We are anonymous, we are legion

Accessing pirated content might lead to prison term & Rs 3-lakh fine

praskrishna — 2016-08-23T02:47:52Z

India puts onus of downloading and viewing pirated content on individuals.

The article by Alnoor Peermohammed was published in the Business Standard on August 22, 2016. Sunil Abraham was quoted.

The central government is putting the onus of downloading and viewing of copyrighted content from sites it has blocked (with the help of internet service providers) on users.

Visiting torrent (a particular type of files) websites while on Tata Communications’ network recently had users being shown a message that viewing or downloading content on those sites could land them in prison for up to three years and a fine of up to Rs 3 lakh.

“There is not enough room in our prisons to keep these infringers and enough time in our courts to try them. It might sound very exciting as a message to put out but, essentially, they’re trying to scare people into good behaviour,” said Sunil Abraham, executive director at research firm Centre for Internet and Society.

There has been no change to the Copyright Act of 1957 or the Information Technology Act of 2000 for the updated notice being shown to users upon visiting blocked sites. Under these provisions, visiting a site, which is blocked is not illegal, unless it is child pornography.

“Copyright infringement happens all the time and even in developed countries, the rates are very high. Crackdowns on individuals and consumers are never going to solve the problem,” added Abraham.

Experts say the most the government could do is prosecute a couple of people and make examples of them, to dissuade others. This practice is followed globally. There are no examples, though, in India of prosecution for copyright infringement of online content.

The recent alteration of the statement seen by users on Tata networks was done on the directives of the Bombay High Court, after the company appealed that showing individual messages for why each website was blocked was not feasible. The resulting message sparked media frenzy that visitors of blocked websites could now be imprisoned.

Other media reports revealed that the recent blocking of websites by internet service providers was prompted by court orders to prevent piracy of Dishoom, the Bollywood movie.

Globally, there’s been a move to clamp on torrent websites which host pirated content, aided by large information technology entities such as Apple or Facebook. Last month, the US authorities arrested Kickass Torrents’ founder, Arten Vaulin, and blocked all the domains of the website, only to have it resurface a day later.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/business-standard-august-22-2016-accessing-pirated-content-might-lead-to-prison-term-and-rs-3-lakh-fine

Access at the cost of Net neutrality?

praskrishna — 2015-10-09T01:18:31Z

In the Net neutrality debate, there is a conflict between two core values: ease of access and neutrality. The ease of access promised by applications like Free Basics compromises neutrality and may later morph into a method of predatory pricingIf programs that bring access to a part of the Internet in the immediate future were to entrench themselves, it could eventually lead to telecom companies abusing their dominant positionsIn the absence of a specific law mandating a neutral Internet, telecom companies enjoy a virtual carte blanche to discriminate between different applications. Though they have not yet exploited this autonomy fully, they are certainly moving towards that.

The article by Suhrith Parthasarathy was published in the Hindu on October 8, 2015. Pranesh Prakash gave inputs.

Earlier this year, the social media giant, Facebook, formalised a partnership with Reliance Communications that enabled the Indian company to provide access to over 30 different websites, without any charge on mobile data accruing to the ultimate user. The platform, originally known as “Internet.org,” has now been rebranded as “Free Basics,” Facebook announced last month. Its fundamental ethos, though, remains unchanged. It allows Reliance’s subscribers to surf completely free of cost a bouquet of websites covered within the scheme, which includes, quite naturally, facebook.com. Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook’s founder, views this supposed initiative as a philanthropic gesture, as part of a purported, larger aim to bring access to the Internet to those people who find the costs of using generally available mobile data prohibitive.

Neutrality, an interpretive concept
On the face of it, this supposed act of altruism appears to be commendable. But, there are many critics — some of whom have come together to launch a website “savetheinternet.in” with a view to defending Internet freedom — who argue that Free Basics violates what has come to be known as the principle of network (or Net) neutrality.

While it is clear to all of us that a notion of Net neutrality involves some regulation of the Internet, it is less clear what the term actually means. Like any phrase that involves either a moral or a legal obligation, Net neutrality is also an interpretive concept. People who employ the term to denote some sort of binding commitment, or at the least an aspirational norm, often tend to disagree over precisely how the idea ought to be accomplished. Tim Wu — an American lawyer and presently a professor at the Columbia University — who coined the term, views the notion of Net neutrality as signifying an Internet that does not favour any one application over another. In other words, the idea is to ensure that Internet service providers do not discriminate content by either charging a fee for acting as its carrier or by incorporating any technical qualifications.

In India, there is no law that expressly mandates the maintenance of a neutral Internet. This March, the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) released a draft consultation paper seeking the public’s views on whether the Internet needed regulation. Unfortunately, much of its attention was focussed on the supposedly pernicious impact of applications such as WhatsApp and Viber. “In a multi-ethnic society there is a vital need,” wrote TRAI, “to ensure that the social equilibrium is not impacted adversely by communications that inflame passions, disturb law and order and lead to sectarian disputes.” The questions, therefore, in its view were these: should at least some Internet applications be amenable to a greater regulation, and should they compensate the telecom service providers in addition to the data charges that the consumers pay directly for the use of mobile Internet?

If the government eventually answers these questions in the affirmative, the consequences could be drastic. It could lead to a classification of Internet applications based on arbitrary grounds, by bringing some of them, whom the government views as harmful to society in some manner or another, within its regulatory net. Through such a move, the state, contrary to helping establish principles of Net neutrality as a rule of law, would be actively promoting an unequal Internet.

In any event, as things stand, in the absence of a specific law mandating a neutral Internet, telecom companies enjoy a virtual carte blanche to discriminate between different applications. Though these companies have not yet completely exploited this autonomy, they are certainly proceeding towards such an exercise. In April this year, Airtel announced Airtel Zero, an initiative that would allow applications to purchase data from Airtel in exchange for the telecom company offering them to consumers free of cost.

On the face of it, this programme appears opposed to Net neutrality. But what is even more alarming is that mobile Internet service providers could, in the future, plausibly also control the speeds at which different applications are delivered to consumers. For example, if WhatsApp were to subscribe to Airtel Zero by paying the fee demanded by the company, Airtel might accede to offering WhatsApp to consumers at a pace superior to that at which other applications are run. This kind of discrimination, as Nikhil Pahwa, one of the pioneers of the Save The Internet campaign, has argued, is prototypically opposed to Net neutrality. It tends to breed an unequal playing field, and, if allowed to subsist, it could create a deep division in the online world. Ultimately, we must view Net neutrality as a concept that stands for the values that we want to build as a society; it pertains to concerns about ensuring freedom of expression and about creating an open space for ideas where democracy can thrive. There is a tendency, though, to view those who support Net neutrality as representing a supercilious position. Such criticism is unquestionably blinkered, but it also highlights certain telling concerns.

Telecom companies that wish to discriminate between applications argue that in the absence of an Internet that has completely permeated all strata of society, an obligation to maintain neutrality is not only unreasonable on the companies, but also unfair on the consumer. After all, if nothing else, Airtel Zero and Free Basics bring, at the least, some portions of the Internet to people who otherwise have no means to access the web. What we have, therefore, at some level, is a clash of values: between access to the Internet (in a limited form) and the maintenance of neutrality in an atmosphere that is inherently unequal. This makes tailoring a solution to the problem a particularly arduous process.

The Internet, in its purest form, is a veritable fountain of information. At its core lies a commitment to both openness and a level playing field, where an ability to innovate is perennially maintained. It is difficult to argue against Facebook when it says that some access is better than no access at all. But one of the problems with Free Basics, and indeed with Airtel Zero too, is that the consumer has no choice in which websites he or she might want to access free of cost. If this decision is made only by Facebook, which might argue that it gives every developer an equal chance to be a part of its project as long as it meets a certain criteria, what we have is almost a paternalistic web. In such a situation, information, far from being free, is shackled by constraints imposed by the service provider.

Laudable end, unethical means
This is precisely one of the concerns raised by those arguing in favour of Net neutrality, who, it is worth bearing in mind, aren’t resistant to the idea of a greater penetration of the Internet. Their apprehensions lie in companies resorting to what they believe is an unethical means to achieving, at least in theory, a laudable end. According to them, negating Net neutrality, in a bid to purportedly achieve greater access to the Internet in the immediate future, could prove profoundly injurious in the long run. Yes, Airtel Zero and Free Basics would bring to the less-privileged amongst us some access to the Internet, but the question is this: at what cost?

The worry is that if the programs that bring access to a part of the Internet in the immediate future were to entrench themselves, it could eventually lead to these telecom companies abusing their dominant positions. No doubt, as Pranesh Prakash, policy director at the Centre for Internet and Society, has argued, it might require a deeper analysis to argue convincingly that packages such as Free Basics and Airtel Zero require immediate invalidation in their present forms; significantly, the former does not demand payments from the applications while the latter is premised on such consideration. But, viewed holistically, the companies’ actions could potentially be characterised as a form of predatory pricing, where consumers might benefit in the short run, only for serious damage to ensue to competition in the long run.

It is, therefore, necessary that any debate on the issue must address the tension between the two apparently conflicting goals — the importance of maintaining a neutral Internet and the need to ensure a greater access to the web across the country. Mr. Zuckerberg argues that these two values are not fundamentally opposed to each other, but can — and must — coexist. He is possibly correct at a theoretical level.

