Centre for Internet and Society

Overview and Concerns Regarding the Indian Draft DNA Profiling Act

GeneWatch UK & the Council for Responsible Genetics, US — 2012-07-11T11:30:38Z

The Indian Code of Criminal Procedure was amended in 2005 to enable the collection of a host of medical details from accused persons upon their arrest. Section 53 of the Cr.PC provides that upon arrest, an accused person may be subjected to a medical examination if there are “reasonable grounds for believing” that such examination will afford evidence as to the crime.

The scope of this examination was expanded in 2005 to include “the examination of blood, blood-stains, semen, swabs in case of sexual offences, sputum and sweat, hair samples and finger nail clippings by the use of modern and scientific techniques including DNA profiling and such other tests which the registered medical practitioner thinks necessary in a particular case.”

In Thogorani Alias K. Damayanti v. State of Orissa and Ors, 2004 Cri. LJ 4003 (Ori), the Orissa High Court affirmed the legality of ordering a DNA test in criminal cases to ascertain the involvement of persons accused. Refusal to cooperate would result in an adverse inference drawn against the accused.

After weighing the privacy concerns involved, the court laid down the following considerations as relevant before the DNA test could be ordered: “(i) the extent to which the accused may have participated in the commission of the crime; (ii) the gravity of the offence and the circumstances in which it is committed; (iii) age, physical and mental health of the accused to the extent they are known; (iv) whether there are less intrusive and practical ways of collecting evidence tending to confirm or disprove the involvement of the accused in the crime; (v) the reasons, if any, for the accused for refusing consent.” Id.

In brief, the 2007 draft DNA Profiling Bill (hereinafter “Bill”) pending before parliament attempts to create an ambitious centralized DNA bank that would store DNA records of virtually anyone who comes within any proximity to the criminal justice system. Specifically, records are maintained of suspects, offenders, missing persons and “volunteers.” The schedule to the Bill contains an expansive list of both civil and criminal cases where DNA data can be collected including cases of abortion, paternity suits and organ transplant. In all fairness, the Bill contains provisions limiting access to and use of information contained in the database, and provides for the deletion of a person’s DNA profile upon their acquittal.

2007 Draft DNA Profiling Bill

Preamble (§ 1)

Section 1 of the Bill sets out the broad policy objectives of its drafters. The most telling portion of § 1 states: “[DNA analysis] makes it possible to determine whether the source of origin of one body substance is identical to that of another, and further to establish the biological relationship, if any, between two individuals, living or dead without any doubt.” Bill, § 1 (emphasis added). Although it later makes mention of potential harms resulting from governmental misuse of genetic information technology, it is evident that the policy animating the Bill presupposes the objective infallibility of genetic analysis. This patent mistruth underpins the policy rationale for the Bill, and as such casts a long shadow over its substantive provisions. At the very least, it tells the reader (and perhaps one day the court) to broadly interpret the Bill’s language to favor DNA analysis as the privileged solution to investigational and prosecutorial needs.

Definitions (§ 2)

A number of the Bill’s definitions are overbroad, further expanding the scope of its later provisions. The “crime scene index” is defined to include “DNA profiles from forensic material found . . . on or within the body of any person, on anything, or at any place, associated with the commission of a specified offence.” Id., § 2(1)(vii) et seq. A “specified offence” is defined as any of a number of more serious crimes, “or any other offence specified in the Schedule [to the Bill].” The so-called “Schedule,” tucked neatly on page 34 of the Bill’s 35 pages, lists a hodgepodge of various crimes from rape, to “offences relating to dowry,” defamation, and “unnatural 3 offenses.”[1] Taken together, the government is empowered to conduct genetic testing on almost anyone in any way connected with even minor infractions of the criminal law.

Furthermore, the crucial term “suspect” is defined as anyone “suspected of having committed an offence.” Id., § 2(1)(xxxvi). By intentionally leaving out the qualifier “specified,” the drafters’ intent is plain: to sweep within the Bill’s breadth all persons suspected of any crime whatsoever. And, accordingly, the Bill defines the “suspects index” to include “DNA profiles derived from forensic material lawfully taken from suspects.” Id., § 2(1)(xxxvix). It is hard to imagine anybody of subsequent regulation that could adequately circumscribe this manifest affront to personal privacy and bodily integrity.

DNA Profiling Board (§§3 to 13)

The DNA Profiling Board (hereinafter “Board”) is responsible for administering and overseeing the Indian DNA database. §3 et seq. Among its several enumerated powers, the Board is charged with “recommend[ing] privacy protection statutes, regulations and practices relating to access to, or use of stored DNA samples or DNA analyses,” as well as “mak[ing] specific recommendations to . . . ensure the appropriate use and dissemination of DNA information [and] take any other necessary steps require to be taken to protect privacy.” §13(1)(xv) to (xvi). This provision is in lieu of any substantive principle limiting the scope of the legislation, which the bill otherwise lacks.

This is a significant omission. As expressed in the preamble, the stated purpose of the Bill is “to enhance protection of people in the society and [the] administration of justice.” §1. Taken alone, this expresses only the government’s interest in the legislation, suggesting an ambiguously wide scope for its provisions. A substantive concept of individual privacy is required to counterbalance the interests of the government and provide protections for the equally vital privacy interests of the individual. As such, a limiting privacy principle should be included alongside the expressing in §1 of the government’s security interest. Without it, the Board will effectively have carte blanche with regard to what privacy protections are—or are not—adopted.

Approval of Laboratories (§§14 to 18)

Sections 14 to 18 provide for the approval by the DNA Profiling Board of DNA laboratories that will process and analyze genetic material for eventual inclusion on the DNA database. Under §14, all laboratories must be approved in writing prior to processing or analyzing any genetic material. However, a conflicting provision appears in the next section, §15(2), which permits DNA laboratories in existence at the time the legislation is enacted to process or analyze DNA samples immediately, without first obtaining approval.

Either an oversight on the part of the drafters, or the product of overly-vague language, the result is that established genetic laboratories—including whatever genetic material or profiles they may already have for whatever reason—are in effect “grandfathered” into the system. The only review of these laboratories is the post hoc approval of the laboratory by the DNA profiling board. The potential for abuse and error that this conflict of provisions would be best addressed in keeping with the rule articulated in §14, i.e. correcting the language of §15(2) that allows for laboratories to be “grandfathered” into the system.

Standards, Obligations of DNA Laboratory (§§19 to 28)

Chapter V, which concerns the obligations of and the standards to be observed by approved DNA laboratories, lacks adequate administrative provisions. For example, §22 requires that labs ensure “adequate security” to minimize contamination without providing for accountability in the event of contamination. Similarly, §28 provides for audits of DNA laboratories only, withholding from similar scrutiny of the DNA Profiling Board itself.

National DNA Database (§§33 to 37)

In addition on one national DNA database, the Bill sanctions the several Indian states to maintain their own DNA databases, provided these state-level databases forward copies of their content to the national database. Id., § 33(3). The national database is envisioned to comprise several sub-databases, each to contain the genetic information of a subset of persons/samples, namely: (1) unidentified crime scene samples, (2) samples taken from suspects, (3) samples taken from persons convicted or currently subject to prosecution for “subject offences,” (4) samples associated with missing persons, (5) samples taken from unidentified bodies, (6) samples taken from “volunteers,”[3] and finally (7) samples taken for reasons “as may be specified by regulations. Id., § 33(4) et seq. Putting to one side the breadth of persons subject to inclusion under subcategories (1) through (6), subsection (7) appears on its face to be a “catch all” provision, leaving one only to guess at the circumstances under which its specificities may be promulgated. Id.

A close reading of § 33(6) strongly suggests that the agency [4]conducting conducting the forensic analyses and populating the DNA database shall retain the DNA samples thereafter. This section reads in relevant part:

The DNA Data Bank shall contain . . . the following information, namely: (i) in the case of a profile in the offenders index, the identity of the person from whose body substance or body substances the profile was derived, and (ii) in case of all other profiles, the case reference number of the investigation associated with the body substance or body substances from which the profile was derived. Id., § 33(6).

Rather than choose to link the DNA profile data to a specific offender or case, the drafters of the Bill instead like the “body substance or body substances” with that specific offender or case. Whether sloppy drafting or clever nuance, this provision elides the DNA profile with the DNA sample, injecting unneeded—and potentially harmful—ambiguity into the proposed law.

Confidentiality, Access to DNA Profiles, Samples, and Records (§§ 38-44)

Further compounding this ambiguity, § 36 entitled “Access to Information” opens the door to much more than DNA profiles alone being kept on the government database. In all three of its subsections it purports to govern access to “the information” contained in the database, not “the DNA profiles” contained in the database. Id., § 36(1) et seq. Subsection 2 employs even broader language, covering “the information in the offenders’ index pertaining to a convict.” Id. Taken at face value, this provision of the Bill suggests that any and all sort of “information . . . pertaining to a convict” that might be derived from his or her DNA can be stored on the database. Even if prudential oversight provisions elsewhere in the Bill suggests a tightly-controlled techno-forensic apparatus, the overbroad construction of provisions such as §§ 33 and 36 raise significant questions about the wisdom of enacting the text in this form.

Two further provisions regarding access to the database warrant close scrutiny. First, §§ 39 and 40 purport to confer upon the police direct access to all of the information contained in the national DNA database. While administratively expedient, this arrangement opens up the possibility for misuse. A more prudent system would place the Board (or some administrative subordinate portion thereof) between the police and the content of the DNA database, with the latter having to make specific and particular requests to the former. This would minimize the risks inherent in the more expansive model of database access the bill currently envisions.

Second, and more concerning, § 41 permits the Data Bank Manager to grant access to the database to “any person or class of persons that the Data Bank Manager considers appropriate.” This is a sweeping provision. It vests in one individual the ability to permit almost anyone access to the DNA database—without administrative review or oversight of any kind. Taken together with the general lack of administrative safeguards in the bill, § 41 again places the government’s interest in investigating crime far above individual privacy rights.

Omissions

Most notably, the bill specifically excludes a private cause of action for the unlawful collection of DNA, or for the unlawful storage of private information on the national DNA database. Nor does the bill grant an individual right to review one’s personal data contained on the database. Without these two key features, there is effectively no check against the unlawful collection, analysis, and storage of private genetic information on the database.

Best Practices Analysis

Collection of DNA

With consent: only for a specific investigation (e.g. from a victim or for elimination purposes). Volunteers should not have information entered on a database	No provision
Without consent: only from persons suspected of a crime for which DNA evidence is directly relevant i.e. a crime scene sample exists or is likely to exist. Or, broader categories?	No provision
Requirement for an order by a court? Or allowed in other circumstances?	No provision
Samples collected by police officers, or only medical professionals? Must take place in a secure location i.e. not on the street etc.	No provision
Provision of information for all persons from whom DNA is taken	No provision
Crime scenes should be promptly examined if DNA evidence is likely to be relevant, and quality assurance procedures must protect against contamination of evidence	No provision; regulated at discretion of DNA Profiling Board

Analysis of DNA

Should take place only in laboratories with quality assurance	Regulated at discretion of DNA Profiling Board
Laboratories should be independent of police	No provision; regulated at discretion of DNA Profiling Board
Profiling standards must be sufficient to minimise false matches occurring by chance. This must take account of increased likelihood of false matches in transboundary searches, and with relatives.	No provision; regulated at discretion of DNA Profiling Board

Storage of DNA

Data from convicted persons should be separate from others e.g. missing persons’ databases	Unclear
Access to databases and samples must be restricted and there must be an independent and transparent system of governance, with regular information published e.g. annual reports, minutes of oversight meetings	Access to database at discretion of DNA Data Bank Manager
Personal identification information should not be sent with samples to laboratories	No provision; regulated at discretion of DNA Profiling Board
Any transfer of data e.g. from police station to lab or database, must be secure	No provision; regulated at discretion of DNA Profiling Board

User Samples and Data

Research uses should be restricted to anonymised verification of database performance (e.g. checking false matches etc.). Third party access to data for such purposes should be allowed, provided public information on research projects is published. There should be an ethics board.	No provision
Research uses for other purposes e.g. health research, behavioural research should not be allowed.	No provision
Uses should be restricted by law to solving crimes or identifying dead bodies/body parts. Identification of a person is not an acceptable use. Missing persons databases (if they exist) should be separate from police databases.	Ambiguous provisions suggest much wider scope
Familial searching should be restricted e.g. ordered by a court? Or not used? Or regulated for use in special cases?	No provision

Destruction of DNA and Linked Datas

DNA samples should be destroyed once the DNA profiles needed for identification purposes have been obtained from them, allowing for sufficient time for quality assurance, e.g. six months	DNA samples are retained
An automatic removals process is required for deletion of data from innocent persons. This must take place within a reasonable time of acquittal etc.	No provision
There should be limits on retention of DNA profiles from persons convicted of minor crimes	No provision
There should be an appeals process against retention of data	No provision
Linked data on other databases (e.g. police record of arrest, fingerprints) should be deleted at the same time as DNA database records	No provision
Crime scene DNA evidence should be retained for as long as a reinvestigation might be needed (including to address miscarriages of justice)	DNA evidence permitted to be retained indefinitely

Use in Court

Individuals must have a right to have a second sample taken from them and reanalysed as a check	No provision
Individuals must have a right to obtain re-analysis of crime scene forensic evidence in the event of appeal	No provision
Expert evidence and statistics must not misrepresent the role and value of the DNA evidence in relation to the crime	No provision

Other

Relevant safeguards must be proscribed by law and there should be appropriate penalties for abuse	No provision
Impacts on children and other vulnerable persons (e.g. mentally ill) must be considered	No provision
Potential for racial bias must be minimised	No provision

[1]. No examples are given as to which unnatural offences are intended, leaving the reader wondering. Perhaps a DNA test of witchcraft?
[2]. Section 15(2) does mandate that such laboratories petition the DNA Profiling Board for approval within six months after the legislation is enacted.
[3].Per § (2)(1)(xxxxiii) of the Definitions, a “volunteer” is “a person who volunteers to undergo a DNA procedure.” The definition does not require that the “volunteer” be informed of the nature, purpose, or possible consequences of his generosity; nor is any such requirement specified elsewhere in the Bill.
[4].Or, as is laid out in great detail in §§ 14-32, at the privately-contracted forensics laboratory.

