We are anonymous, we are legion

Connected Trouble

sunil — 2015-10-28T16:47:58Z

The internet of things phenomenon is based on a paradigm shift from thinking of the internet merely as a means to connect individuals, corporations and other institutions to an internet where all devices in (insulin pumps and pacemakers), on (wearable technology) and around (domestic appliances and vehicles) humans beings are connected.

The guest column was published in the Week, issue dated November 1, 2015.

Proponents of IoT are clear that the network effects, efficiency gains, and scientific and technological progress unlocked would be unprecedented, much like the internet itself.

Privacy and security are two sides of the same coin―you cannot have one without the other. The age of IoT is going to be less secure thanks to big data. Globally accepted privacy principles articulated in privacy and data protection laws across the world are in conflict with the big data ideology. As a consequence, the age of internet of things is going to be less stable, secure and resilient. Three privacy principles are violated by most IoT products and services.

Data minimisation

According to this privacy principle, the less the personal information about the data subject that is collected and stored by the data controller, the more the data subject's right to privacy is protected. But, big data by definition requires more volume, more variety and more velocity and IoT products usually collect a lot of data, thereby multiplying risk.

Purpose limitation

This privacy principle is a consequence of the data minimisation principle. If only the bare minimum of personal information is collected, then it can only be put to a limited number of uses. But, going beyond that would harm the data subject. IoT innovators and entrepreneurs are trying to rapidly increase features, efficiency gains and convenience. Therefore, they don't know what future purposes their technology will be put to tomorrow and, again by definition, resist the principle of purpose limitation.

Privacy by design

Data protection regulation required that products and services be secure and protect privacy by design and not as a superficial afterthought. IoT products are increasingly being built by startups that are disrupting markets and taking down large technology incumbents. The trouble, however, is that most of these startups do not have sufficient internal security expertise and in their tearing hurry to take products to the market, many IoT products may not be comprehensively tested or audited from a privacy perspective.

There are other cyber security principles and internet design principles that are disregarded by the IoT phenomenon, further compromising security and privacy of users.

Centralisation

Most of the network effects that IoT products contribute to require centralisation of data collected from users and their devices. For instance, if users of a wearable physical activity tracker would like to use gamification to keep each other motivated during exercise, the vendor of that device has to collect and store information about all its users. Since some users always wear them, they become highly granular stores of data that can also be used to inflict privacy harms.

Decentralisation was a key design principle when the internet was first built. The argument was that you can never take down a decentralised network by bombing any of the nodes. Unfortunately, because of the rise of internet monopolies like Google, the age of cloud computing, and the success of social media giants, the internet is increasingly becoming centralised and, therefore, is much more fragile than it used be. IoT is going to make this worse.

Complexity

The more complex a particular technology is, the more fragile and vulnerable it is. This is not necessarily true but is usually the case given that more complex technology needs more quality control, more testing and more fixes. IoT technology raises complexity exponentially because the devices that are being connected are complex themselves and were not originally engineered to be connected to the internet. The networks they constitute are nothing like the internet which till now consisted of clients, web servers, chat servers, file servers and database servers, usually quite removed from the physical world. Compromised IoT devices, on the other hand, could be used to inflict direct harm on life and property.

Death of the air gap

The things that will be connected to the internet were previously separated from the internet through the means of an air gap. This kept them secure but also less useful and usable. In other words, the very act of connecting devices that were previously unconnected will expose them to a range of attacks. Security and privacy related laws, standards, audits and enforcement measures are the best way to address these potential pitfalls. Governments, privacy commissioners and data protections authorities across the world need to act so that the privacy of people and the security of our information society are protected.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-week-november-1-2015-sunil-abraham-connected-trouble

Connaught Summer Institute on Monitoring Internet Openness and Rights

praskrishna — 2013-07-26T09:17:45Z

Malavika Jayaram is a speaker at this event being held at the Munk School of Global Affairs, Bloor Street West.

Click to read the original posted on Citizen Lab website

Monday, July 22, 2013

Location: Munk School of Global Affairs (Observatory Site), 315 Bloor Street West (map)

14:00 - 17:00	Meet and Greet at the Citizen Lab Participants are free to drop by the Lab between 2:00-5:00 pm to see the space and meet with Citizen Lab researchers. Participants should go to the reception desk on the first floor and have the receptionist call the Lab.

Tuesday, July 23, 2013

Location: Campbell Conference Room, South House, Munk School of Global Affairs (Trinity site), 1 Devonshire Place (map)

