Centre for Internet and Society

Contestations of Data, ECJ Safe Harbor Ruling and Lessons for India

jyoti — 2015-10-14T14:40:08Z

The European Court of Justice has invalidated a European Commission decision, which had previously concluded that the 'Safe Harbour Privacy Principles' provide adequate protections for European citizens’ privacy rights for the transfer of personal data between European Union and United States. The inadequacies of the framework is not news for the European Commission and action by ECJ has been a long time coming. The ruling raises important questions about how the claims of citizenship are being negotiated in the context of the internet, and how increasingly the contestations of personal data are being employed in the discourse.

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has invalidated a European Commission (EC) decision¹ which had previously concluded that the 'Safe Harbor Privacy Principles'² provide adequate protections for European citizens’ privacy rights³ for the transfer of personal data between European Union and United States. This challenge stems from the claim that public law enforcement authorities in America obtain personal data from organisations in safe harbour for incompatible and disproportionate purposes in violation of the Safe Harbour Privacy Principles. The court's judgment follows the advice of the Advocate General of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) who recently opined⁴ that US practices allow for large-scale collection and transfer of personal data belonging to EU citizens without them benefiting from or having access to judicial protection under US privacy laws. The inadequacies of the framework is not news for the Commission and action by ECJ has been a long time coming. The ruling raises important questions about how increasingly the contestations of personal data are being employed in asserting claims of citizenship in context of the internet.

As the highest court in Europe, the ECJ's decisions are binding on all member states. With this ruling the ECJ has effectively restrained US firms from indiscriminate collection and sharing of European citizens’ data on American soil. The implications of the decision are significant, because it shifts the onus of evaluating protections of personal data for EU citizens from the 4,400 companies⁵ subscribing to the system onto EU privacy watchdogs. Most significantly, in addressing the rights of a citizen against an established global brand, the judgement goes beyond political and legal opinion to challenge the power imbalance that exists with reference to US based firms.

Today, the free movement of data across borders is a critical factor in facilitating trade, financial services, governance, manufacturing, health and development. However, to consider the ruling as merely a clarification of transatlantic mechanisms for data flows misstates the real issue. At the heart of the judgment is the assessment whether US firms apply the tests of ‘necessity and proportionality’ in the collection and surveillance of data for national security purposes. Application of necessity and proportionality test to national security exceptions under safe harbor has been a sticking point that has stalled the renegotiation of the agreement that has been underway between the Commission and the American data protection authorities.⁶

For EU citizens the stake in the case are even higher, as while their right to privacy is enshrined under EU law, they have no administrative or judicial means of redress, if their data is used for reasons they did not intend. In the EU, citizens accessing and agreeing to use of US based firms are presented with a false choice between accessing benefits and giving up on their fundamental right to privacy. In other words, by seeking that governments and private companies provide better data protection for the EU citizens and in restricting collection of personal data on a generalised basis without objective criteria, the ruling is effectively an assertion of ‘data sovereignty’. The term ‘data sovereignty’, while lacking a firm definition, refers to a spectrum of approaches adopted by different states to control data generated in or passing through national internet infrastructure.⁷ Underlying the ruling is the growing policy divide between the US and EU privacy and data protection standards, which may lead to what is referred to as the balkanization⁸ of the internet in the future.

US-EU Data Protection Regime

The safe harbor pact between the EU and US was negotiated in the late 1990s as an attempt to bridge the different approaches to online privacy. Privacy is addressed in the EU as a fundamental human right while in the US it is defined under terms of consumer protection, which allow trade-offs and exceptions when national security seems to be under threat. In order to address the lower standards of data protection prevalent in the US, the pact facilitates data transfers from EU to US by establishing certain safeguards equivalent to the requirements of the EU data protection directive. The safe harbor provisions include firms undertaking not to pass personal information to third parties if the EU data protection standards are not met and giving users right to opt out of data collection.⁹

The agreement was due to be renewed by May 2015¹⁰ and while negotiations have been ongoing for two years, EU discontent on safe harbour came to the fore following the Edward Snowden revelations of collection and monitoring facilitated by large private companies for the PRISM program and after the announcement of the TransAtlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).¹¹ EU member states have mostly stayed silent as they run their own surveillance programs often times, in cooperation with the NSA. EU institutions cannot intervene in matters of national security however, they do have authority on data protection matters. European Union officials and Members of Parliament have expressed shock and outrage at the surveillance programs unveiled by Snowden's 2013 revelations. Most recently, following the CJEU Advocate General’s opinion, 50 Members of European Parliament (MEP) sent a strongly worded letter the US Congress hitting back on claims of ‘digital protectionism’ emanating from the US¹². In no uncertain terms the letter clarified that the EU has different ideas on privacy, platforms, net neutrality, encryption, Bitcoin, zero-days, or copyright and will seek to improve and change any proposal from the EC in the interest of our citizens and of all people.

Towards Harmonization

In November 2013, as an attempt to minimize the loss of trust following the Snowden revelations, the European Commission (EC) published recommendations in its report on 'Rebuilding Trust is EU-US Data Flows'.¹³ The recommendations revealed two critical initiatives at the EU level—first was the revision of the EU-US safe harbor agreement¹⁴ and second the adoption of the 'EU-US Umbrella Agreement¹⁵'—a framework for data transfer for the purpose of investigating, detecting, or prosecuting a crime, including terrorism. The Umbrella Agreement was recently initialed by EU and US negotiators and it only addresses the exchange of personal data between law enforcement agencies.¹⁶ The Agreement has gained momentum in the wake of recent cases around issues of territorial duties of providers, enforcement jurisdictions and data localisation.¹⁷ However, the adoption of the Umbrella Act depends on US Congress adoption of the Judicial Redress Act (JRA) as law.¹⁸

Judicial Redress Act

The JRA is a key reform that the EC is pushing for in an attempt to address the gap between privacy rights and remedies available to US citizens and those extended to EU citizens, including allowing EU citizens to sue in American courts. The JRA seeks to extend certain protections under the Privacy Act to records shared by EU and other designated countries with US law enforcement agencies for the purpose of investigating, detecting, or prosecuting criminal offenses. The JRA protections would extend to records shared under the Umbrella Agreement and while it does include civil remedies for violation of data protection, as noted by the Center for Democracy and Technology, the present framework does not provide citizens of EU countries with redress that is at par with that which US persons enjoy under the Privacy Act.¹⁹

For example, the measures outlined under the JRA would only be applicable to countries that have outlined appropriate privacy protections agreements for data sharing for investigations and ‘efficiently share’ such information with the US. Countries that do not have agreements with US cannot seek these protections leaving the personal data of their citizens open for collection and misuse by US agencies. Further, the arrangement leaves determination of 'efficiently sharing' in the hands of US authorities and countries could lose protection if they do not comply with information sharing requests promptly. Finally, JRA protections do not apply to non-US persons nor to records shared for purposes other than law enforcement such as intelligence gathering. JRA is also weakened by allowing heads of agencies to exercise their discretion to seek exemption from the Act and opt out of compliance.

Taken together the JRA, the Umbrella Act and the renegotiation of the Safe Harbor Agreement need considerable improvements. It is worth noting that EU’s acceptance of the redundancy of existing agreements and in establishing the independence of national data protection authorities in investigating and enforcing national laws as demonstrated in the Schrems and in the Weltimmo²⁰ case point to accelerated developments in the broader EU privacy landscape.

Consequences

The ECJ Safe Harbor ruling will have far-reaching consequences for the online industry. Often, costly government rulings solidify the market dominance of big companies. As high regulatory costs restrict the entrance of small and medium businesses the market, competition is gradually wiped out. Further, complying with high standards of data protection means that US firms handling European data will need to consider alternative legal means of transfer of personal data. This could include evolving 'model contracts' binding them to EU data protection standards. As Schrems points out, “Big companies don’t only rely on safe harbour: they also rely on binding corporate rules and standard contractual clauses.”²¹

The ruling is good news for European consumers, who can now approach a national regulator to investigate suspicions of data mishandling. EU data protection regulators may be be inundated with requests from companies seeking authorization of new contracts and with consumer complaints. Some are concerned that the ruling puts a dent in the globalized flow of data²², effectively requiring data localization in Europe.²³ Others have pointed out that it is unclear how this decision sits with other trade treaties such as the TPP that ban data localisation.²⁴ While the implications of the decision will take some time in playing out, what is certain is that US companies will be have to restructure management, storage and use of data. The ruling has created the impetus for India to push for reforms to protect its citizens from harms by US firms and improve trade relations with EU.

The Opportunity for India

Multiple data flows taking place over the internet simultaneously and that has led to ubiquity of data transfers o ver the Internet, exposing individuals to privacy risks. There has also been an enhanced economic importance of data processing as businesses collect and correlate data using analytic tools to create new demands, establish relationships and generate revenue for their services. The primary concern of the Schrems case may be the protection of the rights of EU citizens but by seeking to extend these rights and ensure compliance in other jurisdictions, the case touches upon many underlying contestations around data and sovereignty.

Last year, Mr Ram Narain, India Head of Delegation to the Working Group Plenary at ITU had stressed, “respecting the principle of sovereignty of information through network functionality and global norms will go a long way in increasing the trust and confidence in use of ICT.”²⁵ In the absence of the recognition of privacy as a right and empowering citizens through measures or avenues to seek redressal against misuse of data, the demand of data sovereignty rings empty. The kind of framework which empowered an ordinary citizen in the EU to approach the highest court seeking redressal based on presumed overreach of a foreign government and from harms abetted by private corporations simply does not exist in India. Securing citizen’s data in other jurisdictions and from other governments begins with establishing protection regimes within the country.

The Indian government has also stepped up efforts to restrict transfer of data from India including pushing for private companies to open data centers in India.²⁶ Negotiating data localisation does not restrict the power of private corporations from using data in a broad ways including tailoring ads and promoting products. Also, data transfers impact any organisation with international operations for example, global multinationals who need to coordinate employee data and information. Companies like Facebook, Google and Microsoft transfer and store data belonging to Indian citizens and it is worth remembering that the National Security Agency (NSA) would have access to this data through servers of such private companies. With no existing measures to restrict such indiscriminate access, the ruling purports to the need for India to evolve strong protection mechanisms. Finally, the lack of such measures also have an economic impact, as reported in a recent Nasscom-Data Security Council of India (DSCI) survey²⁷ that pegs revenue losses incurred by the Indian IT-BPO industry at $2-2.5 billion for a sample size of 15 companies. DSCI has further estimated that outsourcing business can further grow by $50 billion per annum once India is granted a “data secure” status by the EU.²⁸ EU’s refusal to grant such a status is understandable given the high standard of privacy as incorporated under the European Union Data Protection Directive a standard to which India does not match up, yet. The lack of this status prevents the flow of data which is vital for Digital India vision and also affects the service industry by restricting the flow of sensitive information to India such as information about patient records.

