We are anonymous, we are legion

Comments on Information Technology (Security of Prepaid Payment Instruments) Rules, 2017

amber — 2017-03-23T01:54:28Z

The Centre for Internet and Society submitted comments on the Information Technology (Security of Prepaid Payment Instruments) Rules, 2017. The comments were prepared by Udbhav Tiwari, Pranesh Prakash, Abhay Rana, Amber Sinha and Sunil Abraham.

1. Preliminary

1.1. This submission presents comments by the Centre for Internet and Society^[1] in response to the Information Technology (Security of Prepaid Payment Instruments) Rules 2017 (“the Rules”).^[2] The Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MEIT) issued a consultation paper (pdf) which calls for developing a framework for security of digital wallets operating in the country on March 08, 2017. This proposed rules have been drafted under provisions of Information Technology Act, 2000, and comments have been invited from the general public and stakeholders before the enactment of these rules.

2. The Centre for Internet and Society

2.1. The Centre for Internet and Society, (“CIS”), is a non-profit organisation that undertakes interdisciplinary research on internet and digital technologies from policy and academic perspectives. The areas of focus include digital accessibility for persons with diverse abilities, access to knowledge, intellectual property rights, openness (including open data, free and open source software, open standards, and open access), internet governance, telecommunication reform, digital privacy, and cyber-security.

2.2. This submission is consistent with CIS’ commitment to safeguarding general public interest, and the interests and rights of various stakeholders involved, especially the privacy and data security of citizens. CIS is thankful to the MEIT for this opportunity to provide feedback to the draft rules.

3. Comments

3.1 General Comments

Penalty

There is no penalty for not complying with these rules. Even the Information Technology (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data or Information) Rules, 2011 doesn’t have penalties. Under section 43A of the Information Technology Act (under which the 2011 Rules have been promulgated), a wrongful gain or a wrongful loss needs to be demonstrated. This should not be a requirement for financial sector.

Expansion to Contractual Parties.

A majority of these rules, in order to be effective and realistically protect consumer interest, should also be expanded to third parties, agents, contractual relationships and any other relevant relationship an e-PPI issuer may delegate as a part of their functioning.

3.2 Rule 2: Definitions

Certain key words relevant to the field of e-PPI based digital payments such as authorisation, metadata, etc. are not defined in the rules and should both be defined and accounted for in the rules to ensure modern developments such as big data and machine learning, digital surveillance, etc. do not violate human rights and consumer interest.

3.2 Rule 7: Definition of personal information

Rule 7 provides an exhaustive list of data that will be deemed to be personal information for the purposes of the Rules. While information collected at the time of issuance of the pre-paid payment instrument and during its use is included within the scope of Rule 7, it makes no reference to metadata generated and collected by the e-PPI issuer.

3.3 Rule 4: Inadequate privacy protections

Rule 4(2) specifies the details that the privacy policies of each e-PPI issuer must contain. However, these specifications are highly inadequate and fall well below the recommendations under the National Privacy Principles in Report of the Group of Experts on Privacy chaired by Justice A P Shah.

Suggestions: The Rules should include include clearly specified rights to access, correction and opt in/opt out, continuing obligations to seek consent in case of change in policy or purpose and deletion of data after purpose is achieved. Additionally, it must be required that a log of each version of past privacy policies be maintained along with the relevant period of applicability.

3.4 Rule 10: Reasonable security practices

Problem: Financial information (“such as bank account or credit card or debit card or other payment instrument details”) is already invoked in an inclusive manner in the definition of ‘personal information’ in Rule 7. Given this there is no need to make the Reasonable Security Practices Rules applicable to financial data through this provisions: it already is, and it is best to avoid unnecessary redundancy.

Solution: This entire rule should be removed.

3.5 Rule 12: Traceability

Problem: There is a requirement created under this rule that payment-related interactions with customers or other service providers be “appropriately trace[able]”. But it is unclear what that would practically mean: would IP logging suffice? would IMEI need to be captured for mobile transactions? what is “appropriately” traceable? — none of those questions are answered.

Suggestion: The NPCI’s practices and RBI regulations, for instance, seek to limit the amount of information that entities like e-PPI providers have. These rules need to be brought in line with those practices and regulations.

3.6 Rule 5: Risk Assessment

Rule 5 requires e-PPI issuers to carry out risk assessments associated with the security of the payments systems at least once a year and after any major security incident. However, there are no transparency requirements such as publications of details of such review, a summary of the analysis, any security vulnerabilities discovered etc.

Suggestion:

Broaden the scope of this provision to include not just risk assessments but also security audits.
Mandate publication of risk assessment and security audit reports.

3.7 Rule 11: End-to-End Encryption

The rule concerning end-to-end encryption (E2E) needs significantly greater detailing to be effective in ensuring the the protection of information at both storage and transit.

Suggestions: Elements such as Secure Element or a Secured Server and Trusted User Interface, both concepts to enable secure payments, can be detailed in the rule and a timeline can be established to require hardware, e-PPI practices and security standards to realistically account for such best practices to ensure modern, secure and industry accepted implementation of the rule.

3.8 Rule 13: Retention of Information

Problem: Rule 13 leaves the question of retention entirely unanswered by deferring the future rulemaking to the Central Government.

Suggestions: Rule 13 should be expanded to include the various categories of information that can be stored, guidelines for the short-term (fast access) and long-term storage of the information retained under the rule and other relevant details. The rule should also include the security standards that should be followed in the storage of such information, require access logs be maintained for whenever this information is accessed by individuals, detail secure destruction practices at the end of the retention period and finally mandate that end users be notified by the e-PPI issuer of when such retained information is accessed in all situations bar exceptional circumstances such as national security, compromising an ongoing criminal investigations, etc.

3.9 Rule 14: Reporting of Cyber Incidents

Rule 14 is an excellent opportunity to uphold transparency, accountability and consumer rights by mandating time- and information-bound notification of cyber incidents to customers, including intrusions, database breaches and any other compromise of the integrity of the financial system. While the requirement of reporting such incidents to CERT-In is already present in the Rule 12 of the CERT Rules, the rule retains the optional nature of notifying customers. The rule should include an exhaustive list of categories or kinds of cyber incidents that should be reported to affected end users without compromising the investigation of such breaches by private organisations and public authorities. Further, the rule should also include penalties for non-compliance of this requirement (both to CERT-In and the consumer) to serve as an incentive for e-PPI issuers to uphold consumer public interest. The rule should be expanded to include a detailed mechanism for such reporting, including when e-PPI issuers and the CERT-In can withhold information from consumers as well as requiring the withheld information be disclosed when the investigation has been completed. Finally, the rule should also require that such disclosures be public in nature and consumers not be required to not disseminate such information to enable informed choice by the end user community.

Suggestion:

(1) In Rule 14(3) “may” should be substituted by “shall”.

(2) Penalties of up to 5 lakh rupees may be imposed for each day that the e-PPI issuer fails to report any severe vulnerability that could likely result in harm to customers.

3.10 Rule 15: Customer Awareness and Education

Problem: Rule 15 on Customer Awareness and Education by e-PPI issuers does not take into account the vast lingual diversity and varied socio-economic demographic that makes up the end users of e-PPI providers in India, by mandating the actions under the rule must account for these factors prior to be propagated.

Solutions: The rule must ensure that e-PPI issuers track record in carrying out awareness is regularly held accountable by both the government and public disclosures on their websites. Further, the rule can be made more concrete and effective by including mobile operating systems in their scope (along with equipments), mandating awareness for best practices for inclusive technologies like USSD banking, specifying notifications to include SMS reports of financial transactions, etc.

3.11 Rule 16: Grievance Redressal

Problem: Rule 16 lays down the requirement of grievance redressal, without specifying appellate mechanisms (both within the organisation and at the regulatory level), accountability (via penalties) for non-compliance of the rule nor requiring a clear hierarchy of responsibility within the e-PPI organisation. These factors seriously compromise the efficacy of a grievance redressal framework.

Solutions: Similar rules for grievance redressal that have been enacted by the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority for the insurance sector and the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India for the telecom sector can and should serve as a reference point for this rule. Their effectiveness and real world operation should also be monitored by the relevant authorities while ensuring sufficient flexibility exists in the rule to uphold consumer rights and the public interest. Proper appellate mechanisms at the regulatory level are essential along with penalties for non-compliance.

