We are anonymous, we are legion

The Privacy (Protection) Bill 2013: A Citizen's Draft

bhairav — 2013-07-12T11:50:20Z

The Centre for Internet and Society has been researching privacy in India since 2010 with the objective of raising public awareness around privacy, completing in depth research, and driving a privacy legislation in India. As part of this work, Bhairav Acharya has drafted the Privacy (Protection) Bill 2013.

This research was undertaken as part of the 'SAFEGUARDS' project that CIS is undertaking with Privacy International and IDRC.

The Privacy (Protection) Bill 2013 contains provisions that speak to data protection, interception, and surveillance. The Bill also establishes the powers and functions of the Privacy Commissioner, and lays out offenses and penalties for contravention of the Bill. The Bill represents a citizen's version of a possible privacy legislation for India, and will be shared with key stakeholders including civil society, industry, and government.

Click to download a full draft of the Privacy (Protection) Bill, 2013.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/privacy-protection-bill-2013-citizens-draft

The Present — and Future — Dangers of India's Draconian New Internet Regulations

anja — 2011-08-02T07:22:24Z

The uproar surrounding India's Internet Control Rules makes clear that in the Internet age, as before, the active chilling of freedom of expression by the state is unacceptable in a democracy. Yet if India's old censorship regimes are to be maintained in this new context, the state will have little choice but to do just that. Are we ready to rethink the ways in which we deal with free speech and censorship as a society? Asks Anja Kovacs in this article, published in Caravan, 1 June 2011.

WHAT ACTUALLY DEFINES A DEMOCRACY? It is a trickier question than it first seems, and yet it is worthwhile, at least every now and then, to remind ourselves of what constitutes the political system we hold so dear. Free and fair elections; an independent legislative, executive and judiciary; and freedom of the press—these are all vital ingredients. But what may be democracy’s defining element, or at least its sine qua non, is the right to freedom of opinion and expression: without this equal right to “seek, receive and impart information”, as the universal declaration of Human Rights frames it, a system of governance of the people, for the people and by the people simply remains meaningless. Without a free flow of information, democracy does not exist.

It is with good reason, then, that bloggers, tech enthusiasts and watchdogs from civil society have been up in arms over two new sets of rules, notified in April 2011, that will impact every Indian’s Internet use. Formulated by the Central Government under powers conferred to it by the IT (Amendment) Act 2008, one set governs what is known as the liability of intermediaries. This determines in which cases, and to what extent, companies ranging from Google and Facebook to local Internet service providers (ISPs) are legally responsible for the content that you upload.

The second set of rules pertains to cybercafes. In a manner reminiscent of the licence Raj, there are new registration standards for these establishments, which go beyond the usual requirements for commercial enterprises and include detailed procedures to identify all users. Cybercafes will be required to maintain and submit, on a monthly basis, logs that detail the use of all computers in the cafe and to keep backups of all users’ browser histories, to be maintained for at least one year.

There is much that is wrong with these rules, but what makes them such a particular threat to freedom of expression? Some effects are likely to be indirect: for example, the Internet has the potential to emerge as an important avenue for young people from disadvantaged backgrounds to express and discuss concerns so rarely taken into account by the mainstream media. But by putting into place stringent identification requirements for cybercafe users, who are likely to be less well-off, the access of underprivileged users in particular will be further constrained. Moreover, the combination of the need for identification with the requirement for cybercafes to keep a log of every user’s browser history means that anonymity online is now effectively made impossible in India. For whistleblowers, artists, writers or anyone desiring anonymity, there is no longer a place in Indian cyberspace.

But the most troubling impact on freedom of expression of the new mandates remains direct: in their attempt to delineate the liability of Internet providers and websites, the new rules for “intermediary due diligence” actually add important new curbs on freedom of expression to Indian law. India’s Constitution recognises a fairly extensive list of so-called “reasonable restrictions” and these are more or less replicated in the Rules: “the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign states, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence”. But the Rules, which were never vetted by Parliament, do not limit themselves to these Constitutional provisions. Rather surprisingly, they add a whole new slew of qualifications, many of which are so vague, moreover, that they leave the door wide open to abuse. Thus, for example, the Rules impose a blanket ban on impersonation and make it illegal to share any information that is “grossly harmful”, “harassing”, “blasphemous”, “disparaging” or “insulting any other nation”. None of these terms have been explained or defined.

Lacking the precision that would allow citizens to precisely regulate their behaviour in line with the law, overly broad regulations such as these are widely believed to have a chilling effect: in order not to violate the law, people begin to censor themselves—to keep quiet rather than protesting or engaging. But in this particular case, the effects are likely to be particularly pernicious because of a second provision made by the Rules: wherever an intermediary receives a complaint claiming that any information they store, host or publish contravenes the provisions of the Rules, the intermediary is required to take down this information within 36 hours. Censorship, in other words, will effectively be privatised.

The prospect is all the more depressing because the intermediaries have little incentive to resist participating in such censorship. Given the restrictions on free speech that are effectively enforced within Indian society by vigilante groups, especially in the last two decades, the possible impact of these rules is even more frightening. If Facebook has little reason to uphold your right to maintain a page that is critical of say, Gandhiji, what prevents vigilante groups from policing our lives online even more than they do offline? The only recourse available to the owner of the confiscated information will be going to court—meaning that defending one’s own freedom of speech online will require endless litigation.

These are worrying omens, in other words, for those who believe that freedom of expression is the cornerstone of democracy. But to what extent do these new provisions represent a radical break with India’s existing restrictions on free speech? Since its founding, the independent Indian nation-state has wielded censorship as a tool to both contain the conflicts that emanate from India’s tremendous diversity and to ensure its homogeneous social, moral and political development. If the list of reasonable restrictions in the Constitution is fairly long, this is because the country’s lawmakers were clear at the time of Independence that freedom of expression would need to be subordinated to the social reforms necessary to put the country on Nehru’s path to development. India’s far-reaching anti-hate speech laws, too, derive from the desire to combat ill will and disharmony. Since the Internet now makes it so much easier to publish opinions that are hurtful, or indeed “grossly harmful” or “disparaging”, the new Rules can in many ways be seen as an attempt to continue this strategy in the Internet age.