Data and information structures are controlled and owned by private corporations and networks transcend national borders, therefore the foremost emphasis needs to be on improving national frameworks. While, enforcement mechanisms such as the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) process or other methods of international cooperation may seem respectful of international borders and principles of sovereignty,²⁹ for users that live in undemocratic or oppressive regimes such agreements are a considerable risk. Data is also increasingly being stored across multiple jurisdictions and therefore merely applying data location lens to protection measures may be too narrow. Further it should be noted that when companies begin taking data storage decisions based on legal considerations it will impact the speed and reliability of services.³⁰ Any future regime must reflect the challenges of data transfers taking place in legal and economic spaces that are not identical and may be in opposition. Fundamentally, the protection of privacy will always act as a barrier to the free flow of information even so, as the Schrems case ruling points out not having adequate privacy protections could also restrict flow of data, as has been the case for India.

The time is right for India to appoint a data controller and put in place national frameworks, based on nuanced understanding of issues of applying jurisdiction to govern users and their data. Establishing better protection measures will not only establish trust and enhance the ability of users to control data about themselves it is also essential for sustaining economic and social value generated from data generation and collection. Suggestions for such frameworks have been considered previously by the Group of Experts on Privacy constituted by the Planning Commission.³¹ By incorporating transparency in mechanisms for data and access requests and premising requests on established necessity and proportionality Indian government can lead the way in data protection standards. This will give the Indian government more teeth to challenge and address both the dangers of theft of data stored on servers located outside of India and restrain indiscriminate access arising from terms and conditions of businesses that grant such rights to third parties.

1 Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the safe harbour privacy principles and related frequently asked questions issued by the US Department of Commerce (notified under document number C(2000) 2441) (Text with EEA relevance.) Official Journal L 215 , 25/08/2000 P. 0007 -0047 2000/520/EC: http ://eur -lex .europa .eu /LexUriServ /LexUriServ .do ?uri =CELEX :32000 D 0520:EN :HTML

2 Safe Harbour Privacy Principles Issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce on July 21, 2000 http ://www .export .gov /safeharbor /eu /eg _main _018475.asp

3 Megan Graham, Adding Some Nuance on the European Court ’s Safe Harbor Decision , Just security

https ://www .justsecurity .org /26651/adding -nuance -ecj -safe -harbor -decision /

4 Advocate General’s Opinion in Case C-362/14 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner Court of Justice of the European Union, Press Release, No 106/15 Luxembourg, 23 September 2015 http ://curia .europa .eu /jcms /upload /docs /application /pdf /2015-09/cp 150106 en .pdf

5 Jennifer Baker, ‘EU desperately pushes just-as-dodgy safe harbour alternatives’, The Register, October 7, 2015 http ://www .theregister .co .uk /2015/10/07/eu _pushes _safe _harbour _alternatives /

6 Draft Report, General Data Protection Regulation, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, European Parliament, 2009-2014 http ://www .europarl .europa .eu /meetdocs /2009_2014/documents /libe /pr /922/922387/922387 en .pdf

7 Dana Polatin-Reuben, Joss Wright, ‘An Internet with BRICS Characteristics: Data Sovereignty and the Balkanisation of the Internet’, University of Oxford, July 7, 2014 https ://www .usenix .org /system /files /conference /foci 14/foci 14-polatin -reuben .pdf

8 Sasha Meinrath, The Future of the Internet: Balkanization and Borders, Time, October 2013 http ://ideas .time .com /2013/10/11/the -future -of -the -internet -balkanization -and -borders /

9 Safe Harbour Privacy Principles, Issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce, July 2001 http ://www .export .gov /safeharbor /eu /eg _main _018475.asp

10 Facebook case may force European firms to change data storage practices, The Guardian, September 23, 2015 http ://www .theguardian .com /us -news /2015/sep /23/us -intelligence -services -surveillance -privacy

11 Privacy Tracker, US-EU Safe Harbor Under Pressure, August 2, 2013 https ://iapp .org /news /a /us -eu -safe -harbor -under -pressure

12 Kieren McCarthy, Privacy, net neutrality, security, encryption ... Europe tells Obama, US Congress to back off, The Register, 23 September, 2015 http ://www .theregister .co .uk /2015/09/23/european _politicians _to _congress _back _off /

13 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Rebuilding Trust in EU-US Data Flows, European Commission, November 2013 http ://ec .europa .eu /justice /data -protection /files /com _2013_846_en .pdf

14 Safe Harbor on trial in the European Union, Access Blog, September 2014 https ://www .accessnow .org /blog /2014/11/13/safe -harbor -on -trial -in -the -european -union

15 European Commission - Fact Sheet Questions and Answers on the EU-US data protection "Umbrella agreement", September 8, 2015 http ://europa .eu /rapid /press -release _MEMO -15-5612_en .htm

16 McGuire Woods, ‘EU and U.S. reach “Umbrella Agreement” on data transfers’, Lexology, September 14, 2015 http ://www .lexology .com /library /detail .aspx ?g =422 bca 41-2 d 54-4648-ae 57-00 d 678515 e 1 f

17 Andrew Woods, Lowering the Temperature on the Microsoft-Ireland Case, Lawfare September, 2015 https ://www .lawfareblog .com /lowering -temperature -microsoft -ireland -case

18 Jens-Henrik Jeppesen, Greg Nojeim, ‘The EU-US Umbrella Agreement and the Judicial Redress Act: Small Steps Forward for EU Citizens’ Privacy Rights’, October 5, 2015 https ://cdt .org /blog /the -eu -us -umbrella -agreement -and -the -judicial -redress -act -small -steps -forward -for -eu -citizens -privacy -rights /

19 Ibid 18.

20 Landmark ECJ data protection ruling could impact Facebook and Google, The Guardian, 2 October, 2015 http ://www .theguardian .com /technology /2015/oct /02/landmark -ecj -data -protection -ruling -facebook -google -weltimmo

21 Julia Powles, Tech companies like Facebook not above the law, says Max Schrems, The Guardian, Octover 9, 2015 http ://www .theguardian .com /technology /2015/oct /09/facebook -data -privacy -max -schrems -european -court -of -justice

22 Adam Thierer, Unintended Consequences of the EU Safe Harbor Ruling, The Technology Liberation Front, October 6, 2015 http ://techliberation .com /2015/10/06/unintended -consequenses -of -the -eu -safe -harbor -ruling /#more -75831

23 Anupam Chander, Tweeted ECJ #schrems ruling may effectively require data localization within Europe, https ://twitter .com /AnupamChander /status /651369730754801665

24 Lokman Tsui, Tweeted, “If the TPP bans data localization, but the ECJ ruling effectively mandates it, what does that mean for the internet?” https ://twitter .com /lokmantsui /status /651393867376275456

25 Statement from Indian Head of Delegation, Mr Ram Narain for WGPL, Indian statement on ITU and Internet at the Working Group Plenary November 4, 2014 https ://ccgnludelhi .wordpress .com /author /asukum 87/page /2/

26 Sounak Mitra, Xiaomi bets big on India despite problems, Business Standard, December 2014 http ://www .business -standard .com /article /companies /xiaomi -bets -big -on -india -despite -problems -114122201023_1.html

27 Neha Alawadi, Ruling on data flow between EU & US may impact India’s IT sector, Economic Times,October 7, 2015 http ://economictimes .indiatimes .com /articleshow /49250738.cms ?utm _source =contentofinterest &utm _medium =text &utm _campaign =cppst

28 Pranav Menon, Data Protection Laws in India and Data Security- Impact on India and Data Security-Impact on India - EU Free Trade Agreement, CIS Access to Knowledge, 2011 http ://cis -india .org /a 2 k /blogs /data -security -laws -india .pdf

29 Surendra Kumar Sinha, India wants Mutual Legal Assistance treaty with Bangladesh, Economic Times, October 7, 2015 http ://economictimes .indiatimes .com /articleshow /49262294.cms ?utm _source =contentofinterest &utm _medium =text &utm _campaign =cppst

30 Pablo Chavez, Director, Public Policy and Government Affairs, Testifying before the U.S. Senate on transparency legislation, November 3, 2013 http ://googlepublicpolicy .blogspot .in /2013/11/testifying -before -us -senate -on .htm

31 Report of the Group of Experts on Privacy (Chaired by Justice A P Shah, Former Chief Justice, Delhi High Court), Planning Commission, October 2012 http ://planningcommission .nic .in /reports /genrep /rep _privacy .pdf

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/contestations-of-data-ecj-safe-harbor-ruling-and-lessons-for-india

ICANN reveals hitherto undisclosed details of domain names revenues

geetha — 2014-12-12T05:08:02Z

Following requests from CIS, ICANN has shared a detailed list of its revenues from domain names for the fiscal year ending June 2014. Such level of detail has, until now, been unavailable. Historical data is still to be made available.

Five days ago, CIS received a detailed list of ICANN’s revenues from domain name sales and renewals for the fiscal year ending June 2014. The document, sent to us by ICANN’s India head Mr. Samiran Gupta, lists payments received by ICANN from registrars, registries, sponsors and other entities such as the NRO and Country Code TLD administrators. Such granular information is not available at the moment on ICANN’s website as part of its financial transparency disclosures. A summary has also been provided by ICANN.

This revenue disclosure from ICANN comes on the heels of public and email correspondence between CIS and ICANN staff. At the Asia Pacific Regional IGF (August 3-6, 2014), CIS’ Sunil Abraham sought granular data – both current and historical – on ICANN’s revenues from the domain name industry.

Again, at the ICANN Open Forum at IGF (4 September 2014), Sunil sought “details of a list of legal entities that give money to ICANN and how much money they give to ICANN every year”. In emails to Kuek Yu-Chuang (ICANN’s Asia Pacific head) and Xavier Calvez (ICANN CFO), CIS had asked for historical data as well.

