Centre for Internet and Society

RTI Application to BSNL for the list of websites blocked in India

gurshabad — 2019-05-09T09:43:54Z

A Right to Information (RTI) request to a public company operating as an ISP for the list of websites and URLs blocked in India, and copies of such blocking orders issued by the Government of India.

Background

The Government of India draws powers from Section 69A of the Information Technology (IT) Act and the rules issued under it to order Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to block websites and URLs for users. Several experts have questioned the constitutionality of the process laid out in the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009 (hereinafter, “the rules”) [1] since Rule 16 in the regulations allows blocking of websites by the Government and ISPs in secrecy, as it mandates all such orders to be maintained confidentially.

Thus, the law sets up a structure where it is impossible to know the complete list of websites blocked in India and the reasons thereof. Civil society and individual efforts have repeatedly failed to obtain this list. For instance, the Software Freedom Law Centre (SFLC), in August 2017, asked the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) for the number and list of websites and URLs that are blocked in India. In response, MeitY revealed the number of blocked websites and URLs: 11,422. MeitY refused to share the list of websites blocked by Government orders citing the aforementioned confidentiality provision in the rules (and subsequently citing national security when MeitY’s reply was appealed against by SFLC). In 2017, researchers at the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) contacted five ISPs, all of which refused to share information about website blocking requests.

Application under the Right to Information (RTI) Act

In a more recent request filed by under the Right to Information (RTI) Act in June 2018, Akash Sriram (who worked at the Centre for Internet and Society) tried to obtain this information from Bharat Sanchar Nagam Limited (BSNL), a public company which operates as an ISP.

The text of the request of the RTI request is reproduced here:

To
Manohar Lal, DGM(Cordn), Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited
Room No. 306, Bharat Sanchar Bhawan, H.C.Mathur Lane
Janpath, New Delhi, PIN 110001

Subject: Seeking of Information under RTI Act 2005

Sir,
Kindly arrange to provide the following information under the provisions of RTI Act:

What are the names and URLs of websites currently blocked by government notification in India?

Please provide copies of blocking orders issued by the Department of Telecommunications, Ministry of Communications and other competent authorities to block such websites.

Thanking you
Yours faithfully

Akash Sriram
Centre for Internet and Society

BSNL refused to respond to the request citing sections 8(e) and 8(g) of the RTI Act. Their response is reproduced below.

The Information sought vide above reference cannot be disclosed vide clause 8(e) and 8(g) of the RTI act which states.

"8(e) - Information, available to a person in his fiduciary relationship, unless the competent authority is satisfied that the larger public interest warrants the disclosure of such information"

“8(g) - Information, the disclosure of which would endanger the life or physical safety of any person or identify the source of information or assistance given in confidence for law enforcement or security purposes"

This is issued with the approval of competent authority.

A PDF of the response can be accessed here.

[1] Note that in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, the Supreme Court upheld the legality of the rules.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/rti-application-to-bsnl-for-the-list-of-websites-blocked-in-india

India Digital Freedom Series: Internet Shutdowns, Censorship and Surveillance

gurshabad — 2021-01-11T10:07:30Z

A series of reports on digital rights and civic space in India, focusing on four areas where restrictive policies threaten fundamental freedoms and impede public participation: internet shutdowns, censorship, platform governance and surveillance.

Read the reports

1. Introduction, Background and Methodology by Arindrajit Basu

2. Internet Shutdowns: Threats to Digital Access by Torsha Sarkar, Manogna Matam and Gurshabad Grover

3. Censorship: Threats to Expression by Matam Manogna, Torsha Sarkar, Gurshabad Grover and Kanav Khanna

4. Platforms as Gatekeepers: Threats to Digital Space by Torsha Sarkar and Gurshabad Grover

5. Surveillance and Data Protection: Threats to Privacy and Digital Security by Mira Swaminathan and Arindrajit Basu

Background

Amidst global trends towards authoritarianism and closing space for civil society, India’s dynamic changing landscape calls for ongoing attention. In the last year alone, upheaval around the Citizenship Amendment Act protests, sectarian violence and communal riots in Delhi and elsewhere, the emergence of Covid-19, and issues of statelessness and discrimination have raised questions about the state of civic freedoms in India. At the same time, efforts to mold and restrict civil society, through funding limitations and a narrative against activism and ‘foreign agents,’ continue to reverberate across the non-profit sector. Technology has played a major role in all of these developments, with expression and democratic debate increasingly carried into the digital sphere, and privacy, data, and surveillance taking center stage, particularly amidst a global pandemic. India additionally has the notorious distinction of being the world’s democracy with the longest-running internet shutdown. Other examples of how digital rights are being impacted in India abound: possible government-sanctioned surveillance on activists and journalists; various forms of censorship, and denial of access to information.