The problem, however, is that irrespective of the merits of such a strategy in the past, within the radically altered communicative context of the Internet, it is simply no longer feasible. As the Internet guru Clay Shirky has argued, earlier systems of media and communication worked on a “filter, then publish” principle. Because publishing a newspaper, for example, is expensive, editors and journalists take upon themselves the role of filtering out the “worthwhile” from the “not-so-worthwhile”. Without them making that vital differentiation between “news” and “information” on the one hand and “drivel” on the other, newspapers would simply not be viable. In the Internet age, however, this principle has been reversed. The arrival of social media especially has made it so easy and cheap for anyone to share their opinions that the mantra now is: first publish, then filter. The gatekeeper role of the traditional media stands much reduced.

For the Indian government’s strategy of using censorship as a tool to mitigate social conflict, this shift has two important consequences. The first one is quantitative: it means that there are now far more speech acts to police. That undoubtedly has made the state’s task much more difficult. But there is also a second, qualitative difference: it also means that whether the government approves of this or not, there will now be a far wider range of people who will make their voices heard, and thus, a far wider range of opinions that will be expressed in the public sphere. And it is precisely to stop such a diversity from emerging that much censorship in India has been justified over the years. As a 1980 report of the Working Group on National Film Policy argued: “if the overall objective of censorship is to safeguard generally accepted standards of morality and decency, in addition to the well recognised interests of the State, the standards of censorship applicable to freedom of expression cannot be very much ahead of the standards of behaviour commonly accepted in society. Censorship can become liberal only to the extent society itself becomes genuinely liberal”.

What such statements conveniently elide, of course, is the enormous diversity within Indian society itself. Whose standards of behaviour are they thinking of? Kashmiri, Manipuri, Chhattisgarhi? Gandhian, feminist, communist? Adivasi, Muslim, Dalit? Who represents this community of the nation? Censorship always benefits the status quo, and the Indian case has been no different. The rise of the Internet has merely revealed, with increasing frequency, cracks in the supposedly uniform moral, social and political development of India that the government envisioned. If the old censorship regime is to nevertheless be maintained in this new context, it will therefore increasingly require the active chilling of freedom of expression on the part of the state. What the uproar surrounding the Internet Control Rules makes clear is that in the Internet age, as before, this is an unacceptable route for a modern democracy. A new model to deal with diversity and dissent is urgently required.

What makes our democracy? With the undeniable challenges that the Internet throws to our established ways of operating, it is time to reopen this debate as a society, rather than leaving it to politicians and bureaucrats. The open forum of the Internet may often offend, or rattle our sensibilities and beliefs, but it also presents new possibilities for engagement and debate. Will we take this opportunity?

Read the original here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-present-and-future-dangers-of-indias-draconian-new-internet-regulations

The Power of Communication: The Media, Public Space and Participatory Democracy

praskrishna — 2014-09-30T05:49:27Z

Bhairav Acharya will be presenting a paper at this event to be held in the Indian Institute of Advanced Study in Shimla on October 13 and 14, 2014.

For more details, see here.

Bhairav would talk about the tension in defamation law, between its deontological command (Kant's categorical imperative of truth) and its consequentialism (harm, to reputation or to public peace).

The talk would explore the utility of our present common law construction of libel; and, if it's not too bold, he hopes to make the case that Indian libel law should incorporate a new test of serious and actual harm as its primary defence to libel, and that the defence of truth should be done away with. This is because Bhairav believes that free speech law should strictly construe Mill's harm principle. In other words, lies and rumours after all, if the state can freely engage in questionable propanganda, people should be allowed to spread baseless rumours — are good for health and should not be criminalised.

Background note

The media has been a growth sector over two decades and more of liberalisation. All evidence points towards the media industry having substantially outrun the overall rate of growth of the economy. This is not surprising since advertising which has been the principal driver of media growth, tends to leave behind other sectors in times of economic buoyancy. Technology has been another powerful driver of media growth over the last two decades. From the first glimmers of satellite broadcasting over the C band which enabled local cable operators to provide a menu of untold variety in the early 1990s, to the recent spurt in the “direct to home” transmissions, the Indian TV scenario has been transformed from a tightly controlled government monopoly, to a state of unregulated proliferation.

A further enabling mechanism has been the rapid growth of internet access. The digital divide remains very much a reality and the numbers that are able to tap into the full potential of the internet, is still a rather small fraction of the total population. The proliferation of cellular telephony though, has made limited modes of access a reality for growing numbers. And the damage potential is at the same time manifest in the growth of the politics of rumour.

It has been a central dilemma of the recent phase of media growth in India that the physical infrastructure has expanded, but the rules of the game are yet to be agreed. The official response has been to put in place a doctrine of intermediary liability, which has had a special bearing on the emerging sector of the social media. This is a principle that is being fought in the court-rooms by well-endowed internet giants. But at the level of individual users, section 66A of the Information Technology Act -- enacted in 2009 – remains a source of peril for social media users.

There are worries often expressed that competition among media channels has fuelled a race to the bottom. “Sting operations” which are by definition illegal unless they serve a strong public interest, have become a common recourse. Respect for privacy and personal reputation has become a rather loosely observed component of the code of media ethics.

Incidents in the recent past when media coverage has been directly paid for by political and business entities have fuelled public concerns about spurious and inauthentic information circulating in the public domain merely to serve profit objectives.

Episodes when the media has amplified public discontent and caused severe stress within the apparatuses of the state, have led to frequent expressions of concern. Serving and retired intelligence officials have remarked on the destabilisation potential of the new social media. And current and past prime ministers have spoken of the need to be vigilant about the use of the social media, but also to ensure that the free speech right is respected and the potential of the new media in serving larger national goals is realised.

The global financial meltdown in September 2008 made deep inroads into the fortunes of the media. The months that followed sharply highlighted the vulnerability of the media industry to corporate pressures. Despite its very loud voice and its pervasive presence in the lives of several million citizens, the media industry is dwarfed by India’s major corporate players. Illustratively, the advertising budget of just one among the leading players in the “fast moving consumer goods” (FMCG) space would be of the same order of magnitude as the total revenue of India’s biggest media groups.

This has been the context in which certain very large corporate entities – possibly among a host of smaller ones – have moved into the media space. The official response to this complex of changes has been marked by fits and spurts, which finally subside into indecision and inaction.

Efforts to transform the state-owned broadcasting agencies into public service media have faltered. And with commercial motives being dominant, large numbers of citizens who are of no conceivable interest to advertisers have fallen between the cracks, losing their voice within the public sphere.
Older experiments in using the official media as a vehicle for transmitting a message of development and diversity, have fallen into obscurity and neglect. While the ambitious experiment of using satellite-enabled broadcast media for developmental objectives is yet to be evaluated, the state-owned media are seen to have not transformed their approach according to the times.