The global domain name industry is a multi-billion dollar industry, and ICANN sits at the centre of the web. ICANN is responsible for the policy-making and introduction of new Top Level Domains (TLDs), and it also performs technical coordination and maintenance of the Internet’s unique identifiers (domain names and IP addresses). For each domain name that is registered or renewed, ICANN receives payment through a complex contractual network of registries and registrars. The domain name industry is ICANN’s single largest revenue source.

Given the impending IANA transition and accountability debates at ICANN, and the rapid growth of the global domain name industry, one would imagine that ICANN is held up to the same standard of accountability as laid down in the right to information mechanisms of many countries. At the ICANN Open Forum (IGF Istanbul), Sunil raised this very point. Had a Public Information Officer in India failed to respond to a request for information for a month (as ICANN had to CIS’ request for granular revenue data), the officer would have been fined and reprimanded. Since there are no sufficiently effective accountability or reactive transparency measures at ICANN, such penalties are not in place.

In any event, CIS received the list of ICANN’s current domain name revenues after continual email exchanges with ICANN staff. This is undoubtedly heartening, as ICANN has shown itself responsive to repeated requests for transparency. But it remains that ICANN has shared revenue data only for the fiscal year ending June 2014, and historical revenue data is still not publicly available. Neither is a detailed list (current and historical) of ICANN’s expenditures publicly available. Perhaps ICANN could provide the necessary information during its regular Quarterly Stakeholder Reports, as well as on its website. This would go a long way in ascertaining and improving ICANN’s accountability and transparency.

The documents:

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-receives-information-on-icanns-revenues-from-domain-names-fy-2014

DeitY says 143 URLs have been Blocked in 2015; Procedure for Blocking Content Remains Opaque and in Urgent Need of Transparency Measures

jyoti — 2015-04-30T07:37:40Z

Across India on 30 December 2014, following an order issued by the Department of Telecom (DOT), Internet Service Providers (ISPs) blocked 32 websites including Vimeo, Dailymotion, GitHub and Pastebin.

In February 2015, the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) requested the Department of Electronics and Information Technology (DeitY) under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (RTI Act) to provide information clarifying the procedures for blocking in India. We have received a response from DeitY which may be seen here.

In this post, I shall elaborate on this response from DeitY and highlight some of the accountability and transparency measures that the procedure needs. To stress the urgency of reform, I shall also touch upon two recent developments—the response from Ministry of Communication to questions raised in Parliament on the blocking procedures and the Supreme Court (SC) judgment in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India.

Section 69A and the Blocking Rules

Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2008 (S69A hereinafter) grants powers to the central government to issue directions for blocking of access to any information through any computer resource. In other words, it allows the government to block any websites under certain grounds. The Government has notified rules laying down the procedure for blocking access online under the Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public Rules, 2009 (Rules, 2009 hereinafter). CIS has produced a poster explaining the blocking procedure (download PDF, 2.037MB).

There are three key aspects of the blocking rules that need to be kept under consideration:

Officers and committees handling requests

Designated Officer (DO) – Appointed by the Central government, officer not below the rank of Joint Secretary.
Nodal Officer (NO) – Appointed by organizations including Ministries or Departments of the State governments and Union Territories and any agency of the Central Government.
Intermediary contact–Appointed by every intermediary to receive and handle blocking directions from the DO.
Committee for Examination of Request (CER) – The request along with printed sample of alleged offending information is examined by the CER—committee with the DO serving as the Chairperson and representatives from Ministry of Law and Justice; Ministry of Home Affairs; Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and representative from the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In). The CER is responsible for examining each blocking request and makes recommendations including revoking blocking orders to the DO, which are taken into consideration for final approval of request for blocking by the Secretary, DOT.
Review Committee (RC) – Constituted under rule 419A of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1951, the RC includes the Cabinet Secretary, Secretary to the Government of India (Legal Affairs) and Secretary (Department of Telecom). The RC is mandated to meet at least once in 2 months and record its findings and has to validate that directions issued are in compliance with S69A(1).

Provisions outlining the procedure for blocking

Rules 6, 9 and 10 create three distinct blocking procedures, which must commence within 7 days of the DO receiving the request.

a) Rule 6 lays out the first procedure, under which any person may approach the NO and request blocking, alternatively, the NO may also raise a blocking request. After the NO of the approached Ministry or Department of the State governments and Union Territories and/or any agency of the Central Government, is satisfied of the validity of the request they forward it to the DO. Requests when not sent through the NO of any organization, must be approved by Chief Secretary of the State or Union Territory or the Advisor to the Administrator of the Union Territory, before being sent to the DO.

The DO upon receiving the request places, must acknowledge receipt within 24 four hours and places the request along with printed copy of alleged information for validation by the CER. The DO also, must make reasonable efforts to identify the person or intermediary hosting the information, and having identified them issue a notice asking them to appear and submit their reply and clarifications before the committee at a specified date and time, within forty eight hours of the receipt of notice.

Foreign entities hosting the information are also informed and the CER gives it recommendations after hearing from the intermediary or the person has clarified their position and even if there is no representation by the same and after examining if the request falls within the scope outlined under S69A(1). The blocking directions are issued by the Secretary (DeitY), after the DO forwards the request and the CER recommendations. If approval is granted the DO directs the relevant intermediary or person to block the alleged information.

b) Rule 9 outlines a procedure wherein, under emergency circumstances, and after the DO has established the necessity and expediency to block alleged information submits recommendations in writing to the Secretary, DeitY. The Secretary, upon being satisfied by the justification for, and necessity of, and expediency to block information may issue an blocking directions as an interim measure and must record the reasons for doing so in writing.

Under such circumstances, the intermediary and person hosting information is not given the opportunity of a hearing. Nevertheless, the DO is required to place the request before the CER within forty eight hours of issuing of directions for interim blocking. Only upon receiving the final recommendations from the committee can the Secretary pass a final order approving the request. If the request for blocking is not approved then the interim order passed earlier is revoked, and the intermediary or identified person should be directed to unblock the information for public access.

c) Rule 10 outlines the process when an order is issued by the courts in India. The DO upon receipt of the court order for blocking of information submits it to the Secretary, DeitY and initiates action as directed by the courts.

Confidentiality clause

Rule 16 mandates confidentiality regarding all requests and actions taken thereof, which renders any requests received by the NO and the DO, recommendations made by the DO or the CER and any written reasons for blocking or revoking blocking requests outside the purview of public scrutiny. More detail on the officers and committees that enforce the blocking rules and procedure can be found here.

Response on blocking from the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology

The response to our RTI from E-Security and Cyber Law Group is timely, given the recent clarification from the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology to a number of questions, raised by parliamentarian Shri Avinash Pande in the Rajya Sabha. The questions had been raised in reference to the Emergency blocking order under IT Act, the current status of the Central Monitoring System, Data Privacy law and Net Neutrality. The Centre for Communication Governance (CCG), National Law University New Delhi have extracted a set of 6 questions and you can read the full article here.

The governments response as quoted by CCG, clarifies under rule 9—the Government has issued directions for emergency blocking of a total number of 216 URLs from 1st January, 2014 till date and that a total of 255 URLs were blocked in 2014 and no URLs has been blocked in 2015 (till 31 March 2015) under S69A through the Committee constituted under the rules therein. Further, a total of 2091 URLs and 143 URLs were blocked in order to comply with the directions of the competent courts of India in 2014 and 2015 (till 31 March 2015) respectively. The government also clarified that the CER, had recommended not to block 19 URLs in the meetings held between 1^stJanuary 2014 upto till date and so far, two orders have been issued to revoke 251 blocked URLs from 1st January 2014 till date. Besides, CERT-In received requests for blocking of objectionable content from individuals and organisations, and these were forwarded to the concerned websites for appropriate action, however the response did not specify the number of requests.

We have prepared a table explaining the information released by the government and to highlight the inconsistency in their response.

Applicable rule and procedure outlined under the Blocking Rules	Number of websites
	2014	2015	Total
Rule 6 - Blocking requests from NO and others	255	None	255
Rule 9 - Blocking under emergency circumstances	-	-	216
Rule 10 - Blocking orders from Court	2091	143	2234
Requests from individuals and orgs forwarded to CERT-In	-	-	-
Recommendations to not block by CER	-	-	19
Number of blocking requests revoked	-	-	251

In a response to an RTI filed by the Software Freedom Law Centre, DeitY said that 708 URLs were blocked in 2012, 1,349 URLs in 2013, and 2,341 URLs in 2014.

Shreya Singhal v. Union of India

In its recent judgment, the SC of India upheld the constitutionality of 69A, stating that it was a narrowly-drawn provision with adequate safeguards. The constitutional challenge on behalf of the People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) considered the manner in which the blocking is done and the arguments focused on the secrecy present in blocking.

The rules may indicate that there is a requirement to identify and contact the originator of information, though as an expert has pointed out, there is no evidence of this in practice. The court has stressed the importance of a written order so that writ petitions may be filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. In doing so, the court seems to have assumed that the originator or intermediary is informed, and therefore held the view that any procedural inconsistencies may be challenged through writ petitions. However, this recourse is rendered ineffective not only due to procedural constraints, but also because of the confidentiality clause. The opaqueness through rule 16 severely reigns in the recourse that may be given to the originator and the intermediary. While the court notes that rule 16 requiring confidentality was argued to be unconstitutional, it does not state its opinion on this question in the judgment. One expert, holds the view that this, by implication, requires that requests cannot be confidential. However, such a reading down of rule 16 is yet to be tested.

Further, Sunil Abraham has pointed out, “block orders are unevenly implemented by ISPs making it impossible for anyone to independently monitor and reach a conclusion whether an internet resource is inaccessible as a result of a S69A block order or due to a network anomaly.” As there are no comprehensive list of blocked websites or of the legal orders through which they are blocked exists, the public has to rely on media reports and filing RTI requests to understand the censorship regime in India. CIS has previously analysed the leaked block lists and lists received as responses to RTI requests which have revealed that the block orders are full of errors and blocking of entire platforms and not just specific links has taken place.

