We are anonymous, we are legion

UIDAI goes after org that disclosed government departments were releasing Aadhaar data

Nikhil Pahwa — 2017-05-20T10:46:36Z

If there was ever a case of shoot the messenger, it is this.

The blog post by Nikhil Pahwa was published by Medianama on May 19, 2017. Pranesh Prakash was quoted.

The UIDAI, the body which runs the Aadhaar project in India, has written to the Centre for Internet & Society suggesting that their disclosure of the fact that the data of 130 million Aadhaar users is being publicly disclosed on the Internet is owed to a hack-attack, reports the Times of India. On being contacted by MediaNama, Pranesh Prakash, Policy Director at CIS told MediaNama that “We are waiting for an official copy of the letter, and once we receive it we will decide on our future course of action.” The UIDAI told MediaNama that they’ll get back to us, and declined to share a copy of the letter with MediaNama.

Read the full story on Medianama

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/medianama-nikhil-pahwa-may-19-2017-uidai-cis-india-aadhaar

UIDAI denies any breach of Aadhaar database

Admin — 2018-01-07T12:03:13Z

Personal data, including biometric information, of citizens safe and secure, says UIDAI on Aadhaar data breach.

The article by Komal Gupta was published by Livemint on January 7, 2018

The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) on Thursday clarified that there has not been any breach in the Aadhaar database and the personal data of citizens, including biometric information, is safe and secure.

The clarification comes in response to a news report titled ‘Rs 500, 10 minutes, and you have access to a billion Aadhaar details’ published in The Tribune on Thursday. The report claims that a WhatsApp group sold all Aadhaar data available with UIDAI for a sum of Rs. 500.

UIDAI maintained that the reported case appeared to be an instance of misuse of the grievance redressal search facility. As UIDAI maintains complete logs and traceability of the facility, legal action including lodging of FIR against the persons involved in the case is being undertaken. UIDAI maintained that the reported case appeared to be an instance of misuse of the grievance redressal search facility. As UIDAI maintains complete logs and traceability of the facility, legal action including lodging of FIR against the persons involved in the case is being undertaken. UIDAI clarified in a press statement that displayed demographic information cannot be misused; it would need to be paired with an individual’s biometrics.

There are more than 1.19 billion Aadhaar card holders in the country.

“If it is not a data breach, then this means that some people who have legitimate access to the data are selling it illegitimately. This poses a greater problem,” said Pranesh Prakash, policy director at the Centre for Internet and Society, a Bengaluru-based think tank.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/livemint-komal-gupta-january-7-2018-uidai-denies-any-breach-of-aadhaar-database

UIDAI declining multiple requests by police to share Indian citizens’ biometrics

praskrishna — 2017-07-06T15:25:32Z

The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI), the governing agency in charge of Aadhaar, has declined multiple requests from all law enforcement agencies, including the Delhi Police, for biometrics of citizens for criminal investigations, according to a report by The Indian Express.

The blog post by Justin Lee was published by Biometric Update on July 4, 2017.

Investigating agencies such as CBI and NIA have been repeatedly requesting the details of Aadhaar cardholders including their biometrics, UIDAI said.

UIDAI Deputy Director General Rajesh Kumar Singh has written to the heads of each agency, ordering them to stop asking for such details.

“This is regarding requests frequently received by the UIDAI from police and other law enforcement agencies, seeking demographic and biometric information of residents for facilitating identification of individuals in different cases,” Singh said in his letter. “In this regard, I would like to draw your kind attention to provisions under Sections 28 and 29 of the Aadhaar (Targeted delivery of financial and other subsidies, benefits and services) Act, 2016, which prohibits sharing of core biometric and identity related information with other authorities.”

Rather than asking forensic labs to match fingerprints, state police and investigating agencies are requesting biometrics data from UIDAI.

“Identity information cannot be shared by UIDAI,” Singh said. “The requests received from law enforcement agencies lead to avoidable delays in investigation by the police authorities and unnecessary increase in the workload of subordinate authorities.”

UIDAI is also concerned about data potentially leaking as the central government has confirmed that identities of individuals, including Aadhaar numbers and other private information, has been leaked to the public.

In May, the Centre for Internet and Society published a report that claimed between 130 to 135 million numbers in India’s Aadhaar biometric registry system, and around 100 million bank numbers of pensioners and rural jobs-for-work beneficiaries, have been leaked online by four key government programs.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/biometric-update-july-4-2017-justin-lee-uidai-declining-multiple-requests-by-police-to-share-indian-citizens-biometrics

UIDAI asks Centre for Internet & Society to provide hacker details

praskrishna — 2017-06-07T12:21:47Z

The article by Mahendra Singh was published in the Times of India on May 18, 2017.

The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI), the regulatory authority for Aadhaar, has written to a Bengaluru-based research organisation, Centre for Internet & Society (CIS), seeking details about a suspected hack attack on government websites that led to the leak of information about 13 crore users.

In a recent report, CIS had highlighted that websites run by various government departments, owing to a poor security framework, had publicly displayed sensitive personal financial information and Aadhaar numbers of beneficiaries of certainprojects.

In its letter, UIDAI argued that the data downloaded from one of the websites could not have been accessed unless the website was hacked. As hacking is a grave offence under the law, the UIDAI has asked CIS to provide details of the persons involved in the data theft.

According to a source, the UIDAI said that access to data on the website for the 'National Social Assistance Program' was only possible for someone in possession of authorised login details, or if the site (http://nsap.nic.in) was hacked or breached. The UIDAI said in its letter that such illegal access was against the provisions of the Aadhaar Act, 2016, and the IT Act, 2000, and that the persons involved had committed a grave offence.

Asking the CIS to reply before May 30, the UIDAI also said, "Aadhaar system is a protected system under Section 70 of the IT Act, 2000, the violation of which is punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a period up to 10 years." It added that the penalty clauses for violations are also provided in Section 36, Section 38 and Section 39 of the Aadhaar Act.
The UIDAI, however, maintained that even if the Aadhaar details were known to someone it did not pose a real threat to the people whose information was publicly available because the Aadhaar number could not be misused without biometrics.

The UIDAI letter said, "While, as your report suggests, there is a need to strengthen IT security of government websites, it is also important that the persons involved in hacking such sensitive information are brought to justice for which your assistance is required under the law."

