community. The composition of the ICG is, for this purpose, an indicator of the nature of proposals that may find final favour.

At CIS, we examined the affiliations of ICG members with this in mind. Our assumptions are two-fold: (1) greater the diversity in ICG membership, greater the chance of diverse views being heard and represented, including those departing from the status quo; (2) conversely, if the ICG members have histories of affiliations to existing centres of power in global Internet governance (say, the I* organisations), chances of status quo being maintained are greater.

Our findings are presented in tabular format below:

(X – Unknown number of years spent in the organization)

I-star Organisation ________________ Name of person	ICANN	IETF	IAB	W3C	ISOC	AfriNIC	ARIN	APNIC	LACNIC	RIPE-NCC
Patrik Faltstrom	3	X	X	-	3	-	-	-	-	-
Paul Wilson	X	-	-	-	X	-	-	16	-	-
Lynn St. Amour	-	-	13	-	16	-	-	-	-	-
Jari Arkko	-	8	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Keith Davidson	4	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-
Demi Getschko	4	-	-	-	11	-	-	-	-	-
Russell Housley	-	6	1.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Xiaodong Lee	2	X	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Elise Gerich	4	-	X	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hartmut Glaser	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
Wolf Ulrich Knobben	4	-	-	-	X	-	-	-	-	-
Russ Mundy	X	X	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kuo-Wei Wu	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	-	-
Narelle Clark	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-
Daniel Karrenberg	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	-
Mohamed el Bashir	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Martin Boyle	X	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Keith Drazek	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Jean Jacques Subrenat	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
James Bladel	†	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

(† - To serve on the GNSO Council from November 2015.)

As you will have noticed, 20 out of 30 ICG members (66.67%) have occupied positions in seemingly different organizations, but in actuality, these are organisations with very close links to each other. We see not 13, but 2 organizations that all the communities seem to be affiliated to, i.e., ICANN and ISOC. It seems all too ironic that the body that has been allocated the task of the IANA functions’ transition, in line with the ‘multi-stakeholder’ model, is itself representative of only 2 organizations.

A prodding into the histories of these 30 members from ‘varied’ backgrounds reveals that most of them have rotationally served in the I-Star organizations. A close reading of their bio-data (from their ICANN and LinkedIn pages) reveals our findings on the number of years several of the members of the IANA Stewardship Transition Cooperation Group, have spent at the I-Star organizations.

It is not rocket science to recognise the power the I* organisations have over Internet governance today. Indeed, ICANN tells us that the I* run the Internet. They are the leaders of the status quo.

But the IANA transition is anything but an affirmation of the status quo. Stakeholders and participants in IANA transition (in the CWG, CRISP and IETF) have raised serious concerns about the desirability of IANA continuing within ICANN, and about ICANN’s (inadequate) accountability and transparency. True, ICANN has instituted processes to enable discussion on these issues, and the ICG is part of the process. It is entrusted with the momentous task of shifting from the status quo of the IANA Functions contract to a new mechanism of oversight. Given its composition, an assumption that the ICG may have vested interests in maintaining status quo is not out-of-the-way. In fact, some members of the ICG have previously made statements to the effect that Internet is not broken, and it does not need fixing. This poses a real danger to the IANA transition process and the global Internet community must demand safeguards.

Lakshmi Venkataraman performed the revolving door analysis on the ICG. She is a IV year at NALSAR University of Law and an intern at CIS during December 2014. Geetha Hariharan assisted in writing this post.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/ianas-revolving-door

IANA Transition: Suggestions for Process Design

Smarika Kumar — 2014-06-22T09:15:21Z

With analysis of community-input and ICANN processes, Smarika Kumar offers concrete suggestions for process design. She urges the Indian government to take a stronger position in matters of IANA transition.

Introduction:

On 14 March 2014, the NTIA of the US Government announced its intention to transition key internet domain name functions to the global multistakeholder community. These key internet domain name functions comprise functions executed by Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), which is currently contracted to ICANN by the US government. The US Government delineated that the IANA transition proposal must have broad community support and should address the following four principles:

Support and enhance the multistakeholder model;
Maintain the security, stability, and resiliency of the Internet DNS;
Meet the needs and expectation of the global customers and partners of the IANA services; and
Maintain the openness of the Internet.

