Centre for Internet and Society

5G Technologies Workshop by IEEE

rohini — 2015-08-29T14:10:03Z

The workshop was organized by IEEE Communications Society, Bangalore Chapter, at Bangalore on May 22 and 23, 2015. Rohini Lakshané attended the workshop.

Download the programme schedule

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/telecom/news/5-g-technologies-workshop

Regulatory Perspectives on Net Neutrality

pranesh — 2015-07-18T02:46:30Z

In this paper Pranesh Prakash gives an overview on why India needs to put in place net neutrality regulations, and the form that those regulations must take to avoid being over-regulation.

With assistance by Vidushi Marda (Programme Officer, Centre for Internet and Society) and Tarun Krishnakumar (Research Volunteer, Centre for Internet and Society). I would like to specially thank Vishal Misra, Steve Song, Rudolf van der Berg, Helani Galpaya, A.B. Beliappa, Amba Kak, and Sunil Abraham for extended discussions, helpful suggestions and criticisms. However, this paper is not representative of their views, which are varied.

Today, we no longer live in a world of "roti, kapda, makaan", but in the world of "roti, kapda, makaan aur broadband". ^{^[1]} This is recognized by the National Telecom Policy IV.1.2, which states the need to "recognise telecom, including broadband connectivity as a basic necessity like education and health and work towards 'Right to Broadband'."^{^[2]} According to the IAMAI, as of October 2014, India had 278 million internet users. ^{^[3]} Of these, the majority access Internet through their mobile phones, and the WEF estimates only 3 in 100 have broadband on their mobiles.^{^[4]} Thus, the bulk of our population is without broadband. Telecom regulation and net neutrality has a very important role in enabling this vision of Internet as a basic human need that we should aim to fulfil.

1. Why should we regulate the telecom sector?

All ICT regulation should be aimed at achieving five goals: achieving universal, affordable access; ^{^[5]} ensuring and sustaining effective competition in an efficient market and avoiding market failures; protecting against consumer harms; ensuring maximum utility of the network by ensuring interconnection; and addressing state needs (taxation, security, etc.). Generally, all these goals go hand in hand, however some tensions may arise. For instance, universal access may not be provided by the market because the costs of doing so in certain rural or remote areas may outweigh the immediate monetary benefits private corporations could receive in terms of profits from those customers. In such cases, to further the goal of universal access, schemes such as universal service obligation funds are put in place, while ensuring that such schemes either do not impact competition or very minimally impact it.

It is clear that to maximise societal benefit, effective regulation of the ICT sector is a requirement, which otherwise, due to the ability of dominant players to abuse network effect to their advantage, is inherently prone towards monopolies. For instance, in the absence of regulation, a dominant player would charge far less for intra-network calls than inter-network calls, making customers shift to the dominant network. This kind of harm to competition should be regulated by the ICT regulator. However, it is equally true that over-regulation is as undesirable as under-regulation, since over-regulation harms innovation - whether in the form of innovative technologies or innovative business models. The huge spurt of growth globally of the telecom sector since the 1980s has resulted not merely from advancements in technology, but in large part from the de-monopolisation and deregulation of the telecom sector.^{^[6]} Similarly, the Internet has largely flourished under very limited technology-specific regulation. For instance, while interconnection between different telecom networks is heavily regulated in the domestic telecom sector, interconnection between the different autonomous systems (ASes) that make up the Internet is completely unregulated, thereby allowing for non-transparent pricing and opaque transactions. Given this context, we must ensure we do not over-regulate, lest we kill innovation.

2. Why should we regulate Net Neutrality? And whom should we regulate?

We wouldn't need to regulate Net Neutrality if ISPs were not "gatekeepers" for last-mile access. "Gatekeeping" occurs when a single company establishes itself as an exclusive route to reach a large number of people and businesses or, in network terms, nodes. It is not possible for Internet services to reach the customers of the telecom network without passing through the telecom network. The situation is very different in the middle-mile and for backhaul. Even though anti-competitive terms may exist in the middle-mile, especially given the opacity of terms in "transit agreements", a packet is usually able to travel through multiple routes if one route is too expensive (even if that is not the shortest network path, and is thus inefficient in a way). However, this multiplicity of routes is not possible in the last mile.

This leaves last mile telecom operators (ISPs) in a position to unfairly discriminate between different Internet services or destinations or applications, while harming consumer choice. This is why we believe that promoting the five goals mentioned above would require regulation of last-mile telecom operators to prevent unjust discrimination against end-users and content providers.

Thus, net neutrality is the principle that we should regulate gatekeepers to ensure they do not use their power to unjustly discriminate between similarly situated persons, content or traffic.

3. How should we regulate Net Neutrality?

3.1. What concerns does Net Neutrality raise? What harms does it entail?

Discriminatory practices at the level of access to the Internet raises the following set of concerns:

1. Freedom of speech and expression, freedom of association, freedom of assembly, and privacy.

2. Harm to effective competition

a. This includes competition amongst ISPs as well as competition amongst content providers.

b. Under-regulation here may cause harm to innovation at the content provider level, including through erecting barriers to entry.

c. Over-regulation here may cause harm to innovation in terms of ISP business models.

3. Harm to consumers

a. Under-regulation here may harm consumer choice and the right to freedom of speech, expression, and communication.

b. Over-regulation on this ground may cause harm to innovation at the level of networking technologies and be detrimental to consumers in the long run.

4. Harm to "openness" and interconnectedness of the Internet, including diversity (of access, of content, etc.)

a. Exceptions for specialized services should be limited to preserve the open and interconnectedness of the Internet and of the World Wide Web.

It might help to think about Net Neutrality as primarily being about two overlapping sets of regulatory issues: preferential treatment of particular Internet-based services (in essence: content- or source-/destination-based discrimination, i.e., discrimination on basis of 'whose traffic it is'), or discriminatory treatment of applications or protocols (which would include examples like throttling of BitTorrent traffic, high overage fees upon breaching Internet data caps on mobile phones, etc., i.e., discrimination on the basis of 'what kind of traffic it is').

Situations where the negative or positive discrimination happens on the basis of particular content or address should be regulated through the use of competition principles, while negative or positive discrimination at the level of specific class of content, protocols, associated ports, and other such sender-/receiver-agnostic features, should be regulated through regulation of network management techniques . The former deals with instances where the question of "in whose favour is there discrimination" may be asked, while the latter deals with the question "in favour of what is there discrimination".

In order to do this, a regulator like TRAI can use both hard regulation - price ceilings, data cap floors, transparency mandates, preventing specific anti-competitive practices, etc. - as well as soft regulation - incentives and disincentives.

3.1.1 Net Neutrality and human rights

Any discussion on the need for net neutrality impugns the human rights of a number of different stakeholders. Users, subscribers, telecom operators and ISPs all possess distinct and overlapping rights that are to be weighed against each other before the scope, nature and form of regulatory intervention are finalised. The freedom of speech, right to privacy and right to carry on trade raise some of the most pertinent questions in this regard.

For example, to properly consider issues surrounding the practice of paid content-specific zero-rating from a human rights point of view, one must seek to balance the rights of content providers to widely disseminate their 'speech' to the largest audiences against the rights of consumers to have access to a diverse variety of different, conflicting and contrasting ideas.

This commitment to a veritable marketplace or free-market of ideas has formed the touchstone of freedom of speech law in jurisdictions across the world as well as finding mention in pronouncements of the Indian Supreme Court. Particular reference is to be made to the dissent of Mathew, J. inBennett Coleman v. Union of India^{^[7]} and of the majority Sakal Papers v. Union of India^{^[8]} which rejected the approach.

Further, the practice of deep-packet inspection, which is sometimes used in the process of network management, raises privacy concerns as it seeks to go beyond what is "public" information in the header of an IP packet, necessary for routing, to analysing non-public information. ^{^[9]}

3.2 What conditions and factors may change these concerns and the regulatory model we should adopt?

While the principles relating to Net Neutrality remain the same in all countries (i.e., trying to prevent gatekeepers from unjustly exploiting their position), the severity of the problem varies depending on competition in the market, on the technologies, and on many other factors. One way to measure fair or stable allocation of the surplus created by a network - or a network-of-networks like the Internet - is by treating it as a convex cooperation game and thereupon calculating that game's Shapley value:^{^[10]} in the case of the Internet, this would be a game involving content ISPs, transit ISPs, and eyeball (i.e., last-mile) ISPs. The Shapley value changes depending on the number of competitors there are in the market: thus, the fair/stable allocation when there's vibrant competition in the market is different from the fair/stable allocation in a market without such competition. That goes to show that a desirable approach when an ISP tries to unjustly enrich itself by charging other network-participants may well be to increase competition, rather than directly regulating the last-mile ISP. Further, it shows that in a market with vibrant last-mile competition, the capacity of the last-mile ISP to unjustly are far diminished.

In countries which are remote and have little international bandwidth, the need to conserve that bandwidth is high. ISPs can regulate that by either increasing prices of Internet connections for all, or by imposing usage restrictions (such as throttling) on either heavy users or bandwidth-hogging protocols. If the amount of international bandwidth is higher, the need and desire on part of ISPs to indulge in such usage restrictions decreases. Thus, the need to regulate is far higher in the latter case, than in the former case.

The above paragraphs show that both the need for regulation and also the form that the regulation should take depend on a variety of conditions that aren't immediately apparent.

Thus, the framework that the regulator sets out to tackle issues relating to Net Neutrality are most important, whereas the specific rules may need to change depending on changes in conditions. These conditions include:

● last-mile market

○ switching costs between equivalent service providers

○ availability of an open-access last-mile

○ availability of a "public option" neutral ISP

○ increase or decrease in the competition, both in wired and mobile ISPs.

● interconnection market

○ availability of well-functioning peering exchanges

○ availability of low-cost transit

● technology and available bandwidth

○ spectrum efficiency

○ total amount of international bandwidth and local network bandwidth

● conflicting interests of ISPs

○ do the ISPs have other business interests other than providing Internet connectivity? (telephony, entertainment, etc.)

3.3 How should we deal with anti-competitive practices?

Anti-competitive practices in the telecom sector can take many forms: Abuse of dominance, exclusion of access to specific services, customer lock-in, predatory pricing, tying of services, cross-subsidization, etc., are a few of them. In some cases the anti-competitive practice targets other telecom providers, while in others it targets content providers. In the both cases, it is important to ensure that ensure that telecom subscribers have a competitive choice between effectively substitutable telecom providers and an ability to seamlessly switch between providers.

3.3.1 Lowering Switching Costs

TRAI has tackled many of these issues head on, especially in the mobile telephony space, while competitive market pressures have helped too:

● Contractual or transactional lock-in. The easiest way to prevent shifting from one network to another is by contractually mandating a lock-in period, or by requiring special equipment (interoperability) to connect to one's network. In India, this is not practised in the telecom sector, with the exception of competing technologies like CDMA and GSM. Non-contractual lock-ins, for instance by offering discounts for purchasing longer-term packages, are not inherently anti-competitive unless that results in predatory pricing or constitutes an abuse of market dominance. In India, switching from one mobile provider to another, though initiated 15 years into the telecom revolution, is in most cases now almost as easy as buying a new SIM card.^{^[11]} TRAI may consider proactive regulation against contractual lock-in.