Documentation and consideration of such phenomena is critical, given the role digital developments will play shaping Indian society in the 21st century. Technology can be a great enabler of constitutional values, welfare, and act as a facilitator of public discourse. It can also be used by the state to fetter the realization of constitutional rights and restrict the growth of civil society activism and public discourse. To date, there exists little comprehensive coverage of the overall universe of policies and laws affecting digital rights, and how their implementation is impacting Indian civil society actors, including non-profits, activists, media, minority groups, and others.

India’s constitutional ethos provides for a wide array of fundamental rights designed to protect and empower the most vulnerable. It views the state as a key actor in breaking existing barriers of structural inequality - something technology can play a role in - if designed and implemented reasonably, with the widest possible consultation. Given India’s status as the world’s most populous democracy, along with its considerable heft in the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) sector globally, how these issues play out will be critical for the future of digital civic space, in South Asia, Asia, and beyond.

This report undertakes an examination of key topics related to digital rights and civic space in India. It focuses on four areas of particular concern, where restrictive policies threaten to violate fundamental freedoms and restrict civil society and public participation. The topics covered include: 1) Internet Shutdowns, 2) Online Censorship, 3) Platform Governance, and 4) Surveillance. Each chapter begins with a factual overview identifying the scope of the problem across the country. It proceeds to evaluate relevant Indian laws and regulations affecting the enjoyment of fundamental human rights of members of civil society online, including the rights to free association, assembly, expression, privacy, access to information and public participation. The chapter then summarizes relevant international law and standards, many of which are obligatory on the Indian government and constitute binding international commitments, and concludes with some reflections and recommendations.

Ultimately, the report emphasizes the importance of a free, fair, and democratic digital civic space in line with international law and best practices. It evaluates ongoing Indian policies in the four topic areas in light of these standards, and provides suggestions for paths to reform that Indian policymakers can undertake to enable the use of technology in consonance with India’s rich constitutional ethos.

Methodology

This report was researched and written by the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), with support from the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL). Researchers at CIS with specialized knowledge in digital rights undertook an expansive review of a wide range of sources related to this topic, including academic scholarship and legal literature, news articles, government documents, laws, and other publications. In addition to desk research, two teams of CIS researchers travelled across five cities - Jodhpur and Jaipur (state of Rajasthan), Ahmedabad (state of Gujarat), Siliguri (state of West Bengal), and Guwahati (state of Assam). Each of these states have a vibrant civic space, and have seen a number of individuals and organizations engaging with key issues in the digital space over the past months. Researchers interviewed a diverse array of stakeholders, including student activists, public interest lawyers, government officials, party workers, and journalists. While refraining from undertaking quantitative or empirical analysis of the fieldwork findings, the qualitative insights and data gathered from these interviews were instrumental in the shaping of this report.

This report uses the World Bank’s definition of “civil society,” namely: “a wide array of organizations: community groups, non-governmental organizations [NGOs], labour unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, and foundations.” However, to truly understand public participation in a democracy, the report looks beyond organised groups and their workings, and examines how various individuals participate in public processes - including through protests, writing, and engagement through social media. Thus, when considering the impact of digital rights, this report did not limit its investigation only to organised civil society but considered a larger scope to engage with a broader notion of public participation.

Acknowledgements

The Centre for Internet and Society would like to thank the International Center for Not- for-Profit Law for the financial support that made the report possible. The authors would also like to thank Abhijit Roy, Arun Chauhan, Gajendra Singh Dahiya, Kumar Shubham, Manjula Pradeep, Rahul Bordoloi, Roshan Gupta, and many others who chose to remain anonymous for their inputs that informed the research; Akash T for research assistance; and Julie Hunter, Lisa Vermeer, and Nick Robinson for their feedback. Thanks also to the ICNL team for designing, formatting and editing the reports. All opinions and errors in the piece remain those of the authors.