Additionally, the US Government asked ICANN to convene a multistakeholder process to develop the transition plan for IANA. In April 2014, ICANN issued a Scoping Document for this process which outlined the scope of the process, as well as, what ICANN thinks, should not be a part of the process. In the spirit of ensuring broad community consensus, ICANN issued a Call for Public Input on the Draft Proposal of the Principles, Mechanisms and Process to Develop a Proposal to Transition NTIA’s Stewardship of IANA Functions on 8 April 2014, upon which the Government of India made its submission.

ICANN is currently deliberating the process for the development of a proposal for transition of IANA functions from the US Government to the global multistakeholder community, a step which would have implications for internet users all over the world, including India. The outcome of this process will be a proposal for IANA transition. The Scoping Document and process for development of the proposal are extremely limited and exclusionary, hurried, and works in ways which could potentially further ICANN’s own interests instead of global public interests. Accordingly, the Government of India is recommended take a stand on the following key points concerning the suggested process.

Submissions by the Government of India thus far, have however, failed to comment on the process being initiated by ICANN to develop a proposal for IANA transition. While the actual outcome of the process in form of a proposal for transition is an important issue for deliberation, we hold that it is of immediate importance that the Government of India, along with all governments of the world, pay particular attention to the way ICANN is conducting the process itself to develop the IANA transition proposal. The scrutiny of this process is of immense significance in order to ensure that democratic and representative principles sought by the GoI in internet governance are being upheld within the process of developing the IANA transition proposal. How the governance of the IANA functions will be structured will be an outcome of this process. Therefore if one expects a democratic, representative and transparent governance of IANA functions as the outcome, it is absolutely essential to ensure that the process itself is democratic, representative and transparent.

Issues and Recommendations:

Ensuring adequate representation and democracy of all stakeholders in the process for developing the proposal for IANA transition is essential to ensuring representative and democratic outcomes. Accordingly, one must take note of the following issues and recommendations concerning the process.

Open, inclusive deliberation by global stakeholders must define the Scope of the Process for developing proposal for IANA transition:

The current Scoping Document was issued by ICANN to outline the scope of the process by which the proposal for IANA transition would be deliberated. The Scoping Document was framed unilaterally by ICANN, without involvement of the global stakeholder community, and excluding all governments of the world including USA. Although this concern was voiced by a number of submissions to the Public Call by ICANN on the Draft Proposal, such concern was not reflected in ICANN’s Revised Proposal of 6 June 2014. It merely states that the Scoping Document outlines the “focus of this process.” Such a statement is not enough because the focus as well as the scope of the process needs to be decided in a democratic, unrepresentative and transparent manner by the global stakeholder community, including all governments.

This unilateral approach to outline which aspects of IANA transition should be allowed for discussion, and which aspects should not, itself defeats the multistakeholder principle which ICANN and the US government claim the process is based on. Additionally, global community consensus which the US Govt. hopes for the outcome of such process, cannot be conceivable when the scope of such process is decided in a unilateral and undemocratic manner. Accordingly, the current Scoping Document should be treated only as a draft, and should be made open to public comment and discussion by the global stakeholder community in order that the scope of the process reflects concerns of global stakeholders, and not just of the ICANN or the US Government.

Accountability of ICANN must be linked to IANA Transition within Scope of the Process:

ICANN Accountability must not run merely as a parallel process, since ICANN accountability has direct impact on IANA transition. The current Scoping Document states, “NTIA exercises no operational role in the performance of the IANA functions. Therefore, ICANN’s role as the operator of the IANA functions is not the focus of the transition: it is paramount to maintain the security, stability, and resiliency of the DNS, and uninterrupted service to the affected parties.” However this rationale to exclude ICANN’s role as operator of IANA from the scope of the process is not sound because NTIA does choose to appoint ICANN as the operator of IANA functions, thereby playing a vicarious operational role in the performance of IANA functions.

