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RightsCon 2014

praskrishna — 2014-04-08T05:04:09Z

RightsCon Silicon Valley 2014 was an incredible mixture of more than 700 attendees from more than 65 countries and 375 institutions. Pranesh Prakash and Malavika Jayaram were speakers at this event organized by RightsCon at San Francisco on March 3 and 4, 2014.

This incredible union of expertise has led to real outcomes, many of which are viewable here or as a PDF report here. Missed a session? A special thanks to all our speakers and sponsors who made 2014 so smart and productive.

Missed a session in San Francisco? Many of the videos are available for viewing. To learn more about past RightsCon conferences, head here.

Even as we continue to work diligently on the the work generated from RightsCon Silicon Valley 2014, we are looking ahead to 2015 and Southeast Asia, where we will convene civil society and key decision-makers in this rapidly evolving region. Click here to learn more about the planning for RCSEA2015.

Pranesh was invited to be on five panels, and spoke in three.

He spoke in the following sessions:

March 3 from 14:00-15:15 - Nicolas Seidler's panel on "Localizing the Global Internet: Data Centers, Traffic Rerouting, and the Implications of Post-Surveillance Policy Proposals"

March 4 from 12:00-13:15 - Paul & Bertrand's panel on "Internet and Jurisdiction: How Can Heterogenous Laws Coexist in Cross-Border Online Spaces?"

March 4 from 14:30-15:45 - Amie Stepanovich's panel on "The NSA Strikes Back: Who Really Won the Crypto Wars?"

He was also invited to the following panels:

"Toward Accountability: Reflecting on ICT Industry Action To Protect User Rights"

"Policy Laundering: Hacking the International Innovation Policy Machine"

For more info on the conference, click here. For the full list of speakers, see here.

Video

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/rights-con-2014

Right to Privacy in Peril

vipul — 2015-08-13T15:32:18Z

It seems to have become quite a fad, especially amongst journalists, to use this headline and claim that the right to privacy which we consider so inherent to our being, is under attack. However, when I use this heading in this piece I am not referring to the rampant illegal surveillance being done by the government, or the widely reported recent raids on consenting (unmarried) adults who were staying in hotel rooms in Mumbai. I am talking about the fact that the Supreme Court of India has deemed it fit to refer the question of the very existence of a fundamental right to privacy to a Constitution Bench to finally decide the matter, and define the contours of such right if it does exist.

In an order dated August 11, 2015 the Supreme Court finally gave in to the arguments advanced by the Attorney General and admitted that there is some “unresolved contradiction” regarding the existence of a constitutional “right to privacy” under the Indian Constitution and requested that a Constitutional Bench of appropriate strength.

The Supreme Court was hearing a petition challenging the implementation of the Adhaar Card Scheme of the government, where one of the grounds to challenge the scheme was that it was violative of the right to privacy guaranteed to all citizens under the Constitution of India. However to counter this argument, the State (via the Attorney General) challenged the very concept that the Constitution of India guarantees a right to privacy by relying on an “unresolved contradiction” in judicial pronouncements on the issue, which so far had only been of academic interest. This “unresolved contradiction” arose because in the cases of M.P. Sharma & Others v. Satish Chandra & Others,[1] and Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. & Others,[2] (decided by Eight and Six Judges respectively) the Supreme Court has categorically denied the existence of a right to privacy under the Indian Constitution.

However somehow the later case of Gobind v. State of M.P. and another,[3] (which was decided by a two Judge Bench of the Supreme Court) relied upon the opinion given by the minority of two judges in Kharak Singh to hold that a right to privacy does exist and is guaranteed as a fundamental right under the Constitution of India.[4] Thereafter a large number of cases have held the right to privacy to be a fundamental right, the most important of which are R. Rajagopal & Another v. State of Tamil Nadu & Others,[5] (popularly known as Auto Shanker’s case) and People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India & Another.[6] However, as was noticed by the Supreme Court in its August 11 order, all these judgments were decided by two or three Judges only.

The petitioners on the other hand made a number of arguments to counter those made by the Attorney General to the effect that the fundamental right to privacy is well established under Indian law and that there is no need to refer the matter to a Constitutional Bench. These arguments are:

(i) The observations made in M.P. Sharma regarding the absence of right to privacy are not part of the ratio decidendi of that case and, therefore, do not bind the subsequent smaller Benches such as R. Rajagopal and PUCL.

(ii) Even in Kharak Singh it was held that the right of a person not to be disturbed at his residence by the State is recognized to be a part of a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21. It was argued that this is nothing but an aspect of privacy. The observation in para 20 of the majority judgment (quoted in footnote 2 above) at best can be construed only to mean that there is no fundamental right of privacy against the State’s authority to keep surveillance on the activities of a person. However, they argued that such a conclusion cannot be good law any more in view of the express declaration made by a seven-Judge bench decision of this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India & Another.[7]

(iii) Both M.P. Sharma (supra) and Kharak Singh (supra) were decided on an interpretation of the Constitution based on the principles expounded in A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras,[8] which have themselves been declared wrong by a larger Bench in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India.[9]

Other than the points above, it was also argued that world over in all the countries where Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence is followed, ‘privacy’ is recognized as an important aspect of the liberty of human beings. The petitioners also submitted that it was too late in the day for the Union of India to argue that the Constitution of India does not recognize privacy as an aspect of the liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

However these arguments of the petitioners were not enough to convince the Supreme Court that there is no doubt regarding the existence and contours of the right to privacy in India. The Court, swayed by the arguments presented by the Attorney General, admitted that questions of far reaching importance for the Constitution were at issue and needed to be decided by a Constitutional Bench.

Giving some insight into its reasoning to refer this issue to a Constitutional Bench, the Court did seem to suggest that its decision to refer the matter to a larger bench was more an exercise in judicial propriety than an action driven by some genuine contradiction in the law. The Court said that if the observations in M.P. Sharma (supra) and Kharak Singh (supra) were accepted as the law of the land, the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India would get “denuded of vigour and vitality”. However the Court felt that institutional integrity and judicial discipline require that smaller benches of the Court follow the decisions of larger benches, unless they have very good reasons for not doing so, and since in this case it appears that the same was not done therefore the Court referred the matter to a larger bench to scrutinize the ratio of M.P. Sharma (supra) and Kharak Singh (supra) and decide the judicial correctness of subsequent two judge and three judge bench decisions which have asserted or referred to the right to privacy.

[1] AIR 1954 SC 300. In para 18 of the Judgment it was held: “A power of search and seizure is in any system of jurisprudence an overriding power of the State for the protection of social security and that power is necessarily regulated by law. When the Constitution makers have thought fit not to subject such regulation to constitutional limitations by recognition of a fundamental right to privacy, analogous to the American Fourth Amendment, we have no justification to import it, into a totally different fundamental right, by some process of strained construction.”

[2] AIR 1963 SC 1295. In para 20 of the judgment it was held: “… Nor do we consider that Art. 21 has any relevance in the context as was sought to be suggested by learned counsel for the petitioner. As already pointed out, the right of privacy is not a guaranteed right under our Constitutionand therefore the attempt to ascertain the movement of an individual which is merely a manner in which privacy is invaded is not an infringement of a fundamental right guaranteed by Part III.”

[3] (1975) 2 SCC 148.

[4] It is interesting to note that while the decisions in both Kharak Singh and Gobind were given in the context of similar facts (challenging the power of the police to make frequent domiciliary visits both during the day and night at the house of the petitioner) while the majority in Kharak Singh specifically denied the existence of a fundamental right to privacy, however they held the conduct of the police to be violative of the right to personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21, since the Regulations under which the police actions were undertaken were themselves held invalid. On the other hand, while Gobind held that a fundamental right to privacy does exist in Indian law, it may be interfered with by the State through procedure established by law and therefore upheld the actions of the police since they were acting under validly issued Regulations.

[5] (1994) 6 SCC 632.

[6] (1997) 1 SCC 301.

[7] (1978) 1 SCC 248.

[8] AIR 1950 SC 27.

[9] (1970) 1 SCC 248.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/right-to-privacy-in-peril

Right to Privacy Bill 2010 — A Few Comments

elonnai — 2012-03-22T06:26:14Z

Earlier this year, in February 2011, Rajeev Chandrasekhar introduced the Right to Privacy Bill, 2010 in the Rajya Sabha. The Bill is meant to “provide protection to the privacy of persons including those who are in public life”. Though the Bill states that its objective is to protect individuals’ fundamental right to privacy, the focus of the Bill is on the protection against the use of electronic/digital recording devices in public spaces without consent and for the purpose of blackmail or commercial use.

Specific Recommendations

The use of electronic recording devices in public is an important and expansive aspect of privacy, which is yet to be directly covered by Indian law. Though the Bill addresses the basic usage of electronic devices with built-in cameras, it frames the violation as a personal violation. In doing so, the Bill has taken a punitive approach, making it criminal to take photographs in situations outside of the laid-out regulations, rather than protective in nature, i.e., working to protect individuals from harassment and blackmail, and offer forms of redress to those damaged.

The Bill fails to address scenarios such as Google street view, satellite photographs, news channels, and live feeds at events and conferences. In these situations live data is being transmitted and posted on the Web for public to view by the media. When looking at the dilemma of photographs being taken in public by the media, the privacy interests are different to those that are based on control of personal information alone. They are substantive, as opposed to informational, and engage directly with individual dignity, autonomy, and the freedom of expression. For example, the interest in freedom of expression encompasses both those of the photographers and journalists producing material for his/her journal. Can a journalist print a photograph taken in a public space — of a public figure, which the public figure did not consent to, and which that person considers defamatory?

Interestingly, Europe has strong laws regulating the taking of photographs in public spaces, but these rules are covered by the Protection from Harassment Act, 1997 (UK), which speaks specifically to the media’s behaviour towards public figures — or they fall under a tort of misuse. In the US taking photographs only becomes an issue in the use of the photograph. Essentially anyone can be photographed without consent except when they have secluded themselves in places where they have a reasonable expectation of privacy such as dressing rooms, restrooms, medical facilities, or inside a private residence. This legal standard applies regardless of the age, sex, or other attributes of the individual. Once a photograph is taken, and if that photograph is used for commercial gain without consent or publicizes an otherwise private person inappropriately, then that person can be held liable under the tort of misappropriation.

Specific Comments to the Bill

Misguiding Title

The title of the Bill is, the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2006," but the scope of the Bill is focused on regulating the use of electronic recording devices, and it does not include many aspects of privacy. So we recommend that the title of the Bill be modified to "The Electronic Recording Devices Bill, 2010".

Inappropriate Blanket Use of Privacy

The introduction to the Bill states that its purpose is "for the protection of the right to privacy of persons including those who are in public life so as to protect them from being blackmailed or harassed or their image and reputation being tarnished in order to spoil their public life and for the prevention of misuse of digital technology for such purposes and for matters connected therewith and incidental thereto."

Comment: Notwithstanding the fact that violations of privacy extend beyond blackmail, harassment, and defamation, and that digital technologies are not the only vehicles for privacy violations, it is important to qualify that privacy is not a blanket right, and that for public persons, the privacy that they are afforded is determined by balancing their interest against the public interest.

Narrow Definition of Public Figures

Section 2 (b) of the Bill states: "persons in public life" includes the representatives of the people in Parliament, state legislatures, local self government bodies, and office bearers of recognized political parties

Comment: Persons in public life include persons beyond the political sphere, specifically those in higher positions that influence the behaviour, lifestyles, and culture of the general population. Thus, we recommend that this definition be extended to include actors, actresses, athletes, artists, and musicians, CEOs, and authors.

Insufficient Limits to the Right to Privacy

Section 3 (1) states: “Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force every person, including persons in public life, shall have the right to privacy which shall be exclusive, unhindered and there shall be no unwarranted infringement thereof by any other person, agency, media or anyone:

Provided that sub-section (1) of section 3 shall not apply in cases of corruption, and misuse of official positions by persons in public life.