While the state has the power of blocking content, doing so in secrecy and without judical scrutiny, mark deficiencies that remain in the procedure outlined under the provisions of the blocking rules . The Court could read down rule 16 except for a really narrow set of exceptions, and in not doing so, perhaps has overlooked the opportunities for reform in the existing system. The blocking of 32 websites, is an example of the opaqueness of the system of blocking orders, and where the safeguards assumed by the SC are often not observed such as there being no access to the recommendations that were made by the CER, or towards the revocation of the blocking orders subsequently. CIS filed the RTI to try and understand the grounds for blocking and related procedures and the response has thrown up some issues that must need urgent attention.

Response to RTI filed by CIS

Our first question sought clarification on the websites blocked on 30^thDecember 2014 and the response received from DeitY, E-Security and Cyber Law Group reveals that the websites had been blocked as “they were being used to post information related to ISIS using the resources provided by these websites”. The response also clarifies that the directions to block were issued on 18-12-2014 and as of 09-01-2015, after obtaining an undertaking from website owners, stating their compliance with the Government and Indian laws, the sites were unblocked.

It is not clear if ATS, Mumbai had been intercepting communication or if someone reported these websites. If the ATS was indeed intercepting communication, then as per the rules, the RC should be informed and their recommendations sought. It is unclear, if this was the case and the response evokes the confidentiality clause under rule 16 for not divulging further details. Based on our reading of the rules, court orders should be accessible to the public and without copies of requests and complaints received and knowledge of which organization raised them, there can be no appeal or recourse available to the intermediary or even the general public.

We also asked for a list of all requests for blocking of information that had been received by the DO between January 2013 and January 2015, including the copies of all files that had accepted or rejected. We also specifically, asked for a list of requests under rule 9. The response from DeitY stated that since January 1, 2015 to March 31, 2015 directions to block 143 URLs had been issued based on court orders. The response completely overlooks our request for information, covering the 2 year time period. It also does not cover all types of blocking orders under rule 6 and rule 9, nor the requests that are forwarded to CERT-In, as we have gauged from the ministry's response to the Parliament. Contrary to the SC's assumption of contacting the orginator of information, it is also clear from DeitY's response that only the websites had been contacted and the letter states that the “websites replied only after blocking of objectionable content”.

Further, seeking clarification on the functioning of the CER, we asked for the recent composition of members and the dates and copies of the minutes of all meetings including copies of the recommendations made by them. The response merely quotes rule 7 as the reference for the composition and does not provide any names or other details. We ascertain that as per the DeitY website Shri B.J. Srinath, Scientist-G/GC is the appointed Designated Officer, however this needs confirmation. While we are already aware of the structure of the CER which representatives and appointed public officers are guiding the examination of requests remains unclear. Presently, there are 3 Joint Secretaries appointed under the Ministry of Law and Justice, the Home Ministry has appointed 19, while 3 are appointed under the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Further, it is not clear which grade of scientist would be appointed to this committee from CERT-In as the rules do not specify this. While the government has clarified in their answer to Parliament that the committee had recommended not to block 19 URLs in the meetings held between 1st January 2014 to till date, it is remains unclear who is taking these decisions to block and revoke blocked URLs. The response from DeitY specifies that the CER has met six times between 2014 and March 2015, however stops short on sharing any further information or copies of files on complaints and recommendations of the CER, citing rule 16.

Finally, answering our question on the composition of the RC the letter merely highlights the provision providing for the composition under 419A of the Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951. The response clarifies that so far, the RC has met once on 7th December, 2013 under the Chairmanship of the Cabinet Secretary, Department of Legal Affaits and Secretary, DOT. Our request for minutes of meetings and copies of orders and findings of the RC is denied by simply stating that “minutes are not available”. Under 419A, any directions for interception of any message or class of messages under sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 issued by the competent authority shall contain reasons for such direction and a copy of such order shall be forwarded to the concerned RC within a period of seven working days. Given that the RC has met just once since 2013, it is unclear if the RC is not functioning or if the interception of messages is being guided through other procedures. Further, we do not yet know details or have any records of revocation orders or notices sent to intermediary contacts. This restricts the citizens’ right to receive information and DeitY should work to make these available for the public.

Given the response to our RTI, the Ministry's response to Parliament and the SC judgment we recommend the following steps be taken by the DeitY to ensure that we create a procedure that is just, accountable and follows the rule of law.

The revocation of rule 16 needs urgent clarification for two reasons:

Under Section 22 of the RTI Act provisions thereof, override all conflicting provisions in any other legislation.
In upholding the constitutionality of S69A the SC cites the requirement of reasons behind blocking orders to be recorded in writing, so that they may be challenged by means of writ petitions filed under A rticle 226 of the Constitution of India.

If the blocking orders or the meetings of the CER and RC that consider the reasons in the orders are to remain shrouded in secrecy and unavailable through RTI requests, filing writ petitions challenging these decisions will not be possible, rendering this very important safeguard for the protection of online free speech and expression infructuous. In summation, the need for comprehensive legislative reform remains in the blocking procedures and the government should act to address the pressing need for transparency and accountability. Not only does opacity curtial the strengths of democracy it also impedes good governance. We have filed an RTI seeking a comprehensive account of the blocking procedure, functioning of committees from 2009-2015 and we shall publish any information that we may receive.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/deity-says-143-urls-blocked-in-2015

(Updated) Information Security Practices of Aadhaar (or lack thereof): A documentation of public availability of Aadhaar Numbers with sensitive personal financial information

Amber Sinha and Srinivas Kodali — 2019-03-13T00:29:01Z

Since its inception in 2009, the Aadhaar project has been shrouded in controversy due to various questions raised about privacy, technological issues, welfare exclusion, and security concerns. In this study, we document numerous instances of publicly available Aadhaar Numbers along with other personally identifiable information (PII) of individuals on government websites. This report highlights four government projects run by various government departments that have made sensitive personal financial information and Aadhaar numbers public on the project websites.

Read the updated report: Download (pdf)

Read the first statement of clarification (May 16, 2017): Download (pdf)

Read the second statement of clarification (November 05, 2018): Link to page (html)

We are grateful to Yesha Paul and VG Shreeram for research support.

In the last month, there have been various reports pointing out instances of the public disclosure of Aadhaar number through various databases, accessible easily on Twitter under the hashtag #AadhaarLeaks. Most of these public disclosures reported contain personally identifiable information of beneficiaries or subjects of the non UIDAI databases containing Aadhaar numbers of individuals along with other personal identifiers. All of these public disclosures are symptomatic of a significant and potentially irreversible privacy harm, however we wanted to point out another large fallout of such events, those that create a ripe opportunity for financial fraud. For this purpose, we identified benefits disbursement schemes which would require its databases to store financial information about its subjects. During our research, we encountered numerous instances of publicly available Aadhaar Numbers along with other PII of individuals on government websites. In this paper, we highlight four government projects run by various government departments with publicly available financial data and Aadhaar numbers. Our research is focussed largely on the data published by or pertaining to where Aadhaar data is linked with banking information. We chose major government programmes using Aadhaar for payments and banking transactions. We found sensitive and personal data and information very easily accessible on these portals.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/information-security-practices-of-aadhaar-or-lack-thereof-a-documentation-of-public-availability-of-aadhaar-numbers-with-sensitive-personal-financial-information-1

CIS’ Efforts Towards Greater Financial Disclosure by ICANN

Padma Venkataraman — 2017-10-31T02:10:11Z

CIS has been working towards enhancing transparency and accountability at ICANN since 2014. While initial efforts have resulted in ICANN revealing its sources of income in a granular fashion in 2015, we are yet to see this level of transparency become a default approach within ICANN. Here, Padma Venkataraman chronologically maps CIS’ efforts at enhancing financial transparency and accountability at ICANN, while providing an outline of what remains to be done.

With the $135 million sale of .web,^[1] the much protested renewal of the .net agreement^[2] and the continued annual increase in domain name registrations,^[3] among other things, it is no surprise that there are still transparency and accountability concerns within the ICANN Community. CIS, as part of its efforts to examine the functioning of ICANN’s accountability mechanisms, has filed many DIDP requests till date, in a bid for greater transparency of the organisation’s sources of revenues.

1.Efforts towards disclosure of revenue break-up by ICANN

- 2014

- 2015

- 2017

2.The need for granularity regarding historical revenues

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1.Efforts towards disclosure of revenue break-up by ICANN

- 2014

In 2014, CIS’ Sunil Abraham demanded greater financial transparency of ICANN at both the Asia Pacific IGF and the ICANN Open Forum at the IGF. Later that year, CIS was provided with a list of ICANN’s sources of revenue for the financial year 2014, including payments from registries, registrars, sponsors, among others, by ICANN India Head Mr. Samiran Gupta.^[4] This was a big step for CIS and the Internet community, as before this, no details on granular income had ever been publicly divulged by ICANN on request.

However, as no details of historical revenue had been provided, CIS filed a DIDP request in December 2014, seeking financial disclosure of revenues for the years 1999 to 2014, in a detailed manner - similar to the 2014 report that had been provided.^[5] It sought a list of individuals and entities who had contributed to ICANN’s revenues over the mentioned time period.

In its response, ICANN stated that it possessed no documents in the format that CIS had requested, that is, it had no reports that broke down domain name income and revenue received by each legal entity and individual.^[6] It stated that as the data for years preceding 2012 were on a different system, compiling reports of the raw data for these years would be time-consuming and overly burdensome. ICANN denied the request citing this specific provision for non-disclosure of information under the DIDP.^[7]

- 2015

In July 2015, CIS filed a request for disclosure of raw data regarding granular income for the years 1999 to 2014.^[8] ICANN again said that it would be a huge burden ‘to access and review all the raw data for the years 1999 to 2014 in order to identify the raw data applicable to the request’.^[9] However, it mentioned its commitment to preparing detailed reports on a go-forward basis - all of which would be uploaded on its Financials page.^[10]

- 2017

To follow up on ICANN’s commitment to granularity, CIS sought a detailed report on historical data for income and revenue contributions from domain names for FY 2015 and FY 2016 in June 2017.^[11] In its reply, ICANN stated that the Revenue Detail by Source reports for the last two years would be out by end July and that the report for FY 2012 would be out by end September.^[12]

2.The need for granularity regarding historical revenues

In 2014, CIS asked for disclosure of a list of ICANN’s sources of revenue and detailed granular income for the years 1999 to 2014. ICANN published the first but cited difficulty in preparing reports of the second. In 2015, CIS again sought detailed reports of historical granular revenue for the same period, and ICANN again denied disclosure claiming that it was burdensome to handle the raw data for those years. However, as ICANN agreed to publish detailed reports for future years, CIS recently asked for publication of reports for the FYs 2012, 2015 and 2016. Reports for these three years were uploaded according to the timeline provided by ICANN.