08:00 - 09:00	Breakfast
09:00 - 09:15	Opening Remarks
09:15 - 10:45	Tutorial "Welcome to Oz: Beyond a Black and White Debate on Internet Regulation (and Control)" – Jon Penney (Berkman Centre/Oxford Internet Institute/Citizen Lab) and Ryan Budish (Berkman Centre/Herdict)
10:45 - 11:00	Break
11:00 - 12:00	Commercialization of Information Controls "Regulators, Politicians, and Deep Packet Inspection: Who's Driving What and Why" – Chris Parsons (University of Victoria) "Fingerprinting Internet Filtering Products" – Jakub Dalek (Citizen Lab) "Cash Rules Everything Around Me: The Commercialization of Online Spying" – Bill Marczak (UC Berkeley)
12:00 - 13:45	Lunch
13:45 - 14:45	Circumvention / Attacks 1 "Collateral Freedom" – David Robinson (Robinson + Yu) "Remedy: Relays Monitoring and Deployment" – KheOps (Telecomix) "Fake Domain Attacks on Civil Society Groups" – Michael Carbone (Access)
14:45 - 15:45	Characterization / Measurement 1 "Iran through the Eyes of Big Data" – Collin Anderson (Independent Researcher) "Measurement, Detection, and Comparison of Surveillance Data" – Praveen Selvasekaran (Simple Tech Life) "Filbaan: What is Filtered Today?"
15:45 - 16:00	Break
16:00 - 16:45	Identity Systems and Monitoring "Desperately Seeking the Names: Examining the Historical Progression of Real Name Policies on the Chinese Internet" – Lianrui Jia (Carleton University) "India's Civil Liberties Crisis: Digital Free Will in Free Fall" – Malavika Jayaram (Centre for Internet and Society, Bangalore)
17:00 - 18:30	Poster and Demo Session Light refreshments will be served "User-side Approach for Censorship Detection: Home-router and Client-based Platforms" – Giuseppe Aceto (University of Naples Federico II) "The Cyber Losers" – Aaron Brantly and Katrin Verclas (National Democratic Institute) "What is the Impact of Internet Censorship in China?" – Carlotta James (Psiphon Inc.) "Open Integrity Index" – Jun Matsushita "M-Lab: Exploring the Possibilities for Open, Global Censorship and Surveillance Detection" – Stephen Soltesz (Open Technology Institute) and Meredith Whittaker (Google Research) "Mapping Google: Global Business Infrastructure and Implications for Openness " – John Harris Stevenson (University of Toronto) "Chat Program Censorship and Surveillance in China: Tracking TOM-Skype and Sina UC" – Greg Wiseman (Citizen Lab) "The Growth and Spread of Cyberspace Controls" – Benjamin Zaiser (Free University of Berlin)

Wednesday, July 24, 2013

Location: Campbell Conference Room, South House, Munk School of Global Affairs (Trinity site), 1 Devonshire Place (map)

08:00 - 09:00	Breakfast
09:00 - 10:20	Characterization / Methodology 2 "Refining the Tor Censorship Detector" – Sam Burnett (Georgia Tech) "From Internet Security to Internet Freedom: The case of the RPKI" – Sharon Goldberg (Boston University) "Running Software in Albuquerque to Measure Censorship Anywhere" – Jeffrey Knockel (University of New Mexico) "Social Media as Labratory: What We Can Learn about Chinese Politics from Sina Weibo Censorship and Online Discussion" – Jason Q. Ng (Citizen Lab)
10:20 - 11:00	Break
11:00 - 12:00	Circumvention 2 "VPNthnography: Hacking the Great Firewall for Fun and Profit" "Economics of Web Proxy Networks" – Bennett Haselton (Peace Fire/Citizen Lab) "Censors Working Overtime" – Karl Kathuria (Psiphon Inc.)
12:00 - 14:00	Lunch
14:00 - 15:30	Tutorial "Network Censorship Techniques, Detection, and Localization" – Nick Weaver (ICSI)
15:30 - 16:00	Break
16:00 - 17:30	Panel: Bridging Activism and Research (5 minute talks + discussion) Ali Bangi (ASL19 / Citizen Lab) Stefania Milan (Tillburg University) Deji Olukotun (PEN) John Scott-Railton (Citizen Lab / UCLA) 'Gbenga Sesan (Paradigm Initiative Nigeria)

Thursday, July 25, 2013

Location: Campbell Conference Room, South House, Munk School of Global Affairs (Trinity site), 1 Devonshire Place (map)

08:00 - 09:00	Breakfast
09:00 - 10:20	Jurisdictions and Borders Online "Cyberconflict and the Legal-Territorial Paradox" – Cameran Ashraf (UCLA) "Beyond Borders: Legislative Challenges to the Management of Records in the Cloud" – Elaine Goh (University of British Columbia) "Civil Society 2.0: The Global Struggle to Govern the Democratic Impacts of ICTs" – Muzammil M. Hussain (University of Michigan) "The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement and the Networked Public Sphere: How to avoid a Convergent Crisis" – James Losey (Open Technology Institute)
10:20 - 10:40	Break
10:40 - 12:10	Tutorial "Ranking Companies on Digital Rights: Challenges and Synergies" – Rebecca MacKinnon (New America Foundation)
12:10 - 14:00	Lunch
14:00 - 15:30	Surveillance and Monitoring "Revisiting Webtapping: Learning From Five Years’ of U.S. Cyber and Intel Policy" – Chris Bronk (Rice University) "Who Watches the Watchmen?: Detecting Stealth and Unattributed Information Controls" – Herve Saint Louis (University of Toronto) "IX Maps" – Andrew Clement (University of Toronto) "Technologies of Control, ‘National Security’ and Systemic Abuse of Minorities in the East and Horn of Africa" – Clara Gutteridge (Equal Justice Forum)
15:30 - 15:45	Break
15:45 - 16:30	Closing Discussion on Interdisciplinary Research and Information Controls

Friday, July 26, 2013

Location: Rooms 108, 208 and Basement, North House, Munk School of Global Affairs (Trinity site), 1 Devonshire Place (map)

10:00 - 14:00

Breakout Sessions

Light refreshments will be served

The half day will be dedicated to giving participants the opportunity to break into small groups to further discuss, share, and hack on topics raised during the workshop.

Sponsor

The workshop is sponsored by University of Toronto's Connaught Fund. Since it was founded in 1972, the fund has invested more than $1 million in projects that span across the disciplines.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/citizenlab-summer-institute-on-monitoring-internet-openness-and-rights

Conmen seed fake phone numbers in Google to trap people looking for customer care details

Admin — 2019-02-01T15:22:27Z

Googling for anything might seem like a good idea, but searching for contacts of businesses and customer care numbers is landing people in the hands of conmen.

