Centre for Internet and Society

Labour futures: Intersectional responses to southern digital platform economies

Aayush Rathi and Ambika Tandon — 2021-01-27T08:43:36Z

It is our great pleasure to announce that we are undertaking a two-year research project to comprehensively analyse dominant and emerging sectors in India’s platform economies. The project is funded by a research grant of USD 200,000 from the Internet Society Foundation.

The works emerging from this project will directly inform the ongoing challenges that various stakeholders are encountering in negotiating policy-making for the platform economy. It will attempt to address these challenges by bringing forth a southern and worker-first understanding of the platform economy. In the immediate term, the project will speak to labour law "reforms" underway in India. In the long term, it will engage with historical and forthcoming policy discourse regionally and in India around regulation of e-commerce, trade, competition, and digital platforms.

Provocations

Few recent developments in recent times have attracted as much public and scholarly and policy attention as the platform economy (and it’s various terminologies such as sharing/gig/on-demand economy). While it is widely acknowledged that the platform economy is rapidly growing, very little is known about its size other than monetary estimates of market size. Reliable quantitative data on even some of the fundamental aspects of the platform economy has been unavailable. Platform companies have been notoriously averse to publishing open datasets, and the dispersed nature of the platforms and their workforces has made data collection particularly challenging. Innovative methodologies of data collection are urgent.

Another reason for the increasing attention has been the increasing embeddedness of platforms in urban infrastructures, and their central role in urban life. Several camps building approaches to and analyses of the platform economy have already been set-up across and within disciplines. Economists have offered a narrative of platform work that emphasises efficiency and opportunity, with some discussion of disruption of employment relations. Sociological work has focused on two main topics to explain outcomes for platform work—precarity, which focuses on employment classification and insecure labour, and technological control via algorithms. Both of these suggest exploitative experiences of platform labour.

Despite a global proliferation of digital platforms and their integration within numerous urban operations, much of the examination around these tools has tended to focus on their implementation within northern cities. Qualitative work in southern contexts is growing, and has been rich, but has often used similar analytical lenses as work in the North. This is showcased by the outsized attention paid in scholarship to models of labour platformisation referred to with the monikers ‘Uberisation’ and ‘Uber for X’, which limit the imagination of the platform economy to on-demand work. This research team’s work of platformisation in the domestic work sector in India has shown how such work, while crucial, essentialises a male and techno-centric formulation of the experiences of platform labour. There is an urgent need for a southern-led analytic approach to platform economies, which emphasises labour force intersectionalities, informalities in southern contexts, connections to conventional labour markets economics and regulation, and institutional voids in southern economies.

Hypothesis and research questions

The central hypothesis for this research project is that the generation of systematic macro-level data and robust regulatory documentation will lead to effective policy-making and advocacy. This can achieve secure and gainful labour market outcomes for workers in rapidly digitising southern economies. Achieving these outcomes will require multi-pronged strategies that can create pathways for structural changes. Such strategies include top-down approaches which will support regulatory and legislative policies, and judicial action through evidence-building. We will also focus on the embedding of bottom-up approaches in regulatory processes such as through workers’ organisation and resistance.

The broad research questions for this project are:

What are the determinants and characteristics, historical and emergent, of digital platform entities’ recruitment, workforce management and economic value creation strategies?
What institutional roles, vis-à-vis civil society, markets and the state, are digital platform entities in the global south(s) occupying and seeking to occupy?
What are (a) regulatory, (b) corporate policy and (c) individual/collective labour responses that can generate equitable and gainful outcomes for workers in the digital platform economies?

Research team

The research project will be led by Aayush Rathi and Ambika Tandon, along with Amber Sinha. Shayna Robinson, from the Internet Society Foundation, will be supporting our endeavours.

Work with us

The success of this project will be contingent on inter/trans-disciplinary approaches to generate sustainable and gainful work outcomes for the bodies labouring in the platform economies. In addition to stakeholder groups directly engaged in the platform economies, we plan to work with a diverse set of individuals and groups, including public interest technologists, economists, practitioners, labour and technology historians, and designers.

If you are interested in contributing to this project and collaborating on similar agendas, do reach out to either Aayush Rathi (aayush@cis-india.org) or Ambika Tandon (ambika@cis-india.org).

Do keep an eye out on CIS’s website and social media handles for listings of specific work opportunities on this and other projects. One such opportunity is here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/labour-futures-intersectional-responses-to-southern-digital-platform-economies

Your economy, our livelihoods: A policy brief by the All India Gig Workers’ Union

W.C. Shukla, Rikta Krishnaswamy, Rohin Garg, Gunjan Jena, and S.B. Natarajan — 2024-01-31T00:02:12Z

In this policy brief, the All India Gig Workers’ Union (AIGWU) presents its critique on NITI Aayog’s report on India’s platform economy. Through experiences from over 3 years of organising gig workers across India, they highlight fallacies in the report that disregard workers’ experiences and realities. They present alternative recommendations that are responsive to these realities, and offer pathways towards rights-affirming futures for workers in the platform economy.

Click to download the full report

Alternative recommendations towards rights-affirming futures for workers in the platform economy

Regulating the unchecked rise of platforms and the platform workforce

The rise of platforms will not only affect workers in blue collar or grey collar jobs but also engulf other service sectors that currently provide permanent and dignified employment. The platform and gig work paradigm must not be used as a way to further deregulate the Indian economy by subterfuge.

Robust regulatory mechanisms and worker protections must be extended to the gig economy and other forms of perennial employment threatened by the new Central labour codes. Gig workers must be recognised as employees with a clear test of employment enshrined in law.

A stronger push towards better paradigms of work can only come from alternative models of platform work. It is essential that the government foster the creation of platform cooperatives in certain service sectors. Such platform cooperatives will mitigate market concentration that results from the network effects of large private platforms, offer greater stability than profit-oriented private platforms, and offer genuine pro-people alternatives.

Securing data rights and employment security

Gig workers must be guaranteed individual and collective rights to their data collected and stored by platforms. Workers’ data should belong to the workers. Workers should be able to access verified records of their training (if any) and work contributions. The government should prescribe standards to ensure that these records are machine-readable and universally inter-operable. In addition, workers must have easy access to verified receipts for each successful task performed on the platform.

Centering gender-responsive protections for workers facing intersectional vulnerabilities

Platform work is uncritically accepted as a panacea for women without taking a deeper look at labour practices, and how women workers may be particularly vulnerable to workplace risks and exploitation.

Considering these vulnerabilities, there must be legal and regulatory measures enabling women to participate in the gig economy more fully—for example, creches, sexual harassment prevention measures, equal wages, and proper hours and working conditions. Crucially, there should be safety provisions for all gig workers, especially for women who face greater dangers of harassment. Importantly, accessible and efficient enforcement mechanisms must be introduced to operationalise schemes and rights for women workers.

Securing minimum social protection guarantees for all workers on digital platforms

Effective minimum wages of INR 26,000 per month must be enforced as demanded by the Joint Platform of Central Trade Unions in India. This figure must be used to determine the minimum earnings for an hour’s worth of work on a platform.

Provision for Provident Fund (PF) must be introduced, and a bank account that does not require minimum balances or related charges must also be guaranteed. Social insurance measures must be guaranteed including health insurance, personal accident insurance, pension, maternity benefits, and disability benefits. In addition, the state government must consider waiving off charges relating to fuel surcharges and parking expenses/ penalties for gig workers, while on duty.

Security and safety for women workers must be addressed by issuing government ID cards for gig workers. Gig workers are required to travel to unknown localities, where residents tend to be suspicious of them. The government ID card will help workers establish their identity and increase their credibility among the residents.

Social security legislation and a tripartite board (with representation of workers and worker organisations, government, and platforms) must be constituted to ensure registration of all platform-based gig workers and facilitate their access to social security. The law should cover all those persons who are engaged in professions that are using digital platforms for their last mile delivery.

Building accountability mechanisms for financial inclusion measures on platforms

While including gig workers into the formal banking system is essential, this must not be used as a pretext to ensnare them into debt traps. Should the government wish to use platforms as a lever for financial inclusion, it must mandate platforms to deposit a minimum amount above and beyond workers’ existing incomes towards their consumption. For platforms, existing schemes must be rejigged—Firstly, the burden of credit schemes must not be borne only by public sector banks; the private sector must also be directed to take on some of the lending. Secondly, interest rates may be lowered for such loans, but this reduced rate must be made conditional on ensuring a certain threshold of working conditions to gig workers.

Developing workforce estimation strategies that reflect workers’ realities

Workers in the gig economy must not blindly be lumped with the unorganised sector without an understanding of nuances within the broad definition of the gig economy. Assumptions that workers in the gig economy have alternate sources of income must be refuted. Rather, in the case of gig workers in the Indian context, ground realities show that this work actually constitutes primary sources of income.

Primary data must be collected across the country where platform work is seen as a clear option for individuals to choose as a profession. Thus, one can estimate the percentage of the population that depends on the gig economy in a consistent manner. Digital platforms must provide adequate data to state governments on the number of workers registered on the platform in every region (along with work time data) in order for governments to actively prepare for public infrastructure requirements required for such employment generation.

Contributors

Authors: W.C. Shukla, Rikta Krishnaswamy, Rohin Garg, Gunjan Jena, and S.B. Natarajan

Images: All India Gig Workers’ Union (AIGWU)

Design: Annushka Jaliwala

About the All India Gig Workers’ Union (AIGWU)

The All India Gig Workers’ Union (AIGWU) is a registered trade union for all food delivery, logistics, and service workers that work on any app-based platforms in India.

Contact: contactaigwu@gmail.com

Connect: Twitter; Facebook

The views and opinions expressed on this page are those of their individual authors. Unless the opposite is explicitly stated, or unless the opposite may be reasonably inferred, CIS does not subscribe to these views and opinions which belong to their individual authors. CIS does not accept any responsibility, legal or otherwise, for the views and opinions of these individual authors. For an official statement from CIS on a particular issue, please contact us directly.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/your-econonomy-our-livelihoods-a-policy-brief-by-the-all-india-gigi-workers-union

The Competition Law Case Against Whatsapp’s 2021 Privacy Policy Alteration

Aman Nair and Arindrajit Basu — 2021-03-24T16:12:09Z

Having examined the privacy implications of Whatsapp's changes to its privacy policy in 2021, this issue brief is the second output in our series examining the effects of those changes. This brief examines the changes in the context of data sharing between Whatsapp and Facebook as being an anticompetitive action in violation of the Indian Competition Act, 2002.

Executive Summary

On January 4, 2021, Whatsapp announced a revised privacy policy through an in-app notification. It highlighted that the new policy would impact user interactions with business accounts, including those which may be using Facebook's hosting services. The updated policy presented users with the option of either accepting greater data sharing between Whatsapp and Facebook or being unable to use the platform post 15th May, 2021. The updated policy resulted in temporarily slowed growth for Whatsapp and increased growth for other messaging apps like Signal and Telegram. While Whatsapp has chosen to delay the implementation of this policy due to consumer outrage, it is important for us to unpack and understand what this (and similar policies) mean for the digital economy, and its associated competition law concerns. Competition law is one of the sharpest tools available to policy-makers to fairly regulate and constrain the unbridled power of large technology companies.

While it is evident the Indian competition landscape will benefit from revisiting the existing law and policy framework to reign in Big technology companies, we argue that the change in Whatsapp’s privacy policy in 2021 can be held anti-competitive using legal provisions as they presently stand. Therefore, in this issue brief, we largely limit ourselves to evaluating the legality of Whatsapp’s privacy policy within the confines of the present legal system.