Comment: We recommend that the right to privacy, as any right, need not be identified as exclusive or unhindered. The right to privacy must be determined on a case by case basis relative to the public interest, and, while cases of corruption and misuse of official position by persons in public life certainly qualify, they do not encompass the wider variety of situations in which an individual’s right to privacy should be limited. For instance, if a public figure speaks out on an issue in a way that contradicts an earlier position that was captured on video, shouldn’t that be allowed to be made public? If a public figure is photographed in a morally questionable position, shouldn’t that be allowed to be made public? Indeed, even for private individuals, privacy is a matter of context. In airports and other sensitive public places it is commonly accepted that an individual’s right to privacy can be limited. If an individual has a disease such as HIV, under what circumstances should some or all of the greater public should be informed and their right to privacy may be limited?

Limited Scope of Technology

Section 4 of the Bill states: "No person shall use a cellular phone with an inbuilt camera, if it does not produce a sound of at least 65 decibels and flash a light when used to take a picture of any object or person, as the case may be.

Comment: We recommend that this clause clarifies if only cellular phones, and not cameras, computers, or other devices with built-in cameras are required to produce the sound of at least 65 decibels.

Overly Complicated Clauses

Section 5 of the Bill states: Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no person shall make digital recording or take photographs or make videography in any manner whatsoever of:

Section 5(a): any part or whole of a human body which is unclothed or partially clothed without the consent of the person concerned.

Section 5 (b): any part or whole of a human body at any public place without the consent of the person concerned and

Section 5 (c): the personal and intimate relationship of any couple in a home, hotel, resort, or any place within the four walls by hidden digital or other cameras and such other instruments, or any place within the four walls by hidden digital cameras and such other instruments…with the intent of blackmail or of making commercial gains from it or otherwise.

Comment: Section 5 currently lists certain circumstances in which photographs are not allowed to be taken of individuals in public without consent if they are to be used for the purpose of commercial gain or blackmail. Blackmail or commercial gains are not the only ways in which digital recordings of people can be misused. Certainly, taking such pictures to post for purposes of hurting one’s reputation or causing humiliation is as reprehensible as taking pictures for commercial gain, so the provision is too narrow. It may also be overboard, because a person may be captured in an artistic or political photograph but have, for example, bare arms or legs. That would be a picture of a part of a human body at a public place. We recommend that the list of offences include misappropriation and false light, and that the manner of the picture-taking not be limited to clauses (a) to (c) above.

Section 5 is the first instance in which the use of digital recordings for commercial gain has been mentioned as a violation in the Bill. We recommend that commercial gain as a violation should be added to the introduction of the Bill.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/privacy/privacy-bill-2010

Right to Information (RTI) Requests to BSNL and MTNL Regarding Security Equipment

maria — 2015-02-25T15:04:56Z

As part of research, on July 2, 2013, the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) had sent Right to Information (RTI) requests to two of the largest internet service providers (ISPs) in India: Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited (MTNL) and Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL) requesting answers to some questions.

Answers to the following questions were requested:

Please list the companies from which MTNL/BSNL has bought all its security equipment.
What type of security equipment does MTNL/BSNL use to assist Indian law enforcement agencies in detecting and preventing crime, terrorism and all other illegal activity? Please provide the certification for all such equipment.
What malware does MTNL/BSNL test for? What does MTNL/BSNL use for testing malware in its networks?
Which proxy server does MTNL/BSNL use and is it used for filtering data? If so, what type of data is being filtered and for what purpose? Is authorisation required and if so, by whom?
Does MTNL/BSNL use FinFly ISP? If so, who authorises its use and under what conditions?

M. K. Sheda, the appellate authority of MTNL, responded to the above questions on August 3, 2013 with the following answers:

MTNL procures all its equipment through an open competitive bidding process and the details of all past tenders are available on the MTNL website. Equipment from multiple vendors are operational in GSM MTNL Packet-Core Network and specific names cannot be given due to security reasons.
MTNL uses the security equipment by the Department of Telecommunications, Government of India, to assist Indian law enforcement agencies. The details cannot be disclosed as the information is classified as "secret" as per MTNL IT Policy Revision 2.0 and also comes under Section -8 (1) (a) and (d) of the RTI Act 2005.
MTNL GSM Packet Core equipment for data access uses MTNL ISP as its interface with external entities. Thus information is pertaining to MTNL ISP and hence a reply may please be taken from the GM (Broadband) unit.
Same answer as "3" above.
Same answer as "3" above.

BSNL has still not responded to the above questions.

Click below to download the respective files:

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/rti-requests-to-bsnl-mtnl-regarding-security-equipment

Right to Food Campaign, Ranchi Convention, 2016

sumandro — 2019-03-16T04:40:52Z

The Right to Food Campaign held its 2016 Convention in Ranchi during September 23-25, 2016. While three years have elapsed since the passage of the National Food Security Act, despite improvements in the Public Distribution System (PDS), large implementation gaps remain. This is what the Convention focused on, and gathered researchers and campaigners from across the country to share experiences and case studies on effectiveness and exclusions from the PDS. Sumandro Chattapadhyay took part in a session of the Convention to discuss how UID-linked welfare delivery is being rolled out across key programmes like provision of pension and rationed distribution of essential commodities, and their impact on people's right to welfare services.

Right to Food Campaign: Website.

Right to Food Campaign: Cash Transfers and UID: Our Main Demands.

Ranchi Convention, 2016: Programme.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/right-to-food-campaign-ranchi-convention-2016

Right to be Forgotten: A Tale of Two Judgements

amber — 2017-04-07T02:27:03Z

In the last few months, there have been contrasting judgments from two Indian high courts, Karnataka and Gujarat, on matters relating to the right to be forgotten. The two high courts heard pleas on issues to do the right of individuals to have either personal information redacted from the text of judgments available online or removal of such judgment from publically available sources.

While one High Court (Karnataka) ordered the removal of personal details from the judgment,^[1] the other (Gujarat) dismissed the plea^[2]. In this post, we try to understand the global jurisprudence on the right to be forgotten, and how the contrasting judgments in India may be located within it.

Background

The ‘right to be forgotten’ has gained prominence since a matter was referred to the Court of Justice of European Union (CJEU) in 2014 by a Spanish court.^[3] In this case, Mario Costeja González had disputed the Google search of his name continuing to show results leading to an auction notice of his reposed home. The fact that Google continued to make available in its search results, an event in his past, which had long been resolved, was claimed by González as a breach of his privacy. He filed a complaint with the Spanish Data Protection Agency (AEPD in its Spanish acronym), to have the online newspaper reports about him as well as related search results appearing on Google deleted or altered. While AEPD did not agree to his demand to have newspaper reports altered, it ordered Google Spain and Google, Inc. to remove the links in question from their search results. The case was brought in appeal before the Spanish High Court, which referred the matter to CJEU. In a judgement having far reaching implications, CJEU held that where the information is ‘inaccurate, inadequate, irrelevant or excessive,’ individuals have the right to ask search engines to remove links with personal information about them. The court also ruled that even if the physical servers of the search engine provider are located outside the jurisdiction of the relevant Member State of EU, these rules would apply if they have branch office or subsidiary in the Member State.

The ‘right to be forgotten’ is a misnomer, and essentially when we speak of it in the context of the proposed laws in EU, we refer to the rights of individuals to seek erasure of certain data that concerns them. The basis of what has now evolved into this right is contained in the 1995 EU Data Protection Directive, with Article 12 of the Directive allowing a person to seek deletion of personal data once it is no longer required.

Critical to our understanding of the rationale for how the ‘right to be forgotten’ is being framed in the EU, is an appreciation of how European laws perceive privacy of individuals. Unlike the United States (US), where privacy may be seen as a corollary of personal liberty protecting against unreasonable state intrusions, European laws view privacy as an aspect of personal dignity, and are more concerned with protection from third parties, particularly the media. The most important way in which this manifests itself is in where the burden to protect privacy rights lie. In Europe, privacy policy often dictates intervention from the state, whereas in the US, in many cases it is up to the individuals to protect their privacy.^[4]

Since the advent of the Internet, both the nature and quantity of information existing about individuals has changed dramatically. This personal information is no longer limited to newspaper reports and official or government records either. Our use of social media, micro-discussions on Twitter, photographs and videos uploaded by us or others tagging us, every page or event we like, favourite or share—all contribute to our digital footprint. Add to this the information created not by us but about us by both public and private bodies storing data about individuals in databases, our digital shadows begin to far exceed the data we create ourselves. It is abundantly clear that we exist in a world of Big Data, which relies on algorithms tracking repeated behaviour by our digital selves. It is in this context that a mechanism which enables the purging of some of this digital shadow makes sense.

Further, it is not only the nature and quantity of information that has changed, but also the means through which this information can be accessed. In the pre-internet era, access to records was often made difficult by procedural hurdles. Permissions or valid justifications were required to access certain kinds of data. Even for the information available in the public domain, often the process of gaining access were far too cumbersome. Now digital information not only continues to exist indefinitely, but can also be easily accessed readily through search engines. It is in this context that in a 2007 paper, Viktor Mayer-Schöenberger pioneered the idea of memory and forgetting for the digital age.^[5] He proposed that all forms of personal data should have an additional meta data of expiration date to switch the default from information existing endlessly to having a temporal limit after which it is deleted. While this may be a radical suggestion, we have since seen proposals to allow individuals some control over information about them.

In 2016, the EU released the final version of the General Data Protection Regulation. The regulation provides for a right to erasure under Article 17, which would enable a data-subject to seek deletion of data.^[6] Notably, except in the heading of the provision, Article 17 makes no reference to the word ‘forgetting.’ Rather the right made available in this regulation is in the form of making possible ‘erasure’ and ‘abstention from further dissemination.’ This is significant because what the proposed regulations provide for is not an overarching framework to enable or allow ‘forgetting’ but a limited right which may be used to delete certain data or search results. Providing a true right to be forgotten would pose issues of interpretation as to what ‘forgetting’ might mean in different contexts and the extent of measures that data controllers would have to employ to ensure it. The proposed regulation attempts to provide a specific remedy which can be exercised in the defined circumstances without having to engage with the question of ‘forgetting’.

The primary arguments made against the ‘right to be forgotten’ have come from its conflict with the right to freedom of speech. Jonathan Zittrain has argued against the rationale that the right to be forgotten merely alters results on search engines without deleting the actual source, thus, not curtailing the freedom of expression.^[7] He has compared this altering of search results to letting a book remain in the library but making the catalogue unavailable. According to Zittrain, a better approach would be to allow data subjects to provide their side of the story and more context to the information about them, rather than allowing any kind of erasure. Unlike in the US, the European approach is to balance free speech against other concerns. So while one of the exceptions in sub-clause (3) of Article 17 provides that information may not be deleted where it is necessary to exercise the right to free speech, free speech does not completely trump privacy as the value that must be protected. On the other hand, US constitutional law would tend to give more credence to the First Amendment rights and allow them to be compromised in very limited circumstances. As per the position of the US Supreme Court in Florida Star v. B.J.F., lawfully obtained information may be restricted from publication only in cases involving a ‘state interest of the highest order’. This position would allow any potential right to be forgotten to be exercised in the most limited of circumstances and privacy and reputational harm would not satisfy the standard. For these reasons the rights to be forgotten as it exists in Article 17 may be unworkable in the US.

Issues in application

Significant technical challenges remain in the effective and consistent application of Article 17 of the EU Directive. One key issue is concerned with how ‘personal data’ is defined and understood, and how its interpretation will impact this right in different contexts. According to Article 17 of the EU directive, the term ‘personal data’ includes any information relating to an individual. Some ambiguity remains about whether information which may not uniquely identify a person, but as a part of small group, could be considered within the scope of personal data. This becomes relevant, for instance, where one seeks the erasure of information which, without referring to an individual, points fingers towards a family. At the same time, often the piece of information sought to be erased by a person may contain personal information about more than one individual. There is no clarity over whether a consensus of all the individuals concerned should be required, and if not, on what parameters should the wishes of one individual prevail over the others. Another important question, which is as yet unanswered, is whether the same standards for removal of content should apply to most individuals and those in public life.