Radio, which could be the most democratic and accessible of broadcast media, remains underdeveloped in its potential because of a refusal by the government to surrender its monopoly over news and current affairs content over the media.

A broad-based and critical debate on media policy, which looks at its promise as a space for participatory democracy, has been sorely lacking. This is in part because media industry players have worked themselves into the vantage position of setting the terms of the discourse. The voices of civil society and in particular, of those who stand to gain the most from a broadening of democratic spaces, have remained unheard.

This is the context in which an event under the above title is proposed at the institute. The ground covered in the event could include:

public understanding and perceptions of the media;
media representations of the “public” – “in” and “out” groups; voices heard and unheard;
“development” as represented in the media and the public space;
the voice afforded to diverse communities in determining development priorities;
the means afforded to diverse communities in voicing their opinion;
how the technical means of getting diverse opinions into the public space have evolved: from print, to the tightly controlled broadcasting space, to the unregulated broadcast space of the 1990s onwards;
securing transparency and public accountability in the media space;
from the perception of the telephone as a luxury irrelevant to the lives of the majority in the country, to its current status as an irreplaceable accessory of everyday life across all categories;
the plus and minus side of the ledger on the new communication possibilities;
the rights to privacy and personal reputation – reconciling these with accountability and the public right to information;
the politics of rumour; the damage potential of rumour and how rumour is also a means of enforcing public accountability;
how efforts to politically manage information invariably prove self-defeating, whether it is in the 1975-77 Emergency or today;
where do we go for a free and democratic media universe.

The event would seek to look back, look at current realities and look ahead to how things could be made better within a democratic order.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-power-of-communication-media-public-space-participatory-democracy

The Potential for the Normative Regulation of Cyberspace: Implications for India

pranav — 2018-07-31T23:49:47Z

Author: Arindrajit Basu Edited by: Elonnai Hickok, Sunil Abraham and Udbhav Tiwari Research Assistance: Tejas Bharadwaj

The standards of international law combined with strategic considerations drive a nation's approach to any norms formulation process. CIS has already produced work with the Research and Advisory Group (RAG) of the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (GCSC), which looks at the negotiation processes and strategies that various players may adopt as they drive the cyber norms agenda.

This report focuses more extensively on the substantive law and principles at play and looks closely at what the global state of the debate means for India

With the cyber norms formulation efforts in a state of flux,India needs to advocate a coherent position that is in sync with the standards of international law while also furthering India's strategic agenda as a key player in the international arena.

This report seeks to draw on the works of scholars and practitioners, both in the field of cybersecurity and International Law to articulate a set of coherent positions on the four issues identified in this report. It also attempts to incorporate, where possible, state practice on thorny issues of International Law. The amount of state practice that may be cited differs with each state in question.

The report provides a bird’s eye-view of the available literature and applicable International Law in each of the briefs and identifies areas for further research, which would be useful for the norms process and in particular for policy-makers in India.Historically, India had used the standards of International Law to inform it's positions on various global regimes-such as UNCLOS and legitimize its position as a leader of alliances such as the Non-Aligned Movement and AALCO. However, of late, India has used international law far less in its approach to International Relations. This Report therefore explores how various debates on international law may be utilised by policy-makers when framing their position on various issues. Rather than creating original academic content,the aim of this report is to inform policy-makers and academics of the discourse on cyber norms.In order to make it easier to follow, each Brief is followed by a short summary highlighting the key aspects discussed in order to allow the reader to access the portion of the brief that he/she feels would be of most relevance. It does not advocate for specific stances but highlights the considerations that should be borne in mind when framing a stance.

The report focuses on four issues which may be of specific relevance for Indian policy-makers. The first brief, focuses on the Inherent Right of Self-Defense in cyberspace and its value for crafting a stable cyber deterrence regime. The second brief looks at the technical limits of attributability of cyber-attacks and hints at some of the legal and political solutions to these technical hurdles. The third brief looks at the non-proliferation of cyber weapons and the existing global governance framework which india could consider when framing its own strategy. The final brief looks at the legal regime on counter-measures and outlines the various grey zones in legal scholarship in this field. It also maps possible future areas of cooperation with the cyber sector on issues such as Active Cyber Defense and the legal framework that might be required if such cooperation were to become a reality.Each brief covers a broad array of literature and jurisprudence and attempts to explore various debates that exist both among international legal academics and the strategic community.

The ongoing global stalemate over cyber norms casts a grim shadow over the future of cyber-security. However, as seen with the emergence of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, it is not impossible for consensus to emerge in times of global tension. For India, in particular, this stalemate presents an opportunity to pick up the pieces and carve a leadership position for itself as a key norm entrepreneur in cyberspace.

Read the full report here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-potential-for-the-normative-regulation-of-cyberspace-implications-for-india

The politics of Facebook

praskrishna — 2014-04-03T11:30:51Z

With the social media becoming an important political battleground, is Facebook affecting friendships and trying to influence our political leanings?

The article by Shweta Tiwari was published in Livemint on April 1, 2014. Dr. Nishant Shah is quoted.

When social activist Uthara Narayanan, 32, posted an innocuous article link on the Gujarat riots on Facebook in January, she was in for a surprise. An old friend from college fiercely defended Gujarat chief minister and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) prime ministerial candidate Narendra Modi, getting abrasive and personal in the post. “I had known her for more than 14 years and yet hadn’t seen this side to her,” says Narayanan. “I didn’t realize when she had gone off and gotten such strong views on the debate.”

From then on Narayanan decided to stay away from her friend though they live in the same city. “It left a bad taste in my mouth and marred our friendship for me, though I am still Facebook friends with her.” Almost as if agreeing with her, Facebook’s wall automatically started keeping her friend’s posts away from her wall—thanks to the EdgeRank algorithm.

Like-like stick together

EdgeRank, the Facebook algorithm that decides which posts to show in your newsfeed, bases its decision on three factors: an affinity score between the user and the one who’s created the post, the type of post (comment, like, create or tag), and time lapsed since it was created. The first basically means that you will see posts from friends you have interacted with and like to interact with on the social network.

