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Statutory Motion Against Intermediary Guidelines Rules

pranesh — 2012-04-03T09:35:41Z

Rajya Sabha MP, Shri P. Rajeev has moved a motion that the much-criticised Intermediary Guidelines Rules be annulled.

Motion to Annul Intermediary Guidelines Rules

A motion to annul the Intermediary Guidelines Rules was moved on March 23, 2012, by Shri P. Rajeeve, CPI(M) MP in the Rajya Sabha from Thrissur, Kerala.

The motion reads:

"That this House resolves that the Information Technology (Intermediaries Guidelines) Rules, 2011 issued under clause (zg) of sub-section (2) of Section 87 read with sub-section (2) of Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 published in the Gazette of India dated the 13th April, 2011 vide Notification No. G.S.R 314(E) and laid on the Table of the House on the 12th August, 2011, be annuled; and

That this House recommends to Lok Sabha that Lok Sabha do concur on this Motion."

This isn't the first time that Mr. Rajeeve is raising his voice against the Intermediary Guidelines Rules. Indeed, even when the Rules were just in draft stage, he along with the MPs Kumar Deepak Das, Rajeev Chandrashekar, and Mahendra Mohan drew Parliamentarians' attention to the rules. Yet, the government did not heed the MPs' concern, nor the concern of all the civil society organizations that wrote in to them concerned about human rights implications of the new laws. On September 6, 2011, Lok Sabha MP Jayant Choudhary gave notice (under Rule 377 of the Lok Sabha Rules) that the Intermediary Guidelines Rules as well as the Reasonable Security Practices Rules need to be reviewed. Yet, the government has not even addressed those concerns, and indeed has cracked down even harder on online freedom of speech since then.

Fundamental Problems with Intermediary Guidelines Rules

The fundamental problems with the Rules, which deal with objectionable material online:

Shifting blame.

It makes the 'intermediary', including ISPs like BSNL and Airtel responsible for objectionable content that their users have put up.

No chance to defend.

There is no need to inform users before this content is removed. So, even material put up by a political party can be removed based on anyone's complaint, without telling that party. This was done against a site called *CartoonsAgainstCorruption.com". This goes against Article 19(1)(a).

Lack of transparency

No information is required to be provided that content has been removed. It's a black-box system, with no one, not even the government, knowing that content has been removed following a request. So even the government does not know how many sites have been removed after these Rules have come into effect.

No differentiation between intermediaries.

A one-size-fits-all system is followed where an e-mail provider is equated with an online newspaper, which is equated with a video upload site, which is equated with a search engine. This is like equating the post-office and a book publisher as being equivalent for, say, defamatory speech. This is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, which requires that unequals be treated unequally by the law.

No proportionality.

A DNS provider (i.e., the person who gives you your web address) is an intermediary who can be asked to 'disable access' to a website on the basis of a single page, even though the rest of the site has nothing objectionable.

Vague and unconstitutional requirements.

Disparaging speech, as long as it isn't defamatory, is not criminalised in India, and can't be because the Constitution does not allow for it. Content about gambling in print is not unlawful, but now all Internet intermediaries are required to remove any content that promotes gambling.

Allows private censorship.

The Rules do not draw a distinction between arbitrary actions of an intermediary and take-downs subsequent to a request.

Presumption of illegality.

The Rules are based on the presumption that all complaints (and resultant mandatory taking down of the content) are correct, and that the incorrectness of the take-downs can be disputed in court (if they ever discover that it has been removed). This is contrary to the presumption of validity of speech used by Indian courts, and is akin to prior restraint on speech. Courts have held that for content such as defamation, prior restraints cannot be put on speech, and that civil and criminal action can only be taken post-speech.

Government censorship, not 'self-regulation'.

The government says these are industry best-practices in existing terms of service agreements. But the Rules require all intermediaries to include the government-prescribed terms in an agreement, no matter what services they provide. It is one thing for a company to choose the terms of its terms of service agreement, and completely another for the government to dictate those terms of service.

Problems Noted Early

We have noted in the past the problems with the Rules, including when the Rules were still in draft form:

Other organizations like the Software Freedom Law Centre also sent in scathing comments on the law, noting that they are unconstitutional.

We are very glad that Shri Rajeeve has moved this motion, and we hope that it gets adopted in the Lok Sabha as well, and that the Rules get defeated.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/statutory-motion-against-intermediary-guidelines-rules

Stats from 2014 reveal horror of scrapped section 66A of IT Act

praskrishna — 2015-09-26T07:28:13Z

An average of six netizens were arrested every day in 2014 for posting offensive content online under section 66A of the Information Technology Act, a draconian and much abused law no longer in use.

The article by Aloke Tikku was published in the Hindustan Times on August 20, 2015. Pranesh Prakash gave inputs.

A first-of-its-kind set of statistics compiled by the National Crime Records Bureau reveals that 2,402 people, including 29 women, were arrested in 4,192 cases under section 66A — which was struck down in March by the Supreme Court that ruled that it violated the constitutional freedom of speech.

These arrests made up nearly 60% of all arrests under the IT Act, and 40% of arrests for cyber crimes in 2014. It was also a little less than twice the number of people caught red-handed accepting bribes the same year.

“These statistics are shocking. I had assumed there may be a few hundred cases, at worst,” said Shreya Singhal, on whose petition the top court had scrapped the provision.

“It validates the judgment even more than when it was delivered,” said Singhal, a law student.

Quite like Rinu Srinivasan – one of two Mumbai girls arrested in 2012 for a Facebook post regarding Shiv Sena chief Bal Thackrey’s death — nearly half of those arrested (1,217) were in the 18-29 age group. This included nine girls. Another 1,015 were in the 30-44 age group while 166 were between 45 and 59 years old.

The now-repealed section 66A prescribed a three-year jail term for online content that could be construed to be offensive or false.

This is the first time the NCRB has collected detailed statistics on cyber crimes, listing out the number of cases registered under each section of the IT Act.

A government official conceded that the large number of cases registered under section 66A meant that the Centre’s guidelines — issued after a public outcry in November 2012 against its misuse — had served little purpose. In May 2013, the Supreme Court too put its weight behind the guidelines and made it legally binding on them.

In these guidelines, the Centre had made prior approval of an inspector general of police-rank officer mandatory for all arrests under section 66A. “Either this rule wasn’t followed or the IGPs did not rise to the occasion,” the official said.

The NCRB did not give a state-wise break-up of arrests under section 66A.

But in terms of cases registered, Uttar Pradesh led the pack with 898, followed by Karnataka (603), Assam (377), Maharashtra (375), Telangana (352), Rajasthan (291), Kerala (229), Punjab (123) and Delhi (137).

“It was “unconscionable that 2,402 persons were arrested in 2014, and many made to languish in jail, under a provision that we now know to have been unconstitutional,” said Pranesh Prakash at the Bengaluru-headquartered research and advocacy group, Centre for Internet and Society.

“Even after the Supreme Court laid down more stringent ad-hoc guidelines on arrests under Section 66A, it is clear they were not effective in the least: 860 charge-sheets were filed by the police under Section 66A in 2014,” the policy director at CIS said.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/hindustan-times-august-20-2015-aloke-tikku-stats-from-2014-reveal-horror-of-scrapped-section-66-a-of-it-act

Statement of Solidarity on Freedom of Expression and Safety of Internet Users in Bangladesh

pranesh — 2013-01-15T11:51:44Z

This is a statement on the violent attack on blogger Asif Mohiuddin by the participants to the Third South Asian Meeting on the Internet and Freedom of Expression that took place in Dhaka, Bangladesh, on January 14–15, 2013.

Bangladeshi blogger Asif Mohiuddin was brutally attacked in a stabbing last evening. His condition is currently said to be critical. Violent attacks on mediapersons have led to at least four deaths in the past year. This trend is now extending to those writing online.

It is the duty of societies at large to ensure that principles we universally consider sacrosanct, such as the right to life and liberty and of freedom of expression are in fact ideas, and of the government to actively protect the rights guaranteed under the Constitution of Bangladesh and to ensure they are not just words on paper.

Article 39 of the Constitution of Bangladesh—and Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—guarantee both the freedom of thought and conscience, as well as the right of every citizen of freedom of speech and expression, and freedom of the press.

