The Centre for Internet and Society
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Expanding the World of Telugu Wikipedia – CIS-A2K and ALC join hands
https://cis-india.org/openness/blog-old/expanding-the-world-of-telugu-wikipedia-cis-and-alc-join-hands
<b>Students and faculty of Andhra Loyola College in Vijayawada aim to enhance Telugu Wikipedia through increased contributions to Wikipedia and make it available under free license.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/India_Access_To_Knowledge">The Access to Knowledge </a>(A2K) programme of the Centre for Internet and Society (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Centre_for_Internet_and_Society_(India)">CIS</a>) in its quest to catalyze the growth of open knowledge movement in Indic languages recently added another feather to its cap by signing a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with <a href="http://www.andhraloyolacollege.ac.in/">Andhra Loyola College</a> (ALC) in Vijayawada on August 14, 2014 to work collaboratively to improve <a href="https://te.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E0%B0%AE%E0%B1%8A%E0%B0%A6%E0%B0%9F%E0%B0%BF_%E0%B0%AA%E0%B1%87%E0%B0%9C%E0%B1%80">Telugu Wikipedia</a> and <a href="https://te.wikisource.org/wiki/%E0%B0%AE%E0%B1%8A%E0%B0%A6%E0%B0%9F%E0%B0%BF_%E0%B0%AA%E0%B1%87%E0%B0%9C%E0%B1%80">Telugu Wikisource</a>. College Principal Fr. G.A.P. Kishore, Vice-Principals Fr. P. Anil Kumar and Fr. Rex Angelo, correspondent Fr. Raju signed the agreement with CIS-A2K programme director T. Vishnu Vardhan.</p>
<table class="listing">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The MoU signed with ALC is for a period of five years and encompasses four activities:</p>
<ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Open knowledge creation in Telugu across various disciplines on Telugu Wikipedia: ALC faculty and students will be trained by CIS-A2K staff and interested Telugu Wikimedians to understand the principles that govern Wikipedia in order to generate quality entries. Faculty from Botany, Physics, Statistics, Ethics, Religion, Telugu Literature, and Music will work with CIS-A2K. Each of the faculty in the coming months will come up with a plan to generate open knowledge in Telugu in their respective disciplines.</li>
<li>Content donation and digitization on Telugu Wikisource: ALC through its networks will help CIS-A2K to bring Telugu content under CC-BY-SA 4.0 license. The Telugu department of the college expressed keen interest to work with CIS-A2K in digitizing historical Telugu content and to make it available on Telugu Wikisource. Various competitions will be planned in the future.</li>
<li>Creating a free software environment at Andhra Loyola College: 400 machines within various labs on the campus will be converted into FOSS systems with free and open source software including support for Telugu and other Indic languages. It should be noted that all the existing computers of ALC are run on proprietary software. As a pilot initiative CIS-A2K has already converted 30 systems in a lab and named it as Loyola FOSS Lab.</li>
<li>CIS-A2K to revise the FIT (Fundamentals in Information Technology): A mandatory course for all undergraduate students which will introduce students to FOSS, Openness and Wikipedia. This is an outcome of the FOSS orientation done by T. Vishnu Vardhan and Rahimanuddin Shaik during the two workshops that were held at ALC.</li>
</ol></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">CIS-A2K will put every effort to involve Telugu Wikimedians and FOSS community in taking this collaboration with ALC forward. CIS-A2K will also create a project page on Telugu Wikipedia to actively document and publicly share the detailed plans and progress. More updates will also be shared on this website.</p>
<table class="image-alc">
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<th><img src="https://cis-india.org/home-images/alc1.png" alt="ALC and CIS-A2K" class="image-inline" title="ALC and CIS-A2K" /></th>
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<td>Above: Representatives from ALC and CIS-A2K seen during the signing ceremony.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The signing of the MoU was done at a public event in the presence of students, faculty and management of ALC and various representatives from media. The media covered this event enthusiastically. The Hindu coverage can be found <a href="http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/tp-andhrapradesh/alc-signs-mou-for-better-net-access/article6320555.ece">here</a> and Eenadu article coverage is <a href="https://cis-india.org/openness/news/cis-mou-with-alc-coverage-in-eenadu" class="external-link">here</a>.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/openness/blog-old/expanding-the-world-of-telugu-wikipedia-cis-and-alc-join-hands'>https://cis-india.org/openness/blog-old/expanding-the-world-of-telugu-wikipedia-cis-and-alc-join-hands</a>
</p>
No publisherT Vishnu Vardhan and Rahmanuddin ShaikAccess to KnowledgeWikimediaWikipediaFeaturedTelugu WikipediaOpennessHomepage2014-09-30T05:11:29ZBlog EntryPrivacy vs. Transparency: An Attempt at Resolving the Dichotomy
https://cis-india.org/openness/blog-old/privacy-v-transparency
<b>The right to privacy has been articulated in international law and in some national laws. In a few countries where the constitution does not explicitly guarantee such a right, courts have read the right to privacy into other rights (e.g., the right to life, the right to equal treatment under law and also the right to freedom of speech and expression).</b>
<hr />
<p><i>With feedback and inputs from Sumandro Chattapadhyay, Elonnai Hickok, Bhairav Acharya and Geetha Hariharan</i>. I would like to apologize for not providing proper citation to Julian Assange when the first version of this blog entry was published. I would also like to thank Micah Sifry for drawing this failure to his attention. The blog post originally published by Omidyar Network <a class="external-link" href="http://www.openup2014.org/privacy-vs-transparency-attempt-resolving-dichotomy/">can be read here</a>. Also see <a class="external-link" href="http://newint.org/features/2015/01/01/privacy-transparency/">http://newint.org/features/2015/01/01/privacy-transparency/</a></p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In other countries where privacy is not yet an explicit or implicit right, harm to the individual is mitigated using older confidentiality or secrecy law. After the Snowden affair, the rise of social media and the sharing economy, some corporations and governments would like us to believe that “privacy is dead”. Privacy should not and cannot be dead, because that would mean that security is also dead. This is indeed the most dangerous consequence of total surveillance as it is technically impossible to architect a secure information system without privacy as a precondition. And conversely, it is impossible to guarantee privacy without security as a precondition.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The right to transparency [also known as the right to information or access to information] – while unavailable in international law – is increasingly available in national law. Over the last twenty years this right has become encoded in national laws – and across the world it is being used to hold government accountable and to balance the power asymmetry between states and citizens. Independent and autonomous offices of transparency regulators have been established. Apart from increasing government transparency, corporations are also increasingly required to be transparent as part of generic or industry specific regulation in the public interest. For instance, India’s Companies Act, 2013, requires greater transparency from the private sector. Other areas of human endeavor such as science and development are also becoming increasingly transparent though here it is still left up to self-regulation and there isn’t as much established law. Within science and research more generally, the rise of open data accompanied the growth of the Open Access and citizen science movement.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">So the question before us is: Are these two rights – the right to transparency and the right to privacy – compatible? Is it a zero-sum game? Do we have to sacrifice one right to enforce the other? Unfortunately, many privacy and transparency activists think this is the case and this has resulted in some conflict. I suggest that these rights are completely compatible when it comes to addressing the question of power. These rights do not have to be balanced against one another. There is no need to settle for a sub-optimal solution. <b>Rather this is an optimization problem and the solution is as follows: privacy protections must be inversely proportionate to power and as Julian Assange says transparency requirements should be directly proportionate to power.</b><a href="#fn*" name="fr*">[*] </a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In most privacy laws, the public interest is an exception to privacy. If public interest is being undermined, then an individual privacy can be infringed upon by the state, by researchers, by the media, etc. And in transparency law, privacy is the exception. If the privacy of an individual can be infringed, transparency is not required unless it is in the public interest. In other words, the “public interest” test allows us to use privacy law and transparency law to address power asymmetries rather than exacerbate them. What constitutes “public interest” is of course left to courts, privacy regulators, and transparency regulators to decide. Like privacy, there are many other exceptions in any given transparency regime including confidentiality and secrecy. Given uneven quality of case law there will be a temptation by the corrupt to conflate exceptions. Here the old common-law principle of “there is no confidence as to the disclosure of iniquity” – which prevents confidentiality law from being used to cover malfeasance or illegality – can be adopted in appropriate jurisdictions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Around 10 years ago, the transparency movement gave birth to yet another movement – the open government data movement. The tension between privacy and transparency is most clearly seen in the open government data movement. The open government data movement in some parts of the world is dominated by ahistorical and apolitical technologists, and some of them seem intent on reinventing the wheel. In India, ever since the enactment of the Right to Information Act, 2003, 30 transparency activists are either killed, beaten or criminally intimidated every year. This is the statistic from media coverage alone. Many more silently suffer. RTI or transparency is without a doubt one of the most dangerous sectors within civil society that you could choose to work in. In contrast, not a single open data activist has ever been killed, beaten or criminally intimidated. I suspect this is because open data activists do not sufficiently challenge power hierarchies. Let us look a little bit closely at their work cycle. When a traditional transparency activist asks a question, that is usually enough to get them into trouble. When an open data activist publishes an answer [a dataset nicely scrubbed and machine readable, or a visualization, or a tool] they are often frustrated because nobody seems interested in using it. Often even the activist is unclear what the question is. This is because open data activist works where data is available. Open data activists are obsessed with big datasets, which are easier to find at the bottom of the pyramid. They contribute to growing surveillance practices [the nexus between Internet giants, states, and the security establishment] rather that focusing on sousveillance [citizen surveillance of the state, also referred to as citizen undersight or inverse surveillance]. They seem to be obsessed only with tools and technologies, rather than power asymmetries and injustices.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Finally, a case study to make my argument easier to understand – Aadhaar or UID, India’s ambitious centralized biometric identity and authentication management system. There are many serious issues with its centralized topology, proprietary technology, and dependence on biometrics as authentication factors – all of which I have written about in the past. In this article, I will explain how my optimization solution can be applied to the project to make it more effective in addressing its primary problem statement that corruption is a necessary outcome of power asymmetries in India.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In its current avatar – the Aadhaar project hopes to assign biometric-based identities to all citizens. The hope is that, by doing authentication in the last mile, corruption within India’s massive subsidy programmes will be reduced. This, in my view, might marginally reduce retail corruption at the bottom of the pyramid. It will do nothing to address wholesale corruption that occurs as subsidies travel from the top to the bottom of the pyramid. I have advocated over the last two years that we should abandon trying to issue biometric identities to all citizens, thereby making them more transparent to the state. Let us instead issue Aadhaar numbers to all politicians and bureaucrats and instead make the state more transparent to citizens. There is no public interest in reducing privacy for ordinary citizens – the powerless – but there are definitely huge public interest benefits to be secured by increasing transparency of politicians and bureaucrats, who are the powerful.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Indian government has recently introduced a biometric-based attendance system for all bureaucrats and has created a portal that allows Indian citizens to track if their bureaucrats are arriving late or leaving early. This unfortunately is just bean counting [for being corrupt and being punctual are not mutually exclusive] and public access to the national portal was turned off because of legitimate protests from some of the bureaucrats. What bureaucrats do in office, who they meet, and which documents they process is more important than when they arrive at or depart from work. The increased transparency or reduced privacy was not contributing to the public interest.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Instead of first going after small-ticket corruption at the bottom of the pyramid, maximization of public interest requires us to focus on the top, for there is much greater ROI for the anti-corruption rupee. For example: constructing a digital signature based on audit trails that track all funds and subsidies as they move up and down the pyramid. These audit trails must be made public so that ordinary villagers can be supported by open data activists, journalists, social entrepreneurs, and traditional civil society in verification and course correction.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">I hope open data activists, data scientists, and big data experts will draw inspiration from the giants of the transparency movement in India. I hope they will turn their attention to power, examine power asymmetries and then ask how the Aadhaar project can be leveraged to make India more rather than less equal.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Videos</h3>
<table class="plain">
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<th>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Open Up? 2014: Risky Business: Transparency, Technology, Security, and Human Rights</p>
</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><iframe frameborder="0" height="315" src="http://www.youtube.com/embed/tDf8TFjxqiQ" width="560"></iframe></td>
</tr>
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<td><b>Open Up? 2014: Data Collection and Sharing: Transparency and the Private Sector</b></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><iframe frameborder="0" height="315" src="http://www.youtube.com/embed/lPHWkYZjqzo" width="560"></iframe></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>The videos can also be watched on Vimeo:</p>
<ol>
<li><a class="external-link" href="http://vimeo.com/111729069">Open Up? 2014: Risky Business: Transparency, Technology, Security, and Human Rights </a></li>
<li><a class="external-link" href="http://vimeo.com/111748146">Open Up? 2014: Data Collection and Sharing: Transparency and the Private Sector </a></li>
</ol>
<hr />
<p>[<a href="#fr*" name="fn*">*</a>].<a class="external-link" href="http://prospect.org/article/real-significance-wikileaks">http://prospect.org/article/real-significance-wikileaks</a> “Transparency should be proportional to the power that one has.”</p>
<p>Read the presentation on Risky Business: Transparency, Technology, Security and Privacy made at the Pecha Kucha session <a href="https://cis-india.org/openness/blog-old/risky-business.odp" class="internal-link">here</a>. (ODP File, 35 kb)</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>Disclaimer: The views, opinions, and positions expressed by the author(s) of this blog are theirs alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views, opinions, or positions of Omidyar Network. We make no representations as to accuracy, completeness, timeliness, suitability or validity of any information presented by individual authors of the blogs and will not be liable for any errors, omissions, or delays in this information or any losses, injuries or damages arising from its display or use.</i></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/openness/blog-old/privacy-v-transparency'>https://cis-india.org/openness/blog-old/privacy-v-transparency</a>
</p>
No publishersunilPrivacyFeaturedVideoAadhaarOpennessOpen Access2015-03-08T06:26:21ZBlog EntryWorkshop on Open Data for Human Development
https://cis-india.org/openness/blog-old/workshop-on-open-data-for-human-development-2015-06
<b>Sumandro Chattapadhyay and Sunil Abraham will take part in the workshop being organised for government officials from Bhutan, Maldives, Meghalaya, Sikkim, and Tripura, by the International Centre for Human Development (IC4HD) of UNDP India, during June 3-6, 2015. The workshop will be held at the National Institute of Advanced Studies Campus in Bengaluru. Sunil will be one of the panelists in the opening discussion on 'data and transparency in governance,' and Sumandro will provide input for and lead the sessions on developing the draft implementation plan for the Sikkim Open Data Acquisition and Accessibility Policy. Sumandro worked with the IC4HD team to design the objectives and the agenda of the workshop.</b>
<p> </p>
<h2>Sikkim Open Data Acquisition and Accessibility Policy</h2>
<p> </p>
<p>Government of Sikkim passed the <a href="http://www.sikkim.gov.in/stateportal/Link/SODAAP%20Policy%20Document.pdf" target="_blank">SODAA Policy</a> in 2014 so as to streamline and open up the availability of “authentic data to buttress the achievements of the Government of Sikkim and to gather data on key metrics to be able to spur growth in all the areas of human development.” The Policy mandates setting up an open data portal, hosted by the State Data Centre of Sikkim, where data contributed by all the state government agencies will reside, and from which the same data will be made openly accessible to government agencies, non-government organisations, and private individuals alike. Only data that is shareable – data that is not part of negative list prepared by any government agency – and that is non-sensitive – data that does not contain information that can be used to identify any private individual – will be made available through this Sikkim open data portal. The Department of Information Technology of the Government of Sikkim has been assigned the role of being the nodal agency for coordinating and monitoring the implementation “of policy through close collaboration with all State Government Departments and agencies.”</p>
<p> </p>
<h2>Objectives of the Workshop</h2>
<p> </p>
<p>The Government of Sikkim understands that data collection, management, and reporting processes at the different departments must go through a structural reconfiguration before systematic and sustainable publication of data through this open data portal can be possible. This work will of course involve a long duration of change, and participation of a wide range of actors. The <a href="http://www.in.undp.org/content/india/en/home/operations/projects/human-development/the-international-centre-for-human-development.html" target="_blank">International Centre for Human Development</a>, at UNDP India, is organising this workshop for Sikkim government officials to conceptualise and develop the outlines of an action strategy towards this goal of streamlining data acquisition and publication processes across government departments.</p>
<p>Discussions in this workshop will focus on the activities of four departments of the Government of Sikkim – Department of Health, Rural Management and Development Department (RMDD), Human Resource Development Department (HRDD), and Department of Agriculture. At least two officials from each of these departments would take part in the workshop. Apart from these departments, officials from Department of Information Technology (DIT), Department of Economic Statistics, Monitoring, and Evaluation (DESME), and others, will also participate.</p>
<p>Apart from government officials from Sikkim, those from Bhutan, Maldives, Meghalaya, and Tripura will also attend the workshop, so as to think ahead towards their respective open data initiatives.</p>
<p> </p>
<h2>Agenda of the Workshop</h2>
<p> </p>
<h3>Day 1: June 3, 2015</h3>
<p> </p>
<table class="plain">
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Session</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0930-1000</td>
<td><strong>Welcome and Introductions</strong><br />
A.K. Shiva Kumar, Director, IC4HD<br />