3.12 Rule 17: Security Standards

Problem: Rule 17 empowers the Central Government to mandate security standards to be followed by e-PPI issuers operating in India. While appreciable in its overall outlook on ensuring a minimum standard of security, the Rule needs be improved upon to make it more effective. This can be in done by specifying certain minimum security standards to ensure all e-PPI issuers have a minimal level of security, instead of leaving them open to being intimated at a later date.

Solutions: Standards that can either be made mandatory or be used as a reference point to create a new standard under Rule 17(2) are ISO/IEC 14443, IS 14202, ISO/IEC 7816, PCI DSS, etc. Further, the Rule should include penalties for non-compliance of these standards, to make them effectively enforceable by both the government and end users alike. Additional details like the maximum time period in which such security standards should be implemented post their notification, requiring regular third party audits to ensure continuing compliance and effectiveness and requiring updated standards be used upon their release will go a long way in ensuring e-PPI issuers fulfil their mandate under these Rules.

^[1] http://cis-india.org/

^[2] http://meity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/draft-rules-security%20of%20PPI-for%20public%20comments.pdf

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-on-information-technology-security-of-prepaid-payment-instruments-rules-2017

Privacy concerns multiply for Aadhaar, India’s national biometric identity registry

praskrishna — 2017-03-22T14:38:52Z

The largest and most sophisticated biometric identity system of any country in the world, India’s Aadhaar, is sparking new fears that the personal data it stores on more than 1.1 billion people could be vulnerable to exploitation.

The article by Kaelyn Lowmaster was published by One World Identity on March 17, 2017, Sunil Abraham was quoted.

Aadhaar, which translates to “foundation” in Hindi, is a unique 12-digit code tied to citizens’ biometric data and personal information. The system was launched in 2009 in an effort to extend social services to India’s millions of unregistered citizens, and to cut down on welfare benefit “leakage” resulting from an opaque and often corrupt bureaucracy.

Constructing a centralized repository of biometric data on nearly a fifth of the world’s population has raised serious concerns among privacy advocates.

The government has also looked to Aadhaar data to underpin mobile payment transfer platforms, which have become crucial for cashless transactions during the country’s demonetization push over past year.

But constructing a centralized repository of biometric data on nearly a fifth of the world’s population has raised serious concerns among privacy advocates, who cite several vulnerabilities both with the Aadhaar system and the Modi administration’s planned expansion.

Despite this, recent metrics indicate that Aadhaar has been enormously successful in achieving those goals. Though the program is theoretically voluntary, more than 99% of Indian adults are now enrolled. Over three billion individual identity verifications have been conducted, and some reports indicate that the Indian government is saving a billion dollars per year now that welfare subsidies can be paid to citizens directly through Aadhaar-verified fund transfers.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi has ambitions to broaden the system even further, seeking to use Aadhaar as the gateway for accessing government programs ranging from public education to subsidized cooking gas, as well as partnering with private companies to offer services facilitated by the Aadhaar database.

Concerns, however, remain. One primary worry is that India’s legal framework for information security is still weak and fragmented, despite government assurances that Aadhaar biometrics have never been misused or stolen.

“There are no regulations in India on safeguards over and procedures for the collection, processing, storage, retention, access, disclosure, destruction, and anonymization of sensitive personal information by any service provider,” according to a 2016 World Bank report.

A patchwork of rules outlining “reasonable security practices and procedures” for personal data has accumulated since Aadhaar was launched, but there is no codified law outlining how data in the system must be secured, or what penalties exist for potential leaks, fraud or misuse.

“Imagine a situation where the police (are) secretly capturing the iris data of protesters and then identifying them through their biometric records” – Sunil Abraham, executive director of the Centre for Internet and Society in Bangalore

This regulatory gap poses a particularly acute risk now that the government has begun offering companies and app developers support for starting new businesses that use Aadhaar data. Through a new initiative called IndiaStack, the administration is providing open program interfaces for companies in fintech, healthcare, and other areas to integrate Aadhaar-based transactions into their business platforms. While IndiaStack’s terms of use explicitly state that user consent is required for any information sharing between service providers and the Aadhaar database, doubts remain about the integrity of the network infrastructure and the lack of clarity surrounding acceptable information sharing and storing protocols.

Another source of concern is the risk that Aadhaar information could be leveraged by the government itself for political purposes.

“Maintaining a central database is akin to getting the keys of every house in Delhi and storing them at a central police station,” Sunil Abraham, executive director of the Centre for Internet and Society in Bangalore, told Reuters. “It is very easy to capture iris data of any individual with the use of next generation cameras. Imagine a situation where the police (are) secretly capturing the iris data of protesters and then identifying them through their biometric records.”

Further stoking fears of federal overreach, the Modi administration has attempted to make Aadhaar registration mandatory in certain sectors, violating a Supreme Court ruling from October 2015 that enrollment must remain voluntary.

Still, the benefits of building on the Aadhaar identity system appear to be outweighing the risks for now, and the system is gathering momentum worldwide. The World Bank is helping market the Aadhaar model abroad, and Russia, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria have all expressed interest in instituting national biometric identity programs of their own. Microsoft is already on board, and Google is negotiating ways to get involved.

Aadhaar may indeed live up to is potential and become the global standard for universal legal identity, but until India can manage to create more robust mechanisms to protect citizens’ personal data, their security could remain uncertain.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/one-world-indentity-kaelyn-lowmaster-march-17-2017-privacy-concerns-multiply-for-aadhaar-indias-national-biometric-identity-registry

No ID, no benefits: thousands could lose lifeline under India’s biometric scheme

praskrishna — 2017-03-22T14:27:25Z

Controversial Aadhaar card restricts fundamental rights, argue critics, limiting access to free school meals and exposing 1 billion people to privacy risks.

The article was published in the Guardian on March 21, 2017. Sumandro Chattapadhyay was quoted.

An Aadhaar biometric identity card, which will be mandatory for Indians to access many essential government services and benefits. Photograph: Bloomberg/Getty Images

Hundreds of thousands of people in India could be left without essential government services and benefits – including free school meals and uniforms, food subsidies and pensions – under new rules that make access to more than three dozen state-funded schemes conditional on showing identification.

Over the past month, citizens have been notified that they have to prove their identity with a biometric ID, known as an Aadhaar card, to be eligible to use various services. Booking railway tickets online, applying for some jobs, and getting fuel subsidies will also be dependent on showing the controversial card.

Aadhaar cards were introduced by the Indian government in 2009, and rolled out by prime minister Narendra Modi in 2014. They record personal biometric data, including fingerprints and eye scans, which the government says allows it to ensure that welfare services are being delivered to those who really need them, and saving billions of rupees by reducing welfare fraud.

The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI), which oversees the Aadhaar programme, says that more than 1.13 billion people have been enrolled on an official database. But activists say that hundreds of thousands of Indians and migrants are still undocumented and could miss out on their fundamental rights because of the new rules.

“What if a Facebook account was necessary to log in to the internet, and what if Facebook was owned by the government of the US?” asked Sumandro Chattapadhyay, research director at the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), a thinktank with offices in Bangalore and Delhi. “We are building a system that will decide whether a child will eat or not on an afternoon based on [the] quality of internet connectivity and cleanliness of the child’s thumbprint.”

Chattapadhyay argued that Aadhaar, which is effectively being forced upon Indians, and which is used increasingly by private companies, exposed more than a billion people to huge privacy risks.

“The Aadhaar ID is being connected to digital communications via sim card registration, it is being connected to financial transactions via bank accounts, and all Indian citizens are being forced to enrol for it against the threat of losing out from welfare services,” he said.

“The potential of unmonitored and unregulated use of such linked data by the private sector is massive. It does not matter if the Indian state will finally go ahead with implementing this system or not. The fact that [it] is considering such a system is scary enough.”

Nanu Bhasin, spokesperson at the ministry of women and child development, confirmed that the order to link Aadhaar to government schemes had come directly from the Modi government. “There are leakages in the system,” she said. “This will plug leakages.”

Bhasin said Aadhaar was now mandatory: “You have to take it, it is necessary. You cannot take the right to a benefit if you don’t have the Aadhaar card.”

She said she did not know if those who did not want to enrol in the scheme because of potential privacy risks would still be able to receive benefits. “You have bank accounts, there you give all your details, everything. Why make a fuss [about privacy] for Aadhaar?” she said.

One of the most contentious new rules introduced this month, and coming into force in July, requires children to show Aadhaar cards to get free school meals. The notice led to a media storm in India, where malnutrition rates are high and nearly 60 million children are underweight.

On 7 March the government said alternative forms of ID would be accepted for free school meals where people did not yet have Aadhaar cards, and urged schools and childcare centres to enrol all attendees.

