We are anonymous, we are legion

#NAMApolicy on Online Content Regulation

Admin — 2018-05-05T01:52:21Z

Swaraj Barooah attended the #NAMApolicy on Online Content Regulation organized by Media Nama at India Habitat Centre in New Delhi on May 3, 2018.

Agenda

01:30 p.m. - 03:00 p.m.: Panel #1 & Open House - News

03:00 p.m. - 03:15 p.m.: Tea break

03:15 p.m. - 04:45 p.m.: Panel #2 & Open House - Entertainment

04:45 p.m. - 05:15 p.m.: Remaining issues

05:15 p.m. - 06:00 p.m.: High-tea

01:30 p.m. - 03:00 p.m.: Panel #1 & Open House - News03:00 p.m. - 03:15 p.m.: Tea break03:15 p.m. - 04:45 p.m.: Panel #2 & Open House - Entertainment
04:45 p.m. - 05:15 p.m.: Remaining issues
05:15 p.m. - 06:00 p.m.: High-tea

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/namapolicy-on-online-content-regulation

"Whatever happened to Privacy?" - International Activism Conference

praskrishna — 2014-02-03T05:56:27Z

Maria Xynou gave a keynote speech and participated as a panelist on the "Suspect Societies" panel. The event was organized by Heinrich Boell Foundation in Berlin on December 5 and 6, 2013.

"Whatever happened to privacy" brought together international activists on focal topics and combined bar camp style work sessions and political round tables with a classic public event, It focussed on an issue which has far reaching consequences for politically active people across the world - the issue of privacy and surveillance. The revelations around the NSA and GCHQ as well as other countries secret service digital surveillance activities have spurred political debate. This debate was intensified at "Whatever happened to Privacy?" formulating political demands, developing action strategies and debating questions such as:

What cultural and political value does privacy have today?
What are the societal implications of the wide spread "I have nothing to hide" attitude?
What political actions are necessary to protect citizens from mass surveillance and what tools exist for people to secure their communications, movements and lives?

For video and more info, click here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/whatever-happened-to-privacy

"Privacy matters"

praskrishna — 2011-04-04T07:20:22Z

Privacy India invites individuals to attend the second "Privacy matters" conference, a one-day event on the 5th February 2011 at the TERI Southern Regional Centre, Bangalore. Privacy India, Society in Action Group, and the Centre for Internet & Society have joined hands to organize the event.

The “Privacy matters” conference will focus on discussing the challenges to privacy that India is currently facing. The right to privacy in India has been a neglected area of study and engagement. Although sectoral legislation deals with privacy issues, e.g., the TRAI Act for telephony or RBI guidelines for banking, India does not as yet have a horizontal legislation that deals comprehensively with privacy across all contexts. This lack of uniformity has led to ironically imbalanced results. In India today one has a stronger right to privacy over telephone records than over one’s own medical records. The absence of a minimum guarantee of privacy is felt most heavily by marginalized communities, including HIV patients, children, women, sexuality minorities, prisoners, etc. – people who most need to know that sensitive information is protected.

The emergence of information and communications technologies over the past two decades has radically transformed the speed and costs of access to information. However, this enhanced climate of access to information has been a mixed blessing. Whilst augmenting our access to knowledge, this new networked information economy has also now made it much easier, quicker, and cheaper to gain access to intimate personal information about individuals than ever before. As people expose more and more of their lives to others through the use of social networks, reliance on mobile phones, global trade, etc., there has emerged a heightened risk of privacy violations in India. As privacy continues to be a growing concern for individuals, nations, and the international community, it is critical that India understands and addresses the questions, challenges, implications and dilemmas that violations of privacy pose.

Who We Are

Privacy India was set up in collaboration with The Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), Bangalore and Society in Action Group (SAG), under the auspices of the international organization ‘Privacy International.’ Privacy International is a non-profit group that provides assistance to civil society groups, governments, international and regional bodies, the media and the public in a number of countries (see www.privacyinternational.org). Its Advisory Board is made up of distinguished intellectuals, academicians, thinkers and activists such as Noam Chomsky, the late Harold Pinter, and others, and it has collaborated with organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).