The issue of what is personal data and can therefore be erased gets further complicated in cases of derived data about individuals used in statistics and other forms of aggregated content. While, it would be difficult to argue that the right to be forgotten needs to be extended to such forms of information, not erasing such derived content poses the risk of the primary information being inferred from it. In addition, Article 17(1)(a) provides for deletion in cases where the data is no longer necessary for the purposes for which they were collected or used. The standards for circumstances which satisfy this criteria are, as yet, unclear and may only be fully understood through a consistent application of this law.

Finally, once there are reasonable grounds to seek erasure of information, it is not clear how this erasure will be enforced practically. It may not be prudent to require that all copies of the impugned data are deleted such that they may not be recovered, to the extent technologically possible. A more reasonable solution might be to permit the data to continue to remain available in encrypted forms, much like certain records are sealed and subject to the strictest confidentiality obligations. In most cases, it may be sufficient to ensure that the records of the impugned data is removed from search results and database reports without actually tampering with information as it may exist. These are some of the challenges which the practical application of this right will face, and it is necessary to take them into account in enforcing the proposed regulations.

The two Indian judgments

In the first case, (before the Gujarat High Court), the petitioner entered a plea for “permanent restraint [on] free public exhibition of the judgment and order.” The judgment in question concerned proceeding against the petitioner for a number of offences, including culpable homicide amounting to murder. The petitioner was acquitted, both by the Sessions court and the High Court before which he was pleading. The petitioner’s primary contention was that despite the judgment being classified as ‘unreportable’, it was published by an online repository of judgments and was also indexed by Google search. The decision of the High Court to dismiss the petition, rest of the following factors: a) failure on the part of the petitioner to show any provisions in law which are attracted, or threat to the constitutional right to life and liberty, b) publication on a website does not amount to ‘reporting’, as reporting only refers to that by law reports.

While the second point of reasoning made by the courts is problematic in terms of the function of precedent served by the reported judgments, and the basis for reducing the scope of ‘reporting’ to only law reports, the first point is of direct relevance to our current discussion. The lack of available legal provisions points to the absence of data protection legislation in India. Had there been a privacy legislation which addressed the issues of how personal information may be dealt with, it is possible that it may have had instructive provisions to address situation like these. In the absence of such law, the only recourse that an individual has is to seek constitutional protection under one of the fundamental rights, most notably Article 21, which over the years, has emerged as the infinite repository of unenumerated rights. However, typically rights under Article 21 are of a vertical nature, i.e., available only against the state. Their application in cases where a private party is involved remains questionable, at best.

In contrast, in the second case, the Karnataka High Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. In this case, the petitioner’s daughter instituted both criminal and civil proceedings against a person. However, later they arrived at a compromise and one of the conditions was quashing all the proceedings which had been initiated. The petitioner had raised concerns about the appearance of his daughter’s name in the cause title and was easily searchable. The court, while making vague references to “trend in the Western countries where they follow this as a matter of rule “Right to be forgotten” in sensitive cases involving women in general and highly sensitive cases involving rape or affecting the modesty and reputation of the person concerned, held in the petitioner’s favor, and order that the name be redacted from the cause title and the body of the order before releasing to any service provider. The second judgment is all the more problematic for while it makes a reference to jurisprudence in other countries, yet it does not base it on the fundamental right to privacy, but to the idea of modesty and reputation of women, which has no clear legal basis on either Indian or comparative jurisprudence.

Conclusion

The above two cases demonstrate the problem of lack of a clear legal basis being employed by the judiciary in interpreting the right to be forgotten. Not only were no clear legal provisions in Indian law were taken refuge of while ruling on the existence of this right, the court also do not engage in any analysis of comparative jurisprudence such as the GDPR or the Costeja judgment. Such ad-hoc jurisprudence underlines the need for a data protection legislation, as in its absence, it is likely that divergent views are taken upon this issue, without a clear legal direction. It is likely that most matters concerning the right to erasure concern private parties as data controllers. In such cases, the existing jurisprudence on the right to privacy as interpreted under Article 21 may also be of limited value. Further, as has been pointed out above, the right to be forgotten needs to be a right qualified by conditions very clearly, and its conflict with the right to freedom of expression under Article 19. Therefore, it is imperative that a comprehensive data protection law addresses these issues.

^[1] Sri Vasunathan vs The Registrar, available at http://www.iltb.net/2017/02/karnataka-hc-on-the-right-to-be-forgotten/

^[2] Dharmraj Bhanushankar Dave v. State of Gujarat, available at https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BzXilfcxe7yueXFJWG5mZ1pKaTQ/view.

^[3] Google Spain et al v. Mario Costeja González, available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf?doclang=EN&docid=152065.

^[4] http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/536459/IPOL_STU(2015)536459_EN.pdf

^[5] Mayer-Schoenberger, Viktor, Useful Void: The Art of Forgetting in the Age of Ubiquitous Computing (April 2007). KSG Working Paper No. RWP07-022. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=976541 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.976541.

^[6] Article 17 (1) states: The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of personal data concerning him or her without undue delay and the controller shall have the obligation to erase personal data without undue delay where one of the following grounds applies:

(a) the personal data are no longer necessary in relation to the purposes for which they were collected or otherwise processed;

(b) the data subject withdraws consent on which the processing is based according to point (a) of Article 6(1), or point (a) of Article 9(2), and where there is no other legal ground for the processing;

(c) the data subject objects to the processing pursuant to Article 21(1) and there are no overriding legitimate grounds for the processing, or the data subject objects to the processing pursuant to Article 21(2);

(d) the personal data have been unlawfully processed;

(e) the personal data have to be erased for compliance with a legal obligation in Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject;

(f) the personal data have been collected in relation to the offer of information society services referred to in Article 8(1).

^[7] Zittrain, Jonathan, “Don’t Force Google to ‘Forget’”, The New York Times, May 14, 2014. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/15/opinion/dont-force-google-to-forget.html.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/right-to-be-forgotten-a-tale-of-two-judgments

Right to be forgotten poses a legal dilemma in India

praskrishna — 2014-06-09T10:02:25Z

The “right to be forgotten” judgment has raised a controversy, while some argue that it upholds an individual’s privacy, others say it leaves a lot of room for interpretation.

The article by Leslie D' Monte was published in Livemint on June 5, 2014. Sunil Abraham gave his inputs.

Medianama.com has become perhaps the first Indian website to be asked by an individual to remove a link, failing which the user would approach Google Inc. to delete the link under the “right to be forgotten” provision granted by a European court. There’s one hitch: India doesn’t have any legal provision to entertain or process such request.

In his request to the media website, the individual cited a landmark 13 May judgment by the Court of Justice of the European Union (EU), which said users could ask search engines like Google or Bing to remove links to web pages that contain information about them.

According to the judgement, the user is also free to approach “the competent authorities in order to obtain, under certain conditions, the removal of that link from the list of results” if the search engines do not comply.

“...this individual told us of a plan to appeal to Google on the basis of the judgment of the European Court of Justice, and asked us to either convert the public post into a non-indexable post, such that it may not be surfaced by search engines, or to modify the individual’s name, place and any references to his/her employer in the post that we’ve written, so that it cannot be linked directly to the individual,” said Nikhil Pahwa, founder of medianama.com.

Pahwa did not reveal the identity of the individual, who made the request on 31 May. Medianama, according to Pahwa, had written about the individual “a few years ago, protesting against attacks on his/her freedom of speech.” It did not give details. The media website reported about the request on 2 June.

Under legal pressure, the individual eventually relented and retracted the request.

The individual, Pahwa said, requested medianama.com to retain only his last name on the web page, cautioning that if the website does not do so, he would submit the URL (uniform resource locator or address of that link) of that web page to Google in a “right to be forgotten” request.

This, Pahwa said, “might hurt our search ranking, or lead to a blanket removal of our website from Google’s search index.”

“This is a tricky one, and we’ve declined this request,” said Pahwa. He added that “the implications for media are immense, since digital data, which is a recording of online history, will be affected.”

The EU ruling came after a Spanish national complained in 2010 that searching his name in Google threw up links to two newspaper webpages which reported a property auction to recover social security debt he once owed, even though the information had become irrelevant since the proceedings had since been resolved.

Following the ruling, Google put up an online form (mintne.ws/1oYVP5Y), inviting users in Europe to submit their requests.

“...we will assess each individual request and attempt to balance the privacy rights of the individual with the public’s right to know and distribute information,” the form reads.

“When evaluating your request, we will look at whether the results include outdated information about you, as well as whether there’s a public interest in the information—for example, information about financial scams, professional malpractice, criminal convictions, or public conduct of government officials...”

A Google spokesman said on Tuesday that the company had received over 41,000 requests to be forgotten so far.

On the first day itself, Google had received 12,000 requests.

“Almost a third of the requests were in relation to accusations of fraud, 20% were in relation to violent/serious crimes, and around 12% regarded child pornography arrests. More than 1,500 of these requests are believed to have come from people in the UK. An ex-politician seeking re-election, a paedophile and a GP (general practitioner) were among the British applicants”, according to a 2 June report inThe Telegraph of London.

The “right to be forgotten” judgment has raised a controversy. While some argue that it upholds an individual’s privacy, others say it leaves a lot of room for interpretation.

In an interview to Mint on 26 May, Anupam Chander, director of the California International Law Center, reasoned that if a person could simply scrub all the bad information about him from being searchable on the Internet, she/he could do so by claiming that such information was “no longer relevant”.

“Do we want search engines to then judge whether information remains “relevant” or is somehow “inadequate” under the threat of liability for leaving information accessible? An Internet sanitized of accessible negative information will only tell half the truth,” he argued.

The ruling is not binding on India and applies only to EU countries.

According to legal experts, the country has no provision for a right to be forgotten, either in the Information Technology (IT) Act 2000 (amended in 2008) or the IT Rules, 2011. India, for that matter, does not even have a privacy act as yet.

“In India, we do not have a concept of the right to be Forgotten. It’s a very Western concept,” said Pavan Duggal, a cyberlaw expert and Supreme Court advocate.

Still, intermediaries like search engines and Internet services providers, under the country’s IT Act and IT Rules, have the obligation to exercise due diligence if an aggrieved party sends them a written notice, he said.

According to Sunil Abraham, executive director of the Centre for Internet and Society, an Internet rights lobby group, “right to be forgotten” cases should pass the “public interest” test.

“Privacy protection should not have a chilling effect on transparency. The question is: Does the content (which a user wants to be removed) serve a public interest that outweighs the harm that it is doing to the individual concerned? If no public interest is being served, there is no point in knowing what the content is all about. The complication with the EU ruling is that it wants intermediaries and over-the-top providers to play the role of judges,” said Abraham.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/livemint-leslie-d-monte-june-5-2014-right-to-be-forgotten-poses-legal-dilemma-in-india

RFCs We Love: Transport & Apps Edition

Admin — 2019-03-08T00:17:57Z

The 2nd meetup of RFCs we love in 2019 was held at Go-Jek in Domlur on 2nd March 2019 in partnership with Bangalore Mobile performance group. Gurshabad Grover was a speaker at this event organized by India Internet Engineering Society.

Gurshabad Grover spoke about ongoing work in the Transport Layer Security (tls) working group of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) on Server Name Indication (SNI) encryption in TLS. For more info click here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/rfcs-we-love-transport-apps-edition

RFCs We Love meetup

Admin — 2019-02-02T13:43:36Z

In collaboration with India Internet Engineering Society (IIESoc), CIS hosted the a 'RFCs We Love' meetup, where we discussed some IETF specifications and standards. The event was held on January 19 at the CIS office, Bangalore.

The theme of the meetup was data centres and service providers. The agenda was:

10:00 - 10:10 Introduction
10:10 - 11:00 Link State Vector Running for DC Routing (Kannan)
11:00 - 11:50 Multicast via Bit Index Explicit Replication (Senthil)
11:50 - 12:40 Traffic Engineering in WAN (Shraddha)
12:40 - 13:00 Open Discussion and planning for Feb meetup
13:00 - 14:00 Lunch and networking

Dhruv Dhody has written about the meetup at the IIESoc blog, where you can also find slides used by the presenters and some photos of the event.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/rfcs-we-love-meetup

Revisiting Per Se vs Rule of Reason in Light of the Intel Conditional Rebate Case

Shruthi Anand — 2017-10-04T13:45:51Z

Recent developments in the European Union (EU) regarding the antitrust case against Intel have brought back into focus two rules of competition law analysis- the per se rule and the rule of reason. In light of the decision by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the matter, this Note examines the application of the two rules to the case in detail. Additionally, it analyzes the statutory and judicial basis for the rules in the context of the EU and Indian competition law regimes, and concludes by identifying some areas in which these concepts would be relevant.