P.D. Rai, Honourable Member of Parliament (LS) from Sikkim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000-1100<br />
<strong>Session 1</strong></td>
<td><strong>Panel Discussion</strong><br />
<strong>Data and Transparency in Governance</strong><br />
Moderator: P. D. Rai<br />
Panellists:
<ul><li>Srivatsa Krishna, Secretary, Department of Information Technology, Biotechnology and Science & Technology, Government of Karnataka</li>
<li>B. Gangaiah, Additional Director General, Centre for Good Governance, Hyderabad</li>
<li>Sunil Abraham, Executive Director, The Centre for Internet and Society</li></ul>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1100-1130<br />
<strong>Session 2</strong></td>
<td><strong>Sikkim Open Data Acquisition and Accessibility Policy</strong><br />
Moderator: P. D. Rai<br />
Presentation by: T. Samdup, Joint Director, Department of Information Technology, Sikkim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1130-1200</td>
<td><strong>Tea Break</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1200-1300<br />
<strong>Session 3</strong></td>
<td><strong>Implementing an Open Data Policy - Key Components</strong><br />
Moderator: A. K. Shiva Kumar<br />
Presentation by: Sumandro Chattapadhyay, The Centre for Internet and Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1300-1400</td>
<td><strong>Lunch</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1400-1430<br />
<strong>Session 4</strong></td>
<td><strong>Group Exercise 1</strong><br />
<strong>Challenges of Opening up Government Data in Sikkim</strong><br />
Facilitated by: Sumandro Chattapadhyay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1430-1530<br />
<strong>Session 5</strong></td>
<td><strong>Mobile Phone-based Data Collection</strong><br />
<strong>Introduction to Akvo FLOW</strong><br />
Moderator: Meenaz Munshi, IC4HD<br />
Presentation by: Joy Ghosh and Amitangshu Acharya, AKVO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1530-1600</td>
<td>Tea Break</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:00-1730<br />
<strong>Session 6</strong></td>
<td><strong>Group Exercise 2</strong><br />
<strong>Collecting Data Using Akvo FLOW</strong><br />
Facilitated by: Joy Ghosh and Amitangshu Acharya, AKVO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p> </p>
<h3>Day 2: June 4, 2015</h3>
<p> </p>
<table class="plain">
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Session</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0930-1000<br />
<strong>Session 7</strong></td>
<td><strong>Analysing, Visualising, and Publishing Data</strong><br />
Moderator: Amitangshu Acharya<br />
Presentation by: Thejesh GN, DataMeet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000-1045<br />
<strong>Session 8</strong></td>
<td><strong>Collecting, Visualising, and Publishing Geographic Data</strong><br />
Moderator: Amitangshu Acharya<br />
Presentation by: Shiv Ramachandran, MapBox</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1045-1145<br />
<strong>Session 9</strong></td>
<td><strong>Group Exercise 3</strong><br />
<strong>Organising, Analysing, Visualising, and Publishing Data</strong><br />
Facilitated by: Thejesh GN and Shiv Ramachandran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1145-1200</td>
<td><strong>Tea Break</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1200-1300</td>
<td><strong>Group Exercise 3</strong><br />
<strong>Organising, Analysing, Visualising, and Publishing Data</strong><br />
(Continued)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1300-1400</td>
<td><strong>Lunch</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1400-1500<br />
<strong>Session 10</strong></td>
<td><strong>Open Data and Health Management</strong><br />
Presentation by: Dr. Shiban Ganju, Consultant, Ingalls Health, Harvey, Illinois, Chicago; Chair, Atrimed Health Consulting, Bangalore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500-1600<br />
<strong>Session 11</strong></td>
<td><strong>Open Data and Primary Education</strong><br />
Presentation by: Gautam John, Karnataka Learning Partnership</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p> </p>
<h3>Day 3: June 5, 2015</h3>
<p> </p>
<table class="plain">
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Session</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0930-1030<br />
<strong>Session 12</strong></td>
<td><strong>Panel Discussion</strong><br />
<strong>Regional Experiences and Reflections on Open Data</strong><br />
Panellists: representative from Bhutan, and from Meghalaya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1030-1115<br />
<strong>Session 13</strong></td>
<td><strong>Implementing National Data Sharing and Accessibility Policy</strong><br />
Presentation by: D. P. Misra, National Informatics Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1115-1130<br />
<strong>Session 14</strong></td>
<td><strong>Group Exercise 4</strong><br />
<strong>Drafting the SODAAP Implementation Plan</strong><br />
Facilitated by: Sumandro Chattapadhyay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1130-1200</td>
<td><strong>Tea Break</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1200-1300</td>
<td><strong>Group Exercise 4</strong><br />
<strong>Drafting the SODAAP Implementation Plan</strong><br />
(Continued)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1300-1400</td>
<td><strong>Lunch</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1400-1500<br />
<strong>Session 15</strong></td>
<td><strong>Group Presentations</strong><br />
<strong>Draft SODAAP Implementation Plan</strong><br />
Moderator: P. D. Rai<br />
Facilitated by: Sumandro Chattapadhyay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500-1530</td>
<td><strong>Wrap-Up and Vote of Thanks</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p> </p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/openness/blog-old/workshop-on-open-data-for-human-development-2015-06'>https://cis-india.org/openness/blog-old/workshop-on-open-data-for-human-development-2015-06</a>
</p>
No publishersumandroOpen DataFeaturedWorkshopPolicies2015-06-02T15:34:06ZBlog EntryOpen Data Intermediaries in Developing Countries - A Synthesis Report
https://cis-india.org/openness/blog-old/open-data-intermediaries-in-developing-countries
<b>The roles of intermediaries in open data is insufficiently explored; open data intermediaries are often presented as
single and simple linkages between open data supply and use. This synthesis research paper offers a more
socially nuanced approach to open data intermediaries using the theoretical framework of Bourdieu’s social model, in particular, his concept of species of capital as informing social interaction... Because no single
intermediary necessarily has all the capital available to link effectively to all sources of power in a field, multiple
intermediaries with complementary configurations of capital are more likely to connect between power
nexuses. This study concludes that consideration needs to be given to the presence of multiple intermediaries in an open data ecosystem, each of whom may possess different forms of capital to enable the use and unlock the
potential impact of open data.</b>
<p> </p>
<p>This synthesis report is prepared by François van Schalkwyk, Michael Caňares, Sumandro Chattapadhyay, and Alexander Andrason, based on the analysis of a sample of cases from the <a href="http://opendataresearch.org/" target="_blank">Exploring the Emerging Impacts of Open Data in Developing Countries</a> (ODDC) research network managed by the World Wide Web Foundation and supported by the International Development Research Centre, Canada. Data on intermediaries were extracted from the ODDC reports according to a working definition of an open data intermediary presented in this paper, and with a focus on how intermediaries link actors in an open data supply chain.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Below is an excerpt from the report. The full report can be accessed from <a href="http://figshare.com/articles/Open_Data_Intermediaries_in_Developing_Countries/1449222" target="_blank">Figshare</a> or from <a href="https://github.com/ajantriks/docs/raw/master/ODDC_2_Open_Data_Intermediaries_15_June_2015_FINAL.pdf" target="_blank">Github</a>.</p>
<p> </p>
<h2>Implications for Policy</h2>
<p> </p>
<p>The practical implications of the findings presented here are not insignificant. Given that most of the open data intermediaries in this study were found to rely on donor in order to execute their open data-related social benefit activities, it is perhaps funders who should take heed of the findings presented here when making grants. For example, where a single agency is awarded a funding grant to improve the lives of citizens using open data, questions need to be asked whether the grantee possesses all the types of capital required not only to re-use open data but to connect open data to specific user groups in order to
ensure the use and impact of open data. Questions to be asked of grantees could include: “Who are the specific user groups or communities that you expect to use the data, information or product you are making available?”; “Does your organisation have existing links to these user groups or communities?”; and “What types of channels are in place for you to communicate with these user groups or communities?”. Alternatively donor funders may rethink awarding funding to single agencies in favour of funding partnerships or collaborations in which there is a greater spread of types of capital across multiple actors thereby
increasing the likelihood of effectively linking the supply and use of open data. Such an approach would be more in line with an ecosystems approach to multiple actors being participants in the data supply and (re)use of open data, and the importance of keystone species and positive feedback loops to ensure a healthy system.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>In addition to highlighting the importance of social capital in developing-country innovations systems, Intarakummerd and Chaoroenporn (2013) point to the importance of government initiating and coordinating the activities of both public and private intermediaries. Our findings indicate that should governments adopt such a co-ordinating role in the case of open data intermediaries, they would do well to engage with a broad spectrum of intermediaries, and not simply focus on intermediaries who possess only the technical capital required to interpret and repackage open government data. To be sure, this will be a challenging role for government to assume as conflicting vested interests are likely to surface. Although speculative, it is possible that such a coordinating role is likely to work best when there is a strong pact between all actors involved. And this, in turn, will require a common vision of the value and benefits of open data – something that cannot be taken for granted.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Should there be agreement on the value and benefits of open data, our findings show that most of the
intermediaries in our study are NGOs that rely on donor funding. This should raise serious questions about the sustainability of open data initiatives that are civic-minded in conjunction with questions about what incentives other than that of donor funding could ensure the supply and use of open data beyond project funding. Funders and supporters of open data initiatives may have to think not only about the value and benefits or funding projects, but of the sustainability and the impacts of the products produced by the projects they fund.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/openness/blog-old/open-data-intermediaries-in-developing-countries'>https://cis-india.org/openness/blog-old/open-data-intermediaries-in-developing-countries</a>
</p>
No publishersumandroData SystemsOpen DataFeaturedOpen Data CommunityOpenness2015-06-16T09:40:58ZBlog EntryKonkani Wikipedia Goes Live After 'Nine Years' of Incubation
https://cis-india.org/openness/blog-old/konkani-wikipedia-goes-live
<b>Konkani Wikipedia is the second Wikimedia project after Odia Wikisource that has gone live out of incubation. The project stayed in the incubation for nine long years and the community has gone through a long debate to have a Wikipedia of their own. Here is a blog highlighting three Konkani Wikimedians and an advocate of the Wikipedia movement whose efforts finally paid off.</b>
<p>Read the original blog entry published on Wikimedia Blog on July 15, 2015 <a class="external-link" href="http://blog.wikimedia.org/2015/07/15/konkani-wikipedia-goes-live/">here</a>.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify;">The Goan Konkani Wikipedia (available at <a href="https://gom.wikipedia.org">gom.wikipedia.org</a>) has gone live after spending nine long years in incubation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">An Indo-Aryan language, of the Indo-European family of languages, Konkani is the official language of <a title="w:Goa" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goa">Goa</a>. It is a minority language in other Indian states, such as <a title="w:Maharashtra" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maharashtra">Maharashtra</a>, <a title="w:Karnataka" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karnataka">Karnataka</a>, northern <a title="w:Kerala" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kerala">Kerala</a>, <a title="w:Dadra and Nagar Haveli" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dadra_and_Nagar_Haveli">Dadra and Nagar Haveli</a>, and <a title="w:Daman and Diu" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daman_and_Diu">Daman and Diu.</a> It is spoken by about 7.4 million people.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Konkani can be written in five different scripts: Devanagari—officially used by the Government of Goa—as well as Latin (locally known as <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Konkani_in_the_Roman_script">Romi Konkani</a>), Kannada, Malayalam, and Persian. Of these, the Goan Antruz dialect of the language, in the Devanagari script, is considered <a title="en:Konkani alphabets" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Konkani_alphabets">standard</a> by the Indian constitution.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The Konkani Wikipedia has many heroes, as we see them. <a title="gom:User:Melissa Simoes" href="https://gom.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:Melissa_Simoes">Melissa Simoes</a> and <a title="gom:User:Darshan kandolkar" href="https://gom.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:Darshan_kandolkar">Darshan Kandolkar</a> are two of the many long-term contributors who joined during the <a href="https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/CIS-A2K/Konkani_Wikipedia_@Goa_University">Konkani Wikipedia @ Goa University</a> program and are still active even after the program formally concluded. Darshan is an assistant professor at the <a title="w:Government College Pernem" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_College_Pernem">Government College Pernem</a> in Goa. His professor at <a title="w:Goa University" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goa_University">Goa University</a>, Dr. Madhavi Sardesai—who passed away last year—played a vital role in inspiring him to go for higher studies in Konkani. Darshan realized that there is a lot to be written in Konkani when he was introduced to Wikipedia, and after that, he became dedicated to contributing to the project.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">“I would like to bring more students as contributors to our Konkani Wikipedia,” Darshan says. “My aim is to start with my students at Government College Pernem. Being an alumnus of Goa University, I also want my juniors there to join our community and enrich Konkani Wikipedia.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">“I have a dream to start a project for the freedom fighters of Goa and involve a diverse set of people, from students to journalists and columnists. I also want to build partnership with educational institutions so we could engage with the students for a longer run and the existing Konkani community could mentor them,” he continues.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">“Being a new Wikipedia project, Konkani Wikipedia needs more quality measures and the articles have to grow to good quality articles with more images and templates, I want to take it to the level of English Wikipedia with both quantitative and qualitative growth in articles!”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The Konkani Wikimedia community has been using social media actively to promote the Konkani Wikipedia project, and to celebrate the successes of its contributors. After Melissa became the top contributor to the project, her fellow editor <a title="incubator:User:Konknni mogi 24" href="https://incubator.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:Konknni_mogi_24">Luis Gomes</a> <a href="https://www.facebook.com/groups/konkaniwikipedia/permalink/485802771575565">congratulated</a> her. That brought Melissa into the spotlight, gaining the attention of editors from the global Wikimedia community. The community is continuing a tradition to rewarding the most prolific contributor of each month as the “Wikipedian of the Month”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Melissa was introduced to the Wikipedia program at her university where the target for each participating student was to write one article each about a village in Goa. “I wrote my article just for the sake of the marks, but never bothered to think about why I am writing it. After the program was over, I became inactive on Wikipedia.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">“After some time, I met Father [Luis Gomes] in parish and then Darshan and Father inspired me to resume editing. Then, it became an addiction and I never stopped even for a day. I would come back from work and sit in front of my computer.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">“Now, I am a teacher, and my fellow teachers are mostly women. I would like to introduce the Goan Konkani Wikipedia to them so they could also contribute to Wikipedia,” Melissa says.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As Konkani Wikipedia went live, long term Wikimedian Fredrick Noronha, an early advocate of Konkani Wikipedia, said, “It is a wonderful feeling to see the Goan Konkani Wikipedia live. I would like to congratulate all who have been involved in some or the other way with the making of Konkani Wikipedia live from the days of its inception and incubation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">“I am not a great contributor or even a language expert. I come from a content background and found my interest in Wikipedia, Wikimedia Commons and Creative Commons long ago. But this helped me to associate myself in some way with the Konkani Wikipedia incubator. I am happy that CIS-A2K chipped in to help build a community and help it grow in collaboration with the Goa University.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">“Students of the Konkani department in the university are the real heroes to take this effort forward by filling the Wikipedia incubator with more editing activity to which the institutional backing acted as catalyst,” he added.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Fredrick feels there are major challenges that the community now has to start taking measures for: “The macrolanguage is written in multiple scripts. Out of five of the scripts three—Devanagari, Romi/Latin and Kannada—are actively used in printing and publication currently. People using all the scripts should be equally participating in a movement like Wikipedia to take their languages to other native speakers using Wikipedia as a digital tool.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">“The second challenge is with the contributors. Goa, being home to majority of the Konkani language speakers, has English education from the primary level. This means many have a great level of technical ability. The technical contributor community here would be of great use to Konkani Wikipedia if tapped,” he adds.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">“The technical contributors are eager to contribute but have not been approached in a manner that would interest them. Similarly the Konkani authors who are helping propagate the language to masses have sadly no or very little clue about Wikipedia’s existence in Konkani. This disparity is stopping a massive flow of local encyclopedic content to the Konkani Wikipedia. Unless we tap into the technological and the linguistic groups it will be only a tip of the iceberg.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Fredrick explains that the the current Konkani Wikipedia community is primarily made up of students of Goa University. “This is both good and bad,” he says. “Having young and enthusiastic students as Wikipedia editors is helping the project to leap forward, which might not have happened if the faculty were targeted instead. There is, however, a great need for diversification.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">“The approach to bring in authors in the 60–70 years age group will vary from the approach to bring in, for example, technical people. Our outreach strategies should ultimately fulfill both the literary and technological contributors, so that their work can help us to both grow content and to solve the problem of the multiple scripts, respectively,” Fredrick adds.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The Konkani Wikipedia community is organizing a <a href="https://www.facebook.com/events/1449555445347537/">public seminar</a> on July 18 at <a href="https://www.unigoa.ac.in/">Goa University</a> to celebrate the launch of the Konkani Wikipedia and to pay tribute to Dr. Madhavi Sardesai, who always dreamed of the Konkani Wikipedia getting out of incubation.</p>
<hr />
<h2>Video</h2>