● Number of competitors. Even if switching from one network to another is easy, it is not useful unless there are other equivalent options to switch to. In the telecom market, coverage is a very important factor in judging equivalence. Given that last mile connectivity is extremely expensive to provide, the coverage of different networks are very different, and this is even more true when one considers wired connectivity, which is difficult to lay in densely-populated urban and semi-urban areas and unprofitable in sparsely-populated areas. The best way to increase the number of competitors is to make it easier for competitors to exist. Some ways of doing this would be through enabling spectrum-sharing, lowering right-of-way rents, allowing post-auction spectrum trading, and promoting open-access last-mile fibre carriers and to thereby encourage competition on the basis of price and service and not exclusive access to infrastructure.

● Interconnection and mandatory carriage. The biggest advantage a dominant telecom player has is exclusive access to its customer base. Since in the telecom market, no telco wants to not connect to customers of another telco, they do not outright ban other networks. However, dominant players can charge high prices from other networks, thereby discriminating against smaller networks. In the early 2000s, Airtel-to-Airtel calls were much cheaper than Airtel-to-Spice calls. However, things have significantly changed since then. TRAI has, since the 2000s, heavily regulated interconnection and imposed price controls on interconnection ("termination") charges.^{^[12]} Thus, now, generally, inter-network calls are priced similarly to intra-network calls. And if you want cheaper Airtel-to-Airtel calls, you can buy a special (unbundled) pack that enables an Airtel customer to take advantage of the fact that her friends are also on the same network, and benefits Airtel since they do not in such cases have to pay termination charges. Recently, TRAI has even made the interconnection rates zero in three cases: landline-to-landline, landline-to-cellular, and cellular-to-landline, in a bid to decrease landline call rates, and incentivise them, allowing a very low per call interconnection charges of 14 paise for cellular-to-cellular connections. ^{^[13]}

○ With regard to Net Neutrality, we must have a rule that no termination charges or carriage charges may be levied by any ISP upon any Internet service. No Internet service may be discriminated against with regard to carriage conditions or speeds or any other quality of service metric. In essence all negative discrimination should be prohibited. This means that Airtel cannot forcibly charge WhatsApp or any other OTT (which essentially form a different "layer") money for the "privilege" of being able to reach Airtel customers, nor may Airtel slow down WhatsApp traffic and thus try to force WhatsApp to pay. There is a duty on telecom providers to carry any legitimate traffic ("common carriage"), not a privilege. It is important to note that consumer-facing TSPs get paid by other interconnecting Internet networks in the form of transit charges (or the TSP's costs are defrayed through peering). There shouldn't be any separate charge on the basis of content (different layer from the carriage) rather than network (same layer as the carriage). This principle is especially important for startups, and which are often at the receiving end of such discriminatory practices.

● Number Portability. One other factor that prevents users from shifting between one network and another is the fact that they have to change an important aspect of their identity: their phone number (this doesn't apply to Internet over DSL, cable, etc.). At least in the mobile space, TRAI has for several years tried to mandate seamless mobile number portability. The same is being tried by the European Commission in the EU. ^{^[14]} While intra-circle mobile number portability exists in India - and TRAI is pushing for inter-circle mobile number portability as well^{^[15]} - this is nowhere as seamless as it should be.

● Multi-SIM phones. The Indian market is filled with phones that can accommodate multiple SIM cards, enabling customers to shift seamlessly between multiple networks. This is true not just in India, but most developing countries with extremely price-sensitive customers. Theoretically, switching costs would approach zero if in a market with full coverage by n telecom players every subscriber had a phone with n SIM slots with low-cost SIM cards being available.

The situation in the telecom sector with respect to the above provides a stark contrast to the situation in the USA, and to the situation in the DTH market. In the USA, phones get sold at discounts with multi-month or multi-year contracts, and contractual lock-ins are a large problem. Keeping each of the above factors in mind, the Indian mobile telecom space is far more competitive than the US mobile telecom space.

Further, in the Indian DTH market, given that there is transactional lock-in (set-top boxes aren't interoperable in practice, though are mandated to be so by law^{^[16]}), there are fewer choices in the market; further, the equivalent of multi-SIM phones don't exist with respect to set-top boxes. Further, while there are must-carry rules with respect to carriage, they can be of three types: 1) must mandatorily provide access to particular channels^{^[17]} (positive obligation, usually for government channels); 2) prevented from not providing particular channels (negative obligation, to prevent anti-competitive behaviour and political censorship); and 3) must mandatorily offer access to at least a set number of channels (positive obligation for ensuring market diversity). ^{^[18]} Currently, only (1) is in force, since despite attempts by TRAI to ensure (3) as well.^{^[19]}

If the shifting costs are low and transparency in terms of network practice is reported in a standard manner and well-publicised, then that significantly weakens the "gatekeeper effect", which as we saw earlier, is the reason why we wish to introduce Net Neutrality regulation. This consequently means, as explained above in section 3.2, that despite the same Net Neutrality principles applying in all markets and countries, the precise form that the Net Neutrality regulations take in a telecom market with low switching costs would be different from the form that such regulations would take in a market with high switching costs.

3.3.2 Anti-competitive Practices

Some potential anti-competitive practices, which are closely linked, are cross-subsidization, tying (anti-competitive bundling) of multiple services, and vertical price squeeze. All three of these are especial concerns now, with the increased diversification of traditional telecom companies, and with the entry into telecom (like with DTH) of companies that create content. Hence, if Airtel cross-subsidizes the Hike chat application that it recently acquired, ^{^[20]} or if Reliance Infocomm requires customers to buy a subscription to an offering from Reliance Big Entertainment, or if Reliance Infocomm meters traffic from another Reliance Big Entertainment differently from that from Saavn, all those would be violative of the principle of non-discrimination by gatekeepers. This same analysis can be applied to all unpaid deals and non-commercial deals, including schemes such as Internet.org and Wikipedia Zero, which will be covered later in the section on zero-rating.

While we have general rules such as sections 3 and 4 of the Competition Act, we do not currently have specific rules prohibiting these or other anti-competitive practices, and we need Net Neutrality regulation that clearly prohibit such anti-competitive practices so that the telecom regulator can take action for non-compliance . We cannot leave these specific policy prescriptions unstated, even if they are provided for in section 3 of the Competition Act. These concerns are especial concerns in the telecom sector, and the telecom regulator or arbitrator should have the power to directly deal with these, instead of each case going to the Competition Commission of India. This should not affect the jurisdiction of the CCI to investigate and adjudicate such matters, but should ensure that TRAI both has suo motu powers, and that the mechanism to complain is made simple (unlike the current scenario, where some individual complainants may fall in the cracks between TRAI and TDSAT).

3.3.3 Zero-rating

Since a large part of the net neutrality debate in India involves zero-rating practices, we deal with that in some length. Zero-rating is the practice of not counting (aka "zero-rating") certain traffic towards a subscriber's regular Internet usage. The zero-rated traffic could be zero-priced or fixed-price; capped or uncapped; subscriber-paid, Internet service-paid, paid for by both, or unpaid; content- or source/destination-based, or agnostic to content or source/destination; automatically provided by the ISP or chosen by the customer . The motivations for zero-rating may also be varied, as we shall see below. Further, depending on the circumstances, zero-rating could be competitive or anti-competitive. All forms of zero-rating result in some form of discrimination, but not all zero-rating is harmful, nor does all zero-rating need to be prohibited.

While, as explained in the section on interconnection and carriage above, negative discrimination at the network level should be prohibited, that leaves open the question of positive discrimination. It follows from section 3.1 that the right frame of analysis of this question is harm to competition, since the main harm zero-rating is, as we shall see below, about discriminating between different content providers, and not discrimination at the level of protocols, etc.

Whether one should allow for any form of positive discrimination at the network level or not depends on whether positive discrimination of (X) has an automatic and unfair negative impact on all (~X). That, in turn, depends on whether (~X) is being subject to unfair competition. As Wikipedia notes, "unfair competition means that the gains of some participants are conditional on the losses of others, when the gains are made in ways which are illegitimate or unjust." Thus, positive discrimination that has a negative impact on effective competition shall not be permitted, since in such cases it is equivalent to negative discrimination ("zero-sum game") . Positive discrimination that does not have a negative impact on effective competition may be permitted, especially since it results in increased access and increases consumer benefit, as long as the harm to openness and diversity is minimized .

While considering this, one should keep in mind the fact that startups were, 10-15 years ago, at a huge disadvantage with regard to wholesale data purchase. The marketplaces for data centres and for content delivery networks (which speed up delivery of content by being located closer, in network terms, to multiple last-mile ISPs) were nowhere near as mature as they are today, and the prices were high. There was a much higher barrier to startup entry than there is today, due to the prices and due to larger companies being able to rely on economies of scale to get cheaper rates. Was that unfair? No. There is no evidence of anti-competitive practices, nor of startups complaining about such practices. Therefore, that was fair competition, despite specific input costs that were arguably needed (though not essential) for startups to compete being priced far beyond their capacity to pay.

Today the marketplace is very different, with a variety of offerings. CDNs such as Cloudflare, which were once the preserve of rich companies, even have free offerings, thus substantially lowering barriers for startups that want faster access to customers across the globe.

Is a CDN an essential cost for a startup? No. But in an environment where speed matters and customers use or don't use a service depending on speed; and where the startup's larger competitors are all using CDNs, a startup more or less has to. Thankfully, given the cheap access to CDNs these days, that cost is not too high for a startup to bear. If the CDN market was not competitive enough, would a hypothetical global regulator have been justified in outright banning the use of CDNs to 'level' the playing field? No, because the hypothetical global regulator instead had the option to (and would have been justified in) regulating the market to ensure greater competition.

A regulator should not prohibit an act that does not negatively impact access, competition, consumer benefit, nor openness (including diversity), since that would be over-regulation and would harm innovation.

3.3.3.1 Motivations for Zero-Rating

3.3.3.1.1 Corporate Social Responsibility / Incentivizing Customers to Move Up Value Chain

There exist multiple instances where there is no commercial transaction between the OTT involved and the telecom carrier, in which zero-priced zero-rating of specific Internet content happens. We know that there is no commercial transaction either through written policy (Wikipedia Zero) or through public statements (Internet.org, a bouquet of sites). In such cases, the telecom provider would either be providing such services out of a sense of public interest, given the social value of those services, or would be providing such services out of self-interest, to showcase the value of particular Internet set the same time.

The apprehended risk is that of such a scheme creating a "walled garden", where users would be exposed only to those services which are free since the search and discovery costs of non-free Internet (i.e., any site outside the "walled garden") would be rather high. This risk, while real, is rather slim given the fact that the economic incentives for those customers who have the ability to pay for "Internet packs" but currently do not find a compelling reason to do so, or out of both a sense of public interest and self-interest of the telecom providers works against this.