Activists argue that setting any barriers to free school meals is unethical and unconstitutional. Ambarish Rai, national convenor of the Right to Education Forum, said: “This is a very insensitive decision of the government. How can you make it mandatory? It is a clear-cut violation of the Right to Education Act 2009.”

Compulsory identification could deter school attendance if children struggle to get free school meals or uniforms, said Swati Narayan, visiting research scholar from the LSE and food activist. “India’s school meal programme covers almost 100 million children – the largest in the world. Instead of creating unnecessary barriers, the focus should be on how to improve these modest meals by adding eggs, fruit and nutritious foods to the menu.”

Glitches in the Aadhaar system have already led to reports of people being unfairly denied government subsidies. In February, the news website Scroll recorded a number of people in the state of Jharkhand being denied rice subsidies because of problems with Aadhaar card machines.

The constitutional validity of the government’s new orders is currently being debated in court, with questions raised as to whether the Indian parliament can restrict fundamental rights enshrined in the constitution, and whether the government has the power to force citizens to enrol.

In 2015, a supreme court order had ruled that the scheme was purely voluntary, and that it could not become mandatory with a court ruling. But in 2016, parliament passed the Aadhaar Act, which allowed the government to require identification for government services.

Khagesh Jha, a lawyer and activist, argued that the act was fundamentally unconstitutional. “Rescued children, children who have been trafficked or those who have been forced into child labour – [you] can’t expect them to hold an Aadhaar card or documents like a birth certificate. Right to education is a fundamental right, and is protected by the core of the constitution. It cannot be challenged by any other document.”

UIDAI, the agency overseeing Aadhaar, issued a statement saying the government had made savings of more than 490bn rupees (£6bn) in the past two and a half years, thanks to schemes linking government benefits to Aadhaar. It added that during the past seven years, there had been no report of a breach or leak of residents’ data.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-guardian-march-21-2017-no-id-no-benefits

EVMs: How transparent is the Indian election process?

praskrishna — 2017-03-17T01:57:19Z

Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) have become a bone of contention after the results of the Assembly elections in five states were declared last Saturday and the BSP president Mayawati alleged tampering. The Congress party and the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) have called for a probe into her allegation. Social media too is abuzz with messages and videos showing how the machines can be allegedly manipulated to sway the votes in favour of a particular candidate.

The article by Smriti Sharma Vasudeva was published in the Statesman on March 14, 2017. Pranesh Prakash was quoted.

Overnight, several videos on Whatsapp have surfaced wherein people can be seen explaining the "mechanism" on how to alter the votes polled for a candidate in another candidate's favour. Several similar posts and articles are doing the rounds on Facebook.

BBC added fuel to the fire when it shared a 2010 article on how 'US "Scientists" hack India Electronic Machines' . The article details how scientists at a US university say they have developed a technique to hack into Indian electronic voting machines. While the article was posted on the BBC website a day after the election results were declared, it drew considerable flak from users on Facebook who criticised the website for its 'irresponsible' act of sharing an article with a "click bait" headline just to grab eyeballs.

Amid all this frenzy, the Election Commission of India has issued statements clarifying how the entire process is transparent and fool proof and tampering with the EVMs is a far-fetched thing given the checks and balances in place. For instance, the EVMs undergo the process of randomisation wherein which machine will go to which constituency and to which booth is not known to anyone till the last moment. Similarly, before the polling starts, mock polling takes place in the presence of representatives of all the political parties and then each of these machines are tested and a satisfactory report is generated and only after that polling begins.

However, all these checks and balances still do not ensure a fool proof system if experts are to be believed.

Pranesh Prakash, Policy Director for The Centre for Internet and Society, a non-profit organisation that undertakes interdisciplinary research on internet and digital technologies from policy and academic perspectives, said: "The Electronic Voting Machines used in India are the simplest, with no large operating system requirements and are not networked. Thus, from a software design perspective, these are really good and the chances of these being tampered with are bleaker. However it doesn't mean these are fool proof. Most of the developed countries do not trust these machines and these are definitely not secure enough for democratic elections.

"While there are many advantages of using EVMs in the electoral process over the traditional ballot papers, still there are many ways in which one can tamper with these machines without any technical ingenuity. The best way is to make use of the EVMs and ensure that the Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) are effectively utilised to make it an overall effective system".

Recently, the Supreme Court had mandated that VVPAT machines should be used in all the polls and thus the Election Commission had installed VVPAT machines in several constituencies. However, not sure of the efficacy of this system, the Election Commission had itself raised apprehensions regarding performance of the paper-trail machine, which gives a receipt to the voter, verifying the vote went in favour of the candidate against whose name the button was pressed on the electronic voting machine.a

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-statesman-smriti-sharma-vasudeva-march-14-2017-evms-how-transparent-is-the-indian-election-process

Nasscom chief saying full data protection isn’t possible should wake us from our digital slumber

praskrishna — 2017-03-17T01:47:25Z

Considering India is rapidly moving towards a digital economy, the hurdles not withstanding, data and identity security are topics which have to be taken very seriously. Since the demonetisation, a large part of the population who would never bother with digital transactions has suddenly come online. But there is no such thing as complete security of personal data, according to Nasscom chief R Chandrashekhar.

This was published by First Post on March 16, 2017. Pranesh Prakash was quoted.

Attending the World Consumer Rights Day, R Chandrashekhar said that personal data of online consumers cannot be completely secure and stressed on the need to have strict enforcement of consumer protection laws. Speaking to PTI, Chandrashekhar said, “More than 3 million credit card data details were misused recently. Let us face it, these kind of security breaches will take place. There is nothing called fully perfect security in IT.”

It’s high time we call a spade, a spade

R Chandrashekhar, President Nasscom. Image: PIB

Coming from the head of Nasscom, this announcement pertaining to security is very important. According to Chandrashekhar one cannot expect complete cyber security, but there are definitely ways in which such attacks and incidents can be minimised. He very rightly said that that protecting the online consumer data, specially looking at how rapidly e-commerce is growing in the country, is of prime importance.

One cannot help but agree with Chandrashekhar, specially considering the fact India does not have a privacy law ecosystem that is present in countries such as the US and the UK, where online consumer protection is taken very seriously. Germany and other EU nations have always been at the forefront, when it comes to protecting data privacy, and it has ensured that consumer-facing technology companies do not run roughshod when it comes to protecting user data.

Chandrashekhar stated that there was no need for separate regulations for e-commerce sites, but the priority was ensuring means to enforce consumer laws in the digital world.

Lack of dedicated privacy laws

According to cyberlaw and cybersecurity expert, Pavan Duggal, “Going forward, there is an urgent need for India to take a strong view on privacy in terms of legislative frameworks. Unfortunately, at the time of writing, India does not have a dedicated law on privacy.”

Image: Foamy Media

Social media websites for instance have a lot of user data. But what happens when they suddenly change their privacy policies? For instance, a lot of users signed on to WhatsApp when it was an independent company. But post the Facebook acquisition, there have been a lot of instances where WhatsApp has updated its terms and conditions to suit its parent Facebook.

That’s not completely illegal one may say. Loss of privacy is a price you pay for free services. But what if, I as a consumer of WhatsApp do not want the app to share any of my data with Facebook? The only option I am left with is to delete WhatsApp. But then again, I do not know if my data is also deleted from WhatsApp servers or it has already been shared. Social media apps, only let you know what updates are being added. Consent is only required to update the app. You can stall that, up to a point. But there will come a time when you will have to update an app. Then by default you have given approval to all the terms and conditions associated with the app.

Two students had challenged WhatsApp’s revision to its privacy policy before Delhi High Court. The Court dismissed the petition insisting that users could opt out by deleting their accounts.

When a similar challenge was mounted before the authorities in UK, Facebook had to put a pause on their data sharing – and this was because of its strong data protection policy. Under the UK data protection law, the company has to inform the authority established under the Act of any changes in the use of user data. In the case of WhatsApp, the UK authority objected to such sharing.

Aadhaar – the 12-digit biometric storehouse

Aadhaar card is being used for many financial and non financial transactions. Also the Aadhaar number associated with an individual also holds a lot of personal and biometric data. So when recently, there was news about a possible Aadhaar data breach when UIDAI filed a police complaint against Axis Bank, business correspondent Suvidhaa Infoserve and e-sign provider eMudhra, it was naturally a shock to many.

Unlike a password which can be changed, with biometric information there is no scope to do that if it is compromised. Although UIDAI claims that there are multiple levels of security and firewalls to ensure there is no breach of Aadhaar information of an individual, one can only hope that it is robust enough to withstand any attack. Collection of biometric data by the government to form a database, for instance, was debated and ultimately not used in the UK.