Article 32 of the Constitution of Bangladesh—and Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—guarantee that no person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except by law.

The attack on Asif Mohiuddin constitutes a violation these fundamental principle by criminals, and we request the government to act decisively to show it will not tolerate such violations.

Reporters Without Borders note that "the ability of those in the media to work freely has deteriorated alarmingly in Bangladesh, which is now ranked 129th of 179 countries in the 2011-2012 World Press Freedom Index".

In general, the situation of those working as non-professional 'citizen journalists' is even worse. In a 2010 report, the UN Special Rapporteur wrote:

"Citizen journalists are by nature more isolated, they are more vulnerable to attack than professional journalists. However, citizen journalists enjoy less protection than their counterparts in traditional media, as they do not have the support of media organizations and networks, in particular the organizational resources, including lawyers and financial resources, which can help shield them from harassment."

This reality of greater vulnerability is equally applicable to those who do not self-identify as 'citizen journalists', but use social media to express unpopular opinions.

Keeping this in mind, we call upon the government on Bangladesh to carry out swift investigations into this particular incident and bring the perpetrators to justice, and to grant greater legal support to citizen journalists and ensure better protections for all those who use the Internet as a means of expression.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/statement-of-solidarity-asif-mohiuddin

Statement of Civil Society Members and Groups Participating in the "Best Bits" pre-IGF meeting at Baku in 2012

pranesh — 2012-12-07T08:06:25Z

The Centre for Internet & Society was one of the signatories for this submission made to the ITU on November 16, 2012.

Read the statement of civil society members and groups participating in the “Best Bits” pre-IGF meeting at Baku in 2012

We thank the Secretariat of the ITU for making the opportunity to submit our views.

Nevertheless, the process of the revision of the International Telecommunication Regulations (ITRs) has not been sufficiently inclusive and transparent, despite some recent efforts to facilitate public participation. Fundamental to the framing of public policy must be the pursuit of the public interest and fundamental human rights, and we urge Member States to uphold and protect these values.

We as civil society organizations wish to engage with the World Conference on International Telecommunication (WCIT) process in this spirit. Member States, in most cases, have not held open, broad-based, public consultations in the lead up to the WCIT, nor have they indicated such a process for the WCIT itself.

In order to address this deficiency, and at a minimum, we would urge:

All Member States and regional groups to make their proposals available to the public in sufficient time to allow for meaningfulpublic participation;
All delegates to support proposals to open sessions of the WCIT meeting to the public;
The ITU Secretariat to increase transparency of the WCIT including live webcast with the video, audio, and text transcripts, as far as possible, to enable participation by all, including persons with disabilities;
The ITU Secretariat, Member States, and regional groups to make as much documentation publicly available as possible on the ITU's website, so that civil society can provide substantive input on proposals as they are made available;
Member States to encourage and facilitate civil society participation in their national delegations;
The ITU to create spaces during the WCIT for civil society to express their views, as was done during the WSIS process.

Given the uncertainty about the nature of final proposals that will be presented, we urge delegates that the following criteria be applied to any proposed revisions of the ITRs.

That any proposed revisions are confined to the traditional scope of the ITRs, where international regulation is required around technical issues is limited to telecommunications networks and interoperability standards.
There should be no revisions to the ITRs that involve regulation of the Internet Protocol and the layers above.
There should be no revisions that could have a negative impact on affordable access to the Internet or the public's rights to privacy and freedom of expression.

More generally we call upon the ITU to promote principles of net neutrality, open standards, affordable access and universal service, and effective competition.

Signatories:

Access (Global)
Association for Progressive Communications (Global)
Bangladesh NGOs Network for Radio and Communication (Bangladesh)
Bytes for All (Pakistan)
Center for Democracy and Technology (United States of America)
Centre for Community Informatics Research (Canada)
Centre for Internet and Society (India)
Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (Eastern and Southern Africa)
Consumer Council of Fiji (Fiji)
Consumers International (Global)
Dynamic Coalition on Internet Rights and Principles (IRP) (Global)
Electronic Frontier Finland (Finland)
Imagining the Internet Center (United States of America)
Instituto Nupef (Brazil)
Internet Democracy Project (India)
Internet Research Project (Pakistan)
Global Partners and Associates (United Kingdom)
GobernanzadeInternet.co (Colombia)
ICT Watch Indonesia (Indonesia)
Instituto Brasileiro de Defesa do Consumidor / Brazilian Institute for
Consumer Defense (Brazil)
InternetNZ (New Zealand)
IT for Change (India)
Media Education Center (Armenia)
ONG Derechos Digitales (Chile)
OpenMedia (Canada)
Public Knowledge (United States of America)
Thai Netizen Network (Thailand)
Ginger Paque (Venezuala)
Nnenna Nwakanma (Côte d'Ivoire)
Sonigitu Ekpe (Nigeria)
Wolfgang Kleinwächter (Denmark)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/statement-of-civil-society-members-and-groups-at-best-bits-pre-igf-meeting

State-led interference in encrypted systems: A public debate on different policy approaches

Admin — 2017-12-05T14:03:09Z

State-led interference in encrypted systems. Sunil Abraham is a speaker for this event.

Proposer's Name: Mr. Carlos Alberto Afonso
Proposer's Organization: Instituto Nupef
Co-Proposer's Name: Mr. Hartmut Glaser
Co-Proposer's Organization: CGI.br

Co-Organizers:

Mr., Carlos, AFONSO,Civil Society, Instituto Nupef
Mr. Hartmut, GLASER, Technical Community, CGI.br
Ms. Jamila, VENTURINI,Technical Community, NIC.br
Mr. Diego, CANABARRO, Technical Community, NIC.br

Session Format: Other - 90 Min
Format description: The session is designed to host a dialectic debate segment followed by a traditional round-table segment structured around a Q&A format.

Proposer:
Country: Brazil
Stakeholder Group: Civil Society

Co-Proposer:
Country: Brazil
Stakeholder Group: Technical Community

Speakers

Christoph Steck (Telefonica, Spain)
Riana Pfefferkorn (Stanford CIS, EUA)
Cristine Hoepers (CERT.br, Brazil)
Carlos A. Afonso (Nupef Institute, Brazil)
Neide Oliveira (Federal Prosecution Service, Brazil)
Sunil Abraham (CIS India)
Monica Guise Rosina (Facebook Brazil)
Jonah F. Hill (NTIA, EUA)
Nina Leemhuis Janssen (Govt of The Netherlands)

Content of the Session

The workshop is built around a policy question that approaches some historical controversies inherent to the widespread use and availability of encryption in the Internet, with a special focus on the tension between the increasing use of cryptography after Snowden and the supposed challenges it poses to public and national security in a digital era. The session promotes a space for multistakeholder debate on: the state of the art in the development and employment of cryptography; different attitudes towards the freedom to use encryption in different jurisdictions; modes of state-led interference in/with encrypted systems; and the limits posed by national and international law to such interference, as well as the impacts it might have to the protection and promotion fundamental human rights and shared values, to permission-less innovation on the Internet and the open architecture of the network. The session will host two segments: one will consist of two presentations made by government officials from the UK and the Netherlands that will detail different policy approaches for dealing with the use of encryption. The second comprises a multistakeholder round-table that gathers comments and questions about the previous presentations. In the end, moderators will summarize discussions and an overarching and documented report of the session will be made available for the session. The unorthodox format chosen for this session allows public scrutiny over some very practical policy-oriented approaches. The bulk of discussions registered during the workshop can provide dialogued feedback into policy development processes elsewhere.

Relevance of the Session

The development and use of encryption to protect information and communication dates back to ancient times. Encryption has been mainly employed over the centuries to protect personal data, business information, governmental classified information, etc. Attempts to break encryption in general as well as the notion of inserting vulnerabilities (such as backdoors) in systems that rely on encryption have been a parallel phenomenon to (and also an integral part of) the longstanding efforts of cryptography. One might even say that those two processes function as the two different sides of the same coin.

The advent and the great pace of development of computing and networking technologies boosted the science behind cryptography to unprecedented levels of relevance for society in general. More recently, after the Snowden affairs, cryptography has been perceived as a necessary condition (not a sufficient one though) for Internet users to curb the abuses entailed by massive digital surveillance and espionage by an ever growing number of countries. In parallel, together with other measures, the deployment of encryption to commercial applications seems to have become a, somehow, sine qua non condition for some Internet companies to regain consumer trust and retain competitive advantages in relation to other players in the market.