The explicit exclusion of ICANN’s role as operator of IANA functions from the scope of the process works to serve ICANN’s own interests by preventing discussions on those alternate models where ICANN does not play the operator role. Basically, this presumes that in absence of NTIA stewardship ICANN will control the IANA functions. Such presumption raises disturbing questions regarding ICANN’s accountability as the IANA functions operator. If discussions on ICANN’s role as operator of IANA functions is to be excluded from the process of developing the proposal for IANA transition, it also implies exclusion of discussions regarding ICANN’s accountability as operator of these functions.

Although ICANN announced a process to enhance its accountability on 6 May 2014, this was designed as a separate, parallel process and de-linked from the IANA transition process. As shown, ICANN’s accountability, its role as convenor of IANA transition process, and its role as current and/or potential future operator of IANA functions are intrinsically linked, and must not be discussed in separate, but parallel process. It is recommended that ICANN accountability in the absence of NTIA stewardship, and ICANN’s role as the operator of IANA functions must be included within the Scoping Document as part of the scope of the IANA transition process. This is to ensure that no kind of IANA transition is executed without ensuring ICANN’s accountability as and if as the operator of IANA functions so that democracy and transparency is brought to the governance of IANA functions.

Misuse or appearance of misuse of its convenor role by ICANN to influence outcome of the Process must not be allowed:

ICANN has been designated the convenor role by the US Govt. on basis of its unique position as the current IANA functions contractor and the global co-ordinator for the DNS. However it is this unique position itself which creates a potential for abuse of the process by ICANN. As the current contractor of IANA functions, ICANN has an interest in the outcome of the process being conducive to ICANN. In other words, ICANN prima facie is an interested party in the IANA transition process, which may tend to steer the process towards an outcome favourable to itself. ICANN has already been attempting to set the scope of the process to develop the proposal for IANA transition unilaterally, thus abusing its position as convenor. ICANN has also been trying to separate the discussions on IANA transition and its own accountability by running them as parallel processes, as well as attempting to prevent questions on ICANN’s role as operator of IANA functions by excluding it from the Scoping Document. Such instances provide a strong rationale for defining the limitations of the role of ICANN as convenor.

Although ICANN’s Revised Proposal of 6 June 2014 stating that ICANN will have a neutral role, and the Secretariat will be independent of ICANN staff is welcome, additional safeguards need to be put in place to avoid conflicts of interest or appearance of conflicts of interest. The Revised Proposal itself was unilaterally issued, whereby ICANN incorporated some of the comments made on its Proposed Draft, in the revised Draft, but excluded some others without providing rationale for the same. For instance, comments regarding inclusion of ICANN’s role as the operator of IANA functions within the Scoping Document, were ignored by ICANN in its Revised Proposal.

It is accordingly suggested that ICANN should limit its role to merely facilitating discussions and not extend it to reviewing or commenting on emerging proposals from the process. ICANN should further not compile comments on drafts to create a revised draft at any stage of the process. Additionally, ICANN staff must not be allowed to be a part of any group or committee which facilitates or co-ordinates the discussion regarding IANA transition.

Components of Diversity Principle should be clearly enunciated in the Draft Proposal:

The Diversity Principle was included by ICANN in the Revised Proposal of 6 June 2014 subsequent to submissions by various stakeholders who raised concerns regarding developing world participation, representation and lack of multilingualism in the process. This is laudable. However, past experience with ICANN processes has shown that many representatives from developing countries as well as from stakeholder communities outside of the ICANN community are unable to productively involve themselves in such processes because of lack of multilingualism or unfamiliarity with its way of functioning. This often results in undemocratic, unrepresentative and non-transparent decision-making in such processes.

In such a scenario, merely mentioning diversity as a principle is not adequate to ensure abundant participation by developing countries and non-ICANN community stakeholders in the process. Concrete mechanisms need to be devised to include adequate and fair geographical, gender, multilingual and developing countries’ participation and representation on all levels so that the process is not relegated merely to domination by North American or European entities. Accordingly, all the discussions in the process should be translated into multiple native languages of participants in situ, so that everyone participating in the process can understand what is going on. Adequate time must be given for the discussion issues to be translated and circulated widely amongst all stakeholders of the world, before a decision is taken or a proposal is framed. To concretise its diversity principle, ICANN should also set aside funds and develop a programme with community support for capacity building for stakeholders in developing nations to ensure their fruitful involvement in the process.