Pranesh Prakash, policy director of the Centre for Internet and Society, expressed concern about the pace at which we are progressing when it comes to having a legal and regulatory framework when it comes to the Digital India push. “While the security architecture of Aadhaar Enabled Payment Systems (AEPS) might in itself be good, the idea of providing your fingerprints to merchants for financial transactions is a terrible idea since that is like asking you to give your bank password to a merchant, and the merchant can reuse that password, and you can’t ever change the password,” said Prakash.

Enforcing the correct processes

Last year, a malware affected the systems of Hitachi Payment Services, which provides back end services to ATM machines and Point of Sale nodes across India. As a result of this, around 32 lakh debit cards were compromised including those issued by SBI, HDFC, Yes Bank, Axis, BOB and ICICI. Security experts and consultants have pointed out various holes in the electronic transaction systems in place in India. Intel has also warned that ATM machines in India are vulnerable to malicious attacks. Intel points out that countries in the Asia Pacific region are developing and are particularly vulnerable because of old systems and machines being used.

Image: REUTERS/Amit Dave

According to Mahesh Patel, president and group CTO, AGS Transact Technologies this was more of a governance issue of the data centre than any technical error. “It is not about the software, but it is about the processes and procedures you put in place to ensure that the system is secure. Everything from physical security to computing security to admin management, etc should be process driven. So somewhere there could have been a weak link there. Cloud has to be secure and encrypted which suffices the use case of payments. This cloud is different from the ones used by e-commerce sites to display all their products,” said Patel.

We may have the best of software and security measures, but ensuring that they are implemented the right way is equally important. Plugging the loopholes in current regulations is also important.

Existing laws and regulations, not enough

According to Duggal, “The Information Technology Act, 2000 hardly has effective provisions to protect any data and personal privacy in the digital ecosystem. The Indian Government needs to come up with strong privacy law which can protect both personal privacy and data privacy in an effective manner.”

One may find it really shocking to hear the head of Nasscom saying something to the extent that full data protection for online consumers is not possible, but there is definitely truth to the matter. It will require concerted efforts from not only regulators, governments, digital wallet players and banking industry to come up with these privacy laws, but also you the consumer has to ensure that you are aware of the dangers lurking in the digital world. Educating oneself of the various ways in which your data can be compromised is a good way to protect your online self.

Because, let’s face it, for all practical purposes if you are online, your privacy is dead.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/first-post-march-16-nimish-sawant-nasscom-chief-saying-full-data-protection-isnt-possible-should-wake-us-from-our-digital-slumber

AI for Social Good

praskrishna — 2017-03-15T01:22:42Z

AI in Asia event was organised by the Digital Asia Hub on March 6 and 7, 2017 in Tokyo, Japan. The event partners were Waseda University, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, NICT, NTT and the Japan Society of Information and Communication Research. Udbhav Tiwari attended the event.

Udbhav Tiwari presented a small (2 minute) lighting talk on the Autonomous Weapons Design section as a part of the 'Interactive Exercise on Next Steps for the Academic Community session', with the IEEE Ethically Aligned Design document as a guiding note. Read the executive summary here. See the workshop agenda here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/ai-for-social-good

Essentials of building internet tools for inclusion

praskrishna — 2017-03-14T14:38:23Z

A talk jointly proposed by Chinmayi SK and Rohini Lakshané was selected for the Internet Freedom Festival held at Valencia, Spain from March 6 to 10, 2017. The talk held on March 6, 2017 was jointly organized by Random Hacks of Kindness, The Bachchao Project, and the Centre for Internet and Society.

For the full schedule of Internet Freedom Festival, click here. A manual titled Building Tech for Diversity and Inclusion 101 jointly authored by Chinmayi S.K., Rohini Lakshané and Willow Brugh was released during the event.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/events/essentials-of-building-internet-tools-for-inclusion

The 12-digit conundrum

praskrishna — 2017-03-14T13:50:05Z

Even as the Centre plans to link as many as 500 schemes to Aadhaar, concerns over data safety are rising. Richa Mishra reports.

The article by Richa Mishra was published in the Hindu Businessline on March 13, 2017. Sunil Abraham was quoted.

The developments of last few weeks seem to have made real some of the worst fears about Aadhaar. In February, UIDAI (Unique Identification Authority of India) filed a police complaint alleging attempts of unauthorised authentication and impersonation of data related to Aadhaar. Since then, each and every machinery within the government has been trying to convince otherwise, that Aadhaar database is safe and secure, and that the data is protected both by the best available advanced technology as well as by the stringent legal provisions in the Aadhaar Act.

Not everyone is convinced. Critics say, biometrics only make the citizen transparent to the State, it does not make the State transparent to citizens. “We warned the government six years ago, but they ignored us,” said Sunil Abraham, Executive Director of Bengaluru-based research organisation, Centre for Internet and Society. According to him, the legislation implementing Aadhaar has almost no data protection guarantees for citizens. He also believes that by opting for biometrics instead of smart cards the government is using surveillance technology instead of e-governance technology.

“Biometrics is remote, covert and non-consensual identification technology. It is totally inappropriate for authentication. This has only increased the fragility of Indian cyber security,” he stresses.

However, officials associated with UIDAI dismiss these arguments. Collecting biometrics does not pose any threat to the right to privacy because people have been giving their thumb impression for ages, they say. “The biometrics are encrypted at source and kept safe and secure. Unauthorised sharing and leakage of the data does not happen. Fears related to collection of biometrics are not justified,” an official at the helm of affairs said. He requested anonymity.

“However, as and when we find that some suspicious activity or misuse is happening, we will strike at the very beginning itself. UIDAI has full authentication regulation under the Aadhaar Act that has to be followed. It specifies in what manner authorities can use Aadhaar,” the official pointed out.

On the ground

Even as the debate over data security rages, the aam aadmi seem to be little perturbed about the alleged risks involved. For Padmini, who works as a domestic help in East Delhi and is the sole bread earner for her family of four, the Aadhaar card meant access to all government benefits.

“Koi farak nahi padta, kaun dekhta hai mera card. Mujhko LPG cylinder ka paisa bank mein mil jata hai,” (It doesn’t matter to me who sees my card. The subsidy for LPG gets transferred to my account) she says. “Baccho ke school admission mein bhi zaroorat pada,” (I needed it to get my children’s admission in school), she added. Sukh, a cab driver also uses it to get the LPG subsidy.

While everyone BusinessLine talked to were convinced that Aadhaar was not a citizenship card, the more aware ones saw it as a door that gave access to government schemes.

While they had a point, government officials are careful to make it clear that Aadhaar is not mandatory. But the popular perception increasingly points to the opposite view, especially after it emerged that Aadhaar might be made mandatory for children to receive midday meals at schools.

Another senior government official said, “Aadhaar is not mandatory under any welfare scheme of the government and no one is being deprived of a service or benefit for the want of Aadhaar…it’s required for availing a service/subsidy/benefit that accrues through the Consolidated Fund of India.” He added that those who do not have the 12-digit number would be provided with the facility to enrol by the Requiring Agency. “And till the time Aadhaar is assigned, alternative IDs would be allowed,” he said.

If a school which has to get Aadhaar enrolment done for its students puts the Aadhaar numbers of its students on its site and the same is used by someone, you can’t blame us, the official argues. Then, who is accountable?

Pushing for Aadhaar, the UIDAI officials cite the example of Kerala’s Department of General Education (DGE), which has integrated Aadhaar with the student databases and has thereby optimised the teacher-student ratio and identified the schools with excess teachers. In a single academic year, 3,892 excess teacher posts were identified.

“Due to this exercise, no new posts have been sanctioned for the last two years, resulting in notional savings of ₹540 crore per annum,” said a UIDAI official. After student enrolment in the state was linked to Aadhaar since 2012-2013, the head count of pupils have fallen by 5 lakh. Similar trends have been reported in Haryana. Critics have also pointed out the possible security risk in using AadhaarPay, the Andriod-based app. Merchants can download the app in their phone and install a fingerprint scanner linked to the phone. Customers with Aadhaar numbers can use their fingerprints (like the secret PIN in case of debit cards) to do a transaction. While doubts have been raised about the safety of fingerprint data, officials in the know blame the controversy on the “card lobbies.”

“Thirty crore Indians have no mobiles. They find it difficult to handle password, pin or card, this is where AadhaarPay will come handy,” the official added. “They don’t need a smart phone or feature phone. They don’t need a debit card.