<table class="invisible">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th style="text-align: center;"><iframe src="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3ADarshan_Kandolkar_talks_about_Konkani_Wikipedia.webm?embedplayer=yes" frameborder="0" height="288" width="512"></iframe><br /></th>
</tr>
<tr>
<th>
<p>Wikimedian <a title="w:gom:User:Darshan Kandolkar" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/gom:User:Darshan_Kandolkar">Darshan Kandolkar</a> shares his experience of contributing to Konkani Wikipedia. <br />Video in Konkani. <a href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Darshan_Kandolkar_talks_about_Konkani_Wikipedia.webm">Video</a> by <a title="m:Wikimedia India" href="https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_India">Wikimedia India</a>, freely licensed under <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/deed.en">CC-BY-SA 4.0.</a></p>
</th>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/openness/blog-old/konkani-wikipedia-goes-live'>https://cis-india.org/openness/blog-old/konkani-wikipedia-goes-live</a>
</p>
No publishersubhaCreative CommonsAccess to KnowledgeWikimediaWikipediaFeaturedKonkani WikipediaHomepage2016-06-18T18:15:05ZBlog EntryHow India Makes E-books Easier to Ban than Books (And How We Can Change That)
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/india-ebooks-easier-to-ban-than-books
<b>Without getting into questions of what should and should not be unlawful speech, Pranesh Prakash chooses to take a look at how Indian law promotes arbitrary removal and blocking of websites, website content, and online services, and how it makes it much easier than getting offline printed speech removed.</b>
<h2>E-Books Are Easier To Ban Than Books, And Safer</h2>
<p>Contrary to what Mr. Sibal's recent hand-wringing at objectionable online material might suggest, under Indian laws currently in force it is far easier to remove material from the Web, by many degrees of magnitude, than it is to ever get them removed from a bookstore or an art gallery. To get something from a bookstore or an art gallery one needs to collect a mob, organize collective outrage and threats of violence, and finally convince either the government or a magistrate that the material is illegal, thereby allowing the police to seize the books or stop the painting from being displayed. The fact of removal of the material will be noted in various records, whether in government records, court records, police records or in newspapers of record. By contrast, to remove something from the Web, one needs to send an e-mail complaining about it to any of the string of 'intermediaries' that handle the content: the site itself, the web host for the site, the telecom companies that deliver the site to your computer/mobile, the web address (domain name) provider, the service used to share the link, etc. Under the <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/intermediary-guidelines-rules">'Intermediary Guidelines Rules'</a> that have been in operation since 11th April 2011, all such companies are required to 'disable access' to the complained-about content within thirty-six hours of the complaint. It is really that simple.</p>
<p>"That's ridiculous," you think, "surely he must be exaggerating." Think again. A researcher working with us at the Centre for Internet and Society tried it out, several times, with many different intermediaries and always with frivolous and flawed complaints, and was successful <a class="external-link" href="http://www.cis-india.org/news/chilling-impact-of-indias-april-internet-rules"> six out of seven times </a>. Thus it is easier to prevent Flipkart or Amazon from selling Rushdie's Midnight's Children than it is to prevent a physical bookstore from doing so: today Indira Gandhi wouldn't need to win a lawsuit in London against the publishers to remove a single line as she did then; she would merely have to send a complaint to online booksellers and get the book removed. It is easier to block Vinay Rai's Akbari.in (just as CartoonsAgainstCorruption.com was recently blocked) than it is to prevent its print publication. Best of all for complainants: there is no penalty for frivolous complaints such as those sent by us, nor are any records kept of who's removed what. Such great powers of censorship without any penalties for their abuse are a sure-fire way of ensuring a race towards greater intolerance, with the Internet — that republic of opinions and expressions — being a casualty.</p>
<h2>E-Book Bans Cannot Be Challenged</h2>
<p>In response to some of the objections raised, the Cyberlaw Division of the Department of Information Technology, ever the dutiful guardian of free speech, noted that if you have a problem with access to your content being 'disabled', you could always <a href="http://www.pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=72066">approach a court</a> and get that ban reversed. Unfortunately, the Cyberlaw Division of the Department of Information Technology forgot to take into account that you can't contest a ban/block/removal if you don't know about it. While they require all intermediaries to disable access to the content within thirty-six hours, they forgot to mandate the intermediary to tell you that the content is being removed. Whoops. They forgot to require the intermediary to give public notice that content has been removed following a complaint from person ABC or corporation XYZ on such-and-such grounds. Whoops, again.</p>
<p>So while records are kept, along with reasons, of book bans, there are no such records required to be kept of e-book bans.</p>
<h2>E-Book Censors Are Faceless</h2>
<p>Vinay Rai is a brave man. He is being attacked by fellow journalists who believe he's disgracing the professional upholders of free-speech, and being courted by television channels who believe that he should be encouraged to discuss matters that are sub judice. He is viewed by some as a man who's playing politics in courts on behalf of unnamed politicians and bureaucrats, while others view him as being bereft of common-sense for believing that companies should be legally liable for not having been clairvoyant and removing material he found objectionable, though he has never complained to them about it, and has only provided that material to the court in a sealed envelope. I choose, instead, to view him as a scrupulous and brave man. He has a face, and a name, and is willing to openly fight for what he believes in. However, there are possibly thousands of unscrupulous Vinay Rais out there, who know the law better than he does, and who make use not of the court system but of the Intermediary Guidelines Rules, firmly assured by those Rules that their censorship activities will never be known, will never be challenged by Facebook and Google lawyers, and will never be traced back to them.</p>
<h2>Challenging Invisible Censorship</h2>
<p>Dear reader, you may have noticed that this is a bit like a trial involving Free Speech in which Free Speech is presumed guilty upon complaint, is not even told what the charges against it are, has not been given a chance to prove its innocence, and has no right to meet its accusers nor to question them. Yet, the Cyberlaw Division of the Department of Information Technology continues to issue press releases defending these Rules as fair and just, instead of being simultaneously Orwellian and Kafkaesque. These Rules are delegated legislation passed by the Department of Information Technology under <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/section-79-information-technology-act">s.79 of the Information Technology Act</a>. The Rules were laid before Parliament during the 2011 Monsoon session. We at CIS believe that these Rules are *ultra vires* the IT Act as well as the Constitution of India, not only with respect to what is now (newly) proscribed online (which in itself is enough to make it unconstitutional), but how that which is purportedly unlawful is to be removed. We have prepared an alternative that we believe is far more just and in accordance with our constitutional principles, taking on best practices from Canada, the EU, Chile, and Brazil, while still allowing for expeditious removal of unlawful material. We hope that the DIT will consider adopting some of the ideas embodied in our draft proposal.</p>
<p>As Parliament passed the IT Act in the midst of din, without any debate, it is easy to be skeptical and wonder whether Rules made under the IT Act will be debated. However, I remain hopeful that Parliament will not only exercise its power wisely, but will perform its solemn duty — borne out of each MP's oath to uphold our Constitution — by rejecting these Rules.</p>
<p>Photo credit: <a href="https://secure.flickr.com/photos/grandgrrl/5240360344/">Lynn Gardner</a>, under CC-BY-NC-SA 2.0 licence*</p>
<p><a class="external-link" href="http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?279712">This was reproduced in Outlook Magazine</a> on 27 January 2012</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/india-ebooks-easier-to-ban-than-books'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/india-ebooks-easier-to-ban-than-books</a>
</p>
No publisherpraneshObscenityFreedom of Speech and ExpressionInternet GovernanceFeaturedIntermediary LiabilityCensorship2012-02-21T11:50:56ZBlog EntryAccessible Broadcasting in India
https://cis-india.org/accessibility/blog/accessible-broadcasting-in-india
<b>The abridged version of International Telecommunication Union's "Making Television Accessible" Report which we published last year has been broadened in scope and is now called "Accessible Broadcasting in India" report.</b>
<hr />
<p>This is an updated version of the draft that was first put up for comments on October 8, 2012. <a class="external-link" href="http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/sis/PwDs/Documents/ITU-G3ict Making_TV_Accessible_Report_November_2011.pdf">Read</a> the full report published by ITU.</p>
<hr />
<h2>Executive Summary</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Television and Radio are mediums to inform, educate and entertain. Sitting down at the end of the day and turning on the TV or radio is a rather involuntary task for many. They have become part of the fabric of almost every Indian’s life. However, there are a significant number of people in India who are unable to enjoy TV or Radio.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Television and Radio technologies have advanced at a rapid pace but accessibility of TV and Radio in India has been a persistent problem. Being mediums that are consumed through sight and sound, those with impairments in these two areas have found TV viewing and radio listening difficult or impossible. Not much progress has been made in the area of Accessible Broadcasting since the introduction of the TV “Weekly News Bulletin for the hearing impaired” in 1987.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The purpose of this report<i> </i>is to provide information to Indian policymakers about various TV and Radio Accessibility options available, best practices followed internationally and suggest recommendations for a brighter future in the area of Accessible Broadcasting.</p>
<p><b>This report is based on ITU’s “Making Television Accessible Report” (November 2011) by Peter Olaf Looms, Chairman ITU-T Focus Group on Audiovisual Media Accessibility. It has been adapted especially to cater to the needs and interests of India. We’d like to thank ITU for the use of this report and Peter Olaf Looms for his inputs to this abridged version. </b></p>
<hr />
<p>This abridged report specifically covers:</p>
<ul>
<li> TV Accessibility Options</li>
<li>Costs Involved & Bandwidth Requirements</li>
<li>Best Practices followed internationally</li>
<li>Radio Accessibility Options</li>
<li>Recommendations.</li>
</ul>
<hr />
<p><a href="https://cis-india.org/accessibility/blog/accessible-broadcasting-in-india.pdf" class="internal-link">Download the abridged report</a></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/accessibility/blog/accessible-broadcasting-in-india'>https://cis-india.org/accessibility/blog/accessible-broadcasting-in-india</a>
</p>
No publishersrividyaFeaturedAccessibility2013-01-28T05:28:38ZBlog EntryBack When the Past had a Future: Being Precarious in a Network Society
https://cis-india.org/raw/digital-humanities/blogs/habits-of-living/aprja-net-researching-bwpwap-nishant-shah-back-when-the-past-had-a-future
<b>We live in Network Societies. This phrase has been so bastardised to refer to the new information turn mediated by digital technologies, that we have stopped paying attention to what the Network has become. Networks are everywhere. They have become the default metaphor of our times, where everything from infrastructure assemblies to collectives of people, are all described through the lens of a network.</b>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This article by Nishant Shah was published in a peer-reviewed newspaper <a class="external-link" href="http://www.aprja.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/researching_bwpwap_large.pdf">Researching BWPWAP</a>. The write-up is on Page 3.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We are no longer just human beings living in socially connected, politically identified communities. Instead, we have become actors, creating archives of traces and transactions, generating traffic and working as connectors in the ever expanding fold of the network.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The network is an opaque metaphor, conflating description and explanation. So it becomes the object to be studied, the originary context that produces itself, and the explanatory framework that accounts for itself. In other words, the network was our past – it gives us an account of who we were, it is our present – it defines the context of all our activities, and it is our future – where we do everything to support the network because it is the only future that we can imagine for ourselves. It is this flattening characteristic of networks that are diagrammatically mapped, cartographically reproduced, and presented outside of and oblivious to temporality, that produces a condition of the future that can no longer be imagined through our everyday lives.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Networks neither promise nor deliver a flattened utopia of coexistence and decentralised power. Networks are, in fact, quite aware of the structures of inequity and conditions of privilege they create and perpetuate: the only way to recognise the existence of a network is to be outside of it, the only aspiration to belong to a network is to be kept outside of it when you recognise it. Networks create themselves as simultaneously ubiquitous and scarce, of everpresent and ephemeral, creating a new ontology for our being human – an ontology of precariousness, contingent upon erasure of our histories, archives of our present, and unimaginable futures; futures we are not ready for, and don’t have strategies to occupy.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">I remember the times, before networks became the default conditions of being human, when kids, negotiating the variegated temporalities of their past-present-futures, would often begin their speculations on future, by saying, "When I grow up...". In that hope of growing up, was the potential for radical political action, the possibility of social reconstruction. In network societies, though, time has no currency. It has been replaced by attentions, flows of information and actions, and do not offer a tomorrow to grow into.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">There is no future to help mitigate the exigencies of the present. And with the overwhelming emphasis on archiving the present, there is no more a coherent future that can be accounted for in the vocabulary that the network develops to explain itself, and the hypothetical world outside it.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/raw/digital-humanities/blogs/habits-of-living/aprja-net-researching-bwpwap-nishant-shah-back-when-the-past-had-a-future'>https://cis-india.org/raw/digital-humanities/blogs/habits-of-living/aprja-net-researching-bwpwap-nishant-shah-back-when-the-past-had-a-future</a>
</p>
No publishernishantFeaturedHabits of LivingResearchers at WorkDigital Humanities2013-02-12T06:16:12ZBlog EntryArbitrary Arrests for Comment on Bal Thackeray's Death
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/bal-thackeray-comment-arbitrary-arrest-295A-66A
<b>Two girls have been arbitrarily and unlawfully arrested for making comments about the late Shiv Sena supremo Bal Thackeray's death. Pranesh Prakash explores the legal angles to the arrests.</b>
<h2 id="facts-of-the-case">Facts of the case</h2>
<p>This morning, there was <a href="http://www.mumbaimirror.com/article/2/2012111920121119043152921e12f57e1/In-Palghar-cops-book-21yearold-for-FB-post.html">a short report in the Mumbai Mirror</a> about two girls having been arrested for comments one of them made, and the other 'liked', on Facebook about Bal Thackeray:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Police on Sunday arrested a 21-year-old girl for questioning the total shutdown in the city for Bal Thackeray’s funeral on her Facebook account. Another girl who ‘liked’ the comment was also arrested.</p>
<p>The duo were booked under Section 295 (a) of the IPC (for hurting religious sentiments) and Section 64 (a) of the Information Technology Act, 2000. Though the girl withdrew her comment and apologised, a mob of some 2,000 Shiv Sena workers attacked and ransacked her uncle’s orthopaedic clinic at Palghar.</p>
<p>“Her comment said people like Thackeray are born and die daily and one should not observe a bandh for that,” said PI Uttam Sonawane.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2 id="what-provisions-of-law-were-used">What provisions of law were used?</h2>
<p>There's a small mistake in Mumbai Mirror's reportage as there is no section "64(a)"<sup><a class="footnoteRef" href="#fn1" id="fnref1">1</a></sup> in the Information Technology (IT) Act, nor a section "295(a)" in the Indian Penal Code (IPC). They must have meant <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/section-295a-indian-penal-code">section 295A of the IPC</a> ("outraging religious feelings of any class") and <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/section-66A-information-technology-act">section 66A of the IT Act</a> ("sending offensive messages through communication service, etc."). (Update: The Wall Street Journal's Shreya Shah has confirmed that the second provision was section 66A of the IT Act.)</p>
<p>Section 295A of the IPC is cognizable and non-bailable, and hence the police have the powers to arrest a person accused of this without a warrant.<sup><a class="footnoteRef" href="#fn2" id="fnref2">2</a></sup> Section 66A of the IT Act is cognizable and bailable.</p>
<p>Update: Some news sources claim that <a href="http://www.vakilno1.com/bareacts/indianpenalcode/s505.htm">section 505(2) of the IPC</a> ("Statements creating or promoting enmity, hatred or ill-will between classes") has also been invoked.</p>
<h2 id="was-the-law-misapplied">Was the law misapplied?</h2>
<p>This is clearly a case of misapplication of s.295A of the IPC.<sup><a class="footnoteRef" href="#fn3" id="fnref3">3</a></sup> This provision has been frivolously used numerous times in Maharashtra. Even the banning of James Laine's book <i>Shivaji: Hindu King in Islamic India</i> happened under s.295A, and the ban was subsequently held to have been unlawful by both the Bombay High Court as well as the Supreme Court. Indeed, s.295A has not been applied in cases where it is more apparent, making this seem like a parody news report.</p>
<p>Interestingly, the question arises of the law under which the friend who 'liked' the Facebook status update was arrested. It would take a highly clever lawyer and a highly credulous judge to make 'liking' of a Facebook status update an act capable of being charged with electronically "sending ... any information that is grossly offensive or has menacing character" or "causing annoyance or inconvenience", or under any other provision of the IT Act (or, for that matter, the IPC).<sup><a class="footnoteRef" href="#fn4" id="fnref4">4</a></sup> That 'liking' is protected speech under Article 19(1)(a) is not under question in India (unlike in the USA where that issue had to be adjudicated by a court), since unlike the wording present in the American Constitution, the Indian Constitution clearly protects the 'freedom of speech <b>and expression</b>', so even non-verbal expression is protection.</p>
<h2 id="role-of-bad-law-and-the-police">Role of bad law and the police</h2>
<p>In this case the blame has to be shared between bad law (s.66A of the IT Act) and an abuse of powers by police. The police were derelict in their duty, as they failed to provide protection to the Dhada Orthopaedic Hospital, run by the uncle of the girl who made the Facebook posting. Then they added insult to injury by arresting Shaheen Dhada and the friend who 'liked' her post. This should not be written off as a harmless case of the police goofing up. Justice Katju is absolutely correct in <a href="http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/NewDelhi/Katju-demands-action-against-Mumbai-cops-for-arresting-woman/Article1-961478.aspx">demanding that such police officers should be punished</a>.</p>
<h2 id="rule-of-law">Rule of law</h2>
<p>Rule of law demands that laws are not applied in an arbitrary manner. When tens of thousands were making similar comments in print (Justice Katju's article in the Hindu, for instance), over the Internet (countless comments on Facebook, Rediff, Orkut, Twitter, etc.), and in person, how did the police single out Shaheen Dhada and her friend for arrest?<sup><a class="footnoteRef" href="#fn5" id="fnref5">5</a></sup></p>
<h2 id="social-media-regulation-vs.-suppression-of-freedom-of-speech-and-expression">Social Media Regulation vs. Suppression of Freedom of Speech and Expression</h2>