The Co-ordination Group must be made representative of the global multistakeholder community:

Currently, the Co-ordination Group includes representatives from ALAC, ASO, ccNSO, GNSO, gTLD registries, GAC, ICC/BASIS, IAB, IETF, ISOC, NRO, RSSAC and SSAC. Most of these representatives belong to the ICANN community, and is not representative of the global multistakeholder community including governments. This is not representative of even a multistakeholder model which the US Govt. has announced for the transition; nor in the multistakeholder participation spirit of NETmundial.

It is recommended that the Co-ordination Group then must be made democratic and representative to include larger global stakeholder community, including Governments, Civil Society, and Academia, with suitably diverse representation across geography, gender and developing nations. Adequate number of seats on the Committee must be granted to each stakeholder so that they can each co-ordinate discussions within their own communities and ensure wider and more inclusive participation.

Framing of the Proposal must allow adequate time:

All stakeholder communities must be permitted adequate time to discuss and develop consensus. Different stakeholder communities have different processes of engagement within their communities, and may take longer to reach a consensus than others. If democracy and inclusiveness are to be respected, then each stakeholder must be allowed enough time to reach a consensus within its own community, unlike the short time given to comment on the Draft Proposal. The process must not be rushed to benefit a few.

Smarika Kumar is a graduate of the National Law Institute University, Bhopal, and a member of the Alternative Law Forum, a collective of lawyers aiming to integrate alternative lawyering with critical research, alternative dispute resolution, pedagogic interventions and sustained legal interventions in social issues. Her areas of interest include interdisciplinary research on the Internet, issues affecting indigenous peoples, eminent domain, traditional knowledge and pedagogy.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design

CIS Policy Brief: IANA Transition Fundamentals & Suggestions for Process Design

geetha — 2014-07-08T08:39:41Z

In March 2014, the US government announced that it would transfer oversight of IANA functions to an as-yet-indeterminate global multi-stakeholder body. This policy brief, written by Smarika Kumar and Geetha Hariharan, explains the process concisely.

Short Introduction:

In March 2014, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) announced its intention to transition key Internet domain name functions to the global multi-stakeholder community. Currently, the NTIA oversees coordination and implementation of IANA functions through contractual arrangements with ICANN and Verisign, Inc.

The NTIA will not accept a government-led or inter-governmental organization to steward IANA functions. It requires the IANA transition proposal to have broad community support, and to be in line with the following principles: (1) support and enhance the multi-stakeholder model; (2) maintain the security, stability, and resiliency of the Internet DNS; (3) meet the needs and expectation of the global customers & partners of IANA services; (4) maintain the openness of the Internet.

ICANN was charged with developing a proposal for IANA transition. It initiated a call for public input in April 2014. Lamentably, the scoping document for the transition did not include questions of ICANN’s own accountability and interests in IANA stewardship, including whether it should continue to coordinate the IANA functions. Public Input received in May 2014 revolved around the composition of a Coordination Group, which would oversee IANA transition. Now, ICANN will hold an open session on June 26, 2014 at ICANN-50 to gather community feedback on issues relating to IANA transition, including composition of the Coordination Group.

CIS Policy Brief:

CIS' Brief on IANA Transition Fundamentals explains the process further, and throws light on the Indian government's views. To read the brief, please go here.

Suggestions for Process Design

As convenor of the IANA stewardship transition, ICANN has sought public comments on issues relating to the transition process. We suggest certain principles for open, inclusive and transparent process-design:

Short Introduction:

In March 2014, the US government through National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) announced its intention to transition key Internet domain name functions (IANA) to the global multi-stakeholder community. The NTIA announcement states that it will not accept a government-led or intergovernmental organization solution to replace its own oversight of IANA functions. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) was charged with developing a Proposal for the transition.