“Today more than 112 crore people have the Aadhaar card. Approximately, 52.95 crore people have linked their Aadhaar numbers to their bank accounts. We already have a system of Aadhaar authentication in place,” the official added.

Government officials are at pain to point out the larger benefits of Aadhaar, including savings of more than ₹49,000 crore by plugging leakages in government schemes like PDS. Government plans to increase the number of welfare schemes linked to Aadhaar from 36 to over 500. While the intent is good, concerns remain.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/richa-mishra-hindu-businessline-march-13-2017-the-12-digit-conundrum

January 2017 Newsletter

praskrishna — 2017-03-01T06:00:37Z

Welcome to the January 2017 newsletter of the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS).

Dear readers,

We are pleased to bring you the Centre for Internet & Society's January newsletter. Previous issues of the newsletters can be accessed here.

Highlights
The Rights of Persons with Disabilities (RPD) Act, which was passed in December 2016, seeks to give effect to the rights and obligations enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with disabilities, which India signed and ratified nearly a decade ago. Nirmita Narasimhan in a blog entry has summarized the key provisions of the Act relating to digital accessibility. The latest judgment in the matter of Super Cassettes v. MySpace is a landmark and progressive ruling, which strengthens the safe harbor immunity enjoyed by Internet intermediaries in India. CIS was one of the intervenors in the case, and has been duly acknowledged in the judgment. Meena Gayathri became the first South Indian Wikiwoman to complete 100 Wikidays challenge. The challenge required Wikipedians to create one new article per day for one hundred days in a row. Gayathri's contribution and passion towards Telugu language and culture have transcended into a "knowledge revolution". The Committee on Digital Payments constituted by the Ministry of Finance and chaired by Ratan P. Watal, Principal Advisor, NITI Aayog, submitted its report on the "Medium Term Recommendations to Strengthen Digital Payments Ecosystem" on December 09, 2016. The report was made public on December 27, and comments were sought from the general public. CIS submitted its comments. The comments were authored by Sumandro Chattopadhyay. ICANN sought community input on the Proposed ICANN Community Anti-Harassment Policy on 7 November 2016. In response to this CIS submitted its comments. The comments were authored by Padma Venkataraman, Rohini Lakshané, Sampada Nayak and Vidushi Marda. The eleven sessions selected for the Internet Researchers' Conference 2017 (IRC17) to be held at the IIIT Bangalore campus during March 3-5, 2017 has been announced. The conference is being organised by the Centre for Information Technology and Public Policy (CITAPP) at IIIT Bangalore and CIS.

CIS in the news

India’s Digital ID Rollout Collides With Rickety Reality (Gabriele Parussini; Wall Street Journal; January 13, 2017).
Millions of Indians move from cash to digital payments. But some ask whether it’s safe (Rama Lakshmi; Washington Post; January 14, 2017).
Sunil Abraham on Aadhaar's misuse during demonetisation (Economic Times; January 14, 2017)
The soon-to-be launched Aadhaar Pay will let you make purchases using your fingerprint (Indulekha Aravind; January 15, 2017).
Lost your phone? Here's how you can make your mobile theft-proof (Sanjay Kumar Singh; Business Standard; January 16, 2017).
The Dangers Of Aadhaar-Based Payments That No One Is Talking About (Mayank Jain; Bloomberg; January 17, 2017).
Supreme Court issues notice to WhatsApp, Centre on data privacy (MJ Antony, Ayan Pramanik and Apurva Venkat; Business Standard; January 17, 2017).
Demonetisation: Cost Vs Benefit (NDTV; December 24, 2016). Sunil Abraham took part in the Big Fight programme aired by NDTV. The video was published on January 17, 2017.
For India’s complaints department, visit Facebook Live (Amy Kazmin; Financial Times; January 23, 2017).

CIS members wrote the following articles:

Cashlessness Needs Connectivity (Shyam Ponappa; Business Standard; January 4, 2017).
Digital Native: The Dream of the Cyborg (Nishant Shah; Indian Express; January 8, 2017).
Digital transitions in the newsroom: How are Indian language papers adapting differently? (Zeenab Aneez; London School of Economics and Political Science; January 16, 2017).
Digital native: Back at it Again (Nishant Shah; Indian Express; January 22, 2017).

Jobs

Policy Officer (Cyber Security)
Senior Policy Officer (Cyber Security)
Internship - Application accepted throughout the year
Survey Participants for Research on Musician Livelihood

-------------------------------------
Accessibility & Inclusion
-------------------------------------
India has an estimated 70 million persons with disabilities who don't have access to read printed materials due to some form of physical, sensory, cognitive or other disability. As part of our endeavour to make available accessible content for persons with disabilities, we are developing a text-to-speech software in 15 languages with support from the Hans Foundation. The progress made so far in the project can be accessed here.

Blog Entry

Digital accessibility in the Rights of Persons With Disabilities Act 2016 (Nirmita Narasimhan; January 23, 2017).

Participation in Event

Workplace Solutions Champions Consultative Workshop (Organized by Enable India, January 21 - 22, 2017; Ecumenical Christian Centre, Bangalore). Nirmita Narasimhan attended the workshop.

-----------------------------------
Access to Knowledge
-----------------------------------
Our Access to Knowledge programme currently consists of two projects. The Pervasive Technologies project, conducted under a grant from the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), aims to conduct research on the complex interplay between low-cost pervasive technologies and intellectual property, in order to encourage the proliferation and development of such technologies as a social good. The Wikipedia project, which is under a grant from the Wikimedia Foundation, is for the growth of Indic language communities and projects by designing community collaborations and partnerships that recruit and cultivate new editors and explore innovative approaches to building projects.

►Copyright and Patent

Blog Entry

Super Cassettes v. MySpace (Redux) (Anubha Sinha; January 16, 2017).

Event Organized

Seminar on Rethinking Copyright and Licensing for Digital Publishing Today (Organized by Pro Helvetia - Swiss Arts Council, Goethe-Institut Max Mueller Bhavan New Delhi, and CIS; New Delhi; January 23, 2017). Anubha Sinha attended the event.

►Wikipedia

As part of the project grant from the Wikimedia Foundation we have reached out to more than 3500 people across India by organizing more than 100 outreach events and catalysed the release of encyclopaedic and other content under the Creative Commons (CC-BY-3.0) license in four Indian languages (21 books in Telugu, 13 in Odia, 4 volumes of encyclopaedia in Konkani and 6 volumes in Kannada, and 1 book on Odia language history in English).

Blog Entries

WikiSangamotsavam 2016 (Manasa Rao; January 18, 2017).
Telugu Wikipedia Stall at Hyderabad Book Fair (Manasa Rao; January 18, 2017).
Telugu Wikipedia Stall at Rajahmundry Book Fair (Manasa Rao; January 18, 2017).
Mini Workshop on Tools: Wikipedia Monthly Meetup, Hyderabad (Manasa Rao and Pavan Santhosh; January 18, 2017).
Meet Telugu Wikipedian Surampudi Meena Gayathri – the first South Indian Wikiwoman completing 100 Wikidays Challenge (Ting-Yi Chang; January 23, 2017).

Event Organized

Odia Wikipedia and Orientation Training Programme (Organized by CIS-A2K team; Indian Institute of Mass Communication, Dhenkanal; January 31, 2017).

►Openness

Our work in the Openness programme focuses on open data, especially open government data, open access, open education resources, open knowledge in Indic languages, open media, and open technologies and standards - hardware and software. We approach openness as a cross-cutting principle for knowledge production and distribution, and not as a thing-in-itself.

Participation in Event

CBGA - Consultation on Opening Up Access to Budget Data in India (Organized by CBGA; January 27, 2017; New Delhi). Sumandro Chattapadhyay was a speaker.

-----------------------------------
Internet Governance
-----------------------------------

As part of its research on privacy and free speech, CIS is engaged with two different projects. The first one (under a grant from Privacy International and IDRC) is on surveillance and freedom of expression (SAFEGUARDS). The second one (under a grant from MacArthur Foundation) is on restrictions that the Indian government has placed on freedom of expression online.

►Privacy

Submission

Comments on the Report of the Committee on Digital Payments (Sumandro Chattapadhyay and Amber Sinha; January 12, 2017).

Blog Entries

The Design & Technology behind India’s Surveillance Programmes (Udbhav Tiwari; January 20, 2017)
Workshop on ‘Privacy after Big Data’ (Amber Sinha; January 27, 2017).