"Your report mentions 13 crore people's data has been 'leaked'. Please specify how much of this data had been downloaded by you or are in your possession or in the possession of any other persons that you know. Please provide the details," the UIDAI added in its letter. The UIDAI also urged CIS to provide the details of the persons/organisations with whom it shared the data, if it did.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/economic-times-may-18-2017-mahendra-singh-uidai-asks-centre-for-internet-and-society-to-provide-hacker-details

UIDAI and Welfare Services: Exclusion and Countermeasures (Bangalore, August 27)

sumandro — 2016-08-22T13:25:03Z

The Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) invites you to a one day workshop, on Saturday, August 27, 2016, to discuss, raise awareness of, and devise countermeasures to exclusion due to implementation of UID-based verification for and distribution of welfare services. We look forward to making this a forum for knowledge exchange and a learning opportunity for our friends and colleagues.

Invitation

Download (PDF)

Venue

Institution of Agricultural Technologists, No. 15, Queen’s Road, Bangalore, 560 052.

Location on Google Map: https://www.google.com/maps/place/Institution+of+Agricultural+Technologists/.

Agenda

10:00-10:30 Tea and Coffee

10:30-11:00 Introductions and Updates from Delhi Workshop

11:00-12:45 Reconfiguration of Welfare Governance by UIDAI

12:45-14:00 Lunch

14:00-15:00 Updates on Ongoing Cases against UIDAI

15:00-15:15 Tea and Coffee

15:15-16:45 Open Discussion on Countering Welfare Exclusion

16:45-17:00 Tea and Coffee

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/events/uidai-and-welfare-services-exclusion-and-countermeasures-aug-27

UIDAI admits 210 government websites made Aadhaar details public

Admin — 2017-11-21T16:03:29Z

The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) has admitted that Aadhaar details were leaked on over 200 central and state government websites.

The article was published in the Financial Express on November 20, 2017.

The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) has admitted that Aadhaar details were made public on over 200 central and state government websites. According to an RTI reply, these websites publicly displayed name, address and other details of Aadhaar beneficiaries, which was removed when the breach was identified.

However, UIDAI does not have information about the time of the breach. It also said that Aadhaar details have never been made public by UIDAI. “However, it was found that approximately 210 websites of the central government, state government departments including educational institutes were displaying the list of beneficiaries along with their name, address, other details and Aadhaar numbers for information of the general public,” it said.

UIDAI issues Aadhaar — a 12-digit unique identification number — which acts as a proof of identity and addresses anywhere in the country. Lately, Aadhaar has been creating furore for security and privacy reasons, especially after the Narendra Modi government began aggressively pushing the identification number to be linked with social benefits, banks, PAN, mobile number et al. In a landmark judgement this August, the Supreme Court ruled that privacy was a fundamental right of citizens, weakening the case for pushing Aadhar.

Currently, cases are being heard in the apex court on linking Aadhaar to banks and mobile numbers. In May, the Centre for Internet and Society had claimed that Aadhaar numbers of as many as 135 millions could have been leaked. “Based on the numbers available on the websites looked at, the estimated number of Aadhaar numbers leaked through these four portals could be around 130-135 million,” the report by CIS had said. Further, as many as 100 million bank account numbers could have been “leaked” from the four portals, it had added.

UIDAI and the government had been vehemently denying that Aadhaar details can be leaked despite apprehension from different sections of society. Soon after the RTI reply appeared in media, UIDAI refuted the news of leaks, calling it a “skewed presentation of facts. “Such report is a skewed presentation of the facts and poses as if the Aadhaar data is breached or leaked which is not the true presentation. Aadhaar data is fully safe and secure and there has been no data leak or breach at UIDAI,” press release by PIB said.

It said that the data on these websites was placed in public domain as a measure of proactive disclosure under the RTI Act.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/financial-express-november-20-2017-government-websites-made-aadhaar-details-public

UID: The World’s Largest Biometric Database

praskrishna — 2011-07-23T02:04:45Z

At the start of his presentation, Sunil Abraham pointed to two aerial drawings of cybercafes: one where each computer was part of a private booth, and one where the computers were in the open so the screens would be visible to any one. Which layout would be more friendly to women, and why, Abraham wanted to know. Some participants selected the first option, liking the idea of the privacy, while others liked the second option so that the cybercafe owner would be able to monitor users’ activities.

Abraham said he was surprised no one said option one looked like masturbation booths, adding that in May, India passed rules prohibiting the first design option to avoid just such an issue. This is despite a survey conducted of female college students, who liked the idea of privacy in cybercafés that typically are male-dominated.

Cybercafes are just one of the areas impacted by India’s plan for collecting and using biometrics to create unique individual identification cards.

Abraham focused his presentation on activists’ efforts to counter the government’s myths about a unique identification (UID) program.

One campaign image showed two soldiers on the border asking for an east-Asian looking person’s identification. The way to balance, or rectify, the drawing, Abraham said, would be to allow citizens to be able to ask the soldiers for the identification information.

The campaign, “Rethink UID Project,” included several images illustrating various problems with the plan. For example, one said: “Central storage of keys is a bad idea, so is central storage of our biometrics.” As Abraham explained, if storing a copy of your housekey at the police station does not make us feel more secure, then why wouldn’t storing our biometrics with the government also make us a little more scared?

In the Indian scheme, Abraham said, the government says biometrics will be used as an authentication factor in order to prove your identity, but from a computer science perspective, it’s a bad idea because it is so easy to steal biometrics. And, as Abraham pointed out, if your biometrics are stolen, it’s not possible for you to re-secure it—it’s not like getting a new ATM card and password, he said.

If this system of national UID was designed using digital keys instead of biometrics, then we would have a completely different configuration, Abraham said.

Centralized storage is nonnegotiable, and therefore the process of authentification is done through a centralized database, but with digital keys or digital signatures, authentification could be done on a peer basis, so citizen could authenticate border guards and vice versa.

Another image from the “Rethink UID Project” campaign pointed out that “Technology cannot solve corruption.” As Abraham said, problems of corruption in the subsidy system (food, loans, education, employment guarantee act in rural India, etc) won’t be fixed with biometrics. For example, if biometric equipment is installed at fair-price shops, before the shop owner gives the grain, the citizen would have to present biometrics, which would go through a centralized server and be authenticated, then the citizen would get the grain, and ultimately there would be a record saying this particular citizen collected this amount of subsidized grain at this particular time.

But there are a whole range of ways shop owners can compromise the system, Abraham said.

The first way: 30-50 percent of India is illiterate, so shop owner can say the biometrics were rejected by the server and the citizen would not know better. Or, the owner can say there was no connectivity so authentification didn’t go through, or the owner could say there was no electricity so the system won’t work, or the shop owner could give just part of the grain that the citizen is due.

Corruption innovates and terrorism innovates—if technology innovates, so does corruption, as it is not a static phenomenon, Abraham said. You can’t wish away human beings from technological configurations.

One village will have multiple biometric readers.