The article by Tushar Kaushik was published in Economic Times on January 30, 2019.

Many use Google or other search engines for specific contact numbers — the customer care numbers of a bank, for instance. The search results do not throw up bona fide numbers, but those of conmen waiting to lure a victim. The conmen, knowing what the caller is seeking, and on the pretext of helping, cunningly makes them part with information such as bank account, debit/credit card and even the OTP.

About 20-odd people have been duped in this manner in the past month in Bengaluru, according to the city’s cybercrime police. About 20-30 victims have fallen prey in Gurugram in the last one-and-a-half months. In Maharashtra and Hyderabad, the trend of fake numbers being seeded on Google Maps and being used to dupe people is being observed since October 2018. The frauds are helped by the fact that any user can edit contact information on Google Maps. The Maharashtra cyber police reportedly notified Google authorities regarding this.

Inspector and in-charge of cyber police station at Gurugram, Anand Kumar, said another variant of such cases was on the rise. People searching for contacts to help them return products they bought from e-commerce websites have been led to fake numbers. “In the past one-and-half months, about 20-30 such complaints have been received,” Kumar said.

Srinivas Kodali, a Hyderabad-based data security researcher, said similar incidents using fake numbers being uploaded on Google Maps had occurred in Hyderabad 2-3 months ago. He claimed Google had been informed of the incidents.

Illustrating another instance of the way Google searches are misused, dairy brand Amul issued a legal notice to Google, alleging that a series of fake B2B campaigns regarding Amul Parlours and Distributors have started through fake websites using Google search ads since September 2018.

Bengaluru-based app developer and co-founder of TBG Labs Harsha Halvi said it was fairly easy for any conman to seed his own number and masquerade as a contact number and make it appear in a Google search. He said all it takes is a very good understanding of search engine optimisation (SEO).

Gurshabad Grover, senior policy officer at The Centre for Internet and Society, Bengaluru, said, “The problem right now is Google is not making it clear whether something is verified information or is crowdsourced. On Google Maps, businesses can be claimed by legitimate owners. A suggestion is that Google verify the claimed entities,” Grover said. He added that people too should exercise vigilance while accessing information online.

Additional commissioner of police (crime) at Bengaluru Alok Kumar said Google could not be held responsible for such incidents as individuals seeded the fake numbers.

Reacting to the incidents, a spokesperson from Google India said, “Overall, allowing users to suggest edits provides comprehensive and up-to-date info, but we recognise there may be occasional inaccuracies or bad edits suggested by users.” The spokesperson said when such issues are reported to Google, the claims are investigated and action is taken in line with the findings.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/economic-times-tushar-kaushik-january-30-2019-conmen-seed-fake-phone-numbers-in-google-to-trap-people-looking-for-customer-care-details

Confidentiality of Communications and Privacy of Data in the Digital Age

praskrishna — 2018-10-28T06:02:07Z

On September 25, 2018, Elonnai Hickok participated in a side event Confidentiality of Communications and Privacy of Data in the Digital Age organized by INCLO and Privacy International at the Human Rights Council 39th ordinary session. Elonnai spoke on artificial intelligence and privacy.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/confidentiality-of-communications-and-privacy-of-data-in-the-digital-age

Conference: Internet at Liberty 2010

praskrishna — 2011-04-02T10:00:01Z

This conference is being held in Budapest from 20 to 22 September 2010. It is co-sponsored by Google and Central European University. Sunil Abraham and Anja Kovacs are attending the conference.

The conference Internet at Liberty 2010 will explore creative ways to address the boundaries of online free expression, the complex relationship among technology, economic growth and human rights, ways in which dissidents and governments are using the Internet, the role of Internet intermediaries, and pressing policy and legal issues such as privacy and cybersecurity. The event will bring together grassroots global activists alongside representatives of NGOs, academic centers, governments and corporations. The Centre for Media and Communication Studies is playing a core role in the organisation of the event.

Download the agenda

For further information, see CMCS website

Also see, Internet at Liberty 2010 website.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/internet-at-liberty-conference

Conference on the Digitalization of the Indian Legal System

Leilah Elmokadem — 2016-11-16T15:34:36Z

On Legal Services Day, November 9, 2016, LegalDesk.com collaborated with iSPIRT to host a conference on the “Digitalization of the Indian Legal System”. The event invited prominent speakers to present their organizations’ work and to participate in a panel discussion followed by a Q&A period for the audience.

The co-founder of DAKSH Society of India, Kishore Mandyam, opened the event with a thought-provoking presentation on the efficiency levels of the current legal system and the kinds of progress that can be brought about by technological reforms. Members of LegalDesk.com then presented their ideas and then introduced their newest white paper on Legal Digitalization, providing a brief overview of the study and summarizing the most relevant sections. The panel discussion then proceeded, moderated by Sanjay Khan Nagra, a policy expert at iSPIRT Foundation. He facilitated an insightful and conducive discussion around the advantages, disadvantages, risks and incentives of digitalizing the Indian legal system. On the discussion panel was Kishore Mandyam from DAKSH Society and Prabhuling K Navadgi, the Additional Solicitor General of India.