At ICANN-49 in Singapore (March 2014), ICANN rapidly gathered inputs from its community to develop a draft proposal for IANA transition. It then issued a call for public input on the Draft Proposal in April 2014. Some responses were incorporated to create a Revised Proposal, published on June 6, 2014.

Responses had called for transparent composition of an IANA transition Coordination Group, a group comprising representatives of ICANN’s Advisory Committees and Supporting Organizations, as well as Internet governance organizations such as the IAB, IETF and ISOC. Also, ICANN was asked to have a neutral, facilitative role in IANA transition. This is because, as the current IANA functions operator, it has a vested interest in the transition. Tellingly, ICANN’s scoping document for IANA transition did not include questions of its own role as IANA functions operator.

ICANN is currently deliberating the process to develop a Proposal for IANA transition. At ICANN-50, ICANN will hold a governmental high-level meeting and a public discussion on IANA transition, where comments and concerns can be voiced. In addition, discussion in other Internet governance fora is encouraged.

CIS Policy Brief:

CIS' Brief on IANA Transition Principles explains our recommendations for transition process-design. To read the brief, please go here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-policy-brief-iana-transition-fundamentals-and-suggestions-for-process-design

Understanding IANA Stewardship Transition

Smarika Kumar — 2014-06-22T03:23:37Z

Smarika Kumar describes the process of the IANA stewardship transition, and enumerates what the NTIA announcement does and does not do.

NTIA Announcement and ICANN-convened Processes:

On 14 March 2014, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) of the US Government announced “its intent to transition key Internet domain name functions to the global multistakeholder community”. These key Internet domain name functions refer to the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions. For this purpose, the NTIA asked the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) to “convene global stakeholders to develop a proposal to transition the current role played by NTIA in the coordination of the Internet’s domain name system (DNS)”. This was welcome news for the global Internet community, which has been criticising unilateral US Government oversight of Critical Internet Resources for many years now. NTIA further announced that IANA transition proposal must have broad community support and should address the following four principles:

Support and enhance the multistakeholder model;
Maintain the security, stability, and resiliency of the Internet DNS;
Meet the needs and expectation of the global customers and partners of the IANA services; and
Maintain the openness of the Internet.

Subsequently, during ICANN49 in Singapore (March 23-27, 2014), ICANN held flurried discussions to gather initial community feedback from participants to come up with a Draft Proposal of the Principles, Mechanisms and Process to Develop a Proposal to Transition NTIA’s Stewardship of the IANA Functions on 8 April 2014, which was open to public comments until 8 May 2014, which was further extended to 31 May 2014. Responses by various stakeholders were collected in this very short period and some of them were incorporated into a Revised Proposal issued by ICANN on 6th June 2014. ICANN also unilaterally issued a Scoping Document defining the scope of the process for developing the proposal and also specifying what was not part of the scope. This Scoping Document came under severe criticism by various commentators, but was not amended.

ICANN also initiated a separate but parallel process to discuss enhancement of its accountability on 6 May 2014. This was launched upon widespread distress over the fact that ICANN had excluded its role as operator of IANA functions from the Scoping Document, as well as over questions of accountability raised by the community at ICANN49 in Singapore. In the absence of ICANN’s contractual relationship with NTIA to operate the IANA functions, it remains unclear how ICANN will stay accountable upon the transition. The accountability process looks to address the same through the ICANN community. The issue of ICANN accountability is then envisioned to be coordination within ICANN itself through an ICANN Accountability Working Group comprised of community members and a few subject matter experts.

What are the IANA Functions?

Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, or IANA functions consist of three separate tasks:

Maintaining a central repository for protocol name and number registries used in many Internet protocols.
Co-ordinating the allocation of Internet Protocol (IP) and Autonomous System (AS) numbers to the Regional Internet Registries, who then distribute IP and AS numbers to ISPs and others within their geographic regions.
Processing root zone change requests for Top Level Domains (TLDs) and making the Root Zone WHOIS database consisting of publicly available information for all TLD registry operators.

The first two of the abovementioned functions are operated by ICANN in consonance with policy developed at the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and Address Supporting Organisation (ASO) respectively, both of which exist under the ICANN umbrella.