We would also like to wholeheartedly thank The Legal Aid and Awareness Committee from the National Law University Jodhpur for helping us set up a number of interviews with key stakeholders.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/india-digital-freedom-series-internet-shutdowns-censorship-and-surveillance

How safe is your harbour? Discussions on intermediary liability and user rights

gurshabad — 2020-01-10T04:43:35Z

The Centre for Internet and Society is holding discussions on 10 January 2020 to discuss research on automated content filtering, content takedown, traceability and the future of intermediary liability in India

Background

The Manila Principles outline three kinds of liability regimes that countries follow while regulating intermediaries; expansive protections against liability, conditional immunity and primary liability. Post Avneesh Bajaj, India has been following the second model, where intermediaries are provided safe harbour for the acts of their users. In December 2018, the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY), released a draft of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines (Amendment) Rules), 2018. These rules raised a host of concerns in the way they envision liability and user rights in the digital domain. The proposed amendments may mark a departure from the current model by creating cumbersome obligations for intermediaries to avail safe harbour.

At the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), we have been closely examining some of the draft rules to decipher the changed regime. Our research has focussed on the impact of mandating automated content filtering, shortened turnaround times for intermediaries to take content down, and the traceability of originators of information.

As part of our ongoing work, we are hosting this event to contribute to the discussion around the nuances of the rules and the future of intermediary liability in India. As such, this event will begin with a brief analysis of the proposed amendments. We will also address the restrictions these would place on freedom of expression online and the way intermediaries do their business, among others. Subsequently, we would be having sessions on particular aspects of the rules. Finally, we would dedicate the last session on contemplating the future of intermediary liability regime in India.

Panels

Automated content filtering

One of the more controversial and stringent rules introduced in the proposed amendments is Rule 3(9) which necessitates the use of automated technology in filtering content. The draft rule does not specify the scope of the content to be detected, the technologies to be used, or any procedural safeguards that accompany the deployment of the technology. The discussion on the rule will, thus, centre around the legal validity of the proposal, the effect on different scales of intermediaries, and the consequences of intermediaries’ compliance on the exercise of freedom of expression in India.

Panelists: Kanksshi Agarwal (Senior Researcher, Centre for Policy Research); Nayantara Ranganathan (Independent researcher); Shashank Mohan (Counsel, Software Freedom Law Centre); Moderator: Akriti Bopanna (Policy Officer, CIS)

Content takedown

In this session, we will examine S.69 and S.79 of the IT Act that permit the Government to mandate intermediaries to remove/block content. Our discussion will focus on the procedural flaws of the law, issues of due process, and the lack of transparency in the legal process of content takedown. Additionally, we will discuss findings from our research on the feasibility of a specific turnaround time, and regulatory factors that need to be considered before fixing an appropriate takedown timeframe.

Panelists: Bhavna Jha (Research Associate, IT for Change); Divij Joshi (Technology Policy Fellow, Mozilla); Moderator: Torsha Sarkar (Policy Officer, CIS)

Traceability

The draft Intermediary Guidelines propose requiring intermediaries to enable traceability of originators of information. While this move is ostensibly to crack down on misinformation and fake news, there are questions regarding its feasibility and effects on platform architecture. More importantly, it poses grave dangers for the freedom of expression and privacy of users. The discussion will be centred around how traceability interacts with the Constitution and other laws in India, the litigation around it, possible methods to implement traceability (by or without breaking encryption) and what it means for the larger debate on intermediary liability and free speech.

Panelists: Aditi Agrawal (Senior Research Associate, MediaNama); Anand Venkatanarayanan (Cybersecurity researcher); G S Madhusudan (Principal Scientist, IIT Madras); Moderator: Tanaya Rajwade (Policy Officer, CIS)

Future of intermediary liability in India

The panel will bring together the threads from the previous discussions and discuss the ways in which the draft intermediary guidelines represent a departure from the current model of intermediary liability in India, and its potential effects on similar regulation in other countries. We will discuss the nature of changes, especially as they relate to classification of intermediaries, and whether they are within the scope of S.79 of the IT Act and the intermediary guidelines. We will also aim to address the effects of legislation and jurisprudence in related areas such as data protection and competition law. Finally, we will discuss regulatory frameworks for intermediary liability that should be considered in India.

Panelists: Alok Prasanna (Senior Resident Fellow, Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy); Sarvjeet Singh (Executive Director, Centre for Communication Governance); Tanya Sadana (Principal Associate, Ikigai Law); Udbhav Tiwari (Public Policy Advisor, Mozilla); Moderator: Gurshabad Grover (Research Manager, CIS)

RSVP

To register for the event, please RSVP here.