But the history of markets tells us that we have to be very careful in allowing predatory practices, devised to achieve short-term goals, to go unbridled. As citizens, each of us has a fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. If we were to get the balance between these two values wrong, if we were to allow the domination, by a few parties, of appliances that facilitate a free exchange of ideas, in a manner that impinges on the Internet’s neutrality, our most cherished civil liberties could well be put to grave danger.

(Suhrith Parthasarathy is an advocate in the Madras High Court.)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-hindu-october-8-2015-suhrith-parthasarathy-access-at-the-cost-of-net-neutrality

Abuse linked to Net fixation

Nina C. George — 2019-08-15T16:26:27Z

Addiction to surfing for explicit content and loss of privacy are big concerns when it comes to children, say counsellors.

The article by Nina C. George was published by Deccan Herald on August 13, 2019. Aayush Rathi was quoted.

About 15 children are rescued every day in Bengaluru by an organisation working in tandem with the police. Some children in distress are rescued after they call Makkala Sahayavani, a child helpline attached to the police commissioner’s office. Counsellors attribute the high numbers to many causes. Addiction to the Internet may be adding to the problem, they say.

Fr Mathew Thomas, executive director of BOSCO, categorises distress calls received at the helpline under three heads: child marriage, sexual and physical abuse, and child labour.

“When we deal with cases of child abuse, we need to be extremely sensitive and not blamethem,” he says.Rescued children show physical injuries, low self-esteem, and suffer from learning disorders.“In a day, we rescue at least 15 children who are victims of various abuses,” he says. Thomas isassociated with the helpline in a supervisory capacity.Studies show how social media and the Internet can alter the behaviour of children and makethem vulnerable to all kinds of abuse.Dr Manoj Kumar Sharma, professor of clinical psychology at Service for Healthy Use ofTechnology (SHUT Clinic) at Nimhans, says the loss of privacy is one of the biggest concerns.

“On the Internet, users can easily make contact with unsuspecting children through anonymous and unprotected social media pro􀁺les. Game forums can put children at risk for bullying or abuse,” he says. Dr Sharma calls for more measures to protect children, “Disadvantaged children may not understand online risks, including those of loss of privacy,” he says. It is common for children to seek the opinion of their peer group when they experience risks and harm online.

“This makes it difficult for parents to intervene. There is a need to enhance communication between the child and parent so they can identify signs of distress among the children andhelp them,” advises Sharma.Easy access to sexually explicit videos may be one of the reasons for increased sexual abuse of children, say counsellors at Makkala Sahayavani, the child helpline attached to the police commissioner’s office. Preethi Baliga, a senior counsellor, says early exposure to the Internet is leading to addiction, and physical, emotional, and sexual abuse of children. “How do we saveour children from this?” she wonders.The helpline receives 15 calls a day, five of them calling for immediate intervention.

Recent cases at helpline

A 16-year-old girl was sexually abused by her father for years. Her mother was aware but did nothing. Finally, unable to bear the torture, the girl gathered courage to report it to the police.An FIR was filed and the father was arrested. She was sent to a shelter for rescued children.

A 15-year-old girl was orphaned after her parents went their individual ways. Neither parent wanted to take her in. She was sent to a hostel where she became a victim of drug abuse and multiple sexual encounters. She slipped into depression. She received treatment after her case came to the notice of the child helpline.

A 16-year-old girl befriends a boy of the same age on social media and they begin chatting.They get close and soon chatting makes way for exchange of intimate pictures and physical intimacy. After a while, the boy begins to avoid the girl. Repeated attempts to contact him goes in vain. The girl realises that she has been sexually abused and exploited.

Counsellor's Concerns

Things that ought to be educative are glamorised, according to a counsellor. “Even a condom ad is glamorous. The message that it must be used against contracting sexually transmitteddiseases and preventing pregnancy is not highlighted,” says Preethi Baliga, who works at Makkala Sahayavani. She adds, “Teenagers gain access to pubs by showing fake identity cards. “Children with such tendencies have zero emotions and don’t come around to counselling.”

The Internet can be seen as an abettor

Aayush Rathi, Policy Officer with the Center for Internet and Society in Bengaluru, warns thatone should be wary of claims that the Internet causes child maltreatment such as emotional and sexual abuse. “Rather, the Internet can be seen as an abettor - a new medium through which child maltreatment may be pursued. An increase in the number of cases of such maltreatment needn’t necessarily only be because of wider Internet usage, but may also be because awareness initiatives may be working,” he tells Metrolife.

How to help abused children?

Communicate in a non-judgemental way.
Engage in of􀁻ine activities with them.
Recognise, appreciate positive behaviour.
Become a role model: don’t overuse tech.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/deccan-herald-nina-c-george-august-13-2019-abuse-linked-to-net-fixation

ABLI Privacy Workshop

Admin — 2019-06-05T07:29:18Z

On May 21 and 22, 2019, Elonnai Hickok, participated in the ABLI privacy workshop along with side events in Singapore.

Click to view the agenda.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/abli-privacy-workshop

Aadhar: Privacy is not a unidimensional concept

amber — 2017-08-23T01:50:19Z

Right to privacy is important not only for our negotiations with the information age but also to counter the transgressions of a welfare state. A robust right to privacy is essential for all Indian citizens to defend their individual autonomy in the face of invasive state actions purportedly for the public good.

The article was published in the Economic Times on July 23, 2017.

The ruling of this nine-judge bench will have far-reaching impact on the extent and scope of rights available to us all. In a disappointing case of judicial evasion by the apex court, it has taken over 600 days since a reference order was passed in August 11, 2015, for this bench to be constituted. Over two days of arguments, the counsels for the petitioners have presented before the court why the right to privacy, despite not finding a mention in the Constitution of India, is a fundamental right essential to a person’s dignity and liberty, and must be read into not one but multiple articles of the Constitution. The government will make its arguments in the coming week.

One must wonder why we are debating the contours of the right to privacy, which 40 years of jurisprudence had lulled us into believing we already had. The answer to that can be found in a series of hearings in the Aadhaar case that began in 2012. Justice KS Puttaswamy, a former Karnataka High Court judge, filed a petition before the Supreme Court, questioning the validity of the Aadhaar project due its lack of legislative basis (since then the Aadhaar Act was passed in 2016) and its transgressions on our fundamental rights. Over time, a number of other petitions also made their way to the apex court, challenging different aspects of the Aadhaar project. Since then, five different interim orders by the Supreme Court have stated that no person should suffer because they do not have an Aadhaar number. Aadhaar, according to the court, could not be made mandatory to avail benefits and services from government schemes. Further, the court has limited the use of Aadhaar to specific schemes: LPG, PDS, MGNREGA, National Social Assistance Programme, the Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojna and EPFO.

The real spanner in the works in the progress of this case was the stand taken by Mukul Rohatgi, then attorney general of India who, in a hearing before the court in July 2015, stated that there is no constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy. His reliance was on two Supreme Court judgments in MP Sharma v Satish Chandra (1954) and Kharak Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh (1962): both cases, decided by eight- and six-judge benches respectively, denied the existence of a constitutional right to privacy. As the subsequent judgments which upheld the right to privacy were by smaller benches, Rohatgi claimed that MP Sharma and Kharak Singh still prevailed over them, until they were overruled by a larger bench.

The reference to a larger bench has since delayed the entire matter, even as a number of government schemes have made Aadhaar mandatory. This reading of privacy as a unidimensional concept by the courts is, with due respect, erroneous. Privacy, as a concept, includes within its scope, spatial, familial, informational and decisional aspects. We all have a legitimate expectation of privacy in our private spaces, such as our homes, and in our personal relationships. Similarly, we must be able to exercise some control over how personal data, like our financial information, are disseminated. Most importantly, privacy gives us the space to make autonomous choices and decisions without external interference. All these dimensions of privacy must stand as distinct rights. In MP Sharma, the court rejected a certain aspect of the right of privacy by refusing to acknowledge a right against search and seizure. This, in no way prevented the court, even in the form of a smaller bench, from ruling on any other aspects of privacy, including those that are relevant to the Aadhaar case.

The limited referral to this bench means that the court will have to rule on the status of privacy and its possible limitations in isolation, without even going into the details of the Aadhaar case (based on the nature of protection that this bench accords to privacy, the petitioners and defendants in the Aadhaar case will have to argue afresh on whether the project does impede on this most fundamental right). There are no facts of the case to ground the legal principles in, and defining the contours of a right can be a difficult exercise. The court must be wary of how any limits they put on the right may be used in future. Equally, it is important to articulate that any limitations on the right to privacy due to competing interests such as national security and public interest must be imposed only when necessary and always be proportionate.

It will not be enough for the court to merely state that we have a constitutional right to privacy. They would be well advised to cut through the muddle of existing privacy jurisprudence, and unequivocally establish the various facets of the right. Without that, we may not be able to withstand the modern dangers of surveillance, denial of bodily integrity and self-determination through forcible collection of information. The nine judges, in their collective wisdom, must not only ensure that we have a right to privacy, but also clearly articulate a robust reading of this right capable of withstanding the growing interferences with our autonomy.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/economic-times-july-23-2017-amber-sinha-aadhar-privacy-is-not-a-unidimensional-concept

Aadhaar’s moment of truth

praskrishna — 2011-07-05T07:16:58Z

It’s time for the unique identity project to answer tough questions it has dodged so far, writes MA Arun in the Deccan Herald.