The widespread use and availability of encryption tools however refueled tensions and entailed policy responses in a myriad of countries (e.g.: the Apple vs FBI case in the context of the San Bernadino Shooting; the announcement made by some European countries of their willingness to outlaw some uses of encryption as well as the public commitment of the Netherlands government to support encryption and oppose the development of backdoors; and the successive orders by Brazilian courts that aimed at blocking Whatsapp in the country due to the company’s denial to delivery communication records from some of its users). Those tensions generally revolve around the fact that as general-purpose technology, encryption can be also employed to conceal irregular and/or illicit activities, which would justify the creation of some narrow but allegedly needed exceptions to the constitutional limits built over the last century in several countries to impose limits to criminal investigation in order to uphold privacy and personal data protection.

The cases mentioned above gave rise to fierce discussions on whether or not the use of encryption increases by itself the likelihood of and facilitate the occurrence of crime and other illicit activities (most notably organized crime of all sorts and terrorism). Some law enforcement agencies and security forces have argued that encryption impairs crime investigation and the prosecution of criminals, and therefore the development of technology with embedded backdoors might be needed. Other actors, including representatives from the technical community, however, argue that such interference might disrupt regularly protected flows of information and communication as well as compromise privacy and the protection of other fundamental human rights. At this point, we are in a stage in which the trade-off between those two perspectives have to be settled through democratic means and public participation and that is why this workshop was submitted for the IGF 2017.

Besides dealing with several different topics that comprise the overarching agenda of Internet governance (human rights, cybersecurity, openness and permission-less innovation, economic development, infrastructure governance, etc), the topic of this workshop is directly connected to two different goals comprised in the UN SDGs: sound institutions and innovation. Discussions on the contours of sound political institutions and on challenges and incentives for innovation are integral components of any sort of political agenda that aims at reflecting upon the “digital future”, which is the case of the 2017 IGF and highlight the importance of adding this proposal to the overall agenda of the event.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/state-led-interference-in-encrypted-systems-a-public-debate-on-different-policy-approaches

State Surveillance and Human Rights Camp: Summary

elonnai — 2013-07-12T16:02:51Z

On December 13 and 14, 2012, the Electronic Frontier Foundation organized the Surveillance and Human Rights Camp held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The meeting examined trends in surveillance, reasons for state surveillance, surveillance tactics that governments are using, and safeguards that can be put in place to protect against unlawful or disproportionate surveillance.

This research was undertaken as part of the 'SAFEGUARDS' project that CIS is undertaking with Privacy International and IDRC.

The camp also examined different types of data, understanding tools that governments can use to access data, and looked at examples of surveillance measures in different contexts. The camp was divided into plenary sessions and individual participatory workshops, and brought together activists, researchers, and experts from all over the world. Experiences from multiple countries were shared, with an emphasis on the experience of surveillance in Latin America. Among other things, this blog summarizes my understanding of the discussions that took place.

The camp also served as a platform for collaboration on the Draft International Principles on Communications Surveillance and Human Rights. These principles seek to set an international standard for safeguards to the surveillance of communications that recognizes and upholds human rights, and provide guidance for legislative changes related to communications and communications meta data to ensure that the use of modern communications technology does not violate individual privacy. The principles were first drafted in October 2012 in Brussels, and are still in draft form. A global consultation is taking place to bring in feedback and perspective on the principles.

The draft principles were institutionalized for a number of reasons including:

Currently there are no principles or international best standards specifically prescribing necessary and important safeguards to surveillance of communication data.
Practices around surveillance of communications by governments and the technology used by governments is rapidly changing, while legislation and safeguards protecting individual communications from illegal or disproportionate surveillance are staying the same, and thus rapidly becoming outdated.
New legislation that allows surveillance through access to communication data that is being proposed often attempts to give sweeping powers to law enforcement for access to data across multiple jurisdictions, and mandates extensive cooperation and assistance from the private sector including extensive data retention policies, back doors, and built in monitoring capabilities.
Surveillance of communications is often carried out with few safeguards in place including limited transparency to the public, and limited forms of appeal or redress for the individual.

This has placed the individual in a vulnerable position as opaque surveillance of communications is carried out by governments across the world — the abuse of which is unclear. The principles try to address these challenges by establishing standards and safeguards which should be upheld and incorporated into legislation and practices allowing the surveillance of communications.

A summary of the draft principles is below. As the principles are still a working draft, the most up to date version of the principles can be accessed here .

Summary of the Draft International Principles on Communications Surveillance and Human Rights

Legality: Any surveillance of communications undertaken by the government must be codified by statute.

Legitimate Purpose: Laws should only allow surveillance of communications for legitimate purposes.

Necessity: Laws allowing surveillance of communications should limit such measures to what is demonstrably necessary.

Adequacy: Surveillance of communications should only be undertaken to the extent that is adequate for fulfilling legitimate and necessary purposes.

Competent Authority: Any authorization for surveillance of communications must be made by a competent and independent authority.

Proportionality: All measures of surveillance of communications must be specific and proportionate to what is necessary to achieve a specific purpose.

Due process: Governments undertaking surveillance of communications must respect and guarantee an individual’s human rights. Any interference with an individual's human rights must be authorized by a law in force.

User notification: Governments undertaking surveillance of communications must allow service providers to notify individuals of any legal access that takes place related to their personal information.

Transparency about use of government surveillance: The governments ability to survey communications and the process for surveillance should be transparent to the public.

Oversight: Governments must establish an independent oversight mechanism to ensure transparency and accountability of lawful surveillance measures carried out on communications.

Integrity of communications and systems: In order to enable service providers to secure communications securely, governments cannot require service providers to build in surveillance or monitoring capabilities.

Safeguards for international cooperation: When governments work with other governments across borders to fight crime, the higher/highest standard should apply.

Safeguards against illegitimate access: Governments should provide sufficient penalties to dissuade against unwarranted surveillance of communications.

Cost of surveillance: The financial cost of the surveillance on communications should be borne by the government undertaking the surveillance.

Types of Data

The conversations during the camp reviewed a number of practices related to surveillance of communications, and emphasized the importance of establishing the draft principles. Setting the background to various surveillance measures that can be carried out by the government, the different categories of communication data that can be easily accessed by governments and law enforcement were discussed. For example, law enforcement frequently accesses information such as IP address, account name and number, telephone number, transactional records, and location data. This data can be understood as 'non-content' data or communication data, and in many jurisdictions can easily be accessed by law enforcement/governments, as the requirements for accessing communication data are lower than the requirements for accessing the actual content of communications. For example, in the United States a court order is not needed to access communication data whereas a judicial order is needed to access the content of communications.[1]

Similarly, in the UK law enforcement can access communication data with authorization from a senior police officer.[2]

It was discussed how it is concerning that communication data can be accessed easily, as it provides a plethora of facts about an individual. Given the sensitivity of communication data and the ability for personal information to be derived from the data, the ease that law enforcement is accessing the data, and the unawareness of the individual about the access- places the privacy of users at risk.

Ways of Accessing Data

Ways in which governments and law enforcement access information and associated challenges was discussed, both in terms of the legislation that allows for access and the technology that is used for access.