In January, Catherine Grevet, a PhD student at the Georgia Institute of Technology in the US, studied this algorithm in the light of politics and concluded that people tend to get attracted to circles of friends who affirm to their own political leanings, all because of Facebook’s algorithms. “People are mainly friends with those who share similar values and interests,” Grevet wrote in the study. “As a result, they aren’t exposed to opposing viewpoints.” Grevet presented the study at the 17th ACM Conference on Computer-Supported Cooperative Work and Social Computing in the US in February.

Alok Sharma, a Mumbai-based creative writer who used to be a political cartoonist, says social media has led to Indians opening up. “We are taught to be a little politically correct, especially in face-to-face conversations. But when it comes to social networking sites, Indians express their views like fanatics,” he says. He blocked a couple of Facebook friends after a spate of personal comments on one of his posts. “My friends know me and get the crux of what I might be trying to say in a thread but there are others who are on my Friends list but don’t understand the context and take it all wrong.”

The misunderstanding arises because many of us post on the network as we would speak among friends and not as we would say things in public. “Facebook is not a community, a clique or a group of friends,” says Nishant Shah, director of research at Bangalore-based non-profit The Centre for Internet and Society. “It is just a network,” he says. That means that not all people on your Facebook list are friends—you are just connected to them on the network. You might have a professional relationship with them, be teammates or acquaintances or colleagues, but you don’t know them personally. Given that the average Facebook user has 229 Facebook friends—according to the numbers from US think tank Pew Research Center’s Internet Project which tracks statistics about the social network—that’s just too many people to even know personally.

“The audience on the social network is much larger than the friend list, including Facebook itself, which, if it finds your comment problematic, will censor even before a complaint is produced,” says Shah. A post on Facebook or a comment or a like, can get you in trouble not just with other individuals or communities who take offence but even the law, as happened to a girl in 2012 who put up a post criticizing the shutdown of Mumbai after the death of Shiv Sena patriarch Bal Thackeray.

“Though used like it, Facebook is not a conversation,” says Shah, “Because everything you write is archived and recorded. And can be used against you if need be.”

A medium to shout in

But would you shout at a stranger on the street as you do on Facebook? Basav Biradar, a programme manager based in Bangalore, actively posts on politics and comments on Facebook. He feels most people on Facebook give strong opinions that are not well-informed. “A lot of these opinions are dependent on propaganda and campaigns rather than facts. Why don’t people do some homework before forming an opinion?” With over 100 million Indians active on the social network, however, an uninformed opinion is hardly reason to stop anyone from posting, commenting, liking, offending and getting offended through posts on Facebook.

Shah calls this phenomenon cyber-bullying in politics. “Specific vocal and passionate groups and communities have emerged who silence any voice of dissent or critique by trolling the dissident,” says Shah. “They do not need anonymity. They don’t try to hide who they are. They feel so empowered by the backing of the politicos who are either hiring or supporting them, that they have risen in hordes and are stifling the space for dissent and questioning even more effectively than they have been able to do in real life.”

It’s almost like standing in a rally and hearing a swarm of slogans. Sashi Kumar, chairman of the trust Media Development Foundation that runs the Asian College of Journalism, Chennai, gives a similar analogy. He believes that the language of communication on Facebook is not written but oral. “Writing implies a well thought through opinion, whereas speech is responsive and involved. Within the Internet, there’s a strange morphing of written form which is expressed in a way of oral communication. You speak to someone on Facebook, you respond, you hear, you react, you communicate, you talk.” He says that this morphing is leading society back to more oral forms of communication where written forms like newspapers will be a thing of the past.

Replacing traditional media

	With surprising events like the support for Jan Lokpal law, Pink Chaddi campaign and even the backlash against the December 2012 gang rape case in Delhi, social media seems to have somewhere, somehow made all of us more participative, more aware and more active in political and social spaces. Most politicians have active Twitter and Facebook accounts. Most newspapers and even news channels quote their feed as statements when summing up news. Social networks have become almost mainstream. So much so that when earlier in March Modi attacked Bihar chief minister Nitish Kumar at a political rally in Muzaffarpur, Bihar, Kumar’s response was detailed, and through a Facebook post.

With surprising events like the support for Jan Lokpal law, Pink Chaddi campaign and even the backlash against the December 2012 gang rape case in Delhi, social media seems to have somewhere, somehow made all of us more participative, more aware and more active in political and social spaces.

Most politicians have active Twitter and Facebook accounts. Most newspapers and even news channels quote their feed as statements when summing up news. Social networks have become almost mainstream. So much so that when earlier in March Modi attacked Bihar chief minister Nitish Kumar at a political rally in Muzaffarpur, Bihar, Kumar’s response was detailed, and through a Facebook post.

A joint study by the IRIS Knowledge Foundation, a public service initiative of business and financial information provider IRIS Business Services Pvt. Ltd, and the industry body Internet and Mobile Association of India, suggests that social media use is now sufficiently widespread to influence the outcome of the next general election and consequently government formation. The March research, which studied Facebook’s own data, claims that among the social media spaces, Facebook users have the maximum clout.

Kumar agrees and feels that news now is more user-generated: “It’s the people who want to pursue their own news, know more about their own news, create news. In a way it democratizes journalism. People are talking more about issues, giving opinions and comparing notes. Politics has shifted from the streets to these social medias.”

The future holds more participation, and a sense of being a stakeholder in the political process. An “enlarging of political participation”, as Kumar puts it. “Of course because everyone has a mike, a mouthpiece now, there will be lot of more trivial conversation and hairsplitting which might not add up to anything, but the important thing is that people are engaging themselves politically. We are on the streets. All because of technology.”

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/livemint-april-1-2014-shweta-taneja-the-politics-of-facebook

The Phishing Society: Why 'Facebook' is more Dangerous than the Government Spying on You - A Talk by Maria Xynou

maria — 2013-09-27T09:16:19Z

Next Wednesday, you are all invited to listen to Maria Xynou's crazy - or not-so-crazy theory of the "Phishing Society", in which surveillance, control and oppression is not imposed in a traditional top-down manner, but rather a personal and collective "choice"...come and engage in a heated debate!

We have read and heard a lot of theories on the contemporary "Surveillance Society"...but how much of that is about surveillance per se? Are we being spied on a top-down manner...or are we enabling our own surveillance? Have the masses ever directly or indirectly "pursued" their own surveillance in the past...or are we witnessing a new phenomenon in history?

Most geeks would probably agree that the term "phishing" is used to describe the act of attempting to acquire sensitive information, such as usernames, passwords, private encryption keys and credit card details, by masquerading as a trustworthy entity. In other words, "phishing" is commonly used to describe the acquisition of sensitive, personal data through the use of bait.