On June 25, 2009, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh generated one of the biggest feel-good headlines of UPA2. He appointed former Infosys CEO Nandan Nilekani as Chairperson of Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI), which had been set up to assign a unique number to every resident of the country.

UIDAI – billed as the world’s largest e-governance project – presented a numbing technical challenge. Fingerprint and iris samples of one billion plus Indian residents had to be collected along with details of name, gender, birth date and address. A unique identity had to be assigned to each resident in return and then authenticate it online whenever called for.

Nilekani using his stature in the IT industry assembled a smart team of engineers, who could take the challenge head on. He also started tirelessly crisscrossing the country promoting the project and tying up with different government agencies and PSUs.

He addressed countless gatherings conveying a simple message: Indian growth has bypassed the poor and giving them legal identity was the first step in acknowledging their existence and making government services accessible.

In the last two years, there has been a little change in his script and in the response of the audience, which has by and large remained breathless and adulatory. There have been a few jarring notes. Once in a while he is accosted by individuals and organisations, who say the project takes away their privacy.

Most memorably, on January 7, 2011, Nilekani faced an uncharacteristically unruly audience at IISc, Bangalore, which demanded strong protection to privacy. People who attended the meeting found Nilekani evasive as protesting students waved placards outside the venue, urging him to go back.

But for the media, this reporter included, the dissenting opinion from possibly fringe protesters, sounded exaggerated, making too much of a small issue, debating an academic issue of little practical value.

Perhaps reflecting the larger prevailing sentiments on Aadhaar, Sujeet Pillai of Feecounter, says with the rise of social networking, privacy has already eroded. "We put more information on Facebook and Twitter than we share with Aadhaar. The benefits of the project outweigh the cost," he adds.

Many say it is only the middleclass which worries about privacy, while the poor would be more concerned about the benefits. Trying to address privacy concerns, Aadhaar officials have maintained they collect just basic details, enrollment is voluntary and information is encrypted. Your approval is required to authenticate your identity and while revealing who you are, the system just gives a yes or no response, they say.

Over the last year Aadhaar has picked up steam and observers, who expected the bureaucracy to resist, given its anti-corruption overtone, are mildly surprised. Various government departments are embracing it in competition. Several central ministries, state governments, PSUs have begun to tie their programmes to the Aadhaar number.

Aadhaar officials say they are on course to enroll 600 million by 2014 and by October this year they expect to start enrolling one million numbers a day. The pilot projects at Mysore, Tumkur and Hyderabad have already enrolled 85 per cent of the population and the project is ramping up to other districts and states.

Early last month the Cabinet Committee on Security in a seemingly unrelated move gave partial approval for a Home ministry project, National Intelligence Grid (Natgrid). The development alarmed the privacy advocates to again raise a cry over Aadhaar. Among other things, Natgrid, being run by an ex-army man, Capt Raghu Raman, reportedly seeks to integrate 21 databases - railways, airlines, stock exchanges, income tax, bank account details, credit card transactions, visa and immigration records, telecom service providers and chemical vendors.

Most of us reading this article appear in many these databases, which today are islands of information controlled by different government agencies. They cover different segments of the population and may overlap to some extent. Stitching together these disparate databases together would require a mammoth exercise to uniquely identify all Indian residents. That is precisely what Aadhaar, the missing link, is doing, say critics.

"If Aadhaar ever succeeds in assigning a unique number to all residents, it will take a maximum of two years to create a common Natgrid database. Using a terminal in his office, a cop would be able to watch whatever you do - travelling, talking, buying - in real time. The surveillance technology is pretty straightforward," says noted security expert and IIT Mumbai alumni, Dr Samir Kelekar of Teknotrends.

The system is being designed to catch terrorists and criminals, say Natgrid supporters. "But why subject the entire population to potentially the same level of surveillance," asks Sunil Abraham of Centre for Internet and Society.

Noted jurist Usha Ramanathan says since 2008 several measures such as the Collection of Statistics Act, The Information Technology Act, Aadhaar, National Grid have come about to collect information about people. “After 9/11 in the guise of homeland security USA expanded police powers. Something similar is happening in India after 26/11,” she says.

The claims of Aadhaar benefiting the poor is untested as there has been no feasibility study, she adds. "This is a security project masquerading as an anti-poverty project," says Abraham.

Aadhaar has eluded a debate so far on these issues, say critics. Ramanathan says she made three attempts in November 2009, July 2010 and February 2011 to engage Nilekani, Aadhaar Director General R S Sharma and few other project officials on the issue.

Dubious demands

A New Delhi-based Aadhaar government official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said there was no discussion within the project on the potential risks it posed. "The main focus is in making a paradigm shift in governance and reaching out to the poor to ensure that the Rs 3,26,000 crore being spent on subsidy is not pilfered," he said.

But he went on to acknowledge that Aadhaar was like 'nuclear energy', which could be used to either make bombs or generate electricity. “It is for the media and civil society to apply pressure for the right safeguards," he said.

While the engineers and bureaucrats are steamrolling the project, the laws of the land and the promised safeguards are yet to catch up with it.

Indian judiciary has also given a free hand to the law enforcement authorities to conduct surveillance. According to the latest Google Transparency Report, Indian government officials made 67 requests to remove contentious items from various Google services between July to December 2010. Only 6 requests were backed by court orders and rest were demands made by police and other executive agencies.

Why is Nilekani who has emerged as the face of Aadhaar silent about the security dimension of the project, ask critics. After all, the Infosys credo is to ‘disclose when in doubt’, they point out. "Nilekani and team are good people without any evil intention. They have never lived in villages and believe that technology can solve any problem," says Abraham.

Ramanathan differs. "In 2009, I would have said he was unaware of the possible risks of Aadhaar. I will not attribute that innocence to him anymore. People in power tend to be blinded by it," she says.

"Their response has varied from ‘nobody else is asking these questions’, ‘have not come prepared to address these issues today’ and ‘we will get back to you’," she says.

Critics also accuse Aadhaar officials of presenting a misleading picture. Enrollment started as a voluntary exercise, but is now being made mandatory to get LPG cylinders. "They were supposed to collect only basic details, but Aadhaar enrollment forms now ask for email ids and phone numbers," Ramanathan said.

This news appeared in the Deccan Herald on 5 July 2011. The original post can be read here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/aadhaar-truth

Aadhaar: Ushering in a Commercialized Era of Surveillance in India

praskrishna — 2017-06-07T12:45:30Z

Since last year, Indian citizens have been required to submit their photograph, iris and fingerprint scans in order to access legal entitlements, benefits, compensation, scholarships, and even nutrition programs. Submitting biometric information is needed for the rehabilitation of manual scavengers, the training and aid of disabled people, and anti-retroviral therapy for HIV/AIDS patients. Soon police in the Alwar district of Rajasthan will be able to register criminals, and track missing persons through an app that integrates biometric information with the Crime and Criminal Tracking Network Systems (CCTNS).

The article by Jyoti Panday was published by the Electronic Frontier Foundation on June 1, 2017.

These instances demonstrate how intrusive India’s controversial national biometric identity scheme, better known as Aadhaar has grown. Aadhaar is a 12-digit unique identity number (UID) issued by the government after verifying a person’s biometric and demographic information. As of April 2017, the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) has issued 1.14 billion UIDs covering nearly 87% of the population making Aadhaar, the largest biometric database in the world. The government asserts that enrollment reduces fraud in welfare schemes and brings greater social inclusion. Welfare schemes that provide access to basic services for marginalized and vulnerable groups are essential. However, unlike countries where similar schemes have been implemented, invasive biometric collection is being imposed as a condition for basic entitlements in India. The privacy and surveillance risks associated with the scheme have caused much dissension in India.

Identity and Privacy in India

Initiated as an identity authentication tool, the critical problem with Aadhaar is that it is being pushed as a unique identifier to access a range of services. The government continues to maintain that the scheme is voluntary, and yet it has galvanized enrollment by linking Aadhaar to over 50 schemes. Aadhaar has become the de-facto identity document accepted at private, banks, schools, and hospitals. Since Aadhaar is linked to the delivery of essential services, authentication errors or deactivation has serious consequences including exclusion and denial of statutory rights. But more importantly, using a unique identifier across a range of schemes and services enables seamless combination and comparison of databases. By using Aadhaar, the government can match existing records such as driving license, ration card, financial history to the primary identifier to create detailed profiles. Aadhaar may not be the only mechanism, but essentially, it's a surveillance tool that the Indian government can use to surreptitiously identify and track citizens.

This is worrying, particularly in context of the ambiguity regarding privacy in India. The right to privacy for Indian citizens is not enshrined in the Constitution. Although, the Supreme Court has located the right to privacy as implicit in the concept of “ordered liberty” and held that it is necessary in order for citizens to effectively enjoy all other fundamental rights. There is also no comprehensive national framework that regulates the collection and use of personal information. In 2012, Justice K.S. Puttaswamy challenged Aadhaar in the Supreme Court of India on the grounds that it violates the right to privacy. The Court passed an interim order restricting compulsory linking of Aadhaar for benefits delivery, and referred the clarification on privacy as a right to a larger bench. More than a year later, the constitutional bench is yet to be constituted.