'Privacy Matters' conference agenda

February 5th, 2011 --- 10:30 am - 4:30pm

TERI Southern Regional Centre

4th Main, Domlur II Stage
Bangalore - 560 071

Time	Item
10:30 -10:45	Welcome Address Who is PI and what are our objectives Why is privacy important in India Prashant Iyengar (Lead Researcher at Privacy India)
10:45-11:15	Keynote: Ashish Rajadhyaksha (Senior Fellow, Centre for the Study of Culture & Society)
11:15-11:30	Tea Break
11:30 –12:30	Session I: Privacy and Open Government Data Property Rights, Privacy, and Open Government Data: Zainab Bawa (CIS-RAW Fellow)
12:30 – 1:30	Session II: Privacy Rights and Minorities Privacy Rights of Sexualality Minorities: Arvind Narrain (Alternative Law Forum) Now you see her, now you don’t - Issues of sex workers and questions around privacy: Shubha Chacko (Sangama) The UID and Refugees: Sahana Basavapatna
1:30 – 2:30	Lunch
2:30 – 3:00	Session III: Identity and Privacy Malavika Jarayam (Jayaram & Jayaram) Hamish Fraser (Partner at Truman Hoyle, Sydney Australia) Michael Whitener (Principal and co-founder of VistaLaw International LLC)
3:00-3:30	Session IV: Privacy and the Media/Social Networking Privacy and Social Networking: Ujjvala Ballal (Inclusive Planet) Privacy Issues in Social Networking Websites: Gagan K. (NLSIU law student)
3:30 – 3:45	Tea break
3:45 – 4:30	Session V: Open discussion and opinion sharing

RSVP:

prashant@privacyindia.org
elonnai@privacyindia.org

Download the poster here

VIDEOS

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/events/privacy-conferencefeb5

"Decoding the Digital"- Winter School at IIIT Bangalore

praskrishna — 2016-12-17T01:39:20Z

The Centre for IT and Public Policy at IIIT Bangalore organized a winter school from December 12 to 14, 2016 at the IIIT campus on Decoding the Digital, where the theme for the same was Smart Cities and Social Media. Vanya Rakesh participated in it.

The event involved lectures, interactive discussions, film screenings and group activities on topics ranging from smart communities, smart phones, intelligent transportation, big data, privacy, surveillance, etc. For more inflo, click here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/decoding-the-digital-winter-school-at-iiit-bangalore

"ಕನ್ನಡ ಮತ್ತು ತಂತ್ರಜ್ಞಾನದ ಜೊತೆ ಜೊತೆಗೆ..."

praskrishna — 2012-01-16T03:59:59Z

ನಾನು ಏನಾದರು ಮಾಡಬೇಕು ಎಂದುಕೊಂಡರೆ ಸಾಲದು, ಬನ್ನಿ, ಕಾರ್ಯೋನ್ಮುಖರಾಗಿ...

ಮೊದಲ ಹೆಜ್ಜೆ

ಕನ್ನಡ ಮತ್ತು ತಂತ್ರಜ್ಞಾನದ ಬೆಳವಣಿಗೆಯಲ್ಲಿ ಪಾಲ್ಗೊಳ್ಳುವ ಆಸೆಯೇ?

ಪ್ರತಿಯೊಬ್ಬ ಕನ್ನಡಿಗನಲ್ಲೂ ಕನ್ನಡಕ್ಕೆ ದುಡಿಯುವ ಬಲವಾದ ಆಸೆಯಿರುತ್ತದೆ. ಅಕ್ಷರ ಕಲಿಯುವ ದೆಸೆಯಿಂದ ಹಿಡಿದು, ದುಡಿದು ದೊಡ್ಡವನಾಗುವವರೆಗೂ ಹೇಗೆ ತನ್ನ ಆಸೆಯನ್ನು ಈಡೇರಿಸಿಕೊಳ್ಳುವುದೆಂಬ ಪ್ರಶ್ನೆ ಮನಸ್ಸಿನಲ್ಲಿ ಸುಳಿಯುತ್ತಲೇ ಇರುತ್ತದೆ. ಮಾಹಿತಿ ತಂತ್ರಜ್ಞಾನದ ಕ್ಷೇತ್ರದಲ್ಲಂತೂ, ಅದನ್ನು ಬಳಸುವ ಸಾಮಾನ್ಯನಿಂದ ಹಿಡಿದು, ತಂತ್ರಜ್ಞಾನದ ಜೊತೆಗೇ ದಿನದೂಡುವ ತಂತ್ರಜ್ಞನವರೆಗೂ ಎಲ್ಲರಿಗೂ ಕನ್ನಡ ಬಳಸುವ ಮತ್ತು ಬೆಳೆಸುವ ಆಸೆ ಖಂಡಿತ ಇರುತ್ತದೆ. ಅಂತಹ ಆಸೆಗಳನ್ನು ಮತ್ತೆ ಚಿಗುರಿಸಿ, ಮಾಹಿತಿ ತಂತ್ರಜ್ಞಾನದ ಬಳಕೆದಾರನ ದಿನನಿತ್ಯದ ಪ್ರಶ್ನೆಗಳನ್ನು ಉತ್ತರಿಸುತ್ತಾ, ಕನ್ನಡದ ತಾಂತ್ರಿಕ ಬೆಳವಣಿಗೆಗೆ ನಾಂದಿಯಾಗಲು ನಾವು ಇಡಬೇಕಾದ ‘ಹೆಜ್ಜೆಗಳು” ಅನೇಕ.