<p>This should not be seen merely as "social media regulation", but as a restriction on freedom of speech and expression by both the law and the police. Section 66A makes certain kinds of speech-activities ("causing annoyance") illegal if communicated online, but legal if that same speech-activity is published in a newspaper. Finally, this is similar to the Aseem Trivedi case where the police wrongly decided to press charges and to arrest.</p>
<p>This distinction is important as it being a Facebook status update should not grant Shaheen Dhada any special immunity; the fact of that particular update not being punishable under s.295 or s.66A (or any other law) should.</p>
<div class="footnotes">
<hr />
<ol>
<li id="fn1">
<p>Section 64 of the IT Act is about "recovery of penalty" and the ability to suspend one's digital signature if one doesn't pay up a penalty that's been imposed.<a href="#fnref1">↩</a></p>
</li>
<li id="fn2">
<p>The police generally cannot, without a warrant, arrest a person accused of a bailable offence unless it is a cognizable offence. A non-bailable offence is one for which a judicial magistrate needs to grant bail, and it isn't an automatic right to be enjoyed by paying a bond-surety amount set by the police.<a href="#fnref2">↩</a></p>
</li>
<li id="fn3">
<p>Section 295A of the IPC has been held not to be unconstitutional. The first case to <a href="http://ibnlive.in.com/generalnewsfeed/news/pil-to-declare-sec-66a-as-unconstitutional-filed/1111666.html">challenge the constitutionality of section 66A of the IT Act</a> was filed recently in front of the Madurai bench the Madras High Court.)<a href="#fnref3">↩</a></p>
</li>
<li id="fn4">
<p>One can imagine an exceptional case where such an act could potentially be defamatory, but that is clearly exceptional.<a href="#fnref4">↩</a></p>
</li>
<li id="fn5">
<p>This is entirely apart from the question of how the Shiv Sena singled in on Shaheen Dhada's Facebook comment.<a href="#fnref5">↩</a></p>
</li>
</ol>
<hr />
<p>This blog entry has been re-posted in the following places</p>
<ul>
<li><a class="external-link" href="http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?283033">Outlook</a> (November 19, 2012).</li>
<li><a class="external-link" href="http://kafila.org/2012/11/19/social-media-regulation-vs-suppression-of-freedom-of-speech-pranesh-prakash/">KAFILA</a> (November 19, 2012).</li>
</ul>
</div>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/bal-thackeray-comment-arbitrary-arrest-295A-66A'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/bal-thackeray-comment-arbitrary-arrest-295A-66A</a>
</p>
No publisherpraneshIPCIT ActFreedom of Speech and ExpressionFeaturedFacebookCensorship2013-01-02T03:42:37ZBlog EntryIndia's Ratification of the Marrakesh Treaty Celebrated; Accessible Books Consortium Launched
https://cis-india.org/accessibility/blog/indias-ratification-of-marrakesh-treaty-celebrated
<b>On Day 1 of the 28th Session of the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights (“SCCR”), the WIPO organized an event to mark India’s ratification of the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled, 2013 (“Marrakesh Treaty”), and to launch the Accessible Books Consortium (“ABC”).</b>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">India Becomes the First Country to Ratify the Marrakesh Treaty</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Francis Gurry, Director General, WIPO said that the Marrakesh Treaty received 79 signatures in the twelve month period that the treaty was open for signatures. He further said that India’s ratification of the Marrakesh Treaty one year from its conclusion was a “WIPO record of sorts” and a “great example from a major country” of the importance attached to the Marrakesh Treaty.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Dilip Sinha, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations in Geneva handed over India’s Instrument of Accession to the Marrakesh Treaty to Francis Gurry. Ambassador Sinha in his speech stressed on the importance of the Marrakesh Treaty to India and said that it helped that India had its amendments to its Copyright Act, 1957 in place, incorporating the provisions of the Marrakesh Treaty.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Maryanne Diamond, the Immediate Past President of the World Blind Union (“WBU”) congratulated India on its ratification. Calling it a country who showed “huge leadership” in negotiations of the Marrakesh Treaty, Ms. Diamond said that this ratification was extremely significant, with India being home to a large number of blind and print disabled people and a part of the Global South. Ms. Diamond urged other nations to follow India’s example and make it a priority to ratify the Marrakesh Treaty.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Jens Bammel, Secretary General, International Publishers Association (“IPA”) also congratulated India on its ratification of the Marrakesh Treaty and called on other member states to ratify it.</p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">Accessible Books Consortium Launched</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">At the launch of the ABC, Mr. Gurry said that the Marrakesh Treaty was only the means to an end, where the end was books in the hands of print disabled and visually impaired persons across the world. “To make it operational,” said Mr. Gurry, “we need to have operational activities.” He said that the ABC was an operational activity which would “breathe life” into and “make operational” the legal framework provided by the Marrakesh Treaty.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">What Does it Do?</h3>
<p>Mr. Gurry said that the ABC aimed at achieving three things- <i>first, </i>capacity building; <i>second, </i>international book exchange and <i>third, </i>international book exchange.</p>
<ol>
<li style="text-align: justify; ">Capacity Building- Mr. Gurry said that the ABC seeks to provide training on accessible book production and distribution. He thanked the Republic of Korea which has committed to providing financial assistance for training in respect of production of books in accessible formats.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; ">International Book Exchange- Mr. Gurry said that this activity was an IT supported facility, namely, the <a href="http://www.accessiblebooksconsortium.org/tigar/en/">TIGAR Service</a> which has its origins in India. This would allow participating institutions to perform international searches of databases to find out if accessible formats of books are available. </li>
<li style="text-align: justify; ">Inclusive Publishing- Mr. Gurry said that at the end of the day, “books should be born accessible” and technology was creating the “promise of the realization of this aspiration.” Mr. Gurry said that the ABC would promote accessible publishing and to this end, had drawn up a charter of accessible publishing- <a href="http://www.accessiblebooksconsortium.org/inclusive_publishing/en/accessible_best_practice_guidelines_for_publishers.html">Accessible Publishing Best Practice Guidelines for Publishers</a>. Elsevier is the first publisher to have signed this charter.</li>
</ol>
<h2>India, WBU and IPA delighted</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Praising the ABC, Ambassador Sinha called it an indicator of what multi-stakeholder cooperation needs to do. He said that the ABC would assist organizations such as the DAISY Forum of India in achieving the goal of access to books in accessible formats. Congratulating the WIPO for its efforts on this front, Ambassador Sinha said that this would help nations like India realize their goal of achieving the purposes of the Marrakesh Treaty. Ms. Diamond, representing the WBU congratulated Elsevier on signing the charter. Jens Bammel, on behalf of the IPA expressed concern for making books available in accessible formats for non English speakers. The ABC, he said, was a project initiated to “genuinely complement” the Marrakesh Treaty, and would create a global catalogue of accessible works, whether provided by libraries or by publishers. Expressing his delight that the ABC was being supported equally by all stakeholders, Mr. Bammel reached out to member states to support this initiative politically.</p>
<ol> </ol>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/accessibility/blog/indias-ratification-of-marrakesh-treaty-celebrated'>https://cis-india.org/accessibility/blog/indias-ratification-of-marrakesh-treaty-celebrated</a>
</p>
No publishernehaaFeaturedHomepageAccessibilityAccess to Knowledge2014-07-01T11:09:08ZBlog EntryFive Frequently Asked Questions about the Amended ITRs
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/five-faqs-on-amended-itrs
<b>This piece discusses the five major questions that have been the subject of debate after the World Conference on International Telecommunications 2012 (WCIT). The politics surrounding the WCIT are not discussed here but it must be kept in mind that they have played a significant role in the outcome of the conference and in some of the debates about it.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Each question is discussed with reference to the text of the treaty, to the minutes of the plenary sessions (which are available via the <a href="http://www.itu.int/en/pages/default.aspx">ITU website</a>), a little international law and a few references to other people’s comments on the treaty.</p>
<p><b>1. Do the ITRs apply to content on the internet?</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Article 1.1 (a) has been amended to add the sentence “These Regulations do not address the content-related aspects of telecommunications”. Although some discussions about the <a href="http://www.itu.int/en/wcit-12/Documents/final-acts-wcit-12.pdf">International Telecommunication Regulations (ITRs)</a> and content have ignored this altogether, others seem concerned about its interpretation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The ITU Secretary General has issued <a href="http://www.itu.int/en/wcit-12/Pages/statement-toure.aspx">a statement</a> in which he has clarified that “The new ITR treaty does NOT cover content issues and explicitly states in the first article that content-related issues are not covered by the treaty”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Commentators like <a href="http://tryingtoreason.wordpress.com/2012/12/15/yes-the-new-itrs-do-cover-content-and-the-internet/">Chuan-Zheng Lee</a> however, continue to view the treaty with suspicion, on the basis that it is necessary to examine content in order to tell whether it is spam (Lee and <a href="http://globalvoicesonline.org/2013/01/02/wcit-and-its-relationship-to-the-internet-what-lies-ahead/">Chaparro</a> differ on this question). However, others like <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/15/technology/in-a-huff-a-telling-us-walkout.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0">Eric Pfanner</a> have pointed to this paragraph in their skepticism about the US refusal to sign.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>Some highlights from the plenary session discussions</i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Chairman proposed the addition to Article 1.1(a) at the tenth plenary session. He did this to address concerns that the ITRs text could be interpreted to apply to content on the Internet. The original formulation that he proposed was ‘These regulations do not address and cannot be interpreted as addressing content’. This text was suggested in the middle of an extended discussion on Article 5A.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Many countries were skeptical of this insertion. Sudan argued that content could not be avoided in telecommunication networks “because it will always be in transit.” The United Arab Emirates seemed concerned about international interference in states’ existing regulation of content, and said “maybe we could actually say this in the minutes of the meeting that this regulation should not be interpreted as on alteration to Member States content regulation”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Concerns about what the term ‘content’ means and whether it would apply broadly were raised by more than one country, including Saudi Arabia. For instance, it was argued that the text proposed by the Chairman might interfere with parts of the treaty that require operators to send tariff information correspondence. More than one country that felt that the insertion of this text would impact several parts of the treaty, and that it would be difficult to determine what amounted to dealing with content. The primary issue appeared to be that the term ‘content’ was not defined, and it therefore remained unclear what was being excluded. In response to these concerns, the Chairman withdrew his proposal for the amendment excluding content.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">However, several states then spoke up in favour of the Chairman’s proposal, suggesting that the proposed amendment to Article 1.1 influenced their acceptance of Article 5A (on security and robustness of networks – discussed in detail below). Brazil suggested that an answer to the definitional concerns may be found in the work by Study Group 17, which had a definition available.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Following this, the next day, at the twelfth plenary, the Chairman brought back the Article 1.1 amendment excluding content. He stated explicitly that this amendment might be the way to get Articles 5A and 5B approved. The text he read out was insertion of the words <i>“</i>to the exclusion of their content”, after ‘’services’ at the end of 1.1A. Interestingly however, the term ‘content’ was never defined.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">At the next plenary session, Iran raised the objection that this phrase was overbroad, and proposed the following formulation instead: “These Regulations do not address the content-related aspects of telecommunications”. This formulation found its way into the amended ITRs as the treaty stands today.</p>
<p><b>2. Does Article 5A on network security legitimize surveillance of Internet content?</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Article 5A deals with ‘security and robustness of networks’ and requires member states to “individually and collectively endeavour to ensure the security and robustness of international telecommunication networks...”. This may have given rise to concerns about interpretations that may extend the security of networks to malware or viruses, and therefore to content on the Internet. However, Article 5A has to be read with Article 1.1(a), and therefore must be interpreted such that it does not ‘address the content-related aspects of telecommunications’.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Some commentators continue to see Article 5A as problematic. Avri Doria <a href="http://avri.doria.org/post/38641776703/wcit">has argued</a> that the use of the word ‘security’ in addition to ‘robustness’ of telecommunication infrastructure suggests that it means Internet security. However Emma Llansó of the Centre for Democracy and Technology <a href="https://www.cdt.org/blogs/emma-llanso/2012making-sense-wcit-it%E2%80%99s-complicated">has noted</a> that the language used in this paragraph is “ far too vague to be interpreted as a requirement or even a recommendation that countries surveil users on their networks in order to maintain security”. Llansó has suggested that civil society advocates make it clear to countries which attempt to use this article to justify surveillance, that it does not lend itself to such practices.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>Some highlights from the plenary session discussions</i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Article 5A was one of the most controversial parts of the ITRs and was the subject of much debate.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">On December 11<sup>th</sup>, in the Chairman’s draft that was being discussed, Article 5A was titled ‘security of networks’, and required members to endeavour to ensure the “security and robustness of international telecommunication networks”. The Chairman announced that this was the language that came out of Committee 5’s deliberations, and that ‘robustness’ was inserted at the suggestion of CEPT.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Several countries like Poland, Australia, Germany and the United States of America were keen on explicitly stating that Article 5A was confined to the physical or technical infrastructure, and either wanted a clarification that to this effect or use of the term ‘robustness’ instead of security. Many other countries, such as Russia and China, were strongly opposed to this suggestion and insisted that the term security must remain in the document (India was one of the countries that preferred to have the document use the term ‘security’).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It was in the course of this disagreement, during the tenth plenary session, that the Chairman suggested his global solution for Article 1.1 – a clarification that this would not apply to content. This solution was contested by several countries, withdrawn and then reinstated (in the eleventh plenary) after many countries explained that their assent to Article 5A was dependant on the existence of the Article 1 clarification about content (see above for details).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">There was also some debate about whether Article 5A should use the term ‘robustness’ or the term ‘security’ (eg. The United States clarified that its preference was for the use of ‘resilience and robustness’ rather than security). The Secretary General referred to this disagreement, and said that he was therefore using both terms in the draft. The title of Article 5A was changed, in the eleventh plenary, to use both terms, instead of only referring to security.</p>
<p><b>3. Does Article 5B apply to spam content on the Internet? </b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The text of the amended treaty talks of ‘unsolicited bulk electronic communications’ and does not use the term ‘spam’[Article 5B says that ‘Members should endeavour to take necessary measures to prevent the propagation of unsolicited bulk electronic communications and minimize its impact on international telecommunication services’].If this phrase is read in isolation, it may certainly be interpreted as being applicable to spam. Commentators like <a href="http://avri.doria.org/tagged/WCIT/page/2">Avri Doria</a> have pointed to sources like<a href="http://www.itu.int/osg/csd/intgov/resoultions_2010/PP-10/RESOLUTION_130.pdf"> Resolution 130 of the Plenipotentiary Conference of the International Telecommunication Union</a> (Guadalajara, 2010) to demonstrate that ‘unsolicited bulk electronic communications’ ordinarily means spam. However, others like<a href="http://globalvoicesonline.org/2013/01/02/wcit-and-its-relationship-to-the-internet-what-lies-ahead/"> Enrique A. Chaparro</a> argue that it cannot possibly extend to content on the Internet given the language used in Article 1.1(a). Chapparo has explained, that given the exclusion of content, Article 5B it authorizes anti-spam mechanisms that do not work on content.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Article 5B, which discusses ‘unsolicited bulk electronic communications’, must be read with Article 1, which is the section on purpose and scope of the ITRS. Article 1.1 (a) specifies that the ITRs “do not address the content-related aspects of telecommunications”. Therefore it may be argued that ‘unsolicited bulk electronic communications’ cannot be read as being applicable to content on the Internet.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">However, many continue to be concerned about Article 5B’s applicability to spam on the Internet. Although some of them that their fear is that some states may interpret Article 5B as applying to content, despite the contents of Article 1.1(a), many have failed to engage with the issue in the context of Article 1.1(a).</p>
<p><i>Some highlights from the plenary session discussions</i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Article 5B is inextricably linked with the amendment to Article 1.1. Mexico asked specifically about what the proposed amendment to Article 1.1 would mean for Article 5B: “I’m referring to the item which we’ll deal with later, namely unsolicited bulk electronic communications. Could that be referred to as content, perhaps?”. The Chairman responded saying, “This is exactly will solve the second Article 5B, that we are not dealing with content here. We are dealing with measures to prevent propagation of unsolicited bulk electronic messages”.<sup></sup></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The amendment to Article 1.1 was withdrawn soon after it was introduced. Before it was reintroduced, Sweden said (at the eleventh plenary) that it could not see how Article 5B could apply without looking into the content of messages. The United States agreed with this and went on state that the issue of spam was being addressed at the WTSA level, as well as by other organisations. It argued that the spam issue was better addressed at the technical level than by introducing it in treaty text.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The amendment excluding content was reintroduced during the twelfth plenary. The Chairman explicitly stated that it might be the way to get Articles 5A and 5B approved.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The word ‘spam’ was dropped from the ITRs in the eight plenary, and “unsolicited bulk electronic communications” was used instead. However, in the eleventh plenary, as they listed their reasons for not signing the newly-amended ITRs, Canada and the United States of America referred to ‘spam’ which suggests that they may have viewed the change as purely semantic.</p>