In such non-commercial zero-priced zero-rating, a telecom provider would only make money if and only if subscribers start paying for sites outside of the walled garden. If subscribers are happy in the walled garden, the telecom provider starts losing money, and hence has a strong motivation to stop that scheme. If on the other hand, enough subscribers start becoming paying customers to offset the cost of providing the zero-priced zero-rated service(s) and make it profitable, that shows that despite the availability of zero-priced options a number of customers will opt for paid access to the open Internet and the open Web, and the overall harms of such zero-priced zero-rating would be minimal. Hence, the telecom providers have an incentive to keep the costs of Internet data packs low, thus encouraging customers who otherwise wouldn't pay for the Internet to become paying customers.

There is the potential of consumer harm when users seek to access a site outside of the walled garden, and find to their dismay that they have been charged for the Internet at a hefty rate, and their prepaid balance has greatly decreased. This is an issue that TRAI is currently appraised of, and a suitable solution would need to be found to protect consumers against such harm.

All in all, given that the commercial interests of the telecom providers align with the healthy practice of non-discrimination, this form of limited positive discrimination is not harmful in the long run, particularly because it is not indefinitely sustainable for a large number of sites. Hence, it may not be useful to ban this form of zero-priced zero-rating of services as long as they aren't exclusive, or otherwise anti-competitive (a vertical price-squeeze, for instance), and the harm to consumers is prohibited and the harm to openness/diversity is minimized.

3.3.3.1.2 Passing on ISP Savings / Incentivizing Customers to Lower ISP's Cost

Suppose, for instance, an OTT uses a CDN located, in network distance terms, near an eyeball ISP. In this case, the ISP has to probably pay less than it would have to had the same data been located in a data centre located further away, given that it would have fewer interconnection-related charges.

Hence the monetary costs of providing access to different Web destinations are not equal for the ISP. This cost can be varied either by the OTT (by it locating the data closer to the ISP - through a CDN, by co-locating where the ISP is also present, or by connecting to an Internet Exchange Point which the ISP is also connected to - or by it directly "peering" with the ISP) or by the ISP (by engaging in "transparent proxying" in which case the ISP creates caches at the ISP level of specific content (usually by caching non-encrypted data the ISP's customers request) and serves the cached content when a user requests a site, rather than serving the actual site). None of the practices so far mentioned are discriminatory from the customer's perspective with regard either to price or to prioritization, though all of them enable faster speeds to specific content. Hence none of the above-mentioned practices are considered even by the most ardent Net Neutrality advocates to be violations of that principle. ^{^[21]} However, if an ISP zero-rates the content to either pass on its savings to the customer^{^[22]} or to incentivize the customer to access services that cost the ISP less in terms of interconnection costs, that creates a form of price discrimination for the customer, despite it benefiting the consumer.

The essential economic problem is that the cost to the ISP is variable, but the cost to the customer is fixed. Importantly, this problem is exacerbated in India where web hosting prices are high, transit prices are high, peering levels are low, and Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) are not functioning well. ^{^[23]} These conditions create network inefficiencies in terms of hosting of content further away from Indian networks in terms of network distance, and thus harms consumers as well as local ISPs. In order to set this right, zero-rating of this sort may be permitted as it acts as an incentive towards fixing the market fundamentals. However, once the market fundamentals are fixed, such zero-rating may be prohibited.

This example shows that the desirability or otherwise of discriminatory practices depends fully on the conditions present in the market, including in terms of interconnection costs.

3.3.3.1.3 Unbundling Internet into Services ("Special Packs")

Since at least early 2014, mobile operators have been marketing special zero-rating "packs". These packs, if purchased by the customer, allow capped or in some instances uncapped, zero-rating of a service such as WhatsApp or Facebook, meaning traffic to/from that service will not be counted against their regular Internet usage.

For a rational customer, purchasing such a pack only makes sense in one of two circumstances:

● The person has Internet connectivity on her Internet-capable phone, but has not purchased an "Internet data pack" since she doesn't find the Internet valuable. Instead, she has heard about "WhatsApp", has friends who are on it, and wishes to use that to reduce her SMS costs (and thereby eat into the carriage provider's ability to charge separately for SMSes). She chooses to buy a WhatsApp pack for around ₹25 a month instead of paying ₹95 for an all-inclusive Internet data pack.

● The person has Internet connectivity on her Internet-capable phone, and has purchased an "Internet data pack". However, that data pack is capped and she has to decide between using WhatsApp and surfing web sites. She is on multiple WhatsApp groups and her WhatsApp traffic eats up 65% of her data cap. She thus has to choose between the two, since she doesn't want to buy two Internet data packs (each costing around ₹95 for a month). She chooses to buy a WhatsApp pack for ₹25 a month, paying a cumulative total of ₹120 instead of ₹190 which she would have had to had she bought two Internet data packs. In this situation, "unbundling" is happening, and this benefits the consumer. Such unbundling harms the openness and integrity of the Internet.

If users did not find value in the "special" data packs, and there is no market demand for such products, they will cease to be offered. Thus, assuming a telco's decision to offer such packs is purely customer-demand driven - and not due to deals it has struck with service providers - if Orkut is popular, telcos would be interested in offering Orkut packs and if Facebook is popular, they would be interested in offering a Facebook pack. Thus, clearly, there is nothing anti-competitive about such customer-paid zero-rating packs, whereas they clearly enhance consumer benefit. Would this increase the popularity of Orkut or Facebook? Potentially yes. But to prohibit this would be like prohibiting a supermarket from selectively (and non-collusively) offering discounts on popular products. Would that make already popular products even more popular? Potentially, yes. But that would not be seen as a harm to competition but would be seen as fair competition. This contravenes the "openness" of the Internet (i.e., the integral interconnected diversity that an open network like the Internet embodies) as an independent regulatory goal. The Internet, being a single gateway to a mind-boggling variety of services, allows for a diverse "long tail", which would lose out if the Internet was seen solely as a gateway to popular apps, sites, and content. However, given that this is a choice exercised freely by the consumer, such packs should not be prohibited, as that would be a case of over-regulation.

The one exception to the above analysis of competition, needless to say, is if that these special packs aren't purely customer-demand driven and are the product of special deals between an OTT and the telco. In that case, we need to ensure it isn't anti-competitive by following the prescriptions of the next section.

3.3.3.1.4 Earning Additional Revenues from Content Providers

With offerings like Airtel Zero, we have a situation where OTT companies are offering to pay for wholesale data access used by their customers, and make accessing their specific site or app free for the customer. From the customer's perspective, this is similar to a toll-free number or a pre-paid envelope or free-to-air TV channel being offered on a particular network.

However, from the network perspective, these are very different. Even if a customer-company pays Airtel for the toll-free number, that number is accessible and toll-free across all networks since the call terminates on Airtel networks and Airtel pays the connecting network back the termination charge from the fee they are paid by the customer-company. This cannot happen in case of the Internet, since the "call" terminates outside of the reach of the ISP being paid for zero-rating by the OTT company; hence unless specific measures are taken, zero-rating has to be network-specific.

The comparison to free-to-air channels is also instructive, since in 2010 TRAI made recommendations that consumers should have the choice of accessing free-to-air channels à-la-carte, without being tied up to a bouquet.^{^[24]} This would, in essence, allow a subscriber to purchase a set-top box, and without paying a regular subscription fee watch free-to-air channels. ^{^[25]} However, similar to toll-free numbers, these free-to-air channels are free-to-air on all MSO's set-top boxes, unlike the proposed Airtel Zero scheme under which access to a site like Flipkart would be free for customers on Airtel's network alone.

Hence, these comparisons, while useful in helping think through the regulatory and competition issues, should not be used as instructive exact analogies, since they aren't fully comparable situations.

3.3.3.1.5 Market Options for OTT-Paid Zero-Rating

As noted above, a competitive marketplace already exists for wholesale data purchase at the level of "content ISPs" (including CDNs), which sell wholesale data to content providers (OTTs). This market is at present completely unregulated. The deals that exist are treated as commercial secrets. It is almost certain that large OTTs get better rates than small startups due to economies of scale.

However, at the eyeball ISP level, it is a single-sided market with ISPs competing to gain customers in the form of end-users. With a scheme like "Airtel Zero", this would get converted into a double-sided market, with a gatekeeper without whom neither side can reach the other being in the middle creating a two-sided toll. This situation is ripe for market abuse: this situation allows the gatekeeper to hinder access to those OTTs that don't pay the requisite toll or to provide preferential access to those who pay, apart from providing an ISP the opportunity to "double-dip".

One way to fix this is to prevent ISPs from establishing a double-sided market. The other way would be to create a highly-regulated market where the gatekeeping powers of the ISP are diminished, and the ISP's ability to leverage its exclusive access over its customers are curtailed. A comparison may be drawn here to the rules that are often set by standard-setting bodies where patents are involved: given that these patents are essential inputs, access to them must be allowed through fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory licences. Access to the Internet and common carriers like telecom networks, being even more important (since alternatives exist to particular standards, but not to the Internet itself), must be placed at an even higher pedestal and thus even stricter regulation to ensure fair competition.

A marketplace of this sort would impose some regulatory burdens on TRAI and place burdens on innovations by the ISPs, but a regulated marketplace harms ISP innovation less than not allowing a market at all.

At a minimum, such a marketplace must ensure non-exclusivity, non-discrimination, and transparency. Thus, at a minimum, a telecom provider cannot discriminate between any OTTs who want similar access to zero-rating. Further, a telecom provider cannot prevent any OTT from zero-rating with any other telecom provider. To ensure that telecom providers are actually following this stipulation, transparency is needed, as a minimum.

Transparency can take one of two forms: transparency to the regulator alone and transparency to the public. Transparency to the regulator alone would enable OTTs and ISPs to keep the terms of their commercial transactions secret from their competitors, but enable the regulator, upon request, to ensure that this doesn't lead to anti-competitive practices. This model would increase the burden on the regulator, but would be more palatable to OTTs and ISPs, and more comparable to the wholesale data market where the terms of such agreements are strictly-guarded commercial secrets. On the other hand, requiring transparency to the public would reduce the burden on the regulator, despite coming at a cost of secrecy of commercial terms, and is far more preferable.

Beyond transparency, a regulation could take the form of insisting on standard rates and terms for all OTT players, with differential usage tiers if need be, to ensure that access is truly non-discriminatory. This is how the market is structured on the retail side.

Since there are transaction costs in individually approaching each telecom provider for such zero-rating, the market would greatly benefit from a single marketplace where OTTs can come and enter into agreements with multiple telecom providers.

Even in this model, telecom networks will be charging based not only on the fact of the number of customers they have, but on the basis of them having exclusive routing to those customers. Further, even under the standard-rates based single-market model, a particular zero-rated site may be accessible for free from one network, but not across all networks: unlike the situation with a toll-free number in which no such distinction exists.

To resolve this, the regulator may propose that if an OTT wishes to engage in paid zero-rating, it will need to do so across all networks, since if it doesn't there is risk of providing an unfair advantage to one network over another and increasing the gatekeeper effect rather than decreasing it.