The aim of the talk on Wednesday is to discuss the possible existence of a "Phishing Society", through which the act of providing bait — whether it being security, commodities, services or relationships — is a common, contemporary practice on a social, political and economic level in the pursuit of the "Gold of the Digital Age": personal data. Through this discussion, the "Government spying vs. Corporate spying" debate will be looked at, in an attempt to understand why the dynamics of surveillance have changed over the last year.

Everyone with an open mind is welcome to attend this talk and to share all opinions, ideas and concerns!

Video

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/events/the-phishing-society-a-talk-by-maria-xynou

The Phantom Public: The Role of Social Media in Democracy

Admin — 2019-05-01T05:09:19Z

Amber Sinha delivered an open lecture at Ambedkar University, New Delhi on 3 April 2019.

India has over 500 million internet users — over a third of its total population — making it the country with the second largest number of Internet users after China. For the world’s largest democracy, the Internet should be a boon. After all, Sir Tim Berners-Lee, the inventor of the world wide web, had envisioned the Internet to as an “open platform that allows anyone to share information, access opportunities and collaborate across geographical boundaries.” The democratization of information it facilitated should have led to a more informed citizenry, but instead what we have is the complete opposite. The average digital citizen in India maintains a near perpetual information illiteracy about where they receive news and information from, whether or not it is true and how it is intended to manipulate them. This is, in large part, because social media has become the primary source of information.

The problems of the public, how it may get access to meaningful information, how it organises itself, and how public opinion is shaped are now deeply impacted by the rise of social media and messaging platforms as political tools of targeting, gathering and organising. How this new media thwarts and enables the goals of the public in India at present is the primary subject matter of this talk. We will cover a range of issues such as fake news and hate speech on social media, the use Facebook by Cambridge Analytica in elections, and how online platforms are governed, particularly with a view towards elections.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-phantom-public-the-role-of-social-media-in-democracy

The Personal Data (Protection) Bill, 2013

prachi — 2013-08-30T14:53:11Z

Below is the text of the Personal Data (Protection) Bill, 2013 as discussed at the 6th Privacy Roundtable, New Delhi held on 24 August 2013. Note: This version of the Bill caters only to the Personal Data regime. The surveillance and privacy of communications regime was not discussed at the 6th Privacy Roundtable.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-personal-data-protection-bill-2013

The Perils of 'Hactivism'

Chinmayi Arun — 2012-08-20T09:58:55Z

Civil disobedience includes accepting the penalty for breaking the law. Untraceable hackers are far removed from this ethic.

Chinmayi Arun's article was published in LiveMint on August 20, 2012.

Earlier this year, India had an encounter with “Anonymous”, a diffuse alliance of what are commonly (and incorrectly) called hackers. In its much-publicized “Operation India”, Anonymous blocked public access to, hacked and defaced various websites in protest against the rising censorship of the Internet. This is a legitimate political cause. However, a movement cannot be judged purely by the legitimacy of its goals, and it is important to consider the legitimacy of the means used to achieve these goals.

Anonymous used distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks to submerge, albeit temporarily, many websites. The DDoS attack bombards the target website with more user requests than it can bear, until it becomes unavailable to all others. Many compare this to picketing, and use the term “virtual sit-in” for it. The DDoS attack does not breach a website’s security, and is therefore not hacking (more correctly called “cracking”). In contrast, defacement of websites, deletion of data or leaking restricted data, entails hacking, which involves breaching a website’s security and is more analogous to breaking and entering physical premises. Anonymous has done this too in India—defacing some websites and leaking confidential data from others.

There are a few crucial differences between picketing as civil disobedience, and the DDoS attack. One is that picketing requires many people to come together and sit in protest. One or two peace protesters cannot successfully block a road. Although there was a time when DDoS attacks also required a large number of people to bombard the target, they can now be achieved by one person with the technological skills to “fire” a large number of computers at the target website.Therefore, a DDoS attack no longer implies that a sizeable section of the public cares enough to be part of a virtual sit-in.

The second difference between DDoS attacks and civil disobedience lies in the “hacktivists” unwillingness to be accountable. Martin Luther King and Gandhi made it clear that civil disobedience includes accepting the penalty for breaking the law. Faceless untraceable hackers are far removed from this ethic. While it is true that they risk harsh reprisal if identified, the legitimacy and heroic aura of civil disobedience comes from the willingness to risk that reprisal.

It may therefore be difficult to argue that even the DDoS attacks by Anonymous qualify as civil disobedience, which arguably is the most legitimate of the spectrum of options available to a political dissident. If political activists use varied and escalating tactics in the physical world, “hacktivists” use strategies ranging from DDoS to more intrusive defacement, disabling and leaking of data to draw attention to political causes. The legitimacy of these methods—the proportionality and justification of harm caused—can only be determined with reference to particular contexts. One has to evaluate the threat necessitating activism, innocent casualties of the activists’ actions and whether less harmful strategies have already been explored. This is difficult. For instance, the indirect repercussions of a DDoS attack or leaking data may not be apparent at first glance.

Anonymous tried setting boundaries to avoid harming innocent citizens during Operation India. It declared that infrastructure websites such as the railway booking portal were not to be attacked, and it prevented disclosure of sensitive financial information when a cinema tickets database was hacked. These precautions, though laudable, are however not quite enough. The influential members of Anonymous cannot successfully identify every action that may cause public harm. For instance, when Anonymous attacked the Supreme Court of India and the Reserve Bank of India websites, it seemed ignorant of the potential impact on litigants and the economy. When it leaked confidential police records, it seemed unaware of the significant hazards of leaking people’s names, addresses and other private data. The precautions taken by Anonymous may vanish next time, since the loosely knit, ever-changing nature of Anonymous community means that power and influence can shift; splinter groups with fewer scruples can emerge. Anonymous cannot achieve the control and accountability possible in a more tangible organized group.

This collective operates under disturbingly low levels of transparency and accountability, greatly exacerbated by its ability to veil itself in the shadows of the Internet. New recruits are sometimes endangered by misleading information about the legality and consequences of joining in DDoS attacks. Guerilla warfare is often used without properly exploring more peaceable means, thanks to the power and revenge mob-ethic by which Anonymous is driven. The use of technological arsenal to launch cyber-attacks ignores the likelihood of escalation— “hacktivists” tend to forget that technology is a neutral tool that governments can also use. The government may counter-attack, using its considerable resources to acquire the necessary technological capacity. Citizens may end up being the casualties of the exchange.

