Centre for Internet and Society

Compilation of Mobile Phone Patent Litigation Cases in India

rohini — 2018-02-08T14:41:17Z

This working paper is an attempt to chronicle information about big-ticket lawsuits pertaining to mobile technology patents filed in India. All information presented in this paper has been gathered from publicly available sources. Interns Nayana Dasgupta, Sampada Nayak and Suchisubhra Sarkar (in alphabetical order) provided invaluable research assistance. This paper was first published as a blog post on the CIS website on March 15, 2015. It was periodically updated till October 31, 2017 to reflect new developments in the different lawsuits at the Delhi High Court and the cases with the Competition Commission of India.

Abstract

Nearly three years after litigation over patents and designs associated with big-ticket mobile technology started in the US, the first salvo in the patent wars was fired in India. Sweden-based Ericsson, a provider of communications infrastructure and services, sued home-grown budget smartphone manufacturer Micromax in early 2013. Patent litigation in the arena of mobile phone technology has steadily risen since. Lei Jun, the chairman of China's largest smartphone manufacturer Xiaomi has said that facing a patent lawsuit "can be considered a rite of passage for a company that is coming of age". This paper is an attempt to chronicle lawsuits pertaining to mobile technology patents filed in India. The first part of this paper, “Compilation of lawsuits” is an attempt to chronicle the significant developments in big-ticket lawsuits pertaining to mobile technology patents filed in India. The second part, “Commonalities and differences in the lawsuits” is an attempt to join the dots between the developments that were either remarkably common or notably different. All information presented in this paper has been gathered from publicly available sources and is up-to-date till the time of writing (October 31, 2017). This paper has been published as a part of the Pervasive Technologies project at the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS).

View paper on SSRN.

Access the court orders and other references in the paper.

Edit logs

Edited, April 2, 2015: To add section "6. Vringo vs. ZTE"

Edited, April 3, 2015: To add section "7. Vringo vs. Asus"

Edited, October 23, 2015: To add sections "8. Ericsson vs. iBall", "9. Ericsson vs. Competition Commission of India", "10. Ericsson vs. Lava". To update "Ericsson vs. Micromax" from “Micromax has challenged……”

Edited, April 15, 2016: To update "9. Ericsson vs Competition Commission of India... In a judgement dated March 30, 2016, the court dismissed all the writ petitions and applications pertaining to the role of the CCI before it and made these observations..."; "8. Ericsson vs iBall"; "10. Ericsson vs. Lava"; and "6. Vringo vs. ZTE".

Edited, April 29, 2016: To update "Ericsson vs. Xiaomi...On April 22, 2016, the Delhi High Court vacated the interim order passed in December 2014..."

Edited, January 13, 2017: To update "Ericsson vs. Gionee... In July 2014..."

Edited, February 8, 2018: To upload copy of working paper.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/compilation-of-mobile-phone-patent-litigation-cases-in-india

India at Leisure: Media, Culture and Consumption in the New Economy

praskrishna — 2015-03-30T15:34:30Z

Maggie Huang attended the event and presented a paper titled “The Future of Music Streaming: Business Practices and Copyright Management in India”. The paper was co-authored by Maggie and Amba Kak.

A striking feature of India's ongoing transformations is the runaway success of one sector of its economy. This is India’s leisure economy, often overlapping with the media economy, which entails a range of pursuits from sports to movies, from texting to TV---all of which forming a significant constituent of the country’s social and economic social life. While various activities within this sector were almost entirely neglected by India’s early planners, fuelled by narrow conceptions of media as an instrument of the state, today they remain little understood by national scholars and international analysts. With this background, a bi-national working group of scholars from India and New Zealand emerged in 2013 to reflect on the dynamics of India’s media economy. To build on this, an international conference is being organized, under the inaugural round of the India New Zealand Education Council programme, to broaden reflections on the dynamics of media industries and practices of media-culture constituting India’s leisure economy.

For more see the original published by Jamia Milla Islamia.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/news/india-at-leisure

Pervasive Technologies Project in Hong Kong

praskrishna — 2017-03-20T16:09:22Z

Digital Asia Hub and the United Nations University Institute on Computing and Society (UNU-CS) held a new networking initiative. Digital Asia Hub and the United Nations University Institute on Computing and Society co-hosted a series of events aimed at fostering engagement and knowledge sharing at the intersection of technology, society, law, policy and international development.

CIS shared its insights on the Pervasive Technologies project.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/news/pervasive-technologies-project-in-hong-kong

Patent Working Requirements and Complex Products: An Empirical Assessment of India's Form 27 Practice and Compliance

rohini — 2017-10-13T04:32:49Z

India requires every patentee to file an annual statement, also known as “Form 27”, describing the working of each of its issued Indian patents. If a patent is not locally worked within three years of its issuance, any person may request a compulsory license, and if the patent is not adequately worked within two years of the grant of such a compulsory license, it may be revoked. The research paper on Form 27 practices and compliance by patentees authored by Prof Jorge L. Contreras, University of Utah, and Rohini Lakshané, Centre for Internet and Society has been accepted for publication in the NYU Journal of Intellectual Property and Entertainment Law.

The research paper by Prof Jorge L. Contreras, University of Utah, and Rohini Lakshané, Centre for Internet and Society was published on SSRN on July 17, 2017. The paper has been accepted for publication in the NYU Journal of Intellectual Property and Entertainment Law.

The potency of India’s patent working requirement was demonstrated by the 2012 issuance of a compulsory license for Bayer’s patented drug Nexavar. In order to provide the public with information about patent working, India requires every patentee to file an annual statement on “Form 27” describing the working of each of its issued Indian patents.

We conducted the first comprehensive and systematic study of all Forms 27 filed with respect to a key industry sector: mobile devices. We obtained from public online records 4,916 valid Forms 27, corresponding to 3,126 mobile device patents. These represented only 20.1% of all Forms 27 that should have been filed and corresponded to only 72.5% of all mobile device patents for which Forms 27 should have been filed. Forms 27 were missing for almost all patentees, and even among Forms 27 that were obtained, almost none contained useful information regarding the working of the subject patents or fully complying with the informational requirements of the Indian Patent Rules. Patentees adopted drastically different positions regarding the definition of patent working, while several significant patentees claimed that they or their patent portfolios were simply too large to enable the reporting of required information. Many patentees simply omitted required descriptive information from their Forms without explanation.

The Indian government has made little or no effort to monitor or police compliance with Form 27 filings, undoubtedly leading to significant non-compliance. However, some of the complaints raised by patentees and industry observers may have merit. Namely, that patents covering complex, multi-component products that embody dozens of technical standards and thousands of patents are not necessarily amenable to the individual-level data requested by Form 27. We hope that this study will contribute to the ongoing conversation in India regarding the most appropriate means for collecting and disseminating information regarding the working of patents.

Download the Paper

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/patent-working-requirements-and-complex-products-an-empirical-assessment-of-indias-form-27-practice-and-compliance

National IPR Policy Series: Quick Observations on the Leaked Draft of the National IPR Policy

nehaa — 2015-11-19T05:13:14Z

Earlier this week, the “Don’t Trade Our Lives Away” blog leaked the supposed final draft of India’s National IPR Policy (“leaked draft”). This article presents quick comments on this leaked draft.

The leaked draft (which is not final) is available here. The only official document that the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (“DIPP”) has released so far is the First Draft of the National IPR Policy (“First Draft”).

CIS has tracked these developments since the beginning. We have submitted preliminary comments, critical comments to the First Draft, sent multiple requests under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (“RTI requests”) to the DIPP and published their responses, discussed the IPR Think Tank as a public authority under the RTI Act, analysed the process compared to recommendations by the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”), compared the First Draft to an earlier National IPR Strategy[N1] , written a letter to the Think Tank and have now begun to track the work being done by the Sectoral Innovation Council on IPR, also established under the DIPP. At the time of writing this post, we have been unable to locate comments to the First Draft made available by the DIPP.

Since the release of the First Draft in December, 2014, this leaked document has been the first look at an updated IPR Policy for India. Not much seems to have changed since December, 2014 and this new leaked draft (which is dated April, 2015), barring the inclusion of some Special Focus Areas.

Perhaps one of the strongest criticisms of the First Draft had been that it supposed a nexus between IP and innovation, and various stakeholders had been quick to point this out as problematic, and fallacious. Unfortunately, since the language of the new draft has barely changed (I have managed to count only two-three additions), this remains the underlying issue in the new draft as well.

What continues to be worrying in both drafts is sweeping references of benefits of IP to India’s socio-economic development. What constitutes this development and how IPR, and specifically the IPR Policy will achieve it is anyone’s guess, given that there are no references to studies undertaken to assess how IPR contributes to socio-economic development, specifically in India.

Here are some other quick comments:

In the first objective on IP Awareness and Promotion, the new draft includes an additional recommended step – that of engaging with the media to ‘sensitize them on IP issues’ (sic.). Given that this is under a broader objective of encouraging IP promotion, I am inclined to believe that this could be interpreted as telling the media to print positive things about intellectual property and refrain from criticizing intellectual property (that seems to be the theme of this entire document!). What does it mean to ‘sensitize’ the media about intellectual property?
In the second objective, on IP creation, the leaked draft contains a recommendation to conduct a study to assess the contribution of various IP based industries to the economy – including employment, exports and technology transfer. No other details have been provided in the draft.
Also in the second objective, the new draft makes a mention of improving the IP output of universities, national laboratories etc. The new draft proposes to encourage and facilitate the acquisition of intellectual property rights by these labs and institutions, whereas the earlier draft recommended the protection of IPRs created by them.
In the covering letter to the leaked draft, Justice Sridevan states that the final draft includes a discussion on key focus areas – creative industries, biotechnology, ICT, energy, agriculture, health, geographical indications (“GIs”) and traditional knowledge (“TK”). These have been discussed at the end of the new draft.
Limitations and exceptions remain confined to an area of future study/research for future policy development. The ‘Creative Industries’ section of the leaked draft makes a mention of the significance of limitations and exceptions to safeguard access to knowledge and information; and the need to balance user rights and property rights. One would have liked to see this discussed more substantively in the policy and not confined only to a paragraph in the section on ‘Creative Industries’.
In a welcome move, the policy draft (new) seeks to promote the adoption of free and open standards and free and open software in the ‘Information and Communication Technology and Electronics’ section.

With the DIPP Secretary’s latest update that the new policy draft will be released in about a month’s time, one will have to wait and see what the final draft looks like.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/national-ipr-policy-series-quick-observations-on-the-leaked-draft-of-the-national-ipr-policy

CCI allowed to probe Ericsson: FAQs on Ericsson’s disputes with Micromax and Intex

nehaa — 2016-05-01T13:46:52Z

The blog post is an analysis of the recent decision of the Delhi High Court, clarifying that the Competition Commission of India could investigate Ericsson for a violation of competition law. A shorter version of this blog post was published in the Quint on April 30, 2016.

Read the original article published by Quint on April 30 here.

The mobile phone is the sole access point to the internet for about half of India’s population. It has an important role to play in India’s development story, one that is amplified given the central government’s focus on leveraging the internet for better governance. The government has recognized this importance, evidenced through electronics manufacturing incentives and, a stated commitment to ensure ‘universal access to mobile connectivity’. Homegrown brands, including Micromax and Intex, with their affordable, low-cost mobile phones, play an important role in this development story.

In March, 2013, the Swedish multinational, Ericsson, sued Micromax for patent infringement, setting in motion a series of events, with the potential to disturb India’s mobile phone dream. Then, last month, the Delhi High Court (the Court) recognized the authority of the market regulator - the Competition Commission of India (CCI) - to probe Ericsson for its allegedly anticompetitive conduct.

Why did Ericsson sue Micromax?

Ericsson claims that Micromax’s mobile phones infringe its standard essential patents (SEPs) on mobile phone technologies, including 3G and EDGE.

How are some patents identified as SEPs?

International Standard Setting Organizations (SSOs) – such as ETSI or IEEE - recognize international standards. 3G and Wi-Fi are examples of such internationally recognized standards.

According to the SSOs, the determination of standards depends on consensus, driven by their members. After a standard is determined, SEP owners (including Ericsson) voluntarily disclose which of their patents are essential to the determined standard, and, undertake to license these on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms, to any willing licensee.

Does this give rise to legal issues?

This process results in a variety of (well-documented) legal questions, many of which have been raised in India’s SEP litigation, and have been alluded to by the Court in the present judgment. The Court has recognized the potential for SEPs to create dominant positions for their owners, noting that “any technology accepted as a standard would have to be mandatorily followed [emphasis, mine] by all enterprises in the particular industry.”

Some other legal issues around SEPs include the enforceability of FRAND commitments; determining what would constitute ‘fair’, ‘reasonable’ and, ‘non-discriminatory’; the possibility of non/incomplete disclosure by patent owners; and, a refusal by licensees to negotiate FRAND terms in good faith. A related issue that has received comparatively less attention is the essentiality of peripheral or, non standard but essential patents, where there is no obligation to license on FRAND terms.

Have there been other SEP infringement suits filed in India?

Yes. Besides Micromax, Ericsson has also sued other low-cost mobile phone sellers/manufacturers, homegrown and otherwise, for patent infringement. These include Intex, Lava, Gionee, Xia and iBall. In addition, Vringo has also sued ZTE and Asus, separately. [In this article, we will limit ourselves to a discussion on Ericsson’s suits against Micromax and Intex.]

What did Micromax and Intex do after being sued by Ericsson?