Access and Technology

In this discussion it was pointed out that in traditional forms of accessing data governments are no longer effective for a number of reasons. For example, in many cases communications and transactions, etc., that take place on the internet are encrypted. The ubiquitous use of encryption means more protection for the individual in everyday use of the internet, but serves as an obstacle to law enforcement and governments, as the content of a message is even more difficult to access. Thus, law enforcement and governments are using technologies like commercial surveillance software, targeted hacking, and malware to survey individuals. The software is sold off the shelf at trade shows by commercial software companies to law enforcement and governments. Though the software has been developed to be a useful tool for governments, it was found that in some cases it has been abused by authoritarian regimes. For example in 2012, it was found that FinSpy, a computer espionage software made by the British company Gamma Group was being used to target political dissidents by the Government of Bahrain. FinSpy has the ability to capture computer screen shots, record Skype chats, turn on computer cameras and microphones, and log keystrokes.[3]

In order to intercept communications or block access to sites, governments and ISPs also rely on the use of deep packet inspection (DPI).[4] Deep packet inspection is a tool traditionally used by internet service providers for effective management of the network. DPI allows for ISP's to monitor and filter data flowing through the network by inspecting the header of a packet of data and the content of the packet.[5] With this information it is possible to read the actual content of packets, and identify the program or service being used.[6]

DPI can be used for the detection of viruses, spam, unfair use of bandwidth, and copyright enforcement. At the same time, DPI can allow for the possibility of unauthorized data mining and real time interception to take place, and can be used to block internet traffic whether it is encrypted or not.[7]

Governmental requirements for deep packet inspection can in some cases be found in legislation and policy. In other cases it is not clear if it is mandatory for ISP's to provide DPI capabilities, thus the use of DPI by governments is often an opaque area. Recently, the ITU has sought to define an international standard for deep packet inspection known as the "Y.2770" standard. The standard proposes a technical interoperable protocol for deep packet inspection systems, which would be applicable to "application identification, flow identification, and inspected traffic types".[8]

Access and Legislation

The discussions also examined similarities across legislation and policy which allows governments legal access to data. It was pointed out that legislation providing access to different types of data is increasingly becoming outdated, and is unable to distinguish between communications data and personal data. Thus, relevant legislation is often based on inaccurate and outdated assumptions about what information would be useful and what types of safeguards are necessary. For example, it was discussed how US surveillance law has traditionally established safeguards based on assumptions like: surveillance of data on a personal computer is more invasive than access to data stored in the cloud, real-time surveillance is more invasive than access to stored data, surveillance of newer communications is more invasive than surveillance of older communications, etc. These assumptions are no longer valid as information stored in the cloud, surveillance of older communications, and surveillance of stored data can be more invasive than access to newer communications, etc. It was also discussed that increasingly relevant legislation also contains provisions that have generic access standards, unclear authorization processes, and provide broad circumstances in which communication data and content can be accessed. The discussion also examined how governments are beginning to put in place mandatory and extensive data retention plans as tools of surveillance. These data retention mandates highlight the changing role of internet intermediaries including the fact that they are no longer independent from political pressure, and no longer have the ability to easily protect clients from unauthorized surveillance.

1]. EFF. Mandatory Data Retention: United States. Available at: https://www.eff.org/issues/mandatory-data-retention/us
[2].Espiner, T. Communications Data Bill: Need to Know. ZDNet. June 18th 2012. http://www.zdnet.com/communications-data-bill-need-to-know-3040155406/
[3]. Perlroth, M. Software Meant to Fight Crime is Used to Spy on Dissidents. The New York Times. August 30th 2012. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/31/technology/finspy-software-is-tracking-political-dissidents.html?_r=0
[4]. Wawro, A. What is Deep Packet Inspection?. PCWorld. February 1st 2012. Available at: http://www.pcworld.com/article/249137/what_is_deep_packet_inspection_.html
[5]. Geere, D. How deep packet inspection works. Wired. April 27th 2012. Available at: http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2012-04/27/how-deep-packet-inspection-works
[6]. Kassner. M. Deep Packet Inspection: What You Need to Know. Tech Republic. July 27th 2008. Available at: http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/networking/deep-packet-inspection-what-you-need-to-know/609
[7]. Anonyproz. How to Bypass Deep Packet Inspection Devices or ISPs Blocking Open VPN Traffic. Available at: http://www.anonyproz.com/supportsuite/index.php?_m=knowledgebase&_a=viewarticle&kbarticleid=138
[8].Chirgwin. R. Revealed: ITU's deep packet snooping standard leaks online: Boring tech doc or Internet eating monster. The Register. December 6th 2012. Available at: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/12/06/dpi_standard_leaked/

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/state-surveillance-human-rights-camp-summary

State Surveillance and Human Rights Camp

praskrishna — 2012-12-21T07:19:55Z

A two-day conference was held in Rio on December 13 and 14 at Sheraton Rio Hotel & Resort. Elonnai Hickok participated in the event and made a presentation on MLATS and International Cooperation for Law Enforcement Purposes.

Click here to see the Wiki page of the event. See Elonnai's presentation here [PDF, 313 Kb].

DAY 1: Mapping Out Government Surveillance Problems

8:30 - 9:00 Registration

9:00 - 9:10 Welcome/Introduction

Katitza Rodriguez, Electronic Frontier Foundation [Peru, ES]

Simultaneous interpretation from Spanish to English and Portuguese.

Plenary: Kinds of Data, Ways of Getting It

09:10 - 10:30

Chair: Enrique Chaparro, Fundacion Via Libre [Argentina, ES]

Metadata, online identifiers, and technologies of surveillance

Seth Schoen, Electronic Frontier Foundation [United States, EN]

Simultaneous interpretation from English to Spanish and Portuguese.

Surveillance is getting easier and cheaper for many reasons, not least because people are using electronic communications more than ever before, and there are so many facts out there to be noticed about the ways devices are talking to each other.
I will talk about the kinds of things that refer to people and their devices, with a particular focus on telecommunications metadata and transactional records that are described as "non-content" and may receive lower levels of legal protection. I'll discuss who is in a position to record this information, some of the things that can be learned from it, and why traffic analysis is powerful and difficult to defend against.
I'll try to explain concepts like MAC address, IP address, account name and number, telephone number, IMEI, IMSI, transient identifiers, log files, transactional records, locational privacy, and associational privacy.

How law enforcement agencies use cell phone location tracking technology in criminal cases

Hanni Fakhoury, Electronic Frontier Foundation [United States, EN]

With the rise of smartphones, the U.S. government's use of cell site location data to pinpoint our exact location has grown more widespread (and precise) over time. For years, U.S. courts permitted the government to get this location data without a search warrant under a tortured interpretation of federal electronic privacy statutes and an even more alarming constitutional argument: that we don't have any privacy in data we turn over to third parties, like cell phone companies. This talk will review what location data is and why the police want it, how they can get it under U.S. law, and legal and practical steps that need to be taken to safeguard our privacy.

Simultaneous interpretation from English to Spanish and Portuguese.

Deep packet inspection: What it is, how it works, and how it is used for surveillance

Chris Parsons, Doctoral Candidate, University of Victoria [Canada, EN]

Simultaneous interpretation from English to Spanish and Portuguese.

We are in the midst of a standardization revolution, a mass translation of discordant analogue signal types to interoperable digital transmission standards. All this digitized consumer traffic passes through the gateways of Internet Service Providers’ (ISPs). ISPs function as communicative bottlenecks, ideally positioning them to monitor, mine, and modify data using the Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) appliances situated within their networks. Some uses of these appliances could reshape the conditions of communication in democracies, blocking or modifying data transmissions in near real time.
In this presentation I discuss the technical capabilities of deep packet inspection and its significance for increased private and public surveillance capabilities. Drawing from case material from academic and advocacy work, I identify how the technology has been used for ISP-level surveillance, for copyright purposes, for national security purposes, and for advertising purposes. Moreover, I address how advocates in differing nations have opposed various uses of the technology, why they have done so, and conditions that facilitate domestic resistance to deep packet inspections' uses.

Advances in online spying: Commercial surveillance software, targeted hacking and beyond

Morgan Marquis-Boire, Google [New Zealand, EN]

Eva Galperin, Electronic Frontier Foundation [United States, EN]

Simultaneous interpretation from English to Spanish and Portuguese.

Against an increasingly security-aware online community, the traditional tools of blocking, filtering, and wiretapping have become less effective. Nervous regimes turn to the largely unregulated $5 billion a year industry in Internet surveillance tools.
Once the realm of the black market and intelligence agencies, the latest computer spyware is now sold at trade shows for dictator pocket change.
This talk will detail the cat and mouse game between authoritarian regimes and dissidents, as well as ongoing efforts to map out the relationship between surveillance software companies and governments.

10:30 - 10:40 Coffee Break

Workshops: Round I

10:40 - 11:50

Format: Interactive sessions with active participat0ion from the audience.

Workshop 1: Mobile privacy threats

This workshop addresses the ways governments are tracking mobile devices’ location and use, and why it’s been harder to protect communications privacy on mobile devices than on PCs.