However, all forms of competitive Internet service-paid zero-priced zero-rating, even when they don't harm competition, innovation amongst content providers, or consumers, will necessarily harm openness and diversity of the Internet. For instance, while richer companies with a strong presence in India may pay to zero-rate traffic for their Indian customers, decentralized technologies such as XMPP and WebRTC, having no central company behind them, would not, leading to customers preferring proprietary networks and solutions to such open technologies, which in turn, thanks to the network effect, leads to a vicious cycle. These harms to openness and diversity have to be weighed against the benefit in terms of increase in access when deciding whether to allow for competitive OTT-paid zero-priced zero-rating, as such competition doesn't exist in a truly level playing field . Further, it must be kept in mind that there are forms of zero-priced zero-rating that decrease the harm to openness / diversity, or completely remove that harm altogether: that there are other options available must be acknowledged by the regulator when considering the benefit to access from competitive OTT-paid zero-priced zero-rating.

3.3.3.1.6 Other options for zero-rating

There are other models of zero-priced zero-rating that either minimize the harm is that of ensuring free Internet access for every person. This can take the form of:^{^[26]}

● A mandatorily "leaky" 'walled garden':

○ The first-degree of all hyperlinks from the zero-rated OTT service are also free.

○ The zero-rated OTT service provider has to mandatorily provide free access to the whole of the World Wide Web to all its customers during specified hours.

○ The zero-rated OTT service provider has to mandatorily provide free access to the whole of the World Wide Web to all its customers based on amount on usage of the OTT service.^{^[27]}

● Zero-rating of all Web traffic

○ In exchange for viewing of advertisements

○ In exchange for using a particular Web browser

○ At low speeds on 3G, or on 2G.

3.3.3.2. What kinds of zero-rating are good

The majority of the forms of zero-rating covered in this section are content or source/destination-based zero-rating. Only some of the options covered in the "other options for zero-rating" section cover content-agnostic zero-rating models. Content-agnostic zero-rating models are not harmful, while content-based zero-rating models always harm, though to varying degrees, the openness of the Internet / diversity of OTTs, and to varying degrees increase access to Internet-based services. Accordingly, here is an hierarchy of desirability of zero-priced zero-rating, from most desirable to most harmful:

1. Content- & source/destination-agnostic zero-priced zero-rating.^{^[28]}

2. Content- & source/destination-based non-zero-priced zero-rating, without any commercial deals, chosen freely & paid for by users. ^{^[29]}

3. Content- & source/destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, without any commercial deals, with full transparency. ^{^[30]}

4. Content- & source/destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, on the basis of commercial deal with partial zero-priced access to all content, with non-discriminatory access to the same deal by all with full transparency.^{^[31]}

5. Content- & source/destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, on the basis of a non-commercial deal, without any benefits monetary or otherwise, flowing directly or indirectly from the provider of the zero-rated content to the ISP, with full transparency. ^{^[32]}

6. Content- & source-destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, across all telecom networks, with standard pricing, non-discriminatory access, and full transparency.

7. Content- & source-destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, with standard pricing, non-discriminatory access, and full transparency.

8. Content- & source-destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, with non-discriminatory access, and full transparency.

9. Content- & source-destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, with non-discriminatory access, and transparency to the regulator.

10. Content- & source-destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, without any regulatory framework in place.

3.3.4 Cartels and Oligopoly

While cartels and oligopolies may have an impact on Net Neutrality, they are not problems that any set of anti-discrimination rules imposed on gatekeepers can fix. Further, cartels and oligopolies don't directly enhance the ability of gatekeepers to unjustly discriminate if there are firm rules against negative discrimination and price ceilings and floors on data caps are present for data plans. Given this, TRAI should recommend that this issue be investigated and the Competition Commission of India should take this issue up.

3.4 Reasonable Network Management Principles

Reasonable network management has to be allowed to enable the ISPs to manage performance and costs on their network. However, ISPs may not indulge in acts that are harmful to consumers in the name of reasonable network management. Below are a set of guidelines for when discrimination against classes of traffic in the name of network management are justified.

● Discrimination between classes of traffic for the sake of network management should only be permissible if:

○ there is an intelligible differentia between the classes which are to be treated differently, and

○ there is a rational nexus between the differential treatment and the aim of such differentiation, and

○ the aim sought to be furthered is legitimate, and is related to the security, stability, or efficient functioning of the network, or is a technical limitation outside the control of the ISP^{^[33]}, and

○ the network management practice is the least harmful manner in which to achieve the aim.

● Provision of specialized services (i.e., "fast lanes") is permitted if and only if it is shown that

○ The service is available to the user only upon request, and not without their active choice, and

○ The service cannot be reasonably provided with "best efforts" delivery guarantee that is available over the Internet, and hence requires discriminatory treatment, or

○ The discriminatory treatment does not unduly harm the provision of the rest of the Internet to other customers.

These principles are only applicable at the level of ISPs, and not on access gateways for institutions that may in some cases be run by ISPs (such as a university network, free municipal WiFi, at a work place, etc.), which are not to be regulated as common carriers.

These principles may be applied on a case-by-case basis by a regulator, either suo motu or upon complaint by customers.

^{^[1]} Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, (19 May 2011), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/A.HRC.17.27_en.pdf.

^{^[2]} Available at http://www.trai.gov.in/WriteReadData/userfiles/file/NTP%202012.pdf.

^{^[3]} IAMAI, India to Cross 300 million internet users by Dec 14, (19 November, 2014), http://www.iamai.in/PRelease_detail.aspx?nid=3498&NMonth=11&NYear=2014.

^{^[4]} World Economic Forum, The Global Information Technology Report 2015, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global_IT_Report_2015.pdf.

^{^[5]} http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/4.1#s4.1.1

^{^[6]} See R.U.S. Prasad, The Impact of Policy and Regulatory Decisions on Telecom Growth in India (July 2008), http://web.stanford.edu/group/siepr/cgi-bin/siepr/?q=system/files/shared/pubs/papers/pdf/SCID361.pdf.

^{^[7]} 1973 AIR 106

^{^[8]} 1962 AIR 305

^{^[9]} "When ISPs go beyond their traditional use of IP headers to route packets, privacy risks begin to emerge." Alissa Cooper, How deep must DPI be to incur privacy risk? http://www.alissacooper.com/2010/01/25/how-deep-must-dpi-be-to-incur-privacy-risk/

^{^[10]} Richard T.B. Ma & Vishal Misra, The Public Option: A Non-Regulatory Alternative to Network Neutrality, http://dna-pubs.cs.columbia.edu/citation/paperfile/200/netneutrality.pdf

^{^[11]} Mobile number portability was launched in India on January 20, 2011 in the Haryana circle. See http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/pm-launches-nationwide-mobile-number-portability/1/127176.html . Accessed on April 24, 2015.

^{^[12]} For a comprehensive list of all TRAI interconnection regulations & subsequent amendments, see http://www.trai.gov.in/Content/Regulation/0_1_REGULATIONS.aspx.

^{^[13]} See Telecommunication Interconnection Usage Charges (Eleventh Amendment) Regulations, 2015 (1 of 2015), available at http://www.trai.gov.in/Content/Regulation/0_1_REGULATIONS.aspx.

^{^[14]} Article 30 of the Universal Service Directive, Directive 2002/22/EC.

^{^[15]} See Telecommunication Mobile Number Portability (Sixth Amendment) Regulations, 2015 (3 of 2015), available at http://www.trai.gov.in/Content/Regulation/0_1_REGULATIONS.aspx.

^{^[16]} The Telecommunication (Broadcasting and Cable) Services (Seventh) (The Direct to Home Services) Tariff Order, 2015 (2 of 2015).

^{^[17]} Section 8, Cable Television Networks Act, 1995.

^{^[18]} TRAI writes new rules for Cable TV, Channels, Consumers, REAL TIME NEWS, (August 11, 2014), http://rtn.asia/rtn/233/1220_trai-writes-new-rules-cable-tv-channels-consumers.

^{^[19]} An initial requirement for all multi system operators to have a minimum capacity of 500 channels was revoked by the TDSAT in 2012. For more details, see http://www.televisionpost.com/cable/msos-not-required-to-have-500-channel-headends-tdsat/.

^{^[20]} Aparna Ghosh, Bharti SoftBank Invests $14 million in Hike, LIVE MINT, (April 2, 2014), http://www.livemint.com/Companies/nI38YwQL2eBgE6j93lRChM/Bharti-SoftBank-invests-14-million-in-mobile-messaging-app.html.

^{^[21]} Mike Masnick, Can We Kill This Ridiculous Shill-Spread Myth That CDNs Violate Net Neutrality? They Don't, https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140812/04314528184/can-we-kill-this-ridiculous-shill-spread-myth-that-cdns-violate-net-neutrality-they-dont.shtml.

^{^[22]} Mathew Carley, What is Hayai's stance on "Net Neutrality"?, https://www.hayai.in/faq/hayais-stance-net-neutrality?c=mgc20150419

^{^[23]} Helani Galpaya & Shazna Zuhyle, South Asian Broadband Service Quality: Diagnosing the Bottlenecks, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1979928

^{^[24]} DTH players told to offer pay channels on la carte basis, HINDU BUSINESS LINE (July 22, 2010), http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/todays-paper/dth-players-told-to-offer-pay-channels-on-la-carte-basis/article999298.ece.

^{^[25]} The Telecommunication (Broadcasting and Cable) Services (Fourth) (Addressable Systems) Tariff Order, 2010.

^{^[26]} These suggestions were provided by Helani Galpaya and Sunil Abraham, based in some cases on existing practices.

^{^[27]} This is what is being followed by the Jana Loyalty Program: http://www.betaboston.com/news/2015/05/06/with-a-new-loyalty-program-mobile-app-marketplace-jana-pushes-deeper-into-the-developing-world/

^{^[28]} Example: free Internet access at low speeds, with data caps.

^{^[29]} Example: special "packs" for specific services like WhatsApp.

^{^[30]} Example: zero-rating of all locally-peered settlement-free traffic.

^{^[31]} Example: "leaky" walled gardens, such as the Jana Loyalty Program that provide limited access to all of the Web alongside access to the zero-rated content.

^{^[32]} Example: Wikipedia Zero.

^{^[33]} A CGNAT would be an instance of such a technology that poses network limitations.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/regulatory-perspectives-on-net-neutrality

Funding of National Optic Fibre Network (NOFN) - Who's Accountable?

Aditya Garg — 2015-07-17T15:19:51Z

The National Optic Fibre Network, a part of the Government's Digital India Initiative, has been in the news since the recent Expert Committee Report. In this Blog, the author examines the Accountability of the funding of the project.

The National Optic Fibre Network (NOFN) is a project launched by the Government under their 'Digital India' initiative. Implementation of the project is being undertaken by Bharat Broadband Nigam Limited (BBNL), a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) created for the project. ^{^[1]} The project, launched in 2011, has seen multiple delays. The recent Expert Committee report on the project has now set an end-date for December 2016. It has also proposed an increase in the funding from 20,000 crore to 72,000 crore approximately. This is greater than a threefold increase.^{^[2]} The Universal Service Obligation Fund (USOF) provides all the funding for the implementation of the project under an agreement between them and BBNL. ^{^[3]} The close relationship between the two entities through their parent entity, however, can lead to a lax oversight of the entire process.