The delay in sorting out the nature and scope of privacy as right in India has allowed the government to continue linking Aadhaar to as many schemes as possible, perhaps with the intention of ensuring the scheme becomes too big to be rolled back. In 2016, the government enacted the 'Aadhaar Act' passing the legislation without any debate, discussion or even approval of both houses of Parliament. In April this year, Aadhaar was made compulsory for filing income tax or PAN number application and the decision is being challenges in Supreme Court. Defending the State , the Attorney-General of India claimed that the arguments on so-called privacy and bodily intrusion is bogus, and citizens cannot have an absolute right over their body! The State’s articulation is chilling, especially in light of the Human DNA Profiling Bill seeking the right to collect biological samples and DNA indices of citizens. Such anti-rights arguments are worth note because biometric tracking of citizens isn't just government policy - it is also becoming big business.

Role of Private Companies

Private companies supply hardware, software, programs, and the biometric registration services for rolling out Aadhaar to India’s large population. UIDAI’s Committee on Biometrics acknowledges that biometrics data are national assets though American biometric technology provider L-1 Identity Solutions, and consulting firms Accenture and Ernst and Young can access and retain citizens' data. The Aadhaar Act introduces electronic Know-Your-Customer (eKYC) that allows government agencies and private companies to download data such as name, gender and date of birth from the Aadhaar database at the time of authentication. Banks and telecom companies using authentication process to download data and auto-fill KYC forms and to profile users. Over the last few years, the number of companies or applications built around profiling of citizens’ personally sensitive data has grown exponentially.

A number of people linked with creating the UIDAI infrastructure have founded iSPIRT, an organisation that is pushing for commercial uses of Aadhaar. Private companies are using Aadhaar for authentication purposes and background checks. Microsoft has announced SkypeLite integration with Aadhaar to verify users. Others, such as TrustId and Eko are integrating rating systems into their authentication services and tracking users through platforms they create. In essence such companies are creating their own private database to track authenticated Aadhaar users and they may sell this data to other companies. The growth of companies that share and combine databases to profile users is an indication of the value of personal data and its centrality for both large and small companies in India.

Integrating and linking large biometrics collections to each other, which are then linked with traditional data points that private companies hold such as geolocation or phone number enables constant surveillance to take over. So far, there has been no parliamentary discussion on the role of private companies. UIDAI remains the ultimate authority in deciding the nature, level and cost of access granted to private companies. For example, there is nothing in Aadhaar Act that prevents Facebook from entering into an agreement with the Indian government to make Aadhaar mandatory to access WhatsApp or any of its other services. Facebook could also pay data brokers and aggregators to create customer profiles to add to its ever growing data points for tracking and profiling its users.

Security Risks and Liability

A series of data leakages have raised concerns about which private entities are involved, and how they handle personal and sensitive data. In February, UIDAI registered a complaint against three companies for storing and using biometric data for multiple transactions. Aadhaar numbers of over 130 million people and bank account details of about 100 million people have been publicly displayed through government portals owing to poor security practices. A recent report from Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) showed that a simple tweaking of URL query parameters of the National Social Assistance Programme (NSAP) website could unmask and display private information of a fifth of India's population.

Such data leaks pose a huge risk as compromised biometrics can never be recovered. The Aadhaar Act establishes UIDAI as the primary custodian of identity information, but is silent on the liability in case of data breaches. The Act is also unclear about notice and remedies for victims of identity theft and financial frauds and citizens whose data has been compromised. UIDAI has continued to fix breaches upon being notified, but maintains that storage in federated databases ensures that no agency can track or profile individuals.

After almost a decade of pushing a framework for mass collection of data, the Indian government has issued guidelines to secure identity and sensitive personal data in India. The guidelines could have come earlier, and given large data leaks in the past may also be redundant. Nevertheless, it is reassuring to see practices for keeping information safe and the idea of positive informed consent being reinforced for government departments. To be clear, the guidelines are meant for government departments and private companies using Aadhaar for authentication, profiling and building databases fall outside its scope. With political attitudes to corporations exploiting personal information changing the world over, the stakes for establishing a framework that limits private companies commercializing personal data and tracking Indian citizens are as high as they have ever been.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/electronic-frontier-foundation-jyoti-panday-june-1-2017-aadhaar-ushering-in-a-commercialized-era-of-surveillance-in-india

Aadhaar: Still Too Many Problems

pranesh — 2016-04-06T15:31:32Z

While one wishes to welcome govt’s attempt to bring Aadhaar within a legislative framework, the fact is there are too many problems that still remain unaddressed for one to be optimistic.

The article was published by Livemint on March 7, 2016.

The Aadhaar Bill has been introduced as a money bill, even though it doesn’t qualify as such under Article 110 of the Constitution. If the Speaker agrees to this, it will render the Rajya Sabha toothless in this matter, and will weaken our democracy. The government should reintroduce it as an ordinary legislative bill, which is what it is.

While the government has in the past argued before the Supreme Court that Aadhaar is voluntary, Section 7 of the bill allows the government to mandate an Aadhaar number (or application for an Aadhaar number) as a prerequisite for obtaining some subsidies, benefits, services, etc. This undermines its arguments before the Supreme Court, which led the court to pass orders holding that Aadhaar should not be made mandatory. This move to make it mandatory will now need the government to argue that rather than contravene the apex court order, it has instead removed the rationale for it.

Interestingly, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government seems to have done a U-turn on the issue of the unique identification number not being proof of citizenship or domicile. The previous Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government never meant the Aadhaar number to be proof of citizenship or domicile. This was attacked by the Yashwant Sinha-chaired standing committee on finance, which feared that illegal immigrants would get Aadhaar numbers. Now, the BJP and the NDA seem to be in agreement with the original UPA vision of Aadhaar.

Importantly, there is very strong language when it comes to the issue of privacy and confidentiality of the information that is held by the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI). Section 29 (1), for instance, says that no biometric information will be shared for any reason whatsoever, or used for any purpose other than Aadhaar number generation and authentication. However, that provision is undermined wholly by Section 33, which says that “in the interest of national security”, the biometric info may be accessed if authorized by a joint secretary. This will only fan the fears of those who have argued that the real rationale for Aadhaar was not, in fact, delivery of services, but to create a national database of biometric data available to government snoops.

Also Read

Pros and cons of Aadhaar bill

Further, there are no remedies available for governmental abuse of this provision.

Lastly, in terms of privacy, the concern of those people who have been opposing Aadhaar is not just that the biometric and other identity information may be leaked to private parties, but also that having a unique Aadhaar number helps private parties to combine and use other databases that are linked with Aadhaar numbers in a manner that is not within the subject’s control. This is not at all addressed in this bill, and we need a robust data protection law in order to do that.

There are some other crucial details that the law doesn’t address: Is user consent, to be taken by third parties that use the UID database for authentication, needed for each instance of authentication, or would a general consent hold forever? How can consent be revoked?

There were many other objections that were raised against the Aadhaar scheme that have not been addressed by the government. For instance, in a recent article in the Economic and Political Weekly, Hans Varghese Mathews points out that going by the test data UIDAI made available in 2012, for a population of 1.3 billion people, the incidence of false positives—the probability of the identities of two people matching—is 1/112.

This is far too high a ratio to be acceptable.

Actual data from the field in Andhra Pradesh—of people who were unable to claim rations under the public distribution system (PDS)—paints a worse picture. A survey commissioned by the Andhra Pradesh government said 48% of respondents pointed to Aadhaar-related failures as the cause of their inability to claim rations.

So, even if the Aadhaar numbers were no longer issued to Lord Hanuman (Rajasthan), to dogs (e.g., Tommy Singh, a mutt in Madhya Pradesh), and with photos of a tree (New Delhi), it might not prove to be usable in a country of India’s size, given the capabilities of the fingerprint machines. As my colleague Sunil Abraham notes, the law cannot fix technological flaws.

So, while one wishes one could welcome the government’s attempt to bring Aadhaar within a legislative framework, the fact is there are too many problems that still remain unaddressed for one to be optimistic.

Pranesh Prakash is policy director at the Centre for Internet and Society, a think tank.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/livemint-march-7-2016-pranesh-prakash-aadhaar-still-too-many-problems

Aadhaar: Govt will not compromise on national security

praskrishna — 2016-03-22T15:51:13Z

The government is confident that the Aadhaar Bill will be passed.

The article by Shreeja Sen was published by Livemint on March 9, 2016. Pranesh Prakash gave inputs.

In what could raise concerns of privacy activists questioning India’s unique identification project Aadhaar, the government on Tuesday said national security will not be compromised at all.

“We will not compromise on national security; certainly we will not compromise. The Supreme Court has already highlighted certain areas for consideration. We are going ahead taking into consideration all the suggestions of the Supreme Court,” law minister D.V. Sadananda Gowda said at a press conference, when asked how the Aadhaar bill tabled in Parliament last week will balance the protection of core biometrics and national security concerns.

Under the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Bill, 2016, there are measures to protect core biometric information like fingerprints and iris scans of the unique identification number holders.

However, Section 33 says for the purposes of national security, officials at the joint secretary level and above can access this information. The section has caused some worry to experts. In this analysis , policy director of the Centre for Internet and Society Pranesh Prakash says that the national security clause is worrisome. Adding to their concerns, the bill does not define what national security means.

The government is, however, confident that the bill will be passed. “Certainly it will be passed. The benefits that go from the exchequer to the beneficiaries will be taken care of by this bill,” Gowda said.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/livemint-march-9-2016-shreeja-sen-aadhaar-govt-will-not-compromise-on-national-security

Aadhaar: Are a billion identities at risk on India's biometric database

praskrishna — 2017-05-20T06:38:26Z

"My fingerprints and iris are mine and my own. The state cannot take away my body," a lawyer told India's Supreme Court last week.