Events Organized

Discussion on Ranking Digital Rights in India (India Islamic Cultural Centre, New Delhi; January 7, 2017).
Rankathon on Digital Rights (CIS office, New Delhi; January 8, 2017).

Participation in Events

Global Governance Futures 2027 - Session 3 (Organized by Global Public Policy Institute and supported by Robert Bosch Stiftung; New Delhi; January 17, 2017). Sumandro Chattapadhyay joined Ankhi Das (Facebook) and Arun Mohan Sukumar (Observer Research Foundation) to discuss the "data governance" scenarios developed by the GGF 2027 Fellows.
CPDP (Computers, Privacy and Data Protection) 2017 (Organized by Privacy International; Brussels, January 26, 2017). Amber Sinha participated as a panelist.

►Big Data

Blog Entry

New Media, personalisation and the role of algorithms (Amber Sinha; January 2, 2017).

Participation in Events

Training programme for Chairs, Convenor and Experts for International Standardization Work (Organized by National Institute of Training for Standardization, under the Bureau of India Standards; January 19 - 20, 2017; NOIDA). Udbhav Tiwari attended the training programme.
Seminar on Understanding Financial Technology, Cashless India, and Forced Digitalisation (Centre for Financial Accountability; New Delhi; January 24, 2017). Sumandro Chattapadhyay spoke on the emerging architecture of FinTech in India.

►Free Speech & Expression

Submission

Comments on the Proposed ICANN Community Anti-Harassment Policy (Padma Venkataraman, Rohini Lakshané, Sampada Nayak and Vidushi Marda; January 13, 2017).

Blog Entry

Social Media Monitoring (Amber Sinha; January 13, 2017).

-----------------------------------
Telecom
-----------------------------------
CIS is involved in promoting access and accessibility to telecommunications services and resources, and has provided inputs to ongoing policy discussions and consultation papers published by TRAI. It has prepared reports on unlicensed spectrum and accessibility of mobile phones for persons with disabilities and also works with the USOF to include funding projects for persons with disabilities in its mandate:

Article

Cashlessness Needs Connectivity (Shyam Ponappa; Business Standard; January 4, 2017 and Organizing India Blogspot; January 5, 2017).

-----------------------------------
Researchers at Work
-----------------------------------
The Researchers at Work (RAW) programme is an interdisciplinary research initiative driven by an emerging need to understand the reconfigurations of social practices and structures through the Internet and digital media technologies, and vice versa. It aims to produce local and contextual accounts of interactions, negotiations, and resolutions between the Internet, and socio-material and geo-political processes:

Event

Internet Researchers' Conference 2017 (IRC17) - Selected Sessions (Organized by Centre for Information Technology and Public Policy and CIS; IIIT, Bangalore; March 3 - 5, 2017). Eleven sessions have received 10 or more nominations.

-----------------------------------
About CIS
-----------------------------------
The Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) is a non-profit organisation that undertakes interdisciplinary research on internet and digital technologies from policy and academic perspectives. The areas of focus include digital accessibility for persons with disabilities, access to knowledge, intellectual property rights, openness (including open data, free and open source software, open standards, open access, open educational resources, and open video), internet governance, telecommunication reform, digital privacy, and cyber-security. The academic research at CIS seeks to understand the reconfigurations of social and cultural processes and structures as mediated through the internet and digital media technologies.

► Follow us elsewhere

Twitter: http://twitter.com/cis_india
Twitter - Access to Knowledge: https://twitter.com/CISA2K
Twitter - Information Policy: https://twitter.com/CIS_InfoPolicy
Facebook - Access to Knowledge: https://www.facebook.com/cisa2k
E-Mail - Access to Knowledge: a2k@cis-india.org
E-Mail - Researchers at Work: raw@cis-india.org
List - Researchers at Work: https://lists.ghserv.net/mailman/listinfo/researchers

► Support Us

Please help us defend consumer and citizen rights on the Internet! Write a cheque in favour of 'The Centre for Internet and Society' and mail it to us at No. 194, 2nd 'C' Cross, Domlur, 2nd Stage, Bengaluru - 5600 71.

► Request for Collaboration

We invite researchers, practitioners, artists, and theoreticians, both organisationally and as individuals, to engage with us on topics related internet and society, and improve our collective understanding of this field. To discuss such possibilities, please write to Sunil Abraham, Executive Director, at sunil@cis-india.org (for policy research), or Sumandro Chattapadhyay, Research Director, at sumandro@cis-india.org (for academic research), with an indication of the form and the content of the collaboration you might be interested in. To discuss collaborations on Indic language Wikipedia projects, write to Tanveer Hasan, Programme Officer, at tanveer@cis-india.org.

CIS is grateful to its primary donor the Kusuma Trust founded by Anurag Dikshit and Soma Pujari, philanthropists of Indian origin for its core funding and support for most of its projects. CIS is also grateful to its other donors, Wikimedia Foundation, Ford Foundation, Privacy International, UK, Hans Foundation, MacArthur Foundation, and IDRC for funding its various projects.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/about/newsletters/january-2017-newsletter

Fake News, Rumors & Online Content Regulation

praskrishna — 2017-02-28T02:46:13Z

Medianama and Mint organized #NAMApolicy open house on 'Fake News, Rumors & Online Content Regulation' on February 22, 2017 at the India Habitat Centre. Japreet Grewal and Amber Sinha attended the event.

The discussions broadly covered the impact of Fake News on democratic processes, Legal status of online content regulation in India & administrative challenges with Fake News, Responsibility and accountability of online platforms, while addressing challenges of identification of sources of Fake News, Potential legal and non-legal ways of addressing Fake News, etc.

Agenda

06:30 to 07:00 pm - Registration
07:00 to 07:10 pm - Introductory note
07:10 to 09:00 pm - Round-table discussion moderated by Nikhil Pahwa
09:00 pm onwards - Networking dinner

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/fake-news-rumors-online-content-regulation

Can the Judiciary Upturn the Lok Sabha Speaker’s Decision on Aadhaar?

amber — 2017-02-27T15:44:56Z

When ruling on the petition filed by Jairam Ramesh challenging passing the Aadhaar Act as a money Bill, the court has differing precedents to look at.

The article was published in the Wire on February 21, 2017.

In an earlier article, I had argued that the characterisation of the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, as a money Bill by Sumitra Mahajan, speaker of the Lok Sabha, was erroneous. Specifically, I had argued that upon perusal of Article 110 (1) of the constitution, the Aadhaar Act does not satisfy the conditions required of a money Bill. For a legislation to be classified as a money Bill, it must comprise of ‘only’ provisions dealing with the following matters: (a) imposition, regulation and abolition of any tax, (b) borrowing or other financial obligations of the government of India, (c) custody, withdrawal from or payment into the Consolidated Fund of India (CFI) or Contingent Fund of India, (d) appropriation of money out of CFI, (e) expenditure charged on the CFI or (f) receipt or custody or audit of money into CFI or public account of India; or (g) any matter incidental to any of the matters specified in sub-clauses (a) to (f).

Article 110 is modelled on Section 1(2) of the UK’s Parliament Act, 1911, which also defines money Bills as those only dealing with certain enumerated matters. The use of the word ‘only’ was brought up by Ghanshyam Singh Gupta during the constituent assembly debates. He pointed out that the use of the word ‘only’ limits the scope money Bills to only those legislations which did not deal with other matters. His amendment to delete the word ‘only’ was rejected, clearly establishing the intent of the framers of the constitution to keep the ambit of money Bills extremely narrow. G.V. Mavalankar, the first speaker of Lok Sabha, had stated that the word ‘only’ must not be construed so as to give an overly restrictive meaning. For instance, a Bill which deals with taxation could have provisions which deal with the administration of the tax. The finance minister, Arun Jaitley, referred to these words by Mavalankar, justifying the classification of the Aadhaar Act as a money Bill.

While the Aadhaar Bill does makes references to benefits, subsidies and services funded by the CFI, even a cursory reading of the Bill reveals its main objectives as creating a right to obtain a unique identification number and providing for a statutory apparatus to regulate the entire process. Any reasonable reading of the legislation would be hard pressed to view all provisions in the Aadhaar Act, aside from the one creating a charge on the CFI, as merely administrative provisions incidental to the creation such charge. The mere fact of establishing the Aadhaar number as the identification mechanism for benefits and subsidies funded by the CFI does not give it the character of a money Bill. The Bill merely speaks of facilitating access to unspecified subsidies and benefits rather than their creation and provision being the primary object of the legislation. Erskine May’s seminal textbook, Parliamentary Practice, is instructive in this respect and makes it clear that a legislation which simply makes a charge on the consolidated fund does not becomes a money Bill if otherwise its character is not that of one. Further, the subordinate regulations notified under the Aadhaar Act deal almost entirely with matters to do with enrolment, updation, authentication of the Aadhaar number and related matters such as data security regulations and sharing of information collected, rather than the provision of benefits or subsidies or disbursal of funds otherwise from the CFI.