<p><b>4. Does the resolution on Internet Governance indicate that the ITU plans to take over the Internet?</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Much controversy has arisen over the plenary resolution ‘to foster an enabling environment for the greater growth of the Internet’. This controversy has arisen partly thanks to the manner in which it was decided to include the resolution, and partly over the text of the resolution. The discussion here focuses on the text of the resolution and then describes the proceedings that have been (correctly) criticized.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The history of this resolution, as <a href="http://www.circleid.com/posts/20121217_wcit_and_internet_governance_harmless_resolution_or_trojan_horse/">Wolfgang Kleinwächter</a> has explained, is that it was part of a compromise to appease the countries which were taking positions on the ITU’s role in Internet governance, that were similar to the <a href="http://files.wcitleaks.org/public/Merged%20UAE%20081212.pdf">controversial Russian proposal</a>. The controversial suggestions about Internet governance were excluded from the actual treaty and included instead in a non-binding resolution.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The text of the resolution instructs the Secretary General to “to continue to take the necessary steps for ITU to play an active and constructive role in the development of broadband and the multi-stakeholder model of the Internet as expressed in § 35 of the Tunis Agenda”. This paragraph is particularly controversial since of paragraph 35 of the <a href="http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.html">Tunis Agenda</a> says “Policy authority for Internet-related public policy issues is the sovereign right of States. They have rights and responsibilities for international Internet-related public policy issues.” Kleinwächter has pointed out that this selection leaves out later additions that have taken place with progression towards a multi-stakeholder model.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The resolution also resolves to invite member states to “to elaborate on their respective positions on international Internet-related technical, development and public-policy issues within the mandate of ITU at various ITU forums including, inter alia, the World Telecommunication/ICT Policy Forum, the Broadband Commission for Digital Development and ITU study groups”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A little after its introduction, people began expressing concerns such as the <a href="https://www.accessnow.org/blog/2012/12/12/wcit-watch-just-taking-the-temperature-a-late-night-resolution-on-the-inter">Secretary General may treat the resolution as binding</a>, While the language may raise cause for concern, it is important to note that resolutions of this nature are not binding and countries are free to opt out of them. Opinions vary about the intentions that have driven the inclusion of this resolution, and what it may mean for the future. However commentators like Milton Mueller have scoffed at these concerns, pointing out that the resolution is harmless and may have been a <a href="http://www.internetgovernance.org/2012/12/13/what-really-happened-in-dubai/">clever political maneuver</a> to resolve the basic conflict haunting the WCIT, and that <a href="http://www.internetgovernance.org/2012/12/18/itu-phobia-why-wcit-was-derailed/">mere discussion of the Internet in the ITU harms no one</a>.</p>
<p><i>Some highlights from the plenary session discussions</i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Egypt and Bulgaria suggested that the resolution refer to paragraph 55 of the Tunis agenda instead of paragraph 35, by inserted the following text “”Recognizing that the existing arrangements for Internet Governance have worked effectively to make the Internet the highly robust, dynamic and geographically diverse medium it is today, with the private sector taking the lead in day-to-day operations and with innovation and value creation at the edges.” The US was also quite insistent on this language (although it did also argue that this was the wrong forum to discuss these issues).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Chairman was willing to include paragraph 55 in addition to paragraph 35 but Saudi Arabia objected to this inclusion. Finland suggested that the resolution should be removed since it was not supported by all the countries present and was therefore against the spirit of consensus. The Secretary General defended the resolution, suggesting both that it was harmless and that since it was a key component of the compromise, eliminating it would threaten the compromise. South Africa and Nigeria supported this stand.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It was during this debate that the procedural controversy arose. Late into the night, the Chairman said there was a long list of countries that wished to speak and said “I just wanted to have the feel of the room on who will accept the draft resolution”. He proceeded to have countries indicate whether they would accept the draft resolution or not, and then announced that the majority of the countries in the room were in favour of retaining the resolution. The resolution was then retained. Upon Spain’s raising the question, the Chairman clarified that this was not a vote. The next day, other countries raised the same question and the Chairman, while agreeing that the resolution was adopted on the basis of the ‘taking of temperature’ insisted that it was not a vote so much as an effort to see what majority of the countries wanted.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>5. Does the human rights language used in the preamble, especially the part about states’ access to the Internet, threaten the Internet in any way?</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The preamble says “Member States affirm their commitment to implement these Regulations in a manner that respects and upholds their human rights obligations”, and “These Regulations recognize the right of access of Member States to international telecommunication services”. The text of the preamble can be used as an interpretation aid since it is recognized as providing context to, and detailing the object and purpose of, a treaty. However if the meaning resulting from this appears to be ambiguous, obscure, absurd or unreasonable, then supplementary means such as the preparatory work for the treaty and the circumstances for its conclusion may also be taken into account.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Therefore anyone who is concerned about the impact of the text inserted in the preamble must (a) identify text within the main treaty that could be interpreted in an undesirable manner using the text in the preamble; and (b) consider preparatory work for the treaty and see whether it supports this worrying interpretation. For example, if there were concerns about countries choosing to interpret the term ‘human rights’ as subordinating political rights to economic rights, it would be important to take note of the Secretary General’s emphasis on the <a href="http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml">UDHR</a> being applicable to all member states.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Initially, only the first insertion about ‘human rights obligations’ was part of the draft treaty. The second insertion, recognizing states’ rights followed after the discussion about human rights language. Some states argued that it was inconsistent to place human rights obligations on states towards their citizens, but to leave out their cross-border obligations. It was immediately after this text was voted into the draft, that the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries refused to sign the ITRs. This particular insertion is phrased as a right of states rather than that of individuals or citizens, which does not align with the language of international human rights. While it may not be strictly accurate to say that human rights have traditionally been individual centric (since collective rights are also recognized in certain contexts), it is certainly very unusual to treat the rights of states or governments as human rights.</p>
<p><i>Some highlights from the plenary session discussions</i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The United States of America and the Netherlands wanted to include language to state explicitly that states’ international human rights obligations are not altered in anyway. This was to clarify that the inclusion of human rights language was not setting the ITU up as a forum in which human rights obligations are debated. Malaysia objected to the use of human rights language in the preamble right at the outset, on the grounds that the ITRs are the wrong place for this, and that the right place is the ITU Constitution. It even pointed to the fact that jurisprudence is ever-evolving, to suggest that the meaning of human rights obligations might change over time. These were the two major perspectives offered towards the beginning of the discussion.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Chairman underlined the fact that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is already applicable to all UN countries. He argued that reflection of these principles in the ITRs would help build universal public faith in the conference.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The first traces of the states’ access rights can be seen in Cuba’s intervention at the ninth plenary – Cuba argued that limiting states’ access to public information networks amounted to infringement of human rights. At the fourteenth plenary, Nigeria proposed on behalf of the African group that the following text be added to the preamble “And recognize the right of access of all Member States to international telecommunication networks and services." Countries like China which had been ambivalent about the human rights language in the preamble, were happy with this move away from an individual-centric understanding of human rights, to one that sees states as representative of people.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The United States was express in its dissent, and said “human rights obligations go to the individual”. Sweden was also not happy with the proposal and argued that it moved away from well-established human rights language that affirmed existing commitments to drafting new human rights language.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It was an amended version of the African group proposal that finally found its way into the preamble. It was supported by many countries such as China, Nigeria and Sudan, who took the position that group rights are included within human rights, and that governments represent their citizens and therefore have rights on their behalf. This position was strenuously disputed by states like the USA, Switzerland, United Kingdom and Canada.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/five-faqs-on-amended-itrs'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/five-faqs-on-amended-itrs</a>
</p>
No publisherchinmayiWCITInternet GovernanceFeaturedITUHomepageInformation Technology2013-01-30T05:36:26ZBlog EntryAnalysis of DIT's Response to Second RTI on Website Blocking
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/analysis-dit-response-2nd-rti-blocking
<b>In this blog post, Pranesh Prakash briefly analyses the DIT's response to an RTI request on website blocking alongside the most recent edition of Google's Transparency Report, and what it tells us about the online censorship regime in India.</b>
<h2 id="what-the-dits-response-tells-us-and-what-it-doesnt"><br /></h2>
<h2 id="what-the-dits-response-tells-us-and-what-it-doesnt">What the DIT's Response Tells Us, and What It Doesn't</h2>
<p>We at the Centre for Internet and Society had sent in a right to information request to the Department of Information Technology (DIT) asking for more information about website blocking in India. The <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/dit-response-2nd-rti-blocking" class="internal-link" title="Text of DIT's Response to Second RTI on Website Blocking">response we got from the DIT</a> was illuminating in many ways. The following are the noteworthy points, in brief:</p>
<ul>
<li>Six government officials, and one politician have so far made requests for 'disabling access' to certain online content under s.69A of the Information Technology (IT) Act.</li>
<li>68 individual items have been requested to be blocked, those being 64 websites (domain-level blocking), 1 sub-domain, and 3 specific web pages. Seemingly, none of these requests have been accepted.</li>
<li>The data provided by the government seemingly conflicts with the data released by the likes of Google (via its Transparency Report).</li>
<li>India's law enforcement agencies are circumventing the IT Act, the Indian Penal Code (IPC), and ultimately the Constitution, by not following proper procedure for removal of online content.</li>
<li>Either the DIT is not providing us all the relevant information on blocking, or is not following the law.</li></ul>
<p> </p>
<h2 id="conflicting-data-on-censorship-requests">Conflicting Data on Censorship Requests</h2>
<p>The latest <a href="http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/governmentrequests/IN/">Google Transparency Report</a>, released on October 25, 2011, shows that there were 68 written requests (imaginably taking the form of forceful requests/orders) from Indian law enforcement agencies for removal of 358 items from Google's various. If you take the figures since January 2010, it adds up to over 765.</p>
<p>However, the official government statistics show only eight separate requests having been made to the DIT (which, under the IT Act, is the only authority that can order the blocking of online content), adding up to a total of 64 websites (domain-level), 1 sub-domain, and 3 specific web pages. Of these only 3 are for Google's services (2 for Blogger, and 1 for YouTube).</p>
<p>If classified according to presumable reason for seeking of the block, that would be 61 domains hosting adult content; 1 domain (tamil.net.in), 1 sub-domain (ulaginazhagiyamuthalpenn.blogspot.com), and 2 specific pages (video of a speech by Bal Thackeray on YouTube and Wikipedia page for Sukhbir Singh Badal) for political content; 1 for religious content (a blog post titled "Insults against Islam" in Malay); and 1 domain hosting online gambling (betfair.com). It is unclear for why one of the requests was made (topix.net).<sup><a id="fnref1" class="footnoteRef" name="fnref1" href="#fn1">1</a></sup></p>
<h2 id="content-removal-vs.-content-blocking">Content Removal vs. Content Blocking</h2>
<p>Section 69A of the IT Act provides the Central Government the power to "direct any agency of the Government or intermediary to block for access by the public or cause to be blocked for access by the public any information generated, transmitted, received, stored or hosted in any computer resource". The only person through whom this power can be exercised is the 'Designated Officer' (currently Dr. Gulshan Rai of the DIT), who in turn has to follow the procedure laid down in the rules drafted under s.69A ("Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguard for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009", the 'Blocking Rules').</p>
<p>Because of this, we see everyone from the Secretary of the Public Law and Order Department of Tamil Nadu to the Joint Commissioner of Police of Mumbai and the State President of the Bharatiya Janata Minority Morcha approaching the Designated Officer for blocking of websites.</p>
<p>However, as the data from Google shows, there are many times more requests being sent to remove content. The only explanation for this is that an order to 'block for access... or cause to be blocked for access by the public' is taken to be different from an order for removal of content. Nothing in the IT Act, nor in the Blocking Rules actually address this issue.<sup><a id="fnref2" class="footnoteRef" name="fnref2" href="#fn2">2</a></sup></p>
<p>Thus, there is a possibility that the forcible removal of content is treated separately from blocking of content. That would mean that while blocking is regulated by the IT Act, forcible removal of content is not. Thus, it would seem that forcible removal of online content is happening without clear regulation or limits.<sup><a id="fnref3" class="footnoteRef" name="fnref3" href="#fn3">3</a></sup></p>
<h2 id="role-of-the-indian-penal-code-and-code-of-criminal-procedure">Role of the Indian Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure</h2>
<p>There are existing provisions in the Indian Penal Code that provide the government the power to censor book, pamphlets, and other material on varied grounds, including obscenity, causing of enmity between communities, etc. The police is provided powers to enforce such governmental orders. Section 95 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows the State Government to declare (through an official notification) certain publications which seem to violate the Indian Penal Code as 'forfeited to the Government' and to issue search warrants for the same. After this the police can enforce that notification.</p>
<p>It is clear that this is not the case for any of the content removal requests that were sent to Google.</p>
<h2 id="police-are-defeating-the-constitution-and-the-it-act">Police Are Defeating the Constitution and the IT Act</h2>
<p>Therefore, it would seem that law enforcement agencies are operating outside the bounds set up under the Indian Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure, as also the Information Technology Act, when they send requests for removal of content to companies like Google. While a company might comply with it because it appears to them to violate their own terms of service (which generally include a wide clause about content being in accordance with all local laws), community guidelines, etc., it would appear that it is not required under the law to do so if the order itself is not legal.</p>
<p>However, anecdotal evidence has it that most companies comply with such 'requests' even when they are not under any legal obligation to do so.</p>
<p>This way the intention of Parliament in enacting s.69A of the IT Act—to regulate government censorship of the Internet and bring it within the bounds laid down in the Constitution—is defeated.</p>
<h2 id="dit-either-evasive-or-not-following-rules">DIT Either Evasive or Not Following Rules</h2>
<p>The DIT did not provide answers on:</p>
<ul>
<li>Whether any block ordered by the DIT has ever been revoked</li>
<li>On what basis DIT decides which intermediary (web host, ISP, etc.) to send the order of blocking to</li></ul>
<p>It also provided the minutes for only one meeting<sup><a id="fnref4" class="footnoteRef" name="fnref4" href="#fn4">4</a></sup> of the committee that decides whether to carry out a block, when we had requested for minutes of all the meetings it has ever held. That committee (the Committee for Examination of Requests, constituted under Rule 8(4) of the Blocking Rules) has to consider every single item in every single request forwarded to the Designated Officer, and 68 items were sent to the Designated Officer in 6 requests. Quite clearly something doesn't add up. Either the Committee is not following the Blocking Rules or the DIT is not providing a full reply under the RTI Act.</p>
<p> </p>
<div class="footnotes">
<hr />
<ol>
<li id="fn1">
<p>A request was made to block http://www.topix.net, by the 'Commmissioner, Maharashtra State, Colaba, Mumbai—400001', presumably the Commissioner of State Intelligence Department of Maharashtra, whose office is located in Colaba. <a title="Jump back to footnote 1" class="footnoteBackLink" href="#fnref1">↩</a></p>
</li>
<li id="fn2">
<p>However, the Blocking Rules require the person or the hosting intermediary being contacted for a response. This provides the person/intermediary the opportunity to remove the content voluntarily or to oppose the request for blocking.</p>
<p>"Rule 8. Examination of request: (1) On receipt of request under rule 6, the Designated Officer shall make all reasonable efforts to identify the person or intermediary who has hosted the information or part thereof as well as the computer resource on which such information or part thereof is being hosted and where he is able to identify such person or intermediary and the computer resource hosting the information or part thereof which have been requested to be blocked for public access, he shall issue a notice by way of letters or fax or e-mail signed with electronic signatures to such person or intermediary in control of such computer resource to appear and submit their reply and clarifications if any, before the committee referred to in rule 7, at a specified date and time, which shall not be less than forty-eight hours from the time of receipt of such notice by such person or intermediary." <a title="Jump back to footnote 2" class="footnoteBackLink" href="#fnref2">↩</a></p>
</li>
<li id="fn3">
<p>While it is possible to imagine that the Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure lay down limits, it is clear from the Google Transparency Report that the requests from removal are not coming based only on court orders, but from the executive and the police. The police have no powers under the IPC or the CrPC to request removal of content without either a public notification issued by the State Government or a court order. <a title="Jump back to footnote 3" class="footnoteBackLink" href="#fnref3">↩</a></p>
</li>
<li id="fn4">
<p>The minutes of the meeting held on August 24, 2010, on the request for blocking of www.betfair.com were sent as 'Annexure III' of the DIT response. This request was not granted. <a title="Jump back to footnote 4" class="footnoteBackLink" href="#fnref4">↩</a></p>
</li></ol>