Abraham said they have proposed an alternative schema: remove readers from the shop, school, hospital, bank, etc., and have only one scanner at the local governance hall. Instead of the citizen becoming transparent to the government, the government should become transparent to the citizen. The shop owners should make transparent which IDs they have given how much grain to, and only if they are going to dispute the ID of a citizen, can they go to the local government administrative office to prove the ID.

Another image from the “Rethink UID Project” campaign said, “The poor and the rich: who do we track first?”

Abraham explained that one problem in India is “black money,” or money for which you don’t pay taxes because the accounts are in fake names in order to store money. Like creating fake bank accounts, he said it also would be easy to create fake biometrics by combining the handprints and eyes of multiple people to get a second fake ID. Also the system could be hacked into and iris images Photoshopped. Ghost ideas also could be created and then sold off. Because the rich will get their IDs behind closed doors, Abraham said, it will be easy for them to get multiple IDs, but the poor will not be able to.

Referring to “tailgating,” or when one ID is card swiped to gain entrance for multiple people, such as swiping one metro card and then two people walking through, Abraham noted that the problem is that the tailgating only is seen as a problem when it’s at the bottom of the pyramid, such as one woman goes to the fair-price shop to collect grain for five or six families so only one person has to lose a day’s wage instead of all five or six losing a day’s wages. Tailgating at the bottom if the pyramid is usually a question of survival, he said.

Thus, another image from the campaign showed a pyramid and said, “Transparency at the top first…before transparency at the bottom.”

The first principle is that expectations of privacy should be inversely proportional to power, so people who are really powerful, like NGOs, politicians, or heads of corporations, should have less privacy, and people who have very little power should have more privacy, Abraham said.

Also, from a business perspective, the nation gets greater return on its investment if surveillance equipment is trained on people at the top of the pyramid to catch big-time corruption, he said.

Most of the panic around the UID is over the transaction database. Beyond a databse storing everyone’s biometrics, another database will track transactions: every time you buy a mobile phone or purchase a ticket or access a cyber cafe or subsidies, thanks to UID, there will a record made in the transaction database, Abraham said.

Abraham said it is important to note that surveillance is not an intrinsic part of information systems, but once surveillance is engineered into information systems, both those with good intentions or bad intentions can take advantage of that surveillance capability.

The UID means there will be 22 databases available to 12 intelligence agencies, he said.

So when a girl enters into a cybercafé, first she will have to provide her UID, and then the café owner will photocopy the card, then the owner has the right to take a photo of the girl using his own camera, then the owner is supposed to maintain browser logs of her computer for a period of one year.

So the question then is how to assure accountability without surveillance?

The first possibility, Abraham said, is partial storage. The transaction database could store half the data, and the central database could store the other half, so the full 360-view of the data would not be available without a court order.

The second solution is a transaction escrow, where every time a record is put into the main database, it will be encrypted using 2-3 keys, and only if 3 agencies cooperate with keys, can the information be decrypted. Thus, it is targeted surveillance, not blanket surveillance.

To conclude his presentation, Abraham divided participants into four groups in order to design surveillance systems for internet surveillance, mobile technologies, CCTVs, and border control.

Sharon Strover spoke on behalf of the CCTV group, saying they ended up with more questions than anything else. They agreed there should be notices when cameras are in use, there should be public knowledge of who is doing surveillance and who has access to the footage, and the data shouldn’t be sold. But the group couldn’t decide which spaces warranted CCTVs and which not.

Abraham then pointed out that the next generation of CCTVs can read everybody’s irises as they pass the cameras—it’s in the lab now, and 2-3 years from the market, he said.

Next, Andy Carvin spoke on behalf of the mobile technologies surveillance group. Whether or not capturing metadata or content as well, the mobile phone company can collect it, but it shouldn’t be able to keep any identifiable information for the person – it should only be able to look at information in the aggregate. The rest of the information should be shipped to a non-governmental organization or government agency specialized in privacy, and 2 keys would be required: one from the judiciary and one from the NGO or governmental agency.

Smári McCarthy reported back for the Internet surveillance group, pointing out that data retention has been useful in criminal cases less than 0.2 percent of the time in one study, and another showed there has been no statistically significant increase in the number of criminal cases solved because of data retention. So, he said, the group concluded there should be no blanket surveillance, only court orders in certain criminal cases that define who will be under surveillance and for how long. Also, they wanted to see a transparency register available so the public could be informed about how many people are under surveillance currently and throughout year and other general information, such as the success rate—how many of these surveillances have led to criminal convictions or similar.

Finally, Summer Harlow spoke on behalf of the border control group, which said scanning of checked- and carry-on luggage is acceptable, but there should be no luggage searches without specific probable cause from intelligence agencies or if the scans pick up weapons or other contraband. Similarly, people could be subject to spectrum scans and drug/bomb sniffing dogs for weapons and contraband, but again they would not be physically searched by border agents without probable cause. Also, people and luggage could not randomly be searched based on the country of their passport or their flight destination or origin.

In summary, Abraham said, surveillance is like salt in food: it is essential in small amounts, but completely counter-productive if even slightly excessive.

Download Sunil's presentation here [PDF, 1389 kb]
Sunil Abraham made the presentation at the Gary Chapman International School on Digital Transformation on 21 July 2011. The original news published by International School on Digital Transformation can be read here
Read the schedule here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/uid-worlds-largest-database

UID: Questions without Answers – A Talk by Usha Ramanathan

Natasha Vaz — 2011-11-24T04:41:41Z

UID enrolment is in full swing, providing an official identification to millions of Indians, yet there are numerous unanswered questions. A public talk on UID was held at the Institute of Science, Bangalore on September 6, 2011. Usha Ramanathan, an independent law researcher on jurisprudence, poverty and rights, discussed the questions that plague the UID project and the veil of silence enveloping the answers.

Ms. Ramanathan began her presentation by describing the progress and evolution of the UID project. She stated three adjectives that reflect the target goal of the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI): unique, ubiquitous and universal. She demonstrated how their initial objectives and claims have been drastically altered in three major ways.

First and foremost, the UIDAI claimed that enrolment is voluntary, not mandatory, and hence, inclusive. Yet, Nandan Nilekani has consistently maintained that other agencies may make it compulsory. UID is becoming ubiquitous and is a prerequisite for access to a wide variety of welfare schemes and services such as PDS, MGNREGS, banks, public health, etc. It is thus clear that this could actually exclude those who do not have a number or whose biometrics doesn't work. Therefore, this undermines the inclusive nature of the project.