The article by Soutik Biswas was published by BBC News on May 4, 2017. Also see the blog post by Rawlson King published by Biometric Update.com on May 5, 2017.

Shyam Divan was arguing a crucial petition challenging a new law that makes it compulsory for people to submit a controversial biometric-based personal identification number while filing income tax returns.

Defending this law, the government's top law officer told the court on Tuesday that an individual's "right to body is not an absolute right".

"You can have right over your body but the state can restrict trading in body organs, so the state can exercise control over the body," Attorney General Mukul Rohatgi said.

At the heart of the latest challenge are rising concerns over the security of this mega biometric database and privacy of the number holders. (The government says it needs to link the identity number to income tax returns to improve compliance and prevent fraud.)

India's biometric database is the world's largest. Over the past eight years, the government has collected fingerprints and iris scans from more than a billion residents - or nearly 90% of the population - and stored them in a high security data centre. In return, each person has been provided with a randomly generated, unique 12-digit identity number.

For a country of 1.2 billion people with only 65 million passport-holders and 200 million with driving licenses, the portable identity number is a boon to the millions who have long suffered for a lack of one.

States have been using the number, also called Aadhaar (Foundation), to transfer government pensions, scholarships, wages for a landmark rural jobs-for-work scheme and benefits for cooking fuel to targeted recipients, and distribute cheap food to the poor.

Over the years, the number has taken a life of its own and begun exerting, what many say, is an overweening and stifling control over people's lives. For many like political scientist Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Aadhaar has transmuted from a "tool of citizen empowerment to a tool of state surveillance and citizen vulnerability".

People will soon need the number to receive benefits from more than 500 of India's 1,200-odd welfare schemes. Even banks and private firms have begun using it to authenticate consumers: a new telecom company snapped up 100 million subscribers in quick time recently by verifying the customer's identity through the number.

'Forcibly linked'

People are using the number to even get their marriages registered. The number, says Nikhil Pahwa, editor and publisher of Indian news site MediaNama, is "being forcibly linked to mobile numbers, bank accounts, tax filings, scholarships, pensions, rations, school admissions, health records and much much more, which thus puts more personal information at risk".

Some of the fears are not without basis.

The government has assured that the biometric data is "safe and secure in encrypted form", and anybody found guilty of leaking data can be jailed and fined.

But there have already been a number of leaks of details of students, pensioners and recipients of welfare benefits involving a dozen government websites. Even former Indian cricket captain MS Dhoni's personal information was mistakenly tweeted by an overzealous enrolment service provider.

Now a disturbing report by The Centre for Internet and Society claims that details of around 130-135 million Aadhaar numbers, and around 100 million bank numbers of pensioners and rural jobs-for-work beneficiaries have been leaked online by four key government schemes.

More than 230 million people nationwide are accessing welfare benefits using their numbers, and potentially, according to the report, "we could be looking at a data leak closer to that number". And linking the number to different databases - as the government is doing - is increasing the risk of data theft and surveillance.

The chief law officer believes that the outrage over the leaks is "much ado about nothing".

"Biometrics were not leaked, only Aadhaar numbers were leaked. It is nothing substantial. The idea is biometrics should not be leaked," Mukul Rohtagi told the Supreme Court on Tuesday.

The government itself has admitted that it has blacklisted or suspended some 34,000 service providers for helping create "fake" identification numbers or not following proper processes. Two years ago, a man was arrested for getting an identification number for his pet dog. The government itself has deactivated 8.5 million numbers for incorrect data, dodgy biometrics and duplication. Last month, crop loss compensation for more than 40,000 farmers was delayed because their Aadhaar numbers were "entered incorrectly by banks".

'Mass surveillance'

There are also concerns that the number can be used for profiling. Recently, authorities asked participants at a function in a restive university campus in southern India to provide their Aadhaar identity numbers. "This is not only a matter of privacy. The all pervasiveness of the Aadhaar number is a threat to freedom of expression, which is a constitutional right," Srinivas Kodali, who investigated the latest report on data leaks, told me.

Critics say the government is steaming ahead with making the number compulsory for a range of services, violating a Supreme Court order which said enrolment would be voluntary. "The main danger of the number," says economist Jean Dreze, "is that it opens the door to mass surveillance."

Nandan Nilekani, the technology tycoon who set up the programme popularly known by its acronym UIDAI, believes concerns about the safety of the biometric database are exaggerated.

He says the identity number has cut wastage, removed fakes, curbed corruption and made substantial savings for the government. He insists that the programme is completely encrypted and secure. "It's like you are creating a rule-based society," he told Financial Times recently, "it's the transition that is going on right now."

Abused

More than 60 countries around the world take biometric data from its people, says Mr Nilekani. But then there are nagging concerns worldwide about these databases being abused by hackers and state intelligence.

In 2016, personal details of some 50 million people in Turkey were reportedly leaked. (Turkey's population is estimated at 78 million.) In 2015, hackers stole more than five million fingerprints after breaching US government networks. In 2011, French experts discovered a hack involving the theft of millions of people's data in Israel.

Pratap Bhanu Mehta has written that the lack of a "clear transparent consent architecture, no transparent information architecture, no privacy architecture worth the name [India doesn't have a privacy law], and increasingly, no assurance about what exactly you do if the state decides to mess with your identity" could easily make Aadhaar a "tool of state suppression".

So a lot of lingering doubts remain. How pervasive should an identity number be? What about the individual freedom of citizens? How do you ensure the world's biggest biometric database is secure in a country with no privacy laws and a deficient criminal justice system?

In many ways, the debate about Aadhaar is also a debate about the future of India. As lawyer Shyam Divan argued forcefully in the top court, "people are reduced to vassals" when the state controls your body to this extent.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/bbc-news-soutik-biswas-may-4-2017-aadhaar-are-a-billion-identities-at-risk-on-indias-biometric-database

Aadhaar: A widening net

praskrishna — 2017-04-22T05:06:23Z

As India makes Aadhaar compulsory for a range of services, concerns about potential data breaches remain more than six years after the govt started building the world’s largest biometric identification system.

The article by Komal Gupta, Apurva Vishwanath and Suranjana Roy was published in Livemint on April 21, 2017. Pranesh Prakash was quoted.

On 29 March, a storm broke out on social media after private data that former Indian cricket captain M.S. Dhoni had furnished to get enrolled in India’s unique identity system, known as Aadhaar, were leaked online.

The popular cricketer’s wife, Sakshi, flagged the matter on Twitter, tagging information technology (IT) minister Ravi Shankar Prasad. “Is there any privacy left? Information of Aadhaar card, including application, is made public property,” Sakshi fumed on the microblogging site.

The minister replied: “Sharing personal information is illegal. Serious action will be taken against this.”

It turned out to be the fault of an overenthusiastic common services centre in Dhoni’s home town of Ranchi licensed to enrol people in Aadhaar. The centre was promptly blacklisted. “We have ordered further inquiry on the matter and action will be taken against all those involved in the leak,” said Ajay Bhushan Pandey, chief executive officer of the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI), which administers Aadhaar.

The matter blew over soon enough, but it served to illustrate the lingering concerns about potential data breaches and privacy violations surrounding Aadhaar, which has become the world’s largest biometric identification database with 1.13 billion people enrolled in it in the past six years.

The project, under which a 12-digit identification number is to be allotted to every Indian resident, was originally supposed to be a way of plugging leakages in the delivery of state benefits such as subsidized grains to the poor.

It has now become mandatory for everything ranging from opening a bank account and getting a driver’s licence or a mobile phone connection to filing of income tax returns. Even government school students entitled to a free mid-day meal need an Aadhaar number.

The use of Aadhaar has only expanded with the government going on an overdrive to promote cashless transactions and payment systems linked to the biometric ID system after banning old, high-value bank notes in November in a crackdown on unaccounted wealth hidden away from the taxman.

For instance, the Aadhaar-Enabled Payment System (AEPS) empowers a bank customer to use Aadhaar as her identity to access her Aadhaar-enabled bank account and perform basic banking transactions like cash deposit or withdrawal through a bank agent or business correspondent.

The customer can carry out transactions by scanning her fingerprint at any micro ATM or biometric point-of-sale (POS) terminal, and entering the Aadhaar number linked to the bank account. A merchant-led model of AEPS, called Aadhaar Pay, has also been launched.

Last week, Prime Minister Narendra Modi launched the BHIM-Aadhaar platform—a merchant interface linking the unique identification number to the Bharat Interface for Money (BHIM) mobile application. This will enable merchants to receive payments through fingerprint scans of customers.

“Any citizen without access to smartphones, Internet, debit or credit cards will be able to transact digitally through the BHIM-Aadhaar platform,” a government statement said.

Aadhaar’s growing importance in the economy has only served to deepen concerns about potential data breaches. And there are other concerns as well.

For instance, the Aadhaar biometric authentication failure rate in the rural job guarantee scheme, which assures 100 days of work a year to one member of every rural household, is as high as 36% in the southern state of Telangana, according to data released by the state government.

“Aadhaar is supposed to be an enabler and it will happen only when it is made voluntary. Biometric authentications might fail due to poor data connectivity and transactions might not happen even though the Aadhaar number of the person is there; so, what’s the benefit,” asked Pranesh Prakash, policy director of the Centre for Internet and Society, a Bengaluru-based think tank.