First, we dive into an articulation of the present abuse of dominance framework in Indian Competition Law. Second, we analyze whether there was abuse of dominance-bearing in mind an economic analysis of Whatsapp’s role in the relevant market by using tests laid out in previous rulings of the CCI

The framework for determining abuse of dominance as per The Competition Act is based on three factors:

1. Determination of relevant market

2. Determination of dominant position

3. Abuse of the dominant position

In two previous orders in 2016 and 2020, CCI has held that Whatsapp is dominant in its relevant market based on several factors which we explore. These include:

Advantage in user base, usage and reach,
Barriers to entry for other competitors
Power of acquisition over competitors.

However, in both orders, CCI held that Whatsapp did not abuse its dominance by arguing that the practices in question allowed for user choice. We critique these judgments for not reflecting the market structures and exploitative practices of large technology companies. We also argue that even if we use the test of user choice laid down by the CCI in its previous orders concerning Whatsapp and Facebook, the changes made to the privacy policy in 2021 did abuse dominance,and should be held guilty of violating competition law standards.

Our analysis revolves around examining the explicit and implicit standards of user choice laid out by the CCI in its 2016 and 2020 judgements as the standard for evaluating fairness in an Abuse of Dominance claim.We demonstrate how the 2021 changes failed to meet these standards.

Finally, we conclude by noting that the present case offers a crucial opportunity for India to take a giant step forward in its regulation of big tech companies and harmonise its rulings with regulatory developments around the world.

The full issue brief can be found here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-competition-law-case-against-whatsapp2019s-2021-privacy-policy-alteration

Strategies to Organise Platform Workers

furtado — 2023-10-22T09:54:52Z

In 2022, the Centre for Internet and Society hosted a panel with Akkanut Wantanasombut, Ayoade Ibrahim, Rikta Krishnaswamy, and Sofía Scasserra at RightsCon, an annual summit on technology and human rights.

Click to download the full report

Event Report

This event report is based on proceedings from a panel hosted at the 2022 edition of RightsCon. Hosted by the labour and digitalisation team at CIS, the panel brought together seasoned labour organisers, activists, and researchers working across Thailand, Nigeria, India, and Argentina. The panellists represented a diverse group of worker organisations, including transnational federations, national unions, and informally organised movements.

Their experiences of organising in research and practice infused our discussion with insight into collective action struggles across varied sectors and platform economies in the global south. Collective resistance among platform workers has witnessed a sustained rise in these economies over the past three years, with demands for transparency and accountability from platforms, and for a guarantee of rights and protections from governments.

Through this panel, we sought to answer:

How have workers’ organisations overcome challenges in sustained collective action?
What have been unique aspects of organising in the global south?
Which strategies have been gaining traction for organising workers and mobilising other stakeholders?

Placing workers’ participation front and centre, the panellists incorporated common threads around campaigning, education, and mobilisation for increasing worker participation, as well as bargaining with the government for legal and social protections. The panellists highlighted that it’s the resilience and resistance led by workers that drive the way for sustained organising. This panel hoped to spotlight steps taken in that direction, where organising efforts strive to form, sustain, and champion worker-led movements.

Contributors

Panellists:
Akkanut Wantanasombut
Ayoade Ibrahim
Rikta Krishnawamy
Sofía Scasserra

Worker organisations in focus:
Tamsang-Tamsong
National Union of Professional App-based Transport Workers
International Alliance of App-based Transport Workers
All India Gig Workers’ Union
Federación Argentina de Empleados de Comercio y Servicios
Asociación de Personal de Plataformas

Conceptualisation and planning: Ambika Tandon, Chiara Furtado, Aayush Rathi, and Abhishek Sekharan

Author: Chiara Furtado
Reviewers: Ambika Tandon and Nishkala Sekhar
Designer: Annushka Jaliwala

This event report is part of research supported by the Internet Society Foundation under the ‘Labour futures’ grant.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/strategies-to-organise-platform-workers-rightscon

Millions of Indians move from cash to digital payments. But some ask whether it’s safe

praskrishna — 2017-01-16T02:52:33Z

Minutes after Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi began an ambitious new mobile-phone-payment application in December, several clones of the app popped up at Android smartphone stores.

The article by Rama Lakshmi was published by Washington Post on 14 January 2017, Sunil Abraham was quoted. Annie Gowen contributed to this report.

In the first few days, users were flooded with spam requests for money.

The Bhim app sponsored by the government was rushed out after Modi’s abrupt withdrawal of large currency bills two months ago. More than 10 million people downloaded it in just 10 days, but in a country where awareness and regulation of privacy, data protection and digital security are low, the number of cyberattacks is rising.

“We are rushing toward launching and using these plethora of financial tech apps without the exhaustive security testing and education that is needed,” said Sunil Abraham, executive director of the Center for Internet and Society. “We are operating in a bit of a regulatory vacuum.”

Modi’s ambitious move to swap old bills for new was intended to fight the hoarding of illicit cash reserves. But it was derailed by shoddy implementation, left citizens in Asia’s third-largest economy without cash for weeks, slowed manufacturing and sent workers home, and is now likely to significantly affect the country’s economic growth this year, economists say. It was acutely painful for a country where 80 percent of transactions were conducted with cash.

Modi quickly responded by turning the adversity into a call for Indians to kick their overwhelming dependence on cash and opt for digital payments overnight. The Bhim app is just one of many available. But in this leap, experts say, security concerns are being overlooked.

The new payment apps and e-wallet companies are governed by India’s outdated information technology law of 2008 and central bank guidelines.

“India urgently needs a new digital payment law that regulates all these mobile payment apps that have sprung up overnight,” said Pavan Duggal, a cyber-law expert. “We are right now in a completely uncharted and unsupervised territory legally. The norms for wallet companies are undefined. If I lose my money due to a fraud, I can go round and round in circles with no remedy.”

The central bank recently issued guidelines asking payment banks to carry out security audits, but Duggal said “there is no penalty or punishment for noncompliance.”

The problem is compounded by the fact that education about security risks online is abysmally sparse, especially in India’s small towns and villages. Indians are complacent about cyber risks in their online behavior, according to the Norton Cyber Security Insights Report. India does not have a privacy law.

India reported more than 39,000 incidents of cyberattacks in the first nine months of 2016, according to the government, including phishing, scanning and probing, website intrusions, defacements, virus and malicious code, and denial-of-service attacks.

“The Pentagon got hacked, right? You haven’t closed down the Pentagon as yet,” said Piyush Goyal, a minister. “These things will happen, and we have to be one step ahead of the hackers and the so-called security breaches and continuously improving and improvising as they do in America or other developed economies.”

In October, top banks had to fix the security codes of about 3.2 million debit cards in one of the biggest data breaches in India. Some users complained that their cards had been used in China.

Last month, hackers attacked Twitter and email accounts of prominent politicians and journalists and defaced the website of the National Security Guard, an elite commando force.

“The focus of global hackers has shifted to India. The cyber risk is a direct fallout of the growth in the number of digital users,” said Saket Modi, the chief executive of Lucideus Tech, the firm that conducted the security audit of the government’s Bhim app.

Since the cash crunch began, the largest private e-wallet company, Paytm, has experienced a 400 percent jump in new downloads.

But only 342 million people access the Internet on their mobile phones. The government has introduced dial-in service for those who have basic cellphones to make digital payments.

The government is airing radio jingles telling citizens not to share their personal identification numbers and has a toll-free helpline to teach people how to make online payments.

“Officials understand how security worries can be a big dampener in their campaign to get people to go digital,” said Vinayak Godse, senior director at the Data Security Council of India, an industry body that advises the government.

But in a trade-off between convenience and security, the central bank recently waived the mandatory two-factor authentication for transactions less than $30 online.

Some cybersecurity experts say that Indians are not ready for this step.

The police recently arrested a gang in the eastern state of Jharkhand; operators were calling people posing as bank executives and tricking them into sharing their card details. They used the cards to do online shopping and transferred money into their e-wallet accounts.

“People are gullible and can be threatened or lured to part with their bank details easily. We need as many safeguards as we can have,” said Surendra Kumar, a senior police officer in New Delhi who busted the gang.

But the biggest problem people face is that police in one state get very little cooperation from those in another state in digital-crime complaints, said Rakshit Tandon, a cybersecurity expert who trains police, military members and school students.

“Only in big-ticket frauds will police departments from different states coordinate their investigations,” Tandon said. “If a person loses a relatively smaller amount digitally, the case won’t go far. Even though that amount may mean a lot in that person’s life.”

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/washington-post-january-14-2017-rama-lakshmi-millions-of-indians-move-from-cash-to-digital-payments

Seminar on Understanding Financial Technology, Cashless India, and Forced Digitalisation (Delhi, January 24)

sumandro — 2017-01-23T13:17:19Z

The Centre for Financial Accountability is organising a seminar on "Understanding Financial Technology, Cashless India, and Forced Digitalisation" on Tuesday, January 24, at YWCA, Ashoka Road, New Delhi. Sumandro Chattapadhyay will participate in the seminar and speak on the emerging architecture of FinTech in India, as being developed and deployed by UIDAI and NPCI.

Cross-posted from Centre for Financial Accountability.

Programme Schedule

09.30 - Registration

10:00 - Introduction to the Seminar & Setting the Context

Madhuresh Kumar, National Alliance of People’s Movements

10:15–11:30 - Session 1 - Understanding the Political Context of FinTech

B P Mathur, Former Dy CAG

Prabir Purkayastha, Free Software Movement of India and Knowledge Commons

C P Chandrasekhar, Centre for Economic Studies and Planning, JNU

11:30-11:45 – Tea / Coffee break

11:45-13:15 - Session 2 - How will FinTech Impact the Poor, and Labour and Banking Sector?

Ashim Roy, New Trade Union of India

Nikhil Dey, Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan

Ravinder Gupta, General Secretary, State Bank of India Officers Association

13:15-14:00 – Lunch

14:00-15:30 - Session 3 - Understanding the Economic Context of FinTech

Indira Rajaraman, Former Director, RBI

Tony Joseph, Sr. Journalist

15:30-17:00 - Session 4 - Understanding the Architecture of FinTech: Linkages to Aadhaar, IndiaStack etc

Sumandro Chattapadhyay, the Centre for Internet and Society

Gopal Krishna, ToxicsWatch

17:00 – Tea

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/seminar-on-understanding-financial-technology-cashless-india-and-forced-digitalisation-delhi-jan-24-2017

Comments on the Report of the Committee on Digital Payments (December 2016)

Sumandro Chattapadhyay and Amber Sinha — 2017-01-12T12:32:22Z

The Committee on Digital Payments constituted by the Ministry of Finance and chaired by Ratan P. Watal, Principal Advisor, NITI Aayog, submitted its report on the "Medium Term Recommendations to Strengthen Digital Payments Ecosystem" on December 09, 2016. The report was made public on December 27, and comments were sought from the general public. Here are the comments submitted by the Centre for Internet and Society.

1. Preliminary

1.1. This submission presents comments by the Centre for Internet and Society (“CIS”) [1] in response to the report of the Committee on Digital Payments, chaired by Mr. Ratan P. Watal, Principal Advisor, NITI Aayog, and constituted by the Ministry of Finance, Government of India (“the report”) [2].

2. The Centre for Internet and Society

2.1. The Centre for Internet and Society, CIS, is a non-profit organisation that undertakes interdisciplinary research on internet and digital technologies from policy and academic perspectives. The areas of focus include digital accessibility for persons with diverse abilities, access to knowledge, intellectual property rights, openness (including open data, free and open source software, open standards, and open access), internet governance, telecommunication reform, digital privacy, and cyber-security.