Universal Service Obligation Fund

USOF, established in 2002, provides effective subsidies to ensure telegraph services are provided to everyone across India, especially in the rural and remote areas. It is headed by the USOF Administrator who reports to the Secretary, Department of Telecommunications (DoT). ^{^[4]} Funds come from the Universal Service Levy (USL) of 5% charged from all the telecom operators on their Adjusted Gross Revenue (AGR) which are then deposited into the Consolidated Fund of India, and require prior parliamentary approval to be dispatched.^{^[5]} The USOF works through a bidding process, where funds are given to the enterprise quoting the lowest bid. However, the funds for NOFN were made an exception to this process since BBNL was the sole party involved in the implementation having being specifically created for it.^{^[6]}

Agreement to Transfer Funds between USOF and BBNL

The agreement^{^[7]} between USOF and BBNL provided for USOF to cover all the expenses of BBNL undertaken while working on NOFN project. It empowered USOF, amongst other things, to:

Revoke the Agreement in Public Interest within 5 years from signing; and to re-new the agreement or not to re-new it

Enforce Operating and Technical Condition upon BBNL while implementing the NOFN project

Have the Right to Inspect, Test and Monitor the enforcement of such Conditions so imposed

Conflict of Interest between both parties

The Administrator of USOF functions as an attached office to the Ministry of Dot, and is required to report to them,^{^[8]} while BBNL is an SPV established under the DoT^{^[9]} and has an Memorandum of Understanding ^{^[10]} with them. Since the parent entity of both the parties is the same, there is a definite conflict of interest. An analysis of USOF's largest and most ambitious program for mobile provisioning in rural areas showed slow progress due to^{^[11]}:

Lack of Accountability arising from the relationship between the Government owned incumbent and the USOF Administrator

No proper evaluation of USOF

Non-ring fencing of the fund

Poor quality project management

Lack of Review Mechanism with effective power

Similarly in NOFN, if no effective review mechanism is evolved to check the progress of the timeline and implementation of the projects, it may prove ineffective.^{^[12]} 3rd party review mechanisms have been suggested as an alternative to USOF mechanisms to ensure neutrality and efficiency^{^[13]} since the the agreement gives USOF the Right to 'Inspect, Test and Monitor', but there is no effective Review Mechanism available with the USOF to actually undertake the task. The ones available would also be working under the DoT and hence operate under a conflict of interest which may be misused to disburse funds even though they are not being used efficiently or in a timely fashion.

Other Funding Options - Private Actors and State Govts.

The Expert Committee also looked into two other funding options. Bringing Private Actors on Board in implementation of Phase II of the Project was the first.^{^[14]} This has been criticized as being unfair to Public Enterprises since they have been allotted the 'hard' areas while the Private Actors will get the 'soft' ones. ^{^[15]} The abysmal record of Private Actors in Rural Areas has also been mentioned as a factor against them.^{^[16]}

The second suggestion is to bring in State Governments. Andhra Pradesh has already decided to opt for its own SPV to implement NOFN while Kerala and Tamil Nadu are considering it.^{^[17]} The problems with having multiple implementing bodies are:

Transferring Funds to multiple bodies

Having to track their work separately

Lack of accountability for work done by them individually

Since a criticism of the current implementation mechanism has been based on the fact that 3 PSUs (BSNL, RailTel and PowerGrid) have been involved, having multiple SPVs would only add to the woes.^{^[18]}

The project, having been delayed multiple times, is now set for a December-2017 end. The funding for it has also been tripled. Hence, when we see that the funds are being given away so easily to BBNL and without any effective procedure to maintain the efficacy of the work done, it raises questions on the accountability of the Government regarding the fund which has been collected through revenue from all telecom operators (via USL). Therefore, a more open mechanism has to be ensured to reduce chances of bias towards BBNL by USOF, both having the same parent entity leading to conflict of interest between the two. This should be the focus right now, rather than introducing new funding options.

^{^[1]} 'Objectives, About BBNL' http://www.bbnl.nic.in/content/page/objectives.php accessed 2 July 2015.

^{^[2]} Yuthika Bhargava, 'National Opic Fibre Network - Revamp on Cards' (The Hindu, 30 May 2015) http://www.thehindu.com/business/Industry/national-optical-fibre-network-revamp-on-cards/article7261346.ece accessed 2 July 2015.

^{^[3]} 'Agreement For Support from USO Fund For Creation, Operation and Maintenance of the National Optical Fibre Network (NOFN) for Provision of Broadband Connectivity to the Panchayats to be executed by Bharat Broadband Network Limited (BBNL) Under Universal Services Obligation Fund, The Indian Telegraph (Amendment) Rules, 2012' http://www.usof.gov.in/usof-cms/GagendaPdf/NOFN_Agreement.pdf accessed 2 July 2015.

^{^[4]} 'About USOF' http://www.usof.gov.in/usof-cms/usof_home_contd.htm accessed 2 July 2015.

^{^[5]} 'USOF Brochure' http://www.usof.gov.in/usof-cms/USOF-Brochure.pdf accessed 2 July 2015.

^{^[6]} 'Indian Telegraph (Amendment of 2012) Rules, 1951' http://usof.gov.in/usof-cms/ActsRules/Indian%20Telegraph%20Rules%202012.PDF accessed 3 July 2015.

^{^[7]} 'Agreement For Support from USO Fund For Creation, Operation and Maintenance of the National Optical Fibre Network (NOFN) for Provision of Broadband Connectivity to the Panchayats to be executed by Bharat Broadband Network Limited (BBNL) Under Universal Services Obligation Fund, The Indian Telegraph (Amendment) Rules, 2012' http://www.usof.gov.in/usof-cms/GagendaPdf/NOFN_Agreement.pdf accessed 5 July 2015.

^{^[8]} 'Constitution, Powers and Functions of the Office of Universal Service Fund Administrator' http://www.usof.gov.in/usof-cms/usofsub/Constitution,%20Powers%20and%20Functions%20of%20the%20Office%20of%20Universal%20Service%20Fund%20Administrator.pdf accessed 6 July 2015.

^{^[9]} 'Company Profile' http://www.bbnl.nic.in/content/page/company-profile.php accessed 5 July 2015.

^{^[10]} 'Memorandum of Understanding 2015-16 with Department of Telecommunication' http://www.bbnl.nic.in/upload/uploadfiles/files/BBNL_Signed_Copy%20of%20MoU%202015-16.pdf accessed 6 July 2015.

^{^[11]} Rekha Jain & G. Raghuram, 'Role of Universal Service Obligation Fund in Rural Telecom Services: Lessons from the Indian Experience' http://www.iimahd.ernet.in/assets/snippets/workingpaperpdf/2009-06-03Jain.pdf accessed 2 July 2015.

^{^[12]} Ibid

^{^[13]} Ibid

^{^[14]} Mansi Taneja, 'Govt decides to rope in private players for NOFN project' (Business Standard, 15 January 2015) http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/govt-decides-to-rope-in-private-players-for-nofn-project-115011401190_1.html accessed 1 July 2015.

^{^[15]} Prabir Purkayastha, 'National Optical Fibre Network Project And the Expert Committee Report' (Peoples Democracy, No. 25, Vol. XXXIX, 28 June 2015).

^{^[16]} Ibid

^{^[17]} Mansi Taneja, 'National Optic fibre network: Govt to rope in state govts' (Business Standard, 29 May 2015) http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/national-optic-fibre-network-govt-to-rope-in-state-govts-115052900050_1.html accessed 4 July 2015.

^{^[18]} 'Trai: Optical fibre network project caught in red tape' (The Financial Express, 18 April 2015) http://www.financialexpress.com/article/economy/trai-optical-fibre-network-project-caught-in-red-tape/64699/ accessed 2 July 2015.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/telecom/blog/funding-of-national-optic-fibre-network-who-is-accountable

Digital Rights and ISP Accountability in India: An Analysis of Policies and Practices

Anubha Sinha, Yesha Tshering Paul, and Sherina Poyyail — 2025-01-23T10:04:44Z

This report presents a comprehensive evaluation of India's four largest Internet Service Providers (ISPs)—Reliance Jio, Bharti Airtel, Vodafone-Idea (Vi), and BSNL—examining their commitment to digital rights and transparency.

Read the full report here.

India's four largest Internet Service Providers (ISPs)—Reliance Jio, Bharti Airtel, Vodafone-Idea (Vi), and BSNL collectively serve 98% of India's internet subscribers, with Jio and Airtel commanding a dominant market share of 80.87%. The assessment comes at a critical juncture in India's digital landscape, marked by a 279.34% increase in internet subscribers from 2014 to 2024, alongside issues such as proliferation of internet shutdowns.

Adapting the Ranking Digital Rights' (RDR) 2022 methodology framework for its 2022 Telco Giants Scorecard, our analysis reveals significant disparities in governance structures and commitment to digital rights across these providers. Bharti Airtel emerges as the leader in governance framework implementation, maintaining dedicated human rights policies and board-level oversight. In contrast, Vi and Jio demonstrate mixed results with limited explicit human rights commitments, while BSNL exhibits the weakest governance structure with minimal human rights considerations. Notably, all ISPs lack comprehensive human rights impact assessments for their advertising and algorithmic systems.

The evaluation of freedom of expression commitments reveals systematic inadequacies across all providers. Terms and conditions are frequently fragmented and difficult to access, while providers maintain broad discretionary powers for account suspension or termination without clear appeal processes. There is limited transparency regarding content moderation practices and government takedown requests, coupled with insufficient disclosure about algorithmic decision-making systems that affect user experiences.

Privacy practices among these ISPs show minimal evolution since previous assessments, with persistent concerns about policy accessibility and comprehension. The investigation reveals limited transparency regarding algorithmic processing of personal data, widespread sharing of user data with third parties and government agencies, and inadequate user control over personal information. None of the evaluated ISPs maintain clear data breach notification policies, raising significant concerns about user data protection.

The concentrated market power of Jio and Airtel, combined with weak digital rights commitments across the sector, raises substantial concerns about the state of user privacy and freedom of expression in India's digital landscape. The lack of transparency in website blocking and censorship, inconsistent implementation of blocking orders, limited accountability in handling government requests, insufficient protection of user rights, and inadequate grievance redressal mechanisms emerge as critical areas requiring immediate attention.

As India continues its rapid digital transformation, our findings underscore the urgent need for both regulatory intervention and voluntary industry reforms. The development of standardised transparency reporting, strengthened user rights protections, and robust accountability mechanisms will be crucial in ensuring that India's digital growth aligns with fundamental rights and democratic values.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/digital-rights-and-isp-accountability-in-india-an-analysis-of-policies-and-practices

Airtel Open Network

Harsh Gupta and Aditya Tejas — 2016-06-17T11:58:31Z

Today, Airtel launched its Open Network platform. The web page displays visualization data on network coverage and signal strength across the country, as well as a detailed breakdown of cell tower placement, including towers that are shutdown or still being planned.

Airtel also reportedly promises that its call centres and physical stores have been upgraded with tools based on the new interface to allow for easy reporting of network coverage issues.[1] Users can report issues or request new cell towers directly through the platform.

This is part of Airtel’s wider ‘Project Leap’, a Rs. 60,000 crore overhaul of the operator’s network, which claims to include a bevy of technological solutions aimed at improving service. Airtel claims that these include smaller cells, indoor solutions, Wi-Fi hotspots and upgraded base stations.