Aadhaar was the brainchild of the previous United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government, which lost power in the 2014 general election to the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). The first 10 Aadhaar numbers were handed over to residents of a small village called Tembhli in Maharashtra on 29 September 2010 in the presence of then prime minister Manmohan Singh, Congress party president Sonia Gandhi and Aadhaar’s chief architect Nandan Nilekani, a co-founder of software services giant Infosys Ltd.

After coming to power, the NDA systematically went about making Aadhaar the pivot of government welfare programmes. In March last year, Parliament passed the Aadhaar Bill to make the use of Aadhaar mandatory for availing of government subsidies despite resistance from opposition parties.

Last month, finance minister Arun Jaitley said the 12-digit number would eventually become a single, monolithic proof of identity for every Indian, replacing every other identity card.

To be sure, Aadhaar has helped the government better target beneficiaries of its welfare programmes, cutting out middlemen and corruption. For instance, the government claims to have saved about Rs50,000 crore in cooking gas subsidies by linking the Aadhaar number with bank accounts in which the subsidy is directly transferred.

Yet, Aadhaar has its critics, who have challenged the project on grounds including potential compromise of national security, violation of the right to privacy and exclusion of people from welfare programmes. The Supreme Court has cautioned the government that no citizen can be denied access to welfare programmes for lack of an Aadhaar number.

Before cricketer Dhoni’s data breach made the headlines, in February, UIDAI filed a complaint against Axis Bank Ltd, business correspondent Suvidhaa Infoserve and e-sign provider eMudhra, alleging they had attempted unauthorized authentication and impersonation by illegally storing Aadhaar biometrics. The breach was noticed after one individual performed 397 biometric transactions between 14 July 2016 and 19 February 2017. All three entities have been temporarily barred from offering Aadhaar-related services until UIDAI makes a final decision.

Pranesh Prakash of the Centre for Internet and Society said rules on the use of Aadhaar data are inadequate.

“UIDAI is allowed to share the information of a person from its database on its website, after taking proper consent of that person. However, there is no law which states what should be done if any other party does that with the same individual. Such rules must be in place,” Prakash said.

Four years after the Aadhaar project took off, a retired judge took the government to court. K. Puttaswamy, a former judge of the Karnataka high court, moved the Supreme Court in 2013, arguing that Aadhaar violated his fundamental right to privacy under the constitution. The case opened the gates for legal challenges to Aadhaar. Over the next few years till date, at least a dozen cases had questioned the legality of the project.

Ramon Magsaysay award winner Aruna Roy brought a case on behalf of manual workers whose faint finger prints, she said, often go undetected. Currently, only 44 million out of the 101 million beneficiaries of India’s rural job entitlement are paid through Aadhaar.

To be sure, India’s Constitution does not contain a black and white reference to a “fundamental right to privacy”, that the government cannot violate. The list of rights says “no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to a procedure established by law”—often interpreted by courts as an all-encompassing right including right to live with dignity, right to speedy justice and even a right to clean air.

Nilekani, the man behind Aadhaar, has cautioned that privacy is a broader issue involving how people retain their privacy in day-to-day life. “Privacy is an all-encompassing issue because of the rapid rate of digitization the world is seeing. Your smartphone has sensors, GPS and is generating more and more information about everything; voice-activated devices could also be recording your conversations. There’s a profusion of CCTV cameras at malls, restaurants, ATMs recording your movements,” Nilekani said in a recent interview with The Economic Times.

But this is where a problem arises. Although there is concurrence on the need for a privacy law, there is a great reluctance on the part of the government to come out with one.

“We don’t have a comprehensive privacy law; all our databases are unlinked. The government is trying to link the databases using Aadhaar for all schemes but a separate privacy law must be there for protecting any piece of information, whether or not linked to Aadhaar,” said Rahul Matthan, a partner at law firm Trilegal and a Mint columnist.

Matthan said first a privacy law must be put in place and then there has to be a discussion on what all it must include.

The government on its part pointed out that India’s apex court itself has been indecisive on a right to privacy.

“The larger question on privacy needs to be settled by the court. Till then, one cannot comment on secondary concerns,” attorney general Mukul Rohatgi said in an interview.

In 2015, the Supreme Court decided that a bench of at least seven judges will rule on the privacy issue, while clarifying that the government cannot make Aadhaar a mandatory proof of identity for its welfare schemes. Twenty months after the judicial order, the larger bench is yet to be formed by the apex court. The passing of the Aadhaar Act in Parliament to provide statutory backing to Aadhaar also indicates a departure from the Indian government’s position of not taking a legislative stand while an issue is under the apex court’s consideration.

For example, one of the reasons the Indian government has shown restraint in repealing a colonial law that criminalizes homosexuality is because the apex court is seized of the issue.

In the absence of legislation and pending an authoritative ruling by the top court, whether 1.3 billion Indians are entitled to their privacy remains a grey area. Meanwhile, the government is seemingly in the final stretch of its Aadhaar enrolment drive.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/livemint-april-21-2017-komal-gupta-apurva-vishwanath-suranjana-roy-aadhaar-a-widening-net

Aadhaar: ‘Safety is regularly evolving‘

Admin — 2018-02-07T16:44:50Z

Experts say the new security features will significantly ensure there is no ‘large-scale theft of people‘s identity‘. Alnoor Peermohamed reports.

The blog post was published in Kaplan Herald on February 5, 2018.

While the introduction of new features such as face authentication, virtual ID, and limited know-your-customer (KYC) by the Unique Identification Authority of India are being seen as reactions to mounting public pressure over the security of Aadhaar, experts, who have helped build the citizen identity system, say these have been in the pipeline for a long time.

Pegged to be fully functional by July 1, the new features will make Aadhaar more secure, but that hasn‘t stopped the UIDAI from drawing flak over the recent issue of rogue agents selling demographic data of individuals.

Moreover, the agency‘s handling of the issue has not inspired confidence among the public and security researchers.

Experts say for a system of Aadhaar‘s size, security is continually evolving.

Lalitesh Katragadda, former head of Google‘s product centre in India and who also helped build Aadhaar, says as a country we need to understand there‘s ‘no such thing as a 100 per cent secure system‘.

While security gaps will always exist, he says it‘s the UIDAI‘s duty to ensure there‘s no ‘large-scale theft of people‘s identity‘.

According to him, the new security features will help significantly in this regard.

Face authentication will be another biometric Aadhaar will begin offering to combat the reportedly high failure rates of fingerprint authentication.

The system will use common Webcams to capture photos of individuals and match them with the existing photo on the UIDAI‘s database.

The system will not use any high-end hardware backed facial recognition like the recently launched iPhone X, which the company claims is more accurate than its previous fingerprint authentication technology.

The UIDAI will work around this issue by clubbing face authentication with other forms of authentication — fingerprint, iris scan or a one-time password sent to a user‘s mobile phone.

While it isn‘t known how exactly the feature will be built into apps relying on Aadhaar authentication, Srikanth Nadhamuni, the former chief technology officer of Aadhaar, envisions a scenario where a photo of an individual could be captured and matched when fingerprint authentication fails, in order to improve the probability of a match.

But even this isn‘t a foolproof plan, some believe.

“Your face is again a biometric, and that comes with the same host of issues that is plaguing the other biometrics that have so far been used,” says Sunil Abraham, executive director at the Bengaluru-based think-tank, Centre for Internet and Society.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/kaplan-herald-february-5-2018-aadhaar-safety-is-regularly-evolving

Aadhaar-privacy debate: How the 12-digit number went from personal identifier to all pervasive transaction tool

Admin — 2018-01-18T15:01:48Z

Depending on who you ask, the Aadhaar is either a convenience or a curse.

The article was published by First Post on January 18, 2018.

The ongoing hearing in the Supreme Court is testing the constitutional validity of a scheme that has been around in one shape or another since 2003, ever since the need for an identification project was first felt.

By the government's own estimates, the Aadhaar initiative has covered 98 percent of the adult population in India and, as of 7 September, the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) has generated cards for 105.11 crore people. So, if you are an Indian adult, chances are that you possess an Aadhaar card by now.

The Aadhaar database is one of the largest government databases on the planet, where a 12 digit unique-identity number has been assigned to the majority of the Indian citizens. This database contains both the demographic as well as biometric data of the citizens.

What started as a unique identification number to streamline the distribution of welfare to the needy has now turned into an all-pervasive tool that can arm the government with sensitive data of all Indians. At the heart of this issue is the sheer quantity of data being amassed as part of the scheme and the many privacy and security concerns generated as a result of it.

The Aadhaar of today, in addition to basic personal information, includes biometric data like your fingerprints, your iris scan and now even your facial scans (albeit introduced as a safety feature). This is designed to address the issue of failed biometric authentication, as an alternative for people having difficulty authenticating, due to factors like worn out fingerprints, or changing biometric data due to old age, hard work conditions, accidents and the like.

But what it fails to address is the growing unease among citizens about the scale of the project, its intent, and the actual legality of enabling such an architecture, which could threaten the citizens with the possibility of State surveillance.

The sheer amount of private and confidential data amassed in one singular database has given rise to concerns over data security and its privacy.