Note: § is a symbol for 'section'.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/indian-draft-dna-profiling-act

International Open Data Charter: Comments by CIS

sumandro — 2015-09-08T11:01:01Z

The second meeting of Stewards of the International Open Data Charter is in progress in Santiago, Chile, where the revisions made to the Charter based on the comments received during the public consultation period that ended on July 31, 2015, are being re-discussed and finalised by the Stewards. Here we are sharing the comments submitted by us on the first public draft of the Charter published during the International Open Data Conference in Ottawa, Canada, in May 2015. The comments include those submitted by Sumandro and Sharath Chandra Ram.

The draft International Open Data Charter and all the submitted comments can be accessed here: http://opendatacharter.net/charter/

Comments on the Public Draft

Note: The text below contains excerpts from the public draft of the Charter, followed by submitted comments in bold.

1) The world is witnessing the growth of a global movement facilitated by technology and digital media and fuelled by information – one that contains enormous potential to create more accountable, efficient, responsive, and effective governments and businesses, and to spur economic growth.

The word ‘movement’ can perhaps be replaced by ‘transformation.’ ‘Movement’ tends to suggest some kind of unity of purpose or objective, which is not perhaps what is meant here. Also, is it possible to add ‘transparent’ to ‘accountable, efficient, responsive, and effective’?

Open data sit at the heart of this global movement.

Perhaps ‘transformation’ and not ‘movement’.

2) Building a more democratic, just, and prosperous society requires transparent, accountable governments that engage regularly and meaningfully with citizens. Accordingly, there is an ongoing effort to enable collaboration around key social challenges, to provide effective oversight of government activities, to support economic development through innovation, and to develop effective, efficient public policies and programmes.

Perhaps insert ‘sustainable’ before ‘economic development’. In the second sentence, none of the action phrases (‘enable collaboration’ and ‘effective oversight’ and ‘innovation’ and ‘develop effective, efficient’) are speaking about either democracy or justice. The focus seems to be completely on effectiveness. Phrases like ‘transparent’, ‘accountable’, and ‘participatory’ should be introduced here.

Open data is essential to meeting these challenges.

The above point clarifies why ‘data is essential’ but not why ‘open data is essential’. The connection between democracy and justice on one hand, and open data on the other is not yet articulated clearly.

3) Effective access to data allows individuals and organisations to develop new insights and innovations that can generate social and economic benefits to improve the lives of people around the world, and help to improve the flow of information within and between countries. While governments collect a wide range of data, they do not always share these data in ways that are easily discoverable, useable, or understandable by the public.

Along with allowing ‘insights’ and ‘innovations’ to develop, can it also be highlighted that open data make decisions and processes transparent?

This is a missed opportunity.

I agree with above comments that it is perhaps better to articulate this not as ‘missed opportunity’ but to highlight this as the very ‘opportunity’ that the open data agenda is interested in capturing.

4) Today, many people expect to be able to access high quality information and services, including government data, when and how they want. Others see the opportunity presented by government data as one which can provide innovative policy solutions and support economic and social benefits for all members of society. We have arrived at a point at which people can use open data to generate value, insights, ideas, and services to create a better world for all.

This point may also mention that some people are interested in using government data to open up government decisions and processes and make them transparent, which is a necessary condition for making the government accountable.

6) Providing access to government data can drive sustainable and inclusive growth by empowering citizens, the media, civil society, and the private sector to identify gaps, and work toward better outcomes for public services in areas such as health, education, public safety, environmental protection, and governance. Open data can do this by:

Perhaps ‘democratic participation’ can be added after ‘sustainable and inclusive growth’. That is: ‘Providing access to government data can drive sustainable and inclusive growth, and democratic participation, by empowering citizens…’

7) Open government data can be used in innovative ways to create useful tools and products that help to navigate modern life more easily. Used in this way, open data are a catalyst for innovation in the private sector, supporting the creation of new markets, businesses, and jobs. These benefits can multiply as more private sector and civil society organisations adopt open data practices modelled by government and share their own data with the public.

The incentive for private sector and CSOs to open up data is not clear. Overall benefit may rise with them opening up data, but how does a private company / CSO benefit by opening up its data?

8) We, the adherents to the International Open Data Charter, agree that open data are an under-used resource with huge potential to encourage the building of stronger, more interconnected societies that better meet the needs of our citizens and allow innovation and prosperity to flourish.

Along with ‘stronger’ and ‘more interconnected’, please mention ‘more transparent’ and ‘more democratic’. Also it is not clear what is meant by ‘stronger’. ‘[B]etter meet the needs of our citizens’ does not necessarily suggest a more democratic or just society, but a more effective welfare distribution system. Please add ‘… and empower the citizens to ensure accountability of the government.’

9) We therefore agree to follow a set of principles that will be the foundation for access to, and the release and use of, open government data. These principles are:

Open Data by Default;
Quality and Quantity;
Accessible and Useable by All;
Engagement and Empowerment of Citizens;
Collaboration for Development and Innovation

Does it makes sense to remove the ‘Quantity and Quality’ point and merging it with ‘Accessible and Usable by All’? Data quantity and quality issues, along with those related to publication of data, can all logically follow under the topic of data access and use. For example, highly aggregated data published once a year without documentation is not really usable data.

10) We will develop an action plan in support of the implementation of the Charter and its Technical Annexes, and will update and renew the action plan at a minimum of every two years. We agree to commit the necessary resources to work within our political and legal frameworks to implement these principles in accordance with the technical best practices and timeframes set out in our action plan.

We (at CIS) strongly feel that the Charter should also prescribe that along with the national Action Plan, Open Data Citizen’s Charters are created for various levels and verticals of the government. This will clarify data publication responsibilities and targets at ministerial and sub-national (including city) governmental levels, and will allow for much more effective monitoring (national and international) of the Action Plan implementation process.

‘[A]t a minimum of every two years’ reads a bit unclear. Does it mean that the Action Plan should be renewed only after two years and not before, or that the Action Plan should be renewed every two years or before that?

11) We recognise that free access to, and the subsequent use of, government data are of significant value to society and the economy, and that government data should, therefore, be open by default.

Along with clarifying the scope of ‘government data,’ the idea of ‘open’ in the context of data needs a clear definition as an independent point. The document is getting into ‘open by default’ without clarifying what is ‘open’, including both necessary and sufficient conditions.

12) We acknowledge the need to promote the global development and adoption of tools and policies for the creation, use, and exchange of open data and information.

I agree with Mike Linksvayer. This is a great opportunity for the Charter to connect the open data agenda with the wider open agendas, especially that of free and open source softwares. It is very important that this point promotes ‘global development of free and open source tools’.

Extending the comment by Jose Subero, along with ‘tools’ and ‘policies’, it will be great to have a mention of ‘standards’ here, which is critical for ensuring ‘interoperability’ and thus ‘harmonisation’.

13) We recognise that the term ‘government data’ is meant in the widest sense possible. This could apply to data held by national, federal, and local governments, international government bodies, and other types of institutions in the wider public sector. This could also apply to data created for governments by external organisations, and data of significant benefit to the public which is held by external organisations and related to government programmes and services (e.g. data on extractives entities, data on transportation infrastructure, etc).

It is wonderful that the point promotes a wide understanding of ‘government data’ but at the same time it should also define a necessary core understanding of data, just to ensure that governments do not interpret this point too narrowly.

Further, a focus only on data created by public agencies can perhaps be too narrow (for the necessary/core understanding of ‘government data’). With public services delivered increasingly by private agencies and public-private-partnerships, it is crucial that ‘government data’ should explicitly include any data coming out of a process funded by public money (the process may be carried out by a public agency or not). This is an extremely important point from a developing country perspective.

14) We recognise that there is domestic and international legislation, in particular pertaining to security, privacy, confidentiality, intellectual property, and personally-identifiable and other sensitive information, which must be observed and/or updated where necessary.

From a developing country perspective, it is very important that the Charter does not keep this critical point dependent on domestic and international legislations. International legislation may not be very developed for all of the mentioned topics, and many countries may not have existing domestic legislations on these topics either. The Charter should mention an internationally acceptable list of concerns / criteria for not opening up data. The list may include the topics mentioned here, like privacy and national security. This need not be a list of sufficient criteria, but of necessary ones.

15) We will:

develop and adopt policies and practices to ensure that all government data is made open by default, as outlined in this Charter, while recognising that there are legitimate reasons why some data cannot be released;

'Administrative reforms’ are most often crucial to make government data ‘open by default, and the same should be mentioned along with ‘policies’ and ‘practices’.

provide clear justifications as to why certain data cannot be released;

This is a great point. Perhaps it can be added that all government agencies should produce a list of all data assets maintained by them, point out the ones that cannot be made open, and provide clear justification as to why those cannot be released. This comment pre-empts 19.1. Perhaps this point about providing justification for not releasing data can be merged with 19.1.

develop the leadership, management, oversight, and internal communication policies necessary to enable this transition to a culture of openness.

Along with ‘leadership, management, oversight, and internal communication’, is it possible to add ‘incentives’? This is often overlooked in implementing open data policies.

16) We recognise that governments and other public sector organisations hold vast amounts of information that may be of interest to citizens, and that it may take time to identify data for release or publication.

17) We also recognise the importance of consulting with citizens, other governments, non-governmental organisations, and other open data users, to identify which data to prioritise for release and/or improvement.

18) We agree, however, that governments’ primary responsibility should be to release data in a timely manner, without undue delay.

Points 16-18 seem to suggest that the ‘quantity and quality’ issue is mostly one of prioritisation. This can be misleading. This is perhaps the ‘quantity’ issue, but not at all the ‘quality’ issue.

19) We will:

...
release high-quality open data that are timely, comprehensive, and accurate in accordance with prioritisation that is informed by public requests. To the extent possible, data will be released in their original, unmodified form and at the finest level of granularity available, and will also be linked to any visualisations or analyses created based on the data, as well as any relevant guidance or documentation;

Please add ‘human- and machine-readable’ along with ‘timely, comprehensive, and accurate’.

Put ‘, and’ between ‘, and accurate’ and ‘in accordance’.

‘Relevant guidance or documentation’ should be mentioned before, and not after, ‘visualisations or analyses’.

ensure that accompanying documentation is written in clear, plain language, so that it can be easily understood by all;

Add that the documentation should be ‘comprehensive’, along with being written in plain language.

make sure that data are fully described, and that data users have sufficient information to understand their source, strengths, weaknesses, and any analytical limitations;

Regarding ‘Full description of data’ — Aggregate data must be accompanied by low level raw data along with details of analytical methods used to arrive at figures. This allows for verification as well as alternate views and detection of statistical anomalies.

ensure that open datasets include consistent core metadata, and are made available in human- and machine-readable formats under an open and unrestrictive licence;

Is this the necessary definition of ‘open data’? If so, it should be much higher up.

allow users to provide feedback, and continue to make revisions to ensure the quality of the data is improved as needed; and

This point should clarify if it is talking about making revisions of the data itself (its content), or how it is being published (its form), or both?

apply consistent information lifecycle management practices, and ensure historical copies of datasets are preserved, archived, and kept accessible as long as they retain value.

The ‘as long as they retain value’ part seems vague. Who is going to take this decision about value? Is it possible to rephrase this as ‘as long as they are demanded by data users’?

21) We recognise that open data should be made available free of charge in order to encourage their widest possible use.

Maybe ‘government data’ and not ‘open data’ (open data already means it is available gratis). Also, along with ‘free of charge’ maybe add ‘under open license’, as that is a critical requirement for ‘widest possible use.’

22) We recognise that when open data are released, they should be made available without bureaucratic or administrative barriers, such as mandatory user registration, which can deter people from accessing the data.

I strongly believe that this point should be removed. Registration of the data user can also be very useful for the government agencies to track demand and actual usage of their datasets. Instead of the government agencies doing such kind of tracking as a background process, it is much better if the data usage monitoring of all users is done transparently. Along with perhaps a public dashboard of data usages of the users of an open data portal. As long as the registration barrier does not involve an approval process by the government agency, it can be allowed.