Second, the UIDAI claimed that the UID would enable inclusive growth. Ms. Ramanathan expressed a serious concern surrounding the risk of exclusion. Instead of facilitating inclusion, around two to five per cent of the Indian population would be excluded from the current process of authentication and potentially from having a UID number, as they do not have viable biometric data.[1] Physical or visual impairments such as corneal blindness, corneal scars, and malnourishment induced cataracts or ‘low-quality’ fingerprints from a lifetime of hard labour inhibit those from providing valid fingerprints or iris scans.[2]

Third, Ms. Ramanathan reiterated that the National Identification Authority India Bill prohibited sharing data, except by the consent of the resident, by a court order or for national security. However, UID information is being directly fed into the National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) who will then provide information about people that is in 21 databases, to eleven security agencies, including the RAW and IB over which there is no superintendence or oversight.[3] She discussed the high likelihood of a breach of privacy as there are insufficient standards protecting an individual from unlawful invasion. Additionally, the UIDAI does not have mechanisms in place for an individual to be notified if there is a data breach.

Who owns this project?

A very important question asked is, “Who owns this project?” Ms. Ramanathan stated that the convergence of information especially during the ‘de-duplication process clearly reflects the corporatization of the project. She also questioned the background of some of the technological companies involved. For instance, L-1 Identity Solutions is well known for its links with the CIA. Additionally, Accenture is on a Smart Borders project with US Homeland Security. She explained that ownership also plays into the feasibility and financial cost of the project. Furthermore, the UIDAI has not conducted a feasibility study on the technology or the financial cost of the project.

International Experience

Lastly, Ms. Ramanathan discussed the international experience of a universal identity system. In the United Kingdom, their universal system of identification was labelled as ‘intrusive bullying’ as well as ‘an assault on personal liberties’. The United States and the United Kingdom both abandoned a universal identity system, as it was impractical, unjustified and dangerous.

Ms. Ramanathan raised many questions that evoked thought and discussion from the audience. She provided numerous examples of ambiguity, misconceptions and confusion surrounding the UID project. She urged the audience to exercise their civil liberties or risk losing them. Lastly, she believed that an informed debate involving the UIDAI and the public is long overdue.

“The UIDAI must clarify misconception and provide detailed answers to crucial questions, as there is a lack of understanding within the general population about the UID. Therefore, the UIDAI and the Government of India must increase and ensure transparency of the UID project”, she added.

Ms. Usha Ramanathan was speaking at an event organised by Concern, an IISc Student group. She was speaking in her personal capacity and the opinions reflected above are necessarily not those of CIS.

[1] Biometrics Design Standards for UID Applications (December 2009).

[2] Biometrics Design Standards for UID Applications (December 2009).

[3]Usha Ramanathan, The Myth of the Technology Fix, http://www.india-seminar.com/2011/617/617_usha_ramanathan.htm.

VIDEO

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/UID_Questions_without_Answers

UID: Nothing to Hide, Nothing to Fear?

shilpa — 2011-09-28T11:44:21Z

Isn’t it interesting that authorities ask you about your identity and you end up showing your proof of existence! Isn’t this breaching into one’s personal life? Why so much transparency only from the public side? Why can’t the government be equally transparent to the public?, asks Shilpa Narani.

Before I get into an argument, I would like to share with you that my research is based on a comparative study of articles published on UID in leading newspapers like the Times of India, the Indian Express, the Hindustan Times, and its supplement LiveMint, Business Standard, Asian Age, DNA India, Bangalore Mirror, Deccan Chronicle and Deccan Herald. My research shows that the government officials and the individuals working for the UIDAI, who are involved in proposing identity system, are in fact hide their own identity from the public.

Background

A pan-India project to “identify” each resident was formally inaugurated in 2009, with the establishment of the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) as an office attached to the Planning Commission.[1] The goal of the Unique ID project is to issue a unique identity number to every resident in the country. The Unique Identification number (UID) will be linked to every resident’s basic demographic and biometric details, and stored in the UIDAI central database.[2] Now a 12 digit number will henceforth decide whether you exist or not? It will decide whether you remain a known or an unknown person? With this blog I would like to highlight the irony in the UIDAI's attempt to establish if a person is known or is unknown with a 12 digit number.

An identity card virus seems to be spreading across India. Everyone is praising the UID and the social, economic, and political improvements it will bring. “The aim of the UID scheme is to bring transparency in the system,'' says Sonia Gandhi.[3] One has to wonder though — if the aim of the UID is to bring transparency, why it is that government and UIDAI officials are not transparent themselves?

Findings

According to my research, in 55 news articles taken from different newspapers mentioned above, there are 66 persons who shared their views on UID only on the condition of anonymity. Most of these individuals were public servants who themselves did not wish to be identified. For instance, one individual was from the department of information technology, who is working on the UID project and with the UIDAI itself.

Total Anonymous

As one can see from the graph above, the total number of anonymous people sharing their perspectives on the UID are more than the total number of identified people sharing their perspective on the UID. Below is a detailed review of UID articles from each newspaper:

Times of India: Out of 13 articles, Times of India quoted nine anonymous sources in which there were HRD officials, civic sources, sources from census operation department, collectorate sources, senior postal officials, UIDAI officials, and unclassified individuals. Times of India only quoted four identified sources.

Indian Express: Out of 10 articles, the Indian Express quoted twelve anonymous sources including sources from senior officials of the AADHAR office, senior Delhi government officials and some unclassified sources. Again only four identified sources were quoted.

LiveMint: Out of 7 articles, the Live Mint quoted 15 anonymous sources including sources from the Information Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA), UIDAI, Bank of India, a senior SEBI official, sources from ministry, etc. Only 11 sources revealed their identity.

Hindustan Times: Out of 3 articles, there were 6 anonymous sources, and 5 sources that were identified. Anonymous sources were from UIDAI, finance ministry, and other government officials.

Deccan Herald: Out of 11 articles, there were 14 anonymous sources and only 6 were identified. Anonymous sources included UIDAI officials, banks, senior officials from government, and unclassified sources as well.

Asian Age: Out of 4 articles, there were 5 anonymous sources. Anonymous sources included government officials and some unclassified officials.

Power of Identity: Why is anonymity important?

UID has the potential to threaten an individual’s ability to be anonymous in society. Anonymity results when the personal identity or personally identifiable information of a person is not known. As demonstrated above, a certain amount of anonymity already exists in India today, but with the coming of the UID there is the potential that this will be changed.

Conclusion

As Sonia Gandhi herself said, the UID's aim is to bring transparency in the system. Though the government is eager to make the Indian public transparent in their everyday lives, clearly from the analysis above, individuals working for the government and UIDAI are not comfortable being transparent to the public. It is ironic that the individuals developing and working for this scheme are not willing to voice their opinion and be identified, but private individuals are. Though the UID scheme is being promoted as a way to make the people accountable and visible in the eyes of the government, from the very start of the project the UIDAI and government have kept themselves under a cloud of secrecy. The government’s non-transparent attitude towards this project and the unawareness of its use on the people makes the whole scheme shady and unnecessary.