ದೈನಂದಿನ ಬದುಕಿನಲ್ಲಿ ತಂತ್ರಜ್ಞಾನದ ಮುಖೇನ ಕನ್ನಡದಲ್ಲೇ ವ್ಯವಹರಿಸಬಹುದೇ? ಕನ್ನಡದ ತಾಂತ್ರಿಕ ಬೆಳವಣಿಗೆ ಹೇಗೆ ಸಾಧ್ಯ? ಅದರಲ್ಲಿ ತಮ್ಮನ್ನು ತಾವು ತೊಡಗಿಸಿಕೊಳ್ಳುವ ಬಗೆ ಹೇಗೆ? ಕನ್ನಡ ಭಾಷಾ ತಂತ್ರಜ್ಞಾನ ಬೆಳವಣಿಗೆಯ ತೊಡಕುಗಳ ನಿವಾರಣೆ ಸಾಧ್ಯವೇ? ತಂತ್ರಾಂಶಗಳು ನಡೆಯಬೇಕಿರುವ ಹಾದಿಯ ಕಿರು ಪರಿಚಯ ಎಲ್ಲಿ ಸಿಗಬಹುದು? ಇದಕ್ಕೊಂದು ಸಮುದಾಯವಿದೆಯೇ? ಈ ಸಮುದಾಯ ಅಭಿವೃದ್ದಿಯ ಪರಿಕಲ್ಪನೆ ಏನು? ಇತ್ಯಾದಿ ಪ್ರಶ್ನೆಗಳಿಗೆ ಉತ್ತರ ಕಂಡುಕೊಳ್ಳುವ ಸಲುವಾಗಿ ‘ಹೆಜ್ಜೆ’ ರೂಪಿತಗೊಂಡಿದೆ.

ಮಾಹಿತಿ ತಂತ್ರಜ್ಞಾನದ ವಿವಿಧ ಸ್ತರಗಳಲ್ಲಿ ಕನ್ನಡದ ಬೆಳವಣಿಗೆಗೆ ಬೇಕಾದ ವಿಷಯಗಳ ಬಗ್ಗೆ ಅನುಭವಿ ತಜ್ಞರು, ತಂತ್ರಜ್ಞರು ತಮ್ಮ ಅನುಭವವನ್ನು ಹಂಚಿಕೊಳ್ಳುವುದರ ಮೂಲಕ ಪ್ರಾರಂಭವಾಗುವ ಈ ಕಾರ್ಯಕ್ರಮ, ಮೇಲೆ ಹೇಳಿದ ಅನೇಕ ಪ್ರಶ್ನೆಗಳಿಗೆ ಉತ್ತರವನ್ನು ಪಡೆದುಕೊಳ್ಳುವ ‘ಹೆಜ್ಜೆ’ಗಳ ಹಾದಿಯನ್ನು ನಿಮ್ಮ ಮುಂದೆ ತೆರೆಯಲಿದೆ.

ಬನ್ನಿ ನಮ್ಮೊಡನೆ ಜೊತೆಜೊತೆಯಾಗಿ ಹೆಜ್ಜೆ ಹಾಕಿ, ನಿಮ್ಮ ಬರುವಿಕೆಯನ್ನು ಇಂದೇ ಕಾಯ್ದಿರಿಸಿ.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/c95ca8ccdca8ca1-caeca4ccdca4cc1-ca4c82ca4ccdcb0c9cccdc9ecbeca8ca6-c9cca4cc6-c9cca4cc6c97cc6...