CIS appreciates ICANN’s cooperation with its requests and is grateful for their efforts to make the reports for FYs 2012 to 2016 available (and on a continued basis). However, it is important that detailed information of historical revenue and income from domain names for the years 1999 to 2014 be made publicly available. It is also crucial that consistent accounting and disclosure practices are adopted and made known to the Community, in order to avoid omissions of statements such as Detail Revenue by Source and Lobbying Disclosures, among many others, in the annual reports - as has evidently happened for the years preceding 2012. This is necessary to maintain financial transparency and accountability, as an organisation’s sources of revenues can inform the dependant Community about why it functions the way it does.

It will also allow more informed discussions about problems that the Community has faced in the past and continues to struggle with. For example, while examining problems such as ineffective market competition or biased screening processes for TLD applicants, among others, this data can be useful in assessing the long-term interests, motives and influences of different parties involved.

^[1] https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-07-28-en

^[2] Report of Public Comment Proceeding on the .net Renewal. https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/report-comments-net-renewal-13jun17-en.pdf

^[3] https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/cct-metrics-domain-name-registration-2016-06-27-en

^[4] https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-receives-information-on-icanns-revenues-from-domain-names-fy-2014

^[5] DIDP Request no - 20141222-1, 22 December 2014. https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-2

^[6] https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/cis-response-21jan15-en.pdf

^[7] Defined Conditions for Non-Disclosure - Information requests: (i) which are not reasonable; (ii) which are excessive or overly burdensome; (iii) complying with which is not feasible; or (iv) are made with an abusive or vexatious purpose or by a vexatious or querulous individual.

https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/didp-2012-02-25-en

^[8] DIDP Request no - 20150722-2, 22 July 2015. https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-12-revenues

^[9] https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/didp-response-20150722-2-21aug15-en.pdf

^[10] https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/didp-response-20150722-2-21aug15-en.pdf; https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/financials-en

^[11] DIDP Request No. 20170613-1, 14 June 2017.

^[12] https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/didp-20170613-1-marda-obo-cis-response-13jul17-en.pdf

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis2019-efforts-towards-greater-financial-disclosure-by-icann

Why Presumption of Renewal is Unsuitable for the Current Registry Market Structure

Padma Venkataraman — 2017-10-31T02:53:26Z

With the recent and much protested renewal of the .net legacy Top-Level-Domain (TLD), the question of the appropriate method of renewal has again come to the forefront. While this seems relatively uncontroversial to most, Padma Venkataraman, a law student and intern at CIS looks at presumptive renewal through a critical lens.

With the recent renewal of the .net legacy Top-Level-Domain (TLD), the question of the appropriate method of renewal is worth reconsidering. When we talk about presumption of renewal for registry agreements, it means that the agreement has a reasonable renewal expectancy at the end of its contractual term. According to the current base registry agreement, it shall be renewed for 10-year periods, upon expiry of the initial (and successive) term, unless the operator commits a fundamental and material breach of the operator’s covenants or breach of its payment obligations to ICANN.

Download the entire blog post here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/why-presumption-of-renewal-is-unsuitable-for-the-current-registry-market-structure

Workshop on Democratic Accountability in the Digital Age (Delhi, November 14-15)

sumandro — 2016-12-15T09:27:22Z

IT for Change, along with Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), Digital Empowerment Foundation (DEF), Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) and National Campaign for People’s Right to Information (NCPRI), is organising a two day workshop on ‘Democratic Accountability in the Digital Age’. The workshop will focus on evolving a comprehensive policy approach to data based governance and digital democracy, grounded in a rights and social justice framework. It will be held at the United Service Institution of India, Delhi, during November 14-15, 2016. The CIS team to participate in the workshop includes Sumandro Chattapadhyay (speaker), Amber Sinha (speaker), Vanya Rakesh (participant), and Himadri Chatterjee (participant).

The workshop aims to:

Discuss the institutional norms, rules and practices appropriate to the rise of ‘governance by networks’ and ‘rule by data’ that can guarantee democratic accountability and citizen participation, and
Articulate the steps to claim the civic-public value of digital technologies so that data and the new possibilities for networking are harnessed for a vibrant grassroots democracy.

We hope the workshop can create a civil society coalition that can build effective strategies for legal and policy reform to further participatory democracy in the digital age. On the first day, the workshop will set the context through knowledge sharing and thematic presentations and discussions. On the second day, we aim to concretize strategies for collective action to further democratic accountability in the digital age.

Workshop Agenda (PDF)

Background Note (ODT)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/events/workshop-on-democratic-accountability-in-the-digital-age-delhi-november-14-15

Where Does ICANN’s Money Come From? We Asked; They Don’t Know

geetha — 2015-03-05T07:43:45Z

Just how transparent is ICANN? How responsive are they to requests for information? At CIS, we sent ICANN ten questions seeking information about, inter alia, their revenues, commitment to the NETmundial Principles, Globalisation Advisory Groups and organisational structure. Geetha Hariharan wonders at ICANN's reluctance to respond.

Why Is ICANN Here?

The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is responsible for critical backbones of the Internet. It manages the root server system, the global allocation of IP addresses, protocol registries and the domain name system (management of gTLDs, ccTLDs, as well as the newly rolled-out “new gTLDs”).

ICANN was incorporated in California in 1998, and was intended as the technical coordination body for the backbone of the Internet. That is, it was to administer the Internet’s domain names and IP addresses, and also manage the Internet root servers.

As a result of an agreement with the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) in the US Department of Commerce, ICANN is the IANA functions operator. It carries out the IANA functions, which include making changes to the root zone file (the backbone of the domain name system), allocation of IP address blocks to the five Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), and maintaining protocol parameter registries in collaboration with the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). The RIRs are responsible for allocating IP addresses (IPv4 and IPv6) to national and local Internet registries. The IETF develops Internet standards and protocols, such as those within the TCP/IP suite. To be clear, ICANN does not make policy for the IP address or Internet standards/protocols; those are the domains of RIRs and the IETF, respectively.

ICANN, Domain Names and All That Buried Treasure

ICANN is the de facto policy-making body for domain names. Through ICANN’s community Supporting Organisations and Advisory Committees (SOACs) – largely a multi-stakeholder community – ICANN determines policies for dispute resolution (see, for instance, the UDRP for domain name disputes), maintaining the WHOIS database, etc. for domain names.

Under its contracts with Top Level Domain (TLD) Registries, ICANN receives payment for all registrations and/or renewals of domain names. For instance, under the .bharti Registry Agreement, ICANN receives a fixed annual registry free of US $6250. If there are more than 50,000 registrations or renewals of domain names under a TLD (say, .bharti) in a quarter, then ICANN also receives an amount equal to (No. of registrations or renewals X US $0.25). TLD Registries “own” TLDs like .com, and they maintain a list of all the domain names registered under that TLD. There are around 816 such Registry Agreements, and in FY14, ICANN received over US $47 million in Registry fees [see page 7].

Similar agreements exist between ICANN and domain name Registrars accredited by it, too. Domain name Registrars are entities like Go Daddy and Big Rock, from whom people like you and me (or companies) can register domain names. Only Registrars accredited by ICANN can register domain names that will be included in the ICANN DNS, the most frequently used DNS on the Web. Each Registrar pays a yearly accreditation fee of US $4000 to ICANN (see Clause 3.9). Each Registrar also pays to ICANN fees for every domain name registration or renewal. There are over 500 ICANN-accredited Registrars, and in FY14, ICANN received over US $34.5 million in Registrar fees [see page 7].

Now, apart from this, in its IANA operator role, ICANN is responsible for the global allocation of IP addresses (IPv4 and IPv6). From the global pool of IP addresses, ICANN allocates to the five Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), which then allocate to National Internet Registries like the National Internet Exchange of India (NIXI as IRINN), local Internet registries or ISPs. For this, ICANN receives a combined contribution of US $823,000 each year as revenue from RIRs [see, ex.: FY09 Financial Statements, page 3].

And this isn’t all of it! With its new gTLD program, ICANN is sitting on a large treasure trove. Each gTLD application cost US $185,000, and there were 1930 applications in the first round (that’s US $357 million). Where there arose disagreements as to the same or similar strings, ICANN initiated an auction process. Some new gTLDs were auctioned for as high as US $6 million.

So ICANN is sitting on a great deal of treasure (US $355 million in revenues in FY14 and growing). It accumulates revenue from a variety of quarters; the sources identified above are by no means the only revenue-sources. But ICANN is unaware of, or unwilling to disclose, all its sources of revenue.

ICANN's Troubling Scope-creep and Does Transparency Matter?

At CIS, we are concerned by ICANN’s unchecked influence and growing role in the Internet governance institutional space. For instance, under its CEO Fadi Chehade, ICANN was heavily involved backstage for NETmundial, and has set aside over US $200,000 for Mr. Chehade’s brainchild, the NETmundial Initiative. Coupled with its lack of transparency and vocal interests in furthering status quo (for instance, both the names and numbers communities’ proposals for IANA transition want ICANN to remain the IANA functions operator, without stringent safeguards), this makes for a dangerous combination.

The clearest indication lies in the money, one might say. As we have written before, ICANN budgets for less than US $10 million for providing core Internet functions out of a US $160 million strong budget (Budget FY15, page 17). It has budgeted, in comparison, US $13 million for travel and meetings alone, and spent over US $18 million on travel in FY14 (Budget FY15, page 11).

To its credit, ICANN makes public its financial statements (current and historic), and community discussions are generally open. However, given the understandably complex contractual arrangements that give ICANN its revenues, even ploughing through the financials does not give one a clear picture of where ICANN’s money comes from.

So one is left with questions such as the following: Which entities (and how many of them) pay ICANN for domain names? What are the vendor payments received by ICANN and who pays? Who all have paid ICANN under the new gTLD program, and for what purposes? Apart from application fees and auctions, what other heads of payment exist? How much does each RIR pay ICANN and what for, if IP addresses are not property to be sold? For how many persons (and whom all) does ICANN provide pay for, to travel to meetings and other events?