Facilitators:
Hanni Fakhoury, Electronic Frontier Foundation [United States, EN]
Seth Schoen, Electronic Frontier Foundation [United States, EN/PT]

Rapporteur:
Enrique Chaparro, Fundación Vía Libre [Argentina, EN/ES]

Workshop 2: Training activists about state surveillance capabilities

In this workshop we’ll talk about some of new surveillance technologies that states are deploying, and the tactics that are used to legitimize the surveillance.
Going beyond just ‘what is used and how’, we speak to some political tactics that advocates have used to resist these tools on practical and principled levels, some of the conditions that contribute to successes, and ways of mobilizing effective strategies against expansions of state surveillance.

Facilitator:
Chris Parsons, University of Victoria [Canada, EN]

Rapporteur:
Katarzyna Szymielewicz, European Digital Rights [Poland, EN]

Workshop 3: Tactics for opposing state sponsored malware and surveillance

This workshop will review the different tactics government and non-government actors have employed to stop authoritarian regimes from making use of surveillance technology built in the United States and Europe to spy on their citizens.
We will discuss corporate responsibility, export controls, as well as the role of security research and user education campaigns. The workshop will end with a brainstorm of at least one concrete action each workshop attendee can take.

Facilitators:

Eva Galperin, Electronic Frontier Foundation [United States, EN]
Morgan Marquis-Boire [New Zealand, EN]

Rapporteur:
Silvio Rhatto, Sarava Group [Brazil, PT]

Reporting Back Session

11:50 - 12:40 Chair:

Katitza Rodriguez, Electronic Frontier Foundation [Peru, ES]

Rapporteurs:
Enrique Chaparro, Fundación Vía Libre [Argentina, EN/ES]
Katarzyna Szymielewicz, European Digital Rights [Poland, EN]

Report: Training Activists about State Surveillance Capabilities

Silvio Rhatto, Sarava Group [Brazil, PT]

Format: Each rapporteur has 10 minutes to report back about the results of their workshop discussion and 20 minutes to answer questions.

12:40 - 2:00 Lunch

Legal and Policy Plenary: Government Access to People’s Data

2:00 - 3:20

Chair: Pedro Paranaguá, Advisor for Internet Policy to the Workers’ Party in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies [Brazil, PT/EN]

Different data, different rules? How the law has assigned varying levels of privacy protection to different categories of personal information

Kevin Bankston, Center for Democracy and Technology [United States, EN]

Using the example of US law, this presentation will map the different legal protections that have traditionally been applied to different types surveillance of different types of data, and consider how to redraw that map in light of new technologies.
Speaking generally, US surveillance law has been written based on the assumptions that: (1) surveillance of data on your computer is more invasive than access to your data in the cloud;(2) real-time surveillance is more invasive than access to stored data; (3) surveillance of the content of communications is more invasive than surveillance of non-content meta-data; (4) surveillance of newer communications is more invasive than surveillance of older communications.
These assumptions have long defined which types of surveillance are most strongly regulated against and which types of data are most strongly protected by law. Changing technology has made these assumptions about invasiveness and privacy increasingly obsolete, assuming that they ever made sense at all. But if these distinctions are outdated, what if any legal distinctions between different types of surveillance or data should replace them? How, if at all, can the law sensibly distinguish between personal communications and communications data in which we have a reasonable expectation of privacy, and that which we do not?

Simultaneous interpretation from English to Spanish and Portuguese.

Internet companies as an agent of the state & european mandatory telecommunications data retention

Katarzyna Szymielewicz, European Digital Rights [Poland, EN]

In this short presentation I will introduce European (i.e. based on EU legislation) regime of mandatory retention of telecommunication data for law enforcement purposes, explaining its political context, implementation and negative impact on human rights standards (not just privacy-related!).
Using case studies of Poland and Germany I will present two strikingly different approaches to storing telecommunication data and law enforcement, thus questioning the necessity and proportionality of this controversial measure. I will also touch briefly on pending political developments (including the revision of the Data Retention Directive and the reform of data protection law in the EU), explaining what the stakes are, what European civil society organisations are fighting for and why it is such an important fight. Finally, I will explain how the debate about mandatory data retention feeds into a broader discussion about the role of Internet intermediaries, including both their independence from political pressure and protection of their clients from surveillance executed by “private police.”

Simultaneous interpretation from English to Spanish and Portuguese.

Crossborder access to citizen's data and cloud computing in the investigation of criminal cases: Regional trends

Marcos Salt, profesor de derecho penal y procesal penal de la universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA) [Argentina, ES]

During the brief presentation, I will present practical examples of the problems caused by the application by analogy of the rules on physical evidence to obtain digital evidence.
I try to show that this trend is inconvenient to both for efficiency in the investigation of crimes by the state as to the validity of individual rights. I will place special reference to cross-border access to citizen's data in the cloud.

Simultaneous interpretation from Spanish to English and Portuguese.

Background on lawful interception mandates and government access to encryption keys

Seth Schoen, Electronic Frontier Foundation [United States, EN]

Simultaneous interpretation from English to Spanish and Portuguese.

In this session, I'll discuss some of the history of fights over government surveillance powers and government access in the United States, starting in the early 1990s and continuing to the present day. These issues have centered on three main themes: restrictions on cryptography and privacy tools, obligations for communications intermediaries to acquire and implement surveillance capabilities, and mandatory retention of telecommunications data.
One interesting point is that many of the same themes keep recurring: the powers that the government is seeking today are often similar to those it sought two decades ago.
Another interesting point is that the government has not always been successful in expanding its surveillance powers. Many of its proposals never became law and there are still plenty of issues left to fight over. But governments around the world are continuing to having a major effect on the design of technology, getting wiretapping interfaces and backdoors added to communications systems and discouraging deployments of strong encryption.

MLATS and International Cooperation for Law Enforcement Purposes

Elonnai Hickok, Center for Internet & Society India [India, EN]

In this session I will be looking at the challenges, requisite safeguards, and possible solutions in the context of international cooperation for fighting crime. In doing so I will look closely at the proposed principle of safeguards for international cooperation.
The objective of this session will be to explore ways of improving MLATS and international law enforcement cooperation in order to ensure that basic safeguards can be built into the process of international cooperation.

Simultaneous interpretation from English to Spanish and Portuguese.

Format: 10-15 minutes for each five speakers to introduce legal issues and 20 minutes of discussions

3:10 - 3:20 Coffee Break

Workshops: Round II

3:20 - 4:30

Workshop 1: Electronic surveillance demonstrations

In this workshop, we'll take a look at a few electronic surveillance devices (including an ordinary laptop) and look at some of what they can intercept. Technological infrastructure permitting, we may have a live demonstration of intercepting or modifying users' Internet communications.
We'll also consider low-cost surveillance techniques and discuss what kinds of demonstrations have the most pedagogical value for making users aware of particular threats.

Facilitator:
Seth Schoen, Electronic Frontier Foundation [United States, EN]

Rapporteur:
Eva Galperin, Electronic Frontier Foundation [United States, EN/ES/PT]

Simultaneous interpretation from English to Spanish and Portuguese.

Workshop 2: Legal framework regarding compelled disclosure of communications, subscriber information, and cryptographic keys

In this workshop we will cover various examples of compelled disclosure of private information (from subscriber information and content of communication to cryptographic keys) in the context of law enforcement, focusing on their legal aspects. We will briefly present various legal frameworks, discussing both the examples of legal safeguards (“good practices”) and their shortcomings that allow for government surveillance.
We will also look at various human rights implications of these measures and (potential / existing) role of private companies from the perspective of their compliance with such measures (incl. when requested by non-democratic regimes).

Facilitators:
Katarzyna Szymielewicz, European Digital Rights [Poland, EN]
Elonnai Hickok, Center for Internet & Society India [India, EN]

Rapporteur:
Hanni Fakhoury, Electronic Frontier Foundation [United States, EN]

Workshop 3: What data is most private? What surveillance is most invasive? How if at all should laws treat them differently?