The performance of last of these functions is distributed between ICANN and Verisign. NTIA has a Cooperative Agreement with Verisign to perform the related root zone management functions. The related root zone management functions are the management of the root zone “zone signing key” (ZSK), as well as implementation of changes to and distribution of the DNS authoritative root zone file, which is the authoritative registry containing the lists of names and addresses for all top level domains.

Currently, the US Government oversees this entire set of operations by contracting with ICANN as well as Verisign to execute the IANA functions. Though the US Government does not interfere generally in operations of either ICANN or Verisign in their role as operators of IANA functions, it cannot be denied that it exercises oversight on both the operators of IANA functions, through these contracts.

Import of the NTIA Announcement:

The NTIA announcement of 14th March intends to initiate the withdrawal of such oversight of IANA functions by the NTIA in order to move towards global multistakeholder governance. NTIA has asked ICANN to initiate a process to decide upon what such global multistakeholder governance of IANA functions may look like. The following diagram presents the current governance structure of IANA functions and the areas that the NTIA announcement seeks to change:

The IANA Oversight Mechanism (Source)

What does the NTIA Announcement NOT DO?

The NTIA announcement DOES NOT frame a model for governance of IANA functions once it withdraws its oversight role. NTIA has asked ICANN to convene a process, which would figure the details of IANA transition and propose an administrative structure for IANA functions once the NTIA withdraws its oversight role. But what this new administrative structure would look like has not itself been addressed in the NTIA announcement. As per the NTIA announcement, the new administrative structure is yet to be decided by a global multistakeholder community in accordance with the four principles outlined by the NTIA through a process, which ICANN shall convene.

The NTIA announcement DOES NOT limit discussions and participation in IANA transition process to within the ICANN community. NTIA has asked ICANN to convene “global stakeholders to develop a proposal to transition” IANA functions. This means all global stakeholders participation, including that of Governments and Civil Society is sought for the IANA transition process. ICANN has been asked “to work collaboratively with the directly affected parties, including the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the Internet Architecture Board (IAB), the Internet Society (ISOC), the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), top level domain name operators, VeriSign, and other interested global stakeholders”, in the NTIA announcement. This however does not signify that discussions and participation in development of proposal for IANA transition needs to be limited to the ICANN community or the technical community. In fact, ICANN has itself said that the list of events provided as “Timeline of Events” in its Draft Proposal of 8 April 2014 for engagement in development of a proposal for IANA transition is non-exhaustive. This means proposal for IANA transition can be developed by different stakeholders, including governments and civil society in different fora appropriate to their working, including at the IGF and WSIS+10.

The NTIA announcement DOES NOT mean devolution of IANA functions administration upon ICANN. NTIA chooses ICANN and Verisign to operate the IANA functions. If NTIA withdraws from its role, the question whether ICANN or Verisign should operate the IANA functions at all becomes an open one, and should be subject to deliberation. By merely asking ICANN to convene the process, the NTIA announcement in no way assigns any administration of IANA functions to ICANN. It must be remembered that the NTIA announcement says that key Internet domain name functions shall transition to the global multistakeholder community, and not the ICANN community.

The NTIA announcement DOES NOT prevent the possibility of removal of ICANN from its role as operator of IANA functions. While ICANN has tried to frame the Scoping Document in a language to prevent any discussions on its role as operator of IANA functions, the question whether ICANN should continue in its operator role remains an open one. There are at least 12 submissions made in response to ICANN’s Draft Proposal by varied stakeholders, which in fact, call for the separation of ICANN’s role as policy maker (through IETF, ASO, gNSO, ccNSO), and ICANN’s role as the operator of IANA functions. Such calls for separation come from private sector, civil society, as well as the technical community, among others. Such separation was also endorsed in the final NETmundial outcome document (paragraph 27). Governments have, in general, expressed no opinion on such separation in response to ICANN’s Draft Proposal. It is however urged that governments express their opinion in favour of such separation to prevent consolidation of both policy making and implementation within ICANN, which would lead to increased potential situations for the ICANN Board to abuse its powers.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/understanding-iana-transition