2.2. CIS is not an expert organisation in the domain of banking in general and payments in particular. Our expertise is in matters of internet and communication governance, data privacy and security, and technology regulation. We deeply appreciate and are most inspired by the Ministry of Finance’s decision to invite entities from both the sectors of finance and information technology. This submission is consistent with CIS’ commitment to safeguarding general public interest, and the interests and rights of various stakeholders involved, especially the citizens and the users. CIS is thankful to the Ministry of Finance for this opportunity to provide a general response on the report.

3. Comments

3.1. CIS observes that the decision by the Government of India to withdraw the legal tender character of the old high denomination banknotes (that is, Rs. 500 Rs. 1,000 notes), declared on November 08, 2016 [3], have generated unprecedented data about the user base and transaction patterns of digital payments systems in India, when pushed to its extreme use due to the circumstances. The majority of this data is available with the National Payments Corporation of India and the Reserve Bank of India. CIS requests the authorities concerned to consider opening up this data for analysis and discussion by public at large and experts in particular, before any specific policy and regulatory decisions are taken towards advancing digital payments proliferation in India. This is a crucial opportunity for the Ministry of Finance to embrace (open) data-driven regulation and policy-making.

3.2. While the report makes a reference to the European General Data Protection Directive, it does not make a reference to any substantive provisions in the Directive which may be relevant to digital payments. Aside from the recommendation that privacy protections around the purpose limitation principle be relaxed to ensure that payment service providers be allowed to process data to improve fraud monitoring and anti-money laundering services, the report is silent on significant privacy and data protection concerns posed by digital payments services. CIS strongly warns that the existing data protection and security regulations under Information Technology (Reasonable security practices and procedures and sensitive personal data or information), Rules are woefully inadequate in their scope and application to effectively deal with potential privacy concerns posed by digital payments applications and services. Some key privacy issues that must be addressed either under a comprehensive data protection legislation or a sector specific financial regulation are listed below. The process of obtaining consent must be specific, informed and unambiguous and through a clear affirmative action by the data subject based upon a genuine choice provided along with an option to opt out at any stage. The data subjects should have clear and easily enforceable right to access and correct their data. Further, data subjects should have the right to restrict the usage of their data in circumstances such as inaccuracy of data, unlawful purpose and data no longer required in order to fulfill the original purpose.

3.3. The initial recommendation of the report is to “[m]ake regulation of payments independent from the function of central banking” (page 22). This involves a fundamental transformation of the payment and settlement system in India and its regulation. We submit that a decision regarding transformation of such scale and implications is taken after a more comprehensive policy discussion, especially involving a wider range of stakeholders. The report itself notes that “[d]igital payments also have the potential of becoming a gateway to other financial services such as credit facilities for small businesses and low-income households” (page 32). Thus, a clear functional, and hence regulatory, separation between the (digital) payments industry and the lending/borrowing industry may be either effective or desirable. Global experience tells us that digital transactions data, along with other alternative data, are fast becoming the basis of provision of financial and other services, by both banking and non-banking (payments) companies. We appeal to the Ministry of Finance to adopt a comprehensive and concerted approach to regulating, enabling competition, and upholding consumers’ rights in the banking sector at large.

3.4. The report recognises “banking as an activity is separate from payments, which is more of a technology business” (page 154). Contemporary banking and payment businesses are both are primarily technology businesses where information technology particularly is deployed intimately to extract, process, and drive asset management decisions using financial transaction data. Further, with payment businesses (such as, pre-paid instruments) offering return on deposited money via other means (such as, cashbacks), and potentially competing and/or collaborating with established banks to use financial transaction data to drive lending decisions, including but not limited to micro-loans, it appears unproductive to create a separation between banking as an activity and payments as an activity merely in terms of the respective technology intensity of these sectors. CIS firmly recommends that regulation of these financial services and activities be undertaken in a technology-agnostic manner, and similar regulatory regimes be deployed on those entities offering similar services irrespective of their technology intensity or choice.

3.5. The report highlights two major shortcomings of the current regulatory regime for payments. Firstly “the law does not impose any obligation on the regulator to promote competition and innovation in the payments market” (page 153). It appears to us that the regulator’s role should not be to promote market expansion and innovation but to ensure and oversee competition. We believe that the current regulator should focus on regulating the existing market, and the work of the expansion of the digital payments market in particular and the digital financial services market in general be carried out by another government agency, as it creates conflict of interest for the regulator otherwise. Secondly, the report mentions that Payment and Settlement Systems Act does not “focus the regulatory attention on the need for consumer protection in digital payments” and then it notes that a “provision was inserted to protect funds collected from customers” in 2015 (page 153). This indicates that the regulator already has the responsibility to ensure consumer protection in digital payments. The purview and modalities of how this function of course needs discussion and changes with the growth in digital payments.

3.6. The report identifies the high cost of cash as a key reason for the government’s policy push towards digital payments. Further, it mentions that a “sample survey conducted in 2014 across urban and rural neighbourhoods in Delhi and Meerut, shows that despite being keenly aware of the costs associated with transacting in cash, most consumers see three main benefits of cash, viz. freedom of negotiations, faster settlements, and ensuring exact payments” (page 30). It further notes that “[d]igital payments have significant dependencies upon power and telecommunications infrastructure. Therefore, the roll out of robust and user friendly digital payments solutions to unelectrified areas/areas without telecommunications network coverage, remains a challenge.” CIS much appreciates the discussion of the barriers to universal adoption and rollout of digital payments in the report, and appeals to the Ministry of Finance to undertake a more comprehensive study of the key investments required by the Government of India to ensure that digital payments become ubiquitously viable as well as satisfy the demands of a vast range of consumers that India has. The estimates about investment required to create a robust digital payment infrastructure, cited in the report, provide a great basis for undertaking studies such as these.

3.7. CIS is very encouraged to see the report highlighting that “[w]ith the rising number of users of digital payment services, it is absolutely necessary to develop consumer confidence on digital payments. Therefore, it is essential to have legislative safeguards to protect such consumers in-built into the primary law.” We second this recommendation and would like to add further that financial transaction data is governed under a common data protection and privacy regime, without making any differences between data collected by banking and non-banking entities.

3.8. We are, however, very discouraged to see the overtly incorrect use of the word “Open Access” in this report in the context of a payment system disallowing service when the client wants to transact money with a specific entity [4]. This is not an uncommon anti-competitive measure adopted by various platform players and services providers so as to disallow users from using competing products (such as, not allowing competing apps in the app store controlled by one software company). The term “Open Access” is not only the appropriate word to describe the negation of such anti-competitive behaviour, its usage in this context undermines its accepted meaning and creates confusion regarding the recommendation being proposed by the report. The closest analogy to the recommendation of the report would perhaps be with the principle of “network neutrality” that stands for the network provider not discriminating between data packets being processed by them, either in terms of price or speed.

3.9. A major recommendation by the report involves creation of “a fund from savings generated from cash-less transactions … by the Central Government,” which will use “the trinity of JAM (Jan Dhan, Adhaar, Mobile) [to] link financial inclusion with social protection, contributing to improved Social and Financial Security and Inclusion of vulnerable groups/ communities” (page 160-161). This amounts to making Aadhaar a mandatory ID for financial inclusion of citizens, especially the marginal and vulnerable ones, and is in direct contradiction to the government’s statements regarding the optional nature of the Aadhaar ID, as well as the orders by the Supreme Court on this topic.

3.10. The report recommends that “Aadhaar should be made the primary identification for KYC with the option of using other IDs for people who have not yet obtained Aadhaar” (page 163) and further that “Aadhaar eKYC and eSign should be a replacement for paper based, costly, and shared central KYC registries” (page 162). Not only these measures would imply making Aadhaar a mandatory ID for undertaking any legal activity in the country, they assume that the UIDAI has verified and audited the personal documents submitted by Aadhaar number holders during enrollment. A mandate for replacement of the paper-based central KYC agencies will only remove a much needed redundancy in the the identity verification infrastructure of the government.

3.11. The report suggests that “[t]ransactions which are permitted in cash without KYC should also be permitted on prepaid wallets without KYC” (page 164-165). This seems to negate the reality that physical verification of a person remains one of the most authoritative identity verification process for a natural person, apart from DNA testing perhaps. Thus, establishing full equivalency of procedure between a presence-less transaction and one involving a physically present person making the payment will only amount to removal of relatively greater security precautions for the former, and will lead to possibilities of fraud.

3.12. In continuation with the previous point, the report recommends promotion of “Aadhaar based KYC where PAN has not been obtained” and making of “quoting Aadhaar compulsory in income tax return for natural persons” (page 163). Both these measures imply a replacement of the PAN by Aadhaar in the long term, and a sharp reduction in growth of new PAN holders in the short term. We appeal for this recommendation to be reconsidered as integration of all functionally separate national critical information infrastructures (such as PAN and Aadhaar) into a single unified and centralised system (such as Aadhaar) engenders massive national and personal security threats.

3.13. The report suggest the establishment of “a ranking and reward framework” to recognise and encourage for the best performing state/district/agency in the proliferation of digital payments. It appears to us that creation of such a framework will only lead to making of an environment of competition among these entities concerned, which apart from its benefits may also have its costs. For example, the incentivisation of quick rollout of digital payment avenues by state government and various government agencies may lead to implementation without sufficient planning, coordination with stakeholders, and precautions regarding data security and privacy. The provision of central support for digital payments should be carried out in an environment of cooperation and not competition.

3.14. CIS welcomes the recommendation by the report to generate greater awareness about cost of cash, including by ensuring that “large merchants including government agencies should account and disclose the cost of cash collection and cash payments incurred by them periodically” (page 164). It, however, is not clear to whom such periodic disclosures should be made. We would like to add here that the awareness building must simultaneously focus on making public how different entities shoulder these costs. Further, for reasons of comparison and evidence-driven policy making, it is necessary that data for equivalent variables are also made open for digital payments - the total and disaggregate cost, and what proportion of these costs are shouldered by which entities.

3.15. The report acknowledges that “[t]oday, most merchants do not accept digital payments” and it goes on to recommend “that the Government should seize the initiative and require all government agencies and merchants where contracts are awarded by the government to provide at-least one suitable digital payment option to its consumers and vendors” (page 165). This requirement for offering digital payment option will only introduce an additional economic barrier for merchants bidding for government contracts. We appeal to the Ministry of Finance to reconsider this approach of raising the costs of non-digital payments to incentivise proliferation of digital payments, and instead lower the existing economic and other barriers to digital payments that keep the merchants away. The adoption of digital payments must not lead to increasing costs for merchants and end-users, but must decrease the same instead.

3.16. As the report was submitted on December 09, 2016, and was made public only on December 27, 2016, it would have been much appreciated if at least a month-long window was provided to study and comment on the report, instead of fifteen days. This is especially crucial as the recently implemented demonetisation and the subsequent banking and fiscal policy decisions taken by the government have rapidly transformed the state and dynamics of the payments system landscape in India in general, and digital payments in particular.

Endnotes

[1] See: http://cis-india.org/.

[2] See: http://finmin.nic.in/reports/Note-watal-report.pdf and http://finmin.nic.in/reports/watal_report271216.pdf.

[3] See: http://finmin.nic.in/cancellation_high_denomination_notes.pdf.

[4] Open Access refers to “free and unrestricted online availability” of scientific and non-scientific literature. See: http://www.budapestopenaccessinitiative.org/read.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-on-the-report-of-the-committee-on-digital-payments-dec-2016

The soon-to-be launched Aadhaar Pay will let you make purchases using your fingerprint

praskrishna — 2017-01-16T03:14:22Z

Paying for your groceries and other goods by using your biometrics instead of an e-wallet, debit card or cash seems to be the next phase in the Centre’s ambitious push to shift the country to a “less cash” economy, as its mandarins term it.

The article by Indulekha Aravind was published in the Economic Times on 15 January 2017. Sunil Abraham was consulted for this.