The objectives to the conference, as per its website, were to: (1) examine the current legal framework and the possibility of amendments in laws to facilitate digitalization of the system, (2) asses the potential of India Stack in digitalizing the legal system, (3) to identify statutes which require amendment, (4) identify the hurdles and roadblocks in the path towards digital reform of the legal ecosystem, and (5) suggest amendments to the act and potential areas of improvement. With those objectives in mind, this blog post intends to provide a brief overview of the main narratives shared in the conference and to identify some of the loopholes and unanswered questions that I was left with by the end.

Improved efficiency is the dominant narrative used to advocate for the digitalization of the Indian legal system. According to LegalDesk.com, the current Indian legal system relies mostly on paperwork, resulting in thousands of courts and over a million advocates accumulating lackhs of ongoing cases and an enormous pile of pending cases, mostly due to insufficient information. It is stated that the traditional methods of legal documentation, paperwork and court work must change through awareness, technology and pursuance by the government, as it needs to be implemented throughout the country. The key idea here is that digital transactions are faster and simplify the process of storing information. The ultimate desired outcome here, then, is increased efficiency and transparency.

One must question, however, if this narrative may be overly generous with the credit it gives to technology. IT systems, like many other manmade structures, are always bound to glitch and crash. It would be useful, then, to question whether the legal system is a department that can afford the complications that inevitably accompany a digital transformation. If portals or servers fail at critical times (i.e. when a person needs to confirm their trial date, submit a document before a deadline, or any other pressing procedures), the consequences may in fact outweigh the convenience brought about by overall digitalization. This is not to imply that the legal system cannot or should not undergo a digital transformation. Rather, it is to pose the question of whether the government will dedicate sufficient funds and expertise towards developing a resilient and reliable IT system for the courts. The conference was strongly centered on the concept that technology is always the way forward. This is a positive idea but one must pay special attention to the complications that may arise with the digitalization of a system that must function in a particularly time-sensitive manner – and to ensure that these complications can be managed efficiently and effectively should they arise. This then, requires more than a mere push for digitalization. Introducing new technological platforms is a positive step towards digitalization. However, there is a need for a detailed, government-authorized plan on how the judicial system will efficiently and smoothly undergo this digital transformation in a sustainable and resilient manner.

A presenter from LegalDesk.com mentioned Estonia’s model of complete digital governance as an example of successful digitalization: “If a small country like Estonia can do it, why can’t we?” While it is useful to draw examples and lessons from other countries, it is also crucial to recognize the contextual differences between countries. The presenter’s point was that Estonia is small in both size and population and has just recently gained independence in 1991—and has nonetheless been able to undergo technological reform and completely digitalize governance systems. India’s case is extremely different as one can logically argue that digital inclusion is more difficult to accomplish for large, spatially dispersed populations. Furthermore, the socioeconomic disparities in India, particularly in income and literacy, contribute to an immense digital divide that Estonia did not, to any comparable extent, face in order to digitalize governance over 1.3 million individuals. This is not to suggest that India cannot become a world leader in digital governance, or become comparable to Estonia. Rather, this is to highlight the importance of recognizing historical, political and sociocultural differences between countries when comparing governance models and digitalization processes. There is a need to indigenize digital reform strategies and platforms in India to cater to its unique context and vast diversity. This can be done by focusing on issues such as the language of digital governance, ensuring sufficient distribution of access to public digital platforms, and prioritizing the inclusion of all socioeconomic classes. I would argue that digitalization could come at a greater cost than benefit if it perpetuates the exclusion of the underprivileged members of society, especially from a system as critical as the judiciary. These topics were alarmingly overlooked in the conference.

The topic of privacy was also quite overlooked in the conference. As a step towards digital transformation, LegalDesk.com presented the new eNotary technology, which would be implemented by utilizing a combination of Adhaar based authentication, eSign, digilocker systems such as India Stack and video/audio recorded interviews. With the eNotary system, attestation, authentication and verification of legal instruments can be done remotely. This is expected to make paperwork easier, faster and more secure, as individuals would log into digital platforms using their Adhaar numbers to perform their judiciary procedures. A member of the audience asked about privacy concerns associated with digitalizing the legal records or property ownership information of individuals. Kishore Mandyam, from DAKSH, answered confidently with a statement that privacy is not a pressing issue here. He asserted that privacy concerns are a western construct that we have adopted in urban parts of India but that is not a concern for the majority of locals. It is clear, however, from examples such as the United States’ predictive policing practices, that accumulating data regarding the legal affiliations of individuals can result in discriminatory practices if this data does not remain strictly confidential to protect the privacy rights of citizens. This is not to mention the other forms of discrimination that can arise from the accumulation of such data, such as the targeting of certain demographics by corporate marketing and credit scoring practices that rely on trends in big data. To keep citizens’ legal records and affairs out of these databases, a digital legal system must be securely encrypted and protected by rigid privacy policies. India may have a varying context that leads to different privacy concerns with regards to a digital legal system. In any case, special attention must be given to privacy and security rights of individuals as their Adhaar numbers become attached to all their online personal data, including their legal records and judicial affairs.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/conference-on-the-digitalization-of-the-indian-legal-system

Conference on Safety Against Online Child Sexual Abuse

praskrishna — 2017-03-29T04:10:16Z

Japreet Grewal was a speaker at a conference on safety against online child sexual abuse which was jointly organized by CID, Telangana and the Department for Women Development and Child Welfare, Telangana on March 16 and 17, 2017 in Hyderabad.

Japreet spoke about the existing legal framework in India on online child sexual abuse and the challenges in implementing the preventive and response mechanisms to address this problem. Various stakeholders including media, police, school educators and child protection organisations attended this event.