Note that this is a research event. Please ignore social media messages that have erroneously identified this event as a protest.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/how-safe-is-your-harbour-discussions-on-intermediary-liability-and-user-rights

How India Censors The Web

gurshabad — 2020-06-12T08:12:55Z

An empirical study of web censorship in India

A paper authored by Kushagra Singh, Gurshabad Grover and Varun Bansal is now available on arXiv.

Executive Summary

Our work presents the largest study of web censorship in India, both in terms of number of censorship mechanisms that we test for, and the number of potentially-blocked websites. We compile a list of potentially blocked websites from three sources: (i) Published and leaked Government orders issued under section 69A of the IT Act, (ii) Court orders for blocking websites made public via RTIs, and (iii) User reports collected and published by the Internet Freedom Foundation. We pass this list to our tests and run them from connections of six different ISPs (Jio, Airtel, Vodafone, MTNL, BSNL, and ACT), which together serve more than 98% of Internet users in India. Our findings not only confirm that ISPs are using different techniques to block websites, but also demonstrate that different ISPs are not blocking the same websites.

In terms of censorship methods, our results confirm that ISPs in India are at liberty to use any technical filtering mechanism they wish: there was, in fact, no single mechanism common across ISPs. We observe ISPs to be using a melange of techniques for blocking access, including DNS poisoning\ and HTTP host inspection. Our tests also discern the use of SNI inspection being employed by the largest ISP in India (Jio) to block HTTPS websites, the use of which is previously undocumented in the Indian context.

Our study also records large inconsistencies in website blocklists of different Indian ISPs. From our list of 4379 potentially blocked websites, we find that 4033 appear in at least one ISP’s blocklist. In terms of absolute numbers, we notice that ACT blocks the maximum number of websites (3721). Compared to ACT, Airtel blocks roughly half the number of websites (1892). Perhaps most surprisingly, we find that only 1115 websites out of the 4033 (just 27.64%) are blocked by all six ISPs. Simply stated, we find conclusive proof that Internet users in India can have wildly different experiences of web censorship.

Analysing inconsistencies in blocklists also makes it clear that ISPs in India are (i) not properly complying with website blocking (or subsequent unblocking orders), and/or (ii) arbitrarily blocking websites without the backing of a legal order. This has important legal ramifications: India’s net neutrality regulations, codified in the license agreements that ISPs enter with the Government of India, explicitly prohibit such behaviour.

Our study also points to how the choice of technical methods used by ISPs to censor websites can decrease transparency about state-ordered censorship in India. While some ISPs were serving censorship notices, other ISPs made no such effort. For instance, Airtel responded to DNS queries for websites it wishes to block with NXDOMAIN. Jio used SNI-inspection to block websites, a choice which makes it technically impossible for them to serve censorship notices. Thus, the selection of certain technical methods by ISPs exacerbate the concerns created by the opaque legal process that allows the Government to censor websites.

Web censorship is a curtailment of the right to freedom of expression guaranteed to all Indians. There is an urgent need to reevaluate the legal and technical mechanisms of web censorship in India to make sure the curtailment is transparent, and the actors accountable.

The paper can be accessed on arXiv.

Update (12 June 2020): The paper will appear at the 12th ACM Conference on Web Science (WebSci '20). The updated paper can be accessed here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/how-india-censors-the-web

Internet shutdowns: Its legal and commercial dimensions in Kashmir

gurshabad — 2020-02-10T12:51:08Z

This article by Gurshabad Grover appeared on ETVBharat on February 10, 2020. The author would like to thank Kanav Khanna for his research assistance. The article was edited by Arindrajit Basu and translated into various languages by the ETVBharat team. You can also read it in Gujarati, Hindi, Kannada, Odia, and Urdu.

On 4 August 2019, the Central Government ordered the suspension of telecommunication and internet services in Jammu and Kashmir. Suddenly, roughly a crore citizens found themselves unable to exercise their basic freedoms of expression and association online. According to the Software Freedom Law Centre’s Internet Shutdown Tracker, Jammu and Kashmir endured 180 partial or complete internet shutdowns in the last seven years. These astonishing numbers indicate that communication blockades in the state are a common occurrence, but perhaps even Kashmiris did not anticipate that they are entering the longest internet shutdown ever imposed by a democratic country.