Ericsson’s suits were followed by deliberations between the parties (Ericsson and Micromax, and, Ericsson and Intex, independently) and some interim orders by the Court. This litigation is ongoing, and final orders are awaited.

Meanwhile, both Micromax and Intex have pursued a series of other remedies. Intex has filed applications for the revocation of Ericsson’s patents. In addition, Micromax and Intex have each filed separate complaints under India’s Competition Act, 2002 before the CCI, alleging that Ericsson had abused its dominant position. This is a punishable offence under Indian competition law.

Micromax and Intex have both claimed that Ericsson’s royalty rates were excessive. In addition, Micromax has objected to Ericsson’s use of the threat of injunctions and custom seizures, and, has also claimed that Ericsson’s conduct results in a denial of market access for Indian handset manufacturers. Intex has alleged, inter alia, that it was forced into signing an onerous non disclosure agreement by Ericsson; and, that it was forced to negotiate licences without a complete disclosure of its patents by Ericsson.

The CCI, finding there to be a prima facie case in each of the above complaints, ordered the Director General to undertake an investigation into the allegations made by both – Micromax and Intex. These orders were challenged by Ericsson in the Court.

On what grounds did Ericsson challenge the CCI’s orders?

Briefly, Ericsson argued-

(a) that the issue was one of patent law, which barred the applicability of competition law;

(b) that it was not an ‘enterprise’ under the Competition Act, 2002, and, that the CCI was empowered to check anticompetitive conduct only of ‘enterprises’;

(d) that since the disputes between the parties were already being heard in other proceedings before the Court, the CCI could not adjudicate them; and,

(e) that Intex and Micromax were barred from making such allegations. Ericsson opined that since they had challenged its ownership of the SEPs, through revocation of petition applications (filed by Intex), and a denial of infringement claims (by Micromax), they could not now present a complaint premised on it being the owner of those same SEPs.

What did the Court hold?

Rejecting Ericsson’s arguments, the Court held that the CCI did [emphasis, mine] have the jurisdiction to examine if Ericsson’s conduct was anticompetitive, finding it to be an ‘enterprise’ under the Competition Act, 2002. However, the Court was clear that the CCI’s actions could be subject to judicial review by the High Court. It also found that the mere applicability of the Patents Act, 1970, did not bar the applicability of competition law, since the legislations covered distinct fields and served different purposes. Further, it opined that Micromax and Intex were free to explore alternative remedies; neither this pursuit, nor, the pendency of disputes on similar issues before the Court, was a bar to the CCI’s jurisdiction.

Interestingly, while not adjudicating the issue of Ericsson’s abuse of dominance in this particular case, Justice Bakhru, citing its conduct as presented by the other parties said that in some cases, “such conduct, if it is found, was directed in pressuring an implementer to accept non-FRAND terms, would amount to an abuse of dominance.”

What does the judgment mean for India’s homegrown brands?

The judgment is a boost for India’s home grown manufacturers in their battle against global patent holders. However, while it certainly validates the role and powers of India’s young market regulator, it will no doubt be appealed. One also expects multiple appeals over the CCI’s findings in the present and, future similar cases.

It is impossible to predict the outcome of legal proceedings in SEP litigation. Accordingly, Micromax, Intex (and others) would do well to augment their own patent portfolios (either by filing their own patents, or, by acquiring those of other companies). This may create a more level playing field, opening up alternate channels of negotiation, including, cross-licensing. They may also seek access to Ericsson’s SEPs under the compulsory licensing mechanism in India’s patent law.

What does the government have to say?

The Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion has recently released a discussion paper on these issues, inviting comments from stakeholders. It would be unsurprising if the government intends to regulate this space, given the strong implications for not just its flagship Make in India and Digital India programs, but also its foreign policy narrative on protecting IPRs and fostering innovation. Immediate welcome steps from the government would be a final word on the National IPR Policy, and, the adoption of the National Competition Policy, awaited since 2014 and 2011, respectively.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/the-quint-nehaa-chaudhari-april-30-2016-cci-allowed-to-probe-ericsson

MHRD IPR Chair Series: Information Received from IIT Roorkee

Karan Tripathi and Nehaa Chaudhari — 2015-11-21T07:26:45Z

This post provides a factual description about the operation of Ministry of Human Resource Development IPR Chair’s Intellectual Property Education, Research and Public Outreach (IPERPO) scheme in IIT Roorkee.

Nehaa Chaudhari provided inputs, analysed, reviewed and edited this blog post.

The author has analysed all the data received under various heads such as income, grants from MHRD, planned and non planned expenditure, nature and frequency of programmes organised and the allocation of funds for the same. Throughout the course of observation and presentation of the analysed data, the author seeks to trace the presence of unjustified underutilisation of funds by the aforementioned university as provided by the MHRD during the period of 2003-2014.

To collect the information for the given study, an RTI application was filed to the Indian Institute of Technology, Roorkee on 6/02/2015 by the Centre for Internet and Society. The reply to RTI application was received on 16/02/2015.

These are the documents received by CIS from IIT Roorkee:

For RTI Response click here (IIT Roorkee -Receipt of RTI- 20.4.15)
For complete supporting documents click here (IIT Roorkee – Response and Report)

Hereinafter, in order to receive any information about IIT Roorkee’s RTI reply, kindly refer to the above mentioned links.

Following are the queries mentioned in the RTI application along with their replies.

Reports on the implementation of the IPERPO scheme of the Ministry of Human Resource Development and the implementation of the MHRD IPR Chair funded under the scheme at IIT Roorkee from 2003-20014
Reply: The University documented the minutes of the Departmental Faculty Committee Meeting where proposals for forming Departmental Administrative Committee, syllabus for new institute electives, duties of Departmental Research Committee, forming Institute Time Table Committee, conversion of existing LR1 computer lab and teaching scheme of autumn semester 2013 were deliberated upon. The University also organised various events such as Training of Trainers programme and International Conclave on Innovation and Entrepreneurship.
Documents indicating the date on which such an IPR Chair was set up at your institution and a copy of the application made by IIT Roorkee to the MHRD for instituting such an IPR Chair and documents received by IIT Roorkee from the MHRD approving the same
Reply: According to the Office Memorandum (dated 04 May 2012) of IIT Roorkee, Dr P.K. Ghosh had been appointed on the position of Professional Chair on IPERPO with effect from April 27 2012. A suitable financial grant of Rs. 208.02 lakhs was demanded for a period of five years.
Documents detailing the release of grants to the MHRD IPR Chairs under the IPERPO Scheme
Reply: As it appears from the reply filed by IIT Roorkee to the RTI filed by the CIS, Rs. 30,00,000.00 of the Grant in aid was sanctioned to the University by the MHRD during the financial year 2010-2011 and nil amount was utilized for the purpose of it. At the end of the year, the balance sum of Rs. 30,27,041 (including the interest) was surrendered to the Government.
Documents relating to receipts of utilisation certificates and audited expenditure statements and matters related to all financial sanctions with regard to funds granted to the MHRD IPR Chair established under the IPERPO scheme at IIT Roorkee
Reply: IIT Roorkee has replied with a series of Statement of Expenditure ranging from 2010-2014 that explains its rate of expenditure and amount of interest accumulated and surrendered to the Government along with the unutilized amount. In the financial year 2011-2012 the unutilized expenditure was 3,105,159.00 which came down to 11,74, 026.00 in 2012-2013 due to which a grant of Rs. 24,00,000.00 was extended to the University by MHRD for the financial year 2013-2014.
Documents regarding all matters pertaining to finance and budget related the MHRD IPR Chair under the IPERPOs scheme established at IIT Roorkee
Reply: CIS did not receive any sort of clarity on matters pertaining to finance and budget related to MHRD IPR Chair under the IPERPO scheme as the response for this question was coupled with the previous question on utilization certificates.
Details of the IPR Chair’s salary under the IPERPO Scheme indicating whether this amount is paid over and above the professional’s usual salary
Reply: According to the RTI reply, the position of Chair Professor is awarded for a period of three years or upto 68 years of age, whichever is earlier. The pay of Chair Professor is fixed as per the rules and guidelines of Professional Chair in the institute.

2.0 Comparative Analysis between University Response and the guidelines of MHRD Scheme Document

The Scheme Document of MHRD is a comprehensive document which consists of guidelines regarding Intellectual Property Education, Research and Public Outreach. It talks about a list of objectives, purposes, conditions and eligibility criteria for a University to ensure in order to implement IPERPO in a truest sense. This document provides the procedural as well as qualifying conditions for an Institute to ensure or fulfil before applying for the MHRD grant. Some of these conditions include maintenance of utilization certificates, audit reports, expenditure statements and event information which would be open to access on demand by MDHR or Comptroller and Auditor General of India.

A. Objectives:

As it appears from the reply statement of IIT Roorkee, each and every event organised after the establishment of IPR Chair in 2012, where the funds from the grant have been utilized, is done to promote the scholarly as well as academic interests in the field of Intellectual Property. Even before applying for the MHRD grant, the University has organised many National Seminars and has started various short term courses in order to encourage research and excellence in Intellectual Property. This fact completely resonates with the core objective of MHRD scheme document, i.e. strengthening the academic and research discourses in the field of Intellectual Property.

B. Eligibility:
IIT Roorkee is recognized by the University Grants Commission. Therefore, it fulfils the eligibility criteria mentioned in the scheme document.

C. Conditions for Grant of Assistance
There are several conditions laid down in the scheme document which need to be fulfilled by the concerned University in order to successfully receive the grant. The underlying condition is the dissemination and development in the field of Intellectual Property Rights.

According to the documents available with CIS, IIT Roorkee has organised at least 27 events in the field of IPR ranging from introduction of new electives, National Workshops and Symposiums, Expert Lectures, Infrastructure Development, Online portals for IP Administration and awareness and infrastructure development.

3.0 Financial Analysis of IIT Roorkee’s IPR Grant

According to the RTI reply, the IPR Chair at IIT Roorkee was established in the forenoon of 27th April 2012 with Dr P.K. Ghosh as its Chairman. Dr Ghosh was promised an Honorarium payment of Rs. 30,000 per month and a Contingency payment of Rs. 20,000 per month.

3.1 Financial Year 2010-2011

In this financial year, the IPR Chair was not established at IIT Roorkee. The total grant received by the University was Rs. 30, 00,000.00 out of which Rs.0 was utilized for the purpose of it was sanctioned.

At the end of the financial year, the remaining amount of Rs. 30,00,000, (due to Nil utilisation) along with the interest of Rs. 27041 was either surrendered to the government or adjusted towards the grants-in-aid payable during the next financial year.

3.2 Financial Year 2011-2012

The IPR Chair was still not established at the University. The opening balance was the amount carried forward from the previous year (30,27,041) upon which interest of Rs. 1,17,117 was received making the total receipt to be 31,144,158. Out of this, a total of Rs. 38,999 was utilised for travelling and miscellaneous expenditure. At the end of the year, the remaining of amount of Rs. 3,105,159 was either surrendered to the government or adjusted towards the grant-in-aid payable during the next financial year 2012-2013. As per the documents available with CIS, the statement of expenditure for this financial year has not been submitted by the university.

3.3 Financial Year 2012-2013

In this financial year the IPR Chair was established with Dr. P.K. Ghosh as its Chairman. The Opening balance was the amount carried forward from the previous financial year (31,05,159) upon which an interest income of Rs.1,25,376 was received along with a refund of advance amounting to Rs. 42,968. Out of the total receipt of Rs. 32,73,503 the total expenditure of the University on the current financial year was Rs. 20,99,477. The remaining amount of Rs. 11,74,026 was either surrendered to the government or adjusted towards the grants-in-aid payable during the next financial year 2013-2014.

3.4 Financial Year 2013-2014

In this financial year, the University received a grant of Rs. 24,00,000 from the government along with the amount carried forward from the previous financial year (Rs.11,74,026) upon which an interest income of Rs. 55,892 was received. Out of this, a sum of Rs. 24,01,045 was utilised as contingency expenditure. The remaining amount of Rs. 12,28,873 has been either surrendered to the government or adjusted towards the grants-in-aid payable during the next financial year 2014-2015.

In this financial year, the expenditure on library (5,00,979) is the only sum which exceeded the sanctioned amount (5,00,000). Moreover, there has been no expenditure on Outreach Program and Clinics. The honorarium payment to the IPR Chair Professor is similar to the sanctioned amount (3,60,000) but there’s a difference in his contingent payment (1,39,645 instead of 2,40,000). The total amount of expenditure in this financial year is Rs. 24,01,045.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/mhrd-ipr-chair-series-information-received-from-iit-roorkee

A Study of J. Sai Deepak's Comments on Competition Law in India

Aarushi Bansal — 2015-11-21T06:18:42Z

In his blog, 'The Demanding Mistress', J. Sai Deepak has commented on the competition law in India, using provisions of different acts, case judgments and amendments to these acts. He has also included a comment on India’s patent law. This review studies his comments to the Competition Act, 2002 (“Competition Act”) and the Patents Act, 1970 (“Patents Act”).

Read J. Sai Deepak - The Demanding Mistress[1]. Nehaa Chaudhari provided inputs and edited this blog post.

The Nexus Between the Competition Act and the Patents Act

Sai Deepak explains the nexus between the Competition Act and the Patents Act[2] using two positions. Firstly, by using two situations to explain which of these two acts will apply under different circumstances. Secondly, by explaining the overlap that is apparent in cases of abuse of power.