This workshop will build on the discussion that began in the law & policy plenary, discussing how certain surveillance laws have applied different legal protections to different types of data and surveillance, and questioning whether such distinctions make sense in light of new technology.
The workshop will address that question from legal, personal, and political perspectives. Participants will share with each other details of how the laws in their countries treat different types of data and different types of surveillance, to facilitate shared understanding of the existing legal frameworks and to identify existing gaps and discrepancies in current legal protections.
Based on their own personal experiences as Internet users and as advocates, participants will then discuss what data in their lives they consider most private and what types of surveillance they find most invasive, and reflect on how if at all the law should distinguish between them. Finally, participants will discuss the politics of these different frameworks: both how gaps and weaknesses in existing frameworks threaten the ability of advocates to politically organize in the face of government surveillance, and how we can best work through the political process and change those frameworks to better reflect current technology and human rights norms.

Facilitators:
Kevin Bankston, Center for Democracy and Technology [United States, EN]
Danilo Doneda, Fundação Getúlio Vargas [Brazil, PT/EN]

Rapporteur:
Beatriz Busaniche, Fundación Vía Libre [Argentina, ES]

Reporting Back Session & Closing Meeting Day 1

4:30 - 5:20

Chair:
Katitza Rodriguez, Electronic Frontier Foundation [Peru, ES]

Rapporteurs:
Eva Galperin, Electronic Frontier Foundation [United States, EN/ES/PT]

Report: Demonstrating Surveillance

Hanni Fakhoury, Electronic Frontier Foundation [United States, EN]

Report: Compelled Disclosure of Communications, Subscriber Information & Cryptographic Keys

Beatriz Busaniche, Fundación Vía Libre [Argentina, ES]

Report: What Data is Most Private? What Surveillance is Most Invasive? Should Laws Treat Different Data Differently?

8:30 pm Dinner

DAY 2: Challenges and Mapping Out Possible Solutions
8:55 - 9:00 Welcome

Plenary: Surveillance in Latin America
9:00 - 10:20

Chair: Camila Marques, Lawyer, ARTIGO 19 [Brazil, PT]

Surveillance in Colombia
Carlos Eduardo Huertas, Semana [Colombia, ES]

Surveillance in Cuba
“Mario Hernandez” [Cuba, ES]

Surveillance in the Northern Triangle
Renata Avila, Global Voices [Guatemala, ES]

Surveillance in Peru
Yonsi Solis, Global Voices [Peru, ES]

Surveillance in Mexico
Caracol Azul, [Mexico, ES]
This session will have simultaneous interpretation from Spanish to English and Portuguese

Keynote: Challenges Posed By Electronic Surveillance

10:20 - 10:40
Frank La Rue, United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression [Guatemala, ES]
Increasing pressure (legal and political) on private parties to help carry out the state’s surveillance mandate.

Simultaneous interpretation from Spanish to English and Portuguese

10:40 - 11:00 Coffee Break

Plenary: International Surveillance & Human Rights Principles: Challenges and Opportunities in Latin America

11:00 - 11:50

Chair: Carly Nyst, Privacy International [Australia/UK, EN]
Simultaneous interpretation from English to Spanish and Portuguese.

Explanation of the Principles: Background, purpose, need, challenges and opportunities

Chilean and Latin American perspectives

Alberto Cerda, Derechos Digitales [Chile, ES]
Simultaneous interpretation from Spanish to English and Portuguese

Expansion of Brazilian law enforcement powers to access users’ digital information

Pablo Ortellado, GPOPAI [Brasil, PT/EN]
Simultaneous interpretation from Portuguese to Spanish and English

Surveillance and regional human rights standards

Juan Camilo Rivera, Comisión Colombiana de Juristas [Colombia, ES]
Simultaneous interpretation from Spanish to English and Portuguese

Workshops: Round III

11:50 - 1:00

Workshop 1: International surveillance and human rights principles: Perspectives from Latin America

Facilitator:
Alberto Cerda, Derechos Digitales [ES] & Carly Nyst, Privacy International [UK, EN]

Rapporteur:
Juan Camilo Rivera, Comisión Colombiana de Juristas [Colombia, ES]

Workshop 2: Technical community activism
What is the technology community doing to defend privacy?

Facilitators:

Enrique Chaparro, Fundación Vía Libre [Argentina, ES ]
João Carlos Caribé, Movimento Mega (aka Mega Não) [Brazil, PT/EN]

Rapporteur:
Eva Galperin, Electronic Frontier Foundation [USA, EN]

Plenary: Hands-on Activism

2:40 - 3:50 p.m.

Chair: Rebecca Bowe, Electronic Frontier Foundation [United States, EN]

Simultaneous interpretation from English to Spanish and Portuguese.

What is meant by Hands-On Activism? As you’ll learn from our panelists, there are many strategies that can be utilized to push back against a surveillance practice or proposal. We’ll cover the most effective ways to obtain public records; strategies for generating interest in digital rights issues; fresh and extraordinary approaches to creative campaigning, and tactics used by an international nonprofit to tackle privacy issues with online campaigns.

Raising digital awareness in Peru

Marco Sifuentes, Instituto Prensa y Sociedad [Peru, ES]

Peru has a very active and influential online community. It can affect the course of elections, prove the president wrong and stop law projects. It can work very well on "real world" matters. But when it comes to online issues, it's been hard to raise awareness on the Peruvian general public and even on the media. What went wrong? However, in the past year, some digital topics have received a lot of coverage. Some not. What changed? I’ll share Peru's experience in the hope that every participant can compare it with his or her own country's situation.

Online organizing for human rights

Fabiola Carrion, Access [Peru, ES/EN]

A recent addition to the Access Team, Fabiola will begin her presentation by talking about her own experiences in organizing and advocacy, arguing that the struggle for human rights is increasingly moving online. She will discuss new tools of organizing, and the importance of combining technology, policy, and grassroots advocacy tactics to affect holistic change in internet policy debates. Her presentation will include a series of short case studies from around the world where Access, along with its various allies, have successfully campaigned for a free and open internet. Her presentation will conclude with a discussion of lessons learned and best practices for online organizing, particularly around issues of surveillance and due process.

Surveillance and secrecy: Strategy and tactics - Using the law to uncover abuse of LEAs’ surveillance powers

Geoff King, Lawyer [United States, EN]

Open government laws, though riddled with exemptions, are powerful tools for shedding light on the governmental operations. One way in which these laws can be used is to uncover the existence of law enforcement surveillance, as well details about the tools used to achieve such surveillance. This portion of the presentation will explore how journalists and activists can employ successful transparency strategies in the face of various procedural pitfalls. It will also give concrete examples of how such strategies have paid off in the recent past.
Presentation Materials

Creative campaigning: tactical media mashup
Vladan Joler, Share Foundation [Serbia, EN]

Explore the beautiful world of tactical media as a creative tool for getting your message out there.
From creative campaigning during Serbian protests in the 90s to “lo fi” media interventions, protests inside computer games, media pranks and parasite media tactics to social media bots and Twitter bombs.
Presentation Materials

Simultaneous interpretation from English to Spanish and Portuguese Return to Top

3:50 - 4:10 Coffee Break

Workshops: Round IV

4:10 - 5:10

Workshop 1: What the international surveillance and human rights principles are asking the governments to do?

This session will be used to call out exactly what the International Surveillance and Human Rights Principles are asking governments to change or legislative/policy actions they are asking governments to take. This will hopefully be useful in helping individuals and organizations understand what aspects to highlight and push when proposing the principles and why.

Facilitators:

Katitza Rodriguez, Electronic Frontier Foundation [Peru, ES]
Elonnai Hickok, Center for Internet & Society India [India, EN]

Rapporteur:
Graciela Selaimen, NUPEF [Brasil, EN/ES/PT]

Workshop 2: Creative campaigning: tactical media mashup & anti-surveillance campaigns

What are activists around the world doing to counter surveillance proposals and practices? And what could they be doing, with just a little more knowledge and inspiration? At this session, workshop facilitators will share stories about successful campaigns launched around the world in response to government surveillance. How did a humorous Twitter hashtag about a proponent of surveillance legislation rise to “trending” status on Twitter? How did a small team of digital rights activists in Argentina manage to position themselves as one of the most trusted media sources on issues relating to privacy in the digital realm? How did a small group of activists manage to reach biggest world media and how are activists creating their own media? We’ll then open it up for a group discussion in which participants can share their own stories of effective tactics from around the world, and explore ideas for collaborating and harnessing the knowledge gleaned from our collective experiences.