You may well ask why these questions matter, and whether we need greater transparency. To put it baldly: ICANN’s transparency is crucial. ICANN is today something of a monopoly; it manages the IANA functions, makes policy for domain names and is increasingly active in Internet governance. It is without greater (effective) accountability than a mere review by the NTIA, and some teething internal mechanisms like the Documentary Information Disclosure Policy (DIDP), Ombudsman, Reconsideration and Independent Review and the Accountability and Transparency Review (ATRT). I could elaborate on why these mechanisms are inadequate, but this post is already too long. Suffice it to say that by carefully defining these mechanisms and setting out their scope, ICANN has stifled their effectiveness. For instance, a Reconsideration Request can be filed if one is aggrieved by an action of ICANN’s Board or staff. Under ICANN’s By-laws (Article IV, Section 2), it is the Board Governance Committee, comprising ICANN Board members, that adjudicates Reconsideration Requests. This simply violates the principles of natural justice, wherein one may not be a judge in one’s own cause (nemo debet esse judex in propria causa).

Moreover, ICANN serves corporate interests, for it exists on account of contractual arrangements with Registries, Registrars, the NTIA and other sundry entities. ICANN has also troublingly reached into Internet governance domains to which it was previously closed, such as the NETmundial Initiative, the NETmundial, the IGF and its Support Association. It is unclear that ICANN was ever intended to overreach so, a point admitted by Mr. Chehade himself at the ICANN Open Forum in Istanbul (IGF 2014).

Finally, despite its professed adherence to multi-stakeholderism, there is evidence that ICANN’s policy-making and functioning revolve around small, cohesive groups with multiple professional inter-linkages with other I-Star organisations. For instance, a revolving door study by CIS of the IANA Coordination Group (ICG) found that 20 out of 30 ICG members had close and longterm ties with I-Star organisations. This surely creates concern as to the impartiality and fairness of the ICG’s decision-making. It may, for instance, make a pro-ICANN outcome inevitable – and that is definitely a serious worry.

But ICANN is intended to serve the public interest, to ensure smooth, stable and resilient running of the Internet. Transparency is crucial to this, and especially so during the IANA transition phase. As advisor Jan Scholte asked at ICANN52, what accountability will ICANN exercise after the transition, and to whom will it be accountable? What, indeed, does accountability mean? The CCWG-Accountability is still asking that question. But meanwhile, one among our cohorts at CIS has advocated transparency as a check-and-balance for power.

The DIDP process at ICANN may prove useful in the long run, but does it suffice as a transparency mechanism?

ICANN's Responses to CIS' DIDP Requests

Over December ’14 and January ’15, CIS sent 10 DIDP requests to ICANN. Our aim was to test and encourage transparency from ICANN, a process crucial given the CCWG-Accountability’s deliberations on ways to enhance ICANN’s accountability. We have received responses for 9 of our requests. We summarise ICANN’s responses in a table: please go here.

A glance at the table above will show that ICANN’s responses are largely negative. In 7 requests out of 9, ICANN provides very little new information. Though the responses are detailed, the majority of information they provide is already identified in CIS’ requests. For instance, in the response to the NETmundial Request, ICANN links us to blogposts written by CEO Fadi Chehade, where he notes the importance of translating the NETmundial Principles into action. They also link us to the Final Report of the Panel on Global Internet Cooperation and Governance Mechanism, and ICANN’s involvement in the NETmundial Initiative.

However, to the query on ICANN’s own measures of implementing the NETmundial Principles – principles that it has lauded and upheld for the entire Internet governance community – ICANN’s response is surprisingly evasive. Defending lack of action, they note that “ICANN is not the home for implementation of the NETmundial Principles”. But ICANN also responds that they already implement the NETmundial Principles: “Many of the NETmundial Principles are high-level statements that permeate through the work of any entity – particularly a multistakeholder entity like ICANN – that is interested in the upholding of the inclusive, multistakeholder process within the Internet governance framework” (emphasis provided). One wonders, then, at the insistence on creating documents involving such high-level principles; why create them if they’re already implemented?

Responses to other requests indicate that the DIDP is, in its current form, unable to provide the transparency necessary for ICANN’s functioning. For instance, in the response to the Ombudsman Request, ICANN cites confidentiality as a reason to decline providing information. Making Ombudsman Requests public would violate ICANN Bylaws, and topple the independence and integrity of the Ombudsman.

These are, perhaps, valid reasons to decline a DIDP request. But it is also important to investigate these reasons. ICANN’s Ombudsman is appointed by the ICANN Board for 2 year terms, under Clause V of ICANN’s Bylaws. The Ombudsman’s principal function is to “provide an independent internal evaluation of complaints by members of the ICANN community who believe that the ICANN staff, Board or an ICANN constituent body has treated them unfairly”. The Ombudsman reports only to the ICANN Board, and all matters before it are kept confidential, including the names of parties and the nature of complaints. The Ombudsman reports on the categories of complaints he receives, and statistics regarding decisions in his Annual Reports; no details are forthcoming for stated reasons of confidentiality and privacy.

This creates a closed circle in which the Ombudsman operates. The ICANN Board appoints the Ombudsman. He/she listens to complaints about unfair treatment by the ICANN Board, Staff or constituency. He/she reports to the ICANN Board alone. However, neither the names of parties, the nature of complaints, nor the decisions of the Ombudsman are publicly available. Such a lack of transparency throws doubt on the functioning of the Ombudsman himself – and on his independence, neutrality and the extent of ICANN’s influence on him/her. An amendment of ICANN’s Bylaws would then be imperative to rectify this problem; this matter is squarely within the CCWG-Accountability’s mandate and should be addressed.

As is clear from the above examples, ICANN’s DIDP is an inadequate tool to ensure transparency functioning. The Policy was crafted without community input, and requires substantial amendments to make it a sufficient transparency mechanism. CIS’ suggestions in this regard shall be available in our next post.

CIS' Annual Reports are here. Our audit is ongoing, and the Annual Report for 2013-14 will be up shortly. Pranav Bidare (3rd year) of the National Law School, Bangalore assisted with research for this post, and created the table of CIS' DIDP requests and responses.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/where-does-icann2019s-money-come-from-we-asked-they-don2019t-know

DIDP Request #2: Granular Revenue/Income Statements from ICANN

geetha — 2015-03-05T08:07:02Z

CIS sent ICANN a request under its Documentary Information Disclosure Policy, seeking current and historical details of ICANN's income/revenue from its various sources. CIS' request and ICANN's response are detailed below.

CIS Request

22 December 2014

To:

Mr. Cherine Chalaby, Chair, Finance Committee of the Board

Mr. Xavier Calvez, Chief Financial Officer

Mr. Samiran Gupta, ICANN India

All other members of Staff involved in accounting and financial tasks

Sub: Request for granular income/revenue statements of ICANN from 1999-2014

Earlier this month, on 3 December 2014, Mr. Samiran Gupta presented CIS with detailed and granular information regarding ICANN’s domain names income and revenues for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2014. This was in response to several requests made over a few months. The information we received is available on our website.[1]

The information mentioned above was, inter alia, extremely helpful in triangulating ICANN’s reported revenues, despite and in addition to certain inconsistencies between the Annual Report (FY14) and the information provided to us.

We recognize that ICANN makes public its current and historical financial information to a certain extent. Specifically, its Operating Plan and Budget, Audited Financial Statements, Annual Reports, Federal and State Tax Filings, Board Compensation Report and ccTLD Contributions Report are available on the website.[2]

However, a detailed report of ICANN’s income or revenue statement, listing all vendors and customers, is not available on ICANN’s website. Our research on accountability and transparency mechanisms in Internet governance, specifically of ICANN, requires information in such granularity. We request, therefore, historical data re: income and revenue from domain names (1999-2014), in a manner as detailed and granular as the information referenced in FN[1]. We would appreciate if such a report lists all legal entities and individuals who contribute to ICANN’s domain names income/ revenue.

We look forward to the receipt of this information within the stipulated period of 30 days. Please feel free to contact us in the event of any doubts regarding our queries.

Thank you very much.

Warm regards,

Geetha Hariharan

Centre for Internet & Society

W: http://cis-india.org

ICANN Response

ICANN's response to CIS's request can be found here. A short summary of our request and ICANN's response may be found in this table (Request S. no. 2).

[1] See ICANN reveals hitherto undisclosed details of domain names revenues, http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-receives-information-on-icanns-revenues-from-domain-names-fy-2014.

[2] See Historical Financial Information for ICANN, https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/historical-2012-02-25-en.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-2

DIDP Request #3: Cyber-attacks on ICANN

geetha — 2015-03-05T08:16:26Z

CIS sent ICANN a request under its Documentary Information Disclosure Policy, seeking details of cyber-attacks on ICANN, and ICANN's internal and external responses to the same. CIS' request and ICANN's response are detailed below.

CIS Request

24 December 2014

To:

Mr. Steve Crocker, Chairman of the Board

Mr. Fadi Chehade, CEO and President

Mr. Geoff Bickers, Team Lead, ICANN Computer Incident Response Team (CIRT) & Director of Security Operations

Mr. John Crain, Chief Security, Stability and Resiliency Officer

Members of the ICANN-CIRT & ICANN Security Team

Sub: Details of cyber-attacks on ICANN

We understand that ICANN recently suffered a spear-phishing attack that compromised contact details of several ICANN staff, including their email addresses; these credentials were used to gain access to ICANN’s Centralized Zone Data System (CZDS).[1] We are glad to note that ICANN’s critical functions and IANA-related systems were not affected.[2]

The incident has, however, raised concerns of the security of ICANN’s systems. In order to understand when, in the past, ICANN has suffered similar security breaches, we request details of all cyber-attacks suffered or thought/suspected to have been suffered by ICANN (and for which, therefore, investigation was carried out within and outside ICANN), from 1999 till date. This includes, naturally, the recent spear-phishing attack.