Under the first issue, the two situations are thus. In a case where a patentee's patent over a technology allows him to acquire a position of dominance, Competition Act will be applied if he abuses this dominance. In case a patentee imposes a high license fee on his product, many players cannot afford it and get ejected from the market. Here, both the acts would apply, thereby indicating an overlap.

Under the second issue, it is stated that abuse of power could also happen if a patentee sets an "unfair price". Therefore, Sai Deepak argues that for ensuring fair or affordable price, there should be harmony between Competition Act and Patents Act. He has derived harmonized interpretations of "unfair price" under the Competition Act and "reasonably affordable price" under the Patents Act. He explains that the price under each law is measured according to the price for the licensee and not the price demanded or the value of the licensed technology. He further, argues that such a harmonization is possible since "price" under these two acts is essentially used in the same context. It is necessary to harmonize the two acts since the overriding effect of Section 60 of the Competition Act can be effective only when an inconsistency is proved with the other provisions or laws.

Patents and Competition "Arrangements"

An arrangement[3] or collusion may exist between two market players if their activities can be foreseeably linked, even if there is no express act or formal arrangement between these parties. This has been explained through an example.

A sells a patented drug in the market. B sells another patented drug which is similar to the drug sold by A. A also has some share in B's company. When C introduces a similar drug at a much cheaper price, B is forced to reduce his the price of his drug. A follows suit.

It may be noted that since there were similarities between the drugs being sold by A and B, and, therefore the patent, it may have been possible for B to challenge A’s patent on prior art and eject A from the market, thereby reducing competition.

Since he did not challenge A's patent which was closest to that of B in terms of prior art, there may be an arrangement between A and B. This shows that A and B decided to divide the market and not encroach upon each other's trading space. In addition to this, the fact that A was a shareholder in B's company, points in the direction of a collusive activity.

Legality of Pay-for-Delay Settlement Payments

This post, as written by Amshula Prakash, refers to J. Sai Deepak's comments on the topic. She has described a Pay-For-Delay settlement [4] as a patent settlement wherein the patentee pharmaceutical company pays the generic manufacturer to remain ejected from the market for a certain period of time.

She justifies these agreements by relying on the case of Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis [5],which upheld that such agreements are lawful as long as their anti-competitive activities are covered under the exclusive patent granted to them. She opines that entering late into the market is better than not entering at all, and such a deal would anyway not go beyond the life of the patent. She concludes by reiterating J. Sai Deepak's statement that the exact impact of the agreement cannot be ascertained, as no such cases of Pay-For-Delay agreements have arisen in the Indian market yet.

Collective Bargaining

J Sai Deepak has addressed two issues under this post. Firstly, the relation between collective bargaining and cartel-like conduct. Secondly, whether any defense under S.3(3) [6] of the Competition Act is available against cartel-like conduct.

In first issue, [7] J. Sai Deepak suggests that collective bargaining is a joint venture as it increases efficiency of entities in providing services. Similarly, an agreement to reduce such efficiency is also a joint venture, since it may ensure competitiveness in the market and control over prices. He specifies grounds to determine the purpose of a collective act which helps ascertain whether it will be covered under "collective bargaining". These include the nature of business, parity between parties, past negotiations etc. He has relied on foreign sources to justify cartel-like behavior of smaller entities, like Australia's Dawson Committee and Taiwan's efforts to integrate smaller enterprises into the mainstream market to increase efficiency and competitiveness. Hence he suggests that an amendment should be made in law to permit small businesses to make an exception to cartel-like conduct and collective bargaining.

Under the second issue, [9] he opines that a strict assumption of the presence of any anticompetitive nature or agreement is counter productive to the intention of the law. The available defenses under S.3(3) for parties accused of cartel-like conduct can be justified using the proviso[10] under this section. He explains that collective bargaining may be seen as a "joint venture" under the proviso of S.3 if it is not anti-competitive. He has further supported this argument by relying on FICCI - Multiplex Association of India v. United Producers/ Distributors Forum, [11] where "collective bargaining" was accepted as a valid defense to cartel-like behavior.

Power of Competition Commission with Respect to Abuse of Powers

J. Sai Deepak has explained the powers of the Competition Commission of India (CCI),[12] firstly, with respect to abuse of powers and secondly, in terms of imposing liability.

With Respect to Abuse of Powers

With respect to abuse of powers, he refers to Section 4 of the Competition Act. It refers to a situation wherein a dominant player in the market sets a discriminatory (including predatory price) or unfair price in the sale of his good. Predatory pricing is explained in this section and not discriminatory or unfair price. J. Sai Deepak argues that since they are capable of having different meanings, there might be different forms of abuse which a dominant entity can exercise.

He relies on a test laid down in a case on unfair price, namely United Brands Company v. Commission of the European Communities.[13] A question arising under this test was whether the regulator is expected to fix prices if they are found to be unfair. To show that the CCI has the power to fix prices, S.27 and 28 of the Act have been compared. Section 27(d) empowers the CCI to direct that agreements which are in contravention of Section. Furthermore, Section 27 (g) allows the CCI to pass orders 'it may deem fit'. Section 28(2)(a) empowers the CCI to vest property rights, which creates licenses for third parties. The CCI can set future commercial terms in agreements remove complexities of the market in the interest of equity and justice. This shows the abundant powers the Competition Commission of India has to set prices.

In Terms of Imposing Liability

To answer whether these decisions of the CCI are in rem [14], he explains that the CCI can regulate market transactions and the finding of an abusive practice would be applied to other enterprises with similar practices. This shows that CCI lays down rules prescribing acceptable practices in the market.

Review of the Competition Amendment Bill, 2012

This post discusses the proposed amendments in the Bill [15] regarding three issues. Firstly, in regards to joint dominance, i.e. position of dominance enjoyed by one or more enterprises, J. Sai Deepak argues that the Bill recognizes an oligopolistic market's collusive activities, thereby providing a legal method of identifying it. He argues that it is not yet time to introduce it into the Indian industrial arena, since S.3 which regards anti-competitive agreements, is too rigorous to harmonize the concept of joint dominance with it.

Secondly, another proposed change is to render the decision taken under S.21[16] appeal-able under S.53A of the Act. He criticizes this by saying that an appeal on S.21 while adjudicating on S.53A may lead to a multiplicity of legislations and jurisdiction issues.

Lastly, the amendment of S.5A, empowers the government to specify the values of any assets or turnovers based on the class of enterprises. The government may consult the CCI, but the consultation is not binding or of mandatory assent, which shows that the CCI might turn into a tool which furthers the powers of the executive.

Conclusion

On reading J. Sai Deepak's comments on the competition law in India, I have concluded that several provisions under legislations regulating competition in Indian markets might still not be comprehensive. This may be because many scenarios for which these provisions have been made have not yet arisen in India. Hence a few outcomes of these legislations remain to be mere speculations and as several developments in the market are still underway, laws like the Competition Act should adopt to these if and when they arise.

[1]. http://thedemandingmistress.blogspot.in/

[2]. http://thedemandingmistress.blogspot.in/2013/09/the-overlap-between-patents-and.html#links

[3]. http://thedemandingmistress.blogspot.in/2011/10/patents-and-competition-need-for.html#links

[4]. http://thedemandingmistress.blogspot.in/2013/06/legality-of-pay-for-delay-settlement.html#links

[5]. 570 U. S. ____ (2013)

[6]. Defines the type of agreements which would qualify as anti-competitive

[7]. http://thedemandingmistress.blogspot.in/2012/01/collective-bargaining-and-cartel-like.html#links

[8]. Committee of Inquiry for the Review of the Trade Practices Act of the Australian Parliament

[9]. http://thedemandingmistress.blogspot.in/2012/01/competition-act-is-collective.html#links

[10]. Refers to “any agreement entered into by way of joint ventures”.

[11]. Case No. 01 Of 2009

[12]. http://thedemandingmistress.blogspot.in/2015_01_01_archive.html

[13]. C-27/76 [1978]

[14]. http://thedemandingmistress.blogspot.in/2014/07/are-decisions-of-competition-commission.html#links

[15]. http://thedemandingmistress.blogspot.in/2015/03/a-review-of-competition-amendment-bill.html#links

[16]. Reference by Commission to statutory authority in case of contravention with the Act

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/a-study-of-j-sai-deepaks-comments-on-competition-law-in-india

Comments on Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion Discussion Paper on Standard Essential Patents and their Availability on Frand Terms

Anubha Sinha, Nehaa Chaudhari and Rohini Lakshane — 2016-05-03T02:30:15Z

The Centre for Internet & Society gave its comments to the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion. The comments were prepared by Anubha Sinha, Nehaa Chaudhari and Rohini Lakshané.

Download the PDF To access other submissions to the DIPP Discussion Paper on SEP and FRAND, please click here

Authors

I. PRELIMINARY

1. This submission presents comments by the Centre for Internet and Society, India ("CIS") on the Discussion Paper on Standard Essential Patents and their Availability on FRAND Terms (dated 01 March, 2016), released by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion ("the DIPP"), Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India (" the discussion paper/ discussion paper").

2. CIS commends the DIPP for its efforts at seeking inputs from various stakeholders on this important and timely issue. CIS is thankful for the opportunity to put forth its views.

3. This submission is divided into three main parts. The first part, 'Preliminary', introduces the document; the second part, 'About CIS', is an overview of the organization; and, the third part, 'Submissions on the Issues', answers the questions raised in the discussion paper. A list of annexures and their URLs is included at the end of the document.

II. ABOUT CIS

4. CIS is a non-profit organisation that undertakes interdisciplinary research on internet and digital technologies from policy and academic perspectives. The areas of focus include digital accessibility for persons with diverse abilities, access to knowledge, intellectual property rights, openness (including open data, free and open source software, open standards, open access, open educational resources, and open video), internet governance, telecommunication reform, freedom of speech and expression, intermediary liability, digital privacy, and cyber-security.

5. CIS values the fundamental principles of justice, equality, freedom and economic development. This submission is consistent with CIS' commitment to these values, the safeguarding of general public interest and the protection of India's national interest at the international level. Accordingly, the comments in this submission aim to further these principles. In addition, the comments are in line with the aims of the Make in India and Digital India initiatives of the Government of India.

III. SUBMISSION ON THE ISSUES FOR RESOLUTION

6. The following sections provide CIS' views and recommendations on the issues enumerated in section 11 of the discussion paper:

a) Whether the existing provisions in the various IPR-related legislations, especially the Patents Act, 1970 and antitrust legislations, are adequate to address the issues related to SEPs and their availability on FRAND terms? If not, then can these issues be addressed through appropriate amendments to such IPR-related legislations? If so, what changes should be affected?

A.1. The issues related to Standard Essential Patents ("SEPs") and their licensing on a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory ("FRAND") basis lie at the intersection of intellectual property ("IP") law and competition law . As such, in India, the Patents Act, 1970 ("the Patents Act") and, the Competition Act, 2002 ("the Competition Act") are the relevant legislations to be studied. These have been recently discussed, most recently, by Justice Bakhru in his comprehensive order inTelefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (Publ) v. Competition Commission of India and Another.

A.2. It is our submission that at the moment, amendments to the Patents Act and the Competition Act may not be preferred. As Justice Bakhru has noted in the aforesaid decision, there is no conflict between the remedies in the Patents Act and in the Competition Act, and, the pursuit of rights and remedies under one of these legislations does not bar a party from pursuing rights and remedies in the other. Further, under both legislations, there are scenarios for the respective authorities - the Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks ("the Controller") and the Competition Commission of India (" the CCI") for the Patents Act and for the Competition Act respectively - to seek inputs from each other.

A.3. We also note that the CCI is a fairly nascent regulator; one whose jurisdiction is not yet a settled matter of law. While the judgment in the Ericsson-CCI case is indeed a good beginning, we do not believe that the matter has been conclusively decided. Accordingly, given the complex legal questions involved, over not just the interpretation of the Patents Act and the Competition Act, but also constitutional issues around the jurisdiction of regulators and the power of judicial review of the courts, we believe that it would be prudent to examine the ruling of the courts on these issues in some detail, before considering amendments.

A.4. In addition, we are of the opinion that our IP law, and, our competition law, fully honor our international commitments, including the requirements under the TRIPS Agreement. As such, we would urge the Government of India to not enter into free trade agreements including, inter alia, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, that threaten our use of TRIPS flexibilities, and, impose 'TRIPS-plus' obligations.

A.5. We also urge the Government of India to adopt a balanced National IPR Policy, and, a National Competition Policy, both of which has been in abeyance for a considerable amount of time. We believe that these policies are crucial to realize the objectives of the Make in India and Digital India initiatives. At the same time, we submit that these policies be balanced, taking into account the interests of all stakeholders, developed through an extensive consultative process, and, suitably modified based on feedback.

b) What should be the IPR policy of Indian Standard Setting Organizations in developing Standards for Telecommunication sector and other sectors in India where Standard Essential Patents are used?

B.1. The discussion paper identifies four Standard Setting Organizations ("SSOs") in India, namely, the Telecom Standards Development Society of India ("TSDSI"), the Telecommunication Engineering Center ("TEC"), the Bureau of Indian Standards (" BIS"), the Global ICT Standardization Forum for India ("GISFI"), and, the Development Organization of Standards for Telecommunications in India ("DOSTI"). Comments on each of their policies have been made in the following paragraphs.