This is a praiseworthy move on Airtel’s part. No other major telecoms company has undertaken a similar initiative. There exist private alternatives such as OpenSignal[2][3] that provide cell coverage map, among others. However, these services make use of crowdsourced data collection from users to create their maps.

While the portal is very convenient, it is worth pointing out that the website itself contains no links to any open data -- merely the visualization of data. At the time of writing, there was no indication of any way to request access to raw data on network coverage. While OpenSignal and other alternatives provide APIs[4] or direct access to their database, we saw no similar services on the Open Network website. Without access to raw data the Open Network initiative isn’t really open, as citizens cannot make use of data in any way other than what is provided in the visualization. Raw network coverage data would be immensely valuable to public and private actors, researchers, and the general public alike.

Furthermore, while the portal indicates the quality of coverage in an area (including separate indicators for voice and data quality) it gives no indications as to how these categories were arrived at, or what a ‘Moderate’ level of data quality means empirically. It is also unclear how often the visualization is refreshed, or how old the data currently on display are.

In addition, the provisions for reporting issues through the platform seem to be lacking, and it is unclear how open Airtel will be with these. Expressing interest in hosting a cell tower takes you to an online form and a promise that ‘we will get in touch with you.’ By contrast, trying to report an issue takes you to a ‘network troubleshooting guide’ with some basic tech support information and a number to call an advisor.

The Open Network website promises that “the more open questions you ask, the more open answers we can give.” But the platform contains no fundamentally new or different mechanisms for reporting issues which take advantage of the crowdsourced ethos that Airtel lays claim to. While this is a very promising first step for the company, we hope that they continue to refine their website and display a meaningful commitment to the principles they have espoused here.Furthermore, while the portal indicates the quality of coverage in an area (including separate indicators for voice and data quality) it gives no indications as to how these categories were arrived at, or what a ‘Moderate’ level of data quality means empirically. It is also unclear how often the visualization is refreshed, or how old the data currently on display are. In addition, the provisions for reporting issues through the platform seem to be lacking, and it is unclear how open Airtel will be with these.

Expressing interest in hosting a cell tower takes you to an online form and a promise that ‘we will get in touch with you.’ By contrast, trying to report an issue takes you to a ‘network troubleshooting guide’ with some basic tech support information and a number to call an advisor.

http://gadgets.ndtv.com/telecom/news/airtels-open-network-launched-on-app-to-show-coverage-quality-across-india-849280

opensignal.com

https://radiocells.org/

http://developer.opensignal.com/networkrank/

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/telecom/blog/airtel-open-network

Workshop on Set-top Boxes

sinha — 2016-06-24T15:13:22Z

The Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) is organising a one-day workshop in Delhi on Tuesday, July 12 on the evolution and state of the set-top box as an access device in India.

The workshop will be conducted by Dr. Rakesh Mehrotra who is a professor at Sharda University. It will be supported by an advisor from the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India to cover the aspect of regulation. The workshop will focus on the expanding functionality and innovations in set-top box (STB) technologies. It will also include an exposition on the regulatory regime applicable to STBs, around issues of interoperability, competition and privacy, and conclude with an outlook on the future of STBs.

We will initiate research collaborations with suitable participants to produce papers after the workshop. Certificates of participation will be provided.

Apply

There are limited spots for participants. Please state your interest by filling out this form here- http://goo.gl/forms/Mj77h0nkeVBJgHJn2 The deadline for filling application is July 5, 2016.

Fee and Funding

There is no registration fee for the workshop. Participants will be served lunch and refreshments at the venue. Please note that there is no funding for travel and accommodation.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/telecom/events/workshop-set-top-boxes

CIS Submission to TRAI Consultation on Free Data

pranesh — 2016-07-01T16:04:27Z

The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) held a consultation on Free Data, for which CIS sent in the following comments.

The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) asked for public comments on free data. Below are the comments that CIS submitted to the four questions that it posed.

Question 1
Is there a need to have TSP agnostic platform to provide free data or suitable reimbursement to users, without violating the principles of Differential Pricing for Data laid down in TRAI Regulation? Please suggest the most suitable model to achieve the objective.

Is There a Need for Free Data?

No, there is no need for free data, just as there is no need for telephony or Internet. However, making provisions for free data would increase the amount of innovation in the Internet and telecom sector, and there is a good probability that it would lead to faster adoption of the Internet, and thus be beneficial in terms of commerce, freedom of expression, freedom of association, and many other ways.

Thus the question that a telecom regulator should ask is not whether there is a need for TSP agnostic platforms, but whether such platforms are harmful for competition, for consumers, and for innovation. The telecom regulator ought not undertake regulation unless there is evidence to show that harm has been caused or that harm is likely to be caused. In short, TRAI should not follow the precautionary principle, since the telecom and Internet sectors are greatly divergent from environmental protection: the burden of proof for showing that something ought to be prohibited ought to be on those calling for prohibition.

Goal: Regulating Gatekeeping

TRAI wouldn’t need to regulate price discrimination or Net neutrality if ISPs were not “gatekeepers” for last-mile access. “Gatekeeping” occurs when a single entity establishes itself as an exclusive route to reach a large number of people and businesses or, in network terms, nodes. It is not possible for Internet services to reach their end customers without passing through ISPs (generally telecom networks). The situation is very different in the middle-mile and for backhaul. Even though anti-competitive terms may exist in the middle-mile, especially given the opacity of terms in “transit agreements”, a packet is usually able to travel through multiple routes if one route is too expensive (even if that is not the shortest network path, and is thus inefficient in a way). However, this multiplicity of routes is generally not possible in the last mile.¹ This leaves last mile telecom operators (ISPs) in a position to unfairly discriminate between different Internet services or destinations or applications, while harming consumer choice.

However, the aim of regulation by TRAI cannot be to prevent gatekeeping, since that is not possible as long as there are a limited number of ISPs. For instance, even by the very act of charging money for access to the Internet, ISPs are guilty of “gatekeeping” since they are controlling who can and cannot access an Internet service that way. Instead, the aim of regulation by TRAI should be to “regulate gatekeepers to ensure they do not use their gatekeeping power to unjustly discriminate between similarly situated persons, content or traffic”, as we proposed in our submission to TRAI (on OTTs) last year.

Models for Free Data

There are multiple models possible for free data, none of which TRAI should prohibit unless it would enable OTTs to abuse their gatekeeping powers.

Government Incentives For Non-Differentiated Free Data

The government may opt to require all ISPs to provide free Internet to all at a minimum QoS in exchange for exemption from paying part of their USO contributions, or the government may pay ISPs for such access using their USO contributions.

TRAI should recommend to DoT that it set up a committee to study the feasibility of this model.

ISP subsidies

ISP subsidies of Internet access only make economic sense for the ISP under the following ‘Goldilocks’ condition is met: the experience with the subsidised service is ‘good enough’ for the consumers to want to continue to use such services, but ‘bad enough’ for a large number of them to want to move to unsubsidised, paid access.

Providing free Internet to all at a low speed.
1. This naturally discriminates against services and applications such as video streaming, but does not technically bar access to them.
Providing free access to the Internet with other restrictions on quality that aren’t discriminatory with respect to content, services, or applications.

Rewards model

A TSP-agnostic rewards platform will only come within the scope of TRAI regulation if the platform has some form of agreement with the TSPs, even if it is collectively. If the rewards platform doesn’t have any agreement with any TSP, then TRAI does not have the power to regulate it. However, if the rewards platform has an agreement with any TSP, it is unclear whether it would be allowed under the Differential Data Tariff Regulation, since the clause 3(2) read with paragraph 30 of the Explanatory Memorandum might disallow such an agreement.

Assuming for the sake of argument that platforms with such agreements are not disallowed, such platforms can engage in either post-purchase credits or pre-purchase credits, or both. In other words, it could be a situation where a person has to purchase a data pack, engage in some activity relating to the platform (answer surveys, use particular apps, etc.) and thereupon get credit of some form transferred to one’s SIM, or it could be a situation where even without purchasing a data pack, a consumer can earn credits and thereupon use those credits towards data.

The former kind of rewards platform is not as useful when it comes to encouraging people to use the Internet, since only those who already see worth in using in the Internet (and can afford it) will purchase a data pack in the first place. The second form, on the other hand is quite useful, and could be encouraged. However, this second model is not as easily workable, economically, for fixed line connections, since there is a higher initial investment involved.

Recharge API

A recharge API could be fashioned in one of two ways: (1) via the operating system on the phone, allowing a TSP or third parties (whether OTTs or other intermediaries) to transfer credit to the SIM card on the phone which have been bought wholesale. Another model could be that of all TSPs providing a recharge API for the use of third parties. Only the second model is likely to result in a “toll-free” experience since in the first model, like in the case of a rewards platform that requires up-front purchase of data packs, there has to be a investment made first before that amount is recouped. This is likely to hamper the utility of such a model.

Further, in the first case, TRAI would probably not have the powers to regulate such transactions, as there would be no need for any involvement by the TSP. If anti-competitive agreements or abuse of dominant position seems to be taking place, it would be up to the Competition Commission of India to investigate.

However, the second model would have to be overseen by TRAI to ensure that the recharge APIs don’t impose additional costs on OTTs, or unduly harm competition and innovation. For instance, there ought to be an open specification for such an API, which all the TSPs should use in order to reduce the costs on OTTs. Further, there should be no exclusivity, and no preferential treatment provided for the TSPs sister concerns or partners.

“0.example” sites

Other forms of free data, for instance by TSPs choosing not to charge for low-bandwidth traffic should be allowed, as long as it is not discriminatory, nor does it impose increased barriers to entry for OTTs. For instance, if a website self-certifies that it is low-bandwidth and optimized for Internet-enabled feature phones and uses 0.example.tld to signal this (just as wap.* were used in for WAP sites and m.* are used for mobile-optimized versions of many sites), then there is no reason why TSPs should be prohibited from not charging for the data consumed by such websites, as long as the TSP does so uniformly without discrimination. In such cases, the TSP is not harming competition, harming consumers, nor abusing its gatekeeping powers.

OTT-agnostic free data

If a TSP decides not to charge for specific forms of traffic (for example, video, or for locally-peered traffic) regardless of the Internet service from which that traffic emanates, as as long as it does so with the end customer’s consent, then there is no question of the TSP harming competition, harming consumers, nor abusing its gatekeeping powers. There is no reason such schemes should be prohibited by TRAI unless they distort markets and harm innovation.

Unified marketplace

One other way to do what is proposed as the “recharge API” model is to create a highly-regulated market where the gatekeeping powers of the ISP are diminished, and the ISP’s ability to leverage its exclusive access over its customers are curtailed. A comparison may be drawn here to the rules that are often set by standard-setting bodies where patents are involved: given that these patents are essential inputs, access to them must be allowed through fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory licences. Access to the Internet and common carriers like telecom networks, being even more important (since alternatives exist to particular standards, but not to the Internet itself), must be placed at an even higher pedestal and thus even stricter regulation to ensure fair competition.