Read the agenda here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/conference-on-safety-against-online-child-sexual-abuse

Conference on Data Protection

Admin — 2018-09-20T14:47:17Z

Sunil Abraham and Amber Sinha participated in a conference on data protection at NIPFP in New Delhi on September 4, 2018. The event was organized by National Institute of Public Finance and Policy.

Sunil Abraham and Amber Sinha were discussant in the session Disclosures in Privacy Policies: Does Consent Work?

Click to see the agenda

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/conference-on-data-protection

Concerns Regarding DNA Law

bhairav — 2013-10-29T10:09:26Z

Recently, a long government process to draft a law to permit the collection, processing, profiling, use and storage of human DNA is nearing conclusion. There are several concerns with this government effort. Below, we present broad-level issues to be kept in mind while dealing with DNA law.

Background

The Department of Biotechnology released, in 29 April 2012, a working draft of a proposed Human DNA Profiling Bill, 2012 ("DBT Bill") for public comments. The draft reveals an effort to (i) permit the collection of human blood, tissue and other samples for the purpose of creating DNA profiles, (ii) license private laboratories that create and store the profiles, (iii) store the DNA samples and profiles in various large databanks in a number of indices, and (iv) permit the use of the completed DNA profiles in scientific research and law enforcement. The regulation of human DNA profiling is of significant importance to the efficacy of law enforcement and the criminal justice system and correspondingly has a deep impact on the freedoms of ordinary citizens from profiling and monitoring. Below, we highlight five important concerns to bear in mind before drafting and implementing DNA legislation.

Primary Issues

Purpose of DNA Profiling

DNA profiling serves two broad purposes – (i) forensic – to establish unique identity of a person in the criminal justice system; and, (ii) research – to understand human genetics and its contribution to anthropology, biology and other sciences. These two purposes have very different approaches to DNA profiling and the issues and concerns attendant on them vary accordingly. Forensic DNA profiling is undertaken to afford either party in a criminal trial a better possibility of adducing corroborative evidence to prosecute, or to defend, an alleged offence. DNA, like fingerprints, is a biometric estimation of the individuality of a person. By itself, in the same manner that fingerprint evidence is only proof of the presence of a person at a particular place and not proof of the commission of a crime, DNA is merely corroborative evidence and cannot, on its own strength, result in a conviction or acquittal of an offence. Therefore, DNA and fingerprints, and the process by which they are collected and used as evidence, should be broadly similar.

Procedural Integrity

Forensic DNA profiling results from biological source material that is usually collected from crime scenes or forcibly from offenders and convicts. Biological source material found at a crime scene is very rarely non-contaminated and the procedure by which it is collected and its integrity ensured is of primary legislative importance. To avoid the danger of contaminated crime scene evidence being introduced in the criminal justice system to pervert the course of justice, it is crucial to ensure that DNA is collected only from intact human cells and not from compromised genetic material. Therefore, if the biological source material found at a crime scene does not contain at least one intact human cell, the whole of the biological source material should be destroyed to prevent the possibility of compromised genetic material being collected to yield inconclusive results. Adherence to this basic principle will obviate the possibility of partial matches of DNA profiles and the resulting controversy and confusion that ensues.

Conditions of Collection

In India, the taking of fingerprints is chiefly governed by the Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920 ("Prisoners Act") and section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 ("Evidence Act"). The Prisoners Act permits the forcible taking of fingerprints from convicts and suspects in certain conditions. The Evidence Act, in addition, permits courts to require the taking of fingerprints for the forensic purpose of establishing unique identity in a criminal trial. No
provisions exist for consensual taking of fingerprints, presumably because of the danger of self-incrimination and general privacy concerns. Since, as discussed earlier, fingerprints and DNA are biometric measurements that should be treated equally to the extent possible, the conditions for the collection of DNA should be similar to those for the taking of fingerprints.Accordingly, there should be no legal provisions that enable other kinds of collection, including from volunteers and innocent people.

Retention of DNA

As a general rule applicable in India, the retention of biometric measurements must be supported by a clear purpose that is legitimate, judicially sanctioned and transparent. The Prisoners Act, which permits the forcible taking of fingerprints from convicts, also mandates the destruction of these fingerprints when the person is acquitted or discharged. The indefinite collection of biometric measurements of people is dangerous, susceptible to abuse and invasive of civil rights. Therefore, once lawfully collected from crime scenes and offenders, their DNA profiles must be retained in strictly controlled databases with highly restricted access for the forensic purpose of law enforcement only. DNA should not be held in databases that allow non-forensic use. Further, the indices within these databases should be watertight and exclusive of each other.

DNA Laboratories

The process by which DNA profiles are created from biological source material is of critical importance. Because of the evidentiary value of DNA profiles, the laboratories in which these profiles are created must be properly licensed, professionally managed and manned by competent and impartial personnel. Therefore, the process by which DNA laboratories are licensed and permitted to operate is significant.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/concerns-regarding-dna-law

Concerns over central snoop

praskrishna — 2013-07-01T09:33:27Z

Eyebrows have been raised at the Centre’s single-window system to intercept phone calls and internet exchanges — the desi version of the US’s surveillance programme, PRISM — that is expected to roll out this year-end.

The article by Aloke Tikku was published in the Hindustan Times on June 28, 2013. Sunil Abraham is quoted.

The Rs. 400-crore project — tentatively called the Central Monitoring System (CMS) — will not only allow the government to listen to a target’s phone conversation but also track down a caller’s precise location, match his voice against known suspects’ before the call is completed and see what people have been up to on the internet.