Facilitators:

Rebecca Bowe, Electronic Frontier Foundation [United States, EN]
Vladan Joler, Share Foundation [Serbia, EN]

Rapporteur:
Hisham Almiraat, Global Voices Advocacy [Morocco, EN]

Reporting Back Session & Closing Remarks

5:10 - 6:00

Chair:
Katitza Rodriguez, Electronic Frontier Foundation [Peru, ES]

Rapporteurs:
Graciela Selaimen, NUPEF [Brasil, EN/ES/PT]

Renzo Lavin, Asociación Civil por la Igualdad y la Justicia [Argentina, ES]
Hisham Almiraat, Global Voices Advocacy [Morocco, EN]

Each breakout session will have one designated rapporteur, one note-taker, and a module to work around.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/state-surveillance-and-human-rights-camp

State of Work in India

Admin — 2018-10-09T14:25:37Z

Aayush Rathi and Ambika Tandon attended a panel discussion organized by Bangalore International Centre (TERI) and Azim Premji University, on Wednesday, October 3, 2018 in Bengaluru. A report titled 'State of Working India' by the Centre for Sustainable Employment was released on the occasion.

The report can be accessed here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/state-of-work-in-india

State of Digital Rights in India (Delhi, March 24)

Japreet Grewal and Sumandro Chattapadhyay — 2017-03-27T13:21:20Z

The Centre for Communication Governance at National Law University, Delhi and the Internet Freedom Foundation, in association with Access Now, are hosting a discussion on The State of Digital Rights in India on March 24, 2017 (Friday) from 6.00 pm onwards at Lecture Room-I, India International Centre- Annexe, New Delhi. Japreet Grewal and Sumandro Chattapadhyay will participate in the panel discussions.

Registration: Eventbrite

March 24, 2017 marks the two year anniversary of the landmark Shreya Singhal judgment. This was a very significant ruling on freedom of speech and expression and occupies an important place in the Supreme Court’s discourse on civil liberties. The judgment traces out the contours of free speech on the Internet in India and unequivocally holds that the right to freedom of expression provided under Article 19(1)(a) applies to speech over the Internet, making it clear that this is a medium-neutral right.

The event aims to shed some light on this key judgment and discuss ongoing discussions regarding our civil liberties and freedoms online before courts and the Parliament. We would also like to take this opportunity to discuss some of the other pressing issues like Network Neutrality, Internet shutdowns, Privacy and User Security which need immediate attention and engagement of our democratic institutions. We hope to formulate effective strategies which will further shape the legal and policy framework in India, and facilitate better collaborative efforts between stakeholders.

We hope to bring together everyone who contributed to the judgment, and those who do work connected with it, so that we may build on it to seek a better legal framework to protect online speech and to discuss the threats surrounding digital rights and how best build on the foundations of the judgment.

We would be grateful if you could take out some time on Friday evening (6PM) and be a part of this important discussion. The discussion will be followed by dinner and an Open Bar for an Open Internet, which will start from 9.00 pm at the Annexe Court in the India International Centre - Annexe. In case you are unable to attend the seminar, please do join us for dinner!

Featuring:

A keynote address on our online freedoms and policymaking, by Shri Tathagata Satpathy (Member of Parliament, Lok Sabha)
A legal panel analysing the legacy of the Shreya Singhal v. Union of India judgment
Beyond Shreya Singhal: A conversation with women on the future of our digital rights
Briefings on the state of digital rights in our courts and in Parliament
A conversation on the path ahead for our civil liberties and digital rights community

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/state-of-digital-rights-in-india-delhi-march-24

State of Consumer Digital Security in India

pranav — 2021-07-05T11:07:24Z

This report attempts to identify the existing state of digital safety in India, with a mapping of digital threats, which will aid stakeholders in identifying and addressing digital security problems in the country. This project was funded by the Asia Foundation.

Since 2006, successive Union governments in India have shown increased focus on digital governance. The National e-Governance Plan was launched by the UPA government in2006, and several digital projects led by the state such as digitisation of the filing of taxes, appointment process for passports, corporate governance, and the Aadhaar programme(India’s unique digital identity system that utilises biometric and demographic data) arose under it, in the form of mission mode projects (projects that are part of a broader National e-governance initiative, each focusing on specific e-Governance aspects, like banking, land records, or commercial taxes). In 2014, when the NDA government came to power, the National e-Governance Plan was subsumed under the government’s flagship project of Digital India, and several mission mode projects were added. In the meantime, the internet connectivity, first in the form of wire connectivity, and later in the form of mobile connectivity has increased greatly. In the same period, use of digital services, first in new services native to the Internet such as email, social networking, instant messaging, and later the platformization and disruption of traditional business models in transportation, healthcare, finance and virtually every sector, has led to a deluge of digital private service providers in India.

Currently, India has 500 million internet users — over a third of its total population — making it the country with the second largest number of Internet users after China. The uptake of these technological services has also been accompanied by several kinds of digital threats that an average digital consumer in India must regularly contend with. This report is a mapping of consumer-facing digital threats in India and is intended to aid stakeholders in identifying and addressing digital security problems. The first part of the report categorises digital threats into four kinds, Personal Data Threats, Online Content Related Threats, Financial Threats, and Online Sexual Harassment Threats. Threats under each category are then defined, with detailed consumer-facing consequences, and past instances where harm has been caused because of these threats.

Read the full report here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/state-of-consumer-digital-security-in-india

Start-up India turns the heat on Facebook Free Basics

praskrishna — 2015-12-29T15:54:30Z

Facebook launched its "Save Free Basics" campaign last week, asking users to support "digital equality" in India.

The article by Anita Babu was published in Business Standard on December 22, 2015. Pranesh Prakash gave inputs.

Nearly a week after Facebook launched its controversial "Save Free Basics" campaign in India, the net neutrality debate has come to the fore again. This time around, India's star internet entrepreneurs such as Vijay Shekhar Sharma, founder and chief executive of Paytm, and Dippak Khurana of Vserv have joined the crusade for free internet.

"Oh my fellow Indians, either choose this and do a jihad for independent internet later or pick net neutrality today," Sharma of Paytm, India's largest digital wallet, tweeted on Tuesday. "Digital world war heads! We have to load http://www.savetheinternet.in for #NetNeutrality," said Sharma in another tweet. Savetheinternet.in, a volunteer group, has urged people to lend their support for an unfettered internet in India.

Facebook launched its "Save Free Basics" campaign last week, asking users to support "digital equality" in India, in response to a paper by the telecom regulator which is seeking comments on differential pricing practices like Airtel Zero of Facebook's Free Basics, which was earlier called Internet.org.

Facebook launched a print and digital media campaign for a "connected India" asking users to give a missed call, automatically sending a message to the regulator in support of Free Basics.

Facebook has also been asking its users to send an e-mail to Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) supporting "essential internet for all". The social network claims to have gained support from 3.2 million of its 130 million users in India.

On Tuesday, the social media giant earned flak for soliciting support from international users for the campaign. Later, Facebook withdrew the campaign outside India claiming it was an "accident".

However, some net neutrality volunteers said that many of Facebook's 3.2 million supporters for Free Basics were non-Indians.

Activists and tech leaders are calling the Facebook campaign "misleading" and "destructive".

"People are being tricked into supporting Free Basics under the guise of digital equality," wrote Amol Malviya, former chief technology officer at Flipkart, India's largest e-commerce firm, on his blog. "Notice the language on the page? It makes any critic of Free Basics appear to be an enemy of digital equality. People will listen to the critics' arguments much lesser when there's a question mark on their intent."

Nikhil Pahwa, editor and publisher of MediaNama, said India should question the intent of Facebook and its campaign. "There is misrepresentation in the language they have used. It makes people assume that we can't have universal internet access without net-neutrality violating services such as Free Basics. It is important for a country to take note of how much power a platform with as much reach as Facebook has to influence an important government process," said Pahwa, who led a fight against TRAI's move to allow telecom firms charge for internet services like WhatsApp and Hike.

The basic premise of net neutrality is that of freedom - an open internet that protects and enables free communication. Anything that takes away this freedom violates the fundamentals of free Internet. "Facebook's Free Basics is neither free nor basic - it is a cleverly disguised way of walling a garden, and hardly the philanthropic initiative that it is marketed to be," said Khurana of Vserv. He urged internet users to uninstall the Facebook App from their mobile phones in protest.