B.2. The BIS does not have an intellectual property rights ("IPR") policy of its own. The BIS Act, 2016 does not include one either. As the discussion paper notes, the BIS refers to the IPR policies of the relevant international SSO in the context of technology implemented in India, that is the same or equivalent to the ones developed or maintained by the respective SSOs.We recommend that BIS adopt an IPR policy at the earliest, factoring in India specific requirements differences: a large and exponentially growing mobile device market makes it possible for manufacturers, patent owners and implementers alike to achieve financial gains even with a low margin ("India specific requirements"). In addition, our comments on the IPR policy of the TSDSI in paragraph B.4. of this submission (below), may also be considered for the content of the BIS' future policy on IPR.

B.3 . According to the discussion paper, the TEC considers the IPR policies of the International Telecommunication Union. We recommend that like the BIS, the TEC also adopt its own IPR policy, factoring in the India specific requirements detailed above. In addition, our comments on the IPR policy of the TSDSI in paragraph B.4. of this submission (below), may also be considered for the content of the BIS' future policy on IPR.

B.4. The TSDSI, a relatively new standards body, has defined an IPR policy . In respect of this policy, the following observations are presented. First, this policy notes that IPR owners should be adequately and fairly rewarded.Second, it requires members to disclose essential IPRs in a "timely fashion." Third, as per its policy, the TSDSI can request the owner of an essential IPR to undertake, within three months, to license it irrevocably on FRAND terms. At the same time, the policy also states that the (aforesaid) ask may be subject to the condition that licensees agree to reciprocate. Should such an undertaking not be forthcoming, the TSDSI may suspend work on the standard or technical specification in question, or, adopt another course of action. Fourth, the policy identifies two scenarios for the non availability of licences prior to publication, based on the existence, or, the lack thereof, of alternative technologies. In the event of a lack of alternative technology, the policy requires a member to disclose in writing its reasons for not licensing its patents. Following this, it is submitted that there is no clarity on the concrete steps that the TSDSI would adopt in case the efforts to convince a member to license their essential IPRs, fail. The policy only states that "the TSDSI shall take further action as deemed fit." The same is also true where the IPR owner is not a member of the TSDSI. Fifth, the policy also envisages a scenario of non-availability post publication. The procedure for dealing with this is akin to the one detailed above, with the TSDSI asking for a written explanation, considering further action, including the possible withdrawal of the standard or technical specification in question. Sixth, it is observed that the policy does not require a commitment from its members to refrain from seeking injunctive relief. Seventh, it is accordingly recommended that the policy be suitably modified (a) to include India specific requirements discussed above; (b) to require a commitment from its members, that they refrain from seeking injunctive relief; (c) to delete the condition where FRAND negotiations may be subject to a condition of reciprocity; (d) to identify in detail the procedure to be followed in case of patent 'hold-ups' and patent 'hold-outs'; (e) to identify in detail the procedure to be followed in case of refusal to license by TSDSI members, and, non-members, both; and, (f) to include a detailed process on the declassification of a standard or technical specification.

B.5. The IPR policy of GISFI, is substantially similar to the IPR policy of the TSDSI, discussed in paragraph B.4. of this submission (above). Inter alia, GISFI's IPR policy also does not indicate the specific steps to be taken in case an IPR owner refuses to license essential IPRs for which no alternative technology is available. This is true in the cases both, where the refusal is by a member, and, by a non-member. Our recommendations on the IPR policy of the TSDSI in paragraph B.4. of this submission (above), may also be considered for the GISFI's IPR policy.

B.6. According to the discussion paper, the IPR policy of the DOSTI resembles that of the GIFSI. It is submitted that these policies are similar in the context of refusal to license by a member or non-member, and, like the TSDSI and the GISFI, the DOSTI also requires the patent holder to license its IPR irrevocably on FRAND terms. Accordingly, we reiterate our comments on the IPR policy of the TSDSI in paragraph B.4. of this submission (above). The aforesaid recommendations may also be considered to be relevant for the DOSTI's IPR policy.

B.7. We are also of the opinion that it would be useful for Indian SSOs to consider recommending the use of royalty-free licenses for IPRs. Illustratively, the World Wide Web Consortium ("W3C") and the Open Mobile Alliance ("OMA") encourage royalty-free licensing.

c) Whether there is a need for prescribing guidelines on working and operation of Standard Setting Organizations by Government of India? If so, what all areas of working of SSOs should they cover?

C.1. In our opinion, in a milieu where instances of SEP litigation are becoming increasingly complex, and, there is a tangible threat of the abuse of the FRAND process, it might be useful for the Government of India to make suggestions on the working of Indian SSOs.

C.2. It is suggested that the Government of India develop Model Guidelines that may be adopted by Indian SSOs, taking into account India specific requirements, including the ones detailed in paragraph B.2. of this submission (above). We believe that this measure will also enable the fulfilment of the objectives of the Make in India and Digital India initiatives.

C.3. We recommend that various stakeholders, including IP holders, potential licensees and users of IP, civil society organizations, academics, and, government bodies, including the the Indian Patent Office ("IPO"), the Department of Telecommunications, the DIPP, TRAI, and, the CCI be consulted in the creation of these Model Guidelines.

C.4. In our opinion, the Model Guidelines may cover (a) the composition of the SSO; (b) the process of admitting members; (c) the process of the determination of a standard or technical specification; (d) the process of declassification of a standard or technical specification; (e) the IPR Policy; (f) resolution of disputes; (g) applicable law.

d) Whether there is a need for prescribing guidelines on setting or fixing the royalties in respect of Standard Essential Patents and defining FRAND terms by Government of India? If not, which would be appropriate authority to issue the guidelines and what could be the possible FRAND terms?

D.1. In light of the inadequacies in the IPR policies (discussed above) of various SSOs in India, as well the the spate of ongoing patent infringement lawsuits around mobile technologies, we recommend that the Government of India intervene in the setting of royalties and FRAND terms.

D.2. We propose that the Government of India initiate the formation of a patent pool of critical mobile technologies and apply a compulsory license with a five per cent royalty. Further details of this proposal have been enumerated in answer to question 'f' of the discussion paper (below).

D.3. Our motivations for this proposal are many-fold. In our opinion, it is near-impossible for potential licensees to avoid inadvertent patent infringement. As a part of our ongoing research on technical standards applicable to mobile phones sold in India, we have found nearly 300 standards so far . It is submitted that carrying out patent searches for all the standards would be extremely expensive for potential licensees. Further, even if such searches were to be carried out, different patent owners, SSOs and potential licensees disagree on valuation, essentiality, enforceability, validity, and coverage of patents. In addition, some patent owners are non-practising entities ("NPEs") and may not be members of SSOs. The patents held by them are not likely to be disclosed. More importantly, home-grown manufacturers that have no patents to leverage and may be new entrants in the market would be especially disadvantaged by such a scenario. Budget phone manufacturers, standing to incur losses either as a result of heavy licensing fees, or, potential litigation, may close down. Alternatively, they may pass on their losses to consumers, driving the now-affordable phones out of their financial reach. With the objectives of Make in India and Digital India in sight, it is essential that Indian consumers continue to have access to devices within their purchasing power.

e) On what basis should the royalty rates in SEPs be decided? Should it be based on Smallest Saleable Patent Practicing Component (SSPPC), or on the net price of the Downstream Product, or some other criterion?

E.1. It is our submission that royalty rates for SEPs should be based on the smallest saleable patent practising component ("SSPPC"). Most modern telecommunication and IT devices are complex with numerous technologies working in tandem. Different studies indicate that the number of patents in the US applicable to smartphones is between 200,000 and 250,000. A comprehensive patent landscape of mobile device technologies conducted by CIS reveals that nearly 4,000 patents are applicable to mobile phones sold in India. It is thus extremely difficult to quantify the exact extent of interaction and interdependence between technologies in any device, in such a way that the exact contribution of the patented technology to the entire device can be determined.

E.2. The net cost of the device is almost always several times that of the chipset that implements the patented technology. Armstrong et al have found that the cost of a 4G baseband chip costs up to $20 including royalties in a hypothetical $400 phone sold in the US. One of the litigating parties in the ongoing patent infringement lawsuits in India has stated that one of the reasons for preferring to leverage its patents as downstream as possible in the value chain is that it will earn the company more royalties . In instances where patent exhaustion occurs much earlier in the value chain, such as in the case of the company's cross-licenses with Qualcomm (another company that owns patents to chip technologies), the company does not try to obtain royalties from the selling prices of devices for the cross-licensed technologies. It is submitted that such market practices could be detrimental to the government's objectives such as providing a mobile handset to every Indian by 2020 as a part of the Digital India programme . It is also worth noting in this context that the mobile device is the first and only medium of access to the Internet and telecom services for a large number of Indians, and, consequently, the only gateway to access to knowledge, information and critical services, including banking.

E.3. The discussion paper notes that J. Gregory Sidak, having studied the proceedings before the Delhi High Court, approved of the manner in which the court determined royalties. In his paper, Sidak(2015) notes that in determining royalties, the court relied, inter alia, on the decision of CSIRO v.Cisco ("the CSIRO case"), a 2015 decision of the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 2015. We humbly disagree with the opinion of the Delhi High Court on the manner of determining royalties, and, with Sidak's approval of the same.

E.4. It is our submission that the CSIRO case relied on a previous judgment, which we disagree with. The decision, a 2014 district court judgment, analogises the determination of royalties on SEPs to the determination of royalties on a copyrighted book. The court notes, "[b]asing a royalty solely on chip price is like valuing a copyrighted book based only on the costs of the binding, paper, and ink needed to actually produce the physical product. While such a calculation captures the cost of the physical product, it provides no indication of its actual value." In our opinion, this analogy is flawed. While a book is a distinct product as a whole, a mobile phone is a sum-total of its parts. If at all, a mobile phone could be compared with a book with several authors, as multiple technologies belonging to several patent holders are implemented in it. This judgement bases valuation for one set of technologies on the whole device, thus awarding compensation to the licensor even for those technologies implemented in the device that are not related to the licensed technologies. In our opinion, charging royalty on the net selling price of a device for one technology or one set of technologies is thus more like a referral scheme and less like actual compensation for the value added. Accordingly, royalties must be charged on the SSPPC principle.

f) Whether total payment of royalty in case of various SEPs used in one product should be capped? If so, then should this limit be fixed by Government of India or some other statutory body or left to be decided among the parties?

F.1. CIS has proposed a compulsory licensing fee of five per cent on a patent pool of critical mobile technologies. The rationale for this figure is the royalty cap imposed by India in the early 1990s.

F.2. As part of regulating foreign technology agreements, the (former) Department of Industrial Development (later merged with the DIPP) capped royalty rates in the early 1990s. Payment of royalties was capped at either a lump sum payment of $2 million, or, 5 percent on the royalty rates charged for domestic sale, and, 8 percent for export of goods pertaining to "high priority industries". Royalties higher than 5 percent or 8 percent, as the case may be, required securing approval from the government.

F.3. While the early 1990s (specifically, 1991) was too early for the mobile device manufacturing industry to be listed among high priority industries, the public announcement by the government covered computer software, consumer electronics, and electrical and electronic appliances for home use. The cap on royalty rates was lifted by the DIPP in 2009.

F.4. It is submitted in the case of mobile device technology, we are witnessing a situation similar to that of the 1990s. In this sphere, most of the patent holders are multinational corporations which results in large royalty amounts leaving India. At the same time, in our opinion, litigation over patent infringement in India has limited the manufacture and sale of mobile devices of homegrown brands.

F.5. We believe that the aforementioned developments are detrimental to the Make in India and Digital India initiatives of the Government of India, and, the government's aim of encouraging local manufacturing, facilitating indigenous innovation, as well as strengthening India's intellectual property regime. It is our submission, therefore, that the payment of royalties on SEPs be capped.

F.6. We submit that such a measure is particularly important, given the nature of SEP litigation in India. While SEP litigation in India is indeed comparable to international SEP litigation on broader issues raised, specifically competition law concerns, but differs crucially where the parties are concerned. International SEP litigation is largely between multinational corporations with substantial patent portfolios, capable of engaging in long drawn out litigations, or engaging in other strategies including setting off against each other's patent portfolios. Dynamics in the Indian market differ - with a larger SEP holder litigating against smaller manufacturers, many of whom are indigenous, home-grown.

F.7. In June, 2013, we had recommended to the erstwhile Hon'ble Minister for Human Resource Development that a patent pool of essential technologies be established, with the compulsory licensing mechanism. Subsequently, in February, 2015, we reiterated this request to the Hon'ble Prime Minister. We propose that the Government of India initiate the formation of a patent pool of critical mobile technologies and mandate a five percent compulsory license. As we have stated in our request to the Hon'ble Prime Minister, we believe that such a pool would "possibly avert patent disputes by ensuring that the owners' rights are not infringed on, that budget manufacturers are not put out of business owing to patent feuds, and that consumers continue to get access to inexpensive mobile devices. Several countries including the United States issue compulsory licenses on patents in the pharmaceutical, medical, defence, software, and engineering domains for reasons of public policy, or to thwart or correct anti-competitive practices."

F.8. We believe that such a measure is not in breach of our international obligations under the TRIPS Agreement.

g) Whether the practice of Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDA) leads to misuse of dominant position and is against the FRAND terms?

G.1. The issue of Non Disclosure Agreements ("NDAs") in SEP/FRAND litigation is a contentious one. Patent holders argue that they are essential to the license negotiation process to protect confidential information, whereas potential licensees submit that NDAs result in the imposition of onerous conditions.

G.2. In India's SEP litigation, the use of NDAs has been raised as an issue in at least two cases - separately by Intex and by iBall , in their cases against Ericsson. Intex and iBall have both claimed that the NDAs that Ericsson asked them to sign were onerous, and favoured Ericsson.