Ajay Bhushan Pandey, CEO of the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI), says it will be rolling out Aadhaar-enabled payment system, or Aadhaar Pay, for merchants in the next few weeks. This will be an app for merchants that enables them to receive payments through biometric authentication of the customer, provided their bank accounts are linked to their Aadhaar number. "A pilot is under way in fair price shops in Andhra Pradesh where shopkeepers are accepting payments from PDS beneficiaries. The results are very encouraging," says Pandey.

The idea takes off from the existing Aadhaar-enabled payment system (AEPS) used by bank business correspondents (BCs) in rural areas to disburse and accept cash, using micro ATMs. "We are trying to tweak this so that a similar device can be used by a local merchant," says Pandey. Adoption will depend on two factors: merchants’ acceptance of it and whether they can use an app rather than a micro ATM. The biggest advantage through this method of payment, says Pandey, is that the customer will not need a credit or debit card, or even a smartphone.

The limits for transactions using AEPS, such as the number of daily transactions, will be left to the discretion of the banks. In the long term, the AEPS will be migrated to the BHIM (Bharat Interface for Money) platform but the rollout of Aadhaar Pay will happen before that. Post demonetisation, banking BC’s number of transactions using AEPS has leapt from 4-5 lakh to 14-15 lakh, says Pandey. According to Reserve Bank of India data on electronic payment systems, the total volume of such transactions jumped from 671 million in November 2016 to 957 million in December. USSD-based payments, which can be done using a basic feature phone, are among the biggest beneficiaries: the volume rose from just 7,000 in November to 1,02,000 in December, and value of transactions from over Rs 7,000 to over Rs 1 lakh. Prepaid payment instruments — mainly mobile wallets — rose from 59 million to 88 million in the same period (and value from Rs 1,300 crore to Rs 2,100 crore).

While Aadhaar Pay is likely to ride the demonetisation wave if it is launched soon, certain concerns remain, as the list is how secure such a payment system will be. The UIDAI CEO says it is a paramount concern for the organisation, too. "We are using the latest technology to ensure the information stays encrypted end to-end, so that information is not leaked or misused. In the months to come, we will strengthen the security."

Wary About Security
Sunil Abraham, executive director of the Centre for Internet and Society, a think tank that has been analysing the Aadhaar project for six years, outlines several reasons why Aadhaar-based biometrics is inappropriate for authentication in payments, unlike card-based payments that use cryptography.

"With biometrics, there is always an error ratio. It is imprecise matching, whereas with cryptography (smart cards), there is no false positive or negative. You either have the key (PIN) or you don’t. It is also very cheap to defeat biometric authentication — even an unlettered person can do it," says Abraham. It would be easy enough, he says, to replicate someone else’s fingerprint by pressing it against lukewarm wax and filling the mould with glue to get a dummy finger. In contrast, compromising a smart card requires more cost and effort, from tech-savviness to machines such as a skimmer that will read the card. "And once you are compromised,you are compromised forever. You can’t change it, like a debit card PIN."

Using Aadhaar for authentication had proved to be a failure during the exchange of currency notes following demonetisation, he adds, pointing to how the poor and the middle class stood in queues for money while stacks of new currency were recovered from the homes of businessmen and bureaucrats. "When you have bank officials who are corrupt, giving them your biometrics is giving them more ammunition for corruption." To catch the criminals, law enforcement agencies had to resort to CCTV footage,a relatively older technology, he says. Others point out that while it may be secure, certain factors stand in the way of making biometrics-based payment authentication a large-scale success. Amrish Rau, CEO of PayU India, a payment gateway provider, cites a list of reasons why it would inevitably take off but only in 5-10 years.

"For one, the technology is not yet good enough. There are also bandwidth and data constraints in sending biometric data," says Rau. Even in more mature markets, it has yet to find widespread acceptance, he says, pointing to the slow adoption of Apple Pay and Samsung Pay in the US. "It’s not the answer today.” This is in contrast to NITI Aayog CEO Amitabh Kant’s recent remarks that cards and PoS machines would become redundant by 2020 because Indians would be making payments using their thumb (biometrics). "... my view is that in the next two and a half years, India will make all its debit cards, credit cards, all ATM machines, all PoS machines totally irrelevant,” Kant had said at a Pravasi Bharatiya Divas session in Bengaluru.

UIDAI’s Pandey is more circumspect. “I wouldn’t say who would replace what. But from the government’s side we are encouraging all modes of digital payment. India has a diverse population and some people might prefer using a card, others a wallet. Collectively, they will contribute to a less-cash society.”

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/economic-times-indulekha-aravind-january-15-2017-the-soon-to-be-launched-aadhaar-pay-will-let-you-make-purchases-using-your-fingerprint

Platforms, Power, and Politics: Perspectives from Domestic and Care Work in India

Aayush Rathi, and Ambika Tandon — 2021-07-07T15:19:37Z

CIS has been undertaking a two-year project studying the entry of digital platforms in the domestic and care work in India, supported by the Association for Progressive Communications as part of the Feminist Internet Research Network. Implemented through 2019-21, the objective of the project is to use a feminist lens to critique platform modalities and orient platformisation dynamics in radically different, worker-first ways. Ambika Tandon and Aayush Rathi led the research team at CIS. The Domestic Workers’ Rights Union is a partner in the implementation of the project, as co-researchers. Geeta Menon, head of DWRU, was an advisor on the project, and the research team consisted of Parijatha G.P., Radha Keerthana, Zeenathunnisa, and Sumathi, who are office holders in the union and are responsible for organising workers and addressing their concerns.

The Executive Summary for the project report is below.

The full report, ‘Platforms, power, and politics: Perspectives from domestic and care work in India’, can be found here.

The press release can be found here.

Introduction

Paid domestic and care work is witnessing the entry of digital intermediaries over the past decade. More recently, there has been tremendous growth of digital platforms. This holds the potential to impact millions of workers in the sector, which is characterised by a long history of informality and exclusion from rights-according legal frameworks. Digital intermediation of domestic and care work has been a space of high-growth, but also high-attrition. In India, order books of digital platforms providing domestic and care work services were reported to have been growing by upto 60 percent month-on-month in 2016. This is expected to shift the organisation of workers and employment relations profoundly.

Broadly, the discourse on digital platforms providing home-based services can be summarised as follows: proponents argue that digitisation will act as a step towards bringing formalisation to the sector, while critics argue that platforms could replicate the exploitation of workers by further disguising the employer-employee relationship. Similar debates around lack of protections and precarity have also taken place in other occupations in gig work such as transportation and food delivery. In fact, the similarity in precarity and the informal nature of this relationship across gig work and domestic work has led to domestic workers being labelled the original gig workers. Domestic work is a particularly vulnerable and unprotected sector, which makes work in the sector qualitatively different from most other sectors in the gig or sharing economy.

Through a feminist approach to digital labour, our project aimed to examine the dynamics of platformisation in, and of domestic or reproductive care work. Our hypothesis was that platforms are reconfiguring labour conditions, which could empower and/or exploit workers in ways qualitatively different from non-standard work off the platform. In order to interrogate this further, we studied several aspects of the work relationship, including wages, conditions of work, social security, skill levels, and worker surveillance off platforms.

Methodology

We borrowed from ethnographic methods and feminist principles to co-design and implement the research tools with grassroots workers and organisers. Between June to November 2019, we conducted 65 in-depth semi-structured interviews primarily in New Delhi and Bengaluru. A majority of these were with domestic workers who were seeking or had found work through platforms. We also did interviews with workers who had found work through traditional placement agencies to compare our findings, and with representatives from platforms, government labour departments, and workers collectives. Of the workers we interviewed, a majority were women, but men were included as well. Interviews in New Delhi were undertaken by CIS, while interviews with workers in Bengaluru were undertaken by grassroots activists in Bengaluru, affiliated with the Domestic Workers Rights Union (DWRU).

In implementing the data collection approach, we employed feminist methodological principles of intersectionality, self-reflexivity, and participation. The methodology draws on standpoint theory, which encourages knowledge production that centres the lived experiences of marginalised groups. We were acutely aware of our own positionality as high income, Savarna researchers studying a sector dominated by Dalit, Bahujan and Adivasi women from low income groups. This power differential was softened partially by involving DWRU through the course of the project. Workers across both field sites were also interviewed in spaces familiar to them, most often their homes, in languages that they were comfortable with including Hindi, Kannada, and Tamil.

Feminist principles also instrumental during the data analysis, with focus on intersectionality and self-reflexivity. We highlighted the ways in which inequalities of gender, income, migration status, caste, and religion are replicated and amplified in the platform economy. In particular, we discussed the impact of the digital gender gap in access and skills on workers’ ability to find economic opportunities.

Findings

Our typology of platforms mediating domestic work finds three types of platforms – (i) marketplace, or platforms that list workers’ data on their profile, provide certain filters for automated selection of a pool of workers, and charge a fee from customers for access to workers’ contact details, (ii) digital placement agency, or platforms that provide an end-to-end placement service to customers, identify appropriate workers on the basis of selection criteria, and negotiate conditions of work on behalf of workers, and (iii) on-demand platforms, or companies that provide services or ‘gigs’ such as cleaning on an hourly basis, performed by a roster of workers who are characterised as ‘independent contractors’.

When it comes to the role played by platforms in determining employment relations, there is a wide variation within and across platform categories. There are both weak and strong models of intervention. On one end of the spectrum are marketplaces, with minimal intervention in the recruitment process, and on the other on-demand platforms, that exact control over each aspect of work. Digital platforms reconfigure the conception of intermediaries in the domestic work sector, functioning as next-generation placement agencies. All three platform types contain aspects that provide workers agency, as well as those that reinforce their positions of low-power. Platform design impacts the role platforms play in setting conditions of work, but does not determine it entirely.

(Re)shaping the terms of work
Across the three types of platforms, wages are slightly higher than or matching those of workers off platforms. Some marketplace platforms have incorporated features to nudge customers towards setting higher wages, such as enforcing minimum wage standards, or informing customers of expected wages in their locality. Conversely, on-demand platforms charge a high rate of commission from workers, despite refusing to recognise them as employees. This indicates that this is a misclassification of an employment relationship, given that workers are unable to set their own conditions or wages for work. Despite the high rates of commission and appropriation of labour by platforms, on-demand workers earn higher wages than workers on other platforms. The relatively high wage is a result of marketing on-demand cleaning as professionalised and more skilled than day-to-day cleaning. Tasks in the sector continue to be distributed along the lines of gender and caste, as has historically been the case. Dalit, Bahujan and Adivasi women are more likely to take up work such as cleaning and washing dishes, while men and women across castes are equally distributed in cooking work. Women dominate tasks such as elderly and childcare, as in the traditional economy. Workers in professionalised tasks such as deep cleaning that requires technical equipment and chemicals are almost entirely men.

Digital divides and workers’ agency
We find that workers are primarily onboarded onto platforms by learning about it from other workers, through onboarding camps held by platforms, or offline advertising by platforms. Such in-person onboarding techniques allows workers with no digital access or literacy to register themselves on marketplace platforms and digital placement agencies.

However, we find that low levels of education and digital literacy continue to impact platformed labour by creating a strong informational asymmetry between workers and platforms. For instance, we find that women workers from low income communities have very little information about how platforms work, causing deep distrust. Workers with digital devices and literacy (and therefore a relatively better understanding of the functionality of the platform), physical mobility and the resources to bear indirect costs that were outsourced to them were at a significant advantage in finding better-paying jobs. Workers who were seeking flexibility and were not necessarily dependent on the platform for their primary income were also better placed than those entirely dependent on platforms. Women workers tended to be disadvantaged on all these counts, limiting their agency and capacity to reap the benefits of the platform economy.