However, worst fears about Aadhaar have come true after the developments that have happened over the past few weeks. A recent investigation by The Tribune revealed that the details of any of the billion Aadhaar numbers issued in India were accessible for as little as Rs 500.

Since then, the UIDAI and every other government machinery have been in top gear, trying to allay the fears around Aadhaar. It even introduced a flurry of steps to make sure that the database is safe and secure, and that the data is protected. But not everyone is convinced. Critics say, biometrics only make the citizen transparent to the State and that it does not make the State transparent to citizens.

"We warned the government six years ago, but they ignored us," Sunil Abraham, executive director of Bengaluru-based research organisation, Centre for Internet and Society, was quoted by The Hindu Business Line as saying.

According to him, the legislation implementing Aadhaar has almost no data protection guarantees for citizens. He also believes that by opting for biometrics instead of smart cards the government is using surveillance technology instead of e-governance technology.

On the other hand, finance minister Arun Jaitley said recently that an Aadhaar card could become the sole identifier for a person in future. "A stage may come that the unique identity will become the only card," Jaitley said. "There are many countries where such a situation exists. There is a social security number in America and in India it (Aadhaar) could be the counterpart."

Since its inception, the Aadhaar was always pitched as a scheme integral to the modernisation of social welfare in India.

But, according to a Scroll report, state governments are struggling to use Aadhaar-based fingerprint authentication in ration shops. Whereas, at the same time, a rising number of companies are integrating Aadhaar into their databases for private services that have nothing to do with the welfare delivery system.

So, why is the scheme failing at the very job it was created for, while proving useful to private endeavours elsewhere? Why did the BJP, a dispensation critical of Aadhaar in 2014, make a complete u-turn and become a champion for a cause backed by the UPA in its time? Are the security, privacy concerns a small price to pay for better delivery of welfare schemes or is it an instrument of surveillance and a potential goldmine for hackers?

The debate around Aadhaar and the explanations for its need and/or threats are biased, incomplete and solely depend on who you ask. Therefore, it might do well to trace the roots of the Aadhaar mission and retrace its critical moments.

Origins of Aadhaar

According to the Scroll report, India first fiddled with the idea to assign numbers to people in 2003, in the aftermath of the Kargil war.

With rising security concerns, the then BJP government under Atal Bihari Vajpayee wanted every Indian citizen to be accounted for. This desire eventually took the shape of the National Population Register, that aimed to identify citizens amongst the country's residents.

The Citizenship Act was amended in 2004 by the incumbent Congress government to make way for the National Population Register (NPR).

The second and major push for an identity project was introduced subsequently by the UPA-1 government in late 2008. With welfare spending on the rise, adds the report, bureaucrats in the erstwhile Planning Commission were worried about leakages.

Thus, the idea of constituting an authority that would aggregate all databases of social welfare programmes to create a mother database emerged.

Such a database would "weed out ghosts and duplicates so that a person who gets the LPG subsidy doesn’t also get the kerosene subsidy," Scroll quoted a former UIDAI official as saying, on conditions of anonymity.

Eventually, in 2009, Aadhaar, or UIDAI, surfaced as a 12-digit identification number that served as proof of identity and address — meaning, it applies to all residents whether they are citizens or not, unlike with the NPR. Biometric data was not in the picture at this time.

And then, in 2016, the Centre notified the new Aadhaar Act, which gives the unique identity number assigned to each Indian citizen statutory backing. The idea of this Act was to empower Aadhaar with legal backing for the purpose of transferring subsidies and government benefits to beneficiaries through designated bank accounts.

The government said in a notification that the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and other Subsidies, benefits and services) Act, 2016 will provide “efficient, transparent, and targeted delivery of subsidies, benefits and services, the expenditure for which is incurred from the Consolidated Fund of India, to individuals residing in India through assigning of unique identity numbers to such individuals."

Another interesting aspect of the Aadhaar debate is the politics of it all. The Opposition, BJP back then and UPA now, has shaped much of the debate against the use of Aadhaar. But one thing that stands out in this melee is that many in the current dispensation, who are currently the biggest proponents of the scheme, had once opposed it vehemently.

"The people who thought of themselves as having given birth to IT in this country refused to listen to a common man like me. Even the SC has demanded answers,” Narendra Modi had famously said when he was the Gujarat chief minister. He had alleged that the Aadhaar programme was a bundle of lies to loot the country’s treasury.

In 2014, Modi had tweeted: "On Aadhaar, neither the team that I met nor PM could answer my Qs on security threat it can pose. There is no vision, only political gimmick."

So, how was it that one of Aadhaar's most vehement opponents became its biggest proponent?

According to a report in The Hindu Business Line, the destiny of the Aadhaar scheme was shaped by two meetings – between Nilekani and Modi with Jaitley, and the second with Vijay Madan, the UIDAI director general and mission director.

Through the course of these meetings, the potential savings from plugging subsidy leakageswas put across to Modi, a figure of "up to ₹50,000 crore a year".

Modi in his keenness to showcase the arrival of "acche din", the report adds, immediately sought a 100-crore enrolment target at the ‘earliest’, putting paid to speculations that the new government would shelve the UIDAI project.

Thus, the current Aadhaar project was born.

Inclusion of biometric data

Although an extension of UPA's idea, the new Aadhaar act had some crucial differences:

- As per the new Act, "any person who has resided in India for 182 days (in the one year preceding the application for Aadhaar)". The UPA's Bill said any person residing in India.

- Further, the new Act says that the number can be used to verify the identity of any person, for any purpose, by any public or private entity. In the UPA's Bill, no such provision was there.

- The new Act stipulated all these identity facets to be maintained: photograph, biometric information (iris scan and fingerprint), demographic information (name, date of birth, address but excludes race, religion, caste, etc.), and Aadhaar number. The authority may specify any other biological and demographic information to be collected.

Data security debate

Over the last one year, there have been multiple instances of Aadhaar data leaking online through government websites or its mobile app. The most recent case was when an RTI query pushed UIDAI to reveal that about 210 government websites made the Aadhaar details of people with Aadhaar, public on the internet.

Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) also pointed out that about 130 million Aadhar numbers along with other sensitive data were available on the internet.

The recent Tribune report has only highlighted the deeper, infrastructural fallibility of singular mega-database of sensitive data.

As per this Firstpost piece, the UIDAI's response to such an obvious data breach and violation of privacy is extremely worrying. It is yet another reiteration of the privacy concerns with Aadhaar, and the constant denial of privacy concerns by the UIDAI instead of sitting up and addressing the problem at hand.

The large-scale collection of data and the binding of said data with almost all services raises a pertinent question: Is the government capable of safeguarding the massive amounts of data collected as part of the Aadhaar project? The answer, again, depends on who you ask.

Concerns over privacy

Apart from the security concerns, Aadhaar has brought up a question of the citizen's privacy, given that access to such sensitive data empowers the government to keep a close scrutiny of a person's financial, personal information.

The Supreme Court had held recently that privacy is a fundamental right under the Constitution with reasonable restrictions. This decision is bound to impact the Aadhaar project in one way or another, as collectively biometric data of citizens can be construed as a violation of said right.

The Supreme Court started hearing the crucial cases related to the constitutional validity of Aadhaar on Wednesday. A five-judge bench heard the arguments of the petitioner, maintaining that the government's mandatory biometric identification project is, in essence, seeking to change a people's Constitution into State's Constitution.

The petitioners made submissions ranging from the Standing Committee's observations, to the precedents as adopted by other nations to pointing out basic moral and administrative defects in amassing biometric data of citizens on such a large scale, perhaps trying to patiently drive the point that the Aadhaar project can never be safely assumed to be leakproof, hence safe, ergo, legal.

The petitioner also argued that Aadhaar could lead to millions of people being denied access to essential services and benefits in violation of their human rights, as he pointed out that biometric details of almost 6.2 crore people have been rejected, mainly due to calloused hands and fingertips, wherein biometric data could not be recorded.

"These are not dishonest people or ghosts," he said. Even the Standing Committee report on Aadhaar points out: "..it has been proven again and again that in the Indian environment, the failure to enrol with fingerprints is as high as 15 percent due to the prevalence of a huge population dependent on manual labour. These are essentially the poor and marginalised sections of the society. So, while the poor do indeed need identity proofs, Aadhaar is not the right way to do that"

In December 2017, the court had extended the deadline for mandatory linking of Aadhaar with various services and welfare schemes till 31 March, 2018. It had also modified its earlier order with regard to linking Aadhaar with mobile services and said the deadline of 6 February, 2018 for this purpose also stood extended till 31 March.

Right to Privacy and its effect on Aadhaar

In August 2017, the Supreme Court in a unanimous 9:0 judgment had declared the Right to Privacy to be a Fundamental Right. It was hailed as a big victory for pro-privacy advocates who could now point to the Constitutional Bench judgment should the right ever be questioned.

However, the judgment only established the theoretical Right to Privacy. It removed the earlier hurdles of the cases of MP Sharma and Kharak Singh which had held Right to Privacy not to be a Fundamental Right. However, the actual freedoms protected by the Right had to be enshrined into in separate judgments.

As far Aadhaar is concerned, the judgment did not invalidate it in any way. However, it did give a boost to anti-Aadhaar arguments which rely on privacy as now the government can no longer say that there is no Right to Privacy.