Phase one of Operation India was riddled with moral ambiguity. If OpIndia participants wish to show the world that they are more than bored nerds playing at a social movement like it is a video game, with all the accompanying air-punching, adrenaline boosting, self-aggrandising thrills, they will ensure that phase two’s constructive and legitimate Right to Information campaign is a roaring success.

Chinmayi Arun is an assistant professor of law at National Law University, Delhi and a Fellow at the Centre for Internet and Society, Bangalore

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/www-livemint-com-chinmayi-arun-aug-20-2012-perils-of-hactivism

The Perils and Prospects of Bringing the Next Billion Online

praskrishna — 2015-08-23T08:04:01Z

Sunil Abraham is the executive director of the Centre for Internet & Society, Bangalore. In his PDF talk, he explains the fight for net neutrality in India and how many solutions fall under the category of walled garden.

Video

For more see Personal Democracy Media

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/perils-and-prospects-of-bringing-next-billion-online

The PDP Bill 2019 Through the Lens of Privacy by Design

2020-11-13T07:51:03Z

This paper evaluates the PDP Bill based on the Privacy by Design approach. It examines the implications of Bill in terms of the data ecosystem it may lead to, and the visual interface design in digital platforms. This paper focuses on the notice and consent communication suggested by the Bill, and the role and accountability of design in its interpretation.

Background

The Personal Data Protection (PDP) Bill, 2019 was introduced in the Lok Sabha on December 11, 2019 by the Minister of Electronics and Information Technology. The Bill aims to provide for protection of personal data of individuals, and establishes a Data Protection Authority for the same [1]. The PDP Bill, 2019 contains several clauses that have implications on the visual design of digital products. These include the specific requirements for communication of notice and consent at various stages of the product. The Bill also introduces the Privacy by Design policy. Privacy by Design (PbD), as a concept, was proposed by Ann Cavoukian in the 1990s, with the purpose of approaching privacy from a design-thinking perspective [2]. She describes this perspective to be holistic, interdisciplinary, integrative, and innovative. The approach suggests that privacy must be incorporated into networked data systems and technologies, by default [3]. It challenges the practice of enhancing privacy as an afterthought. It expects privacy to be a default setting, and a proactive (not reactive) measure that would be embedded into a design in its initial stage and throughout the life cycle of the product [4]. While PbD is a conceptual framework, it’s application can change the way digital platforms are created and the way in which people interact with them. From devising a business model, to making technological decisions, PbD principles can make privacy integral to the processes and standards of a digital platform.

The PDP Bill states that data fiduciaries are required to prepare a Privacy by Design policy and have it certified by the Data Protection Authority. According to the Bill, the policy would contain the managerial, organisational, business practices and technical systems designed to anticipate, identify and avoid harm to the data principal [5]. It would mention if the technology used in the processing of personal data is in accordance with the certified standards. It would also comprise of the ways in which privacy is being protected throughout the stages of processing of personal data, and that the interest of the individual is accounted for in each of these stages. Once certified by the Data Protection Authority, the data fiduciaries are also required to publish this policy on their website [6]. This forces the data fiduciaries to envision privacy as a fundamental requirement and not an afterthought. Such a policy would have a huge impact in the way digital platforms are conceptualised, both from the technological and the design point of view. The adoption of this policy by digital platforms would enable people to know if their privacy is protected by the companies, and what are the various steps being taken for this purpose. Besides the explicit Privacy by Design policy, the PDP Bill, 2019, also recommends the regulations for data minimisation, establishment of the Data Protection Authority (DPA), and the development of a consent framework. These steps are also part of the Privacy by Design approach.

This paper evaluates the PDP Bill based on the Privacy by Design approach. The Bill’s scope includes both the conceptual and technological aspects of a digital platform, as well as the interface aspect that the individual using the platform faces. The paper will hence analyse how PbD approach is reflected in both these aspects. At the conceptual level, it will look at the data ecosystem that the Bill unwittingly creates, and at the interface level, it will critically analyse the Bill’s implication on the notice and consent communication in the digital products. This includes the several points of communication or touchpoints between a company and an individual using their service, as dictated by the Bill, and how they would translate into visual design. Visual design forms an integral part of digital platforms. It is the way in which the platforms interact with the individuals. The choices made by individuals are largely driven by the visual structuring and presentation of information on these platforms. Presently, the interface design in several platforms is being used to perpetuate unethical data practices in the form of dark patterns. Dark Patterns are deceptive user interface interactions, designed to mislead or trick users to make them do something they don’t want to do [7]. The design of the notice and consent touchpoints can significantly influence the enforcement of this Bill, and how it benefits individuals. Moreover, digital platforms may technically follow the regulations but can still be manipulative through their interface design. Thus, the role and accountability of design becomes crucial in the interpretation of the data protection regulations.

The full paper can be read here.

[1] https://prsindia.org/billtrack/personal-data-protection-bill-2019

[2] https://iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2011/03/fred_carter.pdf

[3] https://iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2011/03/fred_carter.pdf

[4] https://www.smashingmagazine.com/2019/04/privacy-ux-aware-design-framework/

[5] http://164.100.47.4/BillsTexts/LSBillTexts/Asintroduced/373_2019_LS_Eng.pdf

[6] https://sflc.in/key-changes-personal-data-protection-bill-2019-srikrishna-committee-draft

[7] https://uxdesign.cc/dark-patterns-in-ux-design-7009a83b233c

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-pdp-bill-2019-through-the-lens-of-privacy-by-design

The Panama Papers and the question of privacy

praskrishna — 2016-04-24T14:03:35Z

This statement was originally published on privacyinternational.org on 4 April 2016.

Read the entry by Claire Lauterbach published in Big News Network on April 6, 2016. Sunil Abraham was quoted.

We do agree with Ramon Fonseca about one thing: that "Each person has a right to privacy, whether they are a king or a beggar."

But that's where our commonality with co-founder of disgraced Panama law firm Mossack Fonseca ends.

Last year, a whistleblower leaked 11.5 million documents about the firm's business brokering offshore companies, details of which were published yesterday. Reportedly the largest leak in journalistic history, the cache reveals hidden assets by a dozen current and former world leaders, and scores of celebrities and tycoons, some of which are linked to high level corruption scandals.