"All Indian Enterprises should Be Very Worried": Centre for Internet and Society

praskrishna — 2013-02-28T09:21:32Z

This blog post by Shubhra Rishi was published in Computer World on February 25, 2013. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

The chairman of the Indian Institute of Planning and Management (IIPM) is having a Barbara Streisand moment.

The American entertainer Barbra Streisand, in 2003, attempted to suppress photographs of her residence, involuntarily and indirectly fuelling further publicity. Arindam Chaudhuri’s order from a Gwalior Court has unfortunately resulted in more or less the same.

The DoT’s CERT team has successfully censored more than 70 URLs that didn’t particularly contain praises of IIPM. Amusingly, a URL containing a public notice issued by the University Grants Commission (UGC) in July 2012 was also blocked. The UGC notice said that IIPM cannot be recognized as a university according to the provisions of a particular section.

So while this issue has managed to hold our attention, it has also fervently highlighted the misappropriation of section 69 of India’s Information Technology (IT) Act 2000. According to this act, if the Director of Controller is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so, he/she may order or direct any agency of the Government to intercept any information transmitted through any computer resource.

In short, intercepting or blocking is counter-productive in today’s scenario and is often seen as a direct infringement of people’s online freedom. “The Constitution of India does not put so many restrictions on the freedom of speech and expression that IT Act puts under a particular section,” says cyber law expert, Pavan Duggal.

Legal experts are also of the opinion that several provisions of the IT Act are unconstitutional. “It does not have built-in safeguards, especially transparency-related ones, around surveillance and censorship. Censorship in India, especially under the IT (Intermediary Guidelines) Rules 2011, is completely opaque and results in invisible censorship, meaning that we don't even get to find out that censorship has happened and thus cannot challenge it,” says Pranesh Prakash, policy director, Centre for Internet and Society.

In the past, independent activists such as Binayak Sen, Assem Trivedi, and Arundhati Roy, or even commoners such as Shaheen Dhadha have come under fire of the said Act.

Frankly, if this loophole in the IT Act is not addressed, even Indian corporations could face a similar problem.

“I believe all intermediaries (websites that host user content, and networks that carry user traffic among others) are threatened now. Their executives can be dragged to court without any protection; thanks to the broad wording of the IT (Intermediary Guidelines) Rules 2011, despite the IT Act itself granting them some protections. This is dangerous, and all Indian enterprises should be very worried,” says Prakash.

CorporateIndiawill have to tighten its belts. Despite the fact that the entire IT Act needs to be overhauled and employees need to be sensitized, currently, the first thing that corporate India needs to do is ensure that its operations in electronic format comply with the IT Act and its rules. “There's a lack of awareness about compliances in the corporate sector. Any kind of “jugaad” may not help a company get out of a potential exposure under the IT Act. An effective implementation of these compliances will relieve companies of the IT Act’s potential liabilities, both civil and criminal,” advises Duggal.

So the Streisand effect in the IIPM case will slowly wear off, but the potential threat of the IT Act will continue to haunt enterprises.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/computer-world-india-feature-shubra-rishi-feb-25-2013-all-indian-enterprises-should-be-very-worried

"Aadhaar Reduced Agency in Citizens and Empowered Those in Positions of Authority"

Martin Moore — 2019-05-21T15:33:01Z

In the space of one election cycle, authoritarian governments, moneyed elites and fringe hackers figured out how to game elections, bypass democratic processes, and turn social networks into battlefields. Facebook, Google and Twitter – where our politics now takes place – have lost control and are struggling to claw it back. As our lives migrate online, we are gradually moving into a world of datafied citizens and real-time surveillance. The entire political landscape has changed, with profound consequences for democracy.

The article by Martin Moore was published by NewsClick on May 20, 2019. Pranesh Prakash was quoted.

Written by Martin Moore, Democracy Hacked: Political Turmoil and Information Warfare in the Digital Age, is a compelling account of how democracy is being disrupted by the tech revolution, and what can be done to get us back on track. The following are excerpts from the chapter "Survellaince Democracy" of the book.