Click on the link below to read the full article:

Revisiting Per Se vs Rule of Reason in Light of the Intel Conditional Rebate Case

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/revisiting-per-se-vs-rule-of-reason-in-light-of-the-intel-conditional-rebate-case

Revisiting Aadhaar: Law, Tech and Beyond

praskrishna — 2017-05-19T14:47:32Z

Udbhav Tiwari attended a panel on "Revisiting Aadhaar: Law, Tech and Beyond" held at the India International Centre Annexe on May 9, 2017 in New Delhi, organised by the Software Freedom Law Centre (SFLC.in) in collaboration with Digital Empowerment Foundation and IT for Change.

The panel consisted of:

Saikat Datta; Policy Director, Centre for Internet and Society (Moderator)
Anivar Aravind; Founder/Director at Indic Project
Anupam Saraph; Professor and Future Designer
Prasanna S; Advocate
Shyam Divan; Senior Advocate, Supreme Court
Srinivas Kodali; Co-founder at Open Stats
Osama Manzar; Founder and Director, Digital Empowerment Foundation
Usha Ramanathan; Legal Researcher

The panel was quite enlightening (and Saikat was a stellar moderator), with Mr. Divan's elucidation on the arguments made in the court for the Aadhaar case in particular being a great learning experience. Benjamin and Sheetal (both interns in the Delhi office) along with Sumandro also attended the event.

The other learning was that for people who have attended multiple such panels/seminars and meetings on Aadhaar, they can have a lot of repeated content. I passed on the feedback to SFLC about how they could possibly include a small 10 to 15 minute session in future such panels on developments since the previous such event on the Aadhaar and include practical aspects about what people can do about minimising the harms that we are all slowly being co opted into facing with the system.

More info about the event here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/revisiting-aadhaar-law-tech-and-beyond

Revenge Porn Laws across the World

Shradha Nigam — 2018-04-25T16:58:26Z

The following is a compilation of laws dealing with revenge porn if and how they exist across multiple countries and jurisdictions.

Country-wise legislation on “revenge porn” laws, click to download the file (PDF, 636 Kb)

Europe

United Kingdom
England and Wales
Scotland
Northern Ireland
Malta
Germany
France

United States of America

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Iowa
Kansas
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Michigan
Minnesota
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
North Carolina
North Dakota
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia. 20
Wisconsin. 20

Australia

New South Wales
South Australia.
Western Australia
Victoria

Asia and Rest of the World

Canada
Philippines
Israel
Japan

1. Europe

Country	Statute	Year	Contents – definition, classification, punishment, standard of proof	Punishment	Remarks
United Kingdom
England and Wales	Section 33, Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015	2015	Makes it an offence in England and Wales to disclose private sexual photographs and films without the consent of the individual depicted and with the intent to cause distress.	There is a maximum sentence of two years imprisonment	A call has been made to cover a wider range of offences through enactment of a new Act. The law is not applicable retroactively.
Scotland	Part 1, Section 2, Abusive Behaviour and Sexual Harm Act, 2016	2016	A person (“A”) commits an offence if— (a)A discloses, or threatens to disclose, a photograph or film which shows, or appears to show, another person (“B”) in an intimate situation, (b)by doing so, A intends to cause B fear, alarm or distress or A is reckless as to whether B will be caused fear, alarm or distress, and (c)the photograph or film has not previously been disclosed to the public at large, or any section of the public, by B or with B’s consent.	A person who commits such an offence is liable— (a)on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both), (b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or a fine (or both).
Northern Ireland	Part 3, Section 51, Amendment to Justice Act	2016	It is an offence for a person to disclose a private sexual photograph or film if the disclosure is made— (a)without the consent of an individual who appears in the photograph or film, and (b)with the intention of causing that individual distress.	A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable— (a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years or a fine (or both), and (b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both).
Malta	Article 208E, Maltese Criminal Code 2016	2016	It punishes whoever, with an intent to cause distress, emotional harm or harm of any nature, discloses a private sexual photograph or film without the consent of the person or persons displayed or depicted in such photograph or film.	Such person would, on conviction be liable to imprisonment for a term of up to two years or to a fine of not less than €,3000 and not more than €5,000, or to both such imprisonment and fine
Germany	General Data Protection Regulation Art Copyright Law		Regulation (EU) 679/2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) A person also has the right to object to the unauthorised dissemination or public display of his/her photograph (section 22, Art Copyright Law)	If privacy rights are infringed, the individual affected can seek civil law remedies, which include: Cease and desist orders, rectification and Compensatory damages.	In 2014, The Bundesgerichtshof (BGH), upheld an earlier ruling from a regional court in Koblenz, Germany, that said a man did not have the right to keep intimate photos of his ex-lover just because she had consented to taking them in the first place.
France	Digital Republic Act	2016	Under the new law, the persons have a right to oppose the use of their personal data.	Revenge porn may be sanctioned by 2 years of imprisonment and a 60.000 euro fine.