It is no secret that the internet has become an essential tool for democratic participation. The loss of the network infrastructure also causes both social and economic harm: students are denied access to critical educational resources, hospitals and emergency services face an administrative catastrophe, and local business can crumble. As recent work by the scholar Jan Rydzak demonstrates, shutting down the internet may not even be ensuring public order and peace, as the government would readily claim. Rydzak argues that access to the internet allows wide coordination that is necessary to demonstrate a peaceful protest, and that internet shutdowns may thus be fueling violent protests rather than curbing them.

When the internet shutdown, among other state action, was challenged by Kashmiri Times editor Anuradha Bhasin, the Supreme Court (SC) did have an opportunity to consider these factors when deciding on the legality of the shutdown. The concerns of civil society were made severe in this particular situation because the Government failed, in a total disregard for the rule of law, failed to publish the internet shutdown orders or present them before the court. In its final order on 10 January this year, the SC did affirm basic constitutional principles and sets progressive precedent for future cases.

First and foremost, the Court affirms that the Constitution, through Article 19, protects the “freedom of speech and expression and the freedom to practice any profession or carry on any [...] occupation over the medium of internet.” Second, the Court recognised that internet shutdowns cannot be imposed indefinitely, must be reviewed by the executive every week and that the orders are subject to judicial review. In that regard, the SC may pave for strengthened challenges to internet shutdowns in the future. However, as several scholars have noted, besides ordering the restoration of some essential services, the Court does fall short of providing relief to Kashmiri citizens in the case. Soon after the SC delivered this judgment, the government of Jammu and Kashmir issued orders to internet service providers to restore 2G internet services but only permit access to 301 websites. Besides the fact that the list arbitrarily includes and excludes services, major communication services were notably from the list. Most importantly, this piece of ‘internet regulation’ makes little sense when you consider either the internet or the regulations governing it.

In the technical sense, the regulations completely misunderstand how the modern web functions. When one connects to a website, the websites in turn often make the system download critical resources from other servers. If internet service providers permit only specific websites, the content from other unwhite listed sources still remains inaccessible. A recent experiment by Rohini Lakshané and Prateek Waghre confirms this empirically: out of the 301 websites in the list, only 126 were usable in some form. While the order seems like a necessary consequence of the SC order, there is also little legislative basis for the order. The order cites the Temporary Suspension of Telecom Services (Public Emergency or Public Safety) Rules issued in 2017 under the colonial-era Indian Telegraph Act. These regulations do permit the Government to shut down telecom and internet services but do not allow the government to issue orders that allow ‘whitelists’ such as this one. The Information Technology (IT) Act, namely through Section 69A, allows the Central Government and courts to order the blocking of certain websites. Even the license agreements issued by the government to internet service providers only allow the Government to order the blocking certain online resources on the grounds of national security. Therefore, the order of a ‘whitelist’ of websites has no basis in law because it turns the logic of only blocking websites on its head.

After Kashmiris found a way to circumvent the ‘whitelist’ by using virtual private networks (VPNs), reports emerged that security forces were forcing Kashmiris to uninstall these applications. All this, of course, despite the fact that there is no law preventing the use of VPNs or the circumvention of internet censorship in general.

It has now been around seven months since internet and telecom services were suspended in Kashmir. This long-standing deprivation of basic rights to Kashmiris is wrong that perhaps even the future cannot correct. After months of a complete shutdown, the Government can make better amends than restoring only limited and partial access. As we march onto the next decade, the world is watching. History will not judge kindly those who occluded civil liberties through a facile ritual incantation of ‘public order’ and ‘national security’.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/internet-shutdowns-its-legal-and-commercial-dimensions-in-kashmir

Programme Associate (Communications)

gurshabad — 2020-08-09T13:51:27Z

The Centre for Internet & Society (CIS) is seeking applications for the position of Programme Associate (Communications), to support its Access to Knowledge (CIS-A2K) Programme. In keeping with efforts within the larger Wikimedia movement in encouraging an inclusive workplace and addressing issues of gender disparity This position is presently open only to applicants who identify as women.