Across the three types of platforms, systems of placement and ratings add to the information asymmetry, as workers are not aware of the impact of ratings on their ability to find work or charge better wages. Ratings and filtering systems also hard-code the impact of workers’ social characteristics on their work. Workers are unable to exercise control over their data, further undermining their agency vis-a-vis platforms and employers. We identify a clear need for collective bargaining structures to protect workers’ rights, although platformed domestic workers remained distant from both domestic work unions and emergent unions of platform workers in other sectors.

Intersectionalities of formalisation
We find that inequalities of caste, class, and gender that have historically shaped the sector continue to be replicated or even amplified in the platform economy. What remains clear is that platforms in the domestic work sector adopt the logics of this sector, more than the converse. Platformisation is conflated with formalisation, and it is within this vector, from complete informality to piecemeal formalisation, that platforms operate. Labour benefits do not take the form of labour protections or welfare entitlements that are the central function of formalisation processes. Instead, the so-called benefits are intended to transform domestic workers to participate within the logics and vagaries of the market.

Policy Recommendations

Recognise and implement labour protections for domestic workers
Domestic workers have historically occupied the most vulnerable positions in the workforce, with limited legal protections. Exposed to the regulatory grey areas that platforms operate in, this doubly exposes domestic workers to precarious conditions of work. Despite an avowed move towards formalisation of domestic work, platform-mediated labour continues to retain characteristics of informal labour, even heightening some.

If pushed to do so, platform companies can be instrumental in resolving some of the implementation challenges that governments have faced in enforcing legislative protections sought to be made available to domestic workers. Platforms have databases of workers, which can be used to mandatorily register them for social security schemes offered by the government. This data can also be used for better policy making, in the absence of reliable statistics particularly on migrant workers in the informal economy.

Reduce the protective gap between employment and self-employment
The (mis)classification of “gig” work within labour law frameworks is still a matter that continues to be hotly debated within policy practitioners, legal scholarship, and civil society actors. Three positions, in particular, have been taken—treating gig workers as employees, independent contractors, or occupying a third intermediate category. More recently, there have been some legal victories guaranteeing employment protections and increasing platform companies’ accountability. However, these successes have been more visible in Global North jurisdictions.

Regardless of the resolution of these ongoing debates over employment status, labour frameworks should provide some universal protections to all categories of labour. Such protections must include universal coverage of social security, in addition to rights such as freedom of association, collective bargaining, equal remuneration and anti-discrimination. Policies geared towards achieving this objective would be significant in reducing the protective gaps between different categories of labour, and would particularly help historical and emerging occupational categories of workers such as “gig” workers and domestic workers.

Recognise the specific challenge(s) and potential of platformisation of domestic work
Platforms hold the potential of acting as effective facilitators in informal labour markets. Even when they do not replace existing recruitment pathways, they provide alternate ones. Workers were more likely to register on a platform if they were entering the domestic work labour market recently (often distress and migration driven), or had not enjoyed success with informal, word-of-mouth networks. However, platforms also heighten labour market insecurities, and create new ones. These potential risks need to be specifically recognised through appropriate frameworks, such as social security, discrimination law and data protection.

Tailor policy-making to platform models
We identify three types of platforms, each of which intervene to varying degrees in the work relationship. We recommend that digital placement agencies and marketplace platforms be registered with governments and enforce basic protections for workers such as provision of minimum wage, preventing abuse (including non-payment of wages) and trafficking. On-demand companies on the other hand, must be treated as employers, and workers be accorded employment protections including social security.

In addition to rights-based policy actions, legal-regulatory mechanisms geared towards mitigating the precariousness of platform-based work are required. This can take the shape of clarifying and expanding existing legal-regulatory formulations, or preparing new ones. Such policy making should factor in the power and information asymmetry between domestic workers (and gig workers, generally) and platforms.

Further, in the absence of health or retirement benefits, risks and indirect costs of operations are shifted from employers to workers. For instance, workers provide capital in the form of tools or equipment, support the fluctuation of business and income, and can be ‘deactivated’ from an application as a result of poor ratings or periods of inactivity. Any regulation aiming to extend employee status should mandate platforms to support such indirect costs.

Related Publications

1. Research notes with reflections from union members.
2. The event report from a stakeholder consultation with workers, unions, companies and government representatives.
3. A reflection note on the participatory approach taken by the project.
4. A paper with a comparative analysis of the policy landscape on domestic work in the platform economy.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/platforms-power-and-politics-perspectives-from-domestic-and-care-work-in-india

Inputs to the Report on the Non-Personal Data Governance Framework

sumandro — 2020-12-30T09:40:52Z

This submission presents a response by researchers at the Centre for Internet and Society, India (CIS) to the draft Report on Non-Personal Data Governance Framework prepared by the Committee of Experts under the Chairmanship of Shri Kris Gopalakrishnan. The inputs are authored by Aayush Rathi, Aman Nair, Ambika Tandon, Pallavi Bedi, Sapni Krishna, and Shweta Mohandas (in alphabetical order), and reviewed by Sumandro Chattapadhyay.

Text of submitted inputs: Read (PDF)

Report by the Committee of Experts on Non-Personal Data Governance Framework: Read (PDF)

Inputs

Clause 3.7 (v): The role of the Indian government in the operation of data markets

While highlighting the potential for India to be one of the top consumer and data markets of the world, it also sheds light on the concern about the possibility of data monopolies. The clause envisions the role of the Indian government as a regulator and a catalyst for domestic data markets.

In doing so, the clause does not acknowledge that the proactive and dominant roles of the Indian government in generation and reuse of data, based on the existing data collection practices, as well as the provisions that have been given, as under the compulsory sharing provisions in the Report, and would continue to be given by the Personal Data Protection Bill. In reality, the Indian government’s role is not just of a catalyst but also of a key player, potentially with monopolistic market power, in the domestic data market, especially due to the ongoing data marketplace initiatives as detailed in published policy and vision documents. [1]

Clause 3.8 (iv): Introducing collective privacy

The introduction of collective privacy has initiated an overdue discussion at the policy level to arrive at privacy formulations that account for limitations in the contemporary dominant social, legal and ethical paradigms of privacy premised on individual interests and personal harm. The notion of collective privacy has garnered contemporary attention with the rise of data processing technologies and business models that thrive on the collection and processing of aggregate information.

While the Report acknowledges that collective privacy is an evolving concept, it doesn’t attempt to define either collective or what privacy could entail in the context of a collective. The postulation of collective privacy as a legally binding right is bereft with challenges in both domestic and international legal frameworks. [2]

Central to these challenges is the representation of the group of the entity. While the Report illustrates harms that may be incurred by certain collectives that collective privacy could protect against, these illustrated collectives are already recognised in law as rights-holding groups (society members, for example), and/or share pre-determined attributes (sexual orientation, for example).

The Report does not acknowledge that the very technological processes that may have rendered the articulation of collective privacy necessary, also are intended to create ad-hoc and newer sets of individuals or groups with shared attributes. [3] In doing so, the Report furthers an ontology of groups having intuitive, predetermined attributes that exist naturally, or in law, whereas the intervention of data collection and processing technologies can determine shared group attributes afresh. Moreover, the Report also ignores that predetermined attributes are static, and in doing so, ignores a vast existing literature speaking to fluidity of identities and the intersectionality of identities that individuals in groups occupy. [4] We fully appreciate the challenges these pose in the determination of the legal contours of collective privacy. Much of the Report’s recommendations are premised on the idea of a predetermined collective, rendering more granular exploration of these ideas urgent.

Further, the Report also puts forth a limited conception of privacy as a safeguard against data-related harms that may be caused to collectives. In doing so, it dilutes the conceptualisation of individual privacy as articulated in Justice K. S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) and Anr. vs Union Of India And Ors. Notwithstanding this dilution, the illustrations also only indicate harms that may be caused by private actors. Any further recommendations should envision the harms that may also be caused by public data-driven processes, such as those incubated within the state machinery.

Clause 4.1 (iii) and Recommendation 1: Defining Non-Personal Data

The Report proposes the definition of non-personal data to include (i) data that was never related to an identified or identifiable natural person, and (ii) aggregated, anonymised personal data such that individual events are “no longer identifiable”. In doing so, they have attempted to extend protections to categories of data that fall outside the ambit of the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019 (hereafter “PDP Bill”). The Report is cognizant of the fallible nature of anonymization techniques but fails to indicate how these may be addressed. The test of anonymization in regarding data as non-personal data requires further clarification. Anonymization, in and of itself, is an ambiguous standard. Scholarship has indicated that anonymised data may never be completely anonymous. [5] Despite this, the PDP Bill proposes a high threshold of zero-risk of anonymization in relation to personal data, to mean “such irreversible process of transforming or converting personal data to a form in which a data principal cannot be identified”. From a plain reading, it appears that the Report proposes a lower threshold of the anonymization requirements governing non-personal data. It is unclear how non-personal data would then be different from inferred data as described within the definition of personal data under the PDP Bill. This adds regulatory uncertainty making it imperative for the Committee to articulate bright-line, risk-based principles and rules for the test of anonymization. Such rules should also indicate the factors that ought to be taken into account to determine whether anonymization has occurred and the timescale of reference for anonymization outcomes. [6]

The recommendation also states that the data principal should "also provide consent for anonymisation and usage of this anonymized data while providing consent for collection and usage of his/her personal data". However the framing of this recommendation fails to mention the responsibility of the data fiduciary to provide notice to the data principal about the usage of the anonymized data while seeking the data principal’s consent for anonymization. The notice provided to the data principal should provide clear indication that consent of the data principal is based on their knowledge of the use of the anonymized data.

Clause 4.8 (i), (ii): Function of data custodians

The Report does not make it clear who may perform the role of data custodians. The use of data fiduciary indicates the potential import of the definition of ‘data fiduciary’ as specified under Clause 3.13 of the PDP Bill. However, this needs to be further clarified.

Clause 4.8 (iii): Data custodians’ “duty of care”

As is outlined in the following section on data trustees, it can be difficult for a singular entity to maintain a duty of care and undertake actions with the best interest of a community when that community consists of sub-communities that may be marginalised. Further, ‘duty of care’, ‘best interest’, and ‘absence of harm’ are not sufficient standards for data processing by data custodians. Recommendations to the effect of obligating data custodians to uphold the rights of data principals, including economic and fundamental rights need to be incorporated in the framework.

Clause 4.9: Data trustees

The committee’s suggestion that the “most appropriate representative body” should be the data trustee—that often being either the corresponding government entity or community body— is reasonable at face value. However, in the absence of any clear principles defining what constitutes “most appropriate” there are a number of potential issues that can appear:

Lack of means for selecting a data trustee: The report makes note of the fact that both private and public entities can be selected to be data trustees but offers no principles on how these data trustees can be selected, i.e. whether they are to be directly selected by the members of a community, and if so how. Any selection criteria or process prescribed has to keep in mind the following point regarding the potential lack of representation for marginalised communities that could arise from a direct selection of a data trustee by a group of people.

Issues of having a single data trustee for large scale communities and when dealing with marginalised communities: The report assumes that in instances wherein a community is spread across a geographic region, or consists of multiple sub-communities, then the data trustee will be the closest shared government authority (for example, the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India being the data trustee for data regarding diabetes among Indian citizens).

This idea of a singular data trustee assumes that the ‘best interests’ of a community are uniform across that community. This can prove problematic especially when dealing with data obtained from marginalised communities that forms a part of a wider dataset. It is entirely possible to imagine that a smaller disenfranchised community may have interests that are not aligned with the general majority. In such a situation the Report is unclear as to whether the data trustee would have to ensure that the best interests of all groups are maintained, or would they be responsible for ensuring the best interests of the largest number of people within that community. There are power differentials between citizens, government agencies, and other entities described by the Report. This places citizens at risk of abuse of power by government entities in their role as trustees, who are effectively being empowered through this policy framework as opposed to a representative mechanism. It is recommended that data trustees be appointed by relevant communities through clear and representative mechanisms. Additionally, any individual should be able to file complaints regarding the discharge of community trust by data trustees. This is necessary as any subsequent rights vested in the community can only be exercised through the data trustee, and become unenforceable in the lack of an appropriate data trustee.