A more general point should be added as part of this principle, regarding no-discrimination (or approval process) among data users interested in accessing and using of open government data.

23) We will:

release data in open formats and free of charge to ensure that the data are available to the widest range of users to find, access, and use them. In many cases, this will include providing data in multiple formats, so that they can be processed by computers and used by people; and

Please add ‘open license’ along with ‘open formats’ and ‘free of charge’.

24) We recognise that the release of open data strengthens our public and democratic institutions, encourages better development, implementation, and assessment of policies to meet the needs of our citizens, and enables more meaningful, better informed engagement between governments and citizens.

Perhaps add ‘, and makes them transparent’ after ‘strengthens our public and democratic institutions’. Please also add ‘monitoring’ along with ‘development, implementation, and assessment’.

25) We will:

implement oversight and review processes to report regularly on the progress and impact of our open data initiatives;

The functioning of these ‘oversight and review processes’ must be open and transparent themselves. The reporting should be public.

engage with community and civil society representatives working in the domain of transparency and accountability to determine what data they need to effectively hold governments to account; encourage the use of open data to develop innovative, evidence-based policy solutions that benefit all members of society, as well as empower marginalised groups; and

This must also include a point regarding the government proactively seeking data demands from citizens, CSOs, academics, and the private sector.

‘as well as empower marginalised groups’ is too vague. Perhaps it can be made into a separate point, and qualified with what kinds of empowerment is needed – from demanding data, to accessing and using data, to be aware of the data collected from such groups by the government agencies.

be transparent about our own data collection, standards, and publishing processes, by documenting all of these related processes online.

This should be part of point 19.

26) We recognise the importance of diversity in stimulating creativity and innovation. The more citizens, governments, civil society, and the private sector use open data, the greater the social and economic benefits that will be generated. This is true for government, commercial, and non-commercial uses.

The diversity point is almost already made with points 20-21 – widest possible users lead to widest possible use.

28) We will:

...
engage with civil society, the private sector, and academic representatives to determine what data they need to generate social and economic value;

This is also covered under the Principle 3.

provide training programs, tools, and guidelines designed to ensure government employees are capable of using open data effectively in policy development processes;

This should be part of Principle 1.

encourage non-governmental organisations to open up data created and collected by them in order to move toward a richer open data ecosystem with multiple sources of open data;

I agree with ABS. Why not ‘non-governmental organisations and the private sector’?

Also the document shifts back and forth between ‘civil society organisations’ and ‘non-governmental organisations’. If both mean the same in this document, then it should use only one.

General Comments on the Charter

1. Why not merge the Principle 4 and 5 so as to describe an overall situation of engagement and collaboration. The ends can be commercial acts or towards democratic practices, but the existing principles do not make much a difference between the two types of acts.

2. Further, can a new principle be added at the end that would address the implementation process of the Action Plan? Specifically, it should clarify how the implementation itself be an open process, with not only the Action Plan but annual reports regarding the status of implementation. This principle may connect to the work being done by the Implementation WG.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/international-open-data-charter-comments-by-cis

Analysing Latest List of Blocked Sites (Communalism & Rioting Edition)

pranesh — 2012-09-06T11:52:47Z

Pranesh Prakash does preliminary analysis on a leaked list of the websites blocked from August 18, 2012 till August 21, 2012 by the Indian government.

Note: This post will be updated as more analysis is done. Last update: 23:59 on August 22, 2012. This is being shared under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial licence.

How many items have been blocked?

There are a total of 309 specific items (those being URLs, Twitter accounts, img tags, blog posts, blogs, and a handful of websites) that have been blocked. This number is meaningless at one level, given that it doesn't differentiate between the blocking of an entire website (with dozens or hundreds of web pages) from the blocking of a single webpage. However, given that very few websites have been blocked at the domain-level, that number is still reasonably useful.

Please also note, we currently only have information related to what telecom companies and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) were asked to block till August 21, 2012. We do not have information on what individual web services have been asked to remove. That might take the total count much higher.

Why have these been blocked?

As far as I could determine, all of the blocked items have content (mostly videos and images have been targeted, but also some writings) that are related to communal issues and rioting. (Please note: I am not calling the content itself "communal" or "incitement to rioting", just that the content relates to communal issues and rioting.) This has been done in the context of the recent riots in Assam, Mumbai, UP, and the mass movement of people from Bangalore.

There were reports of parody Twitter accounts having been blocked. Preliminary analysis on the basis of available data show that parody Twitter accounts and satire sites have not been targetted solely for being satirical. For instance, very popular parody Twitter accounts, such as @DrYumYumSingh are not on any of the four orders circulated by the Department of Telecom. (I have no information on whether such parody accounts are being taken up directly with Twitter or not: just that they aren't being blocked at the ISP-level. Media reports indicate six accounts have been taken up with Twitter for being similar to the Prime Minister's Office's account.)

Are the blocks legitimate?

The goodness of the government's intentions seem, quite clearly in my estimation, to be unquestionable. Yet, even with the best intentions, there might be procedural illegalities and over-censorship.

There are circumstances in which freedom of speech and expression may legitimately be limited. The circumstances that existed in Bangalore could justifiably result in legitimate limitations on freedom of speech. For instance, I believe that temporary curbs — such as temporarily limiting SMSes & MMSes to a maximum of five each fifteen minutes for a period of two days — would have been helpful.

However it is unclear whether the government has exercised its powers responsibly in this circumstance. The blocking of many of the items on that list are legally questionable and morally indefensible, even while a some of the items ought, in my estimation, to be removed.

If the government has blocked these sites under s.69A of the Information Technology Act ("Power to Issue Directions for Blocking for Public Access of Any Information through any Computer Resource"), the persons and intermediaries hosting the content should have been notified provided 48 hours to respond (under Rule 8 of the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules 2009). Even if the emergency provision (Rule 9) was used, the block issued on August 18, 2012, should have been introduced before the "Committee for Examination of Request" by August 20, 2012 (i.e., within 48 hours), and that committee should have notified the persons and intermediaries hosting the content.

Importantly, even though many of the items on that list are repugnant and do deserve (in my opinion) to be removed, ordering ISPs to block them is largely ineffectual. The people and companies hosting the material should have been asked to remove it, instead of ordering Internet service providers (ISPs) to block them. All larger sites have clear content removal policies, and encouraging communal tensions and hate speech generally wouldn't be tolerated. That this can be done without resort to the dreadful Intermediary Guidelines Rules (which were passed last year) shows that those Rules are unnecessary. It is our belief that those Rules are also unconstitutional.

Are there any egregious mistakes?

Yes, there are numerous such examples of egregious mistakes.

Most importantly, some even people and posts debunking rumours have been blocked.
Some of the Twitter accounts are of prominent people who write for the mainstream media, and who have written similar content offline. If their online content is being complained about, their offline content should be complained about too.
Quite a number of the links include articles published and reports broadcast in the mainstream media (including a Times Now report, a Telegraph picture gallery, etc.), and in print, making the blocks suspect. Only the online content seems to have been targeted for censorship.

There are numerous mistakes and inconsistencies that make blocking pointless and ineffectual.

Some of the items are not even web addresses (e.g., a few HTML img tags were included).
Some of the items they have tried to block do not even exist (e.g., one of the Wikipedia URLs).
An entire domain was blocked on Sunday, and a single post on that domain was blocked on Monday.
For some Facebook pages, the secure version (https://facebook.com/...) is listed, for others the non-secure version (http://facebook.com/...) is listed.
For some YouTube videos, the 'base' URL of YouTube videos is blocked, but for other the URL with various parameters (like the "&related=" parameter) is blocked. That means that even nominally 'blocked' videos will be freely accessible.

All in all, it is clear that the list was not compiled with sufficient care.

Despite a clear warning by the DIT that "above URLs only" should be blocked, and not "the main websites like www.facebook.com, www.youtube.com, www.twitter.com, etc.", it has been seen that some ISPs (like Airtel) have gone overboard in their blocking.

Why haven't you put up the whole list?

Given the sensitivity of the issue, we felt it would be premature to share the whole list. However, we strongly believe that transparency should be an integral part of all censorship. Hence, this analysis is an attempt to provide some much-needed transparency. We intend to make the entire list public soon, though. (Given how porous such information is, it is likely that someone else will procure the list, and release it sooner than us.)

Why can I still access many items that are supposed to be blocked?

One must keep in mind that fresh orders have been issued on a day-by-day basis, that there are numerous mistakes in the list making it difficult to apply (some of these mistakes have been mentioned above), and the fact that that this order has to be implemented by hundreds of ISPs.

Your ISP probably has not have got around to enforcing the blocks yet. At the time of this writing, most ISPs don't seem to be blocking yet. This analysis is based on the orders sent around to ISPs, and not on the basis of actual testing of how many of these have actually been blocked by Airtel, BSNL, Tata, etc.

Additionally, if you are using Twitter through a client (on your desktop, mobile, etc.) instead of the web interface, you will not notice any of the Twitter-related blocks.

So you are fine with censorship?

No. I believe that in some cases, the government has the legal authority to censor. Yet, exercising that legal authority is usually not productive, and in fact there are other, better ways of limiting the harms caused by speech and information than censorship. Limiting speech might even prove harmful in situations like these, if it ends up restricting people's ability to debunk false rumours. In a separate blog post (to be put up soon), I am examining how all of the government's responses have been flawed both legally and from the perspective of achieving the desired end.

So what should the government have done?

Given that the majority of the information it is targeting is on Facebook, Youtube, and Twitter, the government could have chosen to fight alongside those services to get content removed expeditiously, rather than fight against them. (There are some indications that the government might be working with these services, but it certainly isn't doing enough.)

For instance, it could have asked all of them to expedite their complaints mechanism for a few days, by ensuring that the complaints mechanism is run 24x7 and that they respond quickly to any complaint submitted about communal incitement, spreading of panic, etc. This does not need the passing of an order under any law, but requires good public relations skills and a desire not to treat internet services as enemies. The government could have encouraged regular users to flag false rumours and hate speech on these sites. On such occasions, social networking sites should step up and provide all lawful assistance that the government may require. They should also be more communicative in terms of the help they are providing to the government to curtail panic-inducing rumours and hate speech. (Such measures should largely be reactive, not proactive, to ensure legitimate speech doesn't get curtailed.)

The best antidote for the rumours that spread far and wide and caused a mass movement of people from Bangalore to the North-Eastern states would have been clear debunking of those rumours. Mass outreach to people in the North-East (very often the worried parents) and in Bangalore using SMSes and social media, debunking the very specific allegations and rumours that were floating around, would have been welcome. However, almost no government officials actually used social media platforms to reach out to people to debunk false information and reassure them. Even a Canadian interning in our organization got a reassuring SMS from the Canadian government.

It is indeed a pity that the government notified a social media engagement policy today, when the need for it was so very apparent all of the past week.

And what of all this talk of cybersecurity failure and cyber-wars?

Cybersecurity is indeed a cause of concern for India, but only charlatans and the ignorant would make any connection between India's cybersecurity and recent events. The role of Pakistan deserves a few words. Not many Pakistani websites / webpages have been blocked by the Indian government. Two of the Pakistani webpages that have been blocked are actually pages that debunk the fake images that have been doing the rounds in Pakistan for at least the past month. Even Indian websites like Kafila have noted these fake images long ago, and Ayesha Siddiqa wrote about this on August 5, 2012, and Yousuf Saeed wrote about it on August 13, 2012. Even while material that may have been uploaded from Pakistan, it seems highly unlikely they were targeted at an Indian audience, rather than a Pakistani or global one.