Context of the CIS-A2K programme

As an affiliate of the Wikimedia Foundation, the nonprofit behind Wikipedia and it’s sister projects, we design and implement different initiatives with an aim to create high-quality content and bring new contributors to Wikimedia projects in Indian languages. The initiatives are premised on various themes and seek to create a multilingual repository of knowledge using Wikimedia projects as a platform. You are encouraged to carefully read through the CIS-A2K work plan before making the application. You will work cohesively with the Wikimedia community and the Wikimedia India communities to meet the specific goals of each language community in India. You will be a part of a small team of 5 to 10 members doing high visibility and high impact work. Please learn more about CIS-A2K here.

Position Summary

As Programme Associate, your job will be to support the Team’s larger goals -- growth of Indian language Wikipedias, other Wikimedia projects and the contributor communities. Your primary responsibility will be to support the Programme Associates -- that spearhead our on-ground programmatic activities -- with regular communication with the community and the outside world.

Responsibilities

Storytelling and all other forms of of communication-related responsibilities are two major focus areas of this job. You will explore conventional to new media to share the stories of the many of volunteers that make Wikipedia and Wikimedia projects such great knowledge repositories
Creating original stories of challenges and success of the Indian language Wikimedia communities, including the ones that we closely work with Being the interface between A2K team and the community and lead different kinds of communications activities
Sharing the work of the community and A2k team in a regular manner through print media, newsletters, social media, mailing list updates, blog posts etc., including timely announcement of programme activities on these platforms
Providing training on effective communications to the communities on a need basis and enabling them to independently tell their own stories in their own languages
Support with writing, review and editing of the annual work plan and reports of the programme
Interviewing Wikimedians under the ambit of the WikipediansSpeak project and beyond, and share the story of the Wikimedia community widely in the media

Required skills

Good communication skill in writing and speaking, which will be required for correspondence, blog, report etc writing
Experience of blog post, report etc writing
Prior experience of working in a collaborative community, preferably online.
Strong understanding of the internet and work of the Wikimedia movement.
Active participation as a Wikimedia volunteer would be an asset, though not a prerequisite. Demonstrated experience working in a global, multi-cultural team environment.
Must be fluent in English and at least one Indian language.
A good understanding of the cultural and knowledge universe of one Indian language will be an added advantage.
Ability to integrate with and understand the complexity of the Indian Wikimedia community.
Prior experience/ knowledge in working with social media for professional communication would be an added advantage.
Prior experience/knowledge in liasioning with conventional print/broadcast media would be an added advantage.

Characteristics of the Programme Associate

High level of commitment: The Programme Associate should believe in the values of CIS and Wikimedia projects, exude enthusiasm for the mission and can powerfully embody and communicate the mission.
Intellectual curiosity and flexibility: Must enjoy tackling difficult, ambiguous problems and able to incorporate new knowledge into how one approaches situations and generates solutions, loves learning from others while expanding intellectual horizons.
Open and transparent: Have a high level of integrity and be comfortable working in a highly transparent fashion, open to input and feedback, a proactive and candid communicator who isn't afraid to bring others in when things are off-track or when they need help and should be able to handle criticism in a mature fashion.
Community builder: It is essential that the Programme Associate sees themself as a partner to and supporter of the Wikimedians who have and will continue to be the leaders in building the Wikimedia projects. The Programme Associate must be willing and able to work with a diverse array of people, many of whom come from non-traditional backgrounds and have a fervent commitment to Wikimedia movement’s community-led nature.
Strong cultural competency: Able to navigate in a global movement and on a global team in addition to navigating the complexity of India.

Location: Candidate willing to work from CIS’s Bangalore office will be preferred. Remote working option may be considered for experienced Wikimedians

Remuneration: Compensation structure will be determined by the level of expertise, experience and current remuneration.

Do not send anymore application now. the last date is over
To apply, please send your resume to Tito Dutta (tito+comm@cis-india.org) and cover letter by 21 May 2020 (applications must be submitted with cover later before 21 May 11:59:00 IST, please ensure to apply through email only).

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/jobs/programme-associate-communications

Regulating the Internet

gurshabad — 2018-12-20T00:29:06Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/regulating-the-internet

Response to TRAI Consultation Paper on Regulatory Framework for Over-The-Top (OTT) Communication Services

gurshabad — 2019-01-11T16:01:09Z

This submission presents a response to the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India’s Consultation Paper on Regulatory Framework for Over-The-Top (OTT) Communication Services.

Click here to view the submission (PDF).