</div>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/analysis-dit-response-2nd-rti-blocking'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/analysis-dit-response-2nd-rti-blocking</a>
</p>
No publisherpraneshFeaturedInternet GovernanceCensorship2011-12-02T09:26:11ZBlog EntryLeaked Privacy Bill: 2014 vs. 2011
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/leaked-privacy-bill-2014-v-2011
<b>The Centre for Internet and Society has recently received a leaked version of the draft Privacy Bill 2014 that the Department of Personnel and Training, Government of India has drafted.</b>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Note: <i>After obtaining a copy of the leaked Privacy Bill 2014, we have replaced the blog "An Analysis of the New Draft Privacy Bill" which was based off of a report from the Economic Times, with this blog post</i>.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This represents the third leak of potential privacy legislation for India that we know of, with publicly available versions having leaked in <a href="http://bourgeoisinspirations.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/draft_right-to-privacy.pdf">April 2011</a> and <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/draft-bill-on-right-to-privacy">September 2011</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">When compared to the September 2011 Privacy Bill, the text of the 2014 Bill includes a number of changes, additions, and deletions. Below is an outline of significant changes from the <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/draft-bill-on-right-to-privacy">September 2011 Privacy Bill</a> to the 2014 Privacy Bill:</p>
<ol style="text-align: justify; "> </ol>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li><b>Scope:</b> The 2014 Bill extends the right to Privacy to all residents of India. This is in contrast to the 2011 Bill, which extended the Right to Privacy to citizens of India. The 2014 Bill furthermore recognizes the Right to Privacy as a part of Article 21 of the Indian Constitution and extends to the whole of India, whereas the 2011 Bill did not explicitly recognize the Right to Privacy as being a part of Article 21, and excluded Jammu and Kashmir from its purview.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><b><span>Definitions:</span></b><span> The 2014 Bill includes a number of new definitions, redefines existing terms, and deletes others.<br /></span></li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Terms that have been added in the 2014 Bill and the definitions</b></p>
<ol style="text-align: justify; "> </ol><ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><b><i>Personal identifier</i>:</b> Any unique alphanumeric sequence of members, letters, and symbols that specifically identifies an individual with a database or a data set.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><b><i>Legitimate purpose</i>:</b> A purpose covered under this Act or any other law for the time being in force, which is certain, unambiguous, and limited in scope for collection of any personal data from a data subject.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><b><i>Competent authority</i></b> : The authority which is authorized to sanction interception or surveillance, as the case may be, under this Act or rules made there under or any other law for the time being in force.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><b><i>Notification</i></b><i>: </i>Notification issued under this Act and published in the Official Gazette</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><b><i>Control</i> :</b> And all other cognate forms of expressions thereof, means, in relation to personal data, the collection or processing of personal data and shall include the ability to determine the purposes for and the manner in which any personal data is to be collected or processed.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "> <b><i>Telecommunications system</i>:</b> Any system used for transmission or reception of any communication by wire, radio, visual or other electromagnetic means but shall not include broadcasting services.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><b><i>Privacy standards</i>:</b> The privacy standards or protocols or codes of practice. developed by industry associations.</li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Terms that have been re-defined in the 2014 Bill from the 2011 Bill and the 2014 Bill definitions</b></p>
<ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li><b><i>Communication data:</i></b>The data held or obtained by a telecommunications service provider in relation to a data subject including the data usage of the telecommunications </li>
<li><b><i>Data subject</i></b><i> </i>: Any living individual, whose personal data is controlled by any person</li>
<li><b><i>Interception</i></b><i>: </i>In relation to any communication in the course of its transmission through a telecommunication system, any action that results in some or all of the contents of that communication being made available, while being transmitted, to a person other than the sender or the intended recipient of the communication. </li>
<li><b><i>Person</i></b><i>: A</i>ny natural or legal person and shall include a body corporate, partnership, society, trust, association of persons, Government company, government department, urban local body, or any other officer, agency or instrumentality of the state. </li>
<li><b><i>Sensitive personal data</i>:</b> Personal data relating to: (a) physical and mental health including medical history, (b) biometric, bodily or genetic information, (c) criminal convictions (d) password, (e) banking credit and financial data (f) narco analysis or polygraph test data, (g) sexual orientation. Provided that any information that is freely available or accessible in public domain or to be furnished under the Right to Information Act 2005 or any other law for time being in force shall not be regarded as sensitive personal data for the purposes of this Act.</li>
<li><b><i>Individual:</i></b><i> </i>a resident of Indian </li>
<li><b><i>Covert surveillance</i>:</b> covert Surveillance" means obtaining private information about an individual and his private affairs without his knowledge and includes: (i) directed surveillance which is undertaken for the purposes of specific investigation or specific operation in such a manner as is likely to result in the obtaining of private information about a person whether or not that person was specifically identified in relation to the investigation or operation; (ii) intrusive surveillance which is carried out by an individual or a surveillance device in relation to anything taking place on a residential premise or in any private vehicle. It also covers use of any device outside the premises or a vehicle wherein it can give information of the same quality and detail as if the device were in the premises or vehicle; (iii) covert human intelligence service which is information obtained by a person who establishes or maintains a personal or other relationship with an individual for the covert purpose of using such a relationship to obtain or to provide access to any personal information about that individual</li>
<li><b><i>Re-identify</i></b>: means the recovery of data from an anonymised data, capable of identifying a data subject whose personal data has been anonymised;</li>
<li><b><i>Process</i>:</b> “process" and all other cognate forms of expressions thereof, means any operation or set of operations, whether carried out through automatic means or not by any person or organization, that relates to:(a) collation, storage, disclosure, transfer, updating, modification, alteration or use of personal data; or (b) the merging, linking, blocking, degradation or anonymisation of personal data;</li>
<li><b><i>Direct marketing</i></b>: Direct Marketing means sending of a commercial communication to any individual </li>
<li><b><i>Data controller</i></b>: any person who controls, at any point in time, the personal data of a data subject but shall not include any person who merely provides infrastructure for the transfer or storage of personal data to it data controller;</li>
<li><b><i> Government</i></b>: the Central Government or as the case may be, the State Government and includes the Union territory Administration, local authority or any agency and instrumentality of the Government;</li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Terms that have been removed from the 2014 Bill that were in the 2011 Bill and the 2011 definition:</p>
<ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Consent: Includes implied consent</li>
<li>Maintain: Includes maintain, collect, use, or disseminate.</li>
<li>Data processor: In relation to personal data means any person (other than the employee of the data controller), who processes the data on behalf of the data controller. </li>
<li>Local authority: A municipal committee, district board, body of port commissioners, council, board or other authority legally entitled to, or entrusted by the Government with, the control or management of a municipal or local fund. </li>
<li>Prescribed: Prescribed by rules made under this Act.</li>
<li>Surveillance: Surveillance undertaken through installation and use of CCTVs and other system which capture images to identify or monitor individuals (this was removed from the larger definition of surveillance.)</li>
<li>DNA: Cell in the body of an individual, whether collected from a cheek, cell, blood cell, skin cell or other tissue, which allows for identification of such individual when compared with other individual. </li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Terms that have remained broadly (with some modification) the same between the 2014 Bill and 2011 Bill (as per the 2014 Bill definition):</p>
<ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Authority: The Data Protection Authority of India </li>
<li>Appellate tribunal: the Cyber Appellate Tribunal established under Sub-Section (1) of section n48 of the Information Technology Act, 2000.</li>
<li>Personal data: Any data which relates to a data subject, if that data subject can be identified from that data, either directly or indirectly, in conjunction with other data that the data controller has or is likely to have and includes any expression of opinion about such data subject. </li>
<li>Member: Member of the Authority </li>
<li>Disclose: and all other cognate forms of expression thereof, means disclosure, dissemination, broadcast, communication, distribution, transmission, or make available in any manner whatsoever, of personal data. </li>
<li>Anonymised: The deletion of all data that identifies the data subject or can be used to identify the data subject by linking such data to any other data of the data subject, by the data controller. </li>
</ol>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li><b>Exceptions to the Right to Privacy</b>: According to the 2011 Bill, the exceptions to the Right to Privacy included: </li>
</ul>
<ol style="text-align: justify; "> </ol>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
</ul>
<ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Sovereignty, integrity and security of India, strategic, scientific or economic interest of the state </li>
<li>Preventing incitement to the commission of any offence </li>
<li>Prevention of public disorder or the detection of crime</li>
<li>Protection of rights and freedoms of others </li>
<li>In the interest of friendly relations with foreign state</li>
<li>Any other purpose specifically mentioned in the Act. </li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The 2014 Bill reflects almost all of the exceptions defined in the 2011 Bill, but removes ‘detection of crime’ from the list of exceptions. The 2014 Bill also qualifies that the application of each exception must be adequate, relevant, and not excessive to the objective it aims to achieve and must be imposed on the manner prescribed – whereas the 2011 Bill stated only that the application of exceptions to the Right to Privacy cannot be disproportionate to the purpose sought to be achieved.</p>
<p id="content" style="text-align: justify; "></p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Acts not to be considered deprivations of privacy: The 2011 Bill lists five instances that will not be considered a deprivation of privacy - namely</li>
</ul>
<ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>For journalistic purposes unless it is proven that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, </li>
<li>Processing data for personal or household purposes,</li>
<li>Installation of surveillance equipment for the security of private premises, </li>
<li>Disclosure of information via the Right to Information Act 2005,</li>
<li>And any other activity exempted under the Act.</li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The 2014 limits these instances to:</p>
<ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>The processing of data purely for personal or household purposes, </li>
<li>Disclosure of information under the Right to Information Act 2005,</li>
<li>And any other action specifically exempted under the Act.</li>
</ol>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; ">Privacy Principles: Unlike the 2011 Bill, the 2014 Bill defines nine specific privacy principles: notice, choice and consent, collection limitation, purposes limitation, access and correction, disclosure of information, security, openness, and accountability. The Privacy Principles will apply to all existing and evolving practices. </li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Provisions for Personal Data: Both the 2011 Bill and the 2014 Bill have provisions that apply to the processing of personal and sensitive personal data. The 2011 Bill includes provisions addressing the:</li>
</ul>
<ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Collection of personal data, </li>
<li>Processing of personal data, </li>
<li>Data quality, </li>
<li>Provisions relating to sensitive personal data, </li>
<li>Retention of personal data,</li>
<li>Sharing (disclosure) of personal data, </li>
<li>Security of personal data, </li>
<li>Notification of breach of security, </li>
<li>Access to personal data by data subject,</li>
<li>Updation of personal data by data subject</li>
<li>Mandatory processing of data,</li>
<li>Trans border flows of personal data.</li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Of these, the 2014 Bill broadly (though not verbatim) reflects the 2011 Bill provisions relating to the:</p>
<ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Collection of personal data,</li>
<li>Processing of personal data, </li>
<li>Access to personal data,</li>
<li>Updating personal data</li>
<li>Retention of personal data</li>
<li>Data quality, </li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The 2014 Bill has further includes provisions addressing:</p>
<ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Openness and accountability, </li>
<li>Choice, </li>
<li>Consent,</li>
<li>Exceptions for personal identifiers. </li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The 2014 Bill has made changes to the provisions addressing:</p>
<ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Provisions relating to sensitive personal data, </li>
<li>Sharing (disclosure of personal data), </li>
<li>Notification of breach of security, </li>
<li>Mandatory processing of data </li>
<li>Security of personal data</li>
<li>Trans border flows of personal data. </li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The changes that have been made have been mapped out below:</p>
<ol style="text-align: justify; "> </ol>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Provisions Relating to Sensitive Personal Data:</b> The 2011Bill and 2014 Bill both require authorization by the Authority for the collection and processing of sensitive personal data. At the same time, both Bills include a list of circumstances under which authorization for the collection and processing of sensitive personal data is not required. On the whole, this list is the same between the 2011 Bill and 2014 Bill, but the 2014 Bill adds the following circumstances on which authorization is not needed for the collection and processing of sensitive personal data:</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
</ul>
<ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; ">For purposes related to the insurance policy of the individual if the data relates to the physical or mental health or medical history of the individual and is collected and processed by an insurance company.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; ">Collected or processed by the Government Intelligence agencies in the interest of the sovereignty, integrity, security or the strategic, scientific or economic interest of India.</li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The 2014 Bill also allows the Authority to specify additional regulations for sensitive personal data, and requires that any additional transaction sought to be performed with the sensitive personal information requires fresh consent to first be obtained. The 2014 Bill carves out another exception for Government agencies, allowing disclosure of sensitive personal data without consent to Government agencies mandated under law for the purposes of verification of identity, or for prevention, detection, investigation including cyber incidents, prosecution, and punishment of offences.</p>
<ol style="text-align: justify; "> </ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Notification of Breach of Security</b>: The provisions relating to the notification of breach of security in the 2014 Bill differ from the 2011 Bill. Specifically, the 2014 Bill removes the requirement that data controllers must publish information about a data breach in two national news papers. Thus, in the 2014 Bill, data controllers must only inform the data protection authority and affected individuals of the breach. <br /><b><br />Notice</b>: The 2014 Bill changes the structure of the notice mechanism – where in the 2011 Bill, prior to the processing of data, data controllers had to take all reasonable steps to ensure that the data subject was aware of the following:</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
</ul>
<ol style="text-align: justify; "> </ol> <ol style="text-align: justify; "> </ol> <ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>The documented purposes for which such personal data is being collected</li>
<li>Whether providing of personal data by the data subject is voluntary or mandatory under law or in order to avail of any product or service</li>
<li>The consequences of the failure to provide the personal data </li>
<li>The recipient or category of recipients of the personal data </li>
<li>The name and address of the data controller and all persons who are or will be processing information on behalf of the data controller </li>
<li>If such personal data is intended to be transferred out of the country, details of such transfer. </li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In contrast the 2014 Bill provides that before personal data is collected, the data controller must give notice of:</p>
<ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>What data is being collected and</li>
<li>The legitimate purpose for the collection.</li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">If the purpose for which the data was collected has changed the data controller will then be obligated to provide the data subject with notice of:</p>
<ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>The use to which the personal data will be put</li>
<li>Whether or not the personal data will be disclosed to a third party and if so the identity of such person </li>
<li>If the personal data being collected is intended to be transferred outside India and the reasons for doing so, how the transfer helps in achieving the legitimate purpose and whether the country to which such data is transferred has suitable legislation to provide for adequate protection and privacy of the data. </li>
<li>The security and safeguards established by the data controller in relation to the personal data </li>
<li>The processes available to a data subject to access and correct his personal data</li>
<li>The recourse open to a data subject, if he has any complaints in respect of collection or processing of the personal data and the procedure relating thereto</li>
<li>The name, address, and contact particulars of the data controller and all persons who will be processing the personal data on behalf of the data controller. </li>