Domain	Total Number of Entries	Tuesday, August 21, 2012	Monday, August 20, 2012	Sunday, August 19, 2012	Saturday, August 18, 2012
ABC.net.au	1				1
AlJazeera.com	4		4
AllVoices.com	1				1
WN.com	1				1
AtjehCyber.net	1				1
BDCBurma.org	1	1
Bhaskar.com	1			1
Blogspot.com	4			3	1
Blogspot.in	7	1	3		3
Catholic.org	1			1
CentreRight.in	2	2
ColumnPK.com	1			1
Defence.pk	4		2	1	1
EthioMuslimsMedia.com	1				1
Facebook.com (HTTP)	75	36	7	18	14
Facebook.com (HTTPS)	27		3	23	1
Farazahmed.com	5	1			4
Firstpost.com	2		1	1
HaindavaKerelam.com	1			1
HiddenHarmonies.org	1		1
HinduJagruti.org	2		1	1
Hotklix.com	1			1
HumanRights-Iran.ir	2				2
Intichat.com	1	1
Irrawady.org	1			1
IslamabadTimesOnline.com	1				1
Issuu.com	1				1
JafriaNews.com	1				1
JihadWatch.org	2		2
KavkazCenter	1			1
MwmJawan.com	1				1
My.Opera.com	1	1
Njuice.com	1		1
OnIslam.net	1				1
PakAlertPress.com	1	1
Plus.Google.com	4				4
Reddit.com	1		1
Rina.in	1				1
SandeepWeb.com	1		1
SEAYouthSaySo.com	1				1
Sheikyermami.com	1				1
StormFront.org	1				1
Telegraph.co.uk	1				1
TheDailyNewsEgypt.com	1				1
TheFaultLines.com	1				1
ThePetitionSite.com	1	1
TheUnity.org	1				1
TimesofIndia.Indiatimes.com	1		1
TimesOfUmmah.com	1				1
Tribune.com.pk	1	1
Twitter.com (HTTP)	1			1
Twitter.com (HTTPS)	11			1	10
Twitter account	18		16	2
TwoCircles.net	2			2
Typepad.com	1		1
Vidiov.info	1		1
Wikipedia.org	3			3
Wordpress.com	8	1	3	2	2
YouTube.com	85	18	39	14	14
YouTu.be	1			1
Totals	309	65	88	80	75

The analysis has been cross-posted/quoted in the following places:

LiveMint (September 4, 2012)
The Hindu (August 26, 2012)
Wall Street Journal (August 25, 2012)
tech 2 (August 25, 2012)
China Post (August 25, 2012)
The Hindu (August 24, 2012)
LiveMint (August 24, 2012)
Global Voices (August 24, 2012)
Reuters (August 24, 2012)
Outlook (August 23, 2012)
FirstPost.India (August 23, 2012)
IBN Live (August 23, 2012)
News Click (August 23, 2012)
Medianama (August 23, 2012)
KAFILA (August 23, 2012)
CIOL (August 23, 2012)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/analysing-blocked-sites-riots-communalism

Big Data and Reproductive Health in India: A Case Study of the Mother and Child Tracking System

ambika — 2019-12-06T04:57:55Z

In this case study undertaken as part of the Big Data for Development (BD4D) network, Ambika Tandon evaluates the Mother and Child Tracking System (MCTS) as data-driven initiative in reproductive health at the national level in India. The study also assesses the potential of MCTS to contribute towards the big data landscape on reproductive health in the country, as the Indian state’s imagination of health informatics moves towards big data.

Case study: Download (PDF)

Introduction

The reproductive health information ecosystem in India comprises of a range of different databases across state and national levels. These collect data through a combination of manual and digital tools. Two national-level databases have been launched by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare - the Health Management Information System (HMIS) in 2008, and the MCTS in 2009. 4 The MCTS focuses on collecting data on maternal and child health. It was instituted due to reported gaps in the HMIS, which records monthly data across health programmes including reproductive health. There are several other state-level initiatives on reproductive health data that have either been subsumed into, or run in parallel with, the MCTS.

With this case study, we aim to evaluate the MCTS as data-driven initiative in reproductive health at the national level. It will also assess its potential to contribute towards the big data landscape on reproductive health in the country, as the Indian state’s imagination of health informatics moves towards big data. The methodology for the case study involved a desk-based review of existing literature on the use of health information systems globally, as well as analysis of government reports, journal articles, media coverage, policy documents, and other material on the MCTS.

The first section of this report details the theoretical framing of the case study, drawing on the feminist critique of reproductive data systems. The second section maps the current landscape of reproductive health data produced by the state in India, with a focus on data flows, and barriers to data collection and analysis at the local and national level. The case of abortion data is used to further the argument of flawed data collection systems at the national level. Section three briefly discusses the state’s imagination of reproductive health policy and the role of data systems through a discussion on the National Health Policy, 2017 and the National Health Stack, 2018. Finally, we make some policy recommendations and identify directions for future research, taking into account the ongoing shift towards big data globally to democratise reproductive healthcare.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/big-data-reproductive-health-india-mcts

Call for Contributions and Reflections: Your experiences in Decolonizing the Internet’s Languages!

sneha-pp — 2019-08-07T12:29:25Z

Whose Knowledge?, the Oxford Internet Institute, and the Centre for Internet and Society are creating a State of the Internet’s Languages report, as baseline research with both numbers and stories, to demonstrate how far we are from making the internet multilingual. We also hope to offer some possibilities for doing more to create the multilingual internet we want. This research needs the experiences and expertise of people who think about these issues of language online from different perspectives. Read the Call here and share your submission by September 2, 2019.

Cross-posted from the Whose Knowledge? website: Call for Contributions and Reflections

The call is available in Arabic, Brazilian Portuguese, English, IsiZulu, Spanish, and Tamil.

Note: This call for contributions is in a few languages right now, but we invite our friends and communities to translate into many more! Please reach out to info (at) whoseknowledge (dot) org with your translations… thank you!

“It’s not just the words that will be lost. The language is the heart of our culture; it holds our thoughts, our way of seeing the world. It’s too beautiful for English to explain.”
– Potawatomi elder, cited in Robin Wall Kimmerer’s “Braiding Sweetgrass.”

The problem: The internet we have today is not multilingual enough to reflect the full depth and breadth of humanity. Language is a good proxy for, or way to understand, knowledge – different languages can represent different ways of knowing and learning about our worlds. Yet most online knowledge today is created and accessible only through colonial languages, and mostly English. The UNESCO Report on ‘A Decade of Promoting Multilingualism in Cyberspace’ (2015) estimated that “out of the world’s approximately 6,000 languages, just 10 of them make up 84.3 percent of people using the Internet, with English and Chinese the dominant languages, accounting for 52 per cent of Internet users worldwide.” More languages become endangered and disappear every year; 230 languages have become extinct between 1950 and 2010.

At best, then, 7% of the world’s languages are captured in published material, and an even smaller fraction of these languages are available online. This is particularly critical for communities who have been historically or currently marginalized by power and privilege – women, people of colour, LGBT*QIA folks, indigenous communities, and others marginalized from the global South (Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean and Pacific Islands). We often cannot add or access knowledge in our own languages on the internet. This reinforces and deepens inequalities and invisibilities that already exist offline, and denies all of us the richness of the multiple knowledges of the world.

Some of the issues that shape our abilities to create and share content online in our languages include:

The internet’s infrastructure (hardware, software, platforms, protocols…);
Content management tools and technologies for translation, digitization, and archiving (voice, machine-learning systems and AI, semantic web…);
The experience of those who consume and produce information online in different languages (devices like cell phones and laptops, messaging tools, micro-blogging, audio-video…);
The experience of looking for content in different languages online, through search engines and other tools.

Understanding the range of these issues will help us map the possibilities and concerns around linguistic biases and disparities on the internet.

Who we are: We are a group of three research partners who believe that the internet we co-create should support, share, and amplify knowledge in all of the world’s languages. For this to happen, we need to better understand the challenges and opportunities that support or prevent our languages and knowledges from being online. The Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) is a non-profit organisation that undertakes interdisciplinary research on internet and digital technologies from policy and academic perspectives. The areas of focus include digital accessibility for persons with disabilities, access to knowledge, intellectual property rights, openness (including open data, free and open source software, open standards, open access, open educational resources, and open video), internet governance, telecommunication reform, digital privacy, and cyber-security. The Oxford Internet Institute is a multidisciplinary research and teaching department of the University of Oxford, dedicated to the social science of the Internet. Whose Knowledge? is a global campaign to centre the knowledges of marginalized communities – the majority of the world – online.

Together we are creating a State of the Internet’s Languages report, as baseline research with both numbers and stories, to demonstrate how far we are from making the internet multilingual. We also hope to offer some possibilities for doing more to create the multilingual internet we want.

Why we need YOU: This research needs the experiences and expertise of people who think about these issues of language online from different perspectives.

You may be a person who:

Self-identifies as being from a marginalized community, and you find it difficult to bring your community’s knowledge online because the technology to display your language’s script is hard to access or read
Works on creating content in languages that are from parts of the world, and from people, who are mostly invisible and unheard online
Is a techie who works on making keyboards for non-colonial languages
Is a linguist who tries to bring together communities and technologies in a way that is easy and accessible
... you may be any of these, all of these, or more!

We are looking for your experience online to help us tell the story of how limited the language capacities of the internet are, currently, and how much opportunity there is for making the internet share our knowledges in our many different languages. Most importantly: you don’t have to be an academic or researcher to apply, we particularly encourage people experiencing these issues in their everyday lives and work to contribute!

Some of the key questions we’d like you to explore:

How are you or your community using your language online?
What do you wish you could create or share in your language online that you can’t today?
What does content in your language look like online? What exists, what’s missing? (you might think about, for example, news, social media, education or government websites, e-commerce, entertainment, online libraries and archives, self-published content, etc)
How and where and using what technologies do you share or create content in your language? (you might think about, for example, video, audio, writing, social media, digitization…whatever formats, tools, processes or websites you use for creating oral, visual, textual, or other forms of content.)
What is challenging to create or share on your language online? (you might think about, for example, access, device usability, platforms, websites, apps and other tools, software, fonts, digital literacy, etc when developing digital archives, online language resources, or just making any presence on the web in general for your language.)

Submissions:

We would love to hear about your and your community’s experiences in response to any or some of the above questions!

Your contribution could be in the form of a written essay, a visualization or work of art, a video or recorded conversation – we’d be happy to interview you if that’s your preference. We would be happy to accept in any language, and will review the submissions with the support of our multilingual communities and friends.

Are you interested in participating? Please email raw [at] cis-india [dot] org a short note (of about 300 words) by 2 September at 23:59 IST (Indian Standard Time), briefly outlining your idea along with the following information:

Your name
Your location – both country of origin and your current location is useful!
Your language(s)
Your community or any other background you’d care to share with us
Which questions you’re interested in addressing, and why
Your prefered contribution format
Any requests for how we can best support your participation

Timeline:

By 2nd September 2019: Send us your submission note
By 1st November 2019: Contributors will be notified of selection
By 1st December 2019: First round of contributions are due. We’ll work with you to finalise contributions by mid January.

Selected contributors will be offered an honorarium of USD 500, and their final works will be published as part of the Decolonising the Internet – Languages Report, in early 2020.

பங்களிப்பதற்காக அழைப்பு இணைய மொழி ஆதிக்கச் சூழலை மாற்றியதில் உங்கள்அனுபவம்!

“மொழி அழிவால் சொற்கள் மட்டும் அழிவதில்லை. நம் பண்பாட்டின் சாரமே மொழி தான். மொழியே நம் எண்ணங்களை வெளிப்படுத்துகிறது. இவ்வுலகத்தை நாம் காண்பதும் மொழிவழியே தான். ஆங்கிலத்தால் அதை ஒருக்காலும் வெளிப்படுத்த முடியாது.”
– போட்டோவாடோமி எல்டர் (ராபின் வால் கிம்மெரார் எழுதிய ‘பிரெயிடிங் சுவீட்கிராஸ்’ என்ற நூலில் இருந்து)

சிக்கல்: மனித குலத்தின் பரந்துவிரிந்த பண்பாட்டுச் சூழலை வெளிப்படுத்தும் அளவுக்கு இன்றைய இணையம் பன்மொழிச் சூழல் கொண்டதாய் இல்லை. தகவல்களை அறிந்துகொள்வதற்கு மொழி ஒரு கருவியாய் இருக்கிறது. ஒவ்வொரு மொழியும் உலகத்தை வெவ்வேறுவிதத்தில் காட்டத்தக்கன. இருந்தபோதும், பெரும்பாலான அறிவுசார் தளங்கள் ஆதிக்க மொழிகளில், குறிப்பாக ஆங்கிலத்தில் அதிகளவில் இருக்கின்றன. ‘இணையவெளியில் பன்மொழிச் சூழலைக் ஊக்குவிக்க பத்தாண்டுகளில் எடுத்த முயற்சி’ (2015) என்ற யுனெசுகோ அறிக்கையில் குறிப்பிட்டுள்ளதாவது: “உலகில் பேசப்படும் சுமார் 6,000 மொழிகளில், வெறும் 10 மொழியை பேசுவோர் மட்டுமே இணையத்தின் 84.3 சதவீதம் பேராக உள்ளனர். இவற்றில், ஆங்கிலமும் மாண்டரின் சீனமும் பேசுவோர் மட்டும் 52 சதவீதத்தினர் என்பது குறிப்பிடத்தக்கது.” ஒவ்வொரு ஆண்டும் அதிகளவிலான மொழிகள் அருகி, அழிந்து வருகின்றன. 1950 – 2010 ஆகிய ஆண்டுகளுக்குள் 230 மொழிகள் அழிந்திருக்கின்றன

எல்லா உள்ளடக்கத்தையும் கணக்கில் எடுத்தால் கூட, உலகின் 7% மொழிகளில் தான் ஆக்கங்கள் இருக்கின்றன. இவற்றில் சிலவே இணையத்தில் கிடைக்கின்றன. முற்காலத்தில் ஒடுக்கப்பட்டிருந்த பழங்குடியின சமூகத்தினர், அடக்குமுறைக்கு உட்பட்டிருந்த பெண்கள், நிறவெறிக்கு உட்பட்டிருந்தோர், மாற்று பாலின கருத்தியல் கொன்டோர் ஆகியோருக்கான ஆக்கங்கள் வெகு சில. பெரும்பாலானோர் இணையத்தில் தம் தாய்மொழியில் தகவல்களை தேடிப் பெற முடிவதில்லை. தம் மொழியில் கிடைக்கப்பெறாத பெரும்பாலானோருக்கு இவ்வுலகைப் பற்றிய அறிவுசார் ஆக்கங்கள் மறுக்கப்பட்டு, சமமின்மை வெளிப்படுகிறது.