This submission presents a response by Gurshabad Grover, Nikhil Srinath and Aayush Rathi (with inputs from Anubha Sinha and Sai Shakti) to the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India’s “Consultation Paper on Regulatory Framework for Over-The-Top (OTT) Communication Services (hereinafter “TRAI Consultation Paper”) released on November 12, 2018 for comments. CIS appreciates the continual efforts of Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) to have consultations on the regulatory framework that should be applicable to OTT services and Telecom Service Providers (TSPs). CIS is grateful for the opportunity to put forth its views and comments.

Addendum: Please note that this document differs in certain sections from the submission emailed to TRAI: this document was updated on January 9, 2019 with design and editorial changes to enhance readability. The responses to Q5 and Q9 have been updated. This updated document was also sent to TRAI.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/response-to-trai-consultation-paper-on-regulatory-framework-for-over-the-top-ott-communication-services

India should reconsider its proposed regulation of online content

gurshabad — 2019-01-24T16:59:07Z

The lack of technical considerations in the proposal is also apparent since implementing the proposal is infeasible for certain intermediaries. End-to-end encrypted messaging services cannot “identify” unlawful content since they cannot decrypt it. Presumably, the government’s intention is not to disallow end-to-end encryption so that intermediaries can monitor content.

The article was published in the Hindustan Times on January 24, 2019. The author would like to thank Akriti Bopanna and Aayush Rathi for their feedback.

Flowing from the Information Technology (IT) Act, India’s current intermediary liability regime roughly adheres to the “safe harbour” principle, i.e. intermediaries (online platforms and service providers) are not liable for the content they host or transmit if they act as mere conduits in the network, don’t abet illegal activity, and comply with requests from authorised government bodies and the judiciary. This paradigm allows intermediaries that primarily transmit user-generated content to provide their services without constant paranoia, and can be partly credited for the proliferation of online content. The law and IT minister shared the intent to change the rules this July when discussing concerns of online platforms being used “to spread incorrect facts projected as news and designed to instigate people to commit crime”.

On December 24, the government published and invited comments to the draft intermediary liability rules. The draft rules significantly expand “due diligence” intermediaries must observe to qualify as safe harbours: they mandate enabling “tracing” of the originator of information, taking down content in response to government and court orders within 24 hours, and responding to information requests and assisting investigations within 72 hours. Most problematically, the draft rules go much further than the stated intentions: draft Rule 3(9) mandates intermediaries to deploy automated tools for “proactively identifying and removing [...] unlawful information or content”.

The first glaring problem is that “unlawful information or content” is not defined. A conservative reading of the draft rules will presume that the phrase means restrictions on free speech permissible under Article 19(2) of the Constitution, including that relate to national integrity, “defamation” and “incitement to an offence”.

Ambiguity aside, is mandating intermediaries to monitor for “unlawful content” a valid requirement under “due diligence”? To qualify as a safe harbour, if an intermediary must monitor for all unlawful content, then is it substantively different from an intermediary that has active control over its content and not a safe harbour? Clearly, the requirement of monitoring for all “unlawful content” is so onerous that it is contrary to the philosophy of safe harbours envisioned by the law.

By mandating automated detection and removal of unlawful content, the proposed rules shift the burden of appraising legality of content from the state to private entities. The rule may run afoul of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Shreya Singhal v Union of India wherein it read down a similar provision because, among other reasons, it required an intermediary to “apply [...] its own mind to whether information should or should not be blocked”. “Actual knowledge” of illegal content, since then, has held to accrue to the intermediary only when it receives a court or government order.

Given the inconsistencies with legal precedence, the rules may not stand judicial scrutiny if notified in their current form.

The lack of technical considerations in the proposal is also apparent since implementing the proposal is infeasible for certain intermediaries. End-to-end encrypted messaging services cannot “identify” unlawful content since they cannot decrypt it. Internet service providers also qualify as safe harbours: how will they identify unlawful content when it passes encrypted through their network? Presumably, the government’s intention is not to disallow end-to-end encryption so that intermediaries can monitor content.

Intermediaries that can implement the rules, like social media platforms, will leave the task to algorithms that perform even specific tasks poorly. Just recently, Tumblr flagged its own examples of permitted nudity as pornography, and Youtube slapped a video of randomly-generated white noise with five copyright-infringement notices. Identifying more contextual expression, such as defamation or incitement to offences, is a much more complex problem. In the lack of accurate judgement, platforms will be happy to avoid liability by taking content down without verifying whether it violated law. Rule 3(9) also makes no distinction between large and small intermediaries, and has no requirement for an appeal system available to users whose content is taken down. Thus, the proposed rules set up an incentive structure entirely deleterious to the exercise of the right to freedom of expression. Given the wide amplitude and ambiguity of India’s restrictions on free speech, online platforms will end up removing swathes of content to avoid liability if the draft rules are notified.