We request information regarding, inter alia,

(1) the date and nature of all attacks, as well as which ICANN systems were compromised,

(2) actions taken internally by ICANN upon being notified of the attacks,

(3) what departments or members of staff are responsible for security and their role in the event of cyber-attacks,

(4) the role and responsibility of the ICANN-CIRT in responding to cyber-attacks (and when policies or manuals exist for the same; if so, please share them),

(5) what entities external to ICANN are involved in the identification and investigation of cyber-attacks on ICANN (for instance, are the police in the jurisdiction notified and do they investigate? If so, we request copies of complaints or information reports),

(6) whether and when culprits behind the ICANN cyber-attacks were identified, and

(7) what actions were subsequently taken by ICANN (ex: liability of ICANN staff for security breaches should such a finding be made, lawsuits or complaints against perpetrators of attacks, etc.).

Finally, we also request information on the role of the ICANN Board and/or community in the event of such cyber-attacks on ICANN. Also, when was the ICANN-CIRT set up and how many incidents has it handled since its existence? Do there exist contingency procedures in the event of compromise of IANA systems (and if so, what)?

We hope that our request will be processed within the stipulated time period of 30 days. Do let us know if you require any clarifications on our queries.

Thank you very much.

Warm regards,

Geetha Hariharan

Centre for Internet & Society

W: http://cis-india.org

ICANN Response

ICANN responded to our request by noting that it is vague and broad in both time and scope. In response, ICANN has provided information regarding certain cyber-incidents already in the public domain, while noting that the term "cyber-attack" is both wide and vague. While the information provided is undoubtedly useful, it is anecdotal at best, and does not provide a complete picture of ICANN's history of vulnerability to cyber-attacks or cyber-incidents, or the manner of its internal response to such incidents, or of the involvement of external law enforcement agencies or CIRTs in combating cyber-incidents on ICANN.

ICANN's response may be found here. A short summary our request and ICANN's response may be found in this table (Request S. no. 3).

[1] See ICANN targeted in spear-phishing attack, https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2014-12-16-en.

[2] See IANA Systems not compromised, https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2014-12-19-en.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-3-cyber-attacks-on-icann

DIDP Request #5: The Ombudsman and ICANN's Misleading Response to Our Request

geetha — 2015-03-06T11:11:31Z

CIS sent ICANN a request under its Documentary Information Disclosure Policy, seeking details of the complaints received and resolved, parties involved and the nature of complaints under the Ombudsman process. CIS' request and ICANN's response are detailed below. ICANN's response is misleading in its insistence on confidentiality of all Ombudsman complaints and resolutions.

CIS Request

26 December 2014

To:
Mr. Steve Crocker, Chairman of the Board

Mr. Fadi Chehade, CEO and President

Mr. Chris LaHatte, Ombudsman, ICANN

Sub: Details regarding complaints submitted to the ICANN Ombudsman

We are very pleased to note that ICANN’s transparency and accountability mechanisms include maintaining a free, fair and impartial ombudsman. It is our understanding that any person with a complaint against the ICANN Board, staff or organization, may do so to the designated ombudsman.[1] We also understand that there are cases that the ICANN ombudsman does not have the authority to address.

In order to properly assess and study the efficiency and effectiveness of the ombudsman system, we request you to provide us with the following information:

(i) A compilation of all the cases that have been decided by ICANN ombudsmen in the history of the organization.

(ii) The details of the parties that are involved in the cases that have been decided by the ombudsmen.

(iii)A description of the proceedings of the case, along with the party that won in each instance.

Further, we hope you could provide us with an answer as to why there have been no ombudsman reports since the year 2010, on the ICANN website.[2] Additionally, we would like to bring to your notice that the link that provides the ombudsman report for the year 2010 does not work.

In order to properly assess the mechanism that ICANN uses for grievance redressal, it would be necessary to examine the details of all the cases that ICANN ombudsmen have presided over in the past. In this regard, kindly provide us with the above information.

We do hope that you will be able to furnish this information to us within the stipulated time period of 30 days. Do not hesitate to contact us if you have any doubts regarding our queries. Thank you so much.

Yours sincerely,
Lakshmi Venkataraman
NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad, for Centre for Internet & Society
W: http://cis-india.org

ICANN Response

In its response, ICANN declines our request on grounds of confidentiality. It refers to the ICANN Bylaws on the office of the Ombudsman to argue that all matters brought before the Ombudsman "shall be treated as confidential" and the Ombudsman shall "take all reasonable steps necessary to preserve the privacy of, and to avoid harm to, those parties not involved in the complaint being investigated by the Ombudsman". ICANN states that the Ombudsman publishes Annual Reports, in which he/she provides a "consolidated analysis of the year's complaints and resolutions", including "a description of any trends or common elements of complaints received". In sum, ICANN states that making Ombudsman Requests public would violate ICANN Bylaws, and topple the independence and integrity of the Ombudsman.

These are, perhaps, valid reasons to decline our DIDP request. But it is important to investigate ICANN's reasons. The ICANN Board appoints the Ombudsman for 2 year terms, under Article V of ICANN’s Bylaws. As we note in an earlier post, the Ombudsman’s principal function is to receive and dispose of complaints about unfair treatment by the ICANN Board, Staff or constituency. He/she reports to the ICANN Board alone. He/she also reports on the categories of complaints he receives, and statistics regarding decisions in his Annual Reports; no details are forthcoming for stated reasons of confidentiality and privacy. It is clear, therefore, that the Ombudsman receives and disposes of complaints under a procedure that is inadequately transparent.

ICANN argues, however, that for reasons of confidentiality and integrity of the Ombudsman office, ICANN is unable to disclose details regarding Ombudsman complaints, the complainants/respondents and a description of the proceedings (including the decision/resolution). Indeed, ICANN states its "Bylaws and the Ombudsman Framework obligates the Ombudsman to treat all matters brought before him as confidential and 'to take reasonable steps necessary to preserve the privacy of, and to avoid harm to, those parties not involved in the complaint being investigated by the Ombudsman'.” For this reason, ICANN considers that "Disclosing details about the parties involved and the nature of the cases that have been decided by the Ombudsmen would not only compromise the confidentiality of the Ombudsman process but would also violate the ICANN Bylaws and the Ombudsman Framework."

While the privacy of parties both involved and "not involved in the complaint" can be preserved (by redacting names, email addresses and other personal identification), how valid is ICANN's dogged insistence on confidentiality and non-disclosure? Let's look at Article V of ICANN's Bylaws and the Ombudsman Framework both.

Do ICANN Bylaws bind the Ombudsman to Confidentiality?

Under Article V, Section 1(2) of ICANN's Bylaws, the Ombudsman is appointed by the ICANN Board for a 2 year term (renewable). As noted earlier, the Ombudsman's principal function is to “provide an independent internal evaluation of complaints by members of the ICANN community who believe that the ICANN staff, Board or an ICANN constituent body has treated them unfairly” or inappropriately (Art. V, Section 2). The Ombudsman is not a judge; his conflict resolution tools are "negotiation, facilitation, and 'shuttle diplomacy'.

According to Art. V, Section 3(3), the Ombudsman has access to "all necessary information and records from staff and constituent bodies" to evaluate complaints in an informed manner. While the Ombudsman can access these records, he may not "publish if otherwise confidential". When are these records confidential, then? Section 3(3) supplies the answer. The confidentiality obligations are as "imposed by the complainant or any generally applicable confidentiality policies adopted by ICANN". For instance, the complainant can waive its confidentiality by publishing the text of its complaint and the Ombudsman's response to the same (such as the Internet Commerce Association's complaint regarding the Implementation Review Team under the new gTLD program), or a complaint may be publicly available on a listserv. In any event, there is no blanket confidentiality obligation placed on the Ombudsman under ICANN's Bylaws.

Moreover, the Ombudsman also publishes Annual Reports, in which he/she provides a "consolidated analysis of the year's complaints and resolutions", including "a description of any trends or common elements of complaints received". That is, the Ombudsman's Annual Report showcases a graph comparing the increase in the number of complaints, categories of complaints (i.e., whether the complaints fall within or outside of the Ombudsman's jurisdiction), and a brief description of the Ombudsman's scope of resolution and response. The Annual Reports indicate that the mandate of the Ombudsman's office is extremely narrow. In 2014, for instance, 75 out of 467 complaints were within Mr. LaHatte's jurisdiction (page 5), but he notes that his ability to intervene is limited to "failures in procedure". As an input to the ATRT2 Report noted, the Office of the Ombudsman “appears so restrained and contained” (page 53). As the ATRT2 noted, "ICANN needs to reconsider the Ombudsman’s charter and the Office’s role as a symbol of good governance to be further incorporated in transparency processes"; the Office's transparency leaves much to be desired.

But I digress.

The Ombudsman is authorised to make reports on any complaint and its resolution (or lack thereof) to the ICANN Board, and unless the Ombudsman says so in his sole discretion, his reports are to be posted on the website (Art. V, Section 4(4)). The Ombudsman can also report on individual requests, such as Mr. LaHatte's response to a complaint regarding a DIDP denial (cached). Some reports are actually available on the Ombudsman page; the last published report dates back to 2012, though in 2013 and 2014, the Ombudsman dealt with more complaints within his jurisdiction than in 2012 or prior. So ICANN's argument that disclosing the information we ask for in our DIDP Request would violate ICANN Bylaws and the confidentiality of the Ombudsman is misleading.

Does the Ombudsman Framework Prohibit Public Reporting?

So if ICANN Bylaws do not ipso facto bind the Ombudsman's complaint and conflict resolution process to confidentiality, does the Ombudsman Framework do so?

The Ombudsman does indeed have confidentiality obligations under the Ombudsman Framework (page 4). All matters brought before the Ombudsman shall be treated as confidential, and the identities of parties not involved in the complaint are required to be protected. The Ombudsman may reveal the identity of the complainant to the ICANN Board or Staff only to further the resolution of a complaint (which seems fairly obvious); this obligation is extended to ICANN Board and Staff as well.

As the Framework makes crystal clear, the identity of complainants are to be kept confidential. Nothing whatsoever binds the Ombudsman from revealing the stakeholder group or affiliation of the complainants - and these are possibly of more importance. What stakeholders most often receive unfair or inappropriate treatment from ICANN Board, Staff or constituent bodies? Does business suffer more, or do non-commercial users, or indeed, governments? It is good to know what countries the complaints come from (page 4-5), but given ICANN's insistence on its multi-stakeholder model as a gold standard, it is important to know what stakeholders suffer the most in the ICANN system.