நம் மொழியிலேயே இணையத்தில் ஆக்கங்களை உருவாக்குவதிலும் பகிர்வதிலும் சில சிக்கல்களை எதிர்நோக்குகிறோம். அவை:

கட்டமைப்பு வசதிக் குறைபாடு : வன்பொருள், மென்பொருள், இயங்குதளம், மரபுத்தகவு
உள்ளடக்க மேம்பாட்டுக் கருவிகளும் தொழில்நுட்பங்களும் போதிய அளவில் இல்லாமை: மொழிபெயர்ப்புக் கருவி, மின்மயமாக்கக் கருவி, சேமிப்பகம், செயற்கை நுண்ணறிவு, குரல்வழி உள்ளடக்கம்
இணையத்தில் பொருட்களை வாங்கிப் பயன்படுத்துவோரின் கருத்துக்களோ, பொருட்களைப் பற்றிய தகவலோ, இணையச் செயலிகளான செய்தியனுப்பல், வலைப்பூ போன்றவையோ தம் மொழியில் இல்லாமை
தேடுபொறிகளையும் பிற கருவிகளையும் கொன்டு வெவ்வேறு மொழிகளில் ஆக்கங்களைத் தேடிப் பழக்கம் இல்லாமை

இச்சிக்கல்களைப் புரிந்துகொள்வதன் மூலம், இணையத்தின் பன்மொழிச் சூழலுக்கான தேவைகளையும் அவற்றிற்கான குறைநிறைகளையும் சரிப்படுத்திக்கொள்ள முடியும்.

நாங்கள் யார்?: உலக மொழிகளிலான ஆக்கங்கள் இணையவெளியில் இடம்பெற உதவவும், ஊக்குவிக்கவும் மூன்று ஆய்வு நிறுவனங்கள் கைகோர்த்துள்ளோம். இதை நடைமுறைப்படுத்துவதற்கு முன், நாம் எதிர்கொள்ளும் சிக்கல்களையும் பெறக்கூடிய வாய்ப்புகளையும் நன்கு அறிந்துகொள்வது அவசியம் என உணர்ந்தோம்.

1. சென்டர் ஃபார் இன்டர்நெட் அன்ட் சொசைட்டி (the Centre for Internet and Society or CIS) என்ற தன்னார்வல நிறுவனம், இணையத்தையும், மின்மயமாக்கத் தொழில்நுட்பங்களையும் பற்றிய ஆய்வுகளை கொள்கை நோக்கிலும், கல்விசார் நோக்கிலும் செய்கிறது. உடற்குறைபாடு உடையோருக்கு மின்மயமாக்கிய உள்ளடக்கம், அறிவைப் பெறும் சூழல், அறிவுசார் சொத்துரிமை, திறந்தவெளி ஆக்கங்கள், இணையவழி ஆளுகை, தொழில்நுட்பச் சீர்திருத்தம், இணையவெளியில் தனியுரிமை, இணையவெளிப் பாதுகாப்பு போன்ற தலைப்புகளில் இந்நிறுவனம் கவனம் செலுத்துகிறது.

2. ஆக்சுபோர்டு இன்டர்நெட் இன்ஸ்டிடியூட் என்ற ஆய்வு நிறுவனம் ஆக்சுபோர்டு பல்கலைக்கழகத்தைச் சேர்ந்தது. இது இணையச் சமூகத்துக்காகவே தனித்துவமாக உருவாக்கப்பட்ட துறை.

3. ஹூஸ் நாலெட்ஜ் என்ற இயக்கம், உலகளவில் ஒடுக்கப்பட்ட சமூகங்களின் அறிவுசார் ஆக்கங்களை இணையவெளியில் கொண்டு வர முயற்சி எடுக்கிறது.

நாங்கள் மூவரும் இணைந்து, இணையத்தில் பயன்பாட்டிலுள்ள மொழிகளைப் பற்றிய ஆய்வறிக்கையை தயாரிக்கிறோம். புள்ளிவிவரங்களையும், தகவல்களையும் வெளியிட்டு, பன்மொழிச் சூழலில் எந்தளவு பின்தங்கி இருக்கிறோம் என்பதை உணர்த்த உள்ளோம். இணையவெளியில் ஆக்கங்களை வெளியிட எங்களால் முடிந்த சில வாய்ப்புகளையும் வழங்க உள்ளோம்.

உங்கள் உதவி எங்களுக்கு தேவைப்படுவதன் காரணம்: இத்தகைய சிக்கல்களை எதிர்நோக்கி வருவோரின் அனுபவங்களையும், அவர்கள் முயன்ற தீர்வுகளையும் பற்றி அறிந்துகொள்வதே இவ்வாய்வின் நோக்கம்.

நீங்கள்,

ஒடுக்கப்பட்ட சமூகத்தைச் சேர்ந்தவராக உணர்ந்தாலோ, உங்கள் சமூகத்தின் அறிவுசார் உள்ளடக்கங்கள் இணையவெளியில் கிடைப்பதில்லை என்று கருதினாலோ, உங்கள் மொழி எழுத்துவடிவங்கள் அணுகவும், படிக்கவும் ஏற்றவகையில் கணினிமயமாக்கப்படவில்லை என்று உணர்ந்தாலோ,
தொழில்நுட்பராக இருந்து, ஆதிக்கத்துக்கு உட்பட்டோரின் மொழிகளுக்காக விசைப்பலகைகள் செய்பவராக இருந்தாலோ,
மொழியியலாளராக இருந்து, பல்வேறு சமூகங்களை ஒருங்கிணைத்து, தொழில்நுட்பத்தை அவர்களுக்கு புரியும் வகையிலும், அணுகும் வகையிலும் கிடைக்கச் செய்தாலோ,
… உங்களைத் தான் தேடிக் கொன்டிருக்கிறோம்!

உங்கள் இணையவெளி அனுபவங்களை எங்களுக்கு தெரிவிப்பதன் மூலம், ஒவ்வொரு மொழிச் சமூகத்தின் நிலையையும் நாங்கள் அறிந்துகொள்ள உதவியாக இருக்கும். அத்துடன், எத்தகைய வாய்ப்புகளை ஏற்படுத்தித் தரலாம் என்றும் நாங்கள் சிந்திக்க உதவியாய் இருக்கும்.

உங்களிடம் நாங்கள் கேட்க விரும்பும் சில கேள்விகள்:

நீங்களும், உங்கள் மொழிச் சமூகத்தினரும் இணையவெளியில் உங்கள் மொழியை எப்படி பயன்படுத்துகிறீர்கள்?
இன்றைய நிலையில், இணையவெளியில் உங்கள் மொழியைக் கொண்டு செய்ய முடியாதது இருப்பின், அதற்கு என்ன செய்ய விரும்புவீர்கள்?
இணையவெளியில் உங்கள் மொழியில் என்னென்ன ஆக்கங்கள் இருக்கின்றன, எவை இல்லை? (எடுத்துக்காட்டாக, செய்திகள், சமுக வலைத்தளம், கல்விசார் உள்ளடக்கம், அரசுசார் உள்ளடக்கம், மனமகிழ் வீடியோக்கள், இணையவழி கற்றல், போன்றவை)
உங்கள் மொழியில் ஆக்கங்களை படைப்பதற்கு எந்த தளத்தை நாடுவீர்கள், எந்த தொழில்நுட்பத்தை பயன்படுத்துவீர்கள்? (எ.கா : ஒளி, ஒலி, உரை, உரைநடை ஒழுங்கமைவு, பிழைத்திருத்திக் கருவி போன்றவை)
உங்கள் மொழியில் எழுதுவதற்கோ, பகிர்வதற்கோ முயலும் போது என்னென்ன மாதிரியான சிக்கல்களை இணையவெளியில் சந்திக்கிறீர்கள்? (எ.கா: அணுக்கம் இன்மை, கருவியில் எழுத்துரு ஆதரவின்மை, பிழை திருத்த கருவி இன்மை)

ஆய்வேடு சமர்ப்பித்தல்:

மேற்கண்ட கேள்விகளுக்கு உங்கள் சமூகத்தினரிடமும், உங்களிடமும் அனுபவம் மூலம் விடை கிடைத்திருக்கும் என நம்புகிறோம். அவற்றைப் பற்றி தெரிந்து கொள்ள விரும்புகிறோம்!

கட்டுரையாகவோ, கலைப்படைப்பாகவோ, பதிவு செய்யப்பட்ட ஆவணமாகவோ, வேறு வடிவிலோ உங்கள் படைப்புகள் இருக்கலாம். நீங்கள் விரும்பினால் உங்களை பேட்டி காணவும் தயாராக இருக்கிறோம். உங்கள் படைப்புகள் எந்த மொழியில் இருந்தாலும் ஏற்போம். எங்களிடமுள்ள பன்மொழிச் சமூகத்திடம் உங்கள் படைப்புகளை கொடுத்து அவற்றை சீராய்வு செய்யச் சொல்வோம்.

உங்களுக்கு பங்கேற்க விருப்பமா? raw@cis-india.org என்ற மின்னஞ்சல் முகவரிக்கு, செப்டம்பர் இரன்டாம் தேதிக்கு முன்னர் அனுப்புக. 300 சொற்களுக்கு மிகாமல், கீழ்க்காணும் விவரங்களைக்

உங்கள் பெயர்
இருப்பிடம் – பிறந்த நாடும், தற்போது வாழும் நாடும்
உங்கள் மொழி(கள்)
உங்கள் சமூகத்தினரைப் பற்றிய தகவல் (அ) நீங்கள் விரும்பும் சமூகத்தினரைப் பற்றிய தகவல்
எந்தெந்த கேள்விகளுக்கு பதிலளிக்க விரும்புகிறீர்கள், ஏன்
உங்கள் படைப்பு எந்த வடிவில் உள்ளது
உங்கள் பங்களிப்பை மேம்படுத்தல் நாங்கள் ஏதும் செய்ய வேண்டுமா

காலகட்டம்:

2 செப்டம்பர், 2019: உங்கள் படைப்புகள் எங்களை வந்தடைய வேண்டிய கடைசி நாள்
1 நவம்பர், 2019: தேர்ந்தெடுக்கப்பட்ட படைப்பாளர்களிடம் விவரம் தெரிவிக்கப்படும் நாள்
1 திசம்பர், 2019: முதற்கட்ட பங்களிப்பு நடைபெறும். பங்களிப்பை ஜனவரி மாத மத்தியில் முடிக்க முயற்சி செய்வோம்.

தேர்ந்தெடுக்கப்பட்ட படைப்பாளிகளுக்கு 500 அமெரிக்க டாலர்கள் ஊக்கத்தொகையாக வழங்கப்படும். நாங்கள் தயாரிக்கும் அறிக்கையில் அவர்களின் படைப்பு வெளியிடப்படும்.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/stil-2020-call

State of the Internet's Languages 2020: Announcing selected contributions!

sneha-pp — 2019-11-01T18:12:49Z

In response to our call for contributions and reflections on ‘Decolonising the Internet’s Languages’ in August, we are delighted to announce that we received 50 submissions, in over 38 languages! We are so overwhelmed and grateful for the interest and support of our many communities around the world; it demonstrates how critical this effort is for all of us. From all these extraordinary offerings, we have selected nine that we will invite and support the contributors to expand further.

Cross-posted from the Whose Knowledge? website: URL

Call for Contributions and Reflections: URL

Thank you to all of you who wrote in: we would publish every one of your contributions if we could! Each of you highlighted unique aspects of the problem and possibility of the multilingual internet, and it was extremely difficult to select a few to include in the ‘State of the Internet’s Languages Report’. Whether your submission was selected or not, we hope you will continue to be part of this work with us, and that the report will reflect your thoughtful concerns and interests in a multi-lingual internet.

The nine selected contributions will be a significant aspect of the openly licensed State of the Internet’s Languages report to be published mid-2020. In different formats and languages, they span many kinds of language contexts across the world, from many different communities and perspectives. They will form part of a broader narrative combining data and experience, highlighting how limited the current language capacities of the internet are, and how much opportunity there is for making our knowledges available in our many languages.

A special thank you to the final contributors – we’ll be in touch shortly with more details. We’re looking forward to working with you as you develop your contributions and share your experiences!