Tembhli, a remote rural village in northern Maharashtra, about 250 miles north of Mumbai, is rarely visited by high-powered politicians or prominent dignitaries. But on Wednesday, 29 September 2010, it found itself hosting not just the Indian prime minister, Manmohan Singh, but the president of Congress, Sonia Gandhi; the chief and deputy chief ministers and the governor of Maharashtra; and the head of the recently established Unique Identification Authority of India, Nandan Nilekani. It was this last figure, the least well known of the distinguished group, who was the reason behind the visit, and who would subsequently play the most important role in its aftermath. Nilekani and the politicians were there to give out the first ten ‘unique identifiers’ to residents of Tembhli. These ten people received their own twelve-digit number, a number that would, from that day forward, distinguish each of them from every other Indian citizen, and indeed – combined with their biometric data – from every other citizen in the world. “With this,” Sonia Gandhi said, “Tembhli has got a special importance in the map of India. People of Tembhli will lead the rest of the country. It is a historic step towards strengthening the people of our nation.”

Governments of all stripes are prone to exaggerated rhetoric, but in this instance, Gandhi was proved right when she proclaimed that “starting from this tiny hamlet, the scheme will reach more than a billion people of this country.” Despite the change of government in 2014, by April 2016 a billion Indians had been allocated their unique identifier. By 2018 the number had exceeded 1.1 billion, out of a total population of just over 1.3 billion. It was, in the words of a Harvard Business School report, a “hugely ambitious project”, “the largest-scale project of its kind in the world”. Aadhaar, as the project was called, was “unique in its scale and ambition”.3 Each Aadhaar identifier included not just a twelve-digit number, but all ten fingerprints, iris scans from both eyes, and a photograph of each person’s face (with the potential for facial recognition later). By combining the number with one element of biometric data, the government believed, it could ensure that every Indian citizen had a single, verifiable, machine-readable identity. With this verifiable identity a citizen could open a bank account, receive welfare or pension payments, pay tax, apply for a driving license, or receive healthcare, regardless of literacy. In a country known for its administrative torpor and tortuous bureaucracy, where – in 2013 – only forty per cent of children’s births were even registered, such a scheme had the potential to let India leapfrog other democratic countries into the digital era, and make government not just digitally enabled but digitally empowered.

Yet this, for critics of the scheme, was one of its many flaws. “Aadhaar marks a fundamental shift in citizen–state relations,” Pranesh Prakash from India’s Centre for the Internet and Society wrote in the Hindustan Times, “from ‘We the People’ to ‘We the Government’.” Civil society activists objected to the government’s enhanced power, and the relative unaccountability of the body running Aadhaar, headed by Nandan Nilekani until 2014. “In effect,” tech developer and activist Kiran Jonnalagadda wrote, “they are beyond the rule of law.” Others had practical objections.

Biometric identification often did not work. A database of this size and importance was bound to attract hackers. Leaks were inevitable. Indeed, the Tribune newspaper in January 2018 revealed that it had been able to buy a service, for 500 rupees (less than $10), that gave it access to any of up to one billion Aadhaar details. Yet such objections were written off as ‘scaremongering’ and Aadhaar critics as “activists of the upper crust, upper class, wine ’n cheese, Netflix-watching social media elite”. On top of which, despite an Indian Supreme Court judgment in August 2017 that affirmed the fundamental right of Indians to privacy, by early 2018 Aadhaar had achieved such momentum as to appear unstoppable. If the government was able to navigate the various legislative challenges to the scheme, then there was also a queue of other nations keen to adopt something similar.

[…]

As the government pushed Aadhaar towards every interaction the state had with the citizen, evidence mounted of failures in the system.

In the north-eastern state of Jharkhand, an eleven-year-old girl died of starvation after her family stopped receiving their government food ration. Their ration card, the Hindu Centre for Politics and Public Policy reported, “was not linked to Aadhaar”. The centre also reported on data, taken from the government’s websites, showing that in Rajasthan, where receiving rations was dependent on Aadhaar authentication, between a quarter and a third of people with ration cards did not receive rations between September 2016 and July 2017. In some ration shops, after having spent hours trying and failing to get their fingerprints read by the biometric machines, people lost their temper and smashed the machines on the ground.

Across India there were reports of machines not recognizing fingerprints, or only recognizing them after multiple attempts. Old people’s prints turned out to be more difficult to read, as were those of manual workers and fishermen. Since the system presumes guilt rather than innocence, the burden of proof lies with the citizen, not with the state. To claim a ration, apply for a scholarship or buy a train ticket, you have to prove who you are before receiving it. The obligation lies with the citizen to prove she is not a fraud. Even if she is not, and the failure is not with her but with the system, she pays for the system’s failure, not the government. To dispute a decision made by the machine means going to the nearest large town – often many miles away – and convincing an official that the problem is with the machine or the digital record, not with you. It is not surprising that some people wrecked Aadhaar machines in their rage.