Notes

[1]http://uidai.gov.in/UID_PDF/Front_Page_Articles/Documents/Strategy_Overveiw-001.pdf

[2]http://uidai.gov.in/UID_PDF/Working_Papers/UID_and_iris_paper_final.pdf

[3]http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-09-30/india/28243557_1_uid-number-unique-id-numbers-tembhli

Download the UID Summary Grid here [Excel, 19kb]

For the summary of articles in newspapers, click here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/privacy/uid-nothing-to-hide-fear

UID: Are your biometric I-cards stacked against you?

praskrishna — 2012-06-26T09:33:51Z

Imagine a rural family of five. Mom. Dad. Two kids. And Grandma. Assume too that they are below the poverty line. The day is coming when this family will have to give its biometrics out to myriad agencies.

This article by M Rajshekhar was published in the Economic Times on June 24, 2012

You know that Nandan Nilekani's Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) or the Registrar General's National Population Register (NPR) has been collecting biometrics for a while now.

But a set of other departments have entered the fray. This ranges from the PDS department, ministry of rural development (MoRD), states' education departments, the Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY), banks, the department of social welfare, the post office...they are all collecting biometrics (see Agencies Collecting Biometrics Right Now).

This is the latest iteration in India's tryst with biometrics. From a beginning where only the NPR — and, a little later, the UIDAI — were to capture biometrics, we have now reached a point where myriad departments and ministries are camping in India's villages and towns, capturing fingerprints and iris images.

Identity Thieves

There was to be one large database. Now, we are moving to a system where multiple agencies capture and store biometrics data in myriad servers. This is amplifying the risk of biometric theft.

As Sunil Abraham, the head of Bangalore-based Centre for Internet and Society says, "If biometrics is used as authentication factor then it would be possible for a criminal to harvest your biometrics — such as using a glass to collect fingerprints — without your conscious cooperation. Or the registrar can cache your biometrics and duplicate transactions."

As the number of databases containing biometrics rises, the risk of this information leaking out increases. There have been complaints against an UIDAI enrolment agency called Madras Security Printers that it had sold data to private companies. There were also charges that enrolment agencies had outsourced the enrolment work to other companies, which they are not allowed to do.

What complicates matters further is there are not many safeguards. The country doesn't have a policy on how biometrics can be captured, used, stored and destroyed. But before we get deeper into that story, it is useful to understand why multiple departments have begun collecting biometrics.

Biometric Rush

According to a senior bureaucrat who recently retired from the ministry of planning, the answer lies in the 2014 elections. "For the government, cash transfers are the large reforms that they think UPA 2 can point towards in the next elections. For this reason, they need all this up and running before 2014."

However, over the past few months, parts of the government are increasingly unsure if UIDAI and NPR will meet their targets. "I do not think the 2014 target can be met at all," says a senior official in the National Informatics Centre (NIC). "We have to enroll another 800 million people. Then, we have to deduplicate them. Then, we have to make the cards and distribute them."

This is one reason why a set of government departments are configuring their own alternatives. Take the Department of Financial Services (DFS). It has been testing an online, biometric system for cash payments in Haryana's Mewat district for months now. Here, each bank will store its customers' biometric information in its own servers.

If a customer of bank A goes to a banking correspondent (BC) agent of bank B, his biometrics would be forwarded by bank B to bank A for authentication. Once authenticated, the transaction will be completed. "We should be rolling the new system out nationally from July or August," says the bureaucrat.

The rural development ministry is also testing its payment system. Once the local administration tells the ministry about who worked how many days, the ministry will be able to put money into their accounts automatically via a payment gateway. Right now, this is done manually with the block development officer and sarpanch making out the cheques.

This pilot, says DK Jain, joint secretary, MoRD, started 3-4 months ago in parts of Gujarat, Karnataka, Odisha and Rajasthan. In another six months, it will be available across the country. And then, there is the PDS.

Here, different states are putting different systems in place. Andhra, says a senior mandarin in the food ministry, is going with UID, Haryana is looking at smart cards, Jharkhand is going with Aadhaar, MP and Gujarat are testing food coupons, while Chhattisgarh has decided to use RSBY and Orissa has chosen NPR.

Apart from this, data is also being collected by the RSBY and BC companies on behalf of the banks handling welfare payments, or scrambling to meet their financial inclusion targets.

Sunil Abraham is quoted in this article.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/are-your-biometric-i-cards-stacked-against-you

UID: A Debate on Fundamental rights

radha — 2011-04-02T12:33:44Z

UID: A debate on the Fundamental Rights - was jointly organized by the Citizen Action Forum, People's Union for Civil Liberties - Karnataka, Alternative Law Forum and the Centre for Internet and Society on April 16th at IAT, Queens Road, Bangalore - An article in the Prajavani news paper - April 17th.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/uid-a-debate-on-fundamental-rights

UID: A Data Subject's Registration Tale

Mukta Batra — 2014-09-11T09:05:07Z

A person who registered for UIDAI shares their experience of registering for the UID Number, on the condition of anonymity.

The registration process begins with filling a form, which has a verification clause at the end. This is a statement that the data, including biometric data, is correct and is that of the registrant. The presence of the word ‘biometric’ in relation to the verification creates tacit consent in the collection of biometric data.

The data subject registered for the UID number as several utilities were being linked to the UID number at that time.

The data subject pointed out three areas for concern: (i) optional data was being collected under protest; (ii) the subjects documents were being taken out of their sight for scanning; (iii) the ownership of data.

While registering for the UID number, data subjects have a choice not to link their bank numbers to bank accounts and to utilities such as gas connections. This data subject noticed that the data operator linked these by default and the data subject had to specifically request the de-linking. The data operator did not inform the data subject of the choice not to link the UID with these services. If this is the state of affairs for the conscious registrant, it is unlikely that those who cannot read will be informed of their right to choice. Their information will then be inadvertently linked and they will be denied the right to opt out of the linkage.

This data subject additionally noted that their right to refuse to provide optional data on the registration form was blatantly disregarded by the enrolling agency. Despite protests against providing this information, the enroller forcibly entered information such as ‘ward number’, which was optional. The enroller justified these actions - stating: the company will cut our salary. Unfortunately, registrants do not know who the data collection company is.

Where the data subjects do not know who collects their data and where it is going, there can be no accountability.

This incident seems to show that the rules on personal information are being violated. The right to know: the identity and address of the entity collecting the data,[1] the purpose of data collection,[2] the restrictions on data use[3] and the right not to disclose sensitive personal data [4] are all granted by the Information Technology Rules. Data subjects also have the right to be informed about the intended recipients[5] and the entities that will retain the data. [6] The data collector has failed to perform its corresponding duty to make such disclosures and has arguably limited the control of data subjects over their privacy.