The selected contributions are from:

Caddie Brain, Joel Liddle, Leigh Harris, Graham Wilfred

As part of a broader movement to increase inclusion and diversity in emojis, Aboriginal people in Central Australia are creating Indigemoji, the first set of Australian Indigenous emojis delivered via a free app. Caddie, Joel, Leigh and Graham aim to describe how to reflect Aboriginal experiences online, to increase the accessibility of Arrernte language in the broader Australian lexicon, to position Arrernte knowledge on digital platforms for future generations of Arrentre speakers and learners, and to contribute more broadly to the decolonisation of the internet.
Claudia Soria

Claudia will describe “The Digital Language Diversity Project” funded by the European Commission under the Erasmus+ programme. The project has surveyed the digital use and usability of four European minority languages: Basque, Breton, Karelian and Sardinian. It has also developed a number of instruments that can help speakers’ communities drive the digital life of their languages, in the form of a methodology named “digital language planning”.
Donald Flywell Malanga

Donald will share his experiences conducting two panel discussions with elderly and ten young Ndali People in Chisitu Village based in Misuku Hills, Malawi. He aims to hear their stories and make sense of them relating to how Chindali could be spoken/expressed online, examine the barriers they face in sharing/expressing their language online, and unearth possible solutions to address such barriers.
Emna Mizouni

Emna will interview African and Arab content creators and consumers to share their experiences in posting content in their own language and expose their cultures. She will reach out to different ethnicities from Africa to gather data on the reasons they use the “colonial languages” on the internet and the burdens they face, whether technical such as internet connectivity and accessibility, lack of devices, social or cultural barriers, etc.
Ishan Chakraborty

Ishan will explore the experiences of individuals who identify themselves as both disabled and queer, and who are not visible online in Bengali. Online research papers and academic works in Bengali are significantly limited, and even more so in the case of works on marginalities and intersections. One of the most effective ways of making online material accessible to persons with visual disability is through audio material, and Ishan will explore some of these possibilities.
Joaquín Yescas Martínez

Joaquin will be describing the free software, open technology initiatives and the sharing philosophy of “compartencia” in his community of Mixe and Zapotec peoples in Mexico. He will explore initiatives such as Xhidza Penguin School, an app to learn the language online, and learning workshops to look at new methodologies for sharing and using the language. It is not only a means of communication but it also encompasses a different way of understanding the world.
Kelly Foster

Kelly will draw attention to the work being done to revitalise indigenous languages and the struggles to represent the Nation Languages of the Caribbean and its diasporas in structured data and on Wikipedia. She aims to have the native names of the islands, locations and indigenous peoples on Wikidata, labelled with their own language so she can generate a map of the Caribbean with as many native names as possible. But the language of the Taino people of the islands that are now called Jamaican, Cuba, Puerto Rico and Haiti has been labelled as extinct, as are the people, by European researchers. Though a victim of the first European genocide of the Caribbean, they live on in the tongues and blood of people who are more often racialised as Black and Latinx.
Paska Darmawan

As a first-generation college student who did not understand English, Paska had difficulties in finding educational, inspiring content about LGBTQIA issues in their native language, let alone positive content about the local LGBTQIA community. They plan to share a mapping of available Indonesian digital LGBTQIA content, whether it be in the form of Wikipedia articles, websites, social media accounts, or any other online media.
Uda Deshpriya

Uda will explore the lack of feminist content on the internet in Sinhala and Tamil. Mainstream human rights discussions take place in English and leaves out the majority of Sri Lankans. Women’s rights discourse remains even more centralized. Despite the fact that all primary criminal and civil courts work in local languages, statutes and decided cases are not available in Sinhala and Tamil, including Sri Lanka’s Constitution and its amendments. This extends to content creation through both text and art, with significant barriers of keyboard and input methods.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/stil-2020-selected-contributions

User Experiences of Digital Financial Risks and Harms

2023-12-22T16:05:26Z

The reach and use of digital financial services has risen in recent years without a commensurate increase in digital literacy and access. Through this project, supported by a grant from Google(.)org, we will examine the landscape of potential risks and harms posed by digital financial services, and the disproportionate risk that information asymmetry and barriers to access pose for users, especially certain marginalised communities.

Project Background

There is a big evidence gap in the understanding of the financial risks and harms experienced by users of digital financial services. Consequently, adequate consumer protection frameworks and processes to address these harms have been lagging. A survey of 32,000 Indian consumers found only 17% who lost money through banking frauds were able to recoup their funds. Filling this gap is crucial to inform responsive policy making, platform design and data governance.

While a lot more attention is paid to financial frauds and scams, through this study, we aim to situate these alongside experiences of harms that are understudied and sometimes overlooked. Users may also experience financial harm, when negatively impacted by:

Financial misinformation
Loss of control over their assets
Loss of potential income
Difficulty accessing social protection
Financial abuse perpetrated alongside other forms of domestic and family abuse
Unsustainable levels of debt, i.e. over-indebtedness, and
Exclusion from financial services

The Centre for Internet and Society is undertaking a mixed methods study to better understand user awareness, perceptions and experiences of digital financial risks and harms.

For this study, we will survey nearly 4000 users, with differing levels of access to digital devices, digital services and the internet, and undertake semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions with specific target groups and stakeholders. We aim to highlight the experiences of persons with disabilities, gender and sexual minorities, the elderly, women, and regional language first users; to better understand how discrimination and exclusion may increase their burden of risk when using digital financial services.

Key research questions guiding our project are:

How are digital financial risks understood and experienced by users of digital financial services? Which socioeconomic factors amplify risks for different user groups?
What concerns have emerged relating to data privacy, misinformation, identity theft and other forms of social engineering and mobile app based fraud?
How accessible are providers’ and government’s platform based reporting and grievance redressal systems?
What role can fintech platforms, social media platforms, banking institutions, and regulatory bodies play in reducing digital financial risks across the ecosystem?

Project Aims

Through this study, we aim to:

Assess the financial risks and harms users are exposed to when using social media, digital banking, and fintech platforms. While looking at general users, we will also specifically explore this experience for the elderly, gender and sexual minorities, regional language users and persons with visual disabilities.
Develop a framework to categorise the nature of vulnerabilities, risks and harms faced by the concerned user groups
Create a credible evidence base for key stakeholders with regards to experiences of digital financial risks and harm.
Provide recommendations for better policy and platform design to address harms, specifically those arising from lack of accessibility and information asymmetry.
Identify best practices to respond to digital risks and foster safety and equity in digital financial services

Come Talk to Us:

If you have experiences or insights to share, or if you're interested in learning more about our study, please reach out.

We also invite researchers, financial service providers, developers and designers of fintech platforms, and civil society organisations working on digital safety, to speak to us and help inform the study. You may contact garima@cis-india.org

Research Team: Amrita Sengupta, Chiara Furtado, Garima Agrawal, Nishkala Sekhar, Puthiya Purayil Sneha, and Yesha Tshering Paul

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/user-experiences-of-digital-financial-risks-and-harms

Internet Speech: Perspectives on Regulation and Policy

akriti — 2019-04-01T16:38:54Z

The Centre for Internet & Society and the University of Munich (LMU), Germany are jointly organizing an international symposium at India Habitat Centre in New Delhi on April 5, 2019

Click to download the agenda

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/events/internet-speech-perspectives-on-regulation-and-policy

Marathi Language Fortnight Workshops 2019

subodh — 2019-03-01T00:39:33Z

Maharashtra is a state which is rich in diversity in terms of language and culture seen in its various regions such as Konkan, Marathwada, Western Maharashtra, Northern Maharashtra and Vidarbha. Awareness needs to be created to make Wikimedia movement inclusive and diverse in these geographical regions as well as in their social strata.

Collaboration for organizing events

The Centre for Internet & Society’s Access to Knowledge wing (CIS-A2K) launched the concept of organizing state-wide workshops to spread awareness and train editors in the nitty-gritties of Wikipedia editing and creating digital content. The campaign is now regularly conducted by Rajya Marathi Vikas Sanstha (RMVS), the language department of Maharashtra government with support from CIS-A2K and various institutions.

These events were conducted during the Marathi language fortnight (1 – 15 January 2019) upto Marathi Language Day on 27 February 2019. The objectives of the event such as creating awareness about digital knowledge in Marathi, open knowledge resources and Wikimedia projects; explaining the history of Wiki movement; training participants in basic editing skills in Wikipedia; exploring ways to find reliable references; presenting article structure, were broadly covered in the sessions. Trainers also explained participants on copyright, community guidelines, uploading images, and so on.

CIS-A2K had collaborated with the state language department from 2017 onwards. In the first series of workshops, three events were conducted. In the second series in 2018 six workshops out of a total 17 workshops were conducted across the state. In the year 2019, the awareness spread to more educational institutions located in different regions of the state. In the third series, CIS-A2K conducted five workshops out of total 21 workshops conducted. CIS facilitated the process and supported some workshops remotely.

The Workshops

The first workshop was conducted at Chintamanrao College of Commerce at Sangli. The awareness session about open knowledge sources and Wikimedia projects was organized for students and faculty in the beginning of workshop. After this one hour session, actual skill training in Wikipedia editing was done for three hours for 24 participants. They created the account and learnt the editing and image upload on Commons. The practice was done in sandboxes before working in main namespace. The students of pre-university course and graduate course attended the workshop. The commerce and management related articles were edited.

The second workshop was conducted at Shivaji University, Kolhapur. The Marathi language department took the initiative to organize this workshop for the second consecutive year. The participants were selected from 4 colleges affiliated to university. The faculty was also actively involved. The introductory session was attended by 50 students. The editing training of three hours was conducted in computer lab, in which 24 new users participated. The editors practiced the manual of style, providing links and references, etc. on their sandboxes before working on the main namespace articles. The editors mostly worked on locally relevant topics.

The third workshop was conducted in Dayanand College at Solapur. This institution organized this event for the second consecutive year. The thematic discussion on history of Solapur was facilitated by a senior editor of Sakal newspaper. The plan for documentation of local festival - Gadda Yatra and history of Solapur was discussed. It is proposed to start this activity with thematic workshop. Total 15 new and old users participated in the workshop.

The fourth workshop was conducted at Mass Communication & Journalism department of Solapur University. The faculty of this department took the initiative to organize this event for the second time. Total 25 new and old users participated in the workshop. The participants edited the articles related to journalism and also uploaded the images on Commons. Some editors completed the task of adding references to articles. After the meeting with the faculty, group of post graduate students were assigned 50 articles about reputed Marathi newspapers. They will complete this task as part of their online academic submissions.

The fifth wokshop was conducted at SSSKR Innani College at Karanja Lad in district Washim. This was the first Wikipedia programme in this region of the state. As it was the first Wiki event, we decided to organise a two day workshop. The management and faculty participated actively in this workshop. In the workshop, references and images were added to existing articles about local heritage, tourist places and personalities. The images were uploaded to newly created categories - Karanja Lad and SSSKR Innani College on Commons. Over 100 members participated in this two day event, while 45 users edited actively on Wikimedia projects.

Follow-up

After the workshop, quarterly refresher sessions are planned in these institutions. The active students' WhatsApp groups will be formed for support and online training sessions. This cadre of Wiki Guides would facilitate the programs for other students. The meeting with faculty and board of studies would be held for integration of Wikimedia activities with the academic assignments.

More info check out the Meta report.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/marathi-language-fortnight-workshops-2019

CIS Response to Draft E-Commerce Policy

amber — 2019-04-26T06:40:34Z

CIS is grateful for the opportunity to submit comments to the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion on the draft national e-commerce policy. This response was authored by Amber Sinha, Arindrajit Basu, Elonnai Hickok and Vipul Kharbanda.

Access our response to the draft policy here: Download (PDF)

The E-Commerce Policy is a much needed and timely document that seeks to enable the growth of India's digital ecosystem. Crucially, it backs up India's stance at the WTO, which has been a robust pushback against digital trade policies that would benefit the developed world at the cost of emerging economies. However, in order to ensure that the benefits of the digital economy are truly shared, focus must not only be on the sellers but also on the consumers, which automatically brings in individual rights into the question. No right is absolute but there needs to be a fair trade-off between the mercantilist aspirations of a burgeoning digital economy and the civil and political rights of the individuals who are spurring the economy on. We also appreciate the recognition that the regulation of e-commerce must be an inter-disciplinary effort and the assertion of the roles of various other departments and ministries. However, we also caution against over-reach and encroaching into policy domains that fall within the mandate of existing laws.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-response-to-draft-e-commerce-policy

SVG Translation Workshop at KBC North Maharashtra University

subodh — 2019-04-26T06:47:40Z

The Centre for Internet & Access to Knowledge (CIS-A2K) wing organized an SVG translation workshop in collaboration with KBC North Maharashtra University, Jalgaon on 14-15 March 2019. The workshop was a part of India level campaign. Total 58 participants attended the workshop and contributed to Commons till 31 March 2019.

Background

During the edit-a-thons and thematic workshops, the need for images in Marathi was realised. Many articles on health and science have images with labels in English. The issue was discussed with few institutions. KBC University came forward to start the activity under this campaign.

Objectives

Orientation of Wikimedia projects
Localisation of SVG images
Commons upload policies and process

Facilitators

Krishna Chaitanya Velaga -- User: KCVelaga
Subodh Kulkarni, CIS-A2K --Subodh (CIS-A2K)
Prof. Manish Joshi, SOCS KBCNMU, Jalgaon -- Joshmanish
Dr. Snehalata B. Shirude, SOCS KBCNMU, Jalgaon --Snehalata Shirude

Agenda

Introduction to Wikimedia projects, Marathi Wikipedia, Commons
Account creation, basic editing skills
Copyrights, Commons upload process
Graphics images, types of formats, features
Installation of fonts, Inkscape
Resources for translation, verification before uploads
Selection of images, tags, categories for upload
Using translated images in local Wikipedia

Report

As the participants were not aware of Wikimedia projects, the first two sessions dedicated to an introduction to various projects. The participants opened accounts on a smartphone and created user pages after logging in on computers. They were introduced to basic skills in Wikipedia editing, giving references/wiki links and adding images from Commons. The Commons platform was explained in detail. The missing images in Marathi language articles and Commons as well were shown. The discussion on these topics resulted in understanding the need for SVG translation exercise.