The use of draconian laws to quell dissent plays a recurring role in the history of the Indian state. The draft rules follow India’s proclivity to join the ignominious company of authoritarian nations when it comes to disrespecting protections for freedom of expression. To add insult to injury, the draft rules are abstruse, ignore legal precedence, and betray a poor technological understanding. The government should reconsider the proposed regulation and the stance which inspired it, both of which are unsuited for a democratic republic.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/hindustan-times-gurshabad-grover-january-24-2019-india-should-reconsider-its-proposed-regulation-of-online-content

To preserve freedoms online, amend the IT Act

gurshabad — 2019-04-16T10:09:41Z

Look into the mechanisms that allow the government and ISPs to carry out online censorship without accountability.

The article by Gurshabad Grover was published in the Hindustan Times on April 16, 2019.

The issue of blocking of websites and online services in India has gained much deserved traction after internet users reported that popular services like Reddit and Telegram were inaccessible on certain Internet Service Providers (ISPs). The befuddlement of users calls for a look into the mechanisms that allow the government and ISPs to carry out online censorship without accountability.

Among other things, Section 69A of the Information Technology (IT) Act, which regulates takedown and blocking of online content, allows both government departments and courts to issue directions to ISPs to block websites. Since court orders are in the public domain, it is possible to know this set of blocked websites and URLs. However, the process is much more opaque when it comes to government orders.

The Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009, issued under the Act, detail a process entirely driven through decisions made by executive-appointed officers. Although some scrutiny of such orders is required normally, it can be waived in cases of emergencies. The process does not require judicial sanction, and does not present an opportunity of a fair hearing to the website owner. Notably, the rules also mandate ISPs to maintain all such government requests as confidential, thus making the process and complete list of blocked websites unavailable to the general public.

In the absence of transparency, we have to rely on a mix of user reports and media reports that carry leaked government documents to get a glimpse into what websites the government is blocking. Civil society efforts to get the entire list of blocked websites have repeatedly failed. In response to the Right to Information (RTI) request filed by the Software Freedom Law Centre India in August 2017, the Ministry of Electronics and IT refused to provide the entire of list of blocked websites citing national security and public order, but only revealed the number of blocked websites: 11,422.

Unsurprisingly, ISPs do not share this information because of the confidentiality provision in the rules. A 2017 study by the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) found all five ISPs surveyed refused to share information about website blocking requests. In July 2018, the Bharat Sanchar Nagam Limited rejected the RTI request by CIS which asked for the list of blocked websites.

The lack of transparency, clear guidelines, and a monitoring mechanism means that there are various forms of arbitrary behaviour by ISPs. First and most importantly, there is no way to ascertain whether a website block has legal backing through a government order because of the aforementioned confidentiality clause. Second, the rules define no technical method for the ISPs to follow to block the website. This results in some ISPs suppressing Domain Name System queries (which translate human-parseable addresses like ‘example.com’ to their network address, ‘93.184.216.34’), or using the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) headers to block requests. Third, as has been made clear with recent user reports, users in different regions and telecom circles, but serviced by the same ISP, may be facing a different list of blocked websites. Fourth, when blocking orders are rescinded, there is no way to make sure that ISPs have unblocked the websites. These factors mean that two Indians can have wildly different experiences with online censorship.

Organisations like the Internet Freedom Foundation have also been pointing out how, if ISPs block websites in a non-transparent way (for example, when there is no information page mentioning a government order presented to users when they attempt to access a blocked website), it constitutes a violation of the net neutrality rules that ISPs are bound to since July 2018.

While the Supreme Court upheld the legality of the rules in 2015 in Shreya Singhal vs. Union of India, recent events highlight how the opaque processes can have arbitrary and unfair outcomes for users and website owners. The right to access to information and freedom of expression are essential to a liberal democratic order. To preserve these freedoms online, there is a need to amend the rules under the IT Act to replace the current regime with a transparent and fair process that makes the government accountable for its decisions that aim to censor speech on the internet.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/hindustan-times-april-16-2019-gurshabad-grover-to-preserve-freedoms-online-amend-it-act