2. United States of America

State	Statute	Year	Constituents of the offence	Punishment	Remarks
Alabama	SB301. Code of Alabama 1975 Secs 15-20A-4 to 15-20A-43 amended.	2017	Distribution of an intimate, private image, also known as "revenge porn" or "nonconsensual pornography." The law applies when the depicted person has not consented to the transmission and the sender intends to harass or intimidate the depicted person.	A first offense is a Class A misdemeanor, punishable by up to a year in jail. Subsequent offenses are Class C felonies, punishable by up to 10 years in prison.
Alaska	Title 11. Criminal Law § 11.61.120		Provides that whoever publishes or distributes electronic or printed photographs, pictures, or films that show the genitals, anus, or female breast of the other person or show that person engaged in a sexual act commits a crime of harassment in second degree.	Harassment in the second degree is a class B misdemeanor. Class B misdemeanors are less serious crimes, punishable by up to 90 days in jail and a fine of up to $2,000.
Arizona	Unlawful Distribution of Private Images, 2016 through amending Section 13‑1425 of the Arizona Revised Statutes	2016	It provides that the distribution of images depicting states of nudity or specific sexual activities of another person is unlawful. If such disclosure is by electronic means, it is a Class 4 felony. If the person threatens to disclose but does not disclose, then it is a Class 1 Misdemeanor.	· Class 4 felonies are punishable up to 3.75 years in prison. · A class 1 misdemeanor is the most serious misdemeanor offense and is punishable by up to 6 months in jail, 3 years of probation (5 years maximum probation for DUI offenses) and a $2,500 fine plus surcharges.	· The earlier state revenge porn bill was scrapped due to an ACLU Lawsuit.
Arkansas	Arkansas Code 5-26-314	July, 2015	It criminalizes the distribution of an image, picture, video, or voice or audio recording of a sexual nature to harass, frighten, intimidate, threaten, or abuse a family or household member or a person in a current or former dating relationship; and for other purposes. Such an offence is a Class A misdemeanour.	· A Class A misdemeanor is the most serious type of misdemeanor in Arkansas and it is punishable by up to one year in jail and a fine of up to $2,500.	Defines a “dating relationship” as romantic/ intimate relationship between two individuals and provides additional factors.
California	Section 647(j)(4) of California Penal Code	2014	Under this provision an act of revenge porn is defined as someone who “photographs or records by any means the image of the intimate body part or parts of another identifiable person, under circumstances where the parties agree or understand that the image shall remain private, and the person subsequently distributes the image taken, with the intent to cause serious emotional distress, and the depicted person suffers serious emotional distress.	It shall be a disorderly conduct, misdemeanour.
Colorado	Colorado Revised Statutes 18-7-107 and 18-7-108.	2014	Posting a Private Image for Harassment and Posting a Private Image for Pecuniary Gain is a Class 1 Misdemeanor.	The defendant can be fined up to $10,000.
Connecticut	Section 53a-189a, Connecticut General Statutes	October 1, 2015	It provides that whoever indulges in Unlawful dissemination of an intimate image is guilty	The offence is a class A misdemeanor.
Delaware	§ 1335, Title 11 of the Delaware Code	2014	When a person knowingly reproduces, distributes, exhibits, publishes, transmits, or otherwise disseminates a visual depiction of a person who is nude, or who is engaging in sexual conduct, when the person knows or should have known that the reproduction, distribution, exhibition, publication, transmission, or other dissemination was without the consent of the person depicted and that the visual depiction was created or provided to the person under circumstances in which the person depicted has a reasonable expectation of privacy, such person shall be guilty of violation of privacy.	It is a class A misdemeanor; class G felony.
District of Columbia	Criminalization of Non-Consensual Pornography Act	2014	It provides that a person knowingly discloses one or more sexual images of another identified or identifiable person when: (1) The person depicted did not consent to the disclosure of the sexual image; (2) There was an agreement or understanding between the person depicted and the person disclosing that the sexual image would not be disclosed; and (3) The person disclosed the sexual image with the intent to harm the person depicted person depicted or to receive financial gain. (b) A person who violates this subsection shall be guilty of a misdemeanour.	Upon conviction such person shall be fined not more than the amount set forth in section 101 of the Criminal Fine Proportionality Amendment Act of 2012, approved June 11, 2013 (D.C. Law 19-317; D.C.42 Official Code § 22-3571.01), imprisoned for not more than 180 days, or both.
Florida	Florida Statute Section 784.049	2015	· “Sexually cyberharass” means to publish a sexually explicit image of a person that contains or conveys the personal identification information of the depicted person to an Internet website without the depicted person’s consent, for no legitimate purpose, with the intent of causing substantial emotional distress to the depicted person.	A person who willfully and maliciously sexually cyberharasses another person commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. If a person who has one prior conviction for sexual cyber harassment and who commits a second or subsequent sexual cyber harassment commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.	Aggrieved person can also initiate civil action to recover damages.
Georgia	Article 3 of Chapter 11 of Title 16 of the Official Code of Georgia	2014	· Whoever Electronically transmits or posts or causes such transmission or posting, in one or more transmissions or posts, a photograph or video which depicts nudity or sexually explicit conduct of an adult when the transmission or post is harassment or causes financial loss to the depicted person and serves no legitimate purpose to the depicted person.	Such person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of a high and aggravated nature; provided, however, that upon a second or subsequent violation of this Code section, he or she shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than one nor more than five years, a fine of not more than $100,000.00, or both.	There is a rebuttable presumption on the Internet Service Provider that it was not aware of the content of such post
Hawaii	Section 711-1110.9, Hawaii Revised Statutes	2014	A person commits the offense of violation of privacy in the first degree if The person knowingly discloses an image or video of another identifiable person either in the nude, as defined in section 712-1210, or engaging in sexual conduct, as defined in section 712-1210, without the consent of the depicted person, with intent to harm substantially the depicted person with respect to that person’s health, safety, business, calling, career, financial condition, reputation, or personal relationships.	Violation of privacy in the first degree is a class C felony. In addition to any penalties the court may impose, the court may order the destruction of any recording made in violation of this section	Exception has been carved out for When the person was voluntarily nude in public or voluntarily engaging in sexual conduct in public.
Idaho	Idaho Code 18-6609(2)(b)	2017	Intentionally or with reckless disregard disseminating, publishing or selling (or conspiring) any image or images of the intimate areas of another person or persons without the consent of such other person or persons and he knows or reasonably should have known that one or both parties agreed or understood that the images should remain private.	The punishments are decided on a case by case basis, but seem to range from state prison terms of three to five years, and/or a fine of up to $5,000 based on the cases that have emerged
Illinois	Section 11-23.5 of The Illinois Criminal Code of 2012	2015	Criminalises the Non-Consensual Dissemination of Private Sexual Images.	It is a Class 4 Felony.
Iowa	Section708.7 of the Code of 2017	2017	Dissemination, publication, distribution or causing it thereof of photograph or film showing another person in partial or full nudity or engaged in a sex act, without consent, is harassment.	Such an offence is harassment in first degree and is an aggravated misdemeanour
Kansas	Section 21-6101(a)(8) of Kansas State Act	2016	Breach of privacy is knowingly and without lawful authority: disseminating any videotape, photograph, film or image of another identifiable person 18 years of age or older who is nude or engaged in sexual activity and under circumstances in which such identifiable person had a reasonable expectation of privacy, with the intent to harass, threaten or intimidate such identifiable person, and such identifiable person did not consent to such dissemination	Such an offence is a Severity level 8, person felony
Louisiana	R.S. 14:283.2	2015	A person commits the offense of non-consensual disclosure of a private mage when all of the following occur: (1) The person intentionally discloses an image of another person who is seventeen years of age or older, who is identifiable from the image or information displayed in connection with the image, and whose intimate parts are exposed in whole or in part. (2) The person who discloses the image obtained it under circumstances in which a reasonable person would know or understand that the image was to remain private. (3) The person who discloses the image knew or should have known that the person in the image did not consent to the disclosure of the image. (4) The person who discloses the image has the intent to harass or cause emotional distress to the person in the image, and the person who commits the offense knew or should have known that the disclosure could harass or cause emotional distress to the person in the image	Whoever commits the offense of non-consensual disclosure of a private image shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars, imprisoned with or without hard labour for not more than two years, or both	No liability is imposed on the computer service used for posting such image
Maine	Section 1 17-A MRSA §511-A	2015	A person is guilty of unauthorized dissemination of certain private images if the person, with the intent to harass, torment or threaten the depicted person or another person, knowingly disseminates, displays or publishes a photograph, videotape, film or digital recording of another person in a state of nudity or engaged in a sexual act or engaged in sexual contact in a manner in which there is no public or newsworthy purpose when the person knows or should have known that the depicted person: (1) Is 18 years of age or older; (2) Is identifiable from the image itself or information displayed in connection with the image; and (3) Has not consented to the dissemination, display or publication of the private image.	Unauthorized dissemination of certain private images is a Class D crime.
Maryland	§ 3-809, Maryland Code.	2014	A person may not intentionally cause serious emotional distress to another by intentionally placing on the internet an identifiable a photograph, film, videotape, recording, or any other reproduction of the image of the other person that reveals the identity of the other person with his or her intimate parts exposed or while engaged in an act of sexual contact: (1) knowing that the other person did not consent to the placement of the image on the internet; and (2) under circumstances in which the other person had a reasonable expectation that the image would be kept private.	A person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 2 years or a fine not exceeding $5,000 or both.
Michigan	Sec 145e of MCL	2016	If a person threatens, coerces, or intimidates dissemination of any sexually explicit visual material of another person shall be punishable under section 145f.	Section 145f- first offense punishable by 93 day sentence or fine up to $500.
Minnesota	§ 617.261, Minnesota Statutes	2016	A cause of action against a person for the non-consensual dissemination of private sexual images exists when: (1) a person disseminated an image without the consent of the person depicted in the image; (2) the image is of an individual depicted in a sexual act or whose intimate parts are exposed in whole or in part; (3) the person is identifiable: (i) from the image itself, by the person depicted in the image or by another person; or (ii) from the personal information displayed in connection with the image; and (4) the image was obtained or created under circumstances in which the person depicted had a reasonable expectation of privacy. The fact that the individual depicted in the image consented to the creation of the image or to the voluntary private transmission of the image is not a defense to liability for a person who has disseminated the image without consent.	Conviction for nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images qualifies as a prior “qualified domestic violence-related offense” that enhances penalties for convictions for domestic assault, 4th & 5th degree assault, stalking, and violation of a harassment restraining order.	Consent to such image being taken is no defense
Nevada	Sections 2-6 of Chapter 200 of NRS	2015	A person commits the crime of unlawful dissemination of an intimate image when, with the intent to harass, harm or terrorize another person, the person electronically disseminates or sells an intimate image which depicts the other person and the other person: (1) did not give prior consent to the electronic dissemination or sale; (2) had a reasonable expectation that the intimate image would be kept private and would not be made visible to the public; and (3) was at least 18 years of age when the intimate image was created	Such person is guilty of a category D felony
New Hampshire	§ 644:9-a, N.H. Rev. Stat.	2016	Nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images with the intent to harass, intimidate, threaten, or coerce the depicted person.	It is a felony.
New Jersey	§ 2C:14-9, New Jersey Code	2015	Making a nonconsensual recording that reveals another person’s "intimate parts" or shows the person engaged in a sexual act without consent.	Felony, three to five years in prison, a fine not to exceed $15,000.
New Mexico	HB 142, new section added to the New Mexico Criminal Code	2015	Unauthorised distribution of sensitive images without that person’s consent with the intent to harass, humiliate or intimidate that person or cause substantial emotional distress is a misdemeanour.	It is a misdemeanour. Upon a second or subsequent conviction, the offender is guilty of a fourth degree felony
North Carolina	§ 14-190.5A, Article 26 of Chapter 14 of the General Statutes	2015	A person is guilty of disclosure of private images if all of the following apply: (1) The person knowingly discloses an image of another person with the intent to do either of the following: a. Coerce, harass, intimidate, demean, humiliate, or cause financial loss to the depicted person. b. Cause others to coerce, harass, intimidate, demean, humiliate, or cause financial loss to the depicted person. (2) The depicted person is identifiable from the disclosed image itself or information offered in connection with the image. (3) The depicted person's intimate parts are exposed or the depicted person is engaged in sexual conduct in the disclosed image. (4) The person discloses the image without the affirmative consent of the depicted person. (5) The person discloses the image under circumstances such that the person knew or should have known that the depicted person had a reasonable expectation of privacy.	For an offense by a person who is 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense, the violation is a Class H felony. For a first offense by a person who is under 18 years of age at the time of the offense, the violation is a Class 1 misdemeanor. For a second or subsequent offense by a person who is under the age of 18 at the time of the offense, the violation is a Class H felony	The Court may order destruction of such image. This provision is in addition to civil and criminal remedies.
North Dakota	Section 12.1-17-07.2 of the North Dakota Century Code	2015	· A person commits the offense of distribution of intimate images if the person knowingly or intentionally distributes to any third party any intimate image of an individual eighteen years of age or older, if: (1) The person knows that the depicted individual has not given consent to the person to distribute the intimate image; (2) The intimate image was created by or provided to the person under circumstances in which the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy; and (3) Actual emotional distress or harm is caused to the individual as a result of the distribution under this section.	Distribution of an intimate image is a class A misdemeanor
Oklahoma	Section 1040.13b of Title 21, Oklahoma Statutes	2016	· A person commits nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images when he or she: (1) Intentionally disseminates an image of another person: a. who is at least eighteen (18) years of age, b. who is identifiable from the image itself or information displayed in connection with the image, and c. who is engaged in a sexual act or whose intimate parts are exposed, in whole or in part; (2) Disseminates the image with the intent to harass, intimidate or coerce the person, or under circumstances in which a reasonable person would know or understand that dissemination of the image would harass, intimidate or coerce the person (3) Obtains the image under circumstances in which a reasonable person would know or understand that the image was to remain private; and (4) Knows or a reasonable person should have known that the person in the image has not consented to the dissemination.	Any person who violates the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanour punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not more than. One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00), or both such fine and imprisonment	The court shall have the authority to order the defendant to remove the disseminated image should the court find it is in the power of the defendant to do so.
Oregon	ORS 161.005	2015	· (1) A person commits the crime of unlawful dissemination of an intimate image if: (a) The person, with the intent to harass, humiliate or injure another person, knowingly causes to be disclosed through an Internet website an identifiable image of the other person whose intimate parts are visible or who is engaged in sexual conduct; (b) The person knows or reasonably should have known that the other person does not consent to the disclosure; (c) The other person is harassed, humiliated or injured by the disclosure; and (d) A reasonable person would be harassed, humiliated or injured by the disclosure.	Unlawful dissemination of an intimate image is a Class A misdemeanor. Unlawful dissemination of an intimate image is a Class C felony if the person has a prior conviction under this section at the time of the offense.
Pennsylvania	Title 18 Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes § 3131	2014	A person commits the offense of unlawful dissemination of intimate image if, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm a current or former sexual or intimate partner, the person disseminates a visual depiction of the current or former sexual or intimate partner in a state of nudity or engaged in sexual conduct.	· An offense shall be: (1) A misdemeanor of the first degree, when the person depicted is a minor. (2) A misdemeanor of the second degree, when the person depicted is not a minor.
South Dakota	Section 4 of Chapter 22-21 of South Dakota Code of Laws	2015	No person may use or disseminate in any form any visual recording or photographic device to photograph or visually record any other person without clothing or under or through the clothing, or with another person depicted in a sexual manner, for the purpose of viewing the body of, or the undergarments worn by, that other person, without the consent or knowledge of that other person, with the intent to self-gratify, to harass, or embarrass and invade the privacy of that other person, under circumstances in which the other person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.	A violation of this section is a Class 1 misdemeanor. However, a violation of this section is a Class 6 felony if the victim is seventeen years of age or younger and the perpetrator is at least twenty-one years old.
Tennessee	Chapter 872 Tenn. Pub. Act	2017	(a) A person commits unlawful exposure who, with the intent to cause emotional distress, distributes an image of the intimate part or parts of another identifiable person if: (1) The image was photographed or recorded under circumstances where the parties agreed or understood that the image would remain private; and (2) The person depicted in the image suffers emotional distress. (b) As used in this section: (1) "Emotional distress" has the same meaning as defined in § 39-17-315; and (2) "Intimate part" means any portion of the primary genital area, buttock, or any portion of the female breast below the top of the areola that is either uncovered or visible through less than fully opaque clothing.	A violation of subsection (a) is a Class A misdemeanor. However, nothing in this section precludes punishment under any other section of law providing for greater punishment.
Texas	Chapter 98B, ATitle 4, Civil Practice and Remedies Code	2015	(a)A defendant is liable, as provided by this chapter, to a person depicted in intimate visual material for damages arising from the disclosure of the material if: (1)the defendant discloses the intimate visual material without the effective consent of the depicted person; (2)the intimate visual material was obtained by the defendant or created under circumstances in which the depicted person had a reasonable expectation that the material would remain private; (3)the disclosure of the intimate visual material causes harm to the depicted person; and (4)the disclosure of the intimate visual material reveals the identity of the depicted person in any manner, including through: (A)any accompanying or subsequent information or material related to the intimate visual material; or (B)information or material provided by a third party in response to the disclosure of the intimate visual material (b) defendant is liable, as provided by this chapter, to a person depicted in intimate visual material for damages arising from the promotion of the material if, knowing the character and content of the material, the defendant promotes intimate visual material described by Subsection (a) on an Internet website or other forum for publication that is owned or operated by the defendant.	An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor. If conduct that constitutes an offense under this section also constitutes an offense under another law, the actor may be prosecuted under this section, the other law, or both.	Aggrieved person may recover actual and exemplary damages. The provisions shall be liberally construed by the courts to promote its underlying purpose to protect Persons from, and provide adequate remedies to victims of, the disclosure or promotion of intimate visual material.
Utah	§ 76-5b-203, Utah Code.	2014	An actor commits the offense of distribution of intimate images if the actor, with the intent to cause emotional distress or harm, knowingly or intentionally distributes to any third party any intimate image of an individual who is 18 years of age or older, if: (a) the actor knows that the depicted individual has not given consent to the actor to distribute the intimate image; (b) the intimate image was created by or provided to the actor under circumstances in which the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy; and (c) actual emotional distress or harm is caused to the person as a result of the distribution under this section.	Distribution of an intimate image is a class A misdemeanour.
Vermont	Sec. 2. 13 V.S.A. § 2606	2015	A person violates this section if he or she knowingly discloses a visual image of an identifiable person who is nude or who is engaged in sexual conduct, without his or her consent, with the intent to harm, harass, intimidate, threaten, or coerce the person depicted, and the disclosure would cause a reasonable person to suffer harm. A person may be identifiable from the image itself or information offered in connection with the image. Consent to recording of the visual image does not, by itself, constitute consent for disclosure of the image.	A person who violates this provision shall be imprisoned not more than two years or fined not more than $2,000.00, or both. A person who violates this provision with the intent of disclosing the image for financial profit shall be imprisoned not more than five years or fined not more than $10,000.00, or both.	In addition, the Court may order equitable relief, including a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, or a permanent injunction ordering the defendant to cease display or disclosure of the image. The Court may grant injunctive relief maintaining the confidentiality of a plaintiff using a pseudonym.
Virginia	§ 18.2-386.2, Code of Virginia	2014	Any person who, with the intent to coerce, harass, or intimidate, maliciously disseminates or sells any videographic or still image created by any means whatsoever that depicts another person who is totally nude, or in a state of undress so as to expose the genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or female breast, where such person knows or has reason to know that he is not licensed or authorized to disseminate or sell such videographic or still image is guilty.	Such an offense is a Class 1 misdemeanor.
Washington	Title 9A RCW	2015	A person commits the crime of disclosing intimate images when the person knowingly discloses an intimate image of another person and the person disclosing the image: (a) Obtained it under circumstances in which a reasonable person would know or understand that the image was to remain private; (b) Knows or should have known that the depicted person has not consented to the disclosure; and10 (c) Knows or reasonably should know that disclosure would cause harm to the depicted person.	The crime of disclosing intimate images: (a) Is a gross misdemeanor on the first offense; or (b) Is a class C felony if the defendant has one or more prior convictions for disclosing intimate images.	A person who is under the age of eighteen is not guilty of the crime of disclosing intimate images unless the person: (a) Intentionally and maliciously disclosed an intimate image of another person; (b) Obtained it under circumstances in which a reasonable person would know or understand that the image was to remain private; and (c) Knows or should have known that the depicted person has not consented to the disclosure
West Virginia	§61-8-28a, Code of West Virginia	2017	No person may knowingly and intentionally disclose, cause to be disclosed or threaten to disclose, with the intent to harass, intimidate, threaten, humiliate, embarrass, or coerce, an image of another which shows the intimate parts of the depicted person or shows the depicted person engaged in sexually explicit conduct which was captured under circumstances where the person depicted had a reasonable expectation that the image would not be publicly disclosed.	A person convicted is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be confined in jail for not more than one year, fined not less than $1,000 nor more than $5,000, or both confined and fined.
Wisconsin	§ 942.09, Code of Wisconsin	2014	It provides for posting or publishing a sexually explicit image without consent and providing a penalty. Such an offence is a Class A misdemeanour.	Class A misdemeanors can result in fines up to $10,000, imprisonment up to 9 months or a combination of the two.