While the system was found to reduce agency in citizens, it empowered those in positions of authority. Central government was able to make public services conditional on authentication by Aadhaar (despite repeated court rulings that Aadhaar be voluntary, not mandatory). This conditionality could then be extended to the level and type of public services available to individuals. In fact, it had to be for many services – distinguishing pensioners from non-pensioners, for example. Yet in this conditionality, there is plenty of scope for harm and abuse. In 2017 the independent media site Scroll.in reported a rising number of HIV-positive patients who were dropping out of treatment programmes because they were required to use their Aadhaar numbers and were fearful of their condition becoming public.

Equally, while Aadhaar itself did not provide any information about caste, ethnicity, religion or language, once it was linked to other databases, most notably the National Population Register, then it became possible to identify people by group. Formal group identification by the state has an ignominious history. During the apartheid era in South Africa, the penultimate number on the South African identity card indicated race. In the Rwandan genocide in 1994, anyone who had ‘Tutsi’ on their identification was liable to be killed. In Nazi Germany in 1938, every Jewish citizen had ‘J’ stamped on their ID cards and passports. In India, where political and religious divisions are closely intertwined, there is good reason to be anxious about new opportunities for group identification.

Thanks to Aadhaar, companies started to build services using unique identification. A series of ‘trust platforms’ emerged, built on top of Aadhaar, where employers – and others – could access and authenticate people’s identity. A company called TrustID advertised itself as “India’s first, unique and comprehensive online verification platform”. Through TrustID an employer could check whether a potential employee had any criminal or civil convictions, or whether that person had a good or bad reputation (based on a news search and social media profiling). The company even encouraged women to check up on potential husbands they had found via marriage websites. Other international companies integrated Aadhaar into existing services. This is similar to the way in which companies work with platforms like Facebook to profile, and target, individuals based on their personal information – except in this instance doing it via the government. All the same questions about trust, privacy, freedom and power arise, with even greater political potency. The state and private companies are in partnership to track citizens constantly and to gather as much data as they can on them – data that they can then use for commercial or political purposes. This opaque, asymmetrical knowledge of the citizen seems like the reverse of what was intended by democratic transparency, especially in the absence of strong privacy and data protection. “Totalitarian states often do this against the wishes of their citizens,” Pratap Bhanu Mehta, the president of the Centre for Policy Research, writes, yet “in our democracy, our consent is being mobilized to put an imprimatur over more control and arbitrariness.”

In August 2017, the Supreme Court of India came to a unanimous 9–0 decision that Article 21 of the Indian Constitution did guarantee a fundamental right to privacy. As such, it was not lawful for the government to make it mandatory for people to identify themselves using a unique identifier like Aadhaar, except in specific circumstances. To some this looked like a huge blow to the grand project. The Supreme Court decision “raises serious questions about Aadhaar”, lawyer Adarsh Ramanujan argued in India’s Financial Express, and appeared to send “a direction to the central government to create a regime to ensure that privacy rights are not trammelled by other private parties”. The judgment was about privacy broadly, and did not refer to specific cases like Aadhaar, but was seen as the basis from which future challenges to the scheme could be launched. The Modi government, however, appeared to carry on regardless. In October it linked Aadhaar to driving licence applications. By mid-December, the government had made Aadhaar mandatory if citizens wanted to access any of 140 government services.

Nandan Nilekani, who had stepped down as chair of Aadhaar in 2014 in order to become a candidate for the Congress party, railed against those who criticized the scheme. There was, he claimed, an “orchestrated campaign” to malign the system. “I think this so-called anti-Aadhaar lobby is really just a small bunch of liberal elites who are in some echo chamber,” he told an Indian business news channel. Anyway, Nilekani argued, it was too late for the naysayers to stop it. Too many people were now enrolled. It was too integral to the provision of services. Others saw attacks on Aadhaar as political, arguing that Congress was using it for political gain prior to the 2019 election, and that this would backfire. “Aadhaar today is not just a number,” the editor of India’s Economic Timeswrote. “The Congress envisaged it as a means of identity but the Modi government has taken it to a different level. It has become a weapon in the hands of the poor and a powerful tool to fight entrenched black money interests. It is now a symbol of anti-corruption, anti-black money drives, a symbol of efficient allocation of welfare benefits.”

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/newsclick-martin-moore-may-20-2019-aadhaar-reduced-agency-in-citizens-and-empowered-those-in-positions-of-authority