In fact, in the first page, the Ombudsman Framework says this: "The Ombudsman may post complaints and resolutions to a dedicated portion of the ICANN website (http://www.icann.org/ombudsman/): (i) in order to promote an understanding of the issues in the ICANN community; (ii) to raise awareness of administrative fairness; and (iii) to allow the community to see the results of similar previous cases. These postings will be done in a generic manner to protect the confidentiality and privilege of communicating with the Office of Ombudsman." But the ICANN website does not, in fact, host records of any Ombudsman complaints or resolutions; it links you only to the Annual Reports and Publications.

As I've written before, the Annual Reports provide no details regarding the nature of each complaint, their origins or resolution, and are useful if the only information we need is bare statistics of the number of complaints received. That is useful, but it's not enough. Given that the Ombudsman Framework does allow complaint/resolution reporting, it is baffling that ICANN's response to our DIDP request chooses to emphasise only the confidentiality obligations, while conveniently leaving out the parts enabling and encouring reporting.

Should ICANN Report the Ombudsman Complaints?

Of course it should. The Ombudsman is aimed at filling an integral gap in the ICANN system - he/she listens to complaints about treatment by the ICANN Board, Staff or constituent bodies. As the discussions surrounding the appeal procedures in the CWG-Names show, and as the ATRT2 recommendations on Reconsideration and Independent Review show, conflict resolution mechanisms are crucial in any environment, not least a multi-stakeholder one. And in an organisation that leaves much desired by way of accountability and transparency, not reporting on complaints against the Board, staff or constituencies seems a tad irresponsible.

If there are privacy concerns regarding the identities of complainants, their personal identifying information can be redacted. Actually, in the complaint form, adding a waiver-of-confidentiality tick-box would solve the problem, allowing the complainant to choose whether to keep his/her complaint unreportable. But the details of the respondents ought to be reported; as the entity responsible and accountable, ICANN should disclose whom complaints have been made against.

ICANN's response to our DIDP request may be found here. A short summary of our request and ICANN's response may be found in this table (Request S. no. 5).

[1] See What the Ombudsman can do for you, https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/contact- 2012-02-25-en.

[2] See Annual Reports & Publications, https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/reports-96-2012- 02-25-en.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-5-the-ombudsman-and-icanns-misleading-response-to-our-request-1

DIDP Request #7: Globalisation Advisory Groups

geetha — 2015-03-17T10:07:26Z

CIS sent ICANN a request under its Documentary Information Disclosure Policy, seeking information regarding the creation and dissolution of the President's Globalisation Advisory Groups. The GAGs were created to advise the ICANN Board on its globalisation efforts, and to address questions on Affirmation of Commitments (AOC), policy structures, legal structure, root server system, the IANA multistakeholder accountability, and Internet governance. CIS' request and ICANN's response are detailed below.

CIS Request

12 January 2015

To:
Mr. Fadi Chehade, CEO and President

Mr. Steve Crocker, Chairman of the Board

Ms. Theresa Swineheart, Senior Advisor to the President on Strategy

Mr. Samiran Gupta, ICANN India

Sub: Creation and dissolution of the President’s Globalisation Advisory Groups

On 17 February 2014, at a Special Meeting of the ICANN Board, the Board passed a resolution creating the President’s Globalisation Advisory Groups.1 Six Globalisation Advisory Groups were created, including on IANA globalization, legal structures, Internet governance, the Affirmation of Commitments, policy structures and the root server system.2 According to the minutes of the meeting, the Advisory Groups were to meet with the community at ICANN49 (Singapore, March 2014), make recommendations to the Board, and the Board would present their reports at ICANN50 (London, June 2014).3 Mr. Chehade was vested with the authority to change the Advisory Groups and their composition without the need for a further resolution, but the manner of dissolution was not laid out.

ICANN lists the Advisory Groups on its “Past Groups” page, with no further information.4 Presumably, the Groups remained in existence for at most one month. No explanation is provided for the reasons regarding the dissolution of all the Advisory Groups. There are no reports or transcripts of meetings with the community at ICANN49 or recommendations to Mr. Chehade or the Board.

The Globalisation Advisory Groups covered issues crucial for ICANN and the global Internet governance community, including its seat (“Legal Structures”), the Affirmation of Commitments (considered critical for ICANN’s accountability), the IANA stewardship transition, and ICANN’s (increasing) involvement in Internet governance. Given this, we request the following information:

Of the six Globalisation Advisory Groups created, is any Group active as of today (12 January 2015)?
When and how many times did any of the Groups meet?
On what date were the Groups dissolved? Were all Groups dissolved on the same date?
By what mechanism did the dissolution take place (oral statement, email)? If the dissolution occurred by way of email or statement, please provide a copy of the same.
Did any of the six Globalisation Advisory Groups present any report, advice, or recommendations to Mr. Chehade or any member(s) of the Board, prior to their dissolution? If yes, please provide the report/recommendations (if available) and/or information regarding the same.
Why were the Advisory Groups dissolved? Has any reason been recorded, and if not, please provide an explanation.

We await your favorable response and the requested information within the prescribed time limit. Please do not hesitate to contact us should you require any clarifications.

Thank you very much.

Warm regards,
Geetha Hariharan
Centre for Internet & Society

ICANN Response

ICANN's response to this request is positive. ICANN states that the Board did indeed set up the six Globalisation Advisory Groups (GAGs) on 17 February 2014 to tackle issues surrounding ICANN's globalisation efforts. The Affirmation of Commitments (AOC), policy structures, legal structure, root server system, the IANA multistakeholder accountability, and Internet governance were issues taken up by the GAGs. However, after the NTIA made its announcement regarding the IANA transition in March 2014, the GAGs were disbanded so as to avoid duplication of work on issues that "had a home in the global multistakeholder discussions". As a result, by a Board resolution dated 27 March 2014, the GAGs were dissolved.

This is an example of a good response to an information request. Some documentation regarding the creation and dissolution of the GAGs existed, such as the Board resolutions. The response points us to these documents, and summarises the reasons for the GAGs' creation and dissolution.

It is possible that this response is clear/comprehensive because the GAGs no longer exist, and in any event, did not perform any work worth writing about. Queries about ICANN's involvement in Internet governance (NETmundial, the NETmundial Initiative, etc.) garner responses that are, to say it informally, cage-y and surrounded by legalese.

ICANN's response to our DIDP request may be found here. A short summary of our request and ICANN's response may be found in this table (Request S. no. 7).

[1] See Approved Board Resolutions | Special Meeting of the Board, https://www.icann.org/resources/board-material/resolutions-2014-02-17-en.

[2] See President’s Globalisation Advisory Groups, https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/globalization-19feb14-en.pdf.

[3] See Minutes | Special Meeting of the Board, https://www.icann.org/resources/board- material/minutes-2014-02-17-en.

[4] See Past Committees, Task Forces, and Other Groups, https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/past-2012-02-25-en.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-7-globalisation-advisory-groups

DIDP Request #8: ICANN Organogram

geetha — 2015-03-17T11:39:16Z

CIS sent ICANN a request under its Documentary Information Disclosure Policy, seeking details of its oragnisational structure and headcount of all staff. CIS' request and ICANN's response are detailed below.

CIS Request

13 January 2015

To:

Mr. Steve Crocker, Chairman of the Board

Mr. Fadi Chehade, President and CEO

Mr. Samiran Gupta, ICANN India

Sub: ICANN organogram

In order to understand ICANN’s organizational structure, decision-making and day-to-day functioning, may we request an organogram of ICANN. We request that the organogram include ICANN’s reporting hierarchy, mentioning positions held in all departments. Wherever possible (such as middle and senior management), we request names of the ICANN staff holding the positions as well. Along with this, could you also provide a count per department of the number of ICANN staff employed in all departments as of this date?

We await your favorable response and the requested information within the prescribed time limit. Please do not hesitate to contact us should you require any clarifications.

Thank you very much.

Warm regards,

Geetha Hariharan

Centre for Internet & Society

W: http://cis-india.org

ICANN Response

ICANN does not provide all the information we requested, but it responded with the following:

First, ICANN has responded that its current staff headcount is approx. 310. ICANN states that it already makes publicly available an organisational chart. This is immensely useful, for it sets out the reporting hierarchies at senior and mid-managerial levels. However, it doesn't tell us the organisational structure categorised by all departments and staff in the said departments. The webpages of some of ICANN's departments list out some of its staff; for instance, Contractual Compliance, Global Stakeholder Engagement and Policy Development (scroll down).

What you will notice is that ICANN provides us a list of staff, but we cannot be sure whether the team includes more persons than those mentioned. Second, a quick glance at the Policy Development staff makes clear that ICANN selects from outside this pool to coordinate the policy development. For instance, the IANA Stewardship Transition (the CWG-IANA) is supported by Ms. Grace Abuhamad, who is not a member of the policy support staff, but coordinates the IANA mailing list and F2F meetings anyway. What this means is that we're no longer certain who within ICANN is involved in policy development and support, whom they report to, and where the Chinese walls lie. This is why an organogram is necessary: the policy-making and implementation functions in ICANN may be closely linked because of staff interaction, and effective Chinese walls would benefit from public scrutiny.

Now, ICANN says that one may explore staff profiles on the Staff page. While short biographies/profiles are available for most staff on the Staff page, it's unclear what departments they work in, how many staff members work each in department, whom they report to, and what the broad range of their responsibilities include.

Privacy concerns do not preclude the disclosure of such information for two reasons. First, staff profiles imply a consent to making staff information public (at least their place in the organisational structure, if not their salaries, addresses, phone extension numbers, etc.). Second, such information is necessary and helpful to scrutinise the effectiveness of ICANN's functioning. Like the example of the policy-making process mentioned above, greater transparency in internal functioning will itself serve as a check against hazards like partisanism, public comment aggregation, drafting of charters for policy-making and determining scope, etc. While the functioning itself may or need not change, scrutiny can ensure responsibility from ICANN and its staff.

ICANN's response to our DIDP request may be found here. A short summary of our request and ICANN's response may be found in this table (Request S. no. 8).

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-8-organogram

CIS RTI REQUEST TO DIPP - NUMBER 1 - FEBRUARY, 2015

nehaa — 2015-04-14T17:17:53Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-rti-request-to-dipp-number-1-february-2015

CIS RTI REQUEST TO DIPP - NUMBER 3 - FEBRUARY, 2015

nehaa — 2015-04-14T17:28:53Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-rti-request-to-dipp-number-3-february-2015