Any legislation that arises on the basis of this report will therefore have to not only provide a means for selecting the data trustee, but also safeguards for ensuring that data collected from marginalised communities are used keeping in mind their specific best interests—with these best interests being informed through consultation with that community.

Clause 4.10 (iii): Data trusts

Section 4.10 (iii) notes that data custodians may voluntarily share data in these data trusts. However it is unclear if such sharing must be done with the express consent of the relevant data trustee.

Clause 4.10 (iv): Mandatory sharing and competition

The fundamental premise of a mandatory data sharing regime seems increasingly distant from its practical impacts. The EU which earlier championed the cause now seems reluctant to further it on the face of studies which skews towards counteractive impacts of such steps. Such steps could apply to huge volumes of first-party data companies collect on their own assets, products and services, even though such data are among the least likely to create barriers to entry or contribute to abuses of dominant positions. [7] This is hence likely to bring in more chilling effect on innovation and investment than a pro-competition environment. The velocity of big data also adds to the futility of such data sharing mandates. [8] It is recommended that a sectoral analysis of this mandate be undertaken instead of an overarching stipulation.

The Report suggests extensive data sharing without addressing the extent of obligation on the private players to submit to these requests and process them. The availability of meta-data about the data collected may be made easily accessible under mandates of transparency. However, the access to the detailed underlying data will be difficult in most cases due to the current structure of entities functioning in cyberspace, evidenced by the lack of compliance to such mandates by Courts of Law in the EU. Such a system can easily eliminate the comparative advantage of smaller players, helping larger players with more money at their disposal enabling their growth and throttling the smaller players. It could have serious implications on data quality and integrity through the sharing of erroneous data. Access to superior quality digital services in India may also have to be compromised. If this regime is furthered without amends to address these concerns, it might end up counter productive.

Clause 5.1 (iv): Grievance redressal against state’s role

This clause acknowledges the vast potential for government authorities and other bodies to abuse their power as data trustee. In addition, it should describe the setting up of impartial and accessible mechanisms for citizens to complain against such abuse of power and appropriate penalties, including the removal of the data trustee.

Chapter 7, Recommendation 5: Purpose of data-sharing

Recommendation 5 leaves scope for “national security” as a sovereign purpose for data sharing. This continues to be in line with the trend of having an overarching national security clause, as in the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019. There could be provisions made to enable access to data for sovereign purposes without such broad definition, replacing it based on constitutional terms which will limit it to the confines laid down in the Constitution. This will effectively curb any misuse of the provision and strongly embed the proposed regulation of non-personal data on constitutional ethos. This can also prevent future conflicts with the fundamental rights.

Platform companies have leveraged their position in society to take on an ever-greater number of quasi-public functions, exercising new forms of unaccountable, transnational authority. It is not difficult to imagine that this trend can continue to non-platform companies, or even taken forward by these very entities which also have access to a large chunk of non-personal data. A strict division between sovereign purposes and core public interest purposes seems difficult. However, it is imperative to have a clearer definition of core public interest purposes and sovereign purposes. The broad based definition may facilitate reduced accountability. Separating government actions from sovereign purposes could bring forth the power imbalance between the State and its people, while in the case of the non-governmental entities, it will facilitate encroachment of government functions by private players. Both these cases may not consider the best interest of the data generators, or the people at large.

Clause 7.1 (i): Data needs of law enforcement

Clause 7.1 (i) allows for acquisition of data governed by this framework for crime mapping, devising anticipation and preventive measures, and for investigations and law enforcement. While this may be necessary to be granted to law enforcement in certain cases, this should happen only with an express permission of a court of law. Blanket executive access allows higher possibility of misuse by the people involved in law enforcement.

Clause 7.2 (iv): Use of health data as a pilot

The clause suggests the use of health sector data as a pilot use-case. This is highly undesirable due to the inherent nature of high sensitivity of the larger part of data related to the health sector. The high vulnerability of such data to harm the data principals should act as a deterrent in using this as the pilot use-case. Given the mass availability of data related to the health sector due to the pandemic, it creates further points of vulnerabilities which can be illegally monetised and misappropriated. It is recommended that this proposal be scrapped altogether.

Clause 7.2 (iii): Power of government bodies

As per this clause, data trustees or government bodies (who could also be acting as data trustees) can make requests for data sharing and place such data in appropriate data infrastructures or trusts. This presents a conflict of interest, as a data trust or government body can empower itself to be the data trustee. Such cases should be addressed within the scope of the framework.

Clause 8.2 (vii): Level-playing field for all Indian actors

In terms of this clause the “Non-Personal Data Authority (Authority) will ensure a level playing field for all Indian actors to fulfil the objective of maximising Indian data’s value to the Indian economy”. The emphasis on ensuring a level playing field for only Indian actors instead of non-discriminatory platform for all concerned actors irrespective of the country/nationality of the actor has the potential of violating India’s trade obligations under the WTO. Member states of the WTO are essentially restricted from discriminating between products and services coming from different WTO Members, and between foreign and domestic products and services unless they can avail of exceptions. There is also no clarity on what constitutes ‘Indian Actors’, would a Multi-National Corporation with its headquarters in a foreign State, but its subsidiaries in India also come within its ambit.

Clause 8.2 (x): Composition of the Authority

Clause 8.2 (x) states that the Authority will have some members with relevant industry experience. However, apart from this clause, the report is silent on the composition of the Authority. The report recognises that Authority will need individuals/organisations with specialised knowledge, i.e. data governance, technology, latest research and innovation in the field of non-personal data), however, it does not mention or refer to the role of civil society organisations and the need for representation from such organisations in the Authority.

The report frequently alludes to non-personal data being used for the best interest of the data principal and therefore, it is essential that the composition of the Authority reflect the inherent asymmetry of power between the data principal and the State. Considering that the Authority will also be responsible for sharing of community data and with determining the code of conduct for sharing of such data, it is important that the Authority also has adequate representation from civil society organisations along with groups or individuals having the necessary technological and legal skills.

Clause 8.2 (iii) and (vi): Roles and Responsibility of the Authority

A majority of the datasets in the country comprise of ‘mixed datasets’, i.e. it consists of both personal and non-personal data. However, there is lack of clarity about the coordination between the Data Protection Authority constituted under the PDP Bill and the Non-Personal Data Authority with regard to the regulation of such datasets. The Report refers to the European Union which provides that the Non-Personal Data Regulation applies to the Non-Personal Data of mixed datasets; if the Non-Personal Data part and the personal data parts are ‘inextricably linked’, the General Data Protection Regulation apply to the whole mixed dataset. However, it is unclear whether the Report also proposes the same mechanism for the regulation of mixed datasets.

Further, the contours of the enforcement role of the Committee should be specified and clearly laid down. Will the Committee also have penal powers as prescribed for the Data Protection Authority under the PDP Bill? Also, will the privacy concerns emanating from the risk of re-anonymisation of data be addressed by the NPD Committee or by the DPA under the PDP Bill. Ideally, it should be specified that any such privacy concerns will fall within the domain of the DPA as the data is then converted into personal data and the DPA will be empowered to deal with such issues.

Endnotes

[1] See Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. (2020). National Digital Health Blueprint. Government of India. https://main.mohfw.gov.in/sites/default/files/Final%20NDHB%20report_0.pdf; Tandon, A. (2019). Big Data and Reproductive Health in India: A Case Study of the Mother and Child Tracking System. https://cis-india.org/raw/big-data-reproductive-health-india-mcts

[2] Taylor, L., Floridi, L., van der Sloot, B. eds. (2017) Group Privacy: new challenges of data technologies. Dordrecht: Springer.

[3] Mittelstadt, B. (2017). From Individual to Group Privacy in Big Data Analytics. Philos. Technol. 30, 475–494.

[4] See Taylor, L., Floridi, L., van der Sloot, B. eds. (2017) Group Privacy: new challenges of data technologies. Dordrecht: Springer; Tisne, M. (n.d). The Data Delusion: Protecting Individual Data Isn't Enough When The Harm is Collective. Stanford Cyber Policy Centre. https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/publication/data-delusion

[5] Rocher, L., Hendrickx, J.M. & de Montjoye, Y. (2019). Estimating the success of re-identifications in incomplete datasets using generative models. Nat Commun 10, 3069 . https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-019-10933-3

[6] Finck, M. & Pallas, F. (2020). They who must not be identified—distinguishing personal from non-personal data under the GDPR. International Data Privacy Law, 10 (1), 11–36. https://doi.org/10.1093/idpl/ipz026

[7] European Commission (2020). Communication From The Commission To The European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic And Social Committee And The Committee Of The Regions: A European strategy for data. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1593073685620&uri=CELEX:52020DC0066

[8] Modrall, Jay. (2019). Antitrust risks and Big Data. Norton Rose Fullbright. https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en-in/knowledge/publications/64c13505/antitrust-risks-and-big-data

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/inputs-to-report-on-non-personal-data-governance-framework

IFAT and ITF - Protecting Workers in the Digital Platform Economy: Investigating Ola and Uber Drivers’ Occupational Health and Safety

2021-06-29T06:53:47Z

Between July to November 2019, Indian Federation of App-based Transport Workers (IFAT) and International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF), New Delhi office, conducted 2,128 surveys across 6 major cities: Bengaluru, Chennai, Delhi NCR, Hyderabad, Jaipur, and Lucknow, to determine the occupational health and safety of app-based transport workers. CIS is proud to publish the study report and the press release. Akash Sheshadri, Ambika Tandon, and Aayush Rathi of CIS supported post-production of this report.

Report: Download (PDF)

Press Release: Download (PDF)

Press Release, August 25, 2020

Between July to November 2019, IFAT and ITF conducted 2,128 surveys across 6 major cities: Bengaluru, Chennai, Delhi NCR, Hyderabad, Jaipur, and Lucknow, to determine the occupational health and safety of app-based transport workers.

Some of the most startling findings from the survey are below:

There is a complete absence of social security and protection—a glaring 95.3% claimed to have no form of insurance, accidental, health or medical. This reflects the inability of workers to invest in their own health. This partly is a result of declining wages—after paying off their EMIs, penalties and commission to the companies and having less than Rs. 20,000 left at the end of the month.
Only 0.15% of the respondents reported to have access to accidental insurance, which is the bare minimum companies like Ola and Uber should have provided to their drivers.
Uber and Ola provide no assistance with regard to harassment and violence while drivers are on the road. Ola or Uber for the most part do not intervene if there is any intimidation from traffic police or local authorities, incidents of road rage, violent attack by customers or criminal elements that endanger drivers’ lives, accidents while driving etc.
On average drivers spend close to 16-20 hours in their cars in a day. 39.8% of the respondents spent close to 20 hours in their vehicle in a day, and 72.8% of the respondents from Bengaluru, Chennai and Hyderabad drive for close to 20 hours a day. Due to long hours, 89.8% of the respondents claim they get less than 6 hours of sleep.
Health issues arising directly as a result of conditions of work is affecting the day-to-day lives of workers. Backache, constipation, liver issues, waist pain and neck pain are the top five health ailments that app-based transport workers suffer from due to their work. 60.7% respondents identified backache as a major health issue.

App-based drivers/driver partners work in a very toxic and isolated work environment. Drivers can’t exit their current occupational status even if they want to because they are shackled in debts and outstanding EMIs. As a result, they race every day to complete targets so that they may earn just enough to pay these liabilities.