This scandal isn't about privacy, though. If anything, it's about the need for transparency about how the powerful wield their power. We need transparency - and good solid investigation - to understand where and how our right to privacy is eroded.

Privacy and transparency are not opposites. They are two sides of the same coin. As privacy advocates, we use transparency capabilities to investigate surveillance. Meanwhile, privacy as a right requires transparency from the institutions that gather and use our data.

Privacy International, like other human rights groups, conducts investigations in the public interest. That allows us to understand, for example, how Colombia built a shadow surveillance system despite evidence of illegal interceptions, or how UK police appear to be collecting private communications data at protests, according to a Vice News investigation.

Many of the Panama Papers' revelations are in the public interest insofar as they concern the transformation of public assets - like taxpayers' money and state funds - into private gains, and allow the powerful to avoid scrutiny. Privacy and transparency are not opposites. They are two sides of the same coin.

Fonseca called journalism around the leaked files an "international campaign against privacy".

But what Fonseca is really doing is advocating a status quo of 'privacy for the kings, and transparency for the beggars'. Or rather, privacy for the business moguls, politicians, corporations and government agencies, and transparency for the citizens, consumers, activists and journalists.

For the public, our financial systems are now surveiled by design. Our transactions are labelled as suspicious and sent for mining by intelligence agencies. We need IDs to open accounts, and our records are profiled by credit agencies who facilitate key decisions about us and our families. Secretive institutions collate this information to decide whether or not we are terrorists. While a certain degree of this is necessary for public order, what's clear is that we are watched while the 'kings' are able to circumvent many of these measures and escape scrutiny. We should never make the mistake of conflating the right to privacy for the individual with the desire to hide shadowy, ethically dubious, borderline-or-actual illegal activity for the immensely wealthy and powerful.

The real issues around privacy include: the spreading of draconian laws, from the UK, to Pakistan, to Kenya, that sanction warrantless surveillance and online monitoring, with insufficient protection for the public. It's the intrusive biometric registration of some of the most desperate people, like refugees from Dadaab to Calais, desperate for food and medical care. It's the instrumentalisation of consumer data to draw conclusions about us, with or without our consent. It's also the parallel trend of rolling back Freedom of Information laws (see: UK and United States). And, as the Panama Papers show, it is allowing transfers of public funds for private gain to be obscured.

That is the real "campaign against privacy" - not public interest journalism.

As our friend and partner Sunil Abraham, Executive Director of the Centre for Internet and Society in India states succinctly, the right to privacy should "be inversely proportionate to power and almost conversely the requirement of transparency to be directly proportionate to power."

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/big-news-network-april-6-2016-claire-lauterbach-panama-papers-and-question-of-privacy

The Omnishambles of UID, shrouded in its RTI opacity

elonnai — 2013-02-19T11:04:30Z

The Centre for Internet & Society sponsored Colonel Mathew Thomas to hold a workshop at the fourth National Right to Information (RTI) organized by the National Campaign for People's Right to Information, held in Hyderabad from February 15 to 18, 2013.

Click below to see Colonel Mathew Thomas's presentation

Omnishambles of UID Shrouded in its Opacity

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/omnishambles-of-uid-shrouded-in-its-rti-opacity

The noose tightens on freedom of speech on the Internet

praskrishna — 2015-03-27T01:06:52Z

A WORRYING trend has emerged in the last few years, where intermediaries around the world are being used as chokepoints to restrict freedom of expression online, and to hold users accountable for content.

The blog post by Gabey Goh was published by Digital News Asia on March 26, 2015. Jyoti Panday gave her inputs.

“All communication across the Internet is facilitated by intermediaries: Service providers, social networks, search engines, and more,” said Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) senior global policy analyst Jeremy Malcolm.

“These services are all routinely asked to take down content, and their policies for responding are often muddled, heavy-handed, or inconsistent.

“That results in censorship and the limiting of people’s rights,” he told Digital News Asia (DNA) on the sidelines of RightsCon, an Internet and human rights conference hosted in Manila from March 24-25.

This year, the government of France is moving to implement regulation that makes Internet operators ‘accomplices’ of hate-speech offences if they host extremist messages.

In February, the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) and the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) urged ICANN (the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) to ensure that domain name registries and registrars “investigate copyright abuse complaints and respond appropriately.”

Closer to home, the Malaysian Government passed a controversial amendment to the Evidence Act 1950 – Section 114A – back in 2012.

Under Section 114A, an Internet user is deemed the publisher of any online content unless proven otherwise. The new legislation also makes individuals and those who administer, operate or provide spaces for online community forums, blogging and hosting services, liable for content published through their services.

Due to the potential negative impact on freedom of expression, a roadmap called the Manila Principles on Internet Liability was launched during RightsCon.

The EFF, Centre for Internet Society India, Article 19, and other global partners unveiled the principles, whose framework outlines clear, fair requirements for content removal requests and details how to minimise the damage a takedown can do.

For example, if content is restricted because it’s unlawful in one country or region, then the scope of the restriction should be geographically limited as well.

The principles also urge adoption of laws shielding intermediaries from liability for third-party content, which encourages the creation of platforms that allow for online discussion and debate about controversial issues.

“Our goal is to protect everyone’s freedom of expression with a framework of safeguards and best practices for responding to requests for content removal,” said Malcolm.

Jyoti Panday from the Centre for Internet and Society India noted that people ask for expression to be removed from the Internet for various reasons, good and bad, claiming the authority of myriad local and national laws.

“It’s easy for important, lawful content to get caught in the crossfire. We hope these principles empower everyone – from governments and intermediaries, to the public – to fight back when online expression is censored,” she said.

The Manila Principles can be summarised in six key points:

Intermediaries should be shielded by law from liability for third-party content.

Content must not be required to be restricted without an order by a judicial authority.

Requests for restrictions of content must be clear, be unambiguous, and follow due process.

Laws and content restriction orders and practices must comply with the tests of necessity and proportionality.

Laws and content restriction policies and practices must respect due process.

Transparency and accountability must be built in to laws and content restriction policies and practices.

“Right now, different countries have differing levels of protection when it comes to intermediary liability, and we’re saying that there should be expansive protection across all content,” said Malcolm (pic).

“In addition, there is no logic in distinguishing between intellectual property (IP) and other forms of content as in the case in the United States for example, where under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, intermediaries are not liable for third party content but that doesn’t apply to IP,” he added.

The Manila Principles have two main targets: Governments and intermediaries themselves. The coalition, led by EFF, will be approaching governments to present the document and discuss the recommendations on how best to establish an intermediary liability regime.