G.3. According to Intex, the NDA in question would result in high legal costs for Intex, and, would render it unable to disclose crucial information to its vendors (who had agreed to supply to Intex on the condition that Intex was not infringing on any patents).

G.4. According to iBall, the parties had agreed to enter a global patent license agreement ("GPLA") but Ericsson insisted on an NDA. Upon receiving the terms of the NDA, iBall claimed before the CCI that Ericsson's refusal to identify the allegedly infringed SEPs; the threat of patent infringement proceedings; the attempt to coax iBall to enter into a "one-sided and onerous NDA"; the tying and bundling patents irrelevant to iBall's products by way of a GPLA; demanding unreasonably high royalties by way of a certain percentage value of handset as opposed to the cost of actual patented technology used all constituted abuse of Ericsson's dominant position under Section 4 of the Competition Act.

G.5. In India, the law on misuse (abuse) of dominant position by an 'enterprise' is found primarily in Section 4 of the Competition Act (read with Section 2(h) of the Competition Act, which defines 'enterprise'). In its recent decision in the Ericsson-CCI case , the Delhi High Court has found Ericsson to be an 'enterprise' for the purposes of the Competition Act, and hence subject to an inquiry under Section 4 of the same legislation. In the same decision, the court has also recognised the jurisdiction of the CCI to examine Ericsson's conduct for abuse of behaviour, based on complaints by Micromax and Intex. The use of NDAs is one of the grounds on which the parties have complained to the CCI.

G.6. Pending a final determination by the CCI (and subsequent appeals), it would be premature to make an absolute claim on whether the use of NDAs results in an abuse of dominant position in all instances. However, the following submissions are made: First, the determination of misuse/abuse of dominant position is influenced by a number of factors , i.e., such a determination should be made on a case to case basis. Second, the market regulator, the CCI, is best situated to determine (a) abuse of dominance, and (b) whether the use of NDAs by an enterprise constitutes an abuse of its dominance. Third, the question of whether the use of NDAs constitutes misuse of dominance needs to be addressed in two parts - (a) whether the use of the NDA itself is abusive, irrespective of its terms and, (b) whether the use of certain specific terms renders the NDA abusive. Fourth, NDAs could potentially lead to the patent owner abusing its dominant position in the market, as well as result in an invalidation of FRAND commitments and terms. NDAs make it impossible to determine if a patent holder is engaging in discriminatory licensing practices. Fifth, NDAs are especially harmful in the case of NPEs-- companies that hold patents and monetise them but don't build or manufacture the components or devices that implement the technology associated with the patents.

h) What should be the appropriate mode and remedy for settlement of disputes in matters related to SEPs, especially while deciding FRAND terms? Whether Injunctions are a suitable remedy in cases pertaining to SEPs and their availability on FRAND terms?

H.1. The licensing of SEPs on FRAND terms requires the parties to negotiate "reasonable" royalty rates in good faith, and apply the terms uniformly to all willing licensees. It is our submission that if the parties cannot agree to FRAND terms, they may enter into binding arbitration. Further, if all efforts fail, there exist remedies under the Patents Act and the Competition Act, 2002 to address the issues.

H.2. Section 115 of the Patents Act empowers the court to appoint an independent scientific adviser " to assist the court or to inquire and report upon any such question of fact or of opinion (not involving a question of interpretation of law) as it may formulate for the purpose. " Such an independent adviser may inform the court on the technical nuances of the matter.

H.3. Further, under the Patents Act, pending the decision of infringement proceedings the Court may provide interim relief, if the plaintiff proves first, a prima facie case of infringement; second, that the balance of convenience tilts in plaintiff's favour; and, third, that if an injunction is not granted the plaintiff shall suffer irreparable damage. H.4. However, it is our suggestion that courts adopt a more cautious stance towards granting injunctions in the field of SEP litigation. First, in our opinion, injunctions may prove to be a deterrent to arrive at a FRAND commitment, in particular, egregiously harming the willing licensee. Second, especially in the Indian scenario, where litigating parties operate in vastly different price segments (thereby targeting consumers with different purchasing power), it is difficult to establish that "irreparable damage" has been caused to the patent owner on account of infringement. Third, we note the approach of the European Court of Justice, which prohibited the patent holder from enforcing an injunction provided a willing licensee makes an offer for the price it wishes to pay to use a patent under the condition that it deposited an amount in the bank as a security for the patent holder. Fourth, we also note the approach of the Federal Trade Commission in the USA, which only authorizes patent holders to seek injunctive relief against potential licensees who have either stated that they will not license a patent on any terms, or refuse to enter into a license agreement on terms that have been set in the final ruling of a court or arbitrator. Further, as Contreras (2015) observes, that the precise boundaries of what constitutes as an unwilling licensee remains to be seen. We observe a similar ambiguity in Indian jurisprudence, and accordingly submit that courts should carefully examine the conduct of the licensee to injunct them from the alleged infringement.

i) What steps can be taken to make the practice of Cross-Licensing transparent so that royalty rates are fair & reasonable?

I.1. The Patents Act requires patentees and licensees to submit a statement on commercial working of the invention to the Controller every year. Form 27 under section 146(2) of the Act lists the details necessary to be disclosed for compliance of the requirement of "working". A jurisprudential analysis reveals the rationale and objective behind this mandatory requirement. Undeniably, the scheme of the Indian patent regime makes it amply clear that "working" is a very important requirement, and the public as well as competitors have a right to access this information in a timely manner, without undue hurdles. Indeed, as the decision in Natco Pharma v. Bayer Corporation reveals, the disclosures in Form 27 were crucial to determining the imposition of a compulsory license on the patentee. Thus, broadly, Form 27 disclosures can critically enable willing licensees to access patent "working" information in a timely manner.

I.2. However, there has been little compliance of this requirement by the patentees, despite the IPO reiterating the importance of compliance through the issuance of multiple public notices (suo motu and in response to a public interest litigation filed in 2011 ), and, reminding the patentees that non-compliance is punishable with a heavy fine. Findings of research submitted by one of the parties in the writ of the 2011 public interest litigationShamnad Basheer v. Union of India and others reveal as follows. First, a large number of Form 27s are unavailable for download from the website of the IPO. This possibly indicates that the forms have either not been filed by the patentees with the IPO, or have not been uploaded (yet) by the IPO. Second, a large number of filings in the telecom sector remain incomplete.

I.3. In 2015, CIS queried the IPO website for Form 27s of nearly 4,400 patents. CIS' preliminary research (ongoing and unpublished) echoes findings similar to the ones disclosed in the case discussed in paragraph I.2. of this submission (above).

I.4. In view of the submissions above, CIS makes the following recommendations to make the practice of cross-licensing transparent so that royalty rates are fair & reasonable: first, that there be a strict enforcement of the submission of Form 27s on a regular and timely basis by the patentees; and, second, that guidelines may be drawn up on whether it was discriminatory to charge no royalties (whether on the SSPPU or on the whole device) for a patent holder in a cross-licensing arrangement with another, when it charges royalty on the selling price of the device from a non-cross-licensor.

j) What steps can be taken to make the practice of Patent Pooling transparent so that royalty rates are fair & reasonable?

J.1. Patent pools can be understood as an agreement between two or more patent owners to license one or more of their patents to one another or to third parties. Thus, the creation of a patent pool makes use of the legal instrument of licensing, similar to the practice of cross-licensing. Insofar, we reiterate our recommendations made in paragraph I.3. of this submission (above), which apply to the answer to the instant question.

J.2. In furtherance of the recommendation above, we also propose the alteration of the Form 27 template to include more disclosures. Presently, patentees are required to to declare number of licensees and sub-licensees. We specifically propose that the format of Form 27 filings be modified to include patent pool licenses, with an explicit declaration of the names of the licensees and not just the number.

J.3. It is also our submission that patent pools be required to offer FRAND licenses on the same terms to both members and non-members of the pool.

k) How should it be determined whether a patent declared as SEP is actually an Essential Patent, particularly when bouquets of patents are used in one device?

K.1. We submit that several studies on the essentiality of SEPs indicate that only a small percentage of SEPs are actually essential. A study conducted byGoodman and Myers (2004) showed that only 21% of SEPs pertaining to the 3G standard in the US were deemed to be actually essential. Another study conducted by the same authors in 2009 for WCDMA patents showed that 28% SEPs were essential.

K.2. In our opinion, first, the methodology adopted by Goodman and Myers could be replicated to determine the "essential" nature of an SEP. Second, while adopting their methodology, it would be useful to address some of the issues over which these studies were critiqued. Accordingly, we suggest that (a) laboratory tests may be conducted by an outside expert or by a commercial testing laboratory, and not at an in-house facility owned by either parties, so as to eliminate in the lab results; and, (b) expert opinions may be considered in order to determine essentiality.

l) Whether there is a need of setting up of an independent expert body to determine FRAND terms for SEPs and devising methodology for such purpose?

L.1. In our opinion, there is no need for an independent expert body to determine FRAND terms for SEPs and devising the methodology for such a purpose. The existing legal and regulatory framework is reasonably equipped to determine FRAND terms. A more detailed submission on the existing framework and suggested changes has been made in our answer to question 'a' of the discussion paper (above).

L.2. However, we observe that Indian courts, tribunals and the CCI are yet to endorse a methodology for making FRAND determinations. The judgments of the Delhi High Court do not provide a conclusive rationale or methodology for the imposition of royalty rates in the respective matters.

L.3. We submit that in the absence of definitive Indian jurisprudence for determination of FRAND terms, American jurisprudence provides certain guidance. Contreras (2015) informs us about the various case law American courts and regulators have developed and adhered to whilst making such determinations.The dominant analytical framework for determining "reasonable royalty" patent damages in the United States today was set out in 1970 by the District Court for the Southern District of New York in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp . While this may be used as a guiding framework, the question of methodology remains far from settled.

m) If certain Standards can be met without infringing any particular SEP, for instance by use of some alternative technology or because the patent is no longer in force, what should be the process to declassify such a SEP?

M.1. In our opinion, if a standard can be met without infringing a patent declared to be "essential" to it, then the patent is not actually "essential". In this instance, the methods suggested in response to question 'k' of the discussion paper (above) could be used to declassify the SEP.

M.2. We further submit that if a patent is no longer in force, that is, if it has expired, then it ceases to be patent, and therefore an SEP. The process to declassify such an SEP could be simply to declare it an expired patent.

M.3. In addition, if it is possible to implement a certain standard by using an alternative technology, then the SEP for such a standard is not actually an SEP. However, the scale of operations and that of mass manufacturing and compatibility requirements in devices and infrastructure mean that it is unlikely to have different methods of implementing the same standard.

M.4. In general, it is our submission that an Indian SSO could maintain a publicly accessible database of SEPs found to be invalid or non-essential in India.

7. We reiterate our gratitude to the DIPP for the opportunity to make these submissions. In addition to our comments above, we have shared some of our research on this issue, in the 'Annexures', below.

8. It would be our pleasure and privilege to discuss these comments with the DIPP; and, supplement these with further submissions if necessary. We also offer our assistance on other matters aimed at developing a suitable policy framework for SEPs and FRAND in India, and, working towards the sustained innovation, manufacture and availability of mobile technologies in India.

On behalf of the Centre for Internet and Society, 22 April, 2016

Anubha Sinha - anubha@cis-india.org | Nehaa Chaudhari - nehaa@cis-india.org

Rohini Lakshané - rohini@cis-india.org

___________________________________________________________________________

___________________________________________________________________________

ANNEXURES

___________________________________________________________________________

● Anubha Sinha, Fuelling the Affordable Smartphone Revolution in India, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/digital-asia-hub-the-good-life-in-asias-21-st-century-anubha-sinha-fueling-the-affordable-smartphone-revolution-in-india (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

● Nehaa Chaudhari, Standard Essential Patents on Low-Cost Mobile Phones in India: A Case to Strengthen Competition Regulation?, available at http://www.manupatra.co.in/newsline/articles/Upload/08483340-C1B9-4BA4-B6A9-D6B6494391B8.pdf (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

● Nehaa Chaudhari, Pervasive Technologies:Patent Pools, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/patent-pools (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

● Nehaa Chaudhari, The Curious Case of the CCI:Competition Law and SEP Regulation in India, presented at the 4th Global Congress on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/the-curious-case-of-the-cci-competition-law-and-sep-regulation-in-indi a (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

● Nehaa Chaudhari, Letter for Establishment of Patent Pool for Low Cost Access Devices through Compulsory Licences, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/letter-for-establishment-of-patent-pool-for-low-cost-access-devices (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

● Prof Jorge L. Contreras and Rohini Lakshané, Patents and Mobile Devices in India: An Empirical Survey, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2756486 (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

● Rohini Lakshané, CIS, List of technical standards and IP types (Working document), available at https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B8SgjShAjhbtaml5eW50bS01d2s/view?usp=sharing (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

● Rohini Lakshané, Open Letter to Prime Minister Modi, February 2015, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/open-letter-to-prime-minister-modi (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

● Rohini Lakshané, FAQ: CIS' proposal to form a patent pool of critical mobile technology, September 2015, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/faq-cis-proposal-for-compulsory-licensing-of-critical-mobile-technologies (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

● Rohini Lakshané, Joining the dots in India's big-ticket mobile phone patent litigation, May 2015, last updated October 2015, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/joining-the-dots-in-indias-big-ticket-mobile-phone-patent-litigation (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

● Rohini Lakshané, Compilation of Mobile Phone Patent Litigation Cases in India, March 2015, last updated April 2016, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/compilation-of-mobile-phone-patent-litigation-cases-in-india , (last accessed April 22, 2016).