The next session was to download and install the necessary software on each computer. The participants installed Google Input Tools for Marathi typing and also Inkscape. Before translating images on Inkscape, the students first practised Marathi typing on their sandboxes. After this, the main graphics sessions were conducted. Krishna explained various types of formats, differences between raster and vector graphics, the importance of SVGs and actual SVG file translation process. He demonstrated the process for images with different difficulty levels. They were introduced to resources available as a part of the campaign for SVG translation and necessary techniques. The usage of various online resources like encyclopedia and thesaurus available was also explained. The images were selected and working tags were applied by the participants. The faculty facilitated the process of work distribution among the students. The participants were able to upload 100+ images on the first day.

Pictured above: Students from Day 1 helping others on Day 2 (Picture by Subodh Kulkarni)

On Day 2, around 20 participants newly joined the workshop. This group comprised of teachers, journalists, doctors, and other enthusiastic citizens. Active students from Day 1 facilitated the training of this new batch. Having conducted a session on the previous day greatly helped to facilitate this session easily. The experienced teachers and citizens helped others to get correct translations and terms. This boosted the speed of the work. The images were also used in the articles on Marathi Wikipedia.

With the help of science teachers, the images were verified before uploading to Commons. Due to active participatory work on the second day, the total images crossed 200 mark. The students continued to contribute till last day of campaign i.e. 31 March. At the end, due to consistent work Marathi category reached the highest number with a total of 357 images among all Indian languages. The workshop and further work was well organized and motivated by Prof. Manish Joshi and Prof. Snehalata Shirude from Computer Science department.

Link to the Wikipedia page report here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/subodh-kulkarni-april-10-2019-svg-translation-workshop-at-kbc-north-maharashtra-university

What’s up with WhatsApp?

Aayush Rathi and Sunil Abraham — 2018-04-23T16:45:51Z

In 2016, WhatsApp Inc announced it was rolling out end-to-end encryption, but is the company doing what it claims to be doing?

The article by Aayush Rathi and Sunil Abraham was published in Asia Times on April 20, 2018.

Back in April 2016, when WhatsApp Inc announced it was rolling out end-to-end encryption (E2EE) for its billion-plus strong user base as a default setting, the messaging behemoth signaled to its users it was at the forefront of providing technological solutions to protect privacy.

Emphasized in the security white paper explaining the implementation of the technology is the encryption of both forms of communication – one-to-one and group and also of all types of messages shared within such communications – text as well as media.

Simply put, all communication taking place over WhatsApp would be decipherable only to the sender and recipient – it would be virtual gibberish even to WhatsApp.

This announcement came in the backdrop of Apple locking horns with the FBI after being asked to provide a backdoor to unlock the San Bernardino mass shooter’s iPhone. This further reinforced WhatsApp Inc’s stand on the ensuing debate between the interplay of privacy and security in the digital age.

Kudos to WhatsApp, for there is growing discussion around how encryption and anonymity is central to enabling secure online communication which in turn is integral to essential human rights such as those of freedom of opinion and expression.

WhatsApp may have taken encryption to the masses, but here we outline why WhatsApp’s provisioning of privacy and security measures needs a more granular analysis – is the company doing what it claims to be doing? Security issues with WhatsApp’s messaging protocol certainly are not new.

Man-in-the-middle attacks

A study published by a group of German researchers from Ruhr University highlighted issues with WhatsApp’s implementation of its E2EE protocol to group communications. Another paper points out how WhatsApp’s session establishment strategy itself could be problematic and potentially be targeted for what are called man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks.

An MITM attack takes the form of a malicious actor, as the term suggests, placing itself between the communicating parties to eavesdrop or impersonate. The Electronic Frontier Foundation also highlighted other security vulnerabilities, or trade-offs, depending upon ideological inclinations, with respect to WhatsApp allowing for storage of unencrypted backups, issues with WhatsApp’s web client and also with its approach to cryptographic key change notifications.

Much has been written questioning WhatsApp’s shifting approach to ensuring privacy too. Quoting straight from WhatsApp’s Privacy Policy: “We joined the Facebook family of companies in 2014. As part of the Facebook family of companies, WhatsApp receives information from, and shares information with, this family of companies.” Speaking of Facebook …

Culling out larger issues with WhatsApp’s privacy policies is not the intention here. What we specifically seek to explore is right at the nexus of WhatsApp’s security and privacy provisioning clashing with its marketing strategy: the storage of data on WhatsApp’s servers, or ‘blobs,’ as they are referred to in the technical paper. Facebook’s rather. In WhatsApp’s words: “Once your messages (including your chats, photos, videos, voice messages, files and share location information) are delivered, they are deleted from our servers. Your messages are stored on your own device.”

In fact, this non-storage of data on their ‘blobs’ is emphasizes at several other points on the official website. Let us call this the deletion-upon-delivery model.

A simple experiment

While drawing up a rigorous proof of concept, made near-impossible thanks to WhatsApp being a closed source messaging protocol, a simple experiment is enough to raise some very pertinent questions about WhatsApp’s outlined deletion-upon-delivery model. It should, however, be mentioned that the Signal Protocol developed by Open Whisper Systems and pivotal in WhatsApp’s rolling out of E2EE is open source. Here is how the experiment proceeds:

Rick sends Morty an attachment.

Morty then switches off the data on her mobile device.

Rick downloads the attachment, an image.

Subsequently, Rick deletes the image from his mobile device’s internal storage.

Rick then logs into a WhatsApp’s web client on his browser. (Prior to this experiment, both Rick and Morty had logged out from all instances of the web client)

Upon a fresh log-in to the web client and opening the chat with Morty, the option to download the image is available to Rick.

The experiment concludes with bewilderment at WhatsApp’s claim of deletion-upon-delivery as outlined earlier. The only place from which Morty could have downloaded the image would be from Facebook’s ‘blobs.’ The attachment could not have been retrieved from Morty’s mobile device as it had no way of sending data and neither from Rick’s mobile device as it no longer existed in the device’s storage.

As per the Privacy Policy, the data is stored on the ‘blobs’ for a period of 30 days after transmission of a message only when it can’t be delivered to the recipient. Upon delivery, the deletion-upon-delivery model is supposed to kick in.

Another straightforward experiment that leads to a similar conclusion is seeing the difference in time taken for a large attachment to be forwarded as opposed to when the same large attachment is uploaded. Forwarding is palpably quicker than uploading afresh: non-storage of attachments on the ‘blob’ would entail that the same amount should be taken for both.

The plot thickens. WhatsApp’s Privacy Policy goes on to state: “To improve performance and deliver media messages more efficiently, such as when many people are sharing a popular photo or video, we may retain that content on our servers for a longer period of time.” The technical paper offers no help in understanding how WhatsApp systems assess frequently shared encrypted media messages without decrypting it at its end.

A possible explanation could be the usage of metadata by WhatsApp, which it discloses in its Privacy Policy while simultaneously being sufficiently vague about the specifics of it. That WhatsApp may be capable of reading encrypted communication through the inclusion of a backdoor bodes well for law enforcement, but not so much for unsuspecting users.

The weakest link in the chain

Concerns about backdoors in WhatsApp’s product have led the French government to start developing their own encrypted messaging service. This will be built using Matrix – an open protocol designed for real-time communication. Indeed, the Privacy Policy lays out that the company “may collect, use, preserve, and share your information if we have a good-faith belief that it is reasonably necessary to respond pursuant to applicable law or regulations, to legal process, or to government requests.”

The Signal Protocol is the undisputed gold standard of E2EE implementations. It is the integration with the surrounding functionality that WhatsApp offers which leads to vulnerabilities. After all, a chain is only as strong as its weakest link. Assuming that the attachments stored on the ‘blobs’ are in encrypted form, indecipherable to all but the intended recipients, this does not pose a privacy risk for the users from a technological point of view.

However, it is easy lose sight of the fact that the Privacy Policy is a legally binding document and it specifically states that messages are not stored on the ‘blobs’ as a matter of routine. As a side note, WhatsApp’s Privacy Policy and Terms of Service are refreshing in their readability and lack of legalese.

As we were putting the final touches to this piece, news from WABetaInfo, a well-reputed source of information on WhatsApp features, has broken that newer updates of WhatsApp for Android are permitting users to re-download media deleted up to three months back. WhatsApp cannot possibly achieve this without storing the media in the ‘blobs,’ or in other words, in violation of its Privacy Policy.

As the aphorism goes: “When the service is free, you are the product.”

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/asia-times-april-20-2018-aayush-rathi-sunil-abraham-what-s-up-with-whatsapp

National Resource Kit: The Lakshadweep Chapter (Call for Comments)

anandi — 2014-02-20T10:00:32Z

The National Resource Kit team is pleased to bring you its research on the state of laws, policies and programmes for persons with disabilities in the state of Lakshadweep.

The Department of Social Justice, Empowerment and Culture is responsible for welfare of persons with disabilities in Lakshadweep. The union territory has an estimated population of 1678 persons with disabilities in a total population of 64,429 people. Lakshadweep implements two schemes under Skill Development & Employment, three schemes under Social Security, Health, Rehabilitation & Recreation and has notified authorities for disability Certification and certifying Organisations & Individuals for Persons with Disabilities.

Click to download the full chapter (PDF, 187 Kb)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/accessibility/blog/national-resource-lakshadweep-chapter-call-for-comments

CIS Welcomes Standing Committee Report on IT Rules

pranesh — 2013-04-03T10:54:52Z

The Centre for Internet and Society welcomes the report by the Standing Committee on Subordinate Legislation, in which it has lambasted the government and has recommended that the government amend the Rules it passed in April 2011 under section 79 of the Information Technology Act.

Click to read the Parliamentary Standing Committee Report on the IT Rules. A modified version was published in CiOL on March 27, 2013.

These rules have been noted by many, including CIS, Software Freedom Law Centre, and Society for Knowledge Commons, and many eminent lawyers, as being unconstitutional. The Standing Committee, noting this, has asked the government to make changes to the Rules to ensure that the fundamental rights to freedom of speech and privacy are safeguarded, and that the principles of natural justice are respected when a person’s freedom of speech or privacy are curtailed.

Ambiguous and Over-reaching Language

The Standing Committee has noted the inherent ambiguity of words like "blasphemy", "disparaging", etc., which are used in the Intermediary Guidelines Rules, and has pointed out that unclear language can lead to harassment of people as has happened with Section 66A of the IT Act, and can lead to legitimate speech being removed. Importantly, the Standing Committee recognizes that many categories of speech prohibited by the Intermediary Guidelines Rules are not prohibited by any statute, and hence cannot be prohibited by the government through these Rules. Accordingly, the Standing Committee has asked the government to ensure "no new category of crimes or offences is created" by these Rules.

Government Confused Whether Rules Are Mandatory or Advisory

The Standing Committee further notes that there is a discrepancy in the government’s stand that the Intermediary Guidelines Rules are not mandatory, and are only "of advisory nature and self-regulation", and that "it is not mandatory for the Intermediary to disable the information, the rule does not lead to any kind of censorship". The Standing Committee points out the flaw in this, and notes that the language used in the rules is mandatory language (“shall act” within 36 hours). Thus, it rightly notes that there is a "need for clarity on the aforesaid contradiction". Further, it also notes that there is "there should be safeguards to protect against any abuse", since this is a form of private censorship by intermediaries."

Evidence Needed Against Foreign Websites

The government has told the Standing Committee that "foreign websites repeatedly refused to honour our laws", however, it has not provided any proof for this assertion. The government should make public all evidence that foreign web services are refusing to honour Indian laws, and should encourage a public debate on how we should tackle this problem in light of the global nature of the Internet.

Cyber Cafes Rules Violate Citizens’ Privacy

The Standing Committee also pointed out that the Cyber Cafe Rules violated citizens’ right to privacy in requiring that "screens of the computers installed other than in partitions and cubicles should face open space of the cyber café". Unfortunately, the Standing Committee did not consider the privacy argument against retention of extensive and intrusive logs. Under the Cyber Cafe Rules, cyber cafes are required to retain (for a minimum of one year) extensive logs, including that of "history of websites accessed using computer resource at cyber café" in such a manner that each website accessed can be linked to a person. The Committee only considered the argument that this would impose financial burdens on small cybercafes, and rejected that argument. CIS wishes the Committee had examined the provision on log maintenance on grounds of privacy as well."

Government’s Half-Truths

In one response, the government notes that "rules under Section 79 in particular have undergone scrutiny by High Courts in the country. Based on the Rules, the courts have given reliefs to a number of individuals and organizations in the country. No provision of the Rules notified under Sections 43A and 79 of the IT Act, 2000 have been held ultra vires."