The work these drivers are engaged in cannot be considered to be within the ambit of decent work and in reality, is representative of modern slavery. The algorithm of the companies they work for, pits them against their peers in order to maximize profit, while at the same time denying them social security or protection and essentially refusing to acknowledge them as employees.

Drivers working in various cities and working for different app-based platforms have complained about the lack of transparency in how these app-based companies determine fares, promotional cost, surge pricing, incentives, penalties and bonuses. There is little to no information on how rides are being fixed or are being allocated. There also isn't any effective grievance redressal mechanism to resolve any of the issues faced by workers.

The apathy of the state and the exploitation by app-based companies have brought the transport and delivery workers in a precipitous position across the globe. This is underlined and explained by the absence and lack of any social security or protection for the workforce, there are some other issues that the workforce is battling during the Covid-19 pandemic.

Hear our voices and address our demands.

- Shaik Salauddin

National General Secretary, Indian Federation of App-based Transport Workers (IFAT)
Phone: +91 96424 24799

Indian Federation of App-based Transport Workers
Facebook: connectifat
Twitter: @connect_ifat
YouTube: Indian Federation of App-based Transport Workers

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/ifat-itf-protecting-workers-in-digital-platform-economy-ola-uber-occupational-health-safety

IFAT and ITF - Locking Down the Impact of Covid-19

2021-06-29T07:27:09Z

This report, by Indian Federation of App-based Transport Workers (IFAT) and International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF), New Delhi office, explores the responses to the outbreak of Covid-19 by digital platform based companies, trade unions, and governments to help out workers for digital platform based companies hereafter app based workers during the lockdown. The research work in this article is a characterization of the struggles of app based workers during the global pandemic and how it has affected and changed the world of work for them. The surveys were conducted amongst the workforce working for app based companies like Ola, Uber, Swiggy, Zomato etc. This study is partially supported by CIS as part of the Feminist Internet Research Network led by the Association for Progressive Communications.

Report: Download (PDF)

Press Release: Download (PDF)

Press Release, 17 September, 2020

Between March and June 2020, IFAT and ITF conducted 4 surveys with transport and delivery workers to assess (i) their income levels during the Covid-19 pandemic, (ii) the burden of loan repayment during these months, (iii) the relief provided to them by companies, and (iv) the access to welfare schemes offered by state and central governments.

The first survey, on income levels and loans administered in March 2020, had 5964 respondents, across 55 cities, in 16 states. The second and third surveys conducted in April 2020, on financial relief from companies and governments, had 1630 respondents, across 59 cities, in 16 states. The fourth survey was conducted in June 2020 to assess income levels as the economies were slowing opening up. Some of the most startling findings from the 4 surveys are:

The average monthly EMI of the respondents in March 2020 was between Rs. 10,000 - 20,000. 51% of the respondents had taken vehicle loans from 19 national public sector banks.
30.3% of the respondents worked between 40-50 hours a week, in the week prior to the first national lockdown. Despite high hours of work, the average income of the drivers for the week commencing April 15, 2020 was less than Rs. 2500. 57% of respondents earned between 0 to Rs. 2250.
89.8% of workers did not receive any ration or food assistance, and 84.5% did not receive any financial assistance from either companies or governments.
Where companies had announced financial assistance programmes, including through donations collected by customers, there was no transparency in disbursement of funds. Other reasons for exclusion included administrative red tape (such as the requirement to produce bills that are GST compliant), and absence of clear criteria for eligibility, leading to random disbursement, among others.
Ola announced waiving off the rental amount for leased vehicles, and asked drivers to return such vehicles. However, there was no announcement of a plan to repossess vehicles once there was an easing of the lockdown, causing great anxiety among workers.
After the easing of the national lockdown, 69.7% of respondents indicated that they had no earnings, while 20% earned between Rs.500 to 1500.
2716 respondents from 19 states across gig platforms articulated their support for a peaceful demonstration against company practices.
Mandatory installation of Aarogya Setu by workers raised concerns of privacy, as this would allow companies to surveil workers and collect data on their movements after work hours.

IFAT organised several meetings and protests after each survey, to bring attention to the vulnerable conditions of workers. At these gatherings, workers raised the following key demands:

Companies must reduce commission rates to 5%, to allow workers to get back on their feet, and compensate for losses over the past few months;
Adequate protective equipment and health insurance cover to all drivers must be provided;
There must be increased transparency in disbursement process of funds, and in the criteria for selection of beneficiaries;
Compounded interest must be waived on EMIs for the 3 months of moratorium on loan repayment.

Hear our voices and address our demands.

Shaik Salauddin

National General Secretary, Indian Federation of App-based Transport Workers (IFAT)

Phone: +91 96424 24799

Indian Federation of App-based Transport Workers

Facebook: www.facebook.com/watch/connectifat/

Twitter: www.twitter.com/connect_ifat

YouTube: www.youtube.com/channel/UCA1AxGq0Fb_A_O_Ey44eiPg

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/ifat-itf-locking-down-the-impact-of-covid-19

Survey of Estimates of Economic Value of Open Government Data

Ömer Faruk Sarı — 2015-08-22T08:42:30Z

This is a survey of estimates of economic value of open government data, and public sector information in general, across regions, countries, and sectors offered by several reports published during the last decade. The survey is undertaken by Ömer Faruk Sarı, a student of Business Administration at Koc University in Istanbul, Turkey, and research intern with CIS.

Introduction

This is a survey of economic value estimates of open government data, and public sector information in general, by consultancy groups and government bodies across the world. The first part of the post lists estimates from different regions and countries, while the second part collects estimates for different sectors. Major reports surveyed in this study include the 'MEPSIR: Measuring European Public Sector Information Resources' report (2006), 'The Value of Spatial Information' report by ACIL Tasman (2008), 'Review of Recent Studies on PSI Re-Use and Related Market Developments' report by Graham Vickery (2012), 'Market Assessment of Public Sector Information' report by Deloitte (2013), 'Open Data: Unlocking Innovation and Performance with Liquid Information' by McKinsey (2013), 'Big and Open Data in Europe: A Growth Engine or a Missed Opportunity?' by Warsaw Institute for Economic Studies (2014), and 'Open for Business: How Open Data can Help Achieve the G20 Growth Target' report by Omidyar Network (2014).

Note about Exchange Rate:The monetary values stated in these reports vary by years and currencies. The original estimates are mentioned in the currency concerned followed by the converted amount in US Dollar (using exchange rate of the same year) provided within brackets. The exchange rates concerned are mentioned at the bottom of the post.

Countries and Regions

Global

McKinsey estimates global economic value of open data as USD 3.2 Trillion for seven sectors - Education, Transportation, Consumer Products, Electricity, Oil and Gas, Healthcare, and Consumer Finance. [1]

European Union

Pira International Ltd. et al, in 2000, estimated the monetary value of open data for EU countries as EUR 68 Billion (USD 76 Billion). [2]

Zangenberg and Company, estimated this number for EU countries as for minimum EUR 29 Billion (USD 38 Billion) and for an upper limit of EUR 143 Billion (USD 188 Billion). [3]

The Warsaw Institute for Economic Studies (WISE Institute) estimates the economic value of open data in EU, as increase in GDP by 2020, as EUR 206 Billion (USD 253 Billion). [4]

Graham Vickery estimated this number as EUR 200 Billion (USD 264 Billion) in 2012. [5]

In 2006, MEPSIR, in their report for European Commission, mentioned EUR 27 Billion (USD 36 Billion) could be gained by use of open data. [6]

McKinsey, in their report in 2013, estimated the monetary value of open data for EU countries as USD 900 Billion. [1]

G20

For G20 countries taken together, Omidyar Network estimates the economic value of open data as USD 2.6 Trillion. [7]

Australia

Omidyar Network, in their study on business value of open data, estimated the potential of open data for Australia as AUD 3.4 Billion (USD 2.8 Billion). [7]

In 2008, ACIL Tasman estimated the potential economic value of open data for Australia as AUD 1.4 Billion (USD 938 Million). [8]

John Houghton's estimation for the monetary value of open data is AUD 195 Million (USD 197 Million). [9]

Denmark

Zangenberg and Company, in 2011, estimated the economic value of open data for Denmark as DKK 520 Million (USD 92 Million). [3]

France

SerdaLAB, in 2009, estimated EUR 1.57 Billion (USD 2.3 Billion) can be gained by open data in France. [10]

Germany

In 2011, Dr, Martin Fornefeld et al estimated the economic value of open data for Germany as EUR 1.7 Billion (USD 2.2 Billion), only for geo-information. [11]

The POPSIS study estimated this number as EUR 3.2 Million (USD 4.2 Million), in the same year, 2011. [12]

Norway

Graham Vickery's report mentions the potential value of open data as NOK 260 Million (USD 43 Million). [5]

Spain

The Proyecto Aporta (Spanish open data portal project) study estimated the economic value of the infomediary sector in Spain as EUR 330-550 Million (USD 452-753 Million), in 2012. [13]

The Netherlands

In 2011, the POPSIS study estimated the economic potential that can be gained from open data in Netherlands as EUR 78 Million (USD 102 Million). [12]

United Kingdom

Deloitte, in their report, estimated the value of open data as GBP 6.2-7.2 Billion (USD 10-11.8 Billion) for United Kingdom. [14]

Rufus Pollock, in 2011, estimated GBP 4.5-6 Billion (USD 7-9.3 Billion) that can be unlocked by use of open data. [15]

Dot-Econ's estimation for monetary value of open data in United Kingdom is EUR 590 Million (USD 778 Million). [16]

United States

McKinsey's estimation, in 2013, for the value that can be unlocked by open data in United States is quite remarkable at USD 1.1 Trillion. [1]

Pira International Ltd. et al, in 2000, estimated the value as EUR 750 Billion (USD 838 Billion). [2]

Data Types and Sectors

Consumer Finance

McKinsey estimates USD 210-280 Billion, globally, for the consumer finance sector. [1]

Based on McKinsey's Report: The estimate for G20 countries is USD 169 Billion; for Australia, the estimate is AUD 4.2 Billion (USD 4.3 Billion).

Consumer Products

Across the globe, with the use of open data McKinsey estimates USD 520-1470 Billion can be generated from services of consumer products. [1]

Based on McKinsey's Report: G20 countries, in total, have a potential value of USD 419 Billion for this sector; the value is estimated at AUD 10 Billion (USD 10.2 Billion) for Australia.

Education

McKinsey estimates that USD 890-1180 Billion can be generated alone in education sector, across the globe. [1]

Based on McKinsey's Report: Open data in the education sector in G20 countries can generate USD 717 Billion; for Australia, value of open data in education sector is estimated to be AUD 14 Billion (USD 14.2 Billion).

Electricity

McKinsey estimates USD 340-580 Billion, across the globe. [1]

Based on McKinsey's Report: For electricity sector, USD 193 Billion is estimated for G20 countries; estimate for Australia for electricity sector depending on open data is AUD 6.7 Billion (USD 6.8 Billion).