However, in the context of the petition filed by former Union minister Jairam Ramesh challenging the passage of the law on Aadhaar as a money Bill, the more important question is whether the judiciary has a right to question the speaker’s decision in such a matter. If not, any other questions about whether the legislation is a money Bill will remain merely academic in nature.

Irregularity vs illegality

Article 110 (3) clearly states that with regard to the question whether a legislation is a money Bill or not, the decision of the speaker is final and binding. The question is whether such a clause completely excludes any judicial review. Further, Article 122 prohibits the courts from questioning the validity of any proceedings in parliament on the ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure.

During the arguments in the court, the attorney general questioned the locus standi of Ramesh. The petition has been made under Article 32 of the constitution and the government argued that no fundamental rights of Ramesh were violated. However, the court has asked Ramesh to make his submission and adjourned the hearing to July. The petition by Ramesh would hinge largely on the powers of the judiciary to question the decision of the speaker of the Lok Sabha.

The powers of privilege that parliamentarians enjoy are integral to the principle of separation of powers. The rationale behind parliamentary privilege is to prevent interference in the lawmakers’ powers to perform essential functions. The ability to speak and vote inside the legislature without the fear of punishment is certainly essential to the role of a lawmaker. However, the extent of this protection lies at the centre of this discussion. During the constituent assembly debates, H.V. Kamath and others had argued for a schedule to exhaustively codify the existing privileges. However, B.R. Ambedkar pointed to the difficulty of doing so and parliamentary privilege on the lines of the British parliamentary practice was retained in the constitution. In the last few decades, a judicial position has emerged that courts could exercise a limited degree of scrutiny over privileges, as they are primarily responsible for interpreting the constitution.

In the matter of Raja Ram Pal vs The Hon’ble Speaker, Lok Sabha, it had been clarified that proceedings of the legislature were immune from questioning by courts in the case of procedural irregularity but not in the case of illegality. In this case, the Supreme Court while dealing with Article 122 stated that it does not oust review by the judiciary in cases of “gross illegality, irrationality, violation of constitutional mandate, mala fides, non-compliance with rules of natural justice and perversity.”

In 1968, the speaker of the Punjab legislative assembly adjourned the proceedings for a period of two months following rowdy behaviour. Subsequently, an ordinance preventing such a suspension was promulgated and the legislature was summoned by the governor to consider some expedient financial matters. The speaker disagreed with the decision and after some confusion, the deputy speaker passed a few Bills as money Bills. While looking into the question of what was protected from judicial review, the court stated that the protection did not extend to breaches of mandatory provisions of the constitution, only to directory provisions. By that logic, if Article 110 (1) is seen as a mandatory provision, a breach of its provisions could lead to an interpretation that the Supreme Court may well question an erroneous decision by the speaker of the Lok Sabha to certify a legislation as a money Bill. The use of the word “shall” in Article 110 (1), the nature and design of the provision, its overriding impact on the other constitutional provisions granting the Rajya Sabha powers are ample evidence of its mandatory nature. Based on the above, Anup Surendranath has argued that the passage of the Aadhaar Act as a money Bill when it does not satisfy the constitutional conditions for it does amount to a gross illegality.

The judicial precedent in Mohd. Saeed Siddiqui vs State of Uttar Pradesh where the matter of the court’s power to question the decision of a speaker was considered, though, leans in the other direction. In 2012, the Uttar Pradesh Lokayukta and Up-Lokayuktas (Amendment) Act, 2012 was passed as money Bill by the Uttar Pradesh state legislature. Subsequently, a writ petition was filed challenging its constitutional validity. A three-judge bench of the Supreme Court looked into the application of Article 212. It is the provision corresponding to Article 122, dealing with the power of the courts to inquire into the proceedings of the state legislature. The court held that Article 212 makes “it clear that the finality of the decision of the Speaker and the proceedings of the State Legislature being important privilege of the State Legislature, viz., freedom of speech, debate and proceedings are not to be inquired by the Courts.” Importantly, ‘proceedings of the legislature’ were deemed to include within its scope everything done in transacting parliamentary business, including the passage of the Bill. While the court did acknowledge the limitations of parliamentary privilege as established in the Raja Ram Pal case, it did not adequately take into account the reasoning in it.

The Aadhaar Act is a legislation which makes it mandatory of all residents to enrol for a biometric identification system in order to avail certain subsidies, benefits and services. It has huge potential risks for individual privacy and national security and has been the subject of an extremely high profile Public Interest Litigation. Its passage as a money Bill, without any oversight from the Rajya Sabha and an opportunity for substantial debate and discussion, is a fraud on the Constitution. Whether or not the court chooses to see it that way remains to be seen.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-wire-amber-sinha-february-21-2017-can-the-judiciary-upturn-the-lok-sabha-speakers-decision-on-aadhaar

India To Let Private Companies Access Citizens’ Biometric Data

praskrishna — 2017-02-27T15:09:16Z

India, home to the world’s largest national biometric registry, plans to begin sharing citizens’ data with the country’s private companies and startups.

The blog post by Joshua Kopstein was published by Vocativ on February 21, 2017. Sunil Abraham was quoted.

The government-backed program, called “India Stack,” will allow the second most populous country on Earth to share nearly all of its 1.3 billion citizens’ fingerprints, iris scans, and more, potentially creating unprecedented security and privacy risks in the name of convenience and digital commerce.

India Stack will open up the country’s troves of biometric data to Indian software developers, health care providers, and any other business interested in using the government’s identification records in their apps and services. The Indian government hopes the move will spur innovation, jumpstarting its effort to create a centralized system of digital commerce where citizens can purchase goods, apply for health insurance, or even qualify for a loan using the biometric sensors on their smartphones.

Opponents, however, warn that the sharing scheme opens a Pandora’s box of security and privacy problems, dramatically increasing the likelihood of data breaches and abuse.

“It’s the worst time for privacy policy in the country,” Sunil Abraham, the executive director of the Bangalore-based Centre for Internet and Society, told the Wall Street Journal. “We are very caught up in technological exuberance. Techno-utopians are ruling the roost.”

The dangers aren’t just hypothetical. In 2015, an unprecedented breach at the U.S. Office of Personnel Management allowed hackers to steal the fingerprints of 5.6 million federal employees. Researchers have found that stolen fingerprints can be used to commit fraud and identity theft, and even replicated and used to unlock smartphones and other personal devices. Worst of all, unlike passwords and social security numbers, biometric identifiers like fingerprints can never be changed, meaning that any breach is virtually guaranteed to have long-term consequences.

The India Stack program is the latest in several recent schemes to push the country toward a fully-digitized and cashless economy. As of December 2016, the Unique Identification Authority of India had registered more than 91% of the population into a centralized system called Aadhaar, which integrates with banks and allows citizens to complete transactions and access government services using their fingerprints. The country has also temporarily withdrawn its higher-denomination bank notes from circulation in an effort to bolster digital payment systems.

“While the efforts of the government are commendable, the efficacy of these programs in the absence of sufficient infrastructure for security raises various concerns,” the Centre For Internet and Society wrote in a paper outlining the privacy risks of India’s digital identity system. “Increased awareness among citizens and stronger security measures by the governments are necessary to combat the cogent threats to data privacy arising out of the increasing rate of cyberattacks.”

India’s program has already gone far beyond other countries’ biometric data collection schemes, which have mostly been limited to passports and border control. But law enforcement officials’ smaller, more piecemeal efforts to collect biometric information have also raised alarm over their potential for abuse. Thanks to the cooperation of 16 state DMVs, one in two Americans currently has their photo registered to a law enforcement face recognition database – regardless of whether they’ve been charged or even suspected of a crime. Local police in several U.S. states have also begun collecting iris scans and DNA swabs from people randomly stopped on the street, in some cases specifically targeting African American children.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/vocativ-joshua-kopstein-india-private-companies-citizens-biometric-data

T20 Mumbai 2017: Dialogue on the Emerging World Economy

praskrishna — 2017-02-27T15:04:05Z

Gateway House, Indian Council on Global Relations organized a dialogue on emerging world economy in Mumbai on 13 and 14 February 2017. Elonnai Hickok participated in the event.