And then, it can also use analytics to discover possible links — between suspected terrorists, criminals or just about anybody — from the internet and phone data. All this will be done from one place without keeping the internet or phone service provider in the loop — something the telecom and home ministries insist will enhance citizens’ privacy.

Both ministries also insist that the CMS won’t change the rules of the game. “The process to seek authorisation for interception will not be diluted,” a home ministry official promised.

So is everything hunky dory?

Hardly. But technology — in this case, the CMS — is a smaller part of the problem.

The bigger chunk is the process of approving “lawful interception” orders and the lack of transparency around it.

It was in December 1996 that the Supreme Court held that the State could spy on its citizens in extraordinary circumstances but, as an interim measure, made it mandatory for the home secretary to approve each and every such request. Telecom minister Kapil Sibal, who appeared in this case in the mid-1990s, convinced the court that it didn’t have the powers to order that a judge decide each phone-tapping case. Instead, Sibal suggested that this power remain with the executive on lines of the law in the UK. A former home secretary, however, conceded that they hardly have the time to apply their mind before signing a wiretap order.

That isn’t surprising. The home secretary approves around 7,500-9,000 interception orders every month. That means he or she has to sign an average of 300 orders every day without a break.

If he were to spend just 30 seconds on each case, he would have to keep aside four-and-a-half hours just approving interception orders every day.

An official said the ministry was considering a suggestion to pick up a fixed number of cases at random for closer scrutiny before approval.

Many believe this might not be enough. It is argued that the government — which was trying to replicate surveillance technology from the west — needs to adopt their safeguards and transparency norms too.

Sunil Abraham, executive director of the Bangalore-based Centre for Internet and Society, said he didn’t have a problem with CMS as long as it didn’t go for blanket surveillance.

“But there is no reason why the executive — and not a judge — should have the powers to decide on phone-tapping requests,” he said. Or for that matter, why shouldn’t there be an independent audit of phone-tapping decisions, their implementation and outcome?

“The aggregated data should be put in the public domain,” Abraham said. The US has such provisions. So does Britain, which inspired Sibal to argue for retaining interception powers with the executive in the mid-1990s. It is time to follow-up on that model.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/hindustan-times-aloke-tikku-june-28-2013-concerns-over-central-snoop

Conceptualizing an International Security Regime for Cyberspace

Elonnai Hickok and Arindrajit Basu — 2018-10-26T15:09:23Z

This paper was published as part of the Briefings from the Research and Advisory Group (RAG) of the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (GCSC) for the Full Commission Meeting held at Bratislava in 2018.

Policy-makers often use past analogous situations to reshape questions and resolve dilemmas in current issues. However, without sufficient analysis of the present situation and the historical precedent being considered, the effectiveness of the analogy is limited.This applies across contexts, including cyber space. For example, there exists a body of literature, including The Tallinn Manual, which applies key aspects (structure, process, and techniques) of various international legal regimes regulating the global commons (air, sea, space and the environment) towards developing global norms for the governance of cyberspace.

Given the recent deadlock at the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), owing to a clear ideological split among participating states, it is clear that consensus on the applicability of traditional international law norms drawn from other regimes, will not emerge if talks continue without a major overhaul of the present format of negotiations. The Achilles Heel of the GGE thus far has been a deracinated approach to the norms formulation process. There has been excessive focus on the content and the language of the applicable norm rather than the procedure underscoring its evolution, limited state and non state participation, and a lack of consideration for social, cultural, economic and strategic contexts through which norms emerge at the global level. Even if the GGE process became more inclusive and included all United Nations members, strategies preceding the negotiation process must be designed in a manner to facilitate consensus.

There exists to date, no scholarship that traces the negotiation processes that lead to the forging of successful analogous universal regimes or an investigation into the nature of normative contestation that enabled the evolution of the core norms that shaped these regimes. To develop an effective global regime governing cyberspace, we must consider if and how existing international law or norms for other global commons might also apply to ‘cyberspace’, but also transcend this frame into more nuanced thinking around techniques and frameworks that have been successful in consensus building. This paper focuses on the latter and embarks on an assessment of how regimes universally maximized functional utility through global interactions and shaped legal and normative frameworks that resulted, for some time, at least, in broad consensus.

Click to read more

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/conceptualizing-an-international-security-regime-for-cyberspace

Computer Related Offences

pranesh — 2013-06-07T10:47:36Z

If any person, dishonestly or fraudulently, does any act referred to in section 43, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine which may extend to five lakh rupees or with both.

Explanation
For the purposes of this section,

the word “dishonestly” shall have the meaning assigned to it in section 24 of the Indian Penal Code;
the word “fraudulently” shall have the meaning assigned to it in section 25 of the Indian Penal Code.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/section-66-it-act.txt

Complying with Europe’s GDPR will be a “matter of survival” for Indian IT firms

Admin — 2018-05-26T00:22:42Z

Europe’s new data laws could shake up Indian IT companies.

The blog post by Ananya Bhattacharya was published in Quartz India on May 24, 2018

The European Union’s (EU) General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which comes into effect on May 25, will put consumers in charge of their online data.

The law affects not just companies in the 28 EU member states but also those across the world that collect and process data from customers residing in EU nations.

“The first companies to be affected will be any outsourcing firms that deal with the EU, as well as the software firms that have personnel in the EU and in India,” Ryan Johnson, senior manager of international public policy at Access Partnership, a Mumbai-based consultancy, told Quartz. “In addition to the internal compliance issues, a lot of their contracts will need to be amended to reflect GDPR standards, both for vendors and clients. It will also change the kind of products that customers will want, as they change their IT environments to ensure compliance.”