● Rohini Lakshané, Patent landscaping in the Indian Mobile Device Marketplace, presented at the 4th Global Congress on Intellectual Property and Public Interest, December 2015, available at https://drive.google.com/open?id=0B8SgjShAjhbtME45N245SmowOGs (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

● Vikrant Narayan Vasudeva, Patent Valuation and Licence Fee Determination in the Context of Patent Pools, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/patent-valuation-and-license-fee-determination-in-context-of-patent-pools (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

************

This submission has been authored by (alphabetically) Anubha Sinha, Nehaa Chaudhari and Rohini Lakshané, on behalf of the Centre for Internet and Society, India.

See The Centre for Internet and Society, available at http://cis-india.org (last accessed 22 April, 2016) for details of the organization, and, our work.

Make in India, available at http://www.makeinindia.com/home (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Digital India, available at http://www.digitalindia.gov.in/ (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

See Nehaa Chaudhari, The Curious Case of the CCI:Competition Law and SEP Regulation in India, presented at the 4th Global Congress on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/the-curious-case-of-the-cci-competition-law-and-sep-regulation-in-india (last accessed 21 April, 2016) for further details on relevant provisions.

In the High Court of Delhi, W.P.(C) 464/2014 & CM Nos. 911/2014 & 915/2014, judgment delivered on 30 March, 2016. Hereafter referred to as the Ericsson-CCI judgment.

Id.

Under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, and, under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, for the High Courts and the Supreme Court, respectively.

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

KEI Staff, 2015 October 15 version: RCEP IP Chapter, available at http://keionline.org/node/2472 (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

BIS Act, 2016, available at http://www.bis.org.in/bs/bsindex.asp (last accessed 21 April, 2016).

TSDSI, Intellectual Property Rights Policy, available at http://www.tsdsi.org/media/Help/2014-12-17/TSDSI-PLD-40-V1.0.0-20141217.pdf (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Id at Clause 3.1.

Id at Clause 5.1.

Id at Clause 5.2.

Id at Clause 5.5.

Id at Clauses 7.1. and 7.2.

Id at Clause 7.2.1.a (iii).

Id at Clause 7.2.1.b(iii).

Id at Clause 7.3.

GISFI, Intellectual Property Rights Policy, available at http://www.gisfi.org/ipr_policy/gisfi_intellectual_property_righ.htm (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Id at Clauses 6.2.1.a(iii) and 6.2.1.b(iii).

See W3C, Patent Policy, available at https://www.w3.org/Consortium/Patent-Policy-20040205/ (last accessed 22 April, 2016) for more details on their royalty-free licences.

See OMA, Use Agreement, available at http://openmobilealliance.org/about-oma/policies-and-terms-of-use/use-agreement/ (last accessed 22 April, 2016) for more details on their royalty-free licences.

See Rohini Lakshané, Open Letter to PM Modi, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/open-letter-to-prime-minister-modi (last accessed 22 April, 2016) for further details of CIS' proposal.

Rohini Lakshané, CIS, List of Technical Standards and IP Types (Working document), available at https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B8SgjShAjhbtaml5eW50bS01d2s/view?usp=sharing (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 Tex. L. Rev. at 2015; See also, for e.g., RPX Corporation, Amendment No. 3 to Form S-l, 11 Apr. 2011, at 59, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1509432/000119312511101007/ds1a.htm (last accessed 22 April, 2016), quoting - "Based on our research, we believe there are more than 250,000 active patents relevant to today's smartphones…".; See further Steve Lohr, Apple- Samsung Case Shows Smartphone as Legal Magnet, New York Times, 25 Aug. 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/26/technology/apple-samsung-case-shows-smartphone-as-lawsuit-magnet.html (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Jorge L. Contreras and Rohini Lakshané, Patents and Mobile Devices in India: An Empirical Survey, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2756486 (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Ann Armstrong, Joseph J. Mueller and Timothy D. Syrett, The Smartphone- Royalty Stack:Surveying Royalty Demands for the Components Within Modern Smartphones, available at https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/Publications/Documents/The-Smartphone-Royalty-Stack-Armstrong-Mueller-Syrett.pdf (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Florian Mueller, Ericsson Explained Publicly why it Collects Patent Royalties from Device (Not Chipset) Makers, available at http://www.fosspatents.com/2014/01/ericsson-explained-publicly-why-its.html (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Romit Guha and Anandita Singh Masinkotia, PM Modi's Digital India Project:Government to Ensure that Every Indian has a Smartphone by 2019, available at http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-08-25/news/53205445_1_digital-india-india-today-financial-services (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Nehaa Chaudhari, Standard Essential Patents on Low-Cost Mobile Phones in India: A Case to Strengthen Competition Regulation?, available at http://www.manupatra.co.in/newsline/articles/Upload/08483340-C1B9-4BA4-B6A9-D6B6494391B8.pdf (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

See part 10.2.2. of the Discussion Paper, at page 25.

J.Gregory Sidak, FRAND in India:The Delhi High Court's Emerging Jurisprudence on Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, available at http://jiplp.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2015/06/11/jiplp.jpv096.full (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas in No. 6:11-cv-00343-LED, decided on 03 December, 2015, available at. http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/15-1066.Opinion.12-1-2015.1.PDF (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Id.

Kumkum Sen, News on Royalty Payments Brings Cheer in New Year, available at http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/news-on-royalty-payment-brings-cheer-in-new-year-110010400044_1.html (last accessed 21 April, 2016).

See Sanjana Govil, Putting a Lid on Royalty Outflows- How the RBI Can Help Reduce India's IP Costs, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/lid-on-royalty-outflows (last accessed 21 April, 2016), for a discussion on the introduction of royalty caps in the early 1990s, and its success in reducing the flow of money out of India.

Supra note 33.

Nehaa Chaudhari, Letter for Establishment of Patent Pool for Low-cost Access Devices through Compulsory Licenses, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/letter-for-establishment-of-patent-pool-for-low-cost-access-devices (last accessed 21 April, 2016).

Supra note 26.

Rohini Lakshané, FAQ: CIS' proposal to form a patent pool of critical mobile technology, September 2015, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/faq-cis-proposal-for-compulsory-licensing-of-critical-mobile-technologies (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Id.

See the Ericsson-CCI case, supra note 6, for Intex's submissions as discussed by Justice Bakhru.

Id.

Rohini Lakshané, Compilation of Mobile Phone Patent Litigation Cases in India, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/compilation-of-mobile-phone-patent-litigation-cases-in-india (last accessed 21 April, 2016).

See the Ericsson-CCI case, supra note 6, at paragraph 19.2.

Supra note 47.

See the Ericsson-CCI judgment, supra note 6, at paragraphs 88-105.

Section 19(4) of the Competition Act. See also Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India and Another, (2010) 10 SCC 744.

Section 115 of the Patents Act, 1970.

Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v. ZTE Corp. and ZTE Deutschland, Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 16 July 2015 in GmbH C-170/13.

Third Party United States Fed. Trade Commission's Statement on the Public Interest, In re Certain Wireless Communication Devices, Portable Music and Data Processing Devices, Computers and Components Thereof, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, Inv. No. 337-TA-745 (Jun. 6, 2012).

Jorge L. Contreras, A Brief History of FRAND: Analyzing Current Debates in Standard Setting and Antitrust Through a Historical Lens, 80 Antitrust Law Journal 39 (2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2374983 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2374983 (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Section 146(2) of the Patents Act, 1970..

Sai Vinod, Patent Office Finally Takes Form 27s Seriously, available at http://spicyip.com/2013/02/patent-office-finally-takes-form-27s.html (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Order No. 45/2013 (Intellectual Property Appellate Board, Chennai), available at http://www.ipab.tn.nic.in/045-2013.htm (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Intellectual Property India, Public Notice, available at http://www.ipindia.nic.in/iponew/publicNotice_Form27_12Feb2013.pdf (last accessed 22 April, 2016) and Intellectual Property India, Public Notice, available at http://ipindia.nic.in/iponew/publicNotice_24December2009.pdf (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Supra note 57.

Id.

See research findings available at http://spicyip.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/FORM-27-WP-1R-copy.pdf (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

In the High Court of Delhi, W.P.(C) 5590/2015. This litigation is currently ongoing. See, illustratively, Mathews P. George, Patent Working in India: Delhi HC issues notice in Shamnad Basheer v. Union of India & Ors. - I, available at http://spicyip.com/2015/09/patent-working-in-india-delhi-hc-issues-notice-in-shamnad-basheer-v-union-of-india-ors-i.html (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

In response to an RTI request made to the IPO in Mumbai for forms unavailable on the website, CIS received a reply stating, "As thousand [sic] of Form -27 are filed in this office, it is very difficult to segregate Form-27 for the patent numbers enlisted in your RTI application as it needs diversion of huge official staff/ manpower and it will affect day to day [sic] work of this office." This research is ongoing and unpublished. Please contact us for a copy of the RTI application and the response received.

WIPO Secretariat, Patent Pools and Antitrust - A Comparative Analysis, available at https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.wipo.int%2Fexport%2Fsites%2Fwww%2Fip-competition%2Fen%2Fstudies%2Fpatent_pools_report.pdf (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Form 27, The Patents Act, available at http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/manual/HTML%20AND%20PDF/Manual%20of%20Patent%20Office%20Practice%20and%20Procedure%20-%20html/Forms/Form-27.pdf (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

David J. Goodman and Robert A. Myers, 3G Cellular Standards and Patents, available at http://patentlyo.com/media/docs/2009/03/wirelesscom2005.pdf (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Darien CT, Review of Patents Declared as Essential to WCDMA through December, 2008, available at http://www.frlicense.com/wcdma1.pdf (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Supra note 67.

Donald L. Martin and Carl De Meyer, Patent Counting, a Misleading Index of Patent Value: A Critique of Goodman & Myers and its Uses, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=949439 (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Rohini Lakshané, Joining the Dots in India's Big-Ticket Mobile Phone Patent Litigation, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/joining-the-dots-in-indias-big-ticket-mobile-phone-patent-litigation (last accessed 22 April, 2016). See also supra note 47 for more details.

Supra note 55.

318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified and aff'd, 446 F. 2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971).

2015

They filed it in 2011

The 2011 filing only includes pharma, BTW: http://spicyip.com/docs/Form%2027s.pdf. Also, this writ is from May 2015: http://spicyip.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/FORM-27-WP-1R-copy.pdf Anyway, I'll leave it as it is.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/comments-on-department-of-industrial-policy-and-promotion-discussion-paper-on-standard-essential-patents-and-their-availability-on-frand-terms

RTI request to Indian Patents Office for Form 27 (Statement of Working of patents), 2015

rohini — 2017-10-13T04:37:13Z

The Centre for Internet and Society filed this request under the Right to Information Act in 2015 as part of research for the paper: Patent Working Requirements and Complex Products: An Empirical Assessment of India's Form 27 Practice and Compliance (July 2017). We sought Form 27 (also known as Statements of Working) pertaining to randomly selected patents found in our patent landscaping study. These forms were not available on the online public databases, InPASS and IPAIRS, at the time of the filing the RTI request. Research assistance was provided by intern Nayana Dasgupta.

Patent Working Requirements and Complex Products: An Empirical Assessment of India's Form 27 Practice and Compliance (July 2017)

Patent landscaping study -- Patents and Mobile Devices in India: An Empirical Survey (April 2016)

This was our first RTI request filed with the Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks for the research on practices and compliance of patent holders to the Form 27 requirement. The response contained generic instructions about how to download Form 27 from the publicly-accessible online databases. The IPO also stated that, “The desired information relates to about 1700 patents for all the years, to supply and trace out the information physical form requires huge humane resource and need to divert the office staff for some days which would hampers the day-todays- official work therefore, the information is proactively disclosed in the office website for the public”.

We subsequently filed another RTI request with the Indian Patents Office while limiting the number of patents to 61. (View the application and response here).

Text of the application and IPO's response

(View a scanned copy of the application here and the response here)

10 June 2015

To
Central Public Information Officer
Office of the Controller General of Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks
Boudhik Sampada Bhawan
Near Antop Hill Post Office, S.M. Road,
Antop Hill, Mumbai - 400037

Dear Sir/ Madam,

Subject: Request for information under section 6 of the Right To Information Act, 2005; regarding Form 27 submissions for patents

Full name of the applicant: Ajoy Kumar
Address of the applicant: 194, 2^nd C Cross, Domlur 2^nd stage, Bangalore 560071
Details of the information required: Please consider this an application under Section 6 of the Right To Information Act, 2005. This is an application for three pieces of information.

Firstly, you are requested to provide us with the Form 27 submissions for all the following patents for all the years for which they are available.

Secondly, we also request a record of all the years for which such Form 27 submissions have not been made for each of the patents listed here.

Thirdly, we request a record of all the patents among those listed here which do not have a single Form 27 submission from the year of application/ grant.

In the event that you do not possess these documents, please transfer this application to the concerned authority within five days of its receipt and inform us of the same; as mandated under Section 6(3) of the Act.

[List of patent numbers]

*************************************************************

Response from the IPO (reproduced verbatim)

Government of India

Patent Office, Boudhik Sampada Bhavan

S.M. Road, Near Post Office,

Antop Hill, Mumbai 400037, India

Email: mumbai-patent@nic.in

Website: www.ipindia.nic.in

No. RTI/Mum/38

Date: 17/06/2015

To,

Shri Ajoy Kumar,

194, 2^nd C Cross,

Domlur 2^nd Stage

Bangalore - 56007

Sub: Supply of information sought under RTI Act - reg.