The G20 is the premier multilateral platform for global economic and financial issues. It has a rotating presidency, and this year, Germany is the president of the G20. In that role, it is hosting a number of meetings with government officials (G20), business leaders (B20) and experts from think tanks (T20).

The T20 is an official sub-forum of the G20 process, responsible for contributing ideas and research to the G20 on global economic issues.

Think-20 (T20) was first initiated by the Mexican presidency in 2012 and continued by subsequent G20 presidencies. It serves as an “ideas bank” for the G20 by organizing the analysis of global think tanks and high-level experts on relevant international economic issues. Think-20 recommendations are synthesized in policy briefs and presented to G20 working groups, ministerial committees and leaders summits to help the G20 deliver concrete policy measures.

The Kiel Institute for the World Economy and German Development Institute have been appointed by the German government as coordinators for the think tank activities for the year. The institutes hosted the T20 kick-off meeting on December 1-2, 2016 in Berlin with experts from more than 80 countries., and are scheduled to host the first-ever T20 Africa conference on February 1-3, 2017 and eventually the T20 Summit on May 29-31, 2017.

Gateway House has hosted T20 meetings during the 2015 Turkish presidency and during the 2016 Chinese presidency of the G20. The meetings brought together experts from think tanks working international economic governance and foreign economic policy issues, business leaders and relevant government officials from India and the G20 countries to Mumbai. For Gateway House, the meetings were the outcome of the focus on geoeconomics and on-going research on international economic relations and global financial architecture.

At G20 2017, Germany has announced Resilience, Sustainability and Responsibility as its core vision. This will cover global issues such as financial market regulation, fin-tech, trade and investment, digitization, healthcare, migration and agriculture. This meeting in Mumbai is an important indicator of intellectual partnership between German and Indian think tanks and an opportunity to bring up new ideas and deliver concrete policy suggestions that can help Germany achieve its vision for G20 in 2017.

For more info click here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/t-20-mumbai-2017

Is Your Aadhar Biometrics Safe? Firms Accused Of Storing Biometrics And Using Them Illegally

praskrishna — 2017-02-27T01:56:28Z

Fears of Aadhar biometric security have been compounded as the government is sprinting towards the next phase of ‘cashless India’ and digitization

Pranesh Prakash and Sunil Abraham have been quoted in this article published by Outlook on February 24, 2017.

The biggest fear regarding misuse of Aadhar biometrics and security loopholes are becoming real.

Three firms are being probed for attempting unauthorised authentication and impersonation by using stored Aadhaar biometrics, reported The Times of India.

The paper reported that the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) has lodged a criminal complaint with the cyber cell of Delhi Police, saying it is a clear violation of the law.

“The firms are Axis Bank, Suvidhaa Infoserve and eMudhra. They have been served a “notice for action“ under Aadhaar regulations”.

The firms have been accused of storing biometrics and using them illegally.

The fears of biometric security have been compounded as the government is sprinting towards the next phase of ‘cashless India’ and digitization. They are preparing to launch Aadhaar Pay, an initiative that will supersede the need to use credit cards, debit cards, smartphones and PINs to make payments or transfer money.

The proposed system of payments will use a person’s biometric data and fingerprints to make payments through Aadhaar-linked bank accounts.

Outlook’s Senior Associate Editor Arindam Mukherjee had in a clairvoyant article for the magazine raised the fears of biometrics being manipulated.

In the article, critics of Aadhaar and Aadhaar-based services raised the issue of privacy and security of biometric and personal data.

Pranesh Prakash, policy director with the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), recently tweeted, “As long as Aadhar-Enabled Payment Services encourages biometric authorisation of transactions, it is bound to be a security nightmare, with widespread fraud.” Would you tell a shopkeeper your debit card’s PIN? No. Then why share your fingerprint? A fingerprint, in this system, becomes a kind of unchangeable Aadhaar Enabled Payment System PIN, he asks.

Pointing out a possible danger, Usha Ramanathan, an independent law researcher who has been following Aadhaar since its inception, says, “In many payments, biometric data is authenticated and then it remains in the system where there are leakages. Intermediaries then have access to the data, which is thus made insecure.”

According to the UIDAI, however, once biometric data is provided by the consumer while making Aadhaar-based payments, it gets encrypted and a merchant doesn’t get access to that data. The Aadhaar Act also prohibits any storing of biometric data in local devices.

And yet, there are many like CIS executive director Sunil Abraham who believe it is a mistake to use biometrics for authentication, especially when payments are concerned.

“Our concern with Aadhaar Pay is about the biometric component of the project,” says Abraham. “Biometrics is an identification technology. Unfortunately, it is being presented as an authentication technology. It is not a secure authentication technology as biometric data can be stolen easily. It is also irrevocable; once biometric data is stolen, it cannot be re-issued like a smart card.”

Then there is the problem of availability of fingerprints. In the case of many people from rural areas and the working class, fingerprints get affected due to the manual nature of their work. This makes it difficult for this target group of UIDAI to conduct transactions properly through Aadhaar Pay. “In Rajasthan, 30 per cent of the households are not even able to procure ration using fingerprints,” says Ramanathan.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/outlook-february-24-2017-is-your-aadhar-biometrics-safe-firms-accused-of-storing-biometrics-and-using-them-illegally

LinkedIn will help people in India train for semi-skilled jobs

praskrishna — 2017-02-24T01:51:20Z

Microsoft has launched Project Sangam, a cloud service integrated with LinkedIn that will help train and generate employment for middle and low-skilled workers.

The article by John Ribeiro of IDG News Service was mirrored on CIO blog on February 21, 2017. Sunil Abraham was quoted.

Microsoft has launched Project Sangam, a cloud service integrated with LinkedIn that will help train and generate employment for middle and low-skilled workers.

The professional network that was acquired by Microsoft in December has been generally associated with educated urban professionals but the company is now planning to extend its reach to semi-skilled people in India.

Having connected white-collared professionals around the world with the right job opportunities and training through LinkedIn Learning, the platform is now developing a new set of products that extends this service to low- and semi-skilled workers, said Microsoft CEO Satya Nadella at an event on digital transformation in Mumbai on Wednesday.

Project Sangam, which is in private preview, is “the first project that is now the coming together of LinkedIn and Microsoft, where we are building this cloud service with deep integration with LinkedIn, so that we can start tackling that enormous challenge in front of us of how to provide every person in India the opportunity to skill themselves for the jobs that are going to be available.”

LinkedIn also plans a placement product for college graduates that will help students finds jobs regardless of whether they studied at top universities or not, Nadella added.

Microsoft announced earlier in the day its Skype Lite, a version of Skype that consumes less data. The company is also offering a ‘lite’ version of LinkedIn, reflecting the need for vendors to factor in low Internet bandwidth, usually running on low-cost and inadequately featured smartphones, when designing products for markets in countries like India.

LinkedIn Lite works on 2G links and is four times faster than the original LinkedIn client, Nadella said.

A large number of low-skilled and semi-skilled workers that Microsoft is targeting with its Sangam project still use feature phones, which will likely be a challenge as Microsoft tries to popularize the service.

Nadella has also backed a controversial Indian government sponsored project to use biometric data collected from over 1 billion people as an authentication mechanism for a variety of services offered by both the government and the private sector.

The project, called India Stack, aims to use a biometric system, called Aadhaar, to facilitate the digital exchange of information. Microsoft said on Tuesday that Skype Lite would support Aadhaar authentication, pointing out to potential uses of the technology such as for verifying the identity of a candidate for a video job interview. Project Sangam too offers authentication using Aadhaar.

Skype Lite is another example of how India Stack is driving the company’s innovation agenda, Nadella said in Mumbai. He announced in Bangalore on Monday that the company's end user products including Windows would be "great participants in the India Stack."

The Aadhaar project has been criticized by privacy activists for collecting biometric information such as the fingerprints and iris scans of people in a central database, which could be misused by both governments and hackers who might get access to the data.The government has been trying to extend the use of Aadhaar, initially designed for the distribution of government benefits and subsidies, to a variety of financial and other services.

"It is indeed shameful that Microsoft is supporting the centralized surveillance project of the Indian government which has dramatically increased the fragility of the Indian information society,” said Sunil Abraham, executive director of Bangalore-based research organization, the Centre for Internet and Society.

"As Indian citizens we must realize that Microsoft will have our biometrics or our authentication factors that can be used to frame us in crimes or clean out our bank accounts," he added.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/idg-cio-february-21-2017-john-ribeiro-linkedin-will-help-people-in-india-train-for-semi-skilled-jobs