Scores of companies in India’s $160 billion IT sector—Europe is its second-biggest market after North America—may now have to watch their backs.

So what exactly is the GDPR?

The GDPR, enacted in May 2016, is replacing the EU’S severely outdatedData Protection Directive regulation of 1995.

The data monitored under the new regulation will not only include personal information such as names, genders, and e-mail addresses that users voluntarily share, but also background tracking of cookies and browser history, and so on. Even identifiers like location data and IP addresses are explicitly included under personal data now, according to a report by consulting firm Deloitte.

“As regulations catch up, data privacy has fast evolved to become a matter of survival for companies,” said Rana Gupta, an identity and data protection expert at Gemalto, a digital security company.

The new EU rules mandate that companies dealing with high-risk and high-volume data regularly must appoint a data protection officer. Taking transparency up a notch, the regulations give companies a tight 72-hour runway to report data breaches.

Any violation will draw a fine of up to 4% of the firm’s annual turnover or €20 million (around Rs160 crore), whichever is higher. “With those kinds of stakes, investing in compliance now is the only right move for a sustainable business model,” said George Chang, vice-president at US-based cybersecurity firm Forcepoint.

That should be a wake-up call for Indian firms.

Ready or not?

While Indian IT giants like Infosys, Tata Consultancy Services (TCS), and Mindtree, which service European clients, will see an outsized impact of the new regulations, smaller Indian firms aren’t immune. Be it e-commerce sites with users logging in from, say, Belgium, or an India-based e-payments gateway accessed by someone in France, all companies—tech and otherwise—will need to tweak their terms and conditions to reflect the new rules.

“Digital marketing will be most affected once GDPR comes into effect, as promotional e-mails sent without the recipient’s prior consent fall afoul of the legislation’s diktat,” said Arun Balasubramanian, managing director of Qlik India, a software company.

Still, it seems like most companies haven’t prepared themselves for the altered regulation. A mere 13% of Indian companies have a plan to comply with the GDPR, a 2018 Ernst & Young survey revealed.

But India isn’t alone. More than half the companies located outside Europe aren’t ready either. “Even within the EU, small companies are struggling as there is a lot of fear-mongering about it (GDPR) and a general lack of awareness,” said Amber Sinha, senior programme manager at the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS).

Meanwhile, GDPR compliance can be an expensive affair, experts warn. This is so especially for large firms that may need to spend big on legal and consulting fees, besides bringing changes to their IT services. But all that will pay off in the future.

“Compliance can drive operational efficiencies, cost-savings, and even fuel innovation,” Gupta of Gemalto said. “…customers will place greater confidence in businesses, and businesses will minimise the all too common reputational and financial fallout of a breach.”

And as India looks at drafting its own privacy rules this year, Access Partnerships’ Johnson recommends it should look to “create a privacy law for India that’s substantively similar to GDPR, to help harmonise the two markets.”

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/quartz-india-may-24-2018-ananya-bhattacharya-complying-with-europes-gdpr-is-a-struggle-for-indian-it-firms

Comparison of the Manila Principles to Draft of The Information Technology [Intermediary Guidelines(Amendment) Rules], 2018

Akriti Bopanna and Gayatri Puthran — 2020-06-01T07:48:17Z

This paper looks at the Manila Principles intermediary liability framework in comparison to the amended draft Information Technology [Intermediaries Guidelines (Amendment)] Rules, 2018 introduced by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) in December, 2018.

Introduction

In December 2018, the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) introduced amendments to the draft Information Technology [Intermediaries Guidelines (Amendment)] Rules, 2018 [“the 2018 Rules”]. The proposed changes ranged from asking intermediaries to proactively filter content using automated technology to prohibiting promotion of substances such as cigarettes and alcohol. In CIS's submission to the Government, we highlighted our various concerns with the proposed rules. Building on the same, this paper aims to assess how the new draft rules measure up to the best practices on Intermediary Liability as prescribed in the Manila Principles. These principles were formulated in 2015 by a coalition of civil society groups and experts, including CIS, in order to establish best practice to guide policies pertaining to intermediary liability.

Depending on their function, intermediaries have a varying hand in hosting activism and discourse that are integral to a citizen’s right to freedom of speech and expression. The Manila Principles are an attempt at articulating best practices that lead to the development of intermediary liability regimes which respect human rights.

Consequently, the paper examines the draft rules to assess their compatibility with the Manila Principles. It provides recommendations such that, where needed, the rules are aligned with the aforementioned principles. The assessment is done based on the insight into the rationale of the Manila Principles provided in its Background Paper.

Disclosure: CIS is a recipient of research grants from Facebook India.

Click to download the research paper which was edited by Elonnai Hickok and reviewed by Torsha Sarkar.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/akriti-bopanna-and-gayathri-puthran-comparison-of-manila-principles-to-draft-it-intermediary-guidelines-rules

Comparison of Section 35(1) of the Draft Human DNA Profiling Bill and Section 4 of the Identification Act Revised Statute of Canada

elonnai — 2014-03-03T08:20:55Z

A comparison of section 35(1) of the Draft Human DNA Profiling Bill, section 4 of the Identification Act, Revised Statute of Canada, and a review of international best practices.

In continuance of research around the Draft Human DNA Profiling Bill that has been drafted the Department of Biotechnology, this blog entry reviews best practices for the communication of DNA profiles from the DNA Bank Manager to law enforcement and the police, compares the section 35(1) of the Draft Human DNA Profiling Bill and section 4 of the Identification Act Revised Statute of Canada, and recommends a revision of the present provision in the Draft Human DNA Profiling Bill.