With 1.08 billion citizens already enrolled, the ‘mandatory vs. voluntary’ debate on Aadhaar is now mostly a thing of the past. What remains to be seen now is how the Supreme Court will rule on the constitutional validity of the Aadhaar and if the government will be willing to reform/modify the current scheme to allay fears over data security and privacy in order to retailer the project to meet its original goal, the timely and secure delivery of welfare to those who need it.

With inputs from agencies

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/first-post-january-18-2018-aadhaar-privacy-debate-how-the-12-digit-number-went-from-personal-identifier-to-all-pervasive-transaction-tool

Aadhaar-enabled smartphones will ease money transfer

praskrishna — 2016-08-10T13:33:54Z

With its plans to make smartphones Aadhaar-enabled, the government hopes to provide users a means to do self-authentication and let businesses and banks verify the identity of their clients through their smartphones, a move that could potentially lead the way to a cashless society.

The article by Neha Alawadhi and Gulveen Aulakh was published in the Economic Times on August 10, 2016. Sunil Abraham was quoted.

"Iris and fingerprint sensors are now becoming a standard feature in smartphones anyway, and this requirement will only take a minor tweak to the operating system. Once enabled, people will be able to use phones to do self-authentication and KYC (know your customer)," Nandan Nikelani, former chairman of the Unique Identification Authority of India, told ET, welcoming the government's plan to make smartphones Aadhaar-enabled.

ET was the first to report that on July 27 a meeting between UIDAI, which administers Aadhaar, and senior executives of smartphone-makers discussed ways to allow smartphone handsets let citizens authenticate their fingerprints and iris on the phone to get services. The most immediate use for the Aadhaar-enabled smartphones is the Unified Payment Interface (UPI), the new payment system that allows money transfer between any two parties using mobile phones and a virtual payment address.

"The two-factor authentication in UPI is now being done with mobile phone as one factor, and MPIN as the second factor. But once you have Aadhaar authentication on the phone, then the second factor can be biometric authentication through Aadhaar," said Nilekani. Over time, the idea is to open Aadhaar authentication to third party apps, said another person familiar with the ongoing discussions, who did not wish to be named.

In effect, biometric and iris scan authentication could become one of the permissions a user grants to different third party apps, such as access to camera, contacts, phone book and so on. Handset makers have raised concerns about some security issues on using iris scan for Aadhar authentication. Also, companies such as Apple that have very closed ecosystems, would not be easy to get on board, several people told ET.

"The primary challenge lies in safe storing of the iris scan between the time it is captured by the camera and then sent to UIDAI server seeking authentication," said an industry insider, who is aware of the discussions, requesting anonymity. The proposal for smartphone makers includes a "hardware secure zone" where biometric data will be encrypted and sent out. It will not leave the electronic secure zone without encryption, and every phone doing Aadhaar authentication will be registered in the UID system.

"Unfortunately, from the biometric sensor the data goes to the hardware secure zone via the operating system. Therefore, the biometric data can be intercepted by the operating system before it is sent to the hardware secure zone," said Sunil Abraham, executive director at Bengaluru-based research organisation, the Centre for Internet and Society.

"The reluctance to make changes at the vendor level are mainly coming from a desire for control of biometric data for strategic and commercial purposes. Privacy and security are bogus reasons," Nilekani said, adding that both ends - the handset and the Aadhaar database -- will use the highest level of encryption.

Samsung India, which in May launched the Galaxy Tab Iris, a device that uses Aadhaar authentication, said it has taken care that its user's biometric data does not fall into the wrong hands. "We ensure that biometric data is encrypted as per UIDAI specifications in device itself for Galaxy Tab Iris," Sukesh Jain, vice president, Samsung India Electronics, told ET in an email response.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/economic-times-august-10-2016-neha-alawadhi-gulveen-aulakh-aadhaar-enabled-smartphones-will-ease-money-transfer

Aadhaar's the largest biometric database globally but it is leaky by design

praskrishna — 2017-05-12T15:35:00Z

It the largest biometric database in the world and it is fraught with security issues.

The article by Rohith Jyothish was published in the Business Standard on May 5, 2017. This article by Rohith Jyothish originally appeared on Global Voices on May 2, 2017

Over the last few months, the Indian twittersphere has been awash with citizens concerned about government websites leaking millions of individual digital ID numbers.

On May 1, the Centre for Internet and Society, a multi-disciplinary think tank in Bangalore, released a report indicating that faulty information security practices have exposed as many as 135 million ID numbers, leaked from four government databases. The data leaks originated in the process of implementing online dashboards that were likely meant for general transparency and easy administration by the government agencies.

Developed by the Union government of India in 2009, the plan called for the creation a Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) that would issue Unique Identity numbers (UIDs) to all residents of India. Under this scheme, now known as Aadhaar, the UID number ties together several pieces of a person's demographic and biometric information, including their photograph, ten fingerprints and an image of their iris. This information is all stored in a centralized database.

The scheme has so far enrolled 1.13 billion Indians and residents of India, making it the largest biometric database in the world.

This has become a point of pride for government agencies involved in the program. Information Technology Minister Ravishankar Prasad (@rsprasad) tweeted:

Expanding programmes

Aadhaar was built to be used as an identity authentication mechanism that could have multiple services being built on top of it. The scheme was run under an executive order from its inception in 2009 until the Aadhaar Act was passed in 2016. The strategies employed by its supporters generated substantial controversy, and it since has been challenged in the Supreme Court on budgetary grounds. But thus far, it remains in place.

The UIDAI has maintained that the scheme is voluntary. Yet the central government has pushed state governments to include UID for a wide range of essential government services meant to be available to the public.

Independent news portal Scroll regularly covers issues related to UID’s linkages with various welfare programs through its Identity Project. In recent years, Scroll has identified multiple examples of public services being denied to individuals who did not have a UID.

In Delhi in 2015, food rations were denied to those without UID numbers. In April 2016 in the Ajmer district of Rajasthan, UID-enabled food subsidies repeatedly recorded authentication failures.

Six months after Aadhaar was introduced in Rajasthan, state officials report that 10-15% of beneficiaries who normally received food grains from the government (under the National Food Security Act) have been denied some or all of their rations because the system could not authenticate their UIDs. A local farm laborer told Scroll that his rations had been drastically reduced since the arrival of Aadhaar. “In some cases, when we put our fingers, the machine reads out 5 kg, 10 kg, or 15 kg as our entitlement. But we are entitled to 35 kg as per the government norms.”

Advocates are quick to note that there is no adequate avenue to remedy in these situations, leaving citizens with little recourse or ability to seek that these errors be corrected.

In spite of multiple court orders making UID voluntary and limited to selected schemes, the government continues to expand its scope.

Delicate infrastructure and its misuse

According to economist Jean Drèze, the new authentication system requires a lot of fragile technologies to work at the same time, such as a point of sale machine, internet connectivity, biometrics, remote servers and mobile networks. He also maintains that the primary cause of corruption in disbursement of food subsidies is related to the quantity of rations distributed or quantity fraud, which UID doesn't address.

Another economist who has worked extensively on these issues, Reetika Khera points out that the exclusion of large number of people from welfare schemes has not been because of lack of an identity, but rather due to “measly budgets and exclusion errors.“

Contention with the court

The Supreme Court issued two orders in September 2013 and March 2014 which stated that “no person shall be deprived of any service for want of Aadhaar number in case he/she is otherwise eligible/entitled.” On August 11, 2015, the court issued yet another order which limited the use of UID to food, kerosene and cooking gas subsidies. On October 15, it further expanded it to four more schemes: the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana (a scheme for financial inclusion), and policies related to pension and provident funds, after the government argued that it would be difficult to roll back UID now that it is the most used national identity system and is linked to service delivery in several major welfare schemes.

‘Leaky’ by design

Following the repeated arguments by the state that UID makes it possible to weed out ‘ghost beneficiaries’ and ‘de-duplicate’ multiple IDs, revelations of fake ‘UID cards’ began to circulate. These UID cards were reportedly issued under the names of pets, historical figures, one alleged spy and even gods.

More recently, the Indian twittersphere has been vocal in pointing to government websites leaking sensitive information from the UID database. In February, security researcher Srinivas Kodali exposed a parallel database containing UID numbers and other details of 5-600,000 children.

In another case, UID numbers of scholarship-holders sat on a state government website for over a year.

On March 22, 2017, tech worker @St_Hill exposed the severity of the problem by showing spreadsheets of personal data that appear with just a single Google search.

This was immediately taken down. But new ones continue to appear with other simple Google searches.

Under the hashtag #AadhaarLeaks, Twitter users have reported numerous such cases on various government websites. The leaks gained popular attention on social media when former Indian men’s cricket team captain MS Dhoni’s UID appeared in a tweet sent by a UID enrollment operator.

The government response

The UIDAI responded to the uproar with a campaign entitled #AadhaarStars, in which parents of young children were encouraged to post 30-second videos of what UID meant to them.

This was rejected by angry twitterati through the hashtag #AadhaarFail which now offers a compendium of tweets about UID-based authentication failures.

In the last couple of months, after the privacy and security-related concerns became louder, the UIDAI has shut down enrollment operators, websites and payment applications for misuse of biometrics data. The central government has even warned state departments against leaking UID data on their portals.

As the uncertainty looms, privacy researcher Amber Sinha and aforementioned security researcher Srinivas Kodali estimated the size of #AadhaarLeaks.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/business-standard-rohith-jyothish-may-5-2017-aadhaar-the-largest-biometric-database-globally-but-it-is-leaky-by-design