What the government says is a half-truth. So far, courts have not struck down any of the IT Rules. But that is because none of the High Court cases in which the vires of the Rules have been challenged has concluded. So it is disingenuous of the government to claim that the Rule have "undergone scrutiny by High Courts". And in those cases where relief has been granted under the Intermediary Guidelines, the cases have been ex-parte or have been cases where the vires of the Rules have not been challenged. The government, if it wants to defend the Rules, should point out to any case in which the vires of the Rules have been upheld. Not a single court till date has declared the Rules to be constitutional when that question was before it.

Lack of Representation of Stakeholders in Policy Formulation

Lastly, the Standing Committee noted that it is not clear whether the Cyber Regulatory Advisory Committee (CRAC), which is responsible for policy guidance on the IT Act, has "members representing the interests of principally affected or having special knowledge of the subject matter as expressly stipulated in Section 88(2) of the IT Act". This is a problem that we at CIS also noted in November 2012, when the CRAC was reconstituted after having been defunct for more than a decade.

CIS hopes that the government finally takes note of the view of legal experts, the Standing Committee on Delegated Legislation, the Parliamentary motion against the Rules, and numerous articles and editorials in the press, and withdraws the Intermediary Guidelines Rules and the Cyber Cafe Rules, and instead replaces them with rules that do not infringe our constitutional rights.

The Centre for Internet and Society is a non-profit research organization that works on policy issues relating to freedom of expression, privacy, accessibility for persons with disabilities, access to knowledge and IPR reform, and openness, and engages in academic research on digital natives and digital humanities. It was among the organizations that submitted evidence to the Standing Committee on Subordinate Legislation on the IT Rules.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-welcomes-standing-committee-report-on-it-rules

Platforming precarity: Data narratives of workers sustaining urban platform services

2024-10-15T02:42:26Z

CIS conducted quantitative surveys with over 800 workers employed in the app-based taxi and delivery sectors across 4 cities in India as part of the ‘Labour Futures’ project supported by the Internet Society Foundation. The surveys covered key employment indicators, including earnings and working hours, work-related cost burdens, income and social security, and platform policies and management. Findings from these surveys are presented as data visualisation briefs centring workers’ everyday experiences. These data briefs form a foundational evidence base for policy and action around labour rights, social protection, and urban inclusion in platform work.

It has been over a decade since app-based delivery and taxi sectors began operations in India, and have since expanded to several metropolitan and smaller cities. These sectors together account for the largest proportion of the platform workforce in India. Workers’ organising and collective action have long revealed extractive labour practices in the platform economy. Their demands call for the recognition of their labour rights by policymakers and platforms, an end to exploitative working conditions, and the introduction of effective policy that protects their rights and wellbeing.

In 2021-22, the labour research vertical at the Centre for Internet and Society conducted quantitative surveys with over 800 workers in the app-based taxi services and app-based delivery services sectors. Spanning four cities (Delhi-NCR, Mumbai, Guwahati, Lucknow), the surveys gathered comprehensive data on the conditions of work in the platform economy in these cities, within its two dominant sectors.

The survey covered key labour indicators—(i) the conditions of work for workers, including recruitment, wages, incentive structures, and work-related cost burdens (ii) workforce management, including hours spent working for the platform, surveillance and control measures, and (iii) workers’ coverage under income security, social security and social protections, including provident funds, health and accident insurance, and pensions.

Key Findings

The generation of city-level data aimed to support policymaking and advocacy towards achieving just outcomes for workers in the rapidly platformising Indian economy. These survey findings speak to i) top-down approaches of regulatory, legislative, and judicial action through evidence-building, and ii) bottom-up approaches of mobilisation and advocacy campaigns of workers’ collectives.

The city-wise data briefs highlight region-specific differences and similarities shaped by histories and newer developments of labour platforms operating in the urban economy. Across the four survey cities, the data briefs reveal the ways in which precarity materialised in platform work. Workers grappled with numerous socioeconomic vulnerabilities that influenced their entry and continued employment in platform work. They faced low-wage outcomes, worsened by a reduction in bonuses, and high operational work-related expenses. Earnings remained low and uncertain despite workers putting in immensely long hours working for platforms. Worsening these burdens was widespread income insecurity that workers faced in both app-based taxi and delivery sectors.

Mapping delivery and taxi platform services across cities

The taxi services sector in all cities was dominated by two large platforms—Uber and Ola Cabs. These platforms had established a highly concentrated labour market for taxi workers. The exception to this was the taxi platform labour market in Guwahati, where the local platform, PeIndia, employed 35% of taxi workers in the city.

The delivery services sector in all cities had a high concentration of pan-India platforms. Food delivery services were concentrated by Swiggy and Zomato across cities. E-commerce delivery services had a diversity of platforms including Amazon, Flipkart, E-kart Logistics, and Shadowfax, as well as grocery delivery services like Big Basket, Dunzo, and Jio Mart.

Economic necessity and a lack of alternative employment pushing workers into precarious platform work

The pathway to precarious platform work was distress-driven, borne out of low wages in previous salaried work, or a lack of alternative employment. A large proportion of workers were previously engaged in salaried employment, who then shifted to platform work, marking increased informality and precarity in their employment status. In Mumbai, over 64% of workers were in salaried employment previously, and this also the case for over 50% of workers in Guwahati, and over 42% of workers in Delhi-NCR. In Lucknow and Delhi-NCR, pandemic-driven unemployment was a key driver for a staggering proportion of workers who joined platform work as a distress employment source. Over 30% of workers in Lucknow and Delhi-NCR were previously unemployed.

These socioeconomic vulnerabilities influenced workers entry and continued employment in platform work. Key factors for workers entering were the lack of alternative employment sources and the hope for better pay and potential job flexibility. The lack of alternative jobs was a major push into platform work for workers in Delhi-NCR and Lucknow—over 60% of workers in Delhi-NCR and over 50% of workers in Lucknow. At least 40% of workers across cities mentioned the expectation of better pay as a major reason to start platform work, while potential job flexibility was also a key reason for workers in Mumbai and Guwahati. However, as the findings below show, workers’ expectations were unmet.

Externalised joining, statutory, and operational costs

High joining, statutory, and operational costs were offloaded onto workers to access and continue platform work. This was especially the case for taxi workers who owned their vehicles, and had to incur vehicle investment costs and downpayment, as well as statutory costs that included operating permits, road tax, vehicle insurance, and fitness fee. Across all cities, average monthly expenses for taxi workers were above INR 30,000. For delivery workers, average monthly expenses mostly comprised fuel costs, and were around INR 5,500 in Guwahati and Lucknow, and around INR 6,700 in Delhi-NCR and Mumbai. These high externalised costs reveal the economic vulnerabilities inherent within platform work.

Compounding these costs, platforms in the taxi services sectors also charged commissions unevenly and in varying fee structures—ranging from 20% to 30% of the fare in Mumbai and Lucknow, and going as high as 35% in Delhi-NCR and Guwahati. It is important to note that high commissions persist despite the mandate under the Motor Vehicle Aggregator Guidelines, 2020 to cap commissions and other platform charges at 20% of the fare.

Platforms’ offloading of costs to workers have resulted in workers’ having to rely on informal leasing, debt, and subcontracting arrangements. These arrangements were seen across all cities, where workers in the city were either renting the vehicle they were driving, paying a commission to a vehicle owner, paying off vehicle EMIs on someone else’s behalf, or were paid a fixed salary by a vehicle owner. Notably, in Lucknow, around 35% of taxi workers were engaged under these informal arrangements.

Insufficient incomes and economic vulnerabilities

Workers' experiences, across cities, highlight how a majority contended with low-wage outcomes. Earnings remained low and uncertain for workers despite the fact that they were putting in long work hours. Several factors contributed to this insufficiency and uncertainty in workers’ earnings: stringent platform requirements around high acceptance rates and ratings, which were important determinants, decreased flexibility, and high offloaded work-related expenses.

Across cities, earnings for delivery workers were considerably lower than those for taxi workers. When earnings were adjusted for standard weekly work hours (48 hours/week), over 50% of delivery workers in Mumbai, Guwahati, and Lucknow were earning less than the corresponding state-wise minimum wages. Further, over 75% of delivery workers in these cities were earning below estimated state-wise living wages. Platform work was also insufficient in meeting essential living needs for taxi workers in Mumbai, Guwahati, and Lucknow. Around 30% of taxi workers (23% in Guwahati) were earning less than minimum wages, and around 50% (80% in Mumbai) were earning less than estimated living wages. Earnings for both delivery and taxi workers in Delhi-NCR were substantially lower than minimum wage and living wage standards. 69% of workers in the taxi services sector and 87% of workers in the delivery services sector earned less than the minimum wage in Delhi. Moreover, 92% of workers in the taxi sector and 97% of workers in the delivery sector earned lower than the estimated living wage.

These insufficient incomes were particularly damaging to workers’ lives and livelihoods, considering their high dependence on income from platform work. An overwhelming proportion of workers (over 94% across all cities) were engaged in platform work as their main source of income, as opposed to part-time employment. They also faced significant economic burdens such as being sole earners in their household, having multiple financial dependents, having financial commitments to provide remittances back home, and so on. Worsening these burdens was widespread income insecurity that workers faced across all cities—for over 43% of workers (up to 65% in Guwahati), earnings from platform work were insufficient for covering basic household expenses.

Workplace risks and ineffective redressal mechanisms

Workers in both sectors were working immensely long hours in order to try and make adequate earnings while working for platforms, working several hours above standard weekly work hours (48 hours/week) typically prescribed by occupational health standards. Across all cities, delivery workers spent a median of over 60 weekly hours working for platforms, and taxi workers spent a median of around 84 weekly hours.

Alongside the adverse health impacts of long work hours, workers faced grievous workplace risks, including risks of physical assault, theft, poor road safety, and harsh weather conditions. Around 75% of delivery and taxi workers faced these issues in Mumbai and Lucknow. An even greater proportion of workers were exposed to these risks in Delhi-NCR (84%) and Guwahati (90%).

Despite several workplace risks, platforms remained unaccountable for their failure to guarantee safe working conditions. Across all cities, less than 10% of workers found that their platform took steps to improve working conditions. Workers’ overall experience with platform grievance redressal mechanisms was mixed. For instance, in Lucknow, only around 25% of workers who raised grievances did not receive a resolution. In contrast, 50% of taxi workers in Delhi-NCR did not receive a resolution, as was the case for 76% of taxi workers in Mumbai. Workers have limited recourse when their grievances go unanswered. Platforms, however, wield significant control over terms of work, making it difficult for workers to challenge unfair decisions.

Low coverage and accessibility of social protection mechanisms

Social security covered by platforms typically included health insurance and accident insurance. Workers faced significant gaps in insurance coverage, and these gaps were particularly glaring in the taxi services sector. Across cities, health and accident insurance coverage for taxi workers was below 10% (an exception was 11% of workers covered by accident insurance in Delhi-NCR). It is important to note that this low coverage exists despite the Motor Vehicle Aggregator Guidelines, 2020 mandating provision of health insurance and term insurance from platforms.

Delivery workers had a relatively higher percentage of insurance coverage from platforms, although coverage varied across cities. Health insurance coverage was low for delivery workers in Delhi-NCR (21%) and Guwahati (14%), but higher for workers in Lucknow (34%) and Mumbai (44%). In the case of accident insurance, insurance was covered by platforms for over 40% of delivery workers in Delhi-NCR and Lucknow, while a greater proportion of workers were covered in Mumbai (63%) and Guwahati (72%). Even though delivery workers were covered by platform-provisioned insurance, claiming benefits was an unreliable and time-consuming process. Workers who attempted to access benefits faced several obstacles, including poor awareness of available schemes, inadequate coverage, and little to no platform support in navigating complex claims procedures.

The inadequacy of platform-provisioned insurance was exacerbated by the exclusion of workers from government social protection mechanisms. In Delhi-NCR, Guwahati, and Lucknow, over 35% of workers in both sectors were left outside of social protection from governments. In Mumbai, over 66% of workers were excluded.

Contributors

Conceptualisation + planning: Aayush Rathi, Abhishek Sekharan, Ambika Tandon, Chetna V M, Chiara Furtado, and Nishkala Sekhar

Writing: Aayush Rathi, Ambika Tandon, Chetna V M, Chiara Furtado, and Nishkala Sekhar

Data analysis: Abhishek Sekharan, Chetna V M, and Nishkala Sekhar

Data visualisation: Sriharsha Devulapalli

Design + design direction: Annushka Jaliwala and Yatharth

Review: Aayush Rathi and Abhineet Nayyar

Survey design + planning: Abhishek Sekharan and Ambika Tandon

Survey implementation: Abhishek Kumar

Research advice: Nora Gobel and Uma Rani Amara

We are deeply grateful to the workers who participated in the surveys for generously sharing their time, experiences, and insights with us.

This work was supported by the Internet Society Foundation, as part of the “Labour Futures” project at the Centre for Internet and Society.

This work is shared under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License (CC BY-SA 4.0)

To know more about this work, please write to us at chiara@cis-india.org

Explore more of CIS’ research on labour and digitalisation at platformwork.in

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/platforming-precarity-data-narratives-workers