If this is what other UID registrations are like, then perhaps it is time to modify the process of data handling and processing. The law should be implemented better and amended to enable better implementation either through greater state intervention or severe liability when personal information is improperly handled.

[1] R.4(3)(d) of the Information Technology (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data or Information) Rules, 2011.

[2] R. 4(3)(b) Information Technology (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data or Information) Rules, 2011.

[3] R. 4(7) Information Technology (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data or Information) Rules, 2011.

[4] R. 4 (7) Information Technology (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data or Information) Rules, 2011.

[5] R. 4 (3) (c) Information Technology (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data or Information) Rules, 2011.

[6] R.4(3)(d) Information Technology (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data or Information) Rules, 2011.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/uid-a-data-subjects-registration-tale

UID Research

vanya — 2016-01-03T09:59:27Z

The Centre Internet and Society, India has been researching privacy policy in India since the year 2010 with the following objectives.

Researching the vision and implementation of the UID Scheme - both from a technical and regulatory perspective.
Understanding the validity and legality of collection, usage and storage of Biometric information for this scheme.
Raising public awareness around issues concerning privacy, data security and the objectives of the UID Scheme.

The UID scheme seeks to provide all residents of India an identity number based on their biometrics that can be used to authenticate individuals for the purpose of Government benefits and services. A 2015 Supreme Court ruling has clarified that the UID can only be used in the PDS and LPG Schemes.

Concerns with the scheme include the broad consent taken at the time of enrolment, the lack of clarity as to what happens with transactional metadata, the centralized storage of the biometric information in the CIDR, the seeding of the aadhaar number into service providers’ databases, and the possibility of function creep. Also, there are concerns due to absence of a legislation to look into the privacy and security concerns.

UID Research -

1. Ramifications of Aadhar and UID schemes -

The UID and Aadhar systems have been bombarded with criticisms and plagued with issues ranging from privacy concerns to security risks. The following articles deal with the many problems and drawbacks of these systems.

§ UID and NPR: Towards Common Ground http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/uid-npr-towards-common-ground

§ Public Statement to Final Draft of UID Bill http://bit.ly/1aGf1NN

§ UID Project in India - Some Possible Ramifications http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/uid-in-india

§ Aadhaar Number vs the Social Security Number http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/aadhaar-vs-social-security-number

§ Feedback to the NIA Bill http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-feedback-to-nia-bill

§ Unique ID System: Pros and Cons http://bit.ly/1jmxbZS

§ Submitted seven open letters to the Parliamentary Finance Committee on the UID covering the following aspects: SCOSTA Standards (http://bit.ly/1hq5Rqd), Centralized Database (http://bit.ly/1hsHJDg), Biometrics (http://bit.ly/196drke), UID Budget (http://bit.ly/1e4c2Op), Operational Design (http://bit.ly/JXR61S), UID and Transactions (http://bit.ly/1gY6B8r), and Deduplication (http://bit.ly/1c9TkSg)

§ Comments on Finance Committee Statements to Open Letters on Unique Identity: The Parliamentary Finance Committee responded to the open letters sent by CIS through an email on 12 October 2011. CIS has commented on the points raised by the Committee: http://bit.ly/1kz4H0F

§ Unique Identification Scheme (UID) & National Population Register (NPR), and Governance http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/uid-and-npr-a-background-note

§ Financial Inclusion and the UID http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/privacy_uidfinancialinclusion

§ The Aadhaar Case http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-aadhaar-case

§ Do we need the Aadhaar scheme http://bit.ly/1850wAz

§ 4 Popular Myths about UID http://bit.ly/1bWFoQg

§ Does the UID Reflect India? http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/privacy/uid-reflects-india

§ Would it be a unique identity crisis? http://cis-india.org/news/unique-identity-crisis

§ UID: Nothing to Hide, Nothing to Fear? http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/privacy/uid-nothing-to-hide-fear

2. Right to Privacy and UID -

The UID system has been hit by many privacy concerns from NGOs, private individuals and others. The sharing of one's information, especially fingerprints and retinal scans to a system that is controlled by the government and is not vetted as having good security irks most people. These issues are dealt with the in the following articles.

§ India Fears of Privacy Loss Pursue Ambitious ID Project http://cis-india.org/news/india-fears-of-privacy-loss

§ Analysing the Right to Privacy and Dignity with Respect to the UID http://bit.ly/1bWFoQg

§ Analysing the Right to Privacy and Dignity with Respect to the UID http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/privacy/privacy-uiddevaprasad

§ Supreme Court order is a good start, but is seeding necessary? http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/supreme-court-order-is-a-good-start-but-is-seeding-necessary

§ Right to Privacy in Peril http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/right-to-privacy-in-peril

3. Data Flow in the UID -

The articles below deal with the manner in which data is moved around and handled in the UID system in India.

§ UIDAI Practices and the Information Technology Act, Section 43A and Subsequent Rules http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/uid-practices-and-it-act-sec-43-a-and-subsequent-rules

§ Data flow in the Unique Identification Scheme of India http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/data-flow-in-unique-identification-scheme-of-india

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/uid-research

UID Project in India - Some Possible Ramifications

Liliyan — 2012-03-21T10:13:27Z

Having a standard for decentralized ID verification rather than a centralized database that would more often than not be misused by various authorities will solve ID problems, writes Liliyan in this blog entry. These blog posts to be published in a series will voice the expert opinions of researchers and critics on the UID project and present its unique shortcomings to the reader.

Researchers at CIS have been grappling with the UID project from research, advocacy, and legal standpoints though all approach it from their own perspective and opinions are rarely duplicated. In an attempt to make their expert opinions more accessible to readers, a series of blog posts, this being the first, will be put up. These posts will not, and cannot because of its length and format, try to address all the possible issues the UID poses. However, they will present the bare bones of the arguments and research questions that the independent voices at CIS see as crucial. These posts will also ask many more questions than they answer, in an attempt to spur further dialogue about the UID project.

Central to understanding the nature of the UID project and its possible ramifications is the idea that technology is not merely a tool to be used by an unchanging, monolithic state. In fact, its very adoption can create ripple effects throughout the apparatus of the state. When the state adoptsa mainstream and ubiquitous technology, the structure of the government and methods of governance change. These changes are not always so dramatic as to be immediately noticeable without some informed inspection, but if one considers the way the state and the citizen interact the significance of these changes becomes starkly apparent. Can we trust the government to use touch screen voting machines like the ones we see every day at the bank? Do government surveillance cameras make us safer or introduce worrisome intrusion into our privacy, or both? Technology is not as neutral as it appears. That is not to say that it is inherently good or bad, but that it is not inert, it is transformative in nature.