Transparency can take one of two forms: transparency to the regulator alone and transparency to the public. Transparency to the regulator alone would enable OTTs and ISPs to keep the terms of their commercial transactions secret from their competitors, but enable the regulator, upon request, to ensure that this doesn’t lead to anti-competitive practices. This model would increase the burden on the regulator, but would be more palatable to OTTs and ISPs, and more comparable to the wholesale data market where the terms of such agreements are strictly-guarded commercial secrets. On the other hand, requiring transparency to the public would reduce the burden on the regulator, despite coming at a cost of secrecy of commercial terms, and is far more preferable.

To resolve this, the regulator may propose that if an OTT wishes to engage in paid zero-rating, it will need to do so across all networks, since if it doesn’t there is risk of providing an unfair advantage to one network over another and increasing the gatekeeper effect rather than decreasing it.

Question 2

Whether such platforms need to be regulated by the TRAI or market be allowed to develop these platforms?

In many cases, TRAI would have no powers over such platforms, so the question of TRAI regulating does not arise. In all other cases, TRAI can allow the market to develop such platforms, and then see if any of them violates the Discriminatory Data Tariffs Regualation. For government-incentivised schemes that are proposed above, TRAI should take proactive measure in getting their feasibility evaluated.

Question 3

Whether free data or suitable reimbursement to users should be limited to mobile data users only or could it be extended through technical means to subscribers of fixed line broadband or leased line?

Spectrum is naturally a scarce resource, though technological advances (as dictated by Cooper’s Law) and more efficient management of spectrum make it less so. However, we have seen that fixed-line broadband has more or less stagnated for the past many years, while mobile access has increased. So the market distortionary power of fixed-line providers is far less than that of mobile providers. However, competition is far less in fixed-line Internet access services, while it is far higher in mobile Internet access. Switching costs in fixed-line Internet access services are also far higher than in mobile services. Given these differences, the regulation with regard to price discrimination might justifiably be different.

All in all, for this particular issue, it is unclear why different rules should apply to mobile users and fixed line users.

Question 4

Any other issue related to the matter of Consultation.

None.

In India’s mobile telecom sector, according to a Nielsen study, an estimated 15% of mobile users are multi-SIM users, meaning the “gatekeeping” effect is significantly reduced in both directions: Internet services can reach them via multiple ISPs, and conversely they can reach Internet services via multiple ISPs. See Nielsen, ‘Telecom Transitions: Tracking the Multi-SIM Phenomena in India’, http://www.nielsen.com/in/en/insights/reports/2015/telecom-transitions-tracking-the-multi-sim-phenomena-in-india.html↩

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-submission-trai-consultation-free-data

Slow internet driving you nuts? Here is how your service provider is fleecing you

praskrishna — 2016-07-01T15:32:58Z

June 20 was World Wifi Day — an occasion to celebrate speedy, reliable internet connections. India, although a major internet market and the fastest growing now, is a very odd place for such celebration. Average internet speed in India is lower than all other countries in BRICs and lower than most other emerging economies.

The article was published in the Economic Times on June 23, 2016. Sunil Abraham was quoted.

Plus, wired broadband speeds available to 17 million paying consumers in India are far below what service providers promise when they charge end users for particular data services. A data service package that promises 8 Mbps will typically max out at 5 Mbps (Mbps is megabits per second, a measure of internet speed). Wireless connections are even more patchy.

Still worse, the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (Trai) and consumer advocacy groups haven't made much headway and service providers are ready with a set of arguments. Trai, which will release a consultation paper on promoting WiFi in public places, has a fairly conservative definition of broadband — that download speed should not fall below 512 kbps (kilobits per second; 1Mbps equals 1,000 kbps).

The end result: high-paying consumers suffer.

In a wired broadband service used at homes, few factors determine performance. First, the contention ratio, a key metric that measures the number of internet users sharing a fixed amount of data capacity or 'bandwidth' in a location at the same time. If the number of such users is large, the contention ratio will be high and real internet speed low.

Third is per capita spectrum usage/holdings in a country and India's is far below that of Western countries and major emerging economies.

In India, a low bandwidth availability country to begin with, wired broadband services typically have high contention ratio and/or high latency. Service providers Bharti Airtel, RCom and BSNL did not reply to ET's queries on internet speed.

Bijender Yadav, chief technology & information officer at Sistema Shyam Teleservices, another service provider, told ET data download speeds could fall below contracted levels in case of improper network planning and bandwidth distribution, or if there are glitches in the transmission link between a service provider's internet gateway and the home broadband user's premises.

A senior executive of a leading wired broadband service said, on the condition of anonymity, that companies do make certain assumptions.

Say, 10 customers are sold 2 Mbps connections, which means 20 Mbps should be available. But the company may provide only 5 Mbps for these 10 customers, assuming not all customers will be using their internet connections heavily at the same time. Therefore, the guaranteed internet speed is not 2 Mbps, but just 500 kbps.

Many telco executives ET spoke to said while the contention ratios are high given bandwidth availability, since bandwidth is a "scarce resource" it must be "optimised" to keep prices low for consumers. These executives spoke off record.

Consumer advocacy groups are however sceptical of this argument. They say companies are simply maximising data connection sales without offering good network quality.

"Telcos are selling bandwidth way beyond the optimum capacity of their networks and compromising on speed. Could they have done this if bandwidth was a tangible resource like cars or machines...imagine selling more cars than you've manufactured," asks Hemant Upadhyay, advisor (telecom and IT) at Consumer Voice, a leading telecom consumer group.

Consumer groups have recently urged the telecom regulator, Trai, to ensure an app that can continuously monitor bandwidth availability should be in use.

Sunil Abraham, executive director of Bengaluru-based research organisation, Centre for Internet and Society, argues Trai must ensure mandatory disclosure of contention ratios by service providers. "If such disclosures become mandatory, home broadband users can buy wired internet connections more judiciously with a better sense of what data speeds to expect from telcos and the possible quality of their experience."

Trai did not offer any comment on the call for mandatory disclosure of contention ratios by wired broadband operators.

A top executive of a leading operator, speaking off record, dismissed the proposal, saying "it wouldn't make sense to mandate service providers to make such disclosures as contention ratios vary from place to place".

Some experts are optimistic that WiFi networks may offer better services to high-paying data consumers. Bharti Airtel, Vodafone and new entrant Reliance Jio Infocomm are deploying WiFi networks.

Airtel and Vodafone have also launched WiFi hotspots apps. Jio is slated to do the same after its expected launch later this year.

But WiFi in public places hasn't taken off so far. Cumbersome authentication procedures and challenges around monetising services have been hurdles.

The speed of internet in the world's fastest growing internet market will likely remain below world average in the near future.

Second, the latency of a network, a measure of the delay a user experiences when his/her computer tries to access an internet server. If a service provider runs a low latency network, internet speed will be better.
Third is per capita spectrum usage/holdings in a country and India's is far below that of Western countries and major emerging economies.

A senior executive of a leading wired broadband service said, on the condition of anonymity, that companies do make certain assumptions.

Consumer advocacy groups are however sceptical of this argument. They say companies are simply maximising data connection sales without offering good network quality.

Consumer groups have recently urged the telecom regulator, Trai, to ensure an app that can continuously monitor bandwidth availability should be in use.

Trai did not offer any comment on the call for mandatory disclosure of contention ratios by wired broadband operators.

Some experts are optimistic that WiFi networks may offer better services to high-paying data consumers. Bharti Airtel, Vodafone and new entrant Reliance Jio Infocomm are deploying WiFi networks.
Airtel and Vodafone have also launched WiFi hotspots apps. Jio is slated to do the same after its expected launch later this year.

But WiFi in public places hasn't taken off so far. Cumbersome authentication procedures and challenges around monetising services have been hurdles.

The speed of internet in the world's fastest growing internet market will likely remain below world average in the near future.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/telecom/news/economic-times-kalyan-parbat-june-23-2016-slow-internet-driving-you-nuts

Call drops: Dealing with the menace or just shifting goal posts?

praskrishna — 2016-07-01T16:45:45Z

It is nothing short of an irony that the world’s second largest mobile user market that boasts of being the world’s fastest growing economy is plagued by poor infrastructure and overloaded networks to an extent that many callers are cut off even before they can finish a sentence. The fault in India’s much-acclaimed telecom revolution is a questioning, frequent phenomenon called “call drops”. There have been several signature campaigns and media pressure demanding that the government and telecom companies get their heads together to fix this raging demon of a problem. However, all they have been treated with is lip service and nothing more.

The article was published by India TV News on June 29, 2016

So, on one hand we have Union Minister Ravi Shankar Prasad claiming that the call drop problem is improving as telecom companies are installing towers, and on the other is TRAI that shows reports that operators like Aircel, Vodafone and Idea are using call drop masking technology incorrectly to fudge the data on call drops. Not long ago, we had Prime Minister Narendra Modi himself take up the issue and we saw a flurry of allegations and counter allegations flying between the government and the telecom companies on where the fault actually lies.

While the government claimed it had freed enough spectrum to fix network issues and blamed the companies for not investing enough in the infrastructure, the telcos hit back at the government saying they were facing regulatory hurdles in setting up of towers because of environmental issues posed by regulation. In all, we kept going in circles and the change promised remained as elusive as its perception.

Reality is that for cell phone users in India, call drop continues as a common phenomenon and figures released by the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) attest to this claim. According to TRAI, the figures have doubled in the last one year and the worst affected cell has more than 3% TCH drop (traffic channel call drop) rate, which is four times higher than the permitted limit. Quality of Service Regulations has allowed service providers a 2 per cent allowance of call drops on the basis of averaging call drops per month.

TRAI has recently conducted Audit and assessment of Quality of Service being provided by service providers through independent agencies for Cellular Mobile Telephone Service, Basic Service and Broadband Services in many states. In Ahmedabad all the operators have failed to meet the call drop rate benchmark of less that 2% expect Airtel 2G. Also in Mumbai most of the operators have not met the less that 2% call drop benchmark except Airtel 2G and 3G and Vodafone 2G.

Many other states have gone through this drive test and have failed.

This begs us to put up a serious question in the interest of the more than 103.518 cr users who shell out money for pathetic services - Is the problem actually being resolved or are we, the consumers, being taken for a royal ride?

Before we set out to give you a complete idea on the state of affairs and where we stand in terms of actually working towards fixing this problem, a look at some basics first to put things in context.

What is call drop?

A call drop technically signifies the service provider’s incapability to maintain a call, either incoming or outgoing, once it has been properly established. In India, call drops are a performance indicator for the country’s telecom networks. In many cities, mobile users have to rush from one room to another or drive around neighborhoods to find better signals or better voice quality.

Call drops now figure among the top customer issues with telcos in several Indian cities. There is very little transparency on call drop data but it can be said that most companies have multiple sites where the call drop incidence is much above the set 2 percent limit. New Delhi has been particularly hit after city authorities cracked down and sealed unlicensed mobile towers.

The problem had increased so much that India’s Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, the industry regulator, had specified that telecom service providers need to compensate users for dropped calls. The regulator said that the consumers will be paid Re.1 per call up to 3 dropped calls per day, only to be turned down by the Supreme Court, rendering the TRAI decision null and void.

Telecom companies had cried foul over the directive, firstly by saying that the regulator had no authority to levy such penalty and secondly, by saying that it wasn't possible to segregate the reasons for call drops.