3. Australia

Country	Statute	Year	Contents – definition, classification, punishment, standard of proof	Punishment	Remarks
New South Wales	Section 91Q, Crimes Act 1900	2018	A person who intentionally distributes an intimate image of another person: (a) without the consent of the person, and (b) knowing the person did not consent to the distribution or being reckless as to whether the person consented to the distribution, is guilty of an offence. "intimate image" means: (a) an image of a person's private parts, or of a person engaged in a private act, in circumstances in which a reasonable person would reasonably expect to be afforded privacy, or (b) an image that has been altered to appear to show a person's private parts, or a person engaged in a private act, in circumstances in which a reasonable person would reasonably expect to be afforded privacy.	Maximum penalty: 100 penalty units or imprisonment for 3 years, or both.
South Australia	Summary Offences Act 1953	2018	A person who distributes an invasive image of another person, knowing or having reason to believe that the other person— (a) does not consent to that particular distribution of the image; or (b) does not consent to that particular distribution of the image and does not consent to distribution of the image generally, is guilty of an offence. An image of a person will be taken to be an invasive image of the person if it depicts the person in a place other than a public place— (a) engaged in a private act; or (b) in a state of undress such that— (i) in the case of a female—the bare breasts are visible; or (ii) in any case—the bare genital or anal region is visible. (3) However, an image of a person that falls within the standards of morality, decency and propriety generally accepted by reasonable adults in the community will not be taken to be an invasive image of the person.	Maximum penalty: (a) if the invasive image is of a person under the age of 17 years—$20000 or imprisonment for 4 years; (b) in any other case—$10 000 or imprisonment for 2 years.
Western Australia	Section 10G/61, Restraining Orders and Related Legislation Amendment (Family Violence) Act 2016	2016	A court may restrain the respondent from doing all or any of the following in the case of a family violence restraining order: distributing or publishing, or threatening to distribute or publish, intimate personal images of the person seeking to be protected;	2 years imprisonment.	Check comes into play only in case of a family violence restraining order and is not general protection.
Victoria	Section 41C, Summary Offences Act 1966	2012	A person who visually captures or has visually captured an image of another person's genital or anal region must not intentionally distribute that image.	2 years imprisonment.

4. Asia and Rest of the World

Country	Statute	Year	Contents – definition, classification, punishment, standard of proof	Punishment	Remarks
Canada	Section 162.1, Criminal Code through Bill C-13 or Cyberbullying Act	2015	Everyone who knowingly publishes, distributes, transmits, sells, makes available or advertises an intimate image of a person knowing that the person depicted in the image did not give their consent to that conduct, or being reckless as to whether or not that person gave their consent to that conduct, is guilty. In this section, “intimate image” means a visual recording of a person made by any means including a photographic, film or video recording, (a) in which the person is nude, is exposing his or her genital organs or anal region or her breasts or is engaged in explicit sexual activity; (b) in respect of which, at the time of the recording, there were circumstances that gave rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy; and (c) in respect of which the person depicted retains a reasonable expectation of privacy at the time the offence is committed.	Punishment is: (a) of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years; or (b) of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
Philippines	Anti-Photo and Video Voyeurism Act of 2009		It is hereby prohibited and declared unlawful for any person: (a) To take photo or video coverage of a person or group of persons performing sexual act or any similar activity or to capture an image of the private area of a person/s such as the naked or undergarment clad genitals, public area, buttocks or female breast without the consent of the person/s involved and under circumstances in which the person/s has/have a reasonable expectation of privacy; (b) To copy or reproduce, or to cause to be copied or reproduced, such photo or video or recording of sexual act or any similar activity with or without consideration; (c) To sell or distribute, or cause to be sold or distributed, such photo or video or recording of sexual act, whether it be the original copy or reproduction thereof; or (d) To publish or broadcast, or cause to be published or broadcast, whether in print or broadcast media, or show or exhibit the photo or video coverage or recordings of such sexual act or any similar activity through VCD/DVD, internet, cellular phones and other similar means or device. The prohibition under paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) shall apply notwithstanding that consent to record or take photo or video coverage of the same was given by such person/s. Any person who violates this provision shall be liable for photo or video voyeurism as defined herein.	The penalty of imprisonment of not less that three (3) years but not more than seven (7) years and a fine of not less than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) but not more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), or both, at the discretion of the court shall be imposed upon any person found guilty of violating Section 4 of this Act. If the violator is a juridical person, its license or franchise shall be automatically be deemed revoked and the persons liable shall be the officers thereof including the editor and reporter in the case of print media, and the station manager, editor and broadcaster in the case of a broadcast media. If the offender is a public officer or employee, or a professional, he/she shall be administratively liable. If the offender is an alien, he/she shall be subject to deportation proceedings after serving his/her sentence and payment of fines.
Israel	Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law, 5758-1998 amended in 2014	2014	The distribution of still pictures or video recordings of a person’s image that focuses on his/her sexuality, including by editing or incorporation, is unlawful if made: 1. without the person’s consent; 2. in a way that facilitates identification of the person; and 3. under circumstances that may degrade or shame him/her The distribution of such an image constitutes sexual harassment under section 3(a) of the Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law and intentional harm to a person’s privacy under section 5 of the Protection of Privacy Law.	The crimes are punishable with five years of imprisonment, in addition to subjecting the perpetrator to civil liability and the duty to pay monetary compensation to the victim.
Japan	Act on Prevention of Damage by Provision of Private Sexual Image Records Act	2014	It criminalizes the provision of a private sexual image of another person without the person’s approval via a means of telecommunication to an unspecified number of or to many people. It allows Internet service providers to delete suspected revenge porn images without the uploader’s consent, in cases where: 1. the victim had notified the provider of the existence of the image; 2. the provider had requested the consent of the uploader to delete the image; and 3. the uploader did not respond or delete the image.	A maximum sentence of 500,000 yen or three years in jail.	The Act also obligates the national and local governments to ease victims’ embarrassment when they report the crime. For especially young potential victims, the Act further obligates the governments to educate people on how to avoid revenge porn.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/revenge-porn-laws-across-the-world

Revealed: Bangalore’s Basic Instincts

praskrishna — 2012-01-10T06:50:25Z

This is a first – a sex survey that focusses only on Bangalore. Sure, we have sex surveys telling us what the country thinks. But we wanted to know what our city thinks about the three-letter word. The article was published in the Bangalore Mirror on 8 January 2012. Sunil Abraham is quoted right near the end on why Bangalore might not figure in Google Search rends' top 10 India locations for porn-related queries.

And it wasn’t just sex that we discussed. We also quizzed people on fidelity – emotional and physical – homosexuality and love. Predictably, Bangalore’s responses were far from predictable.

Instant attraction

Cynics may scoff at love at first sight, but youngsters are not yet cynical. And love seems to be catching people very young with kids as young as 13 claiming to be struck by Cupid, leaving even school principals shocked.

D Shashi Kumar, principal of Blossoms School, says, “Even kids from fourth to sixth standard claim to have fallen in love at first sight. I am flabbergasted and it’s difficult to deal with this though it is normal even in primary schools. Where is the innocence that one associates with childhood? They seem to be in a hurry to grow up.”

But, given Bangalore’s overwhelming response in favour of instant love, we found someone with a happy ending. Hear it from Narasimha Murthy: “We looked, we smiled and I was a goner. It’s been eight years since we got married and that love still continues to make my heart beat faster every time I see her."

True love waits?

The rip-roaring double standards for the goose and gander does not exist more strongly in any other case. Despite the emergence of the metrosexual male, men still want virgin brides.

As a result, women find it difficult to confess about their previous sexual partners. For instance, 28-year-old Menaka has been married for more than four years, but her guilty conscience hasn’t given up. “I had a boyfriend in college with whom I was intimate. When I got married, I decided to let my past be and start afresh. Everybody has a past, why rake it up and ruin your future? The more practical reason for me to have made that decision was because I knew it would ruin my married life. But then, my husband recently confessed about his affairs before we got married and now I am consumed with guilt. But what would have been even more ideal was for me to have waited till I got married,” she says.

Masti after marriage?

A city that so overwhelmingly believes in love seems to think nothing of infidelity. It’s all about the thrill.

Abhishek Rana, for instance, is a self-confessed stud since college. His list of girlfriends was like a telephone directory and he managed to date multiple girls simultaneously. Finally, he tied the knot with his childhood sweetheart (who knew about his escapades) a couple of years ago and is quite happy with his marriage. But that has not stopped the Casanova. “If anything, I am going out with more women now than I did before I was married.

Back then, it was the thrill of watching me succeed with the ladies where the others failed. Now, it is the thrill of making sure I don’t get caught by my wife. It is forbidden so it makes it more attractive. I have to come up with innovative reasons when I go home late. Once I told her I was helping my Man Friday’s daughter with homework in the office and she bought it! It’s not that I’m not happy with my wife. But, you need to keep the zing in life,” says this alumnus of a top B-school in India.

Unhappy about gays

It has been nine long years since Adithya Rao’s (name changed) father has spoken to him. “I was 24 when I told him I was gay and that was it. He slapped me and that was the last time he ever spoke to me,” says this designer who takes his boyfriends home to introduce them to his mother. “She is the one who keeps peace in the family,” says Adithya.

Forget the decriminalisation of Article 377. Homosexuality is still taboo in the city. Nithin Manayath, who is gay and a very vocal activist for the rights of homosexuals, says it is the shame around the idea of being homosexual that is the main problem. This 33-year-old English literature professor says, “My extended family knows that I am gay because I have even appeared on television. But I still have overzealous aunts and uncles who tell me about this ‘nice girl’ that I should meet. So depending on who it is, I politely tell them to introduce me to guys instead. I don’t think it is the idea of men sleeping with men that has them in knots. Their problem is talking about it in public. Even my parents don’t really talk about it. My mum is sometimes okay talking about it. But dad prefers to just never bring it up.”