The nation state as we know it is built on the printed word, or at least analogue technology. The ways in which we codify, distribute, and assimilate information have, for centuries, been dominated by the printing press. With the introduction of “database governance” there will inevitably be a shift, and a radical one at that. The Indian government has announced its intention to move towards “SMART” (simple, moral, accountable, responsive and transparent) governance, and this implies both an acceptance of the neo-liberal philosophy of government and techno-governance. To achieve a new level of transparency, accountability, and responsiveness, the move towards e-governance could be a major turning point, but how does this shift complicate and change the citizen-state relationship in India? How does this change shift the relationship of India with the rest of the international community?

The UID and Shifts in the Citizen-State Relationship

One way that the citizen-state relationship will change with the shift towards techno-governance, specifically in regard to the UID project, is that the UID posits the state as both the safe-keeper and arbiter of identity. Proponents of the UID project are adamant that it is a voluntary program, but even the UID website states that “in time, certain service providers may require a person to have a UID to deliver services”. As the UID becomes increasingly ubiquitous, could not having a number mean being cut off from some or many of the basic privileges of citizenship if one's identity is becoming more difficult to verify? If having a UID number is the most prominent marker of identity, then it is through state definition, arbitration and upon the state's technical capacity that all will rely.

Moreover, how do we begin to address the privacy issues raised by technological advances in relation to non-changing legal structures? What does it mean to capture all this identity data without introducing a new privacy legislation to protect the citizen? Without new legal accommodation, otherwise benign processes like a statistical census can become a potent tool in a shift towards a police state. As state apparatus's shift, there must be some paradigmatic shift in law to accompany these new technologies and government roles.

If the state transforms through the integration of e-governance forms, then there will inevitably be a recalibration of the relationship between the state, the market, and the citizen. Traditionally the separation of these entities creates arbitration and within a development paradigm there is dynamic, active triangulation. One way we can see this triangulation is through government intervention in markets on behalf of the citizen. There are certain spaces of consumption, for example, such as a cinema where state intervention against discrimination creates a marker for citizenship. That is, because I am able to access a cinema without discrimination, as one of my constitutional rights, this demonstrates my citizenship. However, with the introduction of public- private partnerships, or PPPs, the fact of having multiple stake-holders of political economy allows for the state to disinvest in the production and delivery of certain public services. Satisfying the needs of the citizen for services like sanitation, public education, delivery of power and clean water, maintenance of infrastructure like roads and bridges, can be handed over to corporate entities. The Indian government has enthusiastically embraced PPPs as a way to bring needed capital to the infrastructure demands that accompany their economic growth goals. However, how does this kind of task delegation affect transparency and accountability? If the state decides to stop producing or supplying a good or service, and instead turns this over to a corporation, can the mechanisms for state oversight realistically be trusted to make sure quality and accountability are not adversely affected and rectify the situation if they are? Where does the citizen come into all of this, in terms of what they stand to gain and lose?

The Definition of Citizenship and the UID

As the state and the market enters into new relationships the definition of citizenship changes. If the citizen is seen as the intended beneficiary of state programs, this new relationship between state and market begs the question “Who is subject to (or the subject of) the state?” When the corporate sphere creates micro-financing that helps farmers, they may help the people at the bottom of the economic pyramid manage their debt, but does it necessarily address the problems that created the debt in the first place? How does the market mediate the citizen-state dialogue? As the state and the market enter into new relationships there is a recalibration of the citizen-government relationship. Do market demands for an e-literate consumer put pressure on the state to create one where one did not exist before, and if so, can this not have profound implications for the definition of citizenship?

Part of the movement towards e-governance is signalled by the fact that there has been a shift away from state-sponsored literacy campaigns to e-literacy programs. Does this use of information and communications technology for development (or ITC4D) alienate significant portions of the population? Can such programs in fact widen the digital divide? With the introduction of e-governance the state asks the citizen to participate in governance by creating new avenues for civic participation, such as providing databases of information pertaining to the state that is freely accessible for analysis and manipulation by anyone with the skills to do so. But, if this makes it impossible for some portions of the citizenry to communicate effectively with the state, does this run the risk of making certain, traditional forms of citizenship redundant? How are people with low literacy and little or no access to the necessary technologies supposed to communicate with this new high-tech bureaucracy? Will those who cannot navigate the new systems be inadvertently relegated to second-class status?

This is of particular concern when thinking about the UID project. To properly manage and distribute social services, ID management in some form is crucial. However, when trying to make sure services are properly delivered to the uneducated poor the danger for digital-analogue slippage that is not in their favour increases, and accountability is not necessarily adequately addressed. For example, if I am an illiterate farmer entitled to a certain ration and the person conducting the transaction decides to defraud me, they can easily ask me to authenticate my biometrics, make it appear that they have been simply checking my identity when they have actually fooled me into authenticating the “completed” transaction and simply tell me the computer says, I've already received my share, that I'm only entitled to half of the normal amount, or some other such lie. In this scenario, how would I know this person wasn't telling me the truth? If they lie using a simple ledger, I can take the ledger itself or a copy of it to a literate friend and have them help me navigate the situation. I can seek redress and substantiate my claims more easily if I am not alienated by the technologies being used. Technologies can be empowering or dis-empowering depending on their application. How then, do we balance the demands of the market and the duties of the state against the rights of the citizen? Or rather, how do we apply technology in such a way that the demands of the market and the duties of the state mutually balance each other?

Centralization and Cost-effectiveness of the UID

While ID management is indisputably important, it does not require a centralized database. In the US there are multiple pieces of information, stored in separate databases that can be used to authenticate a transaction. No one can open a bank account with just a social security insurance number. You also need a separate form of ID, often two, that can be used to verify identity. In this way, the SSI number is a bit like a “username” and the other forms of ID, driver's license or passport, function like a corresponding “password”. With the UID project, however, the “username” (the number itself) and the “password” (the number holder's biometrics) are stored in the same place. Thereby, should the database be in some way compromised, all the information needed to verify and complete transactions would be available. If storing this information in a central database is really a good idea, then one must also accept the premise that merging all existing email servers into one monolithic server is also a good idea. Furthermore, centralization is not only more dangerous, it is totally unnecessary. Trillions of dollars worth of trade take place every year using PIN numbers issued by banks and verified without the verifying data being centralized. Having a standard for decentralized ID verification, rather than a centralized database would solve ID problems without creating a database that would be vulnerable to attack.