</ol><ol style="text-align: justify; "> </ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Disclosure of personal data</b>: Though titled as ‘sharing of personal data’ both the 2011 Bill and 2014 Bill require consent for the disclosure of personal information, but list exceptional circumstances on which consent is not needed. In the 2011 bill, the relevant provision permits disclosure of personal data without consent only if (i) the sharing was a part of the documented purpose, (ii) the sharing is for any purpose relating to the exceptions to the right to privacy or (iii) the Data Protection Authority has authorized the sharing. In contrast, the 2014 Bill permits disclosure of personal data without consent if (i) such disclosure is part of the legitimate purpose (ii) such disclosure is for achieving any of the objectives of section 5 (iii) the Authority has by order authorized such disclosure (iv) the disclosure is required under any law for the time being in force (v) the disclosure is made to the Government Intelligence agencies in the interest of the sovereignty, integrity, security or the strategic, scientific or economic interest of India. As a safeguard, the 2014 Bill requires that any person to whom personal information is disclosed, whether a resident or not, must adhere to all provisions of the Act. Furthermore, the disclosure of personal data must be limited to the extent which is necessary to achieve the purpose for which the disclosure is sought and no person can make public any personal data that is in its control.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Transborder flow of information</b>: Though both the 2011 Bill and the 2014 Bill require any country that data is transferred to must have equivalent or stronger data protection standards in place, the 2014 Bill carves out an exception for law enforcement and intelligence agencies and the transfer of any personal data outside the territory of India, in the interest of the sovereignty, integrity, security or the strategic, scientific or economic interest of India.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Mandatory Processing of Data</b>: Both the 2011 Bill and 2014 Bill have provisions that address the mandatory processing of data. These provisions are similar, but the 2014 Bill includes a requirement that data controllers must anonymize personal data that is collected without prior consent from the data subject within a reasonable time frame after collection.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Security of Personal Data:</b> The provision relating to the security of personal information in the 2014 Bill has been changed from the 2011 Bill by expanding the list and type of breaches that must be prevented, but removing requirements that data controllers must ensure all contractual arrangements with data processors specifically ensure that the data is maintained with the same level of security.</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
</ul>
<ol style="text-align: justify; "> </ol><ol> </ol>
<ul>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><b>Conditions on which provisions do not apply:</b> Both the 2011Bill and 2014 Bill define conditions on which the provisions of updating personal data, access, notification of breach of security, retention of personal data, data quality, consent, choice, notice, and right to privacy will not apply to personal data. Though the 2011 Bill and 2014 Bill reflect the same conditions, the 2014 Bill carves out an exception for Government Intelligence Agencies - stating that the provisions of updating personal data, access to data by the data subject, notification about breach of security, retention of personal data, data quality, processing of personal data, consent, choice, notice, collection from an individual will not apply to data collected or processed in the interest of the sovereignty, integrity, security or the strategic, scientific or economic interest of India.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><b>Privacy Officers</b>: Unlike the 2011 Bill, the 2014 Bill defines the role of the privacy officer that must be established by every data controller for the purpose of overseeing the security of personal data and implementation of the provisions of the Act.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><b>Power of Authority to Exempt: </b> Both the 2011 Bill and 2014 Bill contain provisions that enable the Authority to waive the applicability of specific provisions of the Act. The circumstances on which this can be done are based on the exceptions to the Right to Privacy in both the 2011 and 2014 Bill. To this extent, the 2014 Bill differs slightly from the 2011 Bill, by removing the power of the Authority to exempt for the ‘detection of crime’ and ‘any other legitimate purpose mentioned in this Act’ .</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><b>The Data Protection Authority:</b> The 2011 Bill and 2014 Bill both establish Data Protection Authorities, but the 2014 Bill further clarifies certain aspects of the functioning of the Authority and expands the functions and the powers of the Authority. For example, new functions of the Authority include:</li>
</ul>
<ul>
</ul>
<ol>
<li style="text-align: justify; ">Auditing any or all personal data controlled by the data controller to assess whether it is being maintained in accordance with the Act, </li>
<li> Suggesting international instruments relevant to the administration of the Act,</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "> Encouraging industry associations to evolve privacy standards for self regulations, adjudicating on disputes arising between data controllers or between individuals and data controllers.</li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The 2014 Bill also expands the powers of the Data Protection Authority – importantly giving him the power to receive, investigate complaints about alleged violations of privacy and issue appropriate orders or directions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">At the same time, the 2014 Bill carves out an exception for Government Intelligence Agencies and Law Enforcement agencies – preventing the Authority from conducting investigations, issuing appropriate orders or directions, and adjudicating complaints in respect to actions taken by the Government Intelligences Agencies and Law Enforcement, if for the objectives of (a) sovereignty, integrity or security of India; or(b) strategic, scientific or economic interest of India; or(c) preventing incitement to the commission of any offence, or (d) prevention of public disorder, or(e) the investigation of any crime; or (f) protection of rights and freedoms of others; or (g) friendly relations with foreign states; or (h) any other legitimate purpose mentioned in this Act.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This power is instead vested with a court of competent jurisdiction.</p>
<ol> </ol>
<ul>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><b>The National Data Controller Registry</b>: The 2014 Bill removes the National Data Controller Registry and requirements for data controllers to register themselves and oversight of the Registry by the Data Protection Authority.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><b>Direct Marketing: </b>Both the 2011 and 2014 Bills contain provisions regulating the use of personal information for direct marketing purposes. Though the provisions are broadly the same, the 2011 Bill envisions that no person will undertake direct marketing unless he/she is registered in the ‘National Data Registry’ and one of the stated purposes is direct marketing. As the 2014 Bill removes the National Data Registry, the 2014 Bill now requires that any person undertaking direct marketing must have on record where he/she has obtained personal data from.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><b>Interception of Communications</b>: Though maintaining some of the safeguards defined in the 2011 Bill for interception, 2014 Bill changes the interception regime envisioned in the 2011 Bill by carving out a wide exception for organizations monitoring the electronic mail of employees, removing provisions requiring the interception take place only for the minimum period of time required for achieving the purposes, and removing provisions excluding the use of intercepted communications as evidence in a court of law. Similar to the 2011 Bill, the 2014 Bill specifies that the principles of notice, choice and consent, access and correction, and openness will not apply to the interception of communications.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><b>Video Recording Equipment in public places</b>: Unlike the 2011 Bill, which addressed only the use of CCTV’s, the 2014 Bill addresses the installation and use of video recording equipment in public places. Though both the 2011 Bill and 2014 Bill both prevent the use of recording equipment and CCTVs for the purpose of identifying an individual, monitoring his personal particulars, or revealing personal, or otherwise adversely affecting his right to privacy - the 2014 Bill requires that the use of recording equipment must be in accordance with procedures, for a legitimate purpose, and proportionate to the objective for which the equipment was installed. </li>
</ul>
<p>The 2014 Bill makes a broad exception to these safeguards for law enforcement agencies and government intelligence agencies in the interest of the sovereignty, integrity, security or the strategic, scientific, or economic interest of India.</p>
<ol> </ol>
<ul>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><b>Privacy Standards and Self Regulation</b>: The 2014 Bill establishes a specific mechanism of self regulation where industry associations will develop privacy standards and adhere to them. For this purpose, an industry ombudsman should be appointed. The standards must be in conformity with the National Privacy Principles and the provisions of the Privacy Bill. The developed standards will be submitted to the Authority and the Authority may frame regulations based on the standards. If an industry association has not developed privacy standards, the Authority may frame regulations for a specific sector.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><b>Settlement of Disputes and Appellate Tribunal:</b> The 2014 Bill makes significant change to the process for settling disputes from the 2011 Bill. In the 2014 Bill an Alternative Dispute Mechanism is established where disputes between individuals and data controllers are first addressed by the Privacy Officer of each Data Controller or the industry level Ombudsman. If individuals are not satisfied with the decision of the Ombudsman they may take the complaint to the Authority. Individuals can also take the complaint directly to the Authority if they wish. If an individual is aggrieved with the decision of the Authority, by a privacy officer or ombudsman through the Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanism, or by the adjudicating officer of the Authority, they may approach the Appellate Tribunal. Any order from the Appellate Tribunal can be appealed at a high court. </li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In the 2011 Bill disputes between the data controller and an individual can be taken directly to the Appellate Tribunal and orders from the Authority can be appealed at the Tribunal. There is not further path for appeal to an order of the tribunal.</p>
<ol> </ol>
<ul>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><b>Offences and Penalties:</b> The 2014 Bill changes the structure of the offences and penalties section by breaking the two into separate sections - one addressing offences and one addressing penalties while the 2011 Bill addressed offences and penalties in the same section. </li>
</ul>
<ol> </ol><ol> </ol><ol> </ol>
<ul>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><b>Offences</b>: The 2014 Bill penalizes every offence with imprisonment and a fine and empowers a police officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police to investigate any offence, limits the courts ability to take cognizance of an offence to only those brought by the Authority, requires that the Court be no lower than a Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or a Chief Judicial Magistrate, and permits courts to compound offences. The 2014 Bill further specifies that any offence that is punishable with three years in prison and above is cognizable, and offences punishable with three years in prison are bailable. . Under the 2014 Bill offences are defined as:</li>
</ul>
<ol>
<li>Unauthorized interception of communications </li>
<li>Disclosure of intercepted communications </li>
<li>Undertaking unauthorized Covert Surveillance </li>
<li>Unauthorized use of disclosure of communication data </li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The offences defined under the Act are reflected in the 2011 Bill, but the time in prison and fine is higher in the 2014 Bill.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Penalties</b>: The 2014 Bill provides a list of penalties including:</p>
<ol>
<li>Penalty for obtaining personal data on false pretext</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; ">Penalty for violation of conditions of license pertaining to maintenance of secrecy and confidentiality by telecommunications service providers </li>
<li>Penalty for disclosure of other personal information </li>
<li>Penalties for contravention of directions of the Authority </li>
<li>Penalties for data theft </li>
<li>Penalties for unauthorised collection, processing, and disclosure of personal data</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; ">Penalties for unauthorized use of personal data for direction marketing. These penalties reflect the penalties in the 2011 bill, but prescribe higher fines<br /><br /></li>
</ol><ol> </ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Adjudicating Officer</b>: Unlike the 2011 Bill that did not have in place an adjudicating officer, the 2014 Bill specifies that the Chairperson of the Authority will appoint a Member of the Authority not below the Rank of Director of the Government of India to be an adjudicating officer. The adjudicating officer will have the power to impose a penalty and will have the same powers as vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure. Every proceeding before the adjudicating officer will be considered a judicial processing. When adjudicating the officer must take into consideration the amount of disproportionate gain or unfair advantage, the amount of loss caused, the respective nature of the default</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Civil Remedies and compensation</b>: Both the 2011 and 2014 Bill contain provisions that permit an individual to pursue a civil remedy, but the 2014 Bill limits these instances to - if loss or damage has been suffered or an adverse determination is made about an individual due to negligence on complying with the Act, and provides for the possibility that the contravening parties will have to provide a public notice of the offense. <br /><br />The 2014 Bill removes provisions specifying that individuals that have suffered loss due to a contravention by the data controller of the Act are entitled to compensation.</p>
<ol> </ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Exceptions for intelligence agencies</b>: Unlike the 2011 Bill, the 2014 Bill includes an exception for Government Intelligence Agencies and Law Enforcement Agencies – stating that the Authority will not have the power to conduct investigations, issue appropriate orders and directions or otherwise adjudicate complaints in respect of action taken by the Government intelligence agencies and Law Enforcement agencies for achieving any of the objectives that reflect the defined exceptions to privacy.</p>
<ol> </ol><ol> </ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Centre for Internet and Society welcomes many of the changes that are reflected in the Privacy Bill 2014, but are cautious about the wide exceptions that have been carved out for law enforcement and intelligence agencies in the Bill.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In 2012, the Report of Group of Expert s on Privacy was developed for the purpose of informing a privacy framework for India. As such the Centre for Internet and Society will be analyzing in upcoming posts the draft Privacy Bill 2014 and the recommendations in the Report of the Group of Experts on Privacy.</p>
<ol> </ol>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/leaked-privacy-bill-2014-v-2011'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/leaked-privacy-bill-2014-v-2011</a>
</p>
No publisherelonnaiFeaturedInternet GovernancePrivacy2014-04-01T10:52:41ZBlog EntryExploring the Digital Landscape: An Overview
https://cis-india.org/raw/digital-humanities/exploring-the-digital-landscape
<b>One component of the Digital Humanities mapping exercise was a series of six research projects commissioned by HEIRA-CSCS, Bangalore over November 2013-March 2014. These studies attempted to chart various aspects of the digital landscape in India today, with a focus on emerging forms of humanistic enquiry engendered by the Internet and new digital technologies. This blog post presents a broad overview of some of the key learnings from these projects. </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The six research studies commissioned by HEIRA-CSCS as part of the collaborative exercise to map the Digital Humanities (DH) were formulated within a broad rubric of exploring changes at the intersection of youth, technology and higher education in India. Apart from existing questions about the digital divide, and the possibilities of increased connectivity and availability of new sources of information due to proliferation of digital tools and access to the Internet, the projects also tried to address in some way the problem of understanding and formulating a research enquiry about the ‘digital’ itself. The digital as a mode of existence or being, or a new ‘social’ or as discussed in the earlier blog-posts, is essentially a premise of the DH discourse as it has emerged in different parts of the world. While the studies focus largely on youth and higher education and so are located with a certain context, they do attempt to address larger questions about understanding the digital landscape in India today, with reference to new and changing practices of interdisciplinary research and scholarship in the humanities.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Just to recapitulate from an earlier blog-post; the following were the studies commissioned:</p>
<ol> </ol><ol>
<li><b>Survey of Printed Digitised Materials in Bengali</b><b> – </b>an extensive survey and report of printed digitized materials in Bengali across a few selected themes. The objective of this exercise is to map the nature of available digitized materials and explore possibilities of their use in the higher education classroom.<b><br />Researcher: Saidul Haque, Jadavpur University, Kolkata</b></li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><b>Confessions in the Digital Age</b><b> – </b>looks at the rising trend of ‘confession pages’ on social media, most of which are located in an educational context, and explores the manner in which the digital space and its assumed anonymity has reconfigured this practice and the interaction between youth and technology.<b><br />Researcher: Rimi Nandy, Jadavpur University, Kolkata</b></li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><b>Queer Expression in the Online Space</b> – this study explores the concept of digital citizenship with a focus on how youth from the LGBTQ community engage with digital technologies such as social media, mobile phones and radio to negotiate questions of identity politics, activism and citizenship in cyberspace.<b><br />Researcher: Ditilekha Sharma, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai</b></li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><b>Creating Knowledge: Mapping the nature of Content and Processes on the English Wikipedia</b> - analyses the nature of content produced on Wikipedia, with a focus on the representation of women and gender-related topics to explore if online knowledge platforms contain and perpetuate a systemic gender-bias.<b><br />Researcher:</b> <b>Sohnee Harshey, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai</b></li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><b>From the Streets to the Web: Feminist Activism on Social Media</b><b>– </b>an ethnographic exploration of social media platforms to explore how feminist activists have engaged with digital technology and if this has allowed for a redefinition of political organization and new forms of activism within the movement.<b><br />Researcher: Sujatha Subramanian, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai</b></li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This exercise was also an attempt to build on some of the learnings from a four-year programme undertaken by HEIRA-CSCS titled ‘Pathways to Higher Education (supported by the Ford Foundation), which looked at the problem of <i>quality of access</i> in higher education for students from disadvantaged sections of society, particularly with respect to the digital and linguistic divide. The emphasis therefore was on understanding how young people, who are known as digital natives, negotiate with these rapidly changing modes of communication and learning. The projects therefore are located in institutional spaces and primarily address the demographic of 18 – 35 years, although there are exceptions as in the case of the studies on Wikipedia and the Bengali archival materials. Most of the studies draw from conventional methods of humanities and social sciences research, largely consisting of ethnographic and textual analysis, interviews and surveys. Adapting these methods to the digital domain, or rather formulating new research questions and methodology that is adequate to understand the nuances of the digital sphere was one of the key challenges of this exercise. Some of the learning outcomes from these studies may be summarized under the following themes:</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">The Emergence of the (Digital) Public Sphere</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The advent of the internet and digital technologies has largely been considered enabling, in terms of what it allows you to do and be both in the real and virtual worlds. The growth of online activism in the last couple of years is indicative of this change to a large extent. This has been particularly true of traditional forms of activism that have now adopted the digital space, such as the LGBTQ or feminist movements. A majority of the respondents in the studies focussing on these two themes have endorsed the positive aspect of activism in the online space, in terms of organising people and connecting civil society and the community, and bringing these issues into the mainstream. Most felt that the internet offers a space, and a relatively safe one at that, to talk about issues related to sexuality and gender. Not only in terms of its potential to garner large numbers, disseminate information and create wider transnational networks, the online space can now also be seen as the space where the activism originates, rather than merely supplementing or facilitating traditional on-the-ground movements. As such, the digital has evolved into an alternate critical public sphere were the discourse around identity, citizenship, and socio-political participation has become more varied, even if not yet adequately nuanced.