SC gave a 99-page judgment and said that the regulation appears to be meant only to penalise telcos. The judgment highlighted various flaws in the ruling by the Delhi high court which upheld TRAIs regulation.

It further upheld the 2% exemption extended to service providers with regard to call drops and said the regulation would have penalized them despite it.

“A penalty that is imposed ‘without any reason’ either as to the number of call drops made being three, and only to the calling consumer, ‘far from balancing the interest of consumers and service providers’, is manifestly arbitrary, not being based on any factual data or reason,” the court said.

A ‘towering’ menace

Towers act as boosters that help radio waves travel better, and are a necessary part of the telecom architecture in any country. There are approximately 5,50,000 towers in India, and industry associations think another 1,00,000 are needed. The lower radio bands need less towers to travel longer distances, so when telecom companies offer services like 3G or 4G, they have to be at higher frequencies (2,100 MHz or 2,300 MHz instead of 900 MHz), which need more tower support.

Call drops occur due to several reasons.

Cities like Mumbai, Delhi, Chandigarh, Bengaluru, Jaipur and Patna have less towers than needed. Civic authorities across the country have shut down a total of around 10,000 towers and an additional 12,000 towers cannot be used due to various reasons.

Telecom companies are reluctant to share towers. This is because they are fixed investments by subsidiaries of telecom companies. Permission to erect a tower is given by the municipal body, but no uniform standards or procedures exist here.

The setting up of boosters on buildings remains a task, and permission has to be taken on a case-by-case basis. Things could improve if telecom connectivity were seen as being similar to water and power supply, and developers were to apply for a uniform set of permissions.

If we take the recent scenario the State-run telecom operator BSNL is said to expand its network in Chhattisgarh by installing 2,000 new mobile towers in the next two years, Communications and IT Minister Ravi Shankar Prasad, stepping forward to strengthen mobile connectivity in the state.

Telecom Secretary J S Deepak recently said that penal powers cannot be “one and final solution” for call drop and the telecom firms have committed Rs 12,000 cr to install new towers to check this problem.

“Government believes in the telecom sector. The quality of service must improve and industry has responsibility. They have committed 60,000 towers. Each tower cost about Rs 20 lakh which is around Rs 12,000 crore. The industry will make this investment in next three months,” he said recently.

Most of the mobile service providers have frequently failed in quarterly sample call drop tests conducted by Trai but operators have contested the results saying that they comply with benchmark set by the regulator.

On this, the operators raised issues such as regulatory hurdles by local authorities and opposition by residents associations to installation of mobile towers.

“All top CEOs have said they will set up war rooms to address this issue. We need to work with them to facilitate installation of mobile towers,” Deepak said.

“We are coordinating with minister (Ravi Shankar Prasad) to launch portal on EMF (radiation) next month. This will give data of about 4.3 lakh mobile towers. People can go online and check if a tower is emitting radiation within limit or not so that citizens are aware that it not an issue,” he added.

So after the launch of portal on EMF (radiation) next month, the fight on hurdles might be resolved, which will then raise questions on the operators if the call drop issue still persists.

Do companies benefit from call drops?

All the benefits depend on the tariff plan. If it’s measured in seconds, the telecom company gains nothing — no matter how many times the connection cut, billing resumes at the same rate. But if it is measured in minutes, or if the plan contains features such as a certain number of free calls in every billing cycle, call drops is a nightmare for the consumers.

Telecom firms claim that 95 per cent of tariff plans involves billing in seconds. Since call drops are the most common in overcrowded areas, interruptions tend to shorten the call and, to that extent, reduce the average revenue per user per minute. Since companies measure their performance on the basis of call drops too, it is risky for anyone to intentionally create conditions for drops, thus porting to another operator.

Cellular Operators Association of India (COAI) in a report said that the telecom industry is facing a lot of challenges which are leading to call drops:

State bodies initiate actions against the towers without any prior notices like disconnecting electricity supplies, sealing the premises and even dismantling of tower sites.
Restrictions imposed by state governments and municipalities for wireless sites for erecting cell-sites in non-commercial areas, sealing of the cell-sites by municipal authorities.
Issues pertaining to Right of Way (RoW) – due to no approval, operators are not even in a position to put up sites. Frequent fiber cuts due to infrastructure projects are recurring phenomena in almost all circles.
Site outages on account of long power failures and delay in restoration of power supply by electricity boards.
Owner/legal issues, which is an important factor, because if the operator does not obtain the permission to set up the cell site, calls in the area would be dropped.
Interference due to illegal wide band radio and coverage restrictions arising out of cross border spectrum interference.
Shortage of spectrum amid surging data traffic growth and the lack of availability of a sufficient quantum of globally harmonized spectrum in contiguous form is the biggest impediment to the deployment of wireless technologies in the access network and hence for better quality of service resulting in increased call drops with the increase in data traffic.

Government’s role and what it can do

The government says that call drops can be addressed to a large extent through better management of spectrum, something that will only provide partial relief. The occurrence of call drops is higher at busy areas, typically city centres. This means there is an unequal spread of traffic across the spectrum.

Regardless of these technical roadblocks, there is actually quite a lot that the government can do.

General allowing of shared spectrum so that the same bandwidth is homogenously distributed among towers that are in a row.
Government rules prohibit spectrum swapping, but to tackle the issue a policy should be amended for the same.
Unused spectrum bands, which are either not used or have been missed due to the traffic in the bandwidth should be reformed and put to efficient use.
Every state should be encouraged to use uniform procedures on towers and policies regarding this should be amended.
Set up rules for companies to improve on their services. Besides penalty which has been dropped government should keep a check on telcos to work properly.

Pranesh Prakash, Policy Director at the Centre for Internet and Society said that Telecom companies in India have scarcity in terms of spectrum, which needs to be rationalised by allowing spectrum policy in India.

He also added that the government’s decision of not allowing spectrum supply doesn’t really make sense as India needs the policy. Also, the radiations emitted by the spectrum which are harming people should be scientifically taken care of.

What are the benchmarks for call drop that should be followed by the telcos?

TRAI has laid down the quality of service benchmarks for call drop rate to be less than 2 percent. The 2 percent call drop benchmark means that not more than 2 percent calls made from a network should automatically disconnected in a telecom circle.

Recently, the call drop test was conducted in Bhopal and Mumbai. TRAI found that most operators in Mumbai, except Airtel 2G/3G and Vodafone 2G, are not meeting the under 2 per cent call drop rate benchmark. In the drive tests conducted during May 10 to 13 in Mumbai, the call drop rates of No 1 carrier, Bharti Airtel's 2G and 3G networks, stood at 1.49 per cent and 1.94 per cent, while Vodafone-2G's was 1.68 per cent.

Other than Airtel and Vodafone in 2G, all operators failed to meet the Call Drop Rate benchmark in Bhopal. TRAI in a report said that Idea, Reliance and BSNL all have Call Drop Rates in the range of 10 percent or above. These are exceptionally high and clearly indicate urgent need for improvement in order to deliver reasonable levels of service.

What steps should be taken to improve the problem?

A lot has to be done to settle the issue. The mobile towers do not have an unlimited capacity for handling the current network load. So telecom companies need to increase the towers to tackle the load. This is being followed as telecom operators have decided to invest Rs.12,000 crore for installation of 60,000 more towers over the next three months, while the BSNL will install 21,000 BTS towers a report said.

A report by TRAI said that the problems like removal of towers from certain areas by authorities needs to be addressed. Also, with the increase in the usage of 3G networks, the growth rate of mobile towers supporting 2G networks has reduced, which also needs to be addressed.

Recently, Union Minister Ravi Shankar Prasad claimed that the call drop problem was improving with various telecom companies are installing about 1.24 lakh towers to mitigate the issue. In a report he said, “Things are improving....private telecom operators have installed one lakh towers, while the State-owned BSNL has put in place 24,000 Base Transceiver Station (BTS) towers across the country in the past one year to improve the call drop problem.”

The roadmap

Surveys are being conducted and a lot of efforts are being made by the operators and also TRAI to solve the call drop issue. However, in a country with the world’s second-largest mobile user market it is tough to solve the problem completely but not impossible. That, in theory, is the situation. On ground though, things don’t appear to be running in tune with tall claims by the government or the telecom companies. If the situation is improving, as the government claims, change needs to be visible, which is apparently not the case. Also, if the investments are being made to the tune of what the telecom companies are claiming, that would translate into solving the issue.

The moot point here is that if the number of towers is the root cause behind the millions of consumers facing this absolute nightmare of an issue, can this “go-getter” government not come to any arrangement so as to solve the issue? Perhaps, the government, which displayed exemplary enthusiasm in gaining a seat in the coveted Nuclear Suppliers Group, needs to translate some of that energy into getting to a solution for an issue plaguing a large and growing population of its billion plus populace. It would only serve some good. No pun intended.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/telecom/news/india-tv-news-june-26-2016-call-drops

TRAI Free Data paper: Paytm to Hike, the responses from other companies

praskrishna — 2016-07-09T02:44:49Z

Here's a look at responses of other players like Paytm, Hike Messenger, Nasscom, Centre for Internet Society to TRAI's paper.

This was published in the Indian Express on July 5, 2016.

While telecos are not too happy with Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI)’s proposal for TSP-agnostic platforms to provide free data, other companies and groups have also responded to the paper.

On May 19, TRAI released a consultation paper on how to provide free data for consumers and whether a TSP-agnostic platform was one possible solution. TRAI in its paper asked if it was possible to give out free data as rewards to customers, and whether such models should be regulated. Here’s a look at responses of other players like Paytm, Hike Messenger, Nasscom, Centre for Internet Society, etc to TRAI’s paper.

Paytm has also issued an official response to TRAI’s paper.

Paytm

Paytm’s response indicates it views TSP-agnostic platforms for free data as being against the principles of Net Neutrality.

In the response Paytm has said, “Telecom Service Providers (TSPs) being the producers/owners of data have an undue advantage compared to others if award is provided in the form of free data. Award in the form of free data can be used to replicate the effect of zero cost of access for selected sites, an outcome that is against the principle of Net Neutrality.”

The company says free data won’t solve the problem and instead of giving data back as rewards, a neutral currency should be employed as an incentive.

Datawind

Tablet maker Datawind has also responded to the paper and said that a “TSP-agnostic platform as suggested in this consultation paper would benefit the ability of content providers and application providers in delivering affordable internet access.”

Datawind’s statement says breaking the affordability barrier is a key issue in increasing broadband adoption in India, and “this consultation-paper is an important step towards exploring such solutions.”

Hike Messenger

Hike Messenger has also argued in favour of a “TSP-agnostic platform” and say it can allow “start-ups like ours to purchase data in bulk that in turn we can use to make certain parts of the app free.”

The response reads, “TSP agnostic platform would allow data purchase from all TSPs in the market and have a very transparent approval process to ensure that no malicious apps abuse (similar to how the Google Play Store operates) and a pricing plan/rate card that would allow start-ups to purchase data potentially availing of discounts based on volume.”

It also favours some “light regulation should be employed” in case TRAI does adopt this model.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/telecom/news/indian-express-july-5-2016-trai-free-data-paper-paytm-to-hike-the-responses-from-other-companies