There are lots of examples of governments implementing costly safety measures that don't actually make anyone safer. Take for example the cameras put up all over London to monitor the movements of people. Unfortunately, something as low-tech as a hooded sweatshirt can thwart these attempts at surveillance. Moreover, if I am a criminal, I am going to make it a priority to know where the cameras are so that I can strategically avoid them. Another example is the millions of dollar the U.S. government spent on putting an armed Federal Air Marshal on every flight, post 9/11. While traditional intelligence gather has thwarted other attempted attacks since 9/11, Air Marshals have not been responsible for stopping any. Simply because the UID project is more technologically advanced does not make it more effective. It seems to greatly increase the risk of fraud that there can be so many separate biometrics machines scattered in different places to verify so many transactions. Having the machines sequestered in private businesses where they will not be constantly monitored or regulated seems to be both costly and easily subject to tampering. It seems to make more sense to have, say, one central, monitored machine per so many people that could be used to settle identity disputes when they arise rather than making the technology a part of every transaction.

Infallibility and Circumvention of the UID

The UID is not infallible and circumvention will certainly be a problem with the project. We find an analogy in the field of digital rights management. If I copy an mp3 without permission or payment, that is illegal. Digital rights management law was introduced to stop this practice, but it was circumvented. This legislation has not stopped the first crime. It has merely created a second, that of circumventing the law. The UID, in so far as it may be used to try to stop the crime of illegally siphoning resources such as, for example, grain intended to go to the poor, cannot stop people from circumventing the system. Circumventing the UID will be a crime. If doing so were truly impossible there would be no need to criminalize it. So, instead of preventing the initial crime of siphoning may not prevent the first crime, while introducing another.

There are basically two possible types of circumvention that are possible, though they might present themselves in various different forms. “Type A” or “the Mission Impossible” kind of fraud might involve fake thumb prints and contact lenses being worn by someone trying to fool the person conducting the biometric authentication. “Type B” occurs when the person operating the biometrics machine is working to defraud the system, most likely with one or many accomplices.

“Type A” involves one dishonest person, who is trying to access someone else's account or a ghost account, and there are various proposed methods to prevent against this type of fraud. To prevent against people using fake thumb prints, the biometrics machines will measure the heat of the thumb as well as the image of the thumb. With the iris scan, there will be a pulse of light to cause contraction in the iris so that a contact lens, which cannot adjust for light, can be detected. All of this will drastically raise the price of the machines in question. It is hard to imagine farmers and labourers defrauding the system with elaborate biometric defrauding devices, so these expensive machines are much more appropriate for monitoring the top of the economic pyramid, who steal in larger sums and have more sophisticated technology at their disposal.

“Type B” involves dishonesty either by the person in control of the biometric authentication, or both that person and others. This seems to be a much more likely and problematic scenario. Right now, bank accounts that are not connected to a name are regularly created so that people can cheat the tax man. Since the bank profits from these accounts, it's in the bank's interest to help people set up such accounts. Ghost ID numbers, and things like bank accounts that are connected to them, can still be produced with biometrics. How is this possible? Well, to make it possible for so many biometric authentications to happen every day, the whole set of ten finger prints won't be sent. That would be way too much data. So, instead of overwhelming the channels, only one thumb print will be sent. Even that many thumb prints would be an information overload, so each thumb print's image will be reduced to a set of 30 data points that will be compared against the original scans. So, where is there a possibility for fraud? When the scan of the finger is taken, and image is rendered. If someone wants to create a ghost ID they only have to manipulate this image, like with a Photoshop filter, and alter the data points. Once I've created a set of biometric markers that doesn't connect to anyone, I can conduct transactions for a ghost. One can easily imagine a market emerging for ghost IDs. People might start trying to pay foreign tourists for their biometric information, which could be sold to a local office. There are certain settings where biometrics works well, for example, at an airport. There, everything is under constant video surveillance. If someone were to tamper with or try to replace the machinery it would be quickly noticed by the cameras. Even if it weren't, different people would routinely be operating the same machine and this would be an added safe guard against fraud. However, at a bank, or any place where the machines used for verification are operated behind closed doors it is quite likely that the technology will be abused. This abuse could easily go unnoticed, because the draft UID bill has proposed strict accountability measures for the Authority, and has conveniently overlooked extending these to collecting and enrolling agencies.

Digital/Analogue Slippage

There is always the possibility of digital/analogue slippage or, more simply put, the computer records not reflecting what actually happened even if no fake identity was used. This happens all the time in IT buildings in the form of tailgating. Four people go out to lunch together and as they re-enter the building they're supposed to each swipe their ID card individually. It is easier and faster for one person to swipe for everyone so, despite signs discouraging this behaviour, this is a common occurrence. If you were to try to analyse the data collected after a day of such comings and goings it would be indecipherable.

I can also authenticate my biometrics, in order to authorize a transaction, without the transaction actually being complete. Let's say I'm a poor farmer entitled to a ration of 10 kilos of grain. The person who is supposed to give me the grain is not an honest person and insists that I authenticate the transaction before he or she gives me my ration. I do what I'm told but only receive 5 kilos. The computer record shows that I have gotten my full ration, so I have no grounds to contest. In this scenario, more complex technology does not necessarily mean greater accountability. Furthermore, even if I am illiterate, if there is a simple ledger that has recorded the transaction, I can physically take the ledger or a copy of it and show it to some literate person willing to help me. If the only record of the transaction is in a database that I can't access or can't understand it will be even more difficult for me to seek help. Moreover, if I don't understand the technology and the shop owner decides not to give me the grain at all they can simply say “Oh, I'm sorry, your account has been denied” or “The computer says you've already been given your ration” and I have little chance of successfully negotiating that situation. Built in to this example is the disadvantage that the illiterate and the computer illiterate face when dealing with this technology but, this is not necessarily always present in cases where digital/analogue slippage causes confusion or complication.

Commonly, things are bought by or registered to one person and used by another. For example, in a small office building, all the phone lines and computers may have been bought in the name of one person. Each office worker will not buy their own computer or equipment, but instead the computers will be bought in the name of the person who runs the organization or an administrator with financial authority. If someone in the office uses their computer to make a bomb or store child pornography, who is accountable? This is the problem when there is digital/analogue slippage. There is the digital record of events and then things as they really are, which are not always identical, and there is no accountability or safeguard against mistake. In the context of the UID, the possibility of such slippage is too high, and will work against the goal of delivering benefits to the poor instead of facilitating it.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/uid-in-india

UID project draws flak from civil rights activists

praskrishna — 2011-04-02T12:26:20Z

The unique identification project is drawing a flak from civil rights activists.

The unique identification project drew flak from civil liberties activists in the city on Wednesday. "Unique identification is an encroachment of privacy. With the new technology, it will be easy to track people," members of Citizens Against UID / Aashar, a forum floated by those opposing the project, including PUCL and SICHREM, said. They said the project should not be implemented until people's participation was ensured.

Read the original article in DNA

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/UID-project-draws-flak