Geospatial Data

Dr. Nam D. Pham estimates the potential value of Geo-spatial information in US as USD 96 Billion. [17]

In the report by Pira International Limited et al, the economic value of geo-spatial information in EU estimated as EUR 36 Billion (USD 40 Billion). [2]

Fornefeld et al estimates the value of geo-spatial information in Germany as EUR 1.7 Billion (USD 2.2 Billion). [11]

The POPSIS study estimates the economic value of Meteorological data re-use market in Netherlands as EUR 10 Million (USD 13 Million). [12]

Graham Vickery estimates (in 2012) NOK 72 Million (USD 12 Million) can be generated in Norway through geo-spatial information. [5]

The Proyecto Aporta study estimates potential value of geo-spatial information in Spain as EUR 183 Million (USD 240 Million). [13]

ACIL Tasman in their report, estimated that as a direct result of the uptake of spatial technologies New Zealand’s real GDP increased by NZD 1.2 Billion (USD 670 Million) in 2008 through productivity-related gains as a result of the increasing adoption of modern spatial information technologies since 1995. [8]

In the United Kingdom, a 'supply-side' assessment estimated the market size and growth potential for geographic information (GI) products and services. The market size in year 2007 was estimated to be GBP 657 Million (USD 1.32 Billion). [18]

Based on PwC's study in 2010, John Houghton estimates the value of spatial data in Australia as AUD 25 Million (USD 25.3 Million). [9]

Ordnance Survey of UK estimates the economic value of open data published by the same agency as GBP 2.9-6.1 Million (USD 4.5-9.5 Million). [19]

Healthcare

Globally, USD 300-450 Billion is the estimate of McKinsey, depending on open data use in healthcare sector.[1]

Based on McKinsey's Report: Open data in the healthcare sector can generate USD 242 Billion for G20 countries; estimate for Australia is AUD 5.9 Billion (USD 6 Billion).

Oil and Gas

McKinsey estimates USD 240-510 Billion that can be generated through open data for the oil and gas sector, across the globe. [1]

Based on McKinsey's Report: Oil and gas sector, with the use of open data, can generate USD 169 Billion for G20 countries; the value for Australia is estimated to generate AUD 4.8 Billion (USD 4.9 Billion).

Transportation

McKinsey estimates the value of transportation sector with the use of open data as USD 720-920 Billion for the transportation sector, globally. [1]

Based on McKinsey's Report: G20 countries altogether can generate USD 580 Billion in transportation sector; estimate of the value of open data in the transportation sector in Australia is AUD 18 Billion (USD 18.2 Billion).

Reference

[1] Manyika, James, et al. 2013. Open Data: Unlocking Innovation and Performance with Liquid Information. McKinsey Global Institute. October. Accessed from http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/business_technology/open_data_unlocking_innovation_and_performance_with_liquid_information.

[2] Pira International Ltd. et al. 2000. Commercial exploitation of Europe’s Public Sector Information - Executive Summary. European Commission, Brussels. Aceeseed from ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/econtent/docs/2000_1558_en.pdf.

[3] Zangenberg and Company. 2011, Kvantificering af værdien af åbne offentlige data (Quantifying the Value of Open Government Data). Report Prepared for the Danish National Information Technology and Telecom Agency. Accessed from https://digitaliser.dk/resource/1021067/artefact/Kvantificering+af+den+erhvervsm%c3%a6ssige+v%c3%a6rdi+af+%c3%a5bne+offentlige+data+-+Zangenberg2011.pdf.

[4] Buchholtz, Sonia, et al. 2014. Big and Open Data in Europe: A Growth Engine or a Missed Opportunity? demosEUROPA – Centre for European Strategy and Warsaw Institute for Economic Studies. Accessed from http://www.bigopendata.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/bod_europe_2020_full_report_singlepage.pdf.

[5] Vickery, Graham. 2012. Review of Recent Studies on PSI Re-Use and Related Market Developments. European Commission, Brussels. Accessed form http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/cf//document.cfm?doc_id=1093.

[6] Dekkers, Makx, et al. 2006. MEPSIR: Measuring European Public Sector Information Resources - Final Report of Study on Exploitation of Public Sector Information – Benchmarking of EU Framework Conditions. European Commission, Brussels. Accessed from http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/cf/document.cfm?doc_id=1198.

[7] Lateral Economics. 2014. Open for Business: How Open Data can Help Achieve the G20 Growth Target. Omidyar Network. June. Accessed from https://www.omidyar.com/sites/default/files/file_archive/insights/ON%20Report_061114_FNL.pdf.

[8] ACIL Tasman. 2008. The Value of Spatial Information: The Impact of Modern Spatial Information Technologies on the Australian Economy. March. Accessed from http://www.crcsi.com.au/assets/Resources/7d60411d-0ab9-45be-8d48-ef8dab5abd4a.pdf.

[9] Houghton, John. 2011. Costs and Benefits of Data Provision. Report to the Australian National Data Service. September. Accessed from http://www.ands.org.au/resource/houghton-cost-benefit-study.pdf.

[10] Guerre, Louise, et al. 2009. Le marché de l’information électronique professionnelle en France. SerdaLAB. Presentation at CCIP on January 27. Accessed from http://www.fnps.fr/Public/Article/File/DOCUMENTS/Presentation_ET_IEP09_270109.pdf.

[11] Fornefeld, Martin, et al. 2011. Die europäische Gesetzgebung als Motor für das deutsche GeoBusiness (European Legislation as a Driver for German GeoBusiness). Accessed from http://www.micus.de/pdf/MICUS_GeoBusiness-BMWi.pdf.

[12] Citadel Consulting et al. 2011. POPSIS: Pricing Of Public Sector Information Study - Models of Supply and Charging for Public Sector Information (ABC) - Final Report. European Commission. October. Accessed from http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=1158.

[13] Ministry of Finance and Public Administration et al. 2012. Characterization Study of the Infomediary Sector. Proyecto Aporta. Accessed from http://datos.gob.es/sites/default/files/files/Estudio_infomediario/121001%20RED%20007%20Final%20Report_2012%20Edition_vF_en.pdf.

[14] Deloitte. 2013. Market Assessment of Public Sector Information. Report to the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Government of UK. Accessed from https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/198905/bis-13-743-market-assessment-of-public-sector-information.pdf.

[15] Pollock, Rufus. 2010. Welfare Gains from Opening up Public Sector Information in the UK. University of Cambridge. Accessed from http://rufuspollock.org/economics/papers/psi_openness_gains.pdf.

[16] DotEcon. 2006. The Commercial Use of Public Information (CUPI). Report OFT861. Office of Fair Trading, Government of UK. Accessed from http://www.opsi.gov.uk/advice/poi/oft-cupi.pdf.

[17] Pham, Nam D. 2011. The Economic Benefits of Commercial GPS Use in the U.S. and the Costs of Potential Disruption. June. Accessed from http://www.gpsalliance.org/docs/GPS_Report_June_21_2011.pdf.

[18] Coote, Andrew, and Les Rackham. 2008. An Assessment of the Size and Prospects for Growth of the UK Market for Geographic Information Products and Services. ConsultingWhere. Accessed from http://www.consultingwhere.com/wp-content/uploads/resources/UK_Market_Assessment_v11_Final.pdf.

[19] Carpenter, John, and Phil Watts. 2013. Assessing the Value of OS OpenData™ to the Economy of Great Britain - Synopsis. Ordnance Survey. June. Accessed from https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/207692/bis-13-950-assessing-value-of-opendata-to-economy-of-great-britain.pdf.

Exchange Rates

Note: Exchange rates are taken for December of the year concerned.

Euro per 1 US Dollar
2000	0.8947
2006	0.7580
2009	0.6868
2010	0.7562
2011	0.7599
2013	0.7296
2014	0.8123
British Pound per 1 US Dollar
2006	0.5095
2011	0.6415
2013	0.6106
2014	0.6397
Australian Dollar per 1 US Dollar
2008	1.4919
2011	0.9874
2014	1.2144
New Zealand Dollar per 1 US Dollar
2008	1.7923
Norwegian Krone per 1 US Dollar
2010	5.9774
Danish Krone per 1 US Dollar
2011	5.6495

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/survey-of-estimates-of-economic-value-of-open-government-data

CISxScholars Delhi - William F. Stafford (Nov 03, 6:30 pm)

sumandro — 2019-03-13T00:30:39Z

We are delighted to have William F. Stafford, PhD candidate in UC Berkeley, present on "Public Measurements, Private Measurements, and the Convergence of Units" at the CIS office in Delhi on Thursday, Nov 03, at 6:30 pm. Please RSVP if you are joining us: .

CISxScholars are informal events organised by CIS for presentation, discussion, and exchange of academic research and policy analysis.

Public Measurements, Private Measurements and the Convergence of Units

In this discussion I will focus on a comparison between the standard government prescribed meters for autorickshaws and taxis and the role of ridesharing apps as instruments which take measurements, as the basis for the calculation of fares, and the more general questions which arise for commerce, technology and their regulation. I will organise the paper around the observations of a paratransit operations engineer on the distinction between public and private instruments, and explore the possible implications of new forms of commercialisation of location and proximity and reactions to such developments for understanding questions of fairness and corruption.

William F. Stafford

William F. Stafford, Jr., is a PhD candidate in the Department of Anthropology, UC Berkeley. William's research focuses on the auto-rickshaw meter in New Delhi, as a way to engage with classical questions concerning the relationship between measurement, quantification and delimitations of domains of labour. William's general interests concern the analytics of labour and the reconfiguration of what are often taken as its axiomatic aspects. Before joining Berkeley, he studied Sociology at Jawaharlal Nehru University and the Delhi School of Economics.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/cisxscholars-delhi-william-f-stafford-thursday-nov-03

Platformisation of Domestic Work in India: Report from a Multistakeholder Consultation

tasneem — 2020-02-17T09:46:52Z

On November 16, 2019, The Centre for Internet and Society invited officials from the Department of Labour (Government of Karnataka), members of domestic worker unions, domestic workers, company representatives, and civil society researchers at the Student Christian Mission of India House to discuss preliminary findings of an ongoing research project and facilitate a multistakeholder consultation to understand the contemporaneous platformisation of domestic work in India. Please find here a report from this consultation authored by Tasneem Mewa.

Report from the consultation: Download (PDF)

Agenda and details of the consultation: URL

Introduction

This collaborative project is being led by the the Centre for Internet and Society, India (CIS) together with Domestic Workers Rights Union (DWRU) in Bangalore. The research team comprises of Geeta Menon, Parijatha G.P., Sumathi, Radha K., and Zennathunnisa from DWRU, and Aayush Rathi and Ambika Tandon from CIS. Through a collective research process, this research team has explored the proliferation of digital platforms as a key intermediary in the domestic work sector, and in supporting or challenging deeply rooted structural inequities. For more information on the research project, see the project announcement published on the CIS website [1]. This work forms part of the Association for Progressive Communications’ Feminist Internet Research Network project, supported by the International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, Canada.

The multistakeholder consultation was structured in two segments: a) a presentation outlining initial observations and analysis, and b) a semi-moderated open discussion. Together, these sessions aimed to initiate conversations pertaining to the role of digital platforms, the legal classification of domestic and gig workers, and devising regulatory solutions to improve conditions of work. Preliminary findings were based on qualitative in-depth interviews with workers, platform companies, unions, skilling agencies, and labour officials in both Bengaluru and New Delhi. Feminist approaches were employed in conducting these interviews, and participatory, consensual, reflexive and collaborative research was prioritised.

Situating the lived realities of domestic workers, the event sought to centre the voice of domestic workers in the consultation around the future of their work. The event had attendance from multilingual attendees. The original presentation was made in English, and Geeta Menon translated the presentation and the discussion that followed in Kannada [2].

Footnotes

[1] Tandon, A., & Rathi, A. (2019, October 1). Digital mediation of domestic and care work in India: Project Announcement. Retrieved from https://cis-india.org/raw/digital-domestic-work-india-announcement

[2] Rathi, A. (2019, November 16). Domestic Work in the 'Gig Economy'. Retrieved from https://cis-india.org/raw/domestic-work-in-the-gig-economy-20191116; Tandon, A., & Rathi, A. (2019). Domestic workers in the ‘gig’ economy [PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved from https://cis-india.org/raw/domestic-work-and-platforms-presentation

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/platformisation-of-domestic-work-in-india-report-from-a-multistakeholder-consultation