Sir,

With reference to your application under RTI, dated 15.06.2015, wherein the information sought for form 27 details (commercial working of patent) for all the years for about 1700 patents application.

Reply:

a) The requested information can be had from the office website for the filing of form 27 www.ipindia.nic.in,, go to http;//ipindiaservices.in/workingofpatents/

b) Pelase see the print screen from where one can access the desired information

[Screenshot from ipindiaservices.gov.in/workingofpatents]

c) Or the desired information also can be obtained under section 153, Rule.27 of the patents Act and Rules, as the information can be inspected the physical records under the Act.

d) The desired information relates to about 1700 patents for all the years, to supply and trace out the information physical form requires huge humane resource and need to divert the office staff for some days which would hampers the day-todays- official work therefore, the information is proactively disclosed in the office website for the public.

[Screenshots from ipindiaservices.gov.in/workingofpatents]

Thanking you,

Yours faithfully

(N. Ramchander)

Astt. Controller of Patents & Designs

& CPIO, Patent Office, Mumbai

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/rti-request-to-indian-patents-office-for-form-27-statement-of-working-of-patents-2015

RTI request to Indian Patents Office for Form 27 (Statement of Working of patents), March 2016

rohini — 2017-10-13T04:35:46Z

The Centre for Internet and Society filed this request under the Right to Information Act in March 2016 as part of research for the paper: Patent Working Requirements and Complex Products: An Empirical Assessment of India's Form 27 Practice and Compliance (July 2017). We sought forms pertaining to 61 of the patents found in our patent landscaping study. These forms were not available on the online public databases, InPASS and IPAIRS, at the time of the filing the RTI request. Research assistance was provided by intern Shreshth Wadhwa.

Patent Working Requirements and Complex Products: An Empirical Assessment of India's Form 27 Practice and Compliance (July 2017)

Patent landscaping study -- Patents and Mobile Devices in India: An Empirical Survey (April 2016)

We filed our first application under the RTI Act with the Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks in Mumbai in June 2015 for procuring Form 27 not available through their online databases, but received a generic response about how to download Form 27 from the online databases. The IPO also stated, “The desired information relates to about 1700 patents for all the years, to supply and trace out the information physical form requires huge humane resource and need to divert the office staff for some days which would hampers the day-todays- official work therefore, the information is proactively disclosed in the office website for the public”. (View the application and response here)

In view of this response, we filed another RTI application with the same office in March 2016, and restricted the number of patents to 61. The patents represent a cross-section of owners in our landscaping study. (View methodology). We also stated in the RTI request that we had already searched the online databases for the forms and did not find any. The IPO replied in April 2016 that it could provide CIS with forms for eleven of the requested patents. As for the rest of the forms, the IPO stated, “As thousand of Form-27 are filed in this office, it is very difficult to segregate Form-27 for the patent numbers enlisted in your RTI application as it needs diversion of huge official/ staff manpower and it will affect day to day work of this office.”

A few days after CIS received the reply from the IPO, Form 27 pertaining to patents in the landscape happened to start appearing on InPASS and IPAIRS E-register portal.

Text of the application and the IPO’s response

(View a scanned copy of the application here and of the response here)

11 March 2016

Central Public Information Officer

Office of the Controller General of Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks

Boudhik Sampada Bhawan

Near Antop Hill Post Office, S.M. Road,

Antop Hill, Mumbai - 400037

Dear Sir/ Madam,

Subject: Request for information under section 6 of the Right To Information Act, 2005; regarding Form 27 submissions for patents

Full name of the applicant: Ajoy Kumar
Address of the applicant: 194, 2^nd C Cross, Domlur 2^nd stage, Bangalore 560071
Details of the information required: Please consider this an application under Section 6 of the Right To Information Act, 2005. This is an application for three pieces of information.

Firstly, you are requested to provide us with the Form 27 submissions for all the following patents for all the years for which they are available.

Secondly, we also request a record of all the years for which such Form 27 submissions have not been made for each of the patents listed here.

Patent Numbers:

264868
264414
218424
236178
250862
264266
263473
264878
264343
257411
263618
258568
264451
222947
263817
258983
196731
256864
262863
264764
259008
196474
264532
265027
258788
248749
259831
265788
214641
252360
250406
209397
226831
235014
229789
265069
220354
254083
264352
231642
258698
261503
241959
214988
237117
264824
263358
235688
251240
236556
203034
203036
234157
203686
213723
229632
240471
241747
223183
243980
200572

I submit that I have searched for copies of Form 27 filings of the above patents on the online portals of the Indian Patent Office, including the IPAIRS search engine and INPASS. As the search results did not yield the Form 27 documents, I am making this request under the Right To Information Act. Screenshots of three instances in which Form 27 was not found are attached in Annexure I. The respective patent numbers are mentioned along with the screenshots.

[Annexure I]

****************************************************************************************

Response from the IPO (reproduced verbatim)

Government of India

Patent Office, Boudhik Sampada Bhavan

S.M. Road, Near Post Office,

Antop Hill, Mumbai 400037, India

Email: mumbai-patent@nic.in

Website: www.ipindia.nic.in

Letter No: RTI/ 03

06/04/2016

To,

Shri Ajoy Kumar,

194, 2^nd C Cross,

Domlur 2^nd Stage

Bangalore - 560071

Sub: Supply of information sought under RTI Act, 2005 - reg.

Sir,

With reference to your application under the Right to Information Act, 2005 dated 16/03/2016 in this regard the detailed parawise information as follows.

As thousand of Form-27 are filed in this office, it is very difficult to segregate Form-27 for the patent numbers enlisted in your RTI application as it needs diversion of huge official/ staff manpower and it will affect day to day work of this office.
It is difficult to create such a record for the Patent numbers; you have listed for the same reason given above.

However, copies of Form 27 for Patent nos. 222947, 259008, 258788, 250406, 235014, 203034, 203036, 234157, 203686, 213723, 240471 could be made available to you on paying prescribed copying charges of Rs. 480/- (120 x 4 = 480/-)

Yours faithfully,

Dr. Ujjwala Haldankar

Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs & Central Public Information Officer

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/rti-request-to-indian-patents-office-for-form-27-statement-of-working-of-patents-march-2016

2016 Works-in-Progress Intellectual Property ("WIPIP") Colloquium

praskrishna — 2016-03-20T05:10:52Z

Prof. Jorge Contreras presented a paper co-authored by Rohini Lakshané on the patent landscape conducted for the Pervasive Technologies project at WPIP. The event was held in Washington D.C. on February 19 and 20, 2016. It was organized by School of Law, University of Washington.

For more details click here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/news/2016-works-in-progress-intellectual-property-wipip-colloquium

Workshop on Competition Law and Policy

praskrishna — 2016-10-23T01:51:25Z

National School of Law India University and the Delegation of European Union to India jointly organized a workshop at Competition Commission of India in New Delhi from October 19 - 21, 2016. Anubha Sinha and Rohini Lakshané participated and made presentations.

The workshop was organized under the broader EU-India project titled "Capacity Building Initiative in Competition Area under Trade Development Programme" sponsored jointly by European Union Delegation and National Law School of India University, Bengaluru.

Download

Workshop brochure
Anubha Sinha's presentation on "Investigation into the sub $100 Mobile Device Industry from IPR + Competition law lens"
Rohini Lakshané's presentation on CCI Workshop on Competition Law and Policy Competition Policy and Internet

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/news/workshop-on-competition-law-and-policy

Report: 5G Technologies Workshop by IEEE

rohini — 2015-09-27T11:45:57Z

A report on the 5G Technologies Workshop organised by the Bangalore Chapter of the IEEE Communication Society at Bangalore on May 22 -23, 2015.

Workshop schedule [PDF]

Why is 5G needed?

The “Internet of Things” (IoT), increasing number of telephone connections, increasing use of data by mobile devices, and an exponential increase in the diversity of wireless applications, all require a backbone network in the form of 5G. At the same time, network operators need a sound business model. According to a white paper released by Cisco, the Visual Networking Index: Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecast Update 2014 [PDF], the number of connected devices will go up from 7 billion in 2014 to 12 billion in 2020. These include smartphones, mobile phones that are not smartphones, laptops, tablets, wearables, devices that support machine to machine communication (telemetry, automotive, smart grid and transaction devices), and other portable devices. Mobile data traffic is projected to have a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 61% from 2013 to 2018, and the number of connected wearable devices are projected to increase with a CAGR of 52% in the same duration.

5G is projected to completely roll out by the year 2020.

What are the use cases of 5G?

Driverless automobiles, vehicle-to-vehicle communication for road safety, smart cameras in cities, virtual reality gaming, remotely operated robots, tactile internet applications, applications in the cloud, and networks of sensors placed in home, industry and office environments are some of the use cases of 5G.

5G is expected to contribute to massive connectivity and ubiquitous coverage required for smart manufacturing, smart devices in the consumer electronics and personal electronics domains, smart healthcare, smart retail, smart transportation and so on.

Is there a definition of 5G yet?

There is consensus on the following new requirements for wireless communication systems. Most of these will mature beyond 2020.

Speeds of up to 10 gigabytes per second: 100 times faster than 4G LTE and 10 times faster than LTE-Advanced.
Very low latency, which will support augmented reality and tactile Internet.
Very high mobility: Gigabit Ethernet is a form of LAN (local area network) technology that supports data transfer rates of approximately 1 gigabit per second. 5G would support Gigabit Ethernet (also known as Gigabit Everywhere). The user can experience high levels of mobility.
Low energy consumption in networked mobile devices compared with the current rates of energy consumption in order to make mobility sustainable.
Machine-to-machine (M2M) communication among a large number of devices to support the “Internet of Things”.

Challenges in implementing 5G in India/ Ways in which massive growth in the number of users, connected devices, and network traffic can be handled

5G is expected to provide numerous high quality services to millions of users and to provide connectivity to many heterogeneous networked devices, which may contain multiple multiband radios.

While capacity and data throughput need to increase, the amount of radio spectrum available is limited. New spectrum bands could be released to deal with this additional demand. (Refer “Emerging spectrum licensing options” below.)
Additional base transceiver stations will need be set up.
5G will exist alongside multiple and heterogeneous networks (3G, 4G, WLAN, NFC, and beyond with macro/femto/pico cells) while supporting numerous services all the time, many of which will be data-intensive will severely reduce the battery life of mobile devices and hence devices with greater battery life and very efficient power management will be required.
Also, combining various technologies (LTE with WiFi and/or legacy infrastructure with WiFi) and implementing heterogeneous networks will cater to increased demands. LTE will remain the baseline technology for wide area broadband in the 5G era. Interoperability with 4G will be critical to the adoption of 5G.
The backhaul will need upgrading in order to maximise speed and bandwidth. The National Optical Fibre Backbone is an infrastructural project that could work towards meeting this need.
Spectral efficiency needs to be improved but currently spectral efficiency is as optimum as it can get. In light of this, the solution lies usability of currently available technologies, for instance, LTE Release 8 has not been deployed yet. The concept of Small Cell has been defined in LTE Release 12, which has been optimised as much as technologically possible for the current bands. A potential enhancement being discussed for Release 13 is to make LTE operable with unlicensed spectrum bands as well.
Some amount of traffic can be offloaded using free spectrum (WiFi offloading) as well as the existing cellular spectrum (device to device offloading). [Refer: Licensed-assisted Access below]

--- Offloading can happen via cellular-to-WiFi hotspots (LTE and Advanced LTE)

--- Via Cellular small cells and relays (LTE/Advanced LTE, 3G)

--- Via co-located cellular and WiFi (Advanced LTE)

--- Via proximity services and D2D communication (Advanced LTE)

A unified solution lies in the end user enjoying ubiquitous connectivity and consistent user experience, and the telecom operator being able to operate efficiently with the gradual rollout of 5G and with close integration between heterogeneous technologies, with the use of the cloud and software defined networking (SDN) as underlying principles.

Emerging Spectrum Licensing Options

Static assignments and exclusive licenses of spectrum paved the foundation for reliable services and innovation on technology evolution. Cellular systems have now gained the ability to operate on frequencies of up to 5 GHz and to operate over system bandwidths up to 100 MHz.

To deal with the increased demand for spectrum, new spectrum bands could be released. These bands are likely to be in the higher frequencies with a carrier bandwidth of up to 1 GHz. Initial research shows that such high frequency bands might require the development of a new radio waveform, a new radio technology. It is not known yet if and when the standardisation of the new radio technology will be undertaken. Spectrum is a costly investment, so telcos tend to be very picky about it.

The prevalent scenario in India

India is not seen as an early adopter of new wireless communication technologies.
Indian telcos invest late in ‘new’ technologies, but they invest massive amounts of money and for periods of time comparatively much longer than in early adopter countries. Indian telcos are still starting and/ or expanding their 4G operations and these will stand for a long time to come.
Call tariffs are among the lowest in the world.
New spectrum is unlikely to be released in the near future. World Radio Conference 2019 (WRC 2019) is likely to be the earliest possible time of release.
5G system design is therefore likely to happen over two phrases: Evolution design (up to 5 GHz) by the year 2020 and Revolution design (in bands over 5 GHz) around 2023.

Licensed sharing/ Authorised sharing of spectrum

One way of dealing with the spectrum crunch, could be spectrum sharing. When the holder of spectrum is known to be underutilising it, and there is little possibility of changing the policies governing the quantum of utilisation, spectrum sharing is a preferred solution.