Indian Provision

35 (1) “On receipt of a DNA profile for entry in the DNA Data Bank, the DNA Bank Manager shall cause it to be compared with the DNA profiles in the DNA Data Bank in order to determine whether it is already contained in the DNA Data Bank and shall communicate, for the purposes of the investigation or prosecution in a criminal offence, the following information to a court, tribunal, law enforcement agency or DNA laboratory in India which the DNA Data Bank Manager considers is concerned with it, appropriate, namely –

(a) As to whether the DNA profile received is already contained in the Data Bank; and

(b) Any information, other than the DNA profile received, is contained in the Data Bank in relation to the DNA profile received.

(2) The information as to whether a person’s DNA profile is contained in the offenders’ index may be communicated to an official who is authorized to receive the same as prescribed.”

Canadian Provision vs. Indian Provision

According to the Draft Human DNA Profiling Bill 35(1) was adopted from the DNA Identification Act Revised Statute of Canada section 4. The provision found in the Draft Human DNA Profiling Bill is different in three ways:

The Canadian statute limits the communication of whether a DNA profile is contained in the Data Bank or not to law enforcement agencies or other DNA laboratories, where as the provision in the Draft Human DNA Profiling Bill allows the communication to law enforcement agencies, other DNA data banks, and courts and tribunals.
The Canadian statute limits the comparison of any DNA profile to that as entered in the convicted offenders index or the crime scene index with those DNA profiles that are already contained in the databank, where as the Draft Human DNA Profiling Bill allows for any received profile to be compared with the other profiles in the DNA Data Bank.
The Canadian statute defines four types of information that may be communicated to law enforcement or another DNA databank including:

(a) if the DNA profile is not already contained in the data bank, the fact that it is not;
(b) if the DNA profile is already contained in the data bank, the information contained in the data bank in relation to that DNA profile;
(c) if the DNA profile is, in the opinion of the Commissioner, similar to one that is already contained in the data bank, the similar DNA profile; and
(d) if a law enforcement agency or laboratory advises the Commissioner that their comparison of a DNA profile communicated under paragraph (c) with one that is connected to the commission of a criminal offence has not excluded the former as a possible match, the information contained in the data bank in relation to that profile.

While the Draft Human DNA Profiling Bill provides for communication of only (a) and (b) by the DNA Data Bank Manager.

Concerns with 35(1) and Best Practices

The Centre for Internet and Society finds 35(1) problematic because a DNA profile is never a complete match, and is instead a scientific and statistical based probability. There are a number of steps that go into the analysis of a DNA profile. According to the US National Institute of Justice, these include: “1) the isolation of the DNA from an evidence sample containing DNA of unknown origin, and generally at a later time, the isolation of DNA from a sample (e.g., blood) from a known individual; 2) the processing of the DNA so that test results may be obtained; 3) the determination of the DNA test results (or types), from specific regions of the DNA; and 4) the comparison and interpretation of the test results from the unknown and known samples to determine whether the known individual is not the source of the DNA or is included as a possible source of the DNA.”

Though it is common for DNA Banks to communicate responses such as “match”, “no match”, or “partial match” or “inclusion”, “exclusion”, or “inconclusive” to inquiries received from law enforcement and other DNA Banks, this is not the case for communications to courts and tribunals. For example in England and Wales guidelines for presenting DNA evidence in court were laid out in the rule Rv. Dohemy and Adams (1997) 1 Cr. App. R. 396. Along with comprehensive guidelines on how experts should conduct themselves in court to prevent bias, the guidelines require the following information to be presented when DNA material is used as evidence in a case:

“The scientist should adduce the evidence of the DNA comparisons between the crime stain and the defendant’s sample together with the calculations of the Random Match Probability.
Whenever DNA evidence is adduced the Crown should serve on the defence details as to how the calculations have been carried out which are sufficient to enable the defence to scrutinize the basis of the calculations.
The Forensic Science Service should make available to a defence expert, if requested, the databases upon which the calculations have been made.
The expert will, on the basis of empirical statistical data, five the jury the random occurrence rations - the frequency with which the matching DNA characteristics are likely to be found in the population at large.
Provided that the expert has the necessary data, it may then be appropriate for him to indicate how many people with the matching characteristics are likely to be found in the United Kingdom...”

Recommendations

Given the influential weight that DNA evidence can have in a case, it is critical that the evidence is accurately presented to the court and other key stakeholders. The Centre for Internet and Society recommends that the Bill should distinguish the DNA Bank Manager’s response to law enforcement and other DNA Laboratory’s and the DNA Bank Manger’s response to courts and tribunals as below:

Response to Law enforcement agency and DNA Laboratory: The DNA Bank Manger should respond to a request from law enforcement or a DNA laboratory with either: "match" or "partial match" .
Response to Court and tribunal: When DNA evidence is used in a court of law, the Bill should provide that the presentation should include:

The random match probability: The probability that the profile is in the sample from the individual tested if the individual tested has been selected at random.
The frequency with which the matching DNA characteristics are likely to be found in the population at large.
The probability of contamination.

The Bill should also provide for the database upon which the calculations were based to be made available when requested. In addition, the Bill should provide for rules to be made prescribing the procedure for presentation.

[]. http://nij.gov/topics/forensics/evidence/dna/basics/Pages/analyzing.aspx

[2]. http://www.medicalgenomics.co.uk/pdf/Barrister_vol32-2007.pdf

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comparision-of-draft-human-dna-profiling-bill-and-identification-act-revised-statute-of-canada-provisions