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">While most of the studies endorse the democratising potential of the internet and digital technology, particularly that of mobile phones which have made these networks and resources accessible to a larger cross-section of people, many have also speak about the replication of several forms of systemic injustice and marginalisation that exist in the real world in the online space. The project on the gender-gap on Wikipedia cites examples of such a politics of exclusion in the knowledge-making process, not just with respect to content on Wikipedia, but also in the inclusion of women in the process of content-generation. Respondents in the other two projects on activism also spoke of instances of gendered violence and abuse, often a repercussion of being vocal online, thus highlighting the problematic duality of the condition of being visible and vulnerable. The imperative of creating safe online spaces to voice opinions, show solidarity or express dissent has been stressed by a majority of respondents in these studies.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Being Digital: Visibility and Accessibility</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Moving from the question of doing to being, a paradox about the online space has been the way in which it accords a certain hyper-visibility, and increasingly makes invisible people and discourses, many a time not by choice. The option of anonymity accorded by the online space has been important for many voices of dissent to find expression, and for non-normative discourse to become visible in mainstream debates. However, the problems of anonymity can be several, as seen in the case of the study on the Facebook confessions. ‘Performance’ is an important aspect of these confessions; whether it is in the nature of a comment on another person or a representation of the self. The creation and performance of identities has been a significant component of studies on digital and cyber culture studies. The internet as facilitating performance of a certain gendered identity, while also in some ways obscuring certain others – as in the case of the marginalisation of lesbian, bisexual or transsexual individuals within the queer community is a case in point. Further the visibility accorded to issues in the online space is also conditional, in terms of what gets viewed, discussed and acted upon. The Wikipedia study discusses this in terms of a ‘covert alliance-building’ of editors or consensus on what goes up online.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Another positive attribute of the online space as reiterated by most people in the projects was that of increased accessibility - to networks, people and resources. But as is evident from the earlier paragraph, such accessibility often comes with a caveat - the conditions of the access are also as important. In the case of the survey on Bengali materials, the availability of a large corpus of materials in various spaces and the efforts to digitse them is an insufficient measure given the poor accessibility to such digitised materials available online, due to issues of copyright, metadata, technological support and lack of subject expertise. Accessibility is an important aspect of being digital as understood in the project on mapping the digital classroom. While students in most undergraduate classrooms have access to digital devices in one form or the other, the use of these devices in learning is contingent upon several factors such as student and teacher competence and comfort, and the ease to adapt to changing teaching-learning environments given cultural and linguistic divides. More importantly, the perception of the internet or digital technologies as a tool to merely facilitate communication or learning, rather than a space of critical engagement is the predominant understanding, with few notable exceptions.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">New Knowledge-making Practices</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Combining the being and doing in the online space are the new modes of knowledge formation engendered by this medium. The Wikipedia is illustrative of the process of collaborative knowledge production, and the politics inherent therein. The problems and challenges of digitisation and archival practice as evident in the study of the Bengali digitised materials is also an example of this knowledge vs information conundrum. However the connect with higher education, as in the availability of scholarly materials in regional languages in the latter case, and the need to acknowledge non-traditional sources as scholarly as in the former, are some of the immediate challenges identified by these studies. The model of annotations and referencing, as made possible by collaborative and dynamic knowledge repositories is an important concern of the DH debate as well, in terms of questioning existing hierarchies of authorship and expertise.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The bringing in of non-normative discourse on sexuality and gender into the mainstream, and the emergence of new issues in some sense has also been facilitated by the online space to some extent, even if within certain exclusive communities or spaces. An example of this is in terms of narratives of pleasure in feminist discussions, which seem to have found a space online but not so much in debates otherwise seen in India.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Changes in learning and pedagogic practice are an important aspect of new knowledge-making practices, and as mentioned earlier this is apparent in classrooms today given that students and faculty recognise the potential of digital technologies. However, the primacy of textual material in most classrooms, and a certain reluctance to engage with digital media and texts on the part of faculty and students in a substantive way is an attribute of the classroom today. Indeed, ways of reading and writing have changed with the onslaught of technology; as the study on confessions demonstrates communication on social media and mobile phones have evolved a different linguistic forms, both in English and regional languages. This and the problem of an information clutter, or ‘excess’, without the option of verifiability in most cases, is one of the major concerns of faculty with regard to technology.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">While the projects in themselves may have only indirectly contributed to our understanding of DH, the process of formulating these questions and trying to find some answers to them have been insightful, particularly with respect to the problems with understanding technology, the importance of form and process, and the growth of alternative spaces of learning, all which are relevant to the DH discourse. For some reflections on the individual projects, see the guest posts by the researchers on CIS-RAW; the complete research reports are available at <a href="http://cscs.res.in/irps/heira/irps/heira/documents">http://cscs.res.in/irps/heira/irps/heira/documents</a></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/raw/digital-humanities/exploring-the-digital-landscape'>https://cis-india.org/raw/digital-humanities/exploring-the-digital-landscape</a>
</p>
No publishersnehaFeaturedDigital Humanities2014-04-14T15:48:30ZBlog EntryDigital Humanities and the Problem of Definition
https://cis-india.org/raw/digital-humanities/digital-humanities-problem-of-definition
<b>The Digital Humanities as a field that still eludes definition has been the subject of much discourse and writing. This blog post looks at this issue as one of trying to approach the field from a disciplinary lens, and the challenges that this may pose to the attempts at a definition. </b>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Much has been said and written about the Digital Humanities as an emergent field or domain of enquiry; the plethora of departments being set up all across the world, well mostly the developed world is testimony to the claimed innovative and generative potential of the field. However, as outlined in the earlier blog-post, the problem of definition still persists. As Mathew Kirschenbaum points out, the growing literature around the ‘what is Digital Humanities’ question may well be a genre in itself.<a name="fr1" href="#fn1">[1] </a>While the predominant narrative seems to be in terms of defining what Digital Humanities, or to take it a step back, what the ‘digital’ allows you to do, with respect to enabling or facilitating certain kinds of research and pedagogy, a pertinent question still is that of what it allows you to ‘be’. Digital Humanities has been alternatively called a method, practice and field of enquiry, but scholars and practitioners in many instances have stopped short of fully embracing it as a discipline. This is an interesting development given the rapid pace of its institutionalisation - from being located in existing Humanities or Computational Sciences or Media Studies departments it has now claimed functional institutional spaces of its own, with not just interdisciplinary research and teaching but also other creative and innovative knowledge-making practices. The field is slowly gaining credence in India as well, with several institutions pursuing questions around core questions within the fold of Digital Humanities.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">So is the disciplinary lens inadequate to understand this phenomenon, or is it too early for a field still considered in some ways rather incipient. The growth of the academic discipline itself is something of a fraught endeavour; as debates around the scientific revolution and Enlightenment thought have established. To put it in a very simple manner, the story of academic disciplines is that of training in reason.<a name="fr2" href="#fn2">[2] </a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Andrew Cutrofello says “In academia, a discipline is defined by its methodological rigor and the clear boundaries of its field of inquiry. Methods or fields are criticized as being "fuzzy" when they are suspected of lacking a discipline. In a more straightforwardly Foucauldian sense, the disciplinary power of academic disciplines can be located in their methods for producing docile bodies of different sorts.”<a name="fr3" href="#fn3">[3]</a> The problem with defining Digital humanities may lie in it not conforming to precisely this notion of the academic discipline, and changing notions of the function of critique when mediated through the digital.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">However a prevalent mode of understanding Digital Humanities has been in terms of the disciplinary concerns it raises for the humanities themselves; this works with the assumption that it is in fact a newer, improved version or extension of the humanities. The present mapping exercise too began with the disciplinary lens, but instead of enquiring about what the Digital Humanities is, it looked at what the ‘digital’ has brought to, changed or appropriated in terms of existing disciplinary concerns within the humanities. If one has to look at the digital itself as a state of being or existence, then one needs to understand this new techno-social paradigm much better. Prof. Amlan Dasgupta, at the School of Cultural Texts and Records at Jadavpur University in Kolkata sees this as a useful way of going about the problem of trying to arrive at a definition of the field — one is to understand the history of the term, from its inherited definition in the Anglo-American context, and the second is to distinguish it from what he calls the current state of ‘digitality’ — where all cultural objects are being now being conceived of as ‘digital’ objects. In the Indian context, the question of digitality also becomes important from the perspective of technological obsolescence - where there is resistance to discontinuing or phasing out the use of certain kinds of technology; either for lack of access to better ones or simply because one finds other uses for it. Prof. Dasgupta interestingly terms this a ‘culture of reuse’, one example of this being the typewriter which for all practical purposes has been displaced by the computer, but still finds favour with several people in their everyday lives. The question of livelihood is still connected to some of these technologies, so much so that they are very much a part of channels of cultural production and circulation, and even when they cease to become useful they have value as cultural artefacts. We therefore inhabit at the same time, different worlds, or as he calls it ‘a multi-layered technological sphere’. The variedness of this space, and the complexities or ‘degrees of use’ of certain technologies or technological objects is what further determines the nature of this space. This complicates the questions of access to technology or the ‘digital divide’ which have been and still are some of the primary approaches to understanding technology, particularly in the Global South. The need of the hour is to be able to distinguish between this current state of digitality that we are in, and what is meant by the Digital Humanities. It may after all be a set of methodologies rather than a subject or discipline in itself — the question is how it would help us understand the ‘digital’ itself much better and the new kinds of enquiries it may then facilitate about this space we now inhabit.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">One of the important points of departure, from the traditional humanities and later humanities computing itself as mentioned in the earlier blog, has been the blurring of boundaries between content, method and object/s of enquiry. The ‘process’ has become important, as illustrated by the iterative nature of most Digital Humanities projects and the discourse itself which emphasises the ‘making’ and ‘doing’ aspects of research as much as the content itself. Tool-building as a critical activity rather than as mere facilitation is an important part of the knowledge-making process in the field. In conjunction with this, Dr. Moinak Biswas, at the Department of Film Studies at Jadavpur University, thinks that the biggest changes have been in terms of the collaborative nature of knowledge production, based on voluntarily sharing or creating new content through digital platforms and archives, and crucially the possibility of now imagining creative and analytical work as not separate practices, but within in a single space and time. He cites an example from film, where ‘image’ making and critical practice can both be combined on one platform, like the online archive <a href="http://indiancine.ma/">Indiancine.ma</a> or the <a href="http://vectors.usc.edu/issues/index.php?issue=7">Vectors</a> journal for example to produce new layers of meaning around existing texts. The aspect of critique is important here, given that the consistent criticism about the field has been the ambiguity of its social undertaking; its critical or political standpoint or challenge to existing theoretical paradigms. Most of the interest around the term has been in very instrumental terms, as a facilitator or enabler of certain kinds of digital practice. Alan Liu further explains this in what he sees as the role of the Digital Humanities in cultural criticism when he says, “Beyond acting in an instrumental role, the digital humanities can most profoundly advocate for the humanities by helping to broaden the very idea of instrumentalism, technological, and otherwise. This could be its unique contribution to cultural criticism’’.<a name="fr4" href="#fn4">[4] </a>While the move away from computational analysis as a technique to facilitate humanities research is quite apparent, the disciplinary concerns here still seem to be latched onto those of the traditional humanities.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">While reiterating some of these core questions within Digital Humanities; Dr. Souvik Mukherjee and Dr. Padmini Ray Murray, at the Department of English, Presidency University, Kolkata speak of the problem of locating the field in India, where work is presently only being done in a few small pockets. The lack of a precise definition, or location within an established disciplinary context are some reasons why a lot of work that could come within the ambit of Digital Humanities is not being acknowledged as such; conversely it also leads to the problem of projects on digitisation or studies of digital cultures/cyber cultures being easily conflated with Digital Humanities. Related to this also is the absence of self-identifying ‘digital humanists’ (a problem outlined in the earlier blog, which will be explored in detail further in this series). More importantly, the lack of an indigenous framework to theorise around questions of the digital is also an obstacle to understanding what the field entails and the many possibilities it may offer in the Indian context. This is a problem not just of the Digital Humanities, but in general for modes of knowledge production in the social sciences and humanities that have adopted Western theoretical constructs. One could also locate in some sense the present crisis in disciplines within this problem. Gopal Guru and Sundar Sarukkai explicate this very issue when they talk about the absence of ‘experience as an important category of the act of theorising’ because of the privileging of ideas in Western constructs of experience. This is also reflective of the bifurcation between theory and praxis in traditional social sciences or humanities epistemological frameworks which borrow heavily from the West. Digital Humanities while still to arrive at a core disciplinary concern, seems to point towards the problem of this very demarcation by addressing the aspect of practice as a very focal point of its discourse.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Even from diverse disciplinary perspectives, at present the understanding of Digital Humanities is that it facilitates new modes of humanistic enquiry, or enables one to ask questions that could not be asked earlier. As Prof. Dasgupta reiterates, it is no longer possible to imagine humanities scholarship outside of the ‘digital’ as such, as that is the world we inhabit. However, while some of the key conceptual questions for the humanities may remain the same, it is the mode of questioning that has undergone a change — we need to re-learn questioning or question-making within this new digital sphere, which is in some sense also a critical and disciplinary challenge. While this does not resolve the problem of definition, it does provide a useful route into thinking of what would be questions of Digital Humanities, particularly in the Indian context.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">References:</p>
<ol style="text-align: justify;">
<li style="text-align: justify;">Cutrofello, Andrew, “Practicing Philosophy as a Discipline of Resistance’’ Discipline and Critique: Kant, Poststructuralism and the Problem of Resistance State University of New York Press: 1994 pp 116 - 136.</li>
<li>Kirshchenbaum, Mark “What is Digital Humanities and What is it Doing in English Departments”, Debates in the Digital Humanities, ed. Mathew K. Gold, University of Minnesota Press: 2012 pp 4-11, <a href="http://dhdebates.gc.cuny.edu/debates/text/24">http://dhdebates.gc.cuny.edu/debates/text/24</a></li>
<li>Liu, Alan in “Where is Cultural Criticism in the Digital Humanities”, Debates in the Digital Humanities, ed. Mathew K. Gold, University of Minnesota Press: 2012 pp 492 – 502 <a href="http://dhdebates.gc.cuny.edu/debates/text/24">http://dhdebates.gc.cuny.edu/debates/text/24</a></li>
<li>Guru, Gopal and Sundar Sarukkai, The Cracked Mirror: An Indian Debate on Experience and Theory, Oxford University Press, 2012, pp 1-8.</li></ol>
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<p style="text-align: justify;">[<a name="fn1" href="#fr1">1</a>]. See Mark Kirshchenbaum “What is Digital Humanities and What is it Doing in English Departments”, Debates in the Digital Humanities, ed. Mathew K. Gold, (University of Minnesota Press, 2012 ) <a href="http://dhdebates.gc.cuny.edu/debates/text/24">http://dhdebates.gc.cuny.edu/debates/text/24</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">[<a name="fn2" href="#fr2">2</a>]. This is a rather simple abstraction of ideas about discipline and reason as they have stemmed from Enlightenment thought. For a more elaborate understanding see ‘Conflict of the Faculties' (1798) by Immanuel Kant and ‘Discipline and Punish' (1975) by Michel Foucault. For more on Kant’s essay see <a href="https://cis-india.org/raw/the-conflict-of-konigsberg" class="external-link">The Conflict of Konigsberg</a> by Anirudh Sridhar.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">[<a name="fn3" href="#fr3">3</a>]. See Andrew Cutrofello in ‘Discipline and Critique: Kant, Poststructuralism and the Problem of Resistance (State University of New York Press, 1994).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">[<a name="fn4" href="#fr4">4</a>]. See Alan Liu in “Where is Cultural Criticism in the Digital Humanities”, Debates in the Digital Humanities, ed. Mathew K. Gold, (University of Minnesota Press, 2012).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Note: This blog post draws primarily from conversations with faculty at <a class="external-link" href="http://sctrdhci.wordpress.com/">Jadavpur University</a> and <a class="external-link" href="http://www.presiuniv.ac.in/web/">Presidency University, Kolkata</a>, both of whom offer courses on Digital Humanities.</p>
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No publishersnehaFeaturedResearchers at WorkMapping Digital Humanities in IndiaDigital Humanities2015-03-30T12:47:49ZBlog Entry