This includes immunising intermediaries from liability and requiring a court order before any content can be taken down.

With intermediaries, the list includes companies such as Facebook, Twitter and Google, to discuss establishing transparency, responsibility and accountability in any actions taken.

“We recognise that a lot of the time, intermediaries are not waiting for a court order before taking down content, and we’re telling them to avoid removing content unless there is a sufficiently good reason and users have been notified and presented that reason,” said Malcolm.

The overall aim with the Manila Principles is to influence policy changes for the better.

Malcolm pointed out that by coincidence, some encouraging developments have taken place in India. On the same day the principles were released, the Indian Supreme Court struck down the notorious Section 66A of the country’s Information Technology Act.

Since 2009, the law had allowed both criminal charges against users and the removal of content by intermediaries based on vague allegations that the content was “grossly offensive or has menacing character,” or that false information was posted “for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will.”

Calling it a “landmark decision”, Malcolm noted that the case shows why the establishment and promotion of the Manila Principles are important.

“Not only is the potential overreach of this provision obvious on its face, but it was, in practice, misused to quell legitimate discussion online, including in the case of the plaintiffs in that case – two young women, one of whom made an innocuous Facebook post mildly critical of government officials, and the other who ‘liked’ it,” he said.

The court however, upheld section 69A of the Act, which allows the Government to block online content; and Section 79(3), which makes intermediaries such as YouTube or Facebook liable for not complying with government orders for censorship of content.

Gabey Goh reports from RightsCon in Manila at the kind invitation of the South-East Asian Press Alliance or Seapa.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/digital-news-asia-gabey-goh-march-26-2015-noose-tightens-on-freedom-of-speech-on-internet

The Niira Radia Tapes: Scrutinizing the Snoopers

praskrishna — 2011-04-02T07:29:21Z

There’s been plenty of outrage in India over taped phone calls between corporate lobbyist Niira Radia and local journalists, revealing what some people believe is evidence that star reporters at the country’s newspapers and TV channels are too cozy with the subjects they’re supposed to be reporting on.

Amid that firestorm, though, there’s been much less scrutiny of why and how the wiretaps happened in the first place, whether they were justified or a governmental overreach, and how these infamous tapes got from the government into the hands of media companies.

Here are just a few questions that merit more consideration: Who orders telephone surveillance in India and on what grounds? How often is it done? What protections are in place to ensure government officials don’t abuse their surveillance authority to settle scores with journalists, corporate officials or ordinary citizens they have a beef with?

The quick answer to all of these: India trusts its bureaucrats to do the right thing. The central government’s Home Secretary, along with some intelligence agencies and state officials, has the authority to approve wiretaps. Unlike in the U.S. and other countries, where investigators must generally obtain court warrants for surveillance to pursue matters ranging from drug-trafficking to insider trading, in India there is no such legal tradition or rule.

“There is no oversight infrastructure, either in parliament or in the judiciary,” said Sunil Abraham, executive director of the Bangalore-based Center for Internet and Society. There is only “post facto” protection in the sense that you can sue the government later if you feel you were wrongly wiretapped, he said.

According to local media reports, industrial giant Ratan Tata on Monday petitioned the Supreme Court over the leaking of the tapes, on which he is heard bantering with Ms. Radia (his lobbyist) about a range of topics related to the $70 billion Tata Group. The reports say he feels the episode violated his privacy and wants the leakers to be punished. (While there’s no explicit constitutional protection of privacy in India, the Supreme Court in some cases has held it is covered by Article 21 of the Constitution, which says, “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.”)

A report in the Economic Times Monday said government is going to investigate the leak. A Home Ministry spokesman declined to comment on whether an inquiry has been launched but said India’s system of allowing a handful of security and intelligence officials to approve or deny wiretaps sufficiently guards Indian citizens’ privacy. “It isn’t an unchecked kind of thing, that anyone can just do it,” the spokesman said.

India draws its wiretap authority from a few laws, including the 1885 Telegraph Act and a separate information technology law enacted in 2000 and amended in 2008. The government can tap phones or intercept emails for reasons such as “any public emergency” or “in the interest of the public safety” – pretty broad language that gives a lot of leeway to bureaucrats, critics say.

A report in the Hindu last week claimed that more than 5,000 Indian phones are being bugged daily, citing anonymous sources. Mr. Abraham, of the Center for Internet and Society, says that breadth of surveillance in a country of 1.2 billion people wouldn’t be unreasonable. But his organization is planning a Right to Information request to find out more about the scope of government wiretapping.

The government may have had good reasons to conduct the wiretaps of Ms. Radia, which local media reports say were done by the income tax department for two four-month stints in 2008 and 2009, during which time they reportedly logged 5,851 calls.

The income tax agency hasn’t stated publicly what the rationale was and its officials declined to comment Monday.

Media reports suggest that the material was supposed to help probe the irregular allocation of mobile phone spectrum in 2008 to several Indian telecom firms. (The official in charge of that allocation, A. Raja, resigned as telecom minister Nov. 14 amid charges that he rigged the process to favor some companies over others.)

But much of the content in the several hours of so-called “2G tapes” that have leaked to Indian news organizations has little or nothing to do with taxes or 2G spectrum. There’s talk of the billionaire Ambani brothers’ natural gas pricing dispute, mining policy, a dog who is named Google because he is good at finding things, which corporate honchos are easy to get on the phone, and plenty of titillating exchanges between New Delhi’s power brokers on the politics of cabinet appointments. Some pretty top-notch gossip, in other words.

To be sure, the content on the tapes does raise disturbing and serious questions about whether some elements of the Indian media carry water for particular government ministers or corporations. And it pulls the veil back on how the titans of Indian business and politics shape policy away from the public spotlight, as Siddharth Varadarajan explained in Monday’s edition of the Hindu when he made a clever analogy to the movie The Matrix. (We’ve separately parsed the contents of some of the tapes for their potential significance.)

But it’s still worth asking tough questions about the legal and ethical foundations of wiretapping citizens, because, as Indian civil liberties expert Lawrence Liang said in an email, “if this can happen to a Nira Radia, then it can easily be used for a Nida Nobody.”

Update, 5:09 p.m.: “A Home Ministry spokesman confirmed the ministry has asked the Intelligence Bureau and Central Board of Direct Taxes to conduct a probe into the leak.”

Read the original in Wall Street Journal

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/niira-radia-tapes