Live-in is in

For ad woman Ashima, 28, and HR professional Jeremy, 31, (names changed), after five years of being in a relationship, the next logical step was to move in together. Although the decision didn’t come easy with parents opposing it, the couple went ahead and moved in together in January last year. Ashima says she always wanted to live together with her partner before taking the plunge.

“When you are dating someone, it’s different. You don’t get to spend that much time together. It is only when you are living with a person that you can understand how your partner lives, know his personal hygiene, his moods, his habits. I thought living-in would be a good way to test our compatibility before deciding to get married,” said Ashima.

Jeremy says moving in was also a matter of convenience. “It made sense economically as well for us to move in together. Both our parents don’t live in the city but when we told them about our decision, their primary concern was what people would say,” he said.

Dr Bhupendra Chaudhury, consultant psychiatrist, The Apollo Clinic, Koramangala, says that live-in relationships are never permanent. “Live-in relationships are always transient. The good thing about a live-in relationship is that both the people in the relationship are not sure about where the relationship will lead. With a change in the demographic trend where most people are living away from their families, a live-in relationship is natural. With such couples, there is no family pressure and with both partners working, they can afford their own expenses and in most cases parents don’t know about it. A live-in relationship can either end in separation or marriage but I have never come across any couple who has lived together for long. It is never permanent,” said Dr Bhupendra.

In the case of Ashima and Jeremy, they passed the compatibility test and after a year of living together, they are ready to say ‘I do’ this month.

Pure emotions

When Uma Rao found out that her husband of 30 years had cheated on her with a young girl, it hit her hard. “At first, I thought he was going through a mid-life crisis and was looking to spice up his life. I imagined it was just a fling. But, when he said that he was in love with her, I was shattered,” says Uma who divorced her husband last month.

But what if it was the other way round? Rajesh, Uma’s former husband, says: “If Uma had had the affair, I don’t think I would have been able forgive her. I think it is a man-woman thing,” says the father of a 20-something daughter. Incidentally, he’s considering marrying his girlfriend who is also in her 20s.

One wild night

“Why not,” asks Pavithra (name changed), a college student who has already had multiple partners. “I am single and I have the right to enjoy life,” says the nubile young thing who does not label it as sexual promiscuity, but experimentation. “I don’t come from my mother’s generation to subscribe to the idea that you have to sleep with only your husband. Sexual attraction has nothing to do with love or other mushy emotions,” she says.

But for 39-year-old Manjunath, a photographer who indulges in one-night stands, “one-night-stands or a sexual partner is a much better option than dating somebody after you get married. It is too much risk with too little benefit. Enjoy the experience and move on.”

The work-shift rift

Any sexologist tell you that the most number of cases with marital problems are between couples who work in highly stressful jobs. “Couples are now older as people are more concerned about their careers. They do not realise that people have to give time to a marriage. I once had a couple come in after just two weeks of their marriage. While the wife worked in an advertising firm, the husband worked in a call centre.

So they had no time for each other and they realised this within two weeks of marriage. Relationships need patience and perseverance more than anything else. Finally, it came as no surprise that they were divorced within a year,” says Mamtha Shetty, a psychiatrist in the city.

Social network gets a poke

“My husband works in Mumbai and I work in Bangalore. We meet once in a month and Facebook is the only way I keep in touch with him and know what is happening in his life minute by minute. Now, most people think that we can do this over the phone, but we are so tired at the end of the day, I don’t have the energy to have a long-drawn conversation,” says Shefali Gupta.

There are many such couples, you realise, if you listen to Suma Gowda, a private marriage counsellor. “I had a case where the couple were on the verge of getting a divorce, because the husband had complimented his ex-girl friend on Facebook. But what made it even more weird was that their entire fight was going on on Facebook. They refused to talk about it at home whenever they got together. You need to understand that talking is what keeps the marriage going,” she says.

“The days of marriage as an institution are all but over. Today people see it as a compartment and that is where the problem begins. You have to emotionally invest in relationships. Couples today treat it like they can lock it away as a small part of their lives instead of looking at it as an anchor. They don’t have the patience to make a relationship work and it is not just marriage that I am talking about. It is almost like couples have a separate person for every need of theirs,” says Sushil Unni, a certified life coach.

Porn supremacy

Vinutha Reddy never understood why her husband would lock himself in his study. “My husband was uninterested in me sexually. We had had sex once in the six months that we were married. When I finally summoned the courage and told him that we need to get some help, he refused. After a lot of pressure from the family, he agreed, and it was then that he opened up about his fetish for middle-aged women. He would surf the internet all night to find these websites. There was nothing I could do about it,” says the homemaker who is still in the marriage since the last five years because of family pressure.

But despite this, Bangalore does not figure in the top 10 of porn-surfing cities in India while Mangalore makes it. Sunil Abraham, executive director, Centre for Internet Society, explains the science of surfing. “If you look at the Google trend or any other website, Bangalore does not figure among the top 10 cities that surfs for porn. But that does not mean that Bangalore does not surf porn. It only means that we have a very sophisticated surfer with a very specific type. They don’t go through Google or other websites. They know how to go about it. But whether it affects their personal lives is lot more complicated,” he says.

After a lot of family pressure, he opened up about his fetish for middle-aged women.

Read the original in Bangalore Mirror

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/revealed-bangalore2019s-basic-instincts

Rethinking the Internet: The Way Forward

praskrishna — 2013-03-13T04:53:21Z

Telecom Italia and Financial Times are organizing this event at Telecom Italia Future Centre in Italy on March 21 and 22, 2013. Pranesh Prakash is participating in this event.

Overview

The advent of smartphones and other mobile devices, and the resulting explosive growth in internet usage have transformed the way that societies communicate. The internet is a major driver for global economies as it continues to create new forms of interaction, and offers unprecedented business opportunities and profitable collaborations. The evolution of the internet is however also contributing to changing social perceptions of privacy and copyright, and concerns are developing about the security of countries and organisations, and the liabilities of internet intermediaries.

Another crucial issue is internet governance. Some doubts have been cast on the effectiveness of the present decision-making model in setting the basis for an investment-conducive and future-proof framework, and in balancing the interests of all the players involved in the market scenario.

Rethinking the Internet: The Way Forward, organised by the Financial Times and Telecom Italia, will contribute to this debate by featuring interactive CEO-level workshops that explore the impact of the internet on business models, the role of public and private collaborations in enabling innovation, the key policy, governance and security considerations that need to be addressed, and future implications of the internet evolution for all players in the global communications industry.

Agenda Day One: Thursday, March 22, 2013

10:30- 11:05	Registration and networking
11:05- 11:15	Chair's opening remarks
11:15- 11:30	Welcome address by Telecom Italia
11:30- 01:30	Introduction to Rethinking the Internet How will the internet continue to evolve and what implications does this have for future business models? Who will be the key industry players in the next 10 years and which collaborations, investments and infrastructure developments will yield sustainable growth? How sustainable is the internet as a business model? Will excessive policy-making and regulatory controls curb innovation? Where is the industry heading now?
01:30- 02:30	Lunch
02:30 - 04:30	A New Internet Governance What are the latest developments in internet governance policy-making? What changes can be expected in the near future? How can policy groups and organisations work together to create a balanced and fair internet governance model? What are the limitations of the current recommendations and what improvements need to be made? What are the implications for privacy, online anonymity and data protection?
04:30- 05:00	Refreshments
05:00 - 07:00	Internet Security What new threats and challenges are being created by the internet evolution and how are governments legislating for this? As cybersecurity continues to become a threat, can policies keep up with industry innovations and technological advances? How can a truly global internet be monitored and managed by international jurisdictions with different national priorities? What role do non-governmental entities have to play in policing the internet and making it more secure?
07:00 - 07:10	Chair's concluding remarks
07:10	Drinks reception, followed by Dinner

Agenda Day Two: Friday, March 23, 2013

08:30- 08:50	Arrival and networking
08:50- 09:00	Chair's opening remarks
09:00- 11:00	Internet Privacy and Copyrights Co-operation between policy-makers and industry players is critical in encouraging an open communications ecosystem. What pitfalls need to be avoided to ensure that all stakeholder interests are taken into account, including those of the customer? What safeguards need to be put into place to ensure that sensitive data is protected? How is copyright protected in the new digital age? Can the rights of content creators be protected whilst embracing an open internet? Does net neutrality necessarily equal internet freedom? And how is the right government intervention – internet freedom balance maintained?
11:00- 11:30	Refreshments
11:30- 01:30	Internet after OTT Why are commercial agreements among telco and other communication providers so critical to the provision of internet-enabled products and services? What collaborations are necessary to ensure that internet development and investment contribute to economic growth and market competition? And what role does policy have to play in supporting these commercial initiatives?
01:30- 02:30	Lunch
02:30- 04:00	Overview of Key Themes raised during the Two Day Meeting
04:00	Conclusion

Currently confirmed to participate now include:

Alessandro Acquisti, Associate Professor of Information Technology and Public Policy, Carnegie Mellon University

Jan Philipp Albrecht MdEP / MEP, Member, European Parliament

Virgilio Augusto Fernandes Almeida, Secretary for Information Technology Policies, Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (MCTI-SEPIN), Brazil

Suleyman Anil, Head, Cyber Defence Section, Emerging Security Challenges Division, NATO

Johannes M Bauer, Professor, Telecommunication, Information Studies, and Media and Director of Special Programs, Quello Center for Telecommunication Management & Law, Michigan State University

Franco Bernabè, Chairman and CEO of Telecom Italia

Anne Bouverot, Director General & Member of the Board, GSMA

Peter Bradwell, Campaigner, Open Rights Group

Angelo Maria Cardani, Chairman, AGCOM

James W. Cicconi, Senior Executive Vice President-External and Legislative Affairs, AT&T Services, Inc

Giuseppe Corasaniti, General Prosecutor, Italian Supreme Court

Juan Carlos De Martin, Faculty co-director, nexa center for internet & society, Politecnico di Torino and Faculty Fellow, berkman center for internet & society, Harvard University

Adrian Farrel, Routing Area Director, IETF, Juniper Networks and Old Dog Consulting

William W Fisher, Wilmer Hale Professor of Intellectual Property Law and Faculty Director, Berkman Center for Internet and Society, Harvard University

Luigi Gambardella, Chairman Executive Board, ETNO

Hartmut Richard Glaser, Executive Secretary/CGI.br, Brazilian Internet Steering Committee

David A. Gross, Former U.S. Coordinator for International Communications and Information Policy and Partner, Wiley Rein LLP

Ian Hargreaves, Professor of Digital Economy, Cardiff University

James Harkin, Author and Director, Flockwatching

Ahmad Abdulkarim Julfar, CEO, Etisalat Group

Dr Robert E Kahn, TCP/IP co-creator and Chairman, CEO and President, Corporation for National Research Initiatives (CNRI)

Loz (Laurence) Kaye, Leader, Pirate Party UK

Thomas M. Lenard, President and Senior Fellow, Technology Policy Institute

Gerd Leonhard, Futurist, Author and CEO, The Futures Agency

Jonathan Liebenau, Reader in Technology Management, Department of Management, London School of Economics

Robert Levine, Journalist and Author of Free Ride

Patrice Lyons, Corporate Counsel, Corporation for National Research Initiatives (CNRI)

Joe McNamee, Executive Director, European Digital Rights

Milton L Mueller, Professor, School of Information Studies, Syracuse University

Eli Noam, Director, Columbia Institute for Tele-Information, Professor of Finance and Economics and Garrett Professor of Public Policy and Business Responsibility, Columbia University Business School

Sam Paltridge, Directorate of Science Technology and Industry, OECD

Prof. Francesco Pizzetti, Chairman, Privacy Authority

Pranesh Prakash, Policy Director, Centre for Internet and Society

Philip R. Reitinger, Senior Vice President and Chief Information Security Officer, Sony Corporation

Dr Georg Serentschy, CEO Telecommunications, RTR-GmbH (Austrian Regulatory Authority for Broadcasting and Telecommunications)

Michael Skapinker, Assistant Editor and Columnist, Financial Times

Christopher Soghoian, Principal Technologist and Senior Policy Analyst, American Civil Liberties Union

Dr. Hamadoun I. Touré, Secretary General, International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

Nico van Eijk, Professor of Media and Telecommunications Law and Director of the Institute for Information Law, University of Amsterdam

Ben Verwaayen, CEO, Alcatel-Lucent

Philip L. Verveer, Ambassador, U.S. Coordinator, International Communications and Information Policy, US Department of State

Richard Waters, West Coast Editor, Financial Times

Christopher S Yoo, John H. Chestnut Professor of Law, Communication, and Computer & Information Science, Founding Director, Center for Technology, Innovation and Competition, University of Pennsylvania Law School

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/rethinking-the-internet

Rethinking the intermediary liability regime in India

torsha — 2019-08-16T01:49:47Z

The article consolidates some of our broad thematic concerns with the draft amendments to the intermediary liability rules, published by MeitY last December.