License-exempt use of spectrum with the implementation of policy guidelines could be practiced in cases such as apartment complexes and bus stations handling large amounts of traffic.

Traffic offloading: LTE over unlicensed spectrum

-- Licensed-Assisted Access (LAA)

LAA can be use to opportunistically boost data rate. It works by aggregating a primary cell, operating in licensed spectrum to deliver critical information and guaranteed Quality of Service, with a secondary cell operating in unlicensed spectrum. LAA can be implemented globally in the 5 GHz band. The secondary cell operating in unlicensed spectrum can be configured either as downlink-only cell or contain both uplink and downlink. This also facilitates some degree of co-existence between the operators of LTE and WiFi as well as among LTE operators.

How do the availability of network services and cost efficiency affect network performance?

– In general

Availability of network service is inversely proportional to bit-rate.
Costs pertaining to terminals and networking are inversely proportional to latency.
The length of the battery life of terminals (i.e. mobile devices) is inversely proportional to spectral efficiency.

– 2G

2G technology has an emphasis on voice and SMS with low bit-rate and low spectral efficiency. This leads to high mobility and high availability of the network service at the boundaries of the cell. (The cell boundaries are the furthest from the cell tower in terms of physical distance.)

– 2.5G

2.5G (EDGE and GPRS) provided higher bit-rates and hence lower spectral efficiency and lower availability of the network service at the boundaries of the cell.

– 3G

Targets for 3G performance were not comprehensively defined by the ITU-R in the IMT 2000 set of standards. The target defined peak bit-rates for a single user. Hence, in its early stages 3G did not meet expectations for data transfer speeds.

– 4G

Mobility continued to be low in 4G technology even as the ITU-R provided more comprehensive specifications by including spectral efficiency and latency targets. Like 3G, 4G focussed on single-user peak data rates.

– 5G

Attributes currently proposed for 5G:

High connection density (approx 10^5 users per km^2)
Low latency (less than 10 ms)
High bit-rate (approx 10^8 bits per second)
High capacity density (approx 10^3 bits per second per Hertz per km^2)
High spectral efficiency (approx 3 bits per second per Hertz)

Which would result in:

Very high terminal costs for the operator (between USD 100 and USD 1,000)
Low availability of network service
Low battery life of the user equipment,i.e., mobile devices and fixed devices utilised by the end user (less than 1 day)
Low energy efficiency (approx 10^-6 joules per bit)
Somewhat low mobility (less than 10 km per hour)

However, targets for the Internet-of-Things and for public safety conflict with the above attributes and their consequences, indicating the possible future emergence of more than one technical solution.

Key technologies for 5G wireless communication networks

– Massive MIMO (multiple-input multiple-output)

The number of receiver and transmitter elements as (also transceiver elements) are expected to increase to 100- 1000 low-power antennas per base transceiver station (BTS).

- New antenna technologies

Large scale antenna system (LSAS), 3D-MIMO, Steerable array antennas

Transmitted radio significantly reduces as the number of antenna elements is increases. Hundreds of thousands of antennas could be used together to improve the energy efficiency of wireless communications. Steerable arrays of antennas could be used for dynamic beam-forming patterns.

– Cloud technologies for flexible Radio Access Networks (RAN)

Cloud-based network architecture would include a centralised base station with numerous radio units distributed over the cell and ideally connected by optic fibre in order to reduce latency.

– Advanced Interference Management

New air interfaces under consideration include:

UFMC: Universal Filtered Multi-Carrier
FBMC: Filter-Bank Multi-Carrier
GFDM: Generalized Frequency Division Multiplexing
SCMA: Sparse Code Multiple Access
NOMA: Non-Orthogonal Multiple Access

– Network Densification

The proposed 5G requires new network architecture -- HetNet and Small Cell

– Millimetre wave band

New channels models will need to be developed to deal with different propagation conditions. 5G will work on higher frequencies, that is, in the millimetre wave band which has shorter wavelength (10GHz to 50GHz, 60 GHz, and possibly 70 GHz to 80 GHz) and wider bandwidths (500MHz to 3GHz). Millimetre wave (mmWave) MIMO requires dynamic beamforming at the transmitter and receiver.

More technical assumptions:
-- 5G will require significantly higher albeit low cost backhaul capacity (about 400 Gb/s).
-- 5G will have very low round-trip latency requirements.
– Higher frequencies and higher densities will dictate small cells.

Over-The-Top (OTT) Applications on Mobile User Equipment and IoT Devices

Reproduced with permission from Rohde and Schwarz

Green Communications Using 5G

The joint optimisation of Energy efficiency and spectral efficiency is critical for 5G research. There is still a long way to go to develop a unified framework and a comprehensive understanding of the tradeoff between energy efficiency and spectral efficiency. The latter has been pursued for decades as the top design priority of all major wireless standards, ranging from cellular networks to local and personal area networks. The cellular data rate has been improved from kilobits per second in 2G to gigabits per second in 4G. Spectral efficiency-oriented designs, however, have overlooked the issues of infrastructural power consumption.

The total power consumption of India’s mobile telephony infrastructure was 11.16 billion KWh in 2010. About 15% cell sites in India are either not connected to the electricity grid or receive power for less than eight hours a day; only about 10% receive more than 20 hours of power (Source: Intelligent Energy Limited). Two billion liters of diesel is consumed per year to power these cell sites, contributing to CO2 emission levels and massively adding to the operational costs of telcos.

The Indian Institute of Information Technology-Bangalore has proposed two power saving mechanisms.

Power-Saving Semi-Persistent Scheduler (PS-SPS) for VoLTE traffic in LTE-Advanced: This is a new scheduling algorithm implemented for VoLTE traffic in the downlink of LTE-Advanced cells in order to reduce power consumption in the link level. This proposed solution submitted to the IEEE is claimed to save power without affecting the network’s ability to support a large of VoLTE calls.
Random Access strategies for IoT devices in LTE-Advanced network: This scheme reduced the number of what is called “retransmissions” by Internet-of-Things devices so that these devices may complete the data transmission procedure [Random Access Channel procedure] in a comparatively short time. This scheme does not need the use of additional spectrum or barring mechanisms for IoT devices.

Glossary

Beamforming or spatial filtering is a signal processing technique used in sensor arrays for directional signal transmission or reception. -- Van Veen, B.D.; Buckley, K.M. (1988). "Beamforming: A versatile approach to spatial filtering" (PDF). IEEE ASSP Magazine 5 (2): 4. doi:10.1109/53.665.

Latency is a measure of the time delay that occurs when data packets travel from one networked point to another.

Multiple-input and multiple-output, or MIMO, is a method for multiplying the capacity of a radio link using multiple transmit and receive antennas to exploit multipath propagation. -- Lipfert, Hermann (August 2007). MIMO OFDM Space Time Coding – Spatial Multiplexing, Increasing Performance and Spectral Efficiency in Wireless Systems, Part I Technical Basis (Technical report). Institut für Rundfunktechnik.

Spectral efficiency is a measure of the performance of channel coding methods. It refers to the ability of a given channel encoding method to utilize bandwidth efficiently. It is defined as the average number of bits per unit of time (bit-rate) that can be transmitted per unit of bandwidth (bits per second per Hertz). – Taylor and Francis, Encyclopedia of Wireless and Mobile Communications, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1081/E-EWMC-120043448

Throughput is the amount of data transferred from one place to another or processed in a specified amount of time. Data transfer rates for disk drives and networks are measured in terms of throughput. Typically, throughputs are measured in kbps, Mbps and Gbps. – Webopedia, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/T/throughput.html

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/5g-spectrum-ieee-workshop-bangalore

Pervasive Technologies: Access to Knowledge in the Marketplace — CIS’s Upcoming A2K Research Initiative

Jadine Lannon — 2012-10-30T06:23:53Z

Pervasive technologies have flooded the Indian market and are changing the ways in which the average Indian accesses knowledge but very little is understood about these technologies, particularly when it comes to their legality. The Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) plans to begin a research project that aims to understand how pervasive technologies interact with Intellectual Property laws and what can be done to protect these technologies from being labelled “illegal” and eradicated from the Asian market.

Between 2000 and 2012, mobile phone subscriptions in India increased from 3.578 million to 893.86 million — an increase of almost 250 per cent.[1] In fact, mobile device sales were expected to reach 231 million units in 2012, an 8.5 per cent increase from 2011[2] and an incredible leap from the 21 million units sold in India in 2004.[3] While mobile phone penetration has been rising steadily in India,[4] the cost of mobile phones has plummeted, meaning that the ability to purchase and use mobile phones in India is becoming more and more widespread, especially in the marginalized classes. Mobiles are not the only technology that has experienced this phenomenon; indeed, many different types of pervasive technologies (mass-market networked communication technologies) have become increasingly more accessible across the board in Indian society.

When I use the term pervasive, I am referring to those technologies that are the most accessible to and used by the typical Indian. These technologies are characterized by their ability to provide access to media without significant cost to the user through both their low cost and their features. Mobile phones, netbooks and media players, as well as hardware, software and associated content are all considered to be pervasive technologies. For research purposes, CIS will only consider those technologies that cost under USD 100 or about INR 5,400. Considering that in 2011 it was estimated that about 75 per cent of the mobile devices sold in India cost below USD 75,[5] this is not a restrictive figure.

Although these technologies have become near ubiquitous in India and similar developing markets, very little is actually understood about how they interact with Intellectual Property (IP) laws. The pervasive technology industry exists somewhere between formal and informal and legal and illegal (as Carolyn Nordstrom would put it, these technologies would be il slash legal, or il/legal),[6] and can shift in and out of the legal/formal and illegal/informal realm depending on the stage of production; this is why they are often referred to as “gray market” technologies (though in some cases, it may even be appropriate to call them extra-legal). This lack of compliance with IP laws have made technologies both quite cheap to purchase and a popular platform for software, hardware and content innovation. The result is that these technologies often contain the newest and most interesting features and they provide the most “bang-for-your-buck” for content and value-added services. Thus, a consumer can buy a grey market technology that will have a wide array of features and services for a much lower price than would be paid to one of the larger manufacturers for an equal or even lesser product.

It is the low cost but highly sophisticated state of these pervasive technologies that is changing the way that people across the world access information and media, particularly those individuals and groups that routinely face barriers to mainstream structures of access. For those that were left on the wrong side of the infamous “digital divide”, pervasive technologies have been arguably the most effective means of providing real access to knowledge to the masses within India and across Asia, even more so than directed development initiatives. Indeed, pervasive technologies are not the future solution for access to knowledge; they are the current reality.

Although pervasive technologies are plausibly the most effective tools of access for knowledge in the marketplace in emerging economies like China, Indonesia and India, very little scholarly research has been done on pervasive technologies in the developing world, especially research that acknowledges the significant role that pervasive technologies have had in bridging the digital divide. This absence of appreciation for the significance of pervasive technologies in developing economies, coupled with a lack of understanding around their complex interaction with national and international IP regimes, may lead to a policy vacuum within which the existence of pervasive technologies could be jeopardized. Accordingly, CIS will begin a new access to knowledge research initiative that aims to understand the relationship between pervasive technologies and Intellectual Property. Pervasive Technologies: Access to Knowledge in the Marketplace will span over two-and-a-half calendar years (30 calendar months) and will recruit researchers from China, India, and other parts of Asia. Interaction will also be established with members of like-minded projects in Africa and Latin America. This research will begin as soon as it is approved by the Ministry of Home Affairs. The current project proposal is available for download as a PDF document (299 Kb).

The immediate aim of the research is to understand the legal environment, in which pervasive technologies exist, but simply generating comprehension is not enough; pervasive technologies must be allowed a more formal space in the Indian market. As part of the research project, CIS plans to carry out both an advocacy phase and dissemination phase in order to use the research outputs to create a more widespread understanding of the importance of pervasive technologies as access to knowledge tools. We hope that the research will encourage the formation of IP reforms and norms that recognize the role that pervasive technologies play in providing access to knowledge and enable their continued participation in the Indian market and society.

As the formal research project has yet to commence, I will be working on a small section of the Pervasive Technologies: Access to Knowledge in the Marketplace research on pervasive mobile phone technologies. CIS currently possesses 12 mobile phones that fall into the definition of pervasive technologies, though we will hopefully add to our collection as the research continues. The aim of this research is to document as much information about the life-cycles, hardware, software and content of each phone as possible in order to generate a better understanding of how these phones exist and interact with IP regimes and norms. The blog series on this research should begin in the next couple of weeks.

[1]. Data available on the International Telecommunications Union Data Explorer at http://bit.ly/MIfEYO
[2].Gartner Inc. Gartner Says Indian Mobile Handset Sales to Reach 231 Million Units in 2012, http://bit.ly/tKe7nU(November 22, 2011).
[3].Gartner Inc., ‘Forecast: Mobile Terminals, Worldwide, 2000-2009 report’ (July, 2005), but cited information can be retrieved from http://bit.ly/PTAOFC
[4].International Telecommunications Union, 'The World in 2009: ICT Facts and Figures' available at http://bit.ly/qtwGU
[5].Gartner Inc. Gartner Says Indian Mobile Handset Sales to Reach 231 Million Units in 2012, http://bit.ly/qtwGU (November 22, 2011).
[6].Nordstrom, C. Global Outlaws: Crime, Money, and Power in the Contemporary World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 256.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/pervasive-technologies-access-to-knowledge-in-the-market-place