Pranesh Prakash, policy director at the Centre for Internet and Society, said, "Facebook, a foreign company, is allowed to campaign with impunity, but NGOs receiving funding from foreign trusts are subject to all manners of restrictions and may not campaign in India."

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/business-standard-anita-babu-december-23-2015-start-up-india-turns-the-heat-on-facebook-free-basics

Stand up for Digital Rights

elonnai — 2016-06-13T15:30:12Z

The Centre for Internet & Society (CIS) invites you to a discussion on a set of recommendations for Ethical Tech, a report on human rights and private online intermediaries which describes key areas where such actors have responsibilities. The event will be held at CIS office in Bangalore on June 15, 2016 from 5 p.m. to 7 p.m.

The discussion intends to launch a report on human rights and private online intermediaries, which describes key areas where such actors have responsibilities and provides a detailed set of recommendations for Ethical Tech. This work is the culmination of a year long research project led by the Centre for Law and Democracy (CLD), in collaboration with the Arabic Network for Human Rights Information (ANHRI), the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), Open Net Korea, the Center for Studies on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information at the University of Palermo (CELE) and researchers with the University of Ottawa and the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto. The key themes for discussion would include:

General Human Rights Responsibilities and Private Online Intermediaries
Expanding Access
Net Neutrality
Content Moderation
Privacy
Transparency and Informed Consent
Responding to State Interferences

We look forward to meeting you and making this forum for knowledge exchange a success.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/events/stand-up-for-digital-rights

Stand up for Digital Rights

praskrishna — 2016-07-25T15:29:41Z

The Centre for Internet & Society (CIS) invites you to a discussion on a set of Recommendations for Ethical Research, a report on human rights and private online intermediaries which describes key areas where such actors have responsibilities. The discussion is on coming Friday, July 29, 2016 at the Centre for Internet & Society's Delhi office from 3.00 p.m. to 5.00 p.m.

The discussion intends to launch a report on human rights and private online intermediaries, which describes key areas where such actors have responsibilities and provides a detailed set of Recommendations for Ethical Tech. This work is the culmination of a year-long research project led by the Centre for Law and Democracy (CLD), in collaboration with the Arabic Network for Human Rights Information (ANHRI), the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), Open Net Korea, the Center for Studies on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information at the University of Palermo (CELE) and researchers with the University of Ottawa and the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto. The key themes for discussion would include:

General Human Rights Responsibilities and Private Online Intermediaries
Expanding Access
Net Neutrality
Content Moderation
Privacy
Transparency and Informed Consent
Responding to State Interferences

We look forward to meeting you and making this a forum for knowledge exchange a success.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/events/stand-up-for-digital-rights-1

Stakeholder Consultation on Digital Assets for Women’s Economic Empowerment | UN Women + SEWA

Admin — 2020-04-07T13:14:40Z

On December 06, 2019, Ambika Tandon and Aayush Rathi participated in a "Stakeholder Consultation on Digital Assets for Women’s Economic Empowerment: Addressing Barriers and Enhancing Opportunities for Women in Informal Economy and in Agriculture".

Aayush and Ambika participated upon the invite of UN Women and Self Employed Women's Association (SEWA), who were the organisers of the consultation. The consultation was from 9:30 am to 4:30 pm on 6th December, 2019 at the Claridges Hotel, New Delhi.

Former UN Secretary-General Mr. Ban Ki Moon established the UN High-Level Panel on Women’s Economic Empowerment (UNHLP-WEE) to make action oriented recommendations on how to improve economic outcomes for women in the context of the Sustainable Development Agenda 2030.The panel submitted its final report to the UN Secretary General in 2017, identifying seven drivers for women’s economic empowerment and laying out concrete actions for accelerating progress towards women’s full and equal economic participation.

In February 2019, SEWA Bharat and UN Women had organized a National consultation on “Taking Action Towards Transformative Change for Women in the Informal Sector in India” in India with civil society organizations, researchers, philanthropists and international organizations to prioritize action on the drivers for women’s economic empowerment in the context of India. Four drivers, amongst seven, were prioritized through the consultative process. Driver 4 on Building Assets – Digital, Financial and Property is one of the critical drivers for Women’s Economic Empowerment in India and has been prioritized for the first stakeholder consultation in the roadmap development process to contextualize the recommendation of HLP in the Indian context.

The primary objectives, then, of this consultation were as follows:

To provide a platform for sharing of experiences in research, programming and policy to ensure digital assets for women in the informal economy and in agriculture;
To identify proven and promising practices in this regard;
To develop an action agenda including identification of areas for research, programming and policy to reduce the gender digital divide.

*Detailed agenda*

Download the detailed agenda here.

*Participation*

At the consultation, Aayush contributed to the breakout group on DBT while Ambika contributed to the one on employment. The consultation led to rich discussions as on-ground experiences and learning from implementation programs were shared widely to devise a roadmap and policy recommendations.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/stakeholder-consultation-on-digital-assets-for-women2019s-economic-empowerment-un-women-sewa

Srikrishna panel upset at timing of Trai suggestions

Admin — 2018-07-19T14:17:19Z

The Justice BN Srikrishna Committee, which is drafting a model data protection and privacy law for India, is upset by the timing of recommendations made by the country’s telecom regulator this week, according to a senior member of the panel, as it fears this will delay the submission of its own report, due later this month.

The article by Megha Mandavia was published in Economic Times on July 19, 2018. Swaraj Paul Barooah was quoted.

On Monday, Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (Trai) in a surprise move recommended rules that give users control of their data and personal information while severely restricting ways in which telecom and internet firms can use customer data. Its rules are applicable for apps, browsers, operating systems and handset makers.

“Next week somebody will make some recommendations and that will have to be merged, then again somebody will make some other recommendations,” the person told ET. He added that the committee will look into Trai’s submissions.

On Wednesday, ET reported that officials of ministry of electronics and information technology (MeitY), besides industry groupings such as Internet and Mobile Association of India (IAMAI) and the Indian Cellular Association (ICA) were unhappy with Trai’s move.

“Like any other sector, the data protection Act will be the final thing. In respect of telecom matters, there will be a role for Trai as sectoral regulator but the basics of privacy will be governed by the data protection Act,” a MeitY official told ET.

Legal experts and industry analysts also questioned the need for the regulatory announcement just before the Justice Srikrishna committee releases its report, after a year of deliberations.

The high-powered group — consisting of jurists, academicians and policymakers — was formed last July with a brief to suggest principles for data privacy and a draft data protection bill for the country.

“Why is Trai then pre-empting the law?” said Kartik Maheshwari, leader for technology companies at law firm Nishith Desai Associates.

“Now that Trai has published its recommendations in public domain, the government may not be able to completely ignore them. But it’s so late in the day that it may not have any real impact on the final recommendations of the Justice Srikrishna committee,” he said.

The ten-member panel may incorporate some of Trai’s suggestions even as it submits its report to the union government next week. Trai chairman RS Sharma said the regulatory body has jurisdiction to tackle data protection under consumer interest, and those who feed off the industry — content providers, or apps, browsers, operating systems, and devices — were only custodians.

“We will send these recommendations to the committee, but we did not time it to coincide. We’re not dependent on the committee and we had issued this suo moto, since we felt the need to rigorously deliberate on the issue,” Sharma told ET on Tuesday.

There could be sector-specific laws within the general data protection framework for the telecom sector, he added.

Analysts say that regulators making public their recommendations before the data framework only adds to the confusion. “Industry was looking forward to a common primary framework. There are many independent suggestions coming from various regulators. It is creating confusion and chaos. I do expect considerable delay in finalising the law. Once the draft is out, there will be public consultation; all regulators will also have a say,” said Vidur Gupta, partner, government and public sector, EY India.

Others say that while there is clarity on what Trai is expecting, it has to be bound by the panel’s recommendations.

“It is good that a regulator has an eye on the market. It gives us an idea about what Trai has on its mind. The Reserve Bank of India also had not waited for Srikrishna Committee report before issuing a directive on data localisation,” said Swaraj Paul Barooah, policy director at Centre for Internet and Society.

“But the major point is that Trai’s recommendations are not binding; the data privacy law will be influenced by Justice Srikrishna committee only.”

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/economic-times-megha-mandavia-july-19-2018-srikrishna-panel-upset-at-timing-of-trai-suggestions