The blog post by Torsha Sarkar was published by CyberBRICS on August 12, 2019.

Introduction

In December 2018, the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (“MeitY”) released the Intermediary Liability Guidelines (Amendment) Rules (“the Guidelines”), which would be significantly altering the intermediary liability regime in the country. While the Guidelines has drawn a considerable amount of attention and criticism, from the perspective of the government, the change has been overdue.

The Indian government has been determined to overhaul the pre-existing safe harbour regime since last year. The draftversion of the e-commerce policy, which were leaked last year, also hinted at similar plans. As effects of mass dissemination of disinformation, propaganda and hate speech around the world spill over to offline harms, governments have been increasingly looking to enact interventionist laws that leverage more responsibility on the intermediaries. India has not been an exception.

A major source of these harmful and illegal content in India come through the popular communications app WhatsApp, despite the company’s enactment of several anti-spam measures over the past few years. Last year, rumours circulated on WhatsApp prompted a series of lynchings. In May, Reuters reported that clones and software tools were available at minimal cost in the market, for politicians and other interested parties to bypass these measures, and continue the trend of bulk messaging.

These series of incidents have made it clear that disinformation is a very real problem, and the current regulatory framework is not enough to address it. The government’s response to this has been accordingly, to introduce the Guidelines. This rationale also finds a place in its preliminarystatement of reasons.

While enactment of such interventionist laws has triggered fresh rounds of debate on free speech and censorship, it would be wrong to say that such laws were completely one-sided, or uncalled for.

On one hand, automated amplification and online mass circulation of purposeful disinformation, propaganda, of terrorist attack videos, or of plain graphic content, are all problems that the government would concern itself with. On the other hand, several online companies (including Google) also seem to be in an uneasy agreement that simple self-regulation of content would not cut it. For better oversight, more engagement with both government and civil society members is needed.

In March this year, Mark Zuckerberg wrote anop-ed for the Washington Post, calling for more government involvement in the process of content regulation on its platform. While it would be interesting to consider how Zuckerberg’s view aligns with those similarly placed, it would nevertheless be correct to say that online intermediaries are under more pressure than ever to keep their platforms clean of content that is ‘illegal, harmful, obscene’. And this list only grows.

That being said, the criticism from several stakeholders is sharp and clear in instances of such law being enacted – be it the ambitious NetzDG aimed at combating Nazi propaganda, hate speech and fake news, or the controversial new European Copyright Directive which has been welcomed by journalists but has been severely critiqued by online content creators and platforms as detrimental against user-generated content.

In the backdrop of such conflicting interests on online content moderation, it would be useful to examine the Guidelines released by MeitY. In the first portion we would be looking at certain specific concerns existing within the rules, while in the second portion, we would be pushing the narrative further to see what an alternative regulatory framework may look like.

Before we jump to the crux of this discussion, one important disclosure must be made about the underlying ideology of this piece. It would be unrealistic to claim that the internet should be absolutely free from regulation. Swathes of content on child sexual abuse, or terrorist propaganda, or even the hordes of death and rape threats faced by women online are and should be concerns of a civil society. While that is certainly a strong driving force for regulation, this concern should not override the basic considerations for human rights (including freedom of expression). These ideas would be expanded a bit more in the upcoming sections.

Broad, thematic concerns with the Rules

A uniform mechanism of compliance

Timelines

Rule 3(8) of the Guidelines mandates intermediaries, prompted by a court order or a government notification, to take down content relating to unlawful acts within 24 hours of such notification. In case they fail to do so, the safe harbour applicable to them under section 79 of the Information Technology Act (“the Act”) would cease to apply, and they would be liable. Prior to the amendment, this timeframe was 36 hours.

There is a visible lack of research which could rationalize that a 24-hour timeline for compliance is the optimal framework, for all intermediaries, irrespective of the kind of services they provide, or the sizes or resources available to them. As Mozilla Foundation has commented, regulation of illegal content online simply cannot be done in an one-size-fits-all approach, nor can regulation be made with only the tech incumbents in mind. While platforms like YouTube can comfortably remove criminal prohibited content within a span of 24 hours, this still can place a large burden on smaller companies, who may not have the necessary resources to comply within this timeframe. There are a few unintended consequences that would arise out of this situation.

One, sanctions under the Act, which would include both organisational ramifications like website blocking (under section 69A of the Act) as well as individual liability, would affect the smaller intermediaries more than it would affect the bigger ones. A bigger intermediary like Facebook may be able to withstand a large fine in lieu of its failure to control, say, hate speech on its platform. That may not be true for a smaller online marketplace, or even a smaller online social media site, targeted towards a very specific community. This compliance mechanism, accordingly, may just go on to strengthen the larger companies, and eliminating the competition from the smaller companies.

Two, intermediaries, in fear of heavy criminal sanctions would err on the side of law. This would mean that the decisions involved in determining whether a piece of content is illegal or not would be shorter, less nuanced. This would also mean that legitimate speech would also be under risk from censorship, and intermediaries would pay less heed to the technical requirements or the correct legal procedures required for content takedown.

Utilization of ‘automated technology’

Another place where the Guidelines assume that all intermediaries operating in India are on the same footing is Rule 3(9). This mandates these entities to proactively monitor for ‘unlawful content’ on their platforms. Aside the unconstitutionality of this provision, this also assumes that all intermediaries would have the requisite resource to actually set up this tool and operate it successfully. YouTube’s ContentID, which began in 2007, has already seen a whopping 100 million dollars investment by 2018.

Funnily enough, ContentID is a tool exclusively dedicated to finding copyright violation of rights-holder, and even then, it has been proven to be not infallible. The Guidelines’ sweeping net of ‘unlawful’ content include far many more categories than mere violations of IP rights, and the framework assumes that intermediaries would be able to set up and run an automated tool that would filter through all these categories of ‘unlawful content’ at one go.

The problems of AI

Aside the implementation-related concerns, there are also technical challenges related with Rule 3(9). Supervised learning systems (like the one envisaged under the Guidelines) use training data sets for pro-active filtering. This means if the system is taught that for ten instances of A being the input, the output would be B, then for the eleventh time, it sees A, it would give the output B. In the lingo of content filtering, the system would be taught, for example, that nudity is bad. The next time the system encounters nudity in a picture, it would automatically flag it as ‘bad’ and violating the community standards.

Except, that is not how it should work. For every post that is under the scrutiny of the platform operators, numerous nuances and contextual cues act as mitigating factors, none of which, at this point, would beunderstandable by a machine.

Additionally, the training data used to feed the system can be biased. A self-driving car who is fed training data from only one region of the country would learn the customs and driving norms of that particular region, and not the patterns that apply across the intended purpose of driving throughout the country.

Lastly, it is not disputed that bias would be completely eliminated in case the content moderation was undertaken by a human. However, the difference between a human moderator and an automated one, would be that there would be a measure of accountability in the first one. The decision of the human moderator can be disputed, and the moderator would have a chance to explain his reasons for the removal. Artificial intelligence (“AI”) is identified by the algorithmic ‘black box’ that processes inputs, and generates usable outputs. Implementing workable accountability standards for this system, including figuring out appeal and grievance redressal mechanisms in cases of dispute, are all problems that the regulator must concern itself with.

In the absence of any clarity or revision, it seems unlikely that the provision would actually ever see full implementation. Neither would the intermediaries know what kind of ‘automated technology’ they are supposed to use for filtering ‘unlawful content’, nor would there be any incentives for them to actually deploy this system effectively for their platforms.

What can be done?

First, more research is needed to understand the effect of compliance timeframes on the accuracy of content takedown. Several jurisdictions are operating now on different timeframes of compliance, and it would be a far more holistic regulation should the government consider the dialogue around each of them and see what it means for India.

Second, it might be useful to consider the concept of an independent regulator as an alternative and as a compromise between pure governmental regulation (which is more or less what the system is) or self-regulation (which the Guidelines, albeit problematically, also espouse through Rule 3(9)).

The UK White Paper on Harms, a piece of important document in the system of liability overhaul, proposes an arms-length regulator who would be responsible for drafting codes of conduct for online companies and responsible for their enforcement. While the exact merits of the system is still up for debate, the concept of having a separate body to oversee, formulate and also possiblyarbitrate disputes regarding content removal, is finding traction in several parallel developments.

One of the Transatlantic Working Group Sessions seem to discuss this idea in terms of having an ‘internet court’ for illegal content regulation. This would have the noted advantage of a) formulating norms of online content in a transparent, public fashion, something previously done behind closed doors of either the government or the tech incumbents and b) having specially trained professionals who would be able to dispose of matters in an expeditious manner.

India is not unfamiliar to the idea of specialized tribunals, or quasi-judicial bodies for dealing with specific challenges. In 2015, for example, the Government of India passed the Commercial Courts Act, by which specific courts were tasked to deal with matters of very large value. This is neither an isolated instance of the government choosing to create new bodies for dealing with a specific problem, nor would it be inimitable in the future.

There is no silver bullet when it comes to moderation of content on the web. However, in light of these parallel convergence of ideas, the appeal of an independent regulatory system as a sane compromise between complete government control and laissez-faireautonomy, is worth considering.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cyber-brics-august-12-2019-torsha-sarkar-rethinking-the-intermediary-liability-regime-in-india

We are anonymous, we are legion

RightsCon 2014

Video

Right to Privacy in Peril

Right to Privacy Bill 2010 — A Few Comments

Specific Recommendations

Specific Comments to the Bill

Misguiding Title

Inappropriate Blanket Use of Privacy

Narrow Definition of Public Figures

Insufficient Limits to the Right to Privacy

Limited Scope of Technology

Overly Complicated Clauses

Right to Information (RTI) Requests to BSNL and MTNL Regarding Security Equipment

Right to Food Campaign, Ranchi Convention, 2016

Right to Food Campaign: Website.

Right to Food Campaign: Cash Transfers and UID: Our Main Demands.

Ranchi Convention, 2016: Programme.

Right to be Forgotten: A Tale of Two Judgements

Background

Issues in application

The two Indian judgments

Conclusion

Right to be forgotten poses a legal dilemma in India

RFCs We Love: Transport & Apps Edition

RFCs We Love meetup

Revisiting Per Se vs Rule of Reason in Light of the Intel Conditional Rebate Case

Revisiting Aadhaar: Law, Tech and Beyond

Revenge Porn Laws across the World

1. Europe

United Kingdom

2. United States of America

3. Australia

4. Asia and Rest of the World

Revealed: Bangalore’s Basic Instincts

Instant attraction

True love waits?

Masti after marriage?

Unhappy about gays

Live-in is in

Pure emotions

One wild night

The work-shift rift

Social network gets a poke

Porn supremacy

Rethinking the Internet: The Way Forward

Overview

Agenda Day One: Thursday, March 22, 2013

Agenda Day Two: Friday, March 23, 2013

Currently confirmed to participate now include:

Rethinking the intermediary liability regime in India

Introduction

Broad, thematic concerns with the Rules

A uniform mechanism of compliance

Timelines

Utilization of ‘automated